Full opinion text
OPINION GREENAWAY, District Judge. These matters come before the Court on three separate motions for summary judgment of defendant Bashian Bros., Inc. (“Bashian Bros.”), defendants Isaac Etes-sami (“Etessami”) and Moussa Etessami & Sons Corporation (“Etessami & Sons”) (collectively, “Etessami Defendants”), and defendants Eugene Newman (“Newman”) and Noonoo Rug Company (“Noonoo”) (collectively “Newman Defendants”). For the reasons set forth below, this Court denies the Newman Defendants’ motion and grants Bashian Bros.’ motion as to each of Plaintiffs’ claims. This Court denies the Etessami Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiffs’ section 1 and section 2 conspiracy to monopolize claims. Finally, this Court grants the Etessami Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ monopolization, attempted monopolization, and tortious interference claims. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Elsea is the sole shareholder of Carpet Group. Carpet Group is a Virginia corporation in the business of arranging the sale of oriental rugs from foreign manufacturers to retailers in the United States. Defendant Bashian Bros, is an importer and wholesaler of oriental rugs. Bashian Bros, is a member of the Oriental Rug Importers Association, Inc. (“ORIA”), a trade association comprised of importers and wholesalers of oriental rugs. George G. Bashian, Jr. (“Bashian”), president of Bashian Bros., was at all relevant times on the executive board of ORIA. Defendant Etessami & Sons was a small, family-owned and operated oriental rug wholesaler, and a member of ORIA. Etessami, at all relevant times, was the secretary/treasurer of Etessami & Sons. Etessami was also the president of Defendant ORIA in 1992 and 1993. Defendant Noonoo is an importer of oriental rugs, and a member of ORIA. Defendant Newman is the president of Noonoo. The American oriental rug market typically involves manufacturers in countries such as Pakistan, Turkey and India, and wholesalers who import the rugs to the United States and then sell the rugs to retailers who sell them to the public. Plaintiffs believe that the importing of rugs through wholesalers then to retailers causes higher rug prices. In response, Plaintiffs created a method to bypass the wholesalers by: (1) taking U.S. retailers on buying trips to the countries where the rugs are produced where they could purchase the rugs directly from the manufacturers; and (2) operating trade shows in the United States where foreign manufacturers could sell directly to retailers. Plaintiffs excluded wholesalers, such as Defendants, from these trade shows. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants conspired to sabotage their efforts to facilitate direct sales between foreign manufacturers and U.S. retailers and specifically, conspired to wreck Plaintiffs’ trade shows. Plaintiffs offer evidence unveiling the activity of ORIA and its members to convince foreign governments, foreign rug trade associations and one domestic rug retailers’ association not to provide financial assistance to two Carpet Group trade shows in November 1993 and August 1994. Plaintiffs also offer documentary evidence intending to show that the defendants were boycotting domestic retailers and foreign manufacturers who supported Plaintiffs trade shows. Plaintiffs provide two declarations of Elsea, in which he avers several incidents intending to illustrate ORIA’s pressure on its members to distance themselves from Carpet Group’s trade fairs. Specifically, Plaintiffs point to various correspondence to show that ORIA and the individual rug importers had pressured independent trade publications to reject advertising for the trade show. Finally, Plaintiffs offer evidence of ORIA’s historical efforts to prevent foreign manufacturers from selling directly to U.S. retailers. Based on the above, Plaintiffs filed the instant action on October 30, 1995. In their Second Amended Complaint, filed September 18, 1997, Plaintiffs allege violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, as well as tortious interference with prospective business relations and tortious interference with contracts. Soon thereafter, Defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (“FTAIA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6a, deprived this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. This Court referred the motion to Magistrate Judge G. Donald Haneke, who submitted a report and recommendation urging dismissal. Based on subsequent submissions of additional evidence by the parties-, the matter was remanded back to Judge Ha-neke for further evaluation. In his supplemental report and recommendation, Judge Haneke affirmed his original report. On October 29, 1999, this Court adopted both reports and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs appealed. The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal, concluding that: (1) the FTAIA did not divest this Court of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) subject matter jurisdiction existed over Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims; and (3) Plaintiffs had antitrust standing. Carpet Group, 227 F.3d at 78. On remand, this Court is now presented with the motions for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), of several of the Defendants. Bashian Bros, seeks summary judgment against Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims on the basis that there is no evidence suggesting that it was a part of any conspiracy to restrain trade or that it monopolized, attempted to monopolize, or conspired to monopolize the importing and wholesale distribution of oriental rugs in the United States. Bashi-an Bros, also seeks summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claims. The Etessami Defendants’ summary judgment motion is based on the following: (1) Plaintiffs cannot establish the elements of conspiracy, as required by section 1 of the Sherman Act; (2) Plaintiffs cannot establish the elements of monopolization, in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act; and (3) Plaintiffs cannot establish the elements of tortious interference with prospective business relations or tortious interference with contracts. The Etessami Defendants also claim that some of the correspondence relied upon by Plaintiffs are petitions to governmental entities or public officials, and thus are protected from antitrust liabihty under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Similarly, the Newman Defendants seek summary judgment, claiming that their actions are protected by the Noerr-Penning-ton doctrine. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) when the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the evidence establishes the moving party’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1366 (3d Cir.1996). In making this determination, the Court must draw ah reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Hullett v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 38 F.3d 107, 111 (3d Cir.1994); Nat’l State Bank v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 979 F.2d 1579, 1581 (3d Cir.1992). Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the party opposing the motion must establish that a genuine issue as to a material fact exists. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Township, 772 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir.1985). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment cannot rest on mere allegations and instead must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1130-31 (3d Cir.1995). “[Unsupported allegations in [a] memorandum and pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment.” Schoch v. First Fid. Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir.1990); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (requiring the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial”). If the nonmoving party has failed “to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, ... there can be ‘no genuine issue of material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir.1992) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548). In determining whether there are any issues of material fact, the Court must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a material fact against the moving party and draw all reasonable inferences-including on issues of eredibility-in favor of the non-moving party. Watts v. Univ. of Del., 622 F.2d 47, 50 (3d Cir.1980). Although the “traditional summary judgment standard applies with equal force in antitrust cases,” the meaning attributed to circumstantial evidence will vary depending upon the challenged conduct. Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1001 (3d Cir.1994) (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992)). For instance, “evidence of conduct which is ‘as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy,’ without more, does not support an inference of conspiracy.” Id. at 1001 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1348). In comparison, where the “alleged conduct is ‘facially anticompetitive and exactly the harm the antitrust laws aim to prevent,’ no special care need be taken in assigning inferences to circumstantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 478,112 S.Ct. 2072.) Accordingly, where an antitrust plaintiff has only proffered ambiguous evidence, “the Supreme Court has required [that plaintiff submit] ‘evidence tending to exclude the possibility’ of independent action, i.e., ‘direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the alleged conspirators had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.’ ” Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 79 L.Ed.2d 775 (1984)). ANALYSIS I. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine In Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961) and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965), the Supreme Court held that antitrust liability cannot be predicated solely on petitioning to secure government action even where those efforts are intended to eliminate competition. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine thus protects citizens from being penalized for exercising their first amendment right to petition the government. The doctrine extends to persons who petition all types of governmental entities, including legislatures, administrative agencies and courts. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972). In fact, the Noerr Court described only one exception to this immunity, often named the “sham” exception: “There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified.” 365 U.S. at 144, 81 S.Ct. 523. In later cases, the Supreme Court refined the applicability of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to anticompetitive behavior. In Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 108 S.Ct. 1931, 100 L.Ed.2d 497 (1988), the Court explained: The scope of [the Noerr-Pennington ] protection depends ... on the source, context, and nature of the anticompeti-tive restraint at issue. Where a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private action, those urging the governmental action enjoy absolute immunity from antitrust liability for the anticompetitive restraint. In addition, where, independent of any government action, the anticompetitive restraint results directly from private action, the restraint cannot form the basis for antitrust liability if it is incidental to a valid effort to influence governmental action. 486 U.S. at 499, 108 S.Ct. 1931 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court’s decision in Allied Tube also highlighted the boundaries of the term “governmental action.” In determining whether a private organization which set and published product standards and codes related to fire protection engaged in governmental action, the Court reasoned, [T]he Association cannot be treated as a “quasi-legislative” body simply because legislatures routinely adopt the Code the Association publishes. Whatever de fac-to authority the Association enjoys, no official authority has been conferred on it by any government, and the decision-making body of the Association is composed, at least in part, of persons with economic incentives to restrain trade. We may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that a government acts in the public interest. A private party, on the other hand, may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own behalf. The dividing line between restraints resulting from governmental action and those resulting from private action may not always be obvious. But where ... the restraint is imposed by persons unaccountable to the public and without official authority, many of whom have personal financial interests in restraining competition, we have no difficulty concluding that the restraint has resulted from private action. 486 U.S. at 501-02, 108 S.Ct. 1931 (citations omitted). Although a Noerr-Pennington defense may not be dismissed on the ground that the conduct at issue did not involve “direct” petitioning of governmental officials, the doctrine does not immunize every concerted effort that is genuinely intended to influence governmental action. Id. at 503, 108 S.Ct. 1931. Rather, “the Noerr immunity of anticompetitive activity intended to influence the government depends not only on its impact, but also on the context and nature of the activity.” Id. at 504, 108 S.Ct. 1931. Where such activity is essentially political, and cannot be segregated from the activity’s impact on business, it is protected. Id. at 505, 108 S.Ct. 1931. Conversely, where such activity does “not take place in the open political arena, where partisanship is the hallmark of deci-sionmaking,” id. at 493,108 S.Ct. 1931, and “can be more aptly characterized as commercial activity with a political impact,” the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not apply. Id. at 507,108 S.Ct. 1931. In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assoc., 493 U.S. 411, 110 S.Ct. 768, 107 L.Ed.2d 851 (1990) (“SCTLA”), the Supreme Court reiterated that anticompet-itive behavior “is not outside the coverage of the Sherman Act simply because its objective was the enactment of favorable legislation.” 493 U.S. at 424, 110 S.Ct. 768. SCTLA involved a boycott by a group of lawyers in private practice who acted as court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases in the District of Columbia which was aimed at forcing the District to increase hourly compensation. In response to 'the boycott, the Federal Trade Commission filed suit, complaining that the SCTLA engaged in a classic restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. Defendants claimed Noerr-Pennington immunity. The Court clarified Noerr’s holding that “no violation of the Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws,” stressing that “in the Noerr case the alleged restraint of trade was the intended consequence of public action; in this case the boycott was the means by which respondents sought to obtain favorable legislation.” 493 U.S. at 424-25, 110 S.Ct. 768 (emphasis in original) (citing Noerr, 365 U.S. at 135, 81 S.Ct. 523). The Court concluded that defendants’ concerted action in refusing to accept further assignments until their fees were increased was a plain violation of the antitrust laws. Id. at 428, 110 S.Ct. 768. Thus, in SCTLA, the Court distinguished between a restraint resulting from governmental action, which is protected, and a restraint resulting from private action directed at the government, which is not protected. Before evaluating Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims, this Court must first determine whether Defendants’ behavior is entitled to the Noerr-Pennington immunity. At issue are the following communications: • September 24, 1992 letter from Etes-sami, as president of ORIA, to a Pakistani Minister of Commerce, copied to the Export Promotion Bureau of Pakistan (“EPB”) and the “PCEM Association” (Abbey Green Deck, Ex. 6.); • July 23, 1993 letter from Etessami, as president of ORIA, to the Secretary of the Carpet Export Promotion Council of India (“CEPC”) (Id., Ex. 7.); • Notes from a September 29, 1993 meeting between George Bashian, Newman and “two Paks” revealed discussions about “respecting] the channels of distribution.” (Id., Ex. 23.) Bashian testified that Newman gave a lecture at this meeting in which he urged the Pakistani gentlemen present to respect U.S. channels of distribution for oriental rugs. (Id., Ex. 67 at 84.); • January 18, 1994 fax from Newman, on Noonoo Rug Company letterhead, to the Pakistan Carpet Manufacturers and Exporters Association (“PCMEA”) PCMEA, copied to Wool and Carpet Review (“WCR”), EPB, and ORIA (Michael Ira Asen Cert., Ex. B.); and • March 21, 1994 fax from Newman, on Noonoo Rug Company letterhead, to the Vice-Chairman of the EPB, copied to PCMEA and ORIA (Id., Ex. C.) The Etessami Defendants argue that the 1992 and 1993 letters from ORIA may not constitute the basis for antitrust liability since they are petitions to governmental entities or officials, and therefore such actions are immune based upon the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The Newman Defendants similarly claim that its 1994 faxes are entitled to Noerr-Pennington immunity as they were directed to Pakistani government officials. In response, Plaintiffs first challenge whether the PCMEA and the CEPC are actually governmental entities which trigger the applicability of the doctrine. For instance, Plaintiffs assert that the 1992 letter to the Pakistani Minister of Commerce is not entitled to the NoerrPennington immunity because a copy of the letter was forwarded to the PCMEA, which Plaintiffs contend is not a government agency. Plaintiffs appear to acknowledge that the Minister of Commerce is a public official; however, they argue that forwarding the 1992 letter to PCMEA vitiated the Noerr-Pennington protection. Similarly, Plaintiffs urge this Court to deny Noerr-Pennington immunity to the March 1994 fax because it was also copied to PCMEA, despite the fact that it was directed to the EPB-whose government status Plaintiffs do not challenge. However, in the absence of supporting legal authority for Plaintiffs position, this Court is constrained to hold that a letter sent to a governmental authority is not exempt from the application of the Noerr-Pen-nington doctrine and its protection simply because such letter was copied to a private party. (Green Deck, Ex. 6 at 3.) With regard to the January 1994 fax, which was in fact directed to the PCMEA, Plaintiffs insist that the PCMEA is not a governmental entity: “[a]s its name reflects, it is a trade association of manufacturers and exporters.” (Pl.’s Opp. to Etessami at 26.) As proof of PCMEA’s private party status, Plaintiffs highlight Newman’s reference to PCMEA as a trade association in his March 1994 letter. In response, Defendants contend that the PCMEA is a quasi-governmental agency, and cite to a letter written by Yacoob H. Salehji (“Salehji”), Chairman of the PCMEA describing the relationship between the PCMEA and Pakistani government: There is no “official” government agency for the carpet industry, which is why EPB and the Government of Pakistan rely on PCMEA for direction and advice. PCMEA operates, and historically has operated, as a government agency to the extent that it advises and influences policy; it is involved in all aspects of the Government’s role in the carpet industry. (Ira Asen Reply Cert., Ex. A.) For the reasons expressed by the Supreme Court in Allied Tube, this Court nonetheless finds that the PCMEA is a private party under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See 486 U.S. at 501, 108 S.Ct. 1931 (“[W]here ... the restraint is imposed by persons unaccountable to the public and without official authority, many of whom have personal financial interests in restraining competition, we have no difficulty concluding that the restraint has resulted from private action.”). For instance, PCMEA is a member of the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce & Industry (“FPCCI”), which is a corporate body licensed by the Pakistani government. Although Defendants argue that the FPCCI- and thereby PCMEA-is a governmental agency, this Court notes that FPCCI’s “primary aim is to promote, encourage, and safeguard the interest of [the] private sector in Pakistan and to serve as a bridge between the business community and the government.” (available at http:// www.g77tin.org/fpccihp.html.) As a self-described “representative body of the private business and industry,” it is clear that PCMEA and other similar associations within the FCPPI are “composed, at least in part, of persons with economic incentives to restrain trade.” Id.; see also Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 501, 108 S.Ct. 1931. Importantly, Salehji’s assertions, without more, do not demonstrate that the Pakistani government so fully relied upon the PCMEA in formulating oriental rug industry policies such that the PCMEA retained government-like authority. Cf. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 573 F.Supp. 833, 838 (N.D.Ill.1983) (Municipalities’ adoption of professional associations’ standards and complete rebanee on their testing procedures in the promulgation of industry requirements “resulted in a near complete delegation of governmental authority to these otherwise private entities,” and thus estabbshed a quasi-governmental agency under Noerr-Pennington.). Plaintiffs similarly argue that the CEPC, although involved with the government, is not a government agency. As with the PCMEA, Plaintiffs first note Etessami’s own reference to the CEPC as a “trade association” in his July 1993 letter, which begins with the sentence: “We have come to understand that your Trade Association may be considering co-sponsoring a Rug Exhibition to be held in Chicago in November 1993.” (Green Deck, Ex. 7.) Plaintiffs also highlight the deposition testimony of ex-ORIA president Dan Hodges (“Hodges”), who stated his understanding that the CEPC is “the conduit between the manufacturer and the government; [i]t is a body made up, I believe, of both government and industry representatives.” (Pl.’s Ex. 65 at 98.) Lastly, Plaintiffs point to the Ministry of Textiles website, which along with other Export Promotion Councils, lists the CEPC as one of the “incorporated organisations [sic] of exporters of the products concerned,” and states that each group has a nominee of the Ministry of Textiles. (available at http://texmin.nic.in/tex_07.htm.) The website also notes that the CEPC’s objective is “promotion of exports of carpets” and that the council receives “grant-in-aid from Government [sic] for its export promotion activities like organization of fairs/exhibitions/seminars/buyer seber meets, etc.” Id. Based on the above, this Court finds that neither the PCMEA nor the CEPC are government entities, as is required for application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The CEPC and PCMEA are listed as “Export Promotion Councils” and “Industry/Trade Bodies,” respectively. (available at http://texmin.nic.in/tex_07.htm and http://www.pakistan-korea-trade.org/item-nol7.htm.) Rather than governmental entities, the two groups appear to be more akin to ORIA itself, a self-described “National Association of Importers and Wholesalers.” (Green Deck, Ex. 6.) The fact that the CEPC has a nominee from the Ministry of Textiles does not make the entire council a governmental agency. Therefore, Defendants’ petitioning of PCMEA and CEPC is not protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as the lobbying of governmental authorities. Conversely, Plaintiffs have produced no evidence suggesting that the EPB and Pakistani Minister of Commerce are not government entities and officials. Rather, Plaintiffs contend that, to the extent that the persons contacted by Defendants were public officials, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not apply to the lobbying of foreign governments. Indeed, there has been some dispute as to whether the doctrine applies to the petitioning of foreign officials. See, e.g., Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 473 F.Supp. 680, 690 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (“It is an open question whether [the Noerr-Pennington ] doctrine ... has any application to the lobbying of foreign governments.”); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F.Supp. 92, 108 (C.D.Cal.1971) (“Examination of the premises underlying Noerr indicates that the case’s rationales do not readily fit into a foreign context.. .One of the roots of the Noerr decision was a desire to avoid a construction of the antitrust laws that might trespass upon the First Amendment right of petition. The constitutional freedom “to petition the Government” carries limited if indeed any applicability to the petitioning of foreign governments.”); Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1366 (5th Cir.1983) (“We reject the notion that petitioning immunity extends only so far as the first amendment right and then ends abruptly. The Sherman Act, as interpreted by Noerr, simply does not penalize as an antitrust violation the petitioning of a government agency. We see no reasons why acts that are legal and protected if done in the United States should in a United States court become evidence of illegal conduct because performed abroad.”); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962) (Although not specifically addressing the issue of whether Noerr-Penning-ton applied in the foreign context, the Court distinguished Noerr factually rather than holding the doctrine inapplicable to the foreign petitioning in dispute). This Court agrees with the rationale articulated by the Fifth Circuit and implied by the U.S. Supreme Court: lobbying of foreign governments, whether performed at home or abroad, is protected from antitrust liability under Noerr-Pennington. To the extent that Defendants sought political action from Pakistani officials, their actions were not illegal simply because they were petitioning foreign, rather than domestic, government officers. Finally, Plaintiffs maintain that even if certain of Defendants’ conduct is protected under Noerr-Pennington, the Supreme Court’s decision in SCTLA forecloses Defendants’ reliance upon the doctrine. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants “did not merely lobby the government to reject participation in CGI’s trade shows. They engaged in a wide-ranging coercive boycott, one aspect of which was to force the government not to participate.” (Pl.’s Opp. to Newman at 28.) The parties seem to agree that SCTLA provides clear parameters as to its limitation on Noerr-Pennington. For example, “conduct that seeks to influence government to act in a way that would restrain trade is protected, but conduct that in and of itself restrains trade, even if designed to obtain government action, is not protected.” (Etessami Defs.’ Reply at 10; see also, Plaintiffs Opp. to Newman at 30-31.) Thus, the issue that remains is whether Defendants’ “alleged restraint of trade was the intended consequence of public action, [or] ... the means by which [Defendants] sought to obtain favorable legislation.” SCTLA 493 U.S. at 424-25, 110 S.Ct. 768 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs argue that Defendants attempted to restrain CGI’s trade shows and business plans and sought assistance from the Pakistani government in doing the same. Plaintiffs describe Defendants’ interactions with Pakistani officials as follows: • in 1992 ORIA President Etessami threatened “negative repercussions” if the government of India continued to support efforts that break the normal chain of distribution; • in 1993 Etessami threatened that CEPC support of CGI would “jeopardize” the prosperous relationship between importers and manufacturers; • in 1993 Hodges demanded that [the] CEPC provide him with the names of Indian manufacturers who were participating, so that he could boycott them; • Hodges later reiterated his demand for names, implying that he was going to share them with other ORIA members at the August 30 general membership meeting; • shortly before the 1993 Chicago trade show, a delegation of importers demanded that Pakistan “respect” the channels of distribution; • in 1994, Newman announced he was boycotting a Pakistani exhibition as a means of compelling the PCMEA to pressure the EPB into not supporting the trade show; • Newman wrote directly to the EPB and told them that he and ORIA opposed the trade show, and any assistance to [the show] would lead to “ill will and chaos;” • threats directed at the PCMEA forced that private association to demand an end to EPB assistance to show participants. (Pis.’ Opp. to Newman at 28-29.) In reviewing the evidence, this Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party — Plaintiffs. This Court concludes that Defendants did not simply lobby Pakistani government to deny CGI support, but that they themselves engaged in efforts to undermine Plaintiffs’ trade shows. Indeed, most of Plaintiffs’ allegations are directly attributable to Defendants’ behavior, rather than any government action. Even if Defendants’ ultimate goal was to secure Pakistani government support of their position on the appropriate chain of distribution in the oriental rug industry, SCTLA teaches that the injuries resulting from such efforts may still be the basis for antitrust liability. 493 U.S. at 425,110 S.Ct. 768. Defendants have failed to demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ injury was caused solely or even primarily by government action, particularly in light of this Court’s finding that the CEPC and PCMEA are private entities. Thus, Plaintiffs’ injury cannot be classified as “incidental to [Defendants’] valid effort[s] to influence governmental action.” Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 499, 108 S.Ct. 1931. To the contrary, any action secured on the part of the Pakistani government would have been in addition to Defendants’ own attempts to undermine CGI’s efforts. This Court therefore determines that the restraint alleged by Plaintiffs is largely the result of private action directed at the government, rather than governmental action, and that consequently, most of Defendants’ conduct is not subject to Noerr-Pennington protection. Nonetheless, to the extent that Defendants petitioned the EPB and Pakistani Minister of Commerce not to subsidize CGI’s trade shows and other business efforts, their actions are protected by Noerr-Pennington. (See Green Deck, Ex. 6; Ira Asen Cert., Ex. C.) However, the remainder of Defendants’ conduct-including their communications with the CEPC and PCMEA, is not immune, and thus may be the basis of antitrust liability. (See Green Deck, Ex. 7; Ira Asen Cert., Ex. B.) II. The Remaining Evidence Since Defendants’ actions are not protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, this Court must evaluate whether Plaintiffs have provided evidence sufficient to maintain their antitrust and related state law claims. Plaintiffs rely upon the following evidence: • In a letter dated September 24, 1992, Etessami, as president of ORIA, wrote to Pakistan’s Minister of Commerce in response to the EPB’s support of a Pakistani manufacturer’s direct supply to a U.S. department store: “I cannot emphasize enough the damage that would be done to our cooperative efforts if the [EPB] were to make funds available to a department store for the promotion of one sale ... Our message is simple: work with the American importer in promoting your rugs and not around him.” (Green Deck, Ex. 6.); • In a letter to Beijing DDB Needham Advertising, dated September 25, 1992, ORIA, through its Executive Director, Lucille Laufer (“Laufer”), admitted that it strongly recommended to two trade publications that they “not accept ads from manufacturers, because their retail readership would contact manufacturers directly, cutting out the importer.” (Fierst Deck, Ex. 5.) A year later, in a September 1, 1993 memorandum, Plaintiffs noted that Rug News-one of the trade publications mentioned in Laufer’s letter-rejected advertising by CGI with the explanation that it did not accept ads promoting foreign manufacturers, and asserting that CGI’s trade fair would damage oriental rug importers. (Id., Ex. 24.); • The minutes from an ORIA meeting, dated December 7,1992, state that Etes-sami met with Mr. Da from the Chinese Exports Association (“CEA”), and explained to him that he would not be able to deal directly with retailers, but that the CEA had to “go through our members.” (Id., Ex. 8 at 2.); • On May 1, 1993, Plaintiffs received a letter from Roz Rustigian (“Rustigian”), President of the Oriental Rug Retailers Association (“ORRA”), requesting that Elsea make clear that his views and endeavors are not on behalf of, or sanctioned by, ORRA. (Fierst Deck, Ex. 68.) Notes from an ORIA meeting, dated May 24, 1993, suggest that Laufer, ORIA’s Executive Director, contacted ORRA and urged the group to disassociate itself from Elsea. (Id., Ex. 11.) In an undated memorandum to ORRA board members, Rustigian stated: “Over the past year ORRA has made significant progress in mending fences with its sister organization ORIA ... Last year a letter went out under my signature that effectively distanced ORRA from Carpet Group International ... The building process is slow ... and it will come to a grinding halt, in my opinion, if we even entertain the notion of joining forces with Carpet Group International. Both Dan Hodges and Gene Newman have gone on record requesting that ORRA continue to disassociate itself from Mr. Elsea’s efforts ...” (Id., Ex. 39.); • On July 23, 1993, Etessami, as President of ORIA, threatened that CEPC’s support of CGI would “possibly jeopardize a very friendly and prosperous relationship that American Importers and Indian Manufacturers have worked diligently on developing.” (Green Deck, Ex. 7.); • On August 11, 1993, Hodges, as President of Pande Cameron and Company of New York, demanded that the CEPC provide him with the names of Indian manufacturers who were participating, so that he could boycott them: “Once again, I would also appreciate your sending to me the names of those exporters from India who plan on exhibiting [with CGI’s November trade fair]. These would be exporters, I can assure you, we would avoid in any future business discussions.” (Fierst Deck, Ex. 15); • Hodges later reiterated his demand for names, implying that he was going to share them with other ORIA members at the August 30 general membership meeting (Fierst Deck, Ex. 17.) The CEPC eventually complied with Hodges request, sending a list of CEPC participants in the November 1993 trade fair (Id., Ex. 20.); • Minutes from ORIA’s August 30, 1993 meeting state: CGI’s November show “was discussed and it was decided not to deal with it since the show will not succeed. Of course there has been certain communication between ORIA and India’s Carpet Promotion Bureau and ORRA.” (Fierst Deck, Ex. 22.); • In a September 15, 1993 memorandum, Plaintiffs note that the Zarnegian International Rug Co., which had registered to participate in CGI’s November 1993 trade fair, informed Plaintiffs that it could no longer participate since Zarne-gian’s ORIA membership and benefits would be in jeopardy if it did. (Id., Ex. 28); • Notes from a telephone conversation with Durusel of Durusel Carpet Co., dated September 27, 1993, suggest that Du-rusel stated that he had to cancel his booth with the trade fair because ORIA was opposing the show and he was told by ORIA that only one other Turkish Exhibitor would be attending and that the show would fail. Durusel also allegedly stated that he would like to show at the fair, but was afraid of what was going on. (Id., Ex. 27.); • Elsea’s handwritten notes, dated September 27, 1993, indicate a conversation with “Ron O’Calahan” from Decorative Rug Magazine in which O’Callaghan stated that the magazine “is withdrawing acceptance of our ads-He stated that the ORIA & other importers including Bas-hian, NooNoo Rug Co., and Noury & Sons would quit advertising-He also stated that ORIA is actively opposing the show and has pressured his publication to run editorials against the show ...” (Id., Ex. 25.); • In notes from a December 7, 1993 ORIA board members’ meeting, Newman read a memo that was to be distributed to all members regarding CGI’s November 1993 fair which “cut out the role of the importer in the chain of distribution.” (Id., Ex. 31.) Lee Harounian “suggested to boycott the exhibitor/manufacturers of that show.” Bashian “suggested to ignore the issue.” Finally, “[i]t was later decided that the above memo should not go to all members but to the board members only.” (Id.) A list of the exhibitors was purportedly attached to the “memo” regarding Carpet Group, though not produced by Defendants. (Id., Ex. 32.); • On January 18, 1994, Newman wrote to the PCMEA, stating that he would not attend the Pakistan Hand-knotted Carpet Exhibition, since he was unwilling “to participate in [or] attend seminars or exhibitions which have been arranged by some of the very individuals or groups who do not adhere to correct business practices.” (Ira Asen Cert., Ex. B.); • In March, 1994, Elsea began negotiations with the ORRA Board of Trustees to cosponsor CGI’s 1994 trade show. (Fierst Deck, Ex. 36.) On March 23, both Newman (as President of NooNoo Rug Co.) and Hodges (as President of ORIA) sent separate letters to ORRA President Rustigian to discourage ORRA from “promoting, sponsoring, or sanctioning” the trade show. (Id., Exs. 37 and 38, respectively.) Specifically, Hodges stated, “We would naturally hope that the ORRA would not entertain any thoughts whatsoever in being involved and therefore lending credence to Carpet Group International.” (Id., Ex. 38.); • On March 21, 1994, Newman wrote (on NooNoo letterhead) to the Vice-Chairman of the EPB, “I am aware that another exporter to retailer rug exhibition is planned for August in Washington, D.C. My personal opposition to this type of activity, as well as that of the ORIA of which I am Executive Board member, is unequivocable [sic] ... I urge the PCMEA and EPB not to encourage nor support the ‘renegade’ activities and selfish motives of a few Pakistani trader/exporters and their American retail counterparts. To do so would be to continue on the road leading to ill will and chaos.” (Ira Asen Cert., Ex. C.); • On March 28,1994, Hodges, as President of ORIA, sent a letter to Rustigian offering to assist any financial disadvantages to ORRA’s disassociation from CGI: “If divorcing yourself form [sic] the CGI exacerbates whatever fiscal problems might exist within ORRA, I would be more than happy to accompany Gene Newman in any discussions we might have toward helping you overcome these problems.” (Fierst Decl., Ex. 40.) ORIA’s attempts to prevent ORRA’s sponsoring of CGI was also documented in ORIA’s meetings minutes, dated March 31, 1994 and April 12, 1994. (Id., Ex. 42, 44.) The minutes from the April 12, 1994 ORIA meeting states, for example: “Roz Rustigian the president of ORRA has been contacted by Dan and Gene and has promised not to endorse the show as a group. Gene urged the members who import from Pakistan, India and other countries to write the proper Export Promotion authorities in those countries and advise them not to participate in this show.” (Id., Ex. 44 at 2.) The minutes from the August 16,1994 ORIA meeting reveal ORIA member Aram Jerrehian’s request that the prior statement by Gene be amended from “Gene Newman urged the members who import ...” to “Gene Newman suggested that the individual members and not the organization ...” (Id., Ex. 52.); • In a June 1, 1994 letter to ORIA, PCMEA Vice-Chairman Imran Malik states, “As a first step towards rebuilding the old relationship, the Association has decided not to officially participate in the Washington Fair being held in August this year, and have also requested the Export Promotion Bureau, Government of Pakistan not to give any facility to the intending participants ... [N]o manner of encouragement or patronage will be provided by the Association to any firm desiring to participate in its personal capacity.” (Id., Ex. 50) (emphasis in original); • On April 25, 1994, Floor Covering Weekly published a news article about CGI’s August 1994 trade show. (Id., Ex. 45.) The next day, Newman sent a fax to Floor Covering Weekly, lamenting, “I cannot understand why you would publicize an exhibition whose main purpose is to exclude the importer/wholesaler (your advertiser base) in favor of direct trade between foreign exporters and American retailers.” (Id.) At ORIA’s May 10, 1994 meeting, Laufer “suggested writing [Floor Covering Weekly] a letter to investigate all Press Releases before publishing them.” (Id., Ex. 47 at 3.) On June 20, 1994, notes recorded on CGI paper state: “I spoke with Gail Corte-lyou at Floor Covering Weekly at 1:00 pm today-She told me FCW has been getting pressure from the ‘Importer’ not to do favorable stories on [CGI’s trade fairs].” (Id., Ex. 48.); • On May 25, 1994, Bill Hirsch, owner of W. Hirsch, Inc. Oriental Rugs, made the following notes from a call with Joel of Kelaty International: “the whole market knows about me & Elsea’s group[,] we will not be able to get rugs from anyone ... We are being dealt with from both ends[,] i.e., can not get supplied in U.S., also those who supply us from overseas will be boycotted by importers ...” (Id., Ex. 49.); • Istanbul Grand Bazaar (“IGB”), an importer of Turkish rugs, and member of ORIA, participated in the 1993 CGI show. (Elsea Supp. Decl. ¶ 3.) Huseyin Aktug, President of IGB, informed Elsea that IGB would not be able to take part in CGI’s 1994 trade show since he could not be the only member of ORIA to participate. (Id., ¶ 4.); • Another intended participant of the 1994 trade show, Anadol Rugs, also cancelled its contract allegedly at the behest of ORIA. Despite having sent a deposit for a booth in the 1994 trade show (Fierst Decl., Exs. 55, 56), Anadol cancelled its contract, stating: “We have received today a fax from [ORIA] regarding the exhibit you are arranging in Washington, DC. As Anadol Rug Co. we have no intentions whatsoever to attend this exhibit. Please rectify this situation immediately, writing to [ORIA] that it was a mistake on your part.” {Id., Ex. 58.); • On April 11, 1995, Hodges, as President of ORIA, wrote to Carpet-E-World in response to an editorial published by the trade publication in support of allowing manufacturers in the ORIA Atlanta Rug Fair. Hodges reiterated that “[t]here is an established chain of distribution (from manufacturer/exporter to wholesaler/importer to retailer),” and warned, “Our Association will obviously take every measure possible to insure the continuation of a long established and successful form of distribution.” (Id., Ex. 60.) III. Section 1 of the Sherman Act Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states, in relevant part: Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997). To establish a Section 1 violation, Plaintiffs must prove: (1) concerted action by Defendants; (2) that produced anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and geographic markets; (3) that the objects of the conduct pursuant to the concerted action were illegal; and (4) that Plaintiff was injured as a proximate result of the concerted action. Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir.1993). “Without proof of all of these elements,” Plaintiffs’ claim must fail. Id. Although the “traditional summary judgment standard applies with equal force in antitrust cases,” the meaning attributed to circumstantial evidence will vary depending upon the challenged conduct. Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1001 (3d Cir.1994) (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992)). For instance, “evidence of conduct which is ‘as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy,’ without more, does not support an inference of conspiracy.” Id. at 1001 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1348). In comparison, where the “alleged conduct is ‘facially anticompetitive and exactly the harm the antitrust laws aim to prevent,’ no special care need be taken in assigning inferences to circumstantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 478,112 S.Ct. 2072.) Accordingly, where an antitrust plaintiff has only proffered ambiguous evidence, “the Supreme Court has required [that plaintiff submit] ‘evidence tending to exclude the possibility’ of independent action, i.e., ‘direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the alleged conspirators had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.’ ” Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 79 L.Ed.2d 775 (1984)). As suggested above, “a nonmovant Plaintiff in a section 1 case does not have to submit direct evidence, i.e., the so-called smoking gun, but can rely solely on circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence.” Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1230. In determining whether certain behavior amounts to a prohibited restraint, this Court must apply one of two methods of analysis. Depending on “the essence of the concerted action in dispute,” Defendants’ actions will be analyzed under either the “per se” or the “rule of reason” method. In re Baby Food Antitrust Litigation, 166 F.3d 112, 117-118 (3d Cir.1999). The “rule of reason” analysis requires “a case-by-case method that involves consideration of all of the circumstances of a case to decide whether certain concerted action should be prohibited because it amounts to an anticompetitive practice.” Id. at 118. In comparison, the “per se” standard “presumes that the questionable conduct has anticompetitive effects without comprehensive inquiry into whether the concerted action produced adverse, anti-competitive effects.” Id. “Per se” violations “include those types of restraints on competition that are in and of themselves considered unreasonable because their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable.” Id. In this case, the Third Circuit has already determined that the “per se” analysis is the appropriate method of review. Carpet Group, 227 F.3d at 74 (Although “the Supreme Court ... has curtailed the application of per se analysis in cases alleging concerted refusals to deal in recent years[,] ... the plaintiffs[’] claims appear to fail within that class of cases that still enjoys per se analysis.”). A. Concerted Action In Alvordr-Polk, the Third Circuit noted: “The very essence of a section 1 claim ... is the existence of an agreement. Indeed, section 1 liability is predicated upon some form of concerted action.” 37 F.3d at 999. Both Bashian Bros, and the Etessami Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they engaged in concerted activity. First, Defendants argue that their mere membership in ORIA cannot give rise to an inference of conspiracy. James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 557 F.Supp. 1058, 1064-65 (D.Del.1983). Rather, “proof of knowing, intentional participation in illegal activities of members of the trade association will support a Sherman Act cause of action.” Id. at 1065 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co., 513 F.Supp. 1100, 1149 (E.D.Pa.1981), rev’d on other grounds, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.1983), rev’d 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). Thus, “mere membership, even when coupled with knowledge of wrongful conduct of the association, is insufficient to establish knowing participation.” Id. (citing Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 465 F.Supp. 195, 231 (S.D.N.Y.1978), aff'd, 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.1979)). Nonetheless, it is important to note that the standard of knowing participation is not onerous. In fact, “[k]nowing participation may occur when members tacitly or expressly ratify the known illegal actions of the association or individual members.” Id. 1. Bashian Bros. Bashian Bros, thus first disputes the existence of any evidence demonstrating that Bashian Bros, knowingly participated in a conspiracy with other ORIA members. Bashian Bros, emphasizes that although it was a member of ORIA, and attended ORIA meetings through its president George Bashian, Jr. (“Bashian”), “Mpportunities to conspire are not probative of whether firms did in fact conspire; an opportunity to conspire will always exist.” Brown v. Cameron-Brown Co., 1980-2 Trade Cases ¶ 63,400 at p. 76040, 1980 WL 1856 (E.D.Va.1980). To their detriment, Plaintiffs rely on the Second Circuit’s decision in Phelps Dodge Refining Corp. v. FTC, 189 F.2d 393, 396-97 (2d Cir.1943), for the proposition that membership alone coupled with knowledge of illegal activity is sufficient to impose civil liability. (Pis.’ Supp. Mem. in Opp. to Bashian Bros, at 3.) Neither the Third Circuit nor any federal district court in the District of New Jersey has published an opinion directly on this issue. Other courts, however, have noted that Phelps ’ “membership-ratification theory ... has not retained the force of law.” Wilk v. American Medical Assoc., 671 F.Supp. 1465, 1492 (N.D.Ill.1987). As noted by the court in Wilk, numerous courts have since required actual knowledge of, and participation in, an illegal scheme in order to find concerted action by members of associations. Id. (citing Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 231-33 (9th Cir.1974); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 465 F.Supp. 195, 231 (S.D.N.Y.1978), aff'd, 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.1979); and James Julian, 557 F.Supp. at 1058.). This Court finds the reasoning of these latter cases more persuasive. Accordingly, in order to avoid summary judgment, Plaintiffs must produce evidence raising a genuine dispute as to Bashian Bros.’ active participation in the alleged ORIA conspiracy. In support of Bashian’s participation in the ORIA conspiracy, Plaintiffs submit various correspondence and Bashian’s deposition testimony. {See Pis.’ Opp. to Bas-hian Bros, at 29-33; Pis.’ Supp. Opp. to Bashian Bros, at 5-12.) The vast majority of Plaintiffs’ evidence relies upon Bashian Bros.’ membership in ORIA and Bashian’s presence at meetings where CGI activities were discussed. Such evidence, as noted above, is not sufficient to establish Bashian Bros.’ liability and thus will not be discussed here. The most persuasive factual allegations regarding Bashian Bros.’ participation in the conspiracy can be summarized as follows: • Testimony from Hodges that Bashian was shown drafts of “provocative” letters for his approval (Fierst Deck, Ex. 14 at 200-01.); • Bashian’s testimony that he knew about Newman’s refusal to attend the Pakistan Hand-knotted Carpet Exhibition (Id., Ex. 12 at 128-29.); • A letter from Newman to PCMEA, dated July 1,1992, in which Newman specifically alludes to Bashian (Ira Asen Cert., Ex. H.); and • Elsea’s notes from a conversation with Ronald O’Callaghan, publisher of Decorative Rug Magazine, in which O’Callaghan mentioned Bashian Bros.’ threats to quit advertising if the magazine accepted Plaintiffs’ advertisements. (Id., Ex. 25.) Unfortunately, such evidence does not raise a genuine issue as to Bashian Bros.’ participation in the ORIA conspiracy. Certainly, Plaintiffs could make out their case entirely upon circumstantial evidence, and the reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence. Alvord-Polk, 37 F.3d at 1000. However, Bashian Bros, correctly points out that “antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a § 1 case.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Ra dio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That is, Plaintiffs must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts ... .Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Alvordr-Polk, 37 F.3d at 1001' (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348). Plaintiffs have failed to meet this burden. Plaintiffs admit that the alleged conspiracy “was carried out largely through the sending of threatening letters to exporters, associations, publications, government officials and others.” (Pis.’ Supp. Mem. in Opp. to Bashian Bros, at 11.) Yet Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence tending to demonstrate that Bashian Bros, prepared, contributed to, or authorized any of the “provocative” correspondence supporting an ORIA conspiracy. For instance, Hodges’ testimony that Bashian was shown drafts of “provocative” letters is rather speculative. Plaintiffs provide the following excerpt of Hodges’ testimony: A.... There are some letters I will send to the association for Lucille [Laufer] to bounce off whoever [sic] she deems most appropriate for their adjudication, not her. I imagine she might well have shown this to George Bashian. Q. Why would she show it to him? A. He is a well-respected man. Q. Why this letter as opposed to any other letter? A. Again, there is no rhyme or reason to this. Q. Why is it that you think this particular letter is one that she might have shown to George Bashian? A. I’m just suggesting that George Bashian-perhaps I said something incorrectly or you misinterpreted what I said. George Bashian is one of the people to whom certain letters might be bounced off because he used to be a lawyer. He is very well respected. Q. When you say certain letters might be bounced off him, can you be more specific as to what type of letters might be bounced off him? A. Letters that, in my judgment, at any particular moment in time might be considered provocative, but again, there is not a standard there. Q. Is this letter, the letter to Mr. Nath we’ve been talking about, is that one that you would consider to be provocative? A. Not necessarily. (Fierst Decl., Ex. 14 at 200-01.) Bashian, himself, denies ever seeing or approving such letters during Hodges’ and Etessami’s tenures as president of ORIA. (George Bashian Cert. ¶ 2.)' Bashian’s denial is corroborated by Laufer, who stated that she did not recall showing letters written by Hodges or Etessami to Bashian for his input or approval. (Lucille Laufer Cert. ¶ 2.) Hodges’ admitted speculations, in the context of this conflicting testimony, do not raise a genuine issue as to whether Bashian did in fact review such letters. Bashian’s testimony as to his knowledge of Newman’s refusal to attend the Pakistan Hand-knotted Carpet Exhibition is similarly unpersuasive. Indeed, Bashian testified that, “I have a vague recollection of hearing people in the market, I don’t remember who, saying that Gene Newman was not going to attend this exhibit.” (Fierst Deck, Ex. 12 at 129.) When pressed further, Bashian denies any memory of hearing Newman’s reasons for not attending the exhibit as well as with whom he discussed this information: “Like I say, it is a small industry, and somebody said Gene is not going to that trade show. Again, it was a matter of absolutely no importance to me.” (Id. at 129.) Plaintiffs offer no evidence to dispute Bashian’s testimony. Plaintiffs’ attempt to draw an inference of Bashian’s participation in the ORIA conspiracy from Newman’s July, 1, 1992 letter is also far-reaching. It is important to note that the letter relates Newman’s concern with the “flagrant copying of [carpet] designs” rather than Plaintiffs’ attempts to bypass the wholesaler/importer in the sale of oriental rugs. (Ira Asen Cert., Ex. H.) Thus, Newman’s statement that “I and my fellow importers such as Mansour Rahma-nan and George Bashian, Jr. say to you: It is time to put our house in order,” bears little if any relevance to the conspiracy alleged against Plaintiffs. (Id.) Plaintiffs do not suggest that they were targeted for copying carpet designs. Accordingly, their reliance on this evidence is without merit. Plaintiffs’ final piece of evidence, notes from Elsea’s conversation with Ron O’Callaghan (“O’Callaghan”) from Decorative Rug Magazine, would be their most persuasive were it admissible. Bashian Bros, argues that Elsea’s handwritten notes documenting a conversation with O’Callaghan are hearsay. This Court agrees. This Court may not properly consider hearsay in evaluating the merit of Defendants’ summary judgment motions. Elsea’s recounting that O’Callaghan told him that “ORIA & other importers including Bashian ... would quit advertising” if the magazine accepted CGI’s ads does not fall within any exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 803. Moreover, Elsea’s notes are expressly contradicted by O’Callaghan’s testimony that “[n]o one from Bashian Bros, or ORIA ... ever contacted me and threatened to quit advertising in The Decorative Rug Magazine if we accepted advertisements from Mr. Elsea for his Chicago trade show.” (Ronald O’Callaghan Cert. ¶ 2.) Contrary to Plaintiffs’ allegations, the evidence further suggests that Bashian attempted to disassociate himself from a boycott targeted at exhibitors who participated in CGI’s 1993 trade show. Specifically, Bashian’s response to Harounian’s call for such a boycott at a December 7, 1993 ORIA meeting was recorded as: “Bashian suggested to ignore the issue.” (Fierst Decl., Ex. 31.) Bashian Bros, points to the testimony of Laufer, which corroborates Bashian’s rejection of Harou-nian’s suggestion. (Howard Nashel Cert., Ex. F. at 74-75.) Plaintiffs, in response, contend that even if Bashian objected to a retaliatory boycott, “he did not object to the other concerted conduct directed at preserving the importers’ position in the chain of distribution.” (Pis.’ Opp. to Bas-hian Bros, at 13.) Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Bashian seemed more incensed by the term “boycott” than the desire to enforce the chain of distribution. To be sure, Bashian states that he became “livid at [Harounian’s] use of the word ‘boycott’.” (Nashel Cert., Ex. E at 106.) Nonetheless, Plaintiffs’ suggestion that Bashian quibbled only with the actual language used by Harounian, rather than the behavior defining the terra, is unsupported supposition, and thus inadequate to raise a genuine dispute as to Bashian’s actions at the December ORIA meeting. Based on the above, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine dispute as to Bashian’s participation in the ORIA conspiracy to undermine CGI’s trade shows. Accordingly, Bashian Bros.’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ Section 1 claims is granted. 2. Etessami Defendants Like Bashian Bro