Full opinion text
OPINION ROBRENO, District Judge. Plaintiff, ID Security Systems Canada, Inc. (“ID Security”), brought this federal antitrust and state law action against Checkpoint Systems, Inc. (“Checkpoint”) in connection with Checkpoint’s alleged interference in a supply agreement between ID Security and Tokai Electronics, Ltd. (“Tokai”). According to ID Security, Checkpoint, a manufacturer of electronic article surveillance systems (“EAS systems”), violated the federal antitrust laws through illegal monopolization, attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize with respect to the radio frequency tags (“RF tags”), products that are used in conjunction with EAS systems. In particular, ID Security alleged that Checkpoint interfered with its existing contract with Tokai in order to block ID Security’s efforts to enter the RF tag market as a second supplier of tags to Checkpoint customers and as the future producer of a unique and superior tag compatible with Checkpoint’s EAS systems. The contract interference in question also gave rise to ID Security’s state law claims of tortious interference with contractual relations and unfair competition. After a trial, the jury found in favor of Checkpoint on ID Security’s claim of monopolization of commerce, but against Checkpoint on ID Security’s claims of attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize. It awarded ID Security compensatory damages of $28.5 million. Under federal antitrust law, the court trebled that amount to $85.5 million. The jury also found against Checkpoint on the state law tort claims, and awarded damages in the amount of $19 million, for a combined total of $104.5 million for both the antitrust and the state law claims. Checkpoint has since filed a motion for post-trial relief seeking judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial with respect to each of the four claims as to which the jury found in favor against Checkpoint. Checkpoint further challenges the award of damages in this case as unduly speculative, against the great weight of evidence, and a product of erroneous evidentiary rulings by the court. With respect to the antitrust issues in this case, the court’s threshold inquiry, before it may address whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain either of the antitrust verdicts against Checkpoint, is what constitutes the relevant market in this ease, given the particular dynamics between the foremarket for EAS systems, in which Checkpoint competed strenuously with its rival Sensormatic, and the aftermarket for RF tags used with Checkpoint’s system, i.e., the market which ID Security attempted to enter as a second source tag supplier. A related question is whether, given the burden of proof and the evidence in this case, the relevant market may be determined as a matter of law. As explained in more detail below, the court has determined that it can, and that a proper application of Kodak and its progeny dictate, as a matter of law, that EAS systems alone constitute the relevant market that Checkpoint could be accused of attempting or conspiring to monopolize. The next question presented by Checkpoint’s motion for post-trial relief is whether, given a relevant market for EAS systems, there was legally sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that Checkpoint indeed attempted to monopolize, i.e., had a dangerous probability of succeeding in monopolizing, the EAS systems market. In addition, the court must determine whether there was legally sufficient evidence to support a finding that Checkpoint conspired to monopolize the EAS market in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, i.e., whether, even given that Checkpoint had the specific intent to monopolize the EAS market, Tokai Electronics, the object of its acquisition efforts, shared that intent. Having addressed the difficult antitrust questions that characterize this case, the court turns to an examination of the proofs, instructions, and rulings concerning ID Security’s state law claims, as well to a determination of whether a new trial is warranted with respect to the damages awarded by the jury. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that ID Security failed to produce sufficient evidence that the RF tag market is the relevant market in this case. Instead, the court finds that the relevant market in this case is the market for EAS systems. Given this market and the proofs at trial, the court concludes that there was no legally sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that Checkpoint is liable either for attempted monopolization or for conspiracy to monopolize in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Thus, the court will grant judgment as a matter of law in Checkpoint’s favor on ID Security’s federal antitrust claims, and will vacate the verdict in favor of ID Security on the antitrust claims. The court also discerns no error in its treatment warranting either judgment or a new trial with respect to either of the state law claims in this case. However, as set forth in detail below, the court determines, given the speculative nature of the expert testimony offered by ID Security in support of certain items of damages sustained, the court will reduce the state claims award to $13 million. I. FACTS The following facts were established at trial and are viewed in the light most favorable to ID Security, the winner of the jury verdict challenged in this motion. This case involves the relationship between Checkpoint, a manufacturer of anti-shoplifting devices known as electronic article surveillance systems (“EAS systems”), and ID Security Systems Canada, Inc., a company that unsuccessfully attempted to compete with Checkpoint in the aftermarket for sale of RF tags, devices compatible with Checkpoint’s EAS hardware. Tokai is a supplier of tags to Checkpoint and was later acquired by Checkpoint. At the time of the acquisition, ID Security claimed that it had a contract with Tokai under which Tokai was to supply ID Security with tags. Stores using EAS technology affix to their products a tag that, unless deactivated with the proper equipment, emits a radio frequency (RF) or acoustomagnetic (AM) signal that is detectable by a sensor that is placed near the store’s exit. See T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 46M8. The sensor will alert when a shopper attempts to leave the store’s premises with a good bearing an active tag, i.e., a good that the shopper has not presented to the cashier for deactivation at the time of payment. T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 48. Thus, an EAS system is comprised of sensors and deactivators, as well as of a continuing supply of tags compatible with both pieces of hardware. T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 28-29. In the market for EAS systems, the two major competitors are Checkpoint, which sells EAS systems based on RF technology and is the defendant in this case, and Sensormatic, which sells EAS systems based on AM technology. T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 29-30. Given that RF and AM technologies are incompatible with each other, T.T. 5/8/02 (doc. no. 177) at 10; T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 57-58, the choice of one technology over another is a significant decision, because a customer dissatisfied with a system based on one technology could only switch to a system based on the other at the great expense of replacing its entire existing system and retraining its employees. T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 67-68. Such measures are both uneconomic, T.T., 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 58, and rarely undertaken. T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 67. As of 1997, the relevant period in this litigation, Checkpoint held a 25 percent share of the market for EAS systems, while Sensormatic enjoyed a 59 percent share. T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 31. The initial purchase of an EAS system creates an aftermarket for tags compatible with that system. Because RF tags deactivated at the point of sale leave the store with the good that has been purchased, retail stores must buy replacement tags on a continual basis to affix to new inventory. T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 43. . In addition, because RF and AM technologies are incompatible with each other, such that AM tags cannot be used with RF systems, and vice versa, the owner of an RF system, for example, can only buy usable tags from an RF supplier. T.T. 5/8/02 (doc. no. 177) at 10; T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 57-58. In this aftermarket for RF tags, Checkpoint held at least a 90 percent share of the market for replacement RF tags during the relevant period. T.T. 5/7/02 (doc. no. 172) at 66. Sensormatic, on the other hand, sold 100 percent of the tags compatible with its system. T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 41. The sophisticated customers who purchase EAS systems are well aware of the attendant necessity of purchasing compatible replacement tags on an ongoing basis. T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 40-42. Indeed, Checkpoint and Sensormatic present prospective customers with projections detailing return on investment, based on the nature of the customers’ products, the volume of items to be tagged, the customers’ estimated future tag needs, and industry trends. T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 40-44. Such projections also explain to prospective customers the cost of the EAS system, and its component parts, including tags, over time. T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 78-81. Prospective EAS system purchasers typically receive competing proposals from Checkpoint and Sensormatic, T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 81, and then attempt to play the two competitors off against each other in multiple rounds of negotiations in the hope of obtaining a reduced EAS system price as Checkpoint and Sensormatic attempt to undercut each other on price. T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 45; T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 81-83. The total price of the EAS system, and thus of its component parts, decrease as a result of these negotiations. T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 81-83. Moreover, the costs of replacement tags are often explicitly considered in this calculus, with customers typically seeking, and occasionally succeeding, in capping or fixing tag prices over time. T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 84. Checkpoint customers can attempt, and, in some cases, do attempt successfully, to negotiate lower tag prices at the end of their contracts. T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 84-85. In general, however, Checkpoint and Sensormatic match each other’s prices so that prospective customers will choose an EAS system based on the relative appeal of their respective technologies. T.T. 5/14/02 (doc. no. 187) at 67-68. For example, drug stores and supermarkets, which will need to ■ deactivate a large volume of tagged items quickly, may tend to prefer RF-based systems, while retail stores tend to choose AM-based systems because widely spaced AM sensors are less likely to obstruct store entrances. T.T. 5/14/02 (doc. no. 187) at 65-67. From 1995 to 2000, Checkpoint, matching Sensormatic’s prices, charged an average price of 3.5 cents per tag to both new and installed customers. T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 49-50; 58. In 1995, Checkpoint, attempting to enhance its ability to sell EAS systems competitively with Sensormatic in Europe, acquired the Actron Group, Ltd., T.T. 5/10/02 (doc. no. 182) at 179-82, a European company that accounted for 95 percent of the sales of Tokai Electronics, Ltd., a manufacturer of RF tags. T.T. 5/10/02 (doc. no. 182) at 182. At the time, Actron, supported by Tokai’s manufacturing, was the only company, other than Checkpoint, that had developed mass-production capabilities for disposable RF tags. T.T. 5/2/02 (doc. no. 165) at 180. Because of the relationship between Actron and Tokai, Checkpoint’s acquisition of Actron gave it a one-third ownership interest in Tokai and a seat on Tokai’s board of directors. T.T. 5/13/02 (doc. no. 185) at 5. As Checkpoint and Tokai shaped the contours of their new relationship, they entered into a Supply Agreement, under which Checkpoint would purchase 20 to 30 million tags per month over the three years following the acquisition. T.T. 5/13/02 (doc. no. 185) at 7. Although it costed Tokai two cents to make each RF tag, Tokai’s agreement with Checkpoint ensured that Checkpoint would be charged one cent per tag. T.T. 5/2/02 (doc. no. 165) at 203-08; 5/13/02 (doc. no. 185) at 52. To compensate for selling tags to Checkpoint at a loss, under the Supply Agreement, Tokai had the right to sell any tags manufactured in excess of Checkpoint’s quota to other companies at a higher price per tag. T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 99; 5/13/02 (doc. no. 185) at 8-9. ID Security took advantage of Tokai’s ability to sell tags to companies other than Checkpoint. On April 1, 1996, Tokai entered into a two-year agreement negotiated by ID Security’s President, Peter Murdoch, and Tokai’s President, Tadayoshi Haneda, whereby ID Security acquired the right to distribute all Tokai tags produced in excess of the 20 million tags that Tokai was obligated to sell to Checkpoint and the number allotted to Tokai’s small group of existing Asian customers. T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 53, 55. The ID-Tokai contract also contained a provision that prohibited Tokai from selling certain “source tag material” to any company other than ID Security. T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 154-55. Sometime in the course of 1996, Checkpoint became aware of the fact that ID Security and Tokai had entered into a contract. T.T. 5/6/02 (doc. no. 171) at 14. Murdoch viewed a contract with Tokai as desirable for ID Security in two main respects. First, ID Security intended to establish a presence in the RF tag aftermarket as a “second source,” or alternative supply, of Tokai-made RF tags for Checkpoint customers. T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 60, 117-18,122. As such, ID Security expected that it would be able to charge tag prices in excess of Checkpoint’s. T.T. 5/1/02 (doc. no. 164) at 95-96. Indeed, Murdoch stated that he had, in fact, undercut Checkpoint’s RF tag price only inadvertently, as a result of incorrect information on Checkpoint’s pricing. T.T. 4/30/02 (doc. no. 158) at 83-85; 5/1/02 (doc. no. 164) at 95-96. Second, ID Security planned to use its relationship with Tokai in the long term to further the development of Laserfuse, a novel product that ID Security intended to introduce on the RF tag market. T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 94. In theory, the particular technology used in Laserfuse tags would provide EAS system owners with tag that was compatible with RF systems, yet superior to existing tags in that, unlike standard RF tags, (1) one-hundred percent of Laserfuse tags on a purchased roll would be active, (2) one-hundred percent of Laserfuse tags would properly deactivate, and (3) there would be no Lazarus effect, i.e., possibility that even a properly deactivated tag would come back to life at a later date, associated with the product’s use, T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 76, and (4) the Laserfuse technology would allow store owners to control for fraudulent returns because it would allow them to determine whether a tag had, in fact, been passed over the deactivator at a point of sale. T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 80-81. At the time of the April 1996 contract, ID Security’s long term goal was to sell both standard Tokai tags and Laserfuse tags within the RF tag aftermarket. T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 98-99. The first step in ID Security’s plan was to establish itself as a distributor of Tokai tags; later, once Laserfuse tags were no longer in an embryonic stage, Tokai was to act as co-manufacturer of the marketed Laserfuse product. T.T. 1/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 98-99. In particular, Tokai was to participate in the development of Laserfuse by providing hot roll laminate, a unique material integral to the proper functioning of the Lasefuse tag, and to participate in the initial manufacturing stages for Laserfuse tags. T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 93-94, 99. However, neither portion of ID Security’s plan came to fruition. After entering into its contract with Tokai, ID Security managed to warehouse a total of 50 million Tokai tags; of the total 65 million tags purchased, ID Security sold a total of only 16 million up to December 1996, after which point ID Security never ordered, or was permitted to order, another RF tag from Tokai. T.T. 5/1/02 (doc. no. 164) at 199. At trial, ID Security produced only a single purchase order memorializing a promotional sale of ID Security tags to Target at the price of 3 cents per tag, T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 139-41. Moreover, at the time of trial in 2002, not a single Laserfuse tag was then being produced or offered for sale anywhere in the world. T.T. 5/1/02 (doc. no. 164) at 53, 69. ID alleges that Checkpoint’s violations of the antitrust laws and interference with the ID-Tokai contract were ultimately responsible for these eventualities. In the wake of the April 1996 agreement, a series of disputes arose between ID and Tokai. By December 1996, complaining about the poor quality of the adhesive on Tokai-manufactured tags, and alleging that Tokai had breached their contract by selling source tags to Checkpoint, Murdoch informed Haneda that ID Security would place no further orders for Tokai tags and would withhold payments on invoices for tags already received. T.T. 5/1/02 (doc. no. 164) 187-88, 191-93. In response, Haneda agreed to meet with Murdoch in Amsterdam in January 1997 to discuss their dispute. T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 159. In the meantime, according to Murdoch, the two companies were to be in “a standstill position relative to the requirement of purchasing more tags and making additional payments '....” T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 159. During the time period leading up to and following the Amsterdam meeting between Haneda and Murdoch, however, unbeknownst to Murdoch, Haneda and Tokai were negotiating with Checkpoint, which was hoping to acquire the manufacturer in toto. T.T. 5/6/02 (doc. no. 171) at 20-21. Lucas Geiges, Checkpoint’s former Senior Vice President for International Development, testified at trial that, at the time of those negotiations, he was aware that To-kai was selling labels to ID Security, but was unaware that that relationship was an exclusive one. T.T. 5/6/02 (doc. no. 171) at 22. Haneda proceeded to meet with Murdoch in Amsterdam, and addressed with Murdoch a wide variety of topics, including when the adhesive problem would be fixed, new Laserfuse designs, profit sharing, and tag prices. T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 164-65. Coming out of the meeting, Murdoch was satisfied that he and Haneda had agreed that (1) the ID-Tokai contract would be extended for an additional three years, through 2000, T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 165, (2) source tag material would be sold in the future only to ID Security. T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 165, (3) the adhesive would be fixed by February 1997, T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 165-66, (4) no further orders would be placed or products were to be shipped until the adhesive was corrected, T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 166, (5) a payment schedule for outstanding invoices had been worked out, provided that the meeting in Amsterdam produced a written and signed agreement, T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 169-70, and (6) that this agreement was intended to replace prior agreements. 5/1/02 (doc. no. 165) at 205. Murdoch believed that he and Haneda had resolved their disputes. T.T. 5/1/02 (doc. no. 164) at 200-201. Because of Haneda’s reportedly poor English skills, in eases, as here, where the parties had met and reached oral agreement, it was customary that Murdoch would memorialize the agreement reached, and would then send it to Haneda for review and signature. T.T. 5/1/02 (doc. no. 164) at 205. Murdoch followed this procedure on January 28, 1997, when he sent Haneda a confirming letter purporting to document the substantive agreement reached between ID Security and Tokai at the Amsterdam meeting, and to suggest that an arbitration clause be added to the agreement between the parties. T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 177-80. Contrary to Murdoch’s expectations, Haneda did not sign or return the confirmation letter, despite Murdoch’s repeated requests that he do so. T.T. 4/29/02 (doc. no. 159) at 182-83,186-88. In declining to respond to Murdoch’s letter, Haneda acted at the request of Geiges, who, upon learning that a possible agreement between ID Security and Tokai had been reached in Amsterdam, convinced Haneda “not to sign the confirming letter or do anything else that could further restrict Tokai’s ability to sell all of its RF tags to Checkpoint ... [bjecause [he] knew that [Checkpoint was] going to ... buy Tokai and [an agreement with ID Security] would be a big obstacle.” T.T. 5/6/02 (doc. no. 171) at 31. On February 13, 1997, while Murdoch waited for a response from Haneda, Checkpoint signed a contract that made it the exclusive distributor of Tokai’s tags. See Ex. P-140. A press release by Checkpoint to that effect followed. See Ex. P-63. Upon obtaining a copy of the press release, Murdoch wrote a letter on February 20, 1997 to Checkpoint’s President, Kevin Dowd, informing him that ID had a preexisting contract with Tokai to distribute RF tags. T.T. 4/30/02 (doc. no 158) at 9-11. Checkpoint then launched an investigation into Murdoch’s allegations that a contract existed between ID Security and Tokai, T.T. 5/6/02 (doc. no. 171) at 33-35, before it decided to extend the exclusive distributorship contract with Tokai through December 31, 1997. T.T. 5/6/02 (doc. no. 171) at 41; P-144. Tokai sent ID Security formal notice of the termination of the ID-Tokai contract as late as April 8, 1997. T.T. 4/30/02 (doc. no. 158) at 32-33; Ex. P-75. Litigation ensued between ID Security and Tokai, and, after that litigation ultimately terminated in a settlement, Checkpoint acquired Tokai in toto. T.T. 5/6/02 (doc. no. 171) at 40-44. In this litigation, which pits ID Security against Checkpoint, ID Security claims that, as a result of Checkpoint’s actions, ID Security lost its financing with respect to its venture with Tokai, its label supplier, the opportunity to compete with Checkpoint and Sensormatic in the world market, and more than $80 million in potential profits. T.T. 4/30/02 (doc. no. 158) at 105. With respect to Laserfuse, Murdoch asserted that ID Security lost the raw material necessary to make the product, with the result that the introduction of the product was delayed for four years while ID Security scrambled to find an alternative supplier. T.T. 4/30/02 (doc. no. 158) at 105-07. In connection with these claims, ID Security sued Checkpoint in this court for alleged violations of the federal antitrust laws through monopolization, attempt to monopolize, and conspiracy to monopolize, and for Pennsylvania state law torts, including tortious interference with contractual relations and unfair competition. After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Checkpoint on ID Security’s monopolization claim, but found Checkpoint liable for attempted monopolization and for conspiracy to monopolize. On the federal antitrust claims, the jury awarded ID Security $14 million in damages with respect to its Laserfuse line, and $14.5 million in damages for lost Tokai tag sales. The total award of $28.5 million was trebled by the court pursuant to the antitrust laws, such that the Checkpoint was held liable for antitrust damages in the amount of $85.5 million. The jury also found Checkpoint liable on ID Security’s state law claims of tortious interference with contractual relations and unfair competition, and awarded ID Security $6 million in damages for its Laserfuse line and $13 million in lost sales of Tokai tags, for a total of $19 million in damages for state law claims. Thus, the award against Checkpoint totalled $104.5 million. Checkpoint has filed a motion for post-trial relief seeking either judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on all claims. II. DISCUSSION A. Applicable Standards 1. Rule 50 Rule 50 provides that in the aftermath of a jury trial, a court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law if it determines that there was “no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for a particular party on an issue,” and that, without a favorable finding on that issue, the party cannot maintain his claim under controlling law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). In determining whether to grant judgment as a matter of law, the court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and determine whether the record contains the ‘minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.’” Glenn Distribs. Corp. v. Carlisle Plastics, Inc., 297 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir.2002) (quoting Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir.1996)). Indeed, a court may grant judgment as a matter of law “only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is in-, sufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability.” LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 145-46 (3d Cir.2003) (quoting Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir.1993)). In this endeavor, “[t]he court may not weigh evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses or substitute its version of the facts for that of the jury,” Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 691 (3d Cir.1993), but rather may grant a Rule 50 motion only “if upon review of the record it can be said as a matter of law that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence.” Id. at 691-92; see also LePage’s, at 145-46 (“[R]eview of the jury’s verdict is limited to determining whether some evidence in the record supports the jury’s verdict.”); Glenn Distribs., 297 F.3d at 299 (stating that “[t]he standard for granting summary judgment under Rule 56 ‘mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Fed. R.Civ.P. 50(a)’ ”) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). 2. Rule 59 Rule 59 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure allows a trial court, in its discretion, to grant a new trial “on all or part of the issues in an action where there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(a)(1). Such an endeavor is not, however, lightly undertaken, because it necessarily “effects a denigration of the jury system and to the extent that new trials are granted the judge takes over, if he does not usurp, the prime function of the jury as the trier of the facts.” Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir.1960) (en banc). Therefore, “[a] new trial may be granted [only] when the verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence; that is, ‘where a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict were to stand.’ ” Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 448, 453 (3d Cir.2001) (quoting Olefins Trading, Inc. v. Han Yang Chem. Corp., 9 F.3d 282, 289 (3d Cir.1993)). When, as here, the asserted basis for a new trial is trial error, “[t]he court’s inquiry ... is twofold. It must first determine whether an error was made in the course of the trial, and then must determine whether the error was so prejudicial that refusal to grant a new trial would be inconsistent with substantial justice.” Farra v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 838 F.Supp. 1021, 1026 (E.D.Pa.1993). B. Plaintiffs Antitrust Claims 1. Attempt to monopolize Checkpoint challenges under Rule 50(b) the verdict in favor of ID Security on its § 2 claims as being supported by insufficient evidence. In relevant part, § 2 of the Sherman Act sanctions those “who shall ... attempt to monopolize ... any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. In order to prevail under an attempted monopolization claim, “a plaintiff must prove that the defendant (1) engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) specific intent to monopolize and with (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.” Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 442 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456, 113 S.Ct. 884, 122 L.Ed.2d 247 (1993); Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 750 (3d Cir.1996); Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1197 (3d Cir.1995)). It is the third of these elements that is most strongly implicated in Checkpoint’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. In order to determine whether there is a dangerous probability of monopolization in a particular case, however, a court must first “inquire ‘into the relevant product and geographic market and the defendant’s economic power in that market.’ ” Id. (quoting Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 459, 113 S.Ct. 884, Ideal Dairy Farms, 90 F.3d at 750; Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir.1994)). The plaintiff bears the burden of defining and proving the relevant market. Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 513 (3d Cir.1998). The parties agree that the entire world comprises the relevant geographic product market in this case. T.T. 5/21/02 (doc. no. 202) at 183. As to the product market, in order to assess whether there was legally sufficient evidence to support a finding that Checkpoint was dangerously close to achieving monopoly, the court must first consider whether the relevant product market in this case was the market for EAS systems, as Checkpoint asserts, or the market for RF tags, as ID Security contends. Stated in the specific terms of this case, the court must first assess whether ID Security, as the antitrust plaintiff, produced sufficient evidence that RF tags constituted the relevant product market in this case. Once the relevant product and geographic market is defined, the court must assess whether ID Security produced sufficient evidence that Checkpoint attempted to monopolize that market. a. Relevant market and market power i. Kodak and the relevant product market The relevant market for antitrust purposes “is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability.” Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992) (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404, 76 S.Ct. 994, 100 L.Ed. 1264 (1956)); see also Int’l Wood Processors v. Power Dry, Inc., 792 F.2d 416, 430 (4th Cir.1986) (quoting L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust § 12, at 41 (1977) and defining “relevant market” as “the narrowest market which is wide enough so that products from adjacent areas or from other producers in the same area cannot compete on substantial parity with those included in the market”). “ ‘Interchangeability’ implies that one product is roughly equivalent to another for the use to which it is put; while there might be some degree of preference for the one over the other, either would work effectively.” Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 33 F.3d 194, 206 (3d Cir.1994) (explaining that “[a] person needing transportation ... could accordingly buy a Ford or a Chevrolet automobile, or could elect to ride a horse or bicycle, assuming those options were feasible.”). The economic interchangeability of products is, in turn, measured by the “cross-elasticity of demand” between a particular product and any substitutes for it. Brokerage Concepts, 140 F.3d at 513; accord Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 437 (also directing courts to consider “price, use, and qualities”). This is so because, when cross-elasticity is present, the prices of a product and its substitutes are linked such that “the rise in the price of a good within a relevant market would tend to create a greater demand for other like goods in that market.” Tunis Bros. Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722 n. 6 (3d Cir.1991). The inquiry in this case is to determine which of two closely related and interdependent markets constitutes the actual relevant market for antitrust purposes. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992), the Supreme Court confronted, in what was to become the seminal case in the foremarket-after-market area, the question of whether a defendant’s lack of power in a primary-market precludes, as a matter of law, the possibility of market power in derivative aftermarkets. Id. at 455, 112 S.Ct. 2072. In particular, the Court had to determine whether Kodak, a manufacturer of complex business machines whose parts were incompatible with those of other manufacturers, had unlawfully monopolized and attempted to monopolize the sale of service for Kodak machines in violation of § 2 of that Act, when it implemented a policy of selling replacement parts only to buyers of Kodak equipment who used Kodak service or repaired their own machines. Id. at 456-59, 112 S.Ct. 2072. The practical effect of Kodak’s policy was that it became more difficult, if not impossible, for independent service organizations (“ISO’s”) to sell service for Kodak machines, because they were unable to obtain Kodak parts. Id. at 458, 112 S.Ct. 2072. The ISO’s contended that Kodak had monopolized, or attempted to monopolize, what they alleged to be the relevant market, namely the aftermarket for parts and services. Id. at 459, 112 S.Ct. 2072. Kodak countered that the existence of competition in the primary equipment market, which it alleged to be the relevant market and of which it did not possess a monopoly share, inherently constrained its ability to raise aftermarket prices of service and parts above the level that would be charged in a competitive market. See id. at 465-66, 112 S.Ct. 2072. Therefore, Kodak argued that, as a matter of law, it was neither a monopolist nor an attempted monopolist. Id. at 467, 112 S.Ct. 2072. The Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 466-467, 477, 112 S.Ct. 2072. The Court declined the invitation of the defendant in the case to create a legal presumption that the fore- and aftermarkets inherently act as “pure complements to one another,” id. at 477, 112 S.Ct. 2072, because market imperfections in the fore-market, “could create a less responsive connection between service and parts prices [in the aftermarket] and equipment sales [in the foremarket].” Id. at 478, 112 S.Ct. 2072. In particular, the Supreme Court found that significant information and switching costs, for example, could limit the ability of competition in the fore-market to prevent an exercise of monopoly power in the aftermarket. Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court directed that courts faced with the task of evaluating whether a tie between fore- and aftermarkets violates the antitrust laws must proceed on “a case by case basis, focusing on the particular facts disclosed by the record.” Id. at 467, 112 S.Ct. 2072. Kodak’s teaching is not about market power alone, but about market definition. Noting that Kodak had chosen in its arguments to the Court “to focus on market power directly rather than arguing that the relationship between equipment and service and parts is such that the three should be included in the same market definition,” id. at 469 n. 15, 112 S.Ct. 2072, the Court explained that “[w]hether considered in the conceptual category of ‘market definition’ or ‘market power,’ the ultimate inquiry is the same-whether competition in the equipment market will significantly restrain power in the service and parts markets.” Id. (emphasis supplied). Therefore, switching and information costs are significant, not only as indicators of market power, but also in the definition of the relevant market, because they inherently interfere with the cross-elasticity of demand. See id. at 469, 473, 112 S.Ct. 2072. ii. Relevant market analysis in the wake of Kodak In the wake of Kodak, reasonable interchangeability continues to define the boundaries of the relevant market. See Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 513 (3d Cir.1998); Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 439 (3d Cir.1997). However, Kodak established that, in a situation where a court must determine whether the aftermarket, rather than the foremarket, is the relevant market for antitrust purposes, the fact that the aftermarket goods are unique, i.e., not interchangeable with similar repair or replacement products, does not automatically establish the aftermarket as the relevant market. See Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 439-40. Rather, both the uniqueness of aftermarket goods, and the existence of fore-market switching and information costs that “create an economic lock-in that could reduce or eliminate the cross-elasticity of demand” between fore- and aftermarket products, serve to establish the aftermarket as the relevant market. See id. This is so because uniqueness, switching and information costs, in tandem, generate market power even as they delineate the boundaries of the market in which such power is exercised. See id. Using the facts of Kodak as an example, the Third Circuit explained: If Kodak repair parts had not been unique, but rather, could be obtained from additional sources at a reasonable price, Kodak could not have forced copier purchasers to buy repair parts from Kodak. This would be true even if the copier purchasers faced information and switching costs that locked them into to (sic) use of Kodak copiers. This fact indicates that switching and information costs alone cannot create market power. Rather, it is the lack of a competitive market in the object to be purchased-for instance, a competitive market in Kodak parts-that gives a company market power. Id. at 439 n. 10; see also Brokerage Concepts, 140 F.3d at 515 (noting that, in the wake of Kodak, it was possible that “a single brand market may be considered the relevant market where a legitimate class of consumers is locked in to purchasing a non-interchangeable tying product in a derivative market due to high switching costs” in the foremarket); Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 33 F.3d 194, 208 n. 16 (3d Cir.1994) (noting that the “true inquiry” was whether IBM was “constrained by the prices of large scale mainframe computers when pricing its upgrades,” and stating that, “[i]f it is so constrained, then the relevant market consists of both mainframes and upgrades. If not, then it is simpler and more accurate to say that the relevant market itself, not some submarket of it, contains only upgrades”). Furthermore, as Checkpoint emphasizes, several courts writing post -Kodak have found that the existence of uniqueness of aftermarket goods and the existence of switching and information costs in the foremarket are insufficient to establish the aftermarket as the relevant market, unless an antitrust defendant has actually changed its policy after locking-in some of its customers. See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 783 (5th Cir.1999); PSI Repair Servs.,Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 820 (6th Cir.1997). As the Sixth Circuit explained, Kodak itself lends some support to this position: [T]he change in policy in Kodak was the crucial factor in the Court’s decision. By changing its policy after customers were “locked in,” Kodak took advantage of the fact that its customers lacked the information to anticipate this change. Therefore, it was Kodak’s own actions that increased its customers’ information costs. In our view, this was the evil condemned by the Court and the reason for the Court’s extensive discussion of information costs ... [W]e thus hold that an antitrust plaintiff cannot succeed on a Kodak-type theory when the defendant has not changed its policy after locking-in some of its customers, and the defendant has been otherwise forthcoming about its pricing structure and service policies. PSI Repair Servs., 104 F.3d at 820. The court finds this logic persuasive. That a defendant is unable to change the prices of its goods in the aftermarket, even with respect to its most vulnerable customers, i.e., those who are already locked-in to its particular system, strongly suggests, if it does not compel, an absence of market power in the aftermarket. This inability to raise prices in the aftermarket, in turn, indicates that the aftermarket is not the relevant market in which a court should assess the defendant’s market power. With these principles in mind, the court now examines the evidence presented at trial. b. Evidence at trial In this case, the parties argue whether the relevant market is the market for EAS systems, as Checkpoint asserts, or RF tags, as ID contends. Given the applicable framework and viewing all evidence in a light most favorable to ID Security as the non-moving party, however, the evidence presented at trial provided no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable juror to conclude that the relevant market in this case was the market for RF tags. In particular, even given that RF tags are undisputedly a unique product, see T.T. 5/8/02 (doc. no. 177) at 10, and that the switching costs between RF- and AM-based systems are high, low information costs and the absence of evidence of post lock-in exploitation on the part of Checkpoint undermine the conclusion that RF tags, as opposed to EAS systems, comprise the relevant market in this case. Under these circumstances, the court concludes that ID Security’s evidence failed to show that the RF tag market constitutes the relevant market for antitrust purposes. i. Switching and information costs Evidence introduced at trial revealed that switching costs between RF and AM-based EAS systems are significant and extremely high. Logically, then, switching between systems is rare. Once a customer purchases an RF, as opposed to an AM-based system, that customer may thereafter only purchase RF tags for use in that system, because AM tags are incompatible with RF-based security systems. T.T. 5/8/02 (doc. no. 177) at 10; T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 57-58. Therefore, in order for a dissatisfied customer to switch from an RF-based system to an AM-based system, that customer would have to replace its entire existing system and retrain its employees. T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 67-68. Switching, thus, is “uneconomic,” T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 58, and, in any event, rare. T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 67. Indeed, David Shoemaker, Checkpoint’s Group Vice President for Strategic Marketing, could not provide a single example of a “chain-wide rollout switch” from one technology to another. T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 67. The evidence at trial also revealed that the high switching costs associated with EAS systems are significantly counterbalanced by information costs so low as to be almost nonexistent, a fact that increases a consumer’s ability to make an intelligent choice when choosing the company with which it will have a long relationship. As Dr. Martin Asher, testifying for ID as an expert, noted, the purchasers of EAS systems are aware at the time of purchase that buying an RF-based system will necessitate their buying tags throughout the long life of their EAS system, and, most likely, from Checkpoint, the major supplier of RF tags. T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 40^42. Moreover, Dr. Asher conceded that purchasers of EAS systems are retailers, i.e., sophisticated customers, whose analysis of the return on investment expected from the purchase of a security system is facilitated by the fact that both Checkpoint and Sensormatic present them with return detailed projections based on the customers’ products, number of items passing through the store, the number of tags that the customer will need in the future, and well as industry trends. T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 40-44. Dr. Asher further conceded that Checkpoint and Sen-sormatic provide this information to the customers, who then try to play the two off against each other in an effort to obtain a reduced price for the entire system (equipment and replacement tags) to be purchased. T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 44-45. The testimony of Timothy J. King, Vice President of Checkpoint’s sales division, confirmed and fleshed out these market place dynamics. King testified that the return on investment projections prepared by Checkpoint help to quantify for prospective customers the specific cost for the EAS system and its component parts, including tags, projected over up to four years. T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 78-79, 81. According to King, the typical customer receives proposals from both Checkpoint and Sensormatic, and then engages in multiple rounds of negotiations with the two, with the result that the total price of the EAS systems decreases during the course of the negotiations. T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 81.-83. King’s testimony further indicates that tag prices are one aspect of return on investment that customers consider as they negotiate; customers typically request that tag prices be fixed or capped over time, and Checkpoint occasionally accedes to those requests. T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 84. Given these market realities, the court concludes that the low information costs, despite the high cost of switching from an AM- to an RF-based EAS system, militate strongly against a finding that RF tags alone constitute the relevant market for antitrust purposes. ii. Absence of post lock-in change of policy The unequivocal evidence offered at trial further reveals that Checkpoint did not change the price of RF tags even after its customers were locked-in to an RF-based system. Dr. Asher, ID Security’s expert, conceded that from 1995 to 2000, Checkpoint and Sensormatic both charged approximately 3.5 cents for every tag. T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 49-50. Indeed, once customers were locked-in, Checkpoint continued to charge 3.5 cents per tag. T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 58. Checkpoint contends that its consistent pricing reveals that competition with Sensormatic in the EAS foremarket deprived it of actual market power in the RF tag aftermarket, and shows that Checkpoint was unable to exploit even its locked-in customers, despite its 90 percent share of the aftermarket. Consequently, Checkpoint argues that the court must consider the foremark-et for EAS systems as the relevant market for antitrust purposes. ID Security attempts to counter this argument, and combat the inference raised by Checkpoint’s consistent RF tag pricing, with several arguments. ID Security first argues, in essence, that Checkpoint did not disprove the possibility, left open by the fact that 3.5 cents per tag was an average price, i.e., some customers paid more while others paid less for their tags, that locked-in customers were required to pay the highest tag prices. ID Security then asserts that the relatively consistent price of 3.5 cents per tag does not demonstrate that Checkpoint is constrained by foremarket competition, but rather reveals that Checkpoint and Sen-sormatic operate as a duopoly whose effective collusion interferes with the cross-elasticity of demand between foremarket and aftermarket, and allows Checkpoint to charge supracompetitive prices for RF tags in the aftermarket. As noted above, ID Security, as the plaintiff in an antitrust suit, has the burden of proving the relevant market in which the jury was to measure Checkpoint’s market power. See Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 513 (3d Cir.1998). For the reasons that follow, ID Security failed to meet this burden at trial through evidence of post lock-in exploitation on the part of Checkpoint. A. ID’s average price argument ID Security asserts that, because 3.5 cents per tag constituted an average tag price, such that some customers paid more and some paid less for their RF tags, “Checkpoint failed to establish [at trial] that the prices charged to aftermarket customers were not at the higher end of [the average] range.” Mem. of Law by PI. in Response to Mot. by Def. for Post-Trial Relief at 39. In support of this argument, ID Security cites the testimony of Checkpoint witness Timothy King, and asserts that King “admitted” that customers are often charged prices at or above the average price of RF tags once their initial fixed price contracts with Checkpoint expire. Next, ID Security cites the testimony of Mark Perker, Checkpoint’s Senior Director for Planning and Strategic Development, as proof that Checkpoint attempted to raise aftermarket prices on RF tags. As an initial matter, it appears that ID Security has misconstrued its burden of proof in this case. As noted above, the burden of proving the relevant market rests squarely on the shoulders of the antitrust plaintiff. See Brokerage Concepts, 140 F.3d at 513. Thus, ID Security bears the burden of proving post lock-in exploitation and Checkpoint need not prove the negative, i.e., that aftermarket customers were not, in fact, charged higher than average prices. In its response to Checkpoint’s motion for post-trial relief, ID Security offers not a single transcript reference that directly supports its exploitation claim. Moreover, as set forth in greater detail below, the testimony of King and Perker does not provide evidence of post lock-in exploitation sufficient to prove that RF tags, rather than EAS systems, constitute the relevant market in this case. King testified that tag prices were indeed subject to renegotiation at the end of initial fixed-price contracts. T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 84. Upon further questioning, he also explained that “if [Checkpoint has] a blanket purchase order or a contractual agreement with [its] customer, when that ends the customer will undoubtedly attempt to renegotiate a lower price .... ” T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 84, and that the typical result was that Checkpoint “work[s] hard to maintain the pricing [it] had in effect and in some instances we end up lowering the price as a concession ... for a multiple year agreement.” T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 85. Perker testified that in 1998 Checkpoint attempted to enhance its profitability by attempting to increase prices on both base and repeat tag business “where and if possible.” T.T. 5/7/02 (doc. no. 172) at 115-16. He did not comment on the success of any such attempts. Even viewed in a light most favorable to ID, the above testimony clearly does not establish that locked-in customers were charged prices at or above the average price of RF tags, and, thus, that Checkpoint had significant market power in the RF tag aftermarket. At most, King and Perker established that Checkpoint attempted to charge higher prices to locked-in customers. That this attempt was planned and made, however, says nothing about Checkpoint’s ability to succeed. Indeed, King’s testimony suggests that Checkpoint’s market power was, in fact, insufficient to support its aspirations. Therefore, the court concludes that, contrary to ID Security’s claim, the testimony of King and Perker supports no reasonable inference that Checkpoint exploited its locked-in RF tag customers, and thus fails to constitute legally sufficient proof that the RF tag market is the relevant market in this case. B. ID Security’s duopoly claim ID Security next argues that, given the consistent pricing of RF tags in the aftermarket and the absence of apparent post lock-in exploitation, the existence of a duopoly, “[a] condition in the market in which there are only two producers or sellers of a given product.” Black’s Law Dictionary 502 (6th ed., 1990), constitutes a market imperfection in the foremarket for EAS systems not present under the facts of Kodak, and renders the foremarket incapable of constraining Checkpoint’s behavior in the RF tag aftermarket. According to ID Security, competition between Checkpoint and Sensormatic in the EAS fore-market is illusory, because the two companies, in practical effect, match their prices, and thus minimize the extent to which a prospective customer can use an offer by one company as leverage against the other to lower the ultimate purchase price of an EAS system and its components. Unable to choose between the two companies based on price, the customer then chooses a system based on his particular technological needs. ID Security asserts that this alleged duopoly arrangement meant that Checkpoint and Sensormatic were not truly competing in the foremarket, and that Checkpoint was left free to charge a consistent price that mirrored Sensormatic’s tag prices for AM tags, but that was supracompetitive in the RF tag market, as evidenced by the fact that ID Security was willing to accept a lower profit margin per tag and to undercut tag prices offered by Checkpoint. ID cites the testimony of Mark Perker, Checkpoint’s Senior Director for Planning and Strategic Development, as factual support for the duopoly theory ultimately advanced by its expert, Dr. Martin Asher. Perker indeed indicated that Checkpoint and Sensormatic match prices, so that customers choose between the two systems based on their technological needs. T.T. 5/14/02 (doc. no. 187) at 67-68. Perker explained that supermarkets and drug stores tend to prefer RF technology because of their need to process numerous retail items quickly, while clothing retailers tend to prefer AF technology, because they can place the tag sensors far apart and avoid obstructing the exits of their stores. T.T. 5/14/02 (doc. no. 187) at 65-67. ID Security contends that Perker’s testimony supports the inference that “a potential increase in price, or an existing lock-in at a supracompetitive price, will not inevitably drive potential purchasers of Checkpoint’s system to its sole systems competitor, Sensormatic. For many of these customers, RF systems are the only viable choice.” Mem. of Law in Support of Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. by Def. for PosL-Trial Relief at 26. For the following three reasons, the court does not agree. First, that a particular customer prefers one foremarket technology over the other does not necessarily confer on the preferred foremarket supplier an impermissible market power in the aftermarket. As the First Circuit has explained: In a product-differentiated market ... there will always be a subset of customers whose subjective preferences, given their specific business needs, will align them more closely with one manufacturer ... [T]his kind of preference does not translate into the kind of economic power that antitrust laws aim to mitigate. Sophisticated customers with such preferences will know beforehand that they will lock themselves in by their choice of manufacturer and do so willingly. What would be of concern is if a firm were able to extend its control over a sufficiently sizable number of customers who did not have such a preference. SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d 11, 23 (1st Cir.1999). In this case, regardless of their ultimate technological preference, prospective EAS system customers receive proposals from both Checkpoint and Sensor-matic and pit the two firms against each other in order to decrease the price of the EAS system that they will ultimately buy. See discussion, supra. Indeed, the record reveals that customer preferences for one type of EAS technology as opposed to another are ultimately not so ironclad as to preclude a customer from considering, or purchasing, a system based on the other technology. For example, although a drugstore, CVS uses Sensormatic’s AM technology, while Target, a retailer, uses Checkpoint’s RF-based system. T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 33-34. ID Security has offered no evidence to the contrary. Second, an examination of the record in this case belies the notion that a competition-stifling collusion or coordination exists between Checkpoint and Sensormatie. To the contrary, as Dr. Asher conceded, Checkpoint and Sensormatie compete in price and technology within every vertical market. T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 172) at 33-35. The return on investment projections, provided by each company to prospective customers, provide the most obvious manifestation of this competition, see T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 40-45; T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 81-84, because they spark multiple rounds of price negotiations during which the customers pit offers from Checkpoint against those of Sensormatie in order to receive lower prices from each. T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 44-45; T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 81-84. As a direct result of these negotiations, the prices of EAS systems as a whole, and, by implication, their component parts, decrease. T.T. 5/15/02 (doc. no. 192) at 81-83. Moreover, ID Security’s own expert conceded a constraining link between fore-market and aftermarket that outlives the initial purchase of an EAS system. When asked why Checkpoint, faced with a tag shortage in 1995 through 1997, did not raise tag prices to lessen tag demands, Dr. Asher responded that if Checkpoint were to “change the price, then it’s going to affect people’s purchases, and they may lose some system sales and future purchases.” T.T. 5/9/02 (doc. no. 176) at 67-68. Thus, this context of competition offers no factual support for ID Security’s assertion and the conclusion of its expert that Checkpoint’s consistent price of 3.5 cents per tag actually constituted a “supra-competitive” price that stemmed from a lack of competition in the EAS market and that would have been lowered had competition been allowed in the RF tag market. iii. Summary of evidence In summary, the evidence introduced by both sides at trial revealed unequivocally that the foremarket for EAS systems is characterized by high switching costs, exceptionally low information costs, lively competition between Checkpoint and Sen-sormatic, and a lack of post lock-in exploitation in the RF tag aftermarket. Given this factual context and the teachings of Kodak and its progeny, the court finds that there is a legally insufficient basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that the RF tag aftermarket constitutes the relevant market that Checkpoint allegedly attempted or conspired to monopolize. To the contrary, the court finds that EAS systems constitute the relevant market as a matter of law. It is therefore in the EAS systems product market where ID Security must demonstrate that Checkpoint attempted to monopolize. c. Dangerous probability of success prong In order to succeed on its attempted monopoly claim at trial, ID, as an antitrust plaintiff, was required to prove that Checkpoint “(1) engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) specific intent to monopolize and with (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.” Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 442 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456, 113 S.Ct. 884, 122 L.Ed.2d 247 (1993); Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 750 (3d Cir.1996); Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1197 (3d Cir.1995)). At the post-trial motions stage in this case, the issue before the court is whether the evidence introduced at trial was legally sufficient to support a jury finding that Checkpoint “possessed ‘sufficient market power’ to come dangerously close to success within [the EAS] market.” Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 513 (3d Cir.1994). For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that the evidence was insufficient to support a jury finding on this third prong, and that the evidence was therefore insufficient to support a jury verdict against Checkpoint on ID Security’s attempted monopoly claim. The Third Circuit has emphasized that, in determining whether a particular defendant enjoys a dangerous probability of success, “[t]here is no simple formula.” Id. This is so because m