Full opinion text
ORDER (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFF EDGMON AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFF GUILLERMETY; AND (2) GRANTING, SUA SPONTE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFF GUILLERMETY’S CLAIMS BORMAN, District Judge. This is a case concerning the administrative offset of Plaintiffs’ Social Security benefits by the Secretary of Treasury, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3716, to collect outstanding student loan balances owed to the United States. The Court, by order dated March 28, 2002, granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. Now before the Qourt is Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The motion, like the motion for preliminary injunction, presents an issue of first impression in the federal courts — the Court must decide whether the Secretary of Treasury may offset a recipient’s Social Security benefits in order to collect student loans owed to the United States which allegedly have been outstanding for more than ten years. In doing so, the Court must reconcile an apparent conflict between three statutes: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 407; (2) 31 U.S.C. § 3716; and (3) 20 U.S.C. § 1091a. The Court heard oral argument on July 30, 2002. Having considered the entire record, and for the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion with respect to Plaintiff Edgmon, and DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion with respect to Plaintiff Guillermety. Furthermore, the Court, sua sponte, GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiff Guil-lermety’s claims. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Secretary of Treasury of the United States is hereby PERMANENTLY RESTRAINED and ENJOINED from offsetting Plaintiff Edg-mon’s Social Security benefits to collect his outstanding and delinquent Federal Perkins Loan. FACTS On March 28, 2002, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. See Guillermety v. Secretary of Education, No. 01-74904 (E.D.Mich. Mar.28, 2002) (attached as Appendix A). The facts, which were largely uncontested at that time, are adequately documented in the Court’s prior order. The Government has, however, provided supplemental information, further documenting the Plaintiffs’ outstanding and delinquent loans. Plaintiff Guillermety currently has five outstanding and delinquent student loans. Loan Type Date Loan Amount Reinsurance Paid Assigned to Educ. Perkins 10/31/88 $ 750 Not Applicable 8/31/97 Perkins 1/7/91 $ 935 Not Applicable 8/31/97 Federal Stafford 12/2/85 $2,500 5/5/93 1/12/96 Federal Stafford 10/26/88 $2,500 9/23/92 12/25/96 Federal Stafford 9/4/90 $3,276 9/24/93 12/25/96 Plaintiff Edgmon currently has one outstanding and delinquent student loan — a Federal Perkins loan (original principal totaled $2,590) distributed to Plaintiff at various times during the years 1976 and 1977. The loan was assigned to the Department of Education on February 1,1990. ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted may “at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits, for a summary judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part thereof.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b). Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case on which the non-moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Of course, [the moving party] always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1536 (6th Cir.1987). A fact is “material” for purposes of a motion for summary judgment where proof of that fact “would have [the] effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties.” Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 881 (6th ed.1979)) (citations omitted). A dispute over a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Conversely, where a reasonable jury could not find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id.; Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 654 (6th Cir.1993). In making this evaluation, the court must examine the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (6th Cir.1984). If this burden is met by the moving party, the non-moving party’s failure to make a showing that is “sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial” will mandate the entry of summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986). The non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, must set forth specific facts which demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The rule requires the non-moving party to introduce “evidence of evidentiary quality” demonstrating the existence of a material fact. Bailey v. Floyd Cty. Bd. of Ed., 106 F.3d 135, 145 (6th Cir.1997); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (holding that the non-moving party must produce more than a mere scintilla of evidence to survive summary judgment). B. Law of the Case Both parties acknowledge that there is no dispute concerning the underlying facts of this case. Moreover, as noted in the Court’s prior order, the issues before the Court — issues of first impression — involve two abstract legal issues: (1) when does the statute of limitations contained in 31 U.S.C. § 3716(e)(1) — “claim under this subchapter that has been outstanding for more than 10 years” — begin to run; and (2) can the Secretary of Treasury offset a recipient’s Social Security benefits in order to collect student loans owed to the United States after the ten year period codified in section 3716(e)(1) has expired. The Court previously held that (a) the limitations period begins to run when the government’s right to collect the debt first accrues, and (b) the government may not offset a recipient’s Social Security benefits in order to collect student loans that have been outstanding for more than ten years from the date the government’s right to collect the debt first accrues. See Guillermety v. Secretary of Education, 01-74904 (E.D.Mich. Mar. 28, 2002). The same legal issues are now before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. Because briefing for the motion for summary judgment was completed at approximately the same time that the Court issued its previous decision, the parties have not addressed the “law of the ease” doctrine. However, because the legal issues are identical to those previously before the Court, the Court must determine whether law of the case is applicable in the instant case. The “law of the case” doctrine is an amorphous concept. Wilcox v. United States, 888 F.2d 1111, 1113 (6th Cir.1989). The doctrine precludes a court from reconsidering “identical” issues. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 219 F.3d 508, 512 n. 3 (6th Cir.2000); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 167 (1st Cir.1996) (“The law of the case doctrine precludes relitigation of the legal issues presented in successive stages of a single case once those issues have been decided.”). The doctrine serves to (1) prevent the continued litigation of settled issues; and (2) to assure compliance by inferior courts with the decisions of superior courts. E.E.O.C. v. United Ass’n of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of the United States and Canada, Local No. 120, 235 F.3d 244, 249 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir.1990)). However, a court must remember that the law of the case doctrine “is ‘directed to a court’s common sense’ and is not an ‘inexorable command.’ ” McKenzie, 219 F.3d at 512 n. 3; see also A.M. Capen’s Co. v. American Trading and Prod. Corp., 202 F.3d 469, 472 (1st Cir.2000) (“[T]he law of the case doctrine only directs our discretion; it does not limit our power.”). A court may reconsider a ruling if: (1) substantially different evidence is raised on subsequent trial; (2) a subsequent contrary view of the law is decided by the controlling authority; or (3) the prior decision is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. McKenzie, 219 F.3d at 512 n. 3. Moreover, as a general rule, a decision made on a party’s motion for preliminary injunction does not constitute law of the case. Wilcox, 888 F.2d at 1114. The Sixth Circuit has recognized that because motions for preliminary injunctions are generally utilized to maintain the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits, and are, thus, quickly initiated in order to preserve the status quo, “a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.” Id. at 1113. Furthermore, because preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy, plaintiffs are required to satisfy a stringent burden of persuasion — a plaintiff must establish a “strong” likelihood of success on the merits; however, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must merely create a jury issue — i.e., a genuine issue of material fact exists, irrespective of whether there is a strong likelihood that the plaintiff will ultimately succeed on the merits. Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir.2000). Thus, a decision as to the “likelihood of success” on a motion for preliminary injunction does not equate to a decision as to the “success” of the merits of a party’s claim. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 394-95, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981); Wilcox, 888 F.2d at 1114. With this in mind, the Court concludes that, as a technical matter, the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable for purposes of Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The preliminary injunction was heard on an accelerated basis, and consequently, the parties did not have a chance to completely develop all of their legal arguments at the time of the prior hearing. However, the Court also finds that most of the arguments currently before the Court, as set forth in the parties’ briefs supporting and/or opposing Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, are identical to those made during the prior hearing. In fact, Plaintiffs’ brief in support of their motion for preliminary injunction incorporated the arguments made in their motion for summary judgment — both motions were filed on February 5, 2002. (Pl.’s Br. in Support of Mtn. for Preliminary Injunction at 2 — “Plaintiffs’ claim on the merits is straightforward and presents a strictly legal issue. This argument is summarized here, but is presented in detail in Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, which is being resubmitted to the Court contemporaneously with this Motion.”). Because these arguments were carefully scrutinized by the Court, the Court reaffirms the findings and conclusions made in its March 28, 2002 Order- — attached as Appendix A. Simply stated, the Court, after reviewing the entire record, finds no reason to reverse its previous holding. In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ supplemental arguments concerning the statute of limitations as contained in 31 U.S.C. § 3716(e)(1). C. 31 U.S.C. § 3716(e)(1) — Claims Outstanding for More than 10 Years 31 U.S.C. § 3716(e)(1) provides: “This section does not apply (1) to a claim under this subchapter that has been outstanding for more than 10 years.” The Court previously held that this limitations period begins to run when the government’s right to collect the debt first accrues. See Guiller-mety, supra at 734 - 736. Plaintiffs disagree with this conclusion, arguing that the Court’s construction of the term “claim” is inconsistent with prior precedent interpreting the federal priority statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3713 — Plaintiffs contend that the priority statute has interpreted the term to extended to claims or debts even if they are not currently held by the United States. (PL’s Supplemental Br. at 2, 8 — “Student loans under the loan programs at issue here qualify as ‘claims’ from the inception of the debt.”). Plaintiffs also argue that the Treasury regulation relied upon by this Court — 31 C.F.R. § 901.3(a)(4) — is inconsistent with other language contained in the statute. In particular, Plaintiffs believe that the term “outstanding” refers to loans that are not past due and have not yet been assigned to the United States — i.e., the statute of limitations begins to run when the loan funds are distributed to the student. 1. “Claim” Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3716 Plaintiffs are correct in one respect — the normal rule of statutory construction dictates that when Congress uses identical words in two different places in a statute, the words are usually read to mean the same thing in both places. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250, 116 S.Ct. 647, 133 L.Ed.2d 611 (1996). This is buttressed by 31 U.S.C. § 3701(b)(1), which states that in Subchapter II, “claim” shall mean “any amount of funds or property ... owed to the Untied States.” However, the cases interpreting section 3713 counsel against, rather than in favor of Plaintiffs’ interpretation. Section 3713 provides: A claim of the United States Government shall be paid first when— (A) a person indebted to the Government is insolvent and— (i) the debtor without enough property to pay all debts makes a voluntary assignment of property; (ii) property of the debtor, if absent, is attached; or (Hi) an act of bankruptcy is committed; or (B) the estate of a deceased debtor, in the custody of the executor or administrator, is not enough to pay all debts of the debtor. 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a)(1).' Thus, the government is entitled to priority if (1) a debt is due to the United States Government; (2) by a person who is insolvent; and (3) that person either voluntarily assigns property, an absent debtor has his or her property attached, or an act of bankruptcy is committed. Cerilli v. Newport Offshore, Ltd., 624 A.2d 835, 838 (R.I.1993) (citing In re Metzger, 709 F.2d 32, 33-34 (9th Cir.1983)). Furthermore, it is clear that the debt owed to the government must be in existence at the time the insolvent debtor assigns the property, an absent debtor has his or her property attached, or an act of bankruptcy occurs. Id.; see also United States v. Brocato, 403 F.2d 105, 108-09 (5th Cir.1968) (“All of the authority with which this Court is familiar requires the United States, or its agencies, have either actual legal title to the debt, or ‘beneficial ownership’ of the debt prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.”). Government claims, which are wholly contingent upon happenings after the act of bankruptcy, do not constitute claims under the priority statute. In Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 68 S.Ct. 747, 92 L.Ed. 968 (1948), the United States Supreme Court stated in dicta: “And it is at least doubtful on the statute’s wording that obligations wholly . contingent for ultimate maturity and obligation upon the happening of events after insolvency can be said to fall within the reach of ‘debts due’ as of the time of insolvency.” Id. at 626-27, 68 S.Ct. 747. This statement was clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1975 — fixed but unliquidated debts constitute claims of the government for purposes of the priority statute. See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 77, 96 S.Ct. 310, 46 L.Ed.2d 219 (1975). In Moore, the debtor defaulted on a government contract prior to insolvency. Id. at 78, 96 S.Ct. 310. However, the precise amount of the government’s claim was not set until after the act of bankruptcy occurred. Id. at 79, 96 .S.Ct. 310. After citing the above passage from Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Court stated: “But the obligation here, and in the cases cited, was fixed and independent of ‘events after insolvency’; only the precise amount of that obligation awaited future events.” Id. at 85, 96 S.Ct. 310. This holding is entirely consistent with this Court’s interpretation of the word “claim.” The priority statute is only applicable to fixed debts owed to the United States government at the time the act of bankruptcy occurs. While the debt may be unliquidated — i.e., the debt is not a sum certain — there clearly must be a fixed debt owed to the United States government at the time of the act of bankruptcy. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, this does not support the conclusion that a debt can be a claim of the United States “even if the debt is not yet owed to, or enforceable by, the United States.” (PL’s Supplemental Br. at 2.) As noted by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island: If at the time of the act of bankruptcy or other event that triggers the statute a person owed a debt to the United States, with only the amount of the debt uncertain and unliquidated, the United States is entitled to priority. If, however, the existence of the debt obligation is dependent on events that occur after the act of bankruptcy, the United States is not entitled to priority pursuant to § 3713(a). Cerilli, 624 A.2d at 839. Clearly, only fixed debts that are owed to the United States qualify for priority under 31 U.S.C. § 3713. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Small Bus. Admin. v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446, 81 S.Ct. 191, 5 L.Ed.2d 200 (1960), is misplaced. There, a $20,000 loan was made to the debtor. Id. at 447, 81 S.Ct. 191. Of this amount, $5,000 came from a private bank, and $15,000 came directly from the United States Treasury. Id. Thus, the SBA was not acting as a guarantor' — it directly funded 75% of the total loan amount. Thereafter, an involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed against the debtor. Id. at 447-48, 81 S.Ct. 191. The Court held that the government was entitled to priority. The Court found this conclusion to be consistent with prior precedent — priority only attaches to those debts owing to the United States on the date of commencement of bankruptcy proceedings and not debts that come into existence after that date: But this requirement ... is fully met here by virtue of the fact that the debt due the Administration arises out of the loan made jointly by the bank and the United States nine months prior to the petition in bankruptcy. Such beneficial ownership of three-fourths of the debt for which priority is asserted belonged to the Administration from the date of the loan, it is immaterial that formal assignment of the note evidencing the debt was not made by the bank until after the filing of the petition. Id. at 450, 81 S.Ct. 191. Unlike McClellan, the government did not have beneficial ownership of the student loans at issue until the loans were assigned to the Department of Education and/or when the Department of Education paid the reinsurance obligation. As noted in the Court’s March 28, 2002 Order, Federal Stafford and PLUS loans are originated by private lending institutions such as banks and credit unions. The loans are insured by guaranty agencies, generally state and nonprofit private institutions. The guaranty agency only has a contractual right against the United States for reimbursement with respect to losses on the unpaid principal balance and accrued interest on the loan. Thus, the Department of Education does not have a beneficial ownership in the private student loan until the guaranty agency exercises its contractual right for reimbursement on a defaulted student loan. Similarly, Federal Perkins loans are made directly by the debtor’s college or university. While the federal government provides initial contributions to help capitalize a university’s loan fund, the government does not have a right to amounts owed on loans made — amounts owed are repayable solely to the college or university. The Department of Education only obtains beneficial ownership of the loan if the college or university, in its discretion, voluntarily chooses to refer, transfer, or assign the loan for collection. Two cases illustrate the distinction. See United States v. Marxen, 307 U.S. 200, 59 S.Ct. 811, 83 L.Ed. 1222 (1939) and United States v. Brocato, 403 F.2d 105 (5th Cir.1968); see also Lakeshore Apartments, Inc. v. United States, 351 F.2d 349, 353 (9th Cir.1965); City of New York v. United States, 414 F.Supp. 90, 92 (E.D.N.Y.1975). In Marxen, a California bank made a loan to a brewing company. Marxen, 307 U.S. at 201, 59 S.Ct. 811. The California bank was insured by the Federal Housing Administrator (“FHA”). Id. at 201 & n. 1, 59 S.Ct. 811. Under the insurance contract, the bank had to wait 60 days after default before making a claim with the FHA. Id. at 201, 59 S.Ct. 811. The brewing company defaulted on the loan on February 2, 1937 and filed for bankruptcy on April 5, 1937. Id. The bank, however, did not present the claim to the FHA until July 3, 1937 — the claim was ultimately paid by the FHA on August 4, 1937. Id. The United States sought priority in bankruptcy pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 191. Id. at 201-202, 59 S.Ct. 811. The United States Supreme Court held that the government was not entitled to priority. Id. at 207-08, 59 S.Ct. 811. The Court held: “We are of the view that [the priority statute] is inapplicable to general claims in bankruptcy transferred to the United States, or to which it has become subrogated on payment, after the filing of the petition for the reason that the rights of creditors are fixed by the Bankruptcy Act as of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.” Id. at 207, 59 S.Ct. 811. Thus, the Court held that the debt was not a claim of the United States for priority purposes until the United States paid its insurance obligation — mere insurance by the government of a private loan did not give rise to a claim under the priority statute. Similarly, in Brocato, the Gateway National Bank made a loan to the debtor. Brocato, 403 F.2d at 107. The Small Business Association (“SBA”) acted as a guaranty — (1) the bank could require the SBA to purchase 85% of the indebtedness if the borrower was in default for 90 days; or (2) the commencement of bankruptcy effectuated an automatic, simultaneous assignment to the SBA, and the obligation of the SBA to pay the bank 85% of the indebtedness would arise. Id. The debtor filed bankruptcy on December 29, 1964 — the note was formally assigned to the SBA on January 4, 1965. Id. at 108. The SBA filed a claim in bankruptcy, alleging priority status. Id. The Fifth Circuit noted that the United States must have “either actual legal title to the debt, or ‘beneficial ownership’ of the debt prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition.” Id. The Court distinguished McClellan, where the SBA actually supplied three-fourths of the money loaned. Id. at 109. Thus, because the SBA did not have legal title to the note or beneficial ownership prior to the filing of bankruptcy, the United States was not entitled to priority. Id. at 109,110. Consequently, contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, the Court concludes that the construction of the term “claim” in the priority statute -31 U.S.C. § 3713 — is consistent with that previously determined by this Court. 2. “Claims ... Outstanding” under the Statute Plaintiffs also dispute the Court’s previous reliance on Treasury Regulation 31 C.F.R. § 901.3(a)(4) — which defines the term “outstanding.”. The regulation states: Unless otherwise provided by law, administrative offset of payments under the authority of 31 U.S.C. § 3716 to collect a debt may not be conducted more than 10 years after the Government’s right to collect the debt first accrued, unless facts material to the Government’s right were not known and could not reasonably have been known by the official or officials of the Government who were charged with the responsibility to discover and collect such debts. This limitation does not apply to debts reduced to a judgment. C.F.R. § 901.3(a)(4) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs argue that this regulation, which interprets the term “outstanding”, is unreasonable because Congress understood outstanding debts to refer to debts that were not in a delinquent status. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that a claim is outstanding for purposes of the statute of limitation as soon as the loan is distributed to the student. The Court, once again, disagrees. Because the Court holds that the government may not administratively offset a federal payment until a debt is owed to the United States, common sense dictates that the statute of limitations should not begin to run until that time. If Plaintiffs’ interpretation is accepted by the Court, the statute of limitations may expire before a student has defaulted on a loan, or in a rare instance, before a student is even required to begin repayment of his or her student loan. Repayment of a student loan does not begin until one’s academic career is completed. Furthermore, repayment of student loans may be deferred for numerous reasons (e.g., economic hardship, enrollment in a graduate fellowship program, continuing enrollment in an eligible school on a half-time basis, etc.). Thus, if a student received a Federal Stafford Loan during her freshman year, took 4 years to graduate, and received a thirty-six month deferral for economic hardship, repayment of her first year Stafford Loan would not begin until approximately eight years had elapsed on the statute of limitations. As noted in the Court’s March 28, 2002 Order and infra, such a result appears to be at odds with the language of the offset provision and Congress’ intent in providing for administrative offsets. The Treasury regulation in this case is a permissible construction of the statute. If a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, a court must determine if the agency regulation is a permissible construction of the statute. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291-92, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988); Mid-America Care Foundation v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638, 642 (6th Cir.1998). Statutory language contained in section 3716 supports the Department of Treasury’s conclusion that the statute of limitation begins to run when the government’s right to collect the debt first accrues. Section 3716(a) provides that an administrative offset may only be utilized after the debtor has been provided with written notice of the claim, is given an opportunity to examine the government records and have a review of the agency decision, and is afforded an opportunity to enter into a repayment plan. As noted by the government, this language supports the agency’s conclusion that the administrative offset provision applies to debts in default. The conclusion is buttressed by section 3716(c)(7). This subsection provides that after an administrative offset has occurred, the government must provide notice of the occurrence of an offset to satisfy the “past due legally enforceable debt.” Thus, the agency interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute. The agency’s interpretation is also supported by the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 2415. As noted by the Government, sections 3716 and 2415 were amended at the same time. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) provides that actions for money damages based in contract “shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action accrues.” Section 2415(i), however, provides: “The provisions of this section shall not prevent the United States or an officer or agency thereof from collecting any claim of the United States by means of administrative offset, in accordance with section 3716 of title 31.” According to the Senate Report discussing the Debt Collection Act: Section 9 allows collection of delinquent debts owed the government by administrative offset beyond the six-year statute of limitations. Many overdue debts owed the government are now or will be six years old before offset becomes possible. The Justice Department has determined that the six-year statute of limitations prevents the government from collecting debts over six years old by means of offset, thus, the government will be unable to collect a just debt for many debtors because the statute of limitations has run out. For example, the Civil Service Code, 5 U.S.C. § 5514, allows federal agencies to set off a federal employee’s retirement pay in cases where he has not paid a federal claim. However, if more than six years passes between the default and retirement, the government will be unable to set off the employee’s retirement pay. This revision to section 2415 would allow administrative offset of delinquent debts owed the government against future payments benefits, or nontax refunds due the delinquent debtor beyond the six-year statute of limitations. S. Rep. No. 97-378, at 16-17 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3377, 3392-93 (emphasis added). Thus, this legislative history indicates (1) that the administrative offset provision applied to delinquent debt and (2) Congress sought to extend the government’s ability to administratively offset federal payments that might not arise until after the six-year statute of limitations contained in section 2415 had expired — i.e., governmental retirement benefits or tax refunds. This history strongly supports the agency’s interpretation. Consequently, the Court reaffirms its prior holding that the limitations period begins to run when the government’s right to collect the debt first accrues. 3. Conclusion The Court, therefore, reaffirms its prior conclusion. (See Appendix A — Part C.l). The 10-year statute of limitations begins to run when the government’s right to collect the debt first accrues. As such, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff Guillermety. The Treasury offset of Plaintiff Guillermety’s Social Security benefits in 1991 was not more than 10 years from the date the government’s right to collect the debt first accrued. Consistent with this conclusion, the Court, sua sponte, grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiff Guillermety’s claims. According to the Sixth Circuit, “although ‘a district court should only enter summary judgment in the absence of a cross-motion with great caution ... the fact that the nonmoving party has not filed its own summary judgment motion does not preclude the entry of summary judgment if otherwise appropriate.’ ” Shelby County Health Care Corp. v. Southern Council of Indus. Workers Health and Welfare Trust, 203 F.3d 926, 932 (6th Cir.2000) (citing In re Century Offshore Mgmt. Corp., 119 F.3d 409, 412 (6th Cir.1997)); see also Markva v. Haveman, 168 F.Supp.2d 695, 706-07 (E.D.Mich.2001) (“Thus, when a party has moved for summary judgment, and the Court agrees that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, but believes that judgment as a matter of law is appropriate for the non-moving party, the Court is free to so declare.”). For example, in In re Century Offshore Mgmt. Corp, supra, the Sixth Circuit held that a sua sponte grant of summary judgment to the non-moving party was proper where the parties had fully briefed the determinative issue and the parties conceded that there were no facts at issue. Id. at 412. Similarly, here, the material facts are not eon-tested by the parties. Furthermore, the dispute in this case solely involves a legal issue, an issue which has been extensively briefed by the parties as part of the motion for preliminary injunction and the current motion for summary judgment. Consequently, the Court concludes, based on the analysis supra, that summary judgment must be granted in favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiff Guillermety’s claims. D. 20 U.S.C. § 1091a Does Not Eliminate the Statute of Limitations Contained in 31 U.S.C. §„3716(e)(1) With Respect to the Administrative Offset of Social Security Benefits to Collect Outstanding and Delinquent Student Loans Plaintiff Edgmon’s Federal Perkins Loan was assigned to the Department of Education on February 1, 1990. As such, the Treasury’s offset of Edgmon’s Social Security benefits in September, 2001 was clearly more than 10 years from the date the loan became a claim of the United States. The Government’s response to Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment sets forth the same arguments as that made when opposing Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. The Government argues that Plaintiffs’ claim must fail because the 1996 amendment to section 3716 did not implicitly repeal the 1991 amendment to 20 U.S.C. § 1091a. The Court reaffirms its analysis and the legal conclusion reached in Part C.2 of the March 28, 2002 Order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. (See Appendix A — pages 18-31.) The Court holds that the government may not offset a recipient’s Social Security benefits in order to collect student loans that have been outstanding for more than ten years from the date the government’s right to collect the debt first accrued. Plaintiff Edgmon’s motion for summary judgment is therefore GRANTED. The Secretary of Treasury is hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3716(e)(1), from offsetting Plaintiff Edgmon’s Social Security benefits to collect his outstanding and delinquent Federal Perkins Loan. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion with respect to Plaintiff Edgmon, and DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion with respect to Plaintiff Guillermety. Furthermore, the Court, sua sponte, GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiff Guil-lermety’s claims. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Secretary of Treasury of the United States is hereby PERMANENTLY RESTRAINED and ENJOINED from offsetting Plaintiff Edg-mon’s Social Security benefits to collect his outstanding and delinquent Federal Perkins Loan. SO ORDERED. APPENDIX A March 28, 2002. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION This is a case concerning the administrative offset of Plaintiffs’ Social Security benefits by the Secretary of Treasury, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3716, to collect outstanding student loan balances owed to the United States. Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. The motion presents an issue of first impression — the Court must decide whether the Secretary of Treasury may offset a recipient’s Social Security benefits in order to collect student loans owed to the Untied States which allegedly have been outstanding for more than ten years. In doing so, the Court must reconcile an apparent conflict between three statutes: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 407; (2) 31 U.S.C. § 3716; and (3) 20 U.S.C. § 1091a. The Court heard oral argument on March 14, 2002. Having considered the entire record, and for the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. Specifically, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion with respect to Plaintiff Edgmon, and DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion with respect to Plaintiffs Guillermety and Botta. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, until further Order of the Court, the Secretary of Treasury of the United States is hereby RESTRAINED and ENJOINED from undertaking any administrative offset of Plaintiff Glenn D. Edgmon’s Social Security benefits to collect his outstanding Federal Perkins Loan. The Court notes that this ruling does not prevent the United States from suing Plaintiff Edgmon for his debt, and if successful, securing a judgment against him for the sums at issue. BACKGROUND A. The Plaintiffs Plaintiffs Livia Guillermety (“Guillermety”), Glenn Edgmon (“Edgmon”) and Fiore Botta (“Botta”) currently receive Social Security retirement benefits from the United States government. Plaintiff Guillermety is sixty-five years old. (Compl. ¶ 4.) She lives on a fixed income-relying primarily upon Social Security benefits of approximately $1,117 per month ($13,400 per year). (Id.) These funds are used for Guillermety’s basic necessities, including food, rent, utilities, and transportation, as well as for uninsured medical and dental expenses. (Pl.’s Prelim. Inj. Mot. at 6.) Guillermety also earns approximately $200 per week ($10,400 before taxes annually) as a housekeeper. (Guillermety affidavit ¶ 2.) Plaintiff Edgmon is sixty-five years old, and is currently 'confined to a wheelchair. (Compl. ¶ 5; Pl.’s Prelim. Inj. Mot. at 4.) His sole source of income is Social Security retirement benefits of approximately $849 per month (approximately $10,200 per year). (Id.) Edgmon uses this money for basic necessities — food, utilities, rent, insurance, clothing, and uninsured medical expenses. (Edgmon Affidavit at ¶ 6.) Because he is confined to a wheelchair, Mr. Edgmon often relies on the Internet to obtain food and groceries. (Pl.’s Prelim. Inj. Mot. at 4.) Plaintiff Botta is seventy-seven years old. His primary source of income is monthly Social Security retirement benefits of $991 (approximately $12,000 per year). (CompU 6.) He also receives income from two small pensions totaling $173 per month (approximately $2,100 annually). (PL’s Prelim. Inj. Mot. at 5.) Botta has survived several serious medical conditions, including stomach cancer, cataract surgery, and heart surgery. (Botta Affidavit at ¶ 4.) Like Guillermety and Edgmon, Botta relies upon his Social Security retirement benefits to meet his most basic needs. (Id. ¶ 5.) In fact, Botta’s fixed expenses for basic necessities — rent (shared apartment), utilities, gas, insurance and groceries — total approximately $975 per month. (Id. ¶ 6.) This figure does not include the cost of Botta’s uninsured prescription medication — $300 every ninety-days. (Id. ¶ 7.) Botta has been forced to stagger payments in order to pay his bills. (Id. ¶ 5.) B. Plaintiffs’ Student Loans and the Government’s Administrative Offset Beginning in late 2001, the Department of Treasury, at the request of the Department of Education, began to offset a portion of Plaintiffs’ monthly Social Security retirement benefits, pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvement Act — 31 U.S.C. § 3716, in order to collect amounts due the United States. Specifically, monies were administratively offset in order to collect outstanding and delinquent student loans assigned to the Department of Education. 1. Plaintiff Guillermety Plaintiff Guillermety’s outstanding student loans allegedly arose from her studies at the University of Detroih-Mercy and St. Mary’s College in the state of Michigan. (Compl.f 14.) According to the Government, from 1985 to 1991, Guillermety took out two Federal “Perkins” loans and three Federal “Stafford” loans. (Def.’s Resp. Br. at 6-9.) Guillermety allegedly defaulted on the two Perkins loans in June and September, 1992. (Id.) The Perkins loans were assigned by the University of Detroih-Mercy to the Department of Education on November 12,1997. (Id.) Guillermety allegedly defaulted on the three Stafford loans in April 1992, August 1992, and August 1993. (Id.) The Department of Education paid its reinsurance obligation in May 1993, September 1992, and September 1993, respectively. (Id.) The Stafford loans were assigned to the Department of Education in 1996. (Id.) Guillermety’s outstanding student loan balance, including accrued interest, now totals nearly $18,000. (Id.) In September, 2001, the Secretary of Treasury, upon certification from the Department of Education, began withholding $167.55 from Guillermety’s monthly Social Security payment, imposing an administrative offset pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvement Act in order to collect Plaintiffs outstanding student loans. (Compl. ¶ 13; Def.’s Answer ¶ 13.) This amount represents 15% of her monthly Social Security payment, reducing her annual Social Security benefit to approximately $11,400. 2. Plaintiff Edgmon Plaintiff Edgmon’s outstanding student loan allegedly arose from his studies at Northeastern State University in the state of Oklahoma. (Comply 16.) Edgmon took out one Perkins loan in 1977, allegedly defaulting on the loan in November, 1978. (Def.’s Resp. Br. at 9-10.) The loan was assigned by Northeastern State University to the Department of Education in March, 1990. (Id.) The outstanding loan balance, including accrued interest and fees, now totals approximately $4,150. (Id.) Beginning in September, 2001, the Department of Treasury, upon certification from the Department of Education, began withholding $77 from Edgmon’s Social Security payment, imposing an administrative offset pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvement Act in order to collect Plaintiffs outstanding student loan. (Comply 15.) The current offset represents 12% of his monthly Social Security benefit, reducing his annual income to $9,000. 3. Plaintiff Botta Plaintiff Botta’s outstanding student loan did • not arise from his own education — instead, Botta allegedly took out a Parent Loan for Undergraduate Students (PLUS loan) in September, 1990. (Comply 18.) Botta allegedly defaulted on this loan in July, 1992. (Def.’s Resp. Br. at 10-12.) Although it is unclear when the Department of Education paid its reinsurance obligation, it could not have done so prior to April 30, 1993, the date on which the guaranty agency paid the private lender’s claim. (Id.) The loan was officially assigned to the Department of Education on December'3, 1993. (Id.) The outstanding loan balance, including accrued interest, now totals approximately $7,675. (Id.) Beginning in October, 2001, the Department of Treasury, upon certification from the Department of Education, began withholding $147.80 from Botta’s Social Security payment, imposing an administrative offset pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvement Act in order to collect Plaintiffs outstanding PLUS loan. (Comply 17.) This amount represents 15% of his monthly Social Security benefit, reducing his annual income to approximately $10,100. C. The Underlying Dispute After the Government’s administrative offsets began, each Plaintiff, through counsel, sent a letter to the Department of Education, arguing that the offset of their Social Security benefit was unlawful because their student loan balance had been outstanding for more than 10 years. (Compl.) The letters cited 42 U.S.C. § 407, which precluded the offset of Social Security benefits absent express congressional abrogation. Plaintiffs acknowledged, moreover, that 31 U.S.C. § 3Y16(c)(3)(A)(i) permitted the administrative offset of Social Security benefits. However, the letter argued that section 3716 specifically prohibited the administrative offset of claims outstanding for more than ten years: “This section does not apply (1) to a claim under this subchapter that has been outstanding for more than 10 years.” 31 U.S.C. § 3716(e)(1). Thus, according to the Plaintiffs, the administrative offsets were inappropriate because their loans were allegedly outstanding for more than ten years. The Department of Education disagreed, arguing that the ten-year statute of limitation did not apply to the collection of educational loans. (Compl.) As authority for this proposition, the Department cited 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a)(2), which had previously eliminated all statutes of limitation with respect to the collection of student loans. As a result, the Department of Education continued to offset Plaintiffs’ social security benefits in order to collect the aforementioned outstanding student loans. Plaintiffs filed suit with this Court on December 20, 2001, seeking a declaratory judgment that these offsets were unlawful. Plaintiffs’ lawsuit also sought restoration of all benefits offset, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs. Plaintiffs now seek a preliminary injunction preventing the seizure of their Social Security benefits pending a final resolution of their lawsuit. ANALYSIS A. The Secretary of Treasury is a Proper Party to the Lawsuit The Government, as an initial matter, argues that the Secretary of Treasury (“Treasury”) is not a proper party to Plaintiffs’ lawsuit. The Treasury disburses federal payments, for example Social Security benefits, to recipients on behalf of various federal agencies, for example, the Social Security Administration. (Def.’s Resp. Br. at 12.) The Treasury also operates a debt collection program known as the Treasury Offset Program (“TOP”). (Id.) Creditor agencies, in this case the Department of Education, submit government claims to the Treasury for collection by offset under the TOP — -here 31 U.S.C. § 3716. (Id.) The Government contends that the Treasury exercises no control over the collection of the debt — he simply offsets a federal payment upon certification from the creditor agency that the debt is valid and legally enforceable. (Id. at 13.) Thus, according to the Government, an injunction against the Treasury is improper because he has no authority over the debt without certification from the creditor agency — the “debt collection is triggered and controlled by [the Department of] Education.” (Id. at 14.) The Court disagrees. Although the Treasury cannot initiate an offset without certification from the Department of Education, it is the Treasury that is charged with disbursing federal payments, and it is the Treasury that is charged with actually offsetting the recipients federal payment on behalf of the creditor agency. Moreover, the Treasury has been given substantial rule-making authority under the Debt Collection Improvement Act. 31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(5) declares: The Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the Commissioner of Social Security and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, may prescribe such rules, regulations, and procedures as the Secretary of the Treasury considers necessary to carry out this subsection. The Secretary shall consult with the heads of affected agencies in the development of such rules, regulations, and procedures. 31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(5); see, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 5.30-38, 285.1-8, 901.1-12 (establishing detailed regulations concerning the administrative offset of federal payments). It is irrelevant whether offsets would not occur without certification from the Department of Education — the Treasury is the party who regulates the administrative offset of federal payments, and the Treasury is the party actually offsetting the recipient’s benefits, and, as such, he is a proper party to this lawsuit. Moreover, contrary to the Government’s contention, an injunction would not force “a Federal agency or official to perform a function it is not clearly authorized by law to perform.” Instead, an injunction would require the Treasury to cease performing a function that he clearly is authorized to perform- — the offset, in certain circumstances, of Social Security benefits pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3716. As such, the Court will proceed to the merits of Plaintiffs’ motion. B. Preliminary Injunction Standard The granting of a preliminary injunction is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. United States v. Any And All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 204 F.3d 658, 665 (6th Cir.2000). The plaintiff has the burden of proof in seeking an injunction. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda County, 415 U.S. 423, 441, 94 S.Ct. 1113, 39 L.Ed.2d 435 (1974); Garlock, Inc. v. United Seal, Inc., 404 F.2d 256 (6th Cir.1968). The Sixth Circuit has held that a court must consider four factors when deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the plaintiff has a strong likelihood of succeeding on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury absent the injunction; (3) whether issuing the injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest will be furthered by the issuance of the injunction. Gonzales v. National Bd. of Med. Examiners, 225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir.2000). These considerations are merely factors to be balanced, “not prerequisites that must be met.” Teamsters Local Union 299 v. U.S. Truck Co. Holdings, 87 F.Supp.2d 726, 733 n. 2 (E.D.Mich.2000) (quoting Mascio v. Public Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio, 160 F.3d 310 (6th Cir.1998)). However, a finding that there is no likelihood of success on the merits is usually fatal. Gonzales, 225 F.3d at 625. C. Strong Likelihood of Success on the Merits 1. Claims Outstanding for More than 10 Years As a threshold matter, the Government argues that Plaintiff Guillermety’s and Plaintiff Botta’s claims have not been outstanding for more than ten years. Consequently, the Government contends that the limitation found in section 3716(e)(1), prohibiting the offset of claims outstanding for more than ten years, has not been violated, even assuming that the limitation is applicable, in this case, to the offset of Plaintiffs’ Social Security benefits. Based on the record currently before the Court, the Court agrees. “It is a well settled canon of statutory construction that when interpreting statutes, ‘[t]he language of the statute is the starting point for interpretation, and it should also be the ending point if the plain meaning of that language is clear.’ ” United States v. Boucha, 236 F.3d 768, 774 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Choice, 201 F.3d 837, 840 (6th Cir.2000)). The clear and unambiguous language of section 3716 speaks to the collection of “claims” of the United States Government. Section 3716(a) states, in relevant part: “After trying to collect a claim from a person under section 3711(a) of this title, the head of the executive ... agency may collect the claim by administrative offset.” 31 U.S.C. § 3716(a) (emphasis added). Subsection (e) of the provision provides a statute of limitation, declaring: “This section does not apply (1) to a claim under this sub-chapter that has been outstanding for more than 10 years.” 31 U.S.C. § 3716(e)(1) (emphasis added). A “claim” is defined under this subchap-ter as: “any amount of funds or property that has been determined by an appropriate official of the Federal Government to be owed to the United States by a person, organization, or entity other than another Federal agency.” 31 U.S.C. § 3701(b)(1) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Treasury regulation which sets forth the special rules applicable to the offset of Federal benefit payments, including Social Security benefits, defines “claim” in an identical manner: “claim” means “an amount of money, funds, or property which has been determined by an agency official to be due the United States from any person, organization, or entity except another Federal agency.” 31 C.F.R. § 285.4(b). The Debt Collection Improvement Act, therefore, only speaks to the offset of amounts owed to the United States Government, or, third-party claims which the United States has a legal right to collect. An alternative reading simply cannot be reconciled with the unambiguous language of the statute. Moreover, the limitation period set forth in section 3716(e) speaks to “claims” under this subchapter — i.e., claims of the United States. The limitation period contained in 31 U.S.C. § 3716(e)(1), therefore, only begins to run when the debt, the student loan in this case, becomes a claim of the United States — it does not begin to run when the student loan becomes delinquent in the hands of an outside lender. This interpretation is consistent with Treasury regulations setting forth the federal claims collection standards. 31 C.F.R. § 901.3(a)(4) states: Unless otherwise provided by law, administrative offset of payments under the authority of 31 U.S.C. § 3716 to collect a debt may not be conducted more than 10 years after the Government’s right to collect the debt first accrued, unless facts material to the Government’s right were not known an could not reasonably have been known by the official or officials of the Government who were charged with the responsibility to discover and collect such debts. ' This limitation does not apply to debts reduced to a judgment. 31 C.F.R. § 901.3(a)(4) (emphasis added). This reasonable, formal interpretation of the statute, is accorded substantial deference. See Mid-America Care Foundation v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638, 642 (6th Cir.1998) (discussing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). The Plaintiffs disagree. At oral argument, Plaintiffs referenced the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Grider v. Cavazos, 911 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir.1990). There, the Fifth Circuit interpreted 31 U.S.C. § 3720A, and the relevant regulation, 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-6(T)(b)(2), to impose a ten year statute of limitation, beginning from the time the debt first became delinquent, not from the time the loan was assigned to the government. Id. at 1164. However, even assuming arguen-do, that this interpretation is correct and applies with equal force to the offset of student loans pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3716, the Court’s conclusion infra would not change. Plaintiff Guillermety and Plaintiff Botta defaulted on their loans in 1992 and 1993, less than ten years before the Government initiated offset of their Social Security benefits in late 1991. Seemingly recognizing this problem, counsel for Plaintiffs took the argument one step further at oral argument — Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitation under section 3716(e)(1) began to run when the underlying. student loan was incurred by Plaintiffs, in this case when each Plaintiff received the money and/or when the money was credited to the Plaintiffs tuition account. This reading simply cannot be reconciled with the statutory, language of the Debt Collection Improvement Act, and the Treasury regulation setting forth the federal claims collection standards, discussed supra. The Court cannot accept the conclusion, given the clear language utilized by Congress, that the statute of limitation begins to run on the Government’s ability to administratively offset a non-tax claim before the Government has a right of action with respect to the debt. Consequently, the Court must determine when the Plaintiffs’ outstanding student loan debt became a “claim” of the United States. To do so, the Court must differentiate between the different loans received by the Plaintiffs in this case. (i) Federal Stafford and PLUS Loans Federal Stafford Loans (both subsidized and unsubsidized) and Federal PLUS Loans are available through .the federally sponsored Federal Family Education Loan Program (“FFELP”). Under the FFELP, student loans are originated by private lending institutions, such as banks and credit unions. Cara A. Morea, Note, Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy— It is Time for a Unified Equitable Approach, 7 Am. BankR. Inst. L. Rev. 193, 206 & n. 89 (1999) (citing Jonathan Sheldon, Unfair and Deoeptive Acts and Practices 290 (3d ed.1991)). These loans are insured by guaranty agencies, generally state and nonprofit private institutions. Id; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071(a), 1072, 1078(b). The guaranty agencies have a contractual right against the United States for reimbursement with respect to losses on the unpaid principal balance and accrued interest on the loan. 20 U.S.C. § 1078(c). Thus, upon default, the loan is turned over by the private holder of the loan to the guaranty agency, who is reinsured by the federal government. In this case, therefore, the earliest date upon which Plaintiffs’ Federal Stafford and PLUS loans could be considered claims of the United States is the earlier of (1) the date in which the government paid its reinsurance obligation or (2) the date in which the outstanding loan was assigned to the Department of Education. In the case of Plaintiff Guillermety’s three Federal Stafford Loans, the Department of Education paid the guaranty agency in September 1992, May 1993, and September 1993. The loans were not assigned to the Department of Education until 1996. As such, the earliest date upon which any of Plaintiff Guillermety’s Federal Stafford Loans could be considered to be a claim of the United States was September, 1992. The Treasury’s offset of Guillermety’s Social Security benefits in September, 1991, was, therefore, not more than 10 years from this date. Consequently, based on the record currently before the Court, section 3716(e)(1) was not violated with regard to these loans. In the case of Plaintiff Botta’s Federal PLUS Loan, the Department of Education, as noted supra, could not have paid the guaranty agency prior to April 30, 1993. The loan was assigned to the Department of Education on December 3, 1993. The Treasury’s offset of Plaintiff Botta’s Social Security benefits in October, 2001, was, therefore, not more than 10 years from either the date of assignment, or the date on which the government paid the reinsurance claim. Consequently, based on the record currently before the Court, section 3716(e)(1) was not violated with regard to this loan. (ii) Federal Perkins Loans Federal Perkins Loans are low-interest loans made to students directly by the participating institution of higher education. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087aa — 1087Ü. The loans are originated and serviced by the educational institution and repaid to the institution by the debtor. Unlike Federal Stafford and PLUS loans, the government does not insure Federal Perkins Loans. The government does, however, provide initial contributions to eligible institutions to partially capitalize a loan fund. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087aa — 1087cc. Eligible institutions may, in their discretion, refer, transfer and/or assign Perkins Loans to the Secretary of Education. 20 U.S.C. § 1087gg. Thus, an outstanding Perkins Loan does not become a claim of the United States until the borrower’s educational institution assigns, in its discretion, the delinquent loan to the Department of Education. Pri- or to this date, the loan is owned, serviced, and collected by the borrower’s educational institution — the Government merely provides initial capital funding for Perkins Loans pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087aa— 1087cc. Plaintiff Guillermety’s two Perkins Loans were assigned to the Department of Education on November 12, 1997. As with Guillermety’s Federal Stafford Loans, the Treasury’s offset in September, 1991, was not more than 10 years from this date. As such, based on the record currently before the Court, section 3716(e)(1) was not violated with regard to these loans. Therefore, based on the record before the Court at this time, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs Guillermety and Botta have not established a strong likelihood of success. In fact, the Court concludes that there is a strong likelihood that Plaintiff Guillermety’s and Plaintiff Botta’s claims will not succeed on the merits. The Department of Education’s claims, at the time the offsets were initiated, had not been outstanding for more than 10 years. Consequently, the administrative