Full opinion text
ORDER ADJUDICATING PARTIES’ MOTIONS AND CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARMSTRONG, District Judge. Plaintiff Katherine G. (“Plaintiff’ or “Katherine”), by and through her guardian ad litem, Cynthia G., brings the instant action pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the “IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., against the Kent-field School District and the Marin County Office of Education (collectively, “Defendants” or the “District”), seeking review of portions of a special education administrative hearing decision. The District has filed a counterclaim against Katherine also pursuant to the IDEA, seeking review of different portions of the decision. The parties are presently before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiffs Motion”) and Defendants’ Cross-motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Claim (“Defendants’ Cross-motion”), which relate to Katherine’s claim against the District, and on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Their Counterclaim (“Defendants’ Motion”) and Plaintiffs Cross-motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiffs Cross-motion”), which relate to the District’s counterclaim against Katherine. Having read and considered the- papers submitted and being fully informed, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion and GRANTS the District’s Cross-motion, and DENIES the District’s Motion and GRANTS Plaintiffs Cross-motion. BACKGROUND A. Factual Summary Katherine is a minor child who resides in the Kentfield School District, which lies in Marin County, California. In or around 1998, Katherine, who was then three years old, was diagnosed with language disorder. At her initial Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) meeting on June 19, 1998, the IEP team found Katherine eligible for special education services under the IDEA. In September 1998, Katherine was placed in a special day pre-school class (the “SDC”) taught by Clara Yourman, a credentialed special day class teacher and certified speech and language pathologist, at Marindale. Katherine attended Ms. Yourman’s class for five hours per day (8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.), four days per week (Tuesday through Friday), during the entire 1998-1999 school year, as well as the 1999-2000 school year. In March 1999, in preparation for the upcoming annual IEP meeting, Ms. Your-man administered several tests to Katherine to assess her in the areas of receptive and expressive language “to determine her current functioning, goals and placement.” The IEP team subsequently convened in May 1999. At the meeting, the team reviewed Ms. Yourman’s speech and language assessment and Katherine’s goals and objectives, as written in the IEP. The team recommended that Katherine remain in Ms. Yourman’s SDC for the remainder of the 1999-2000 school year, a continuation of Katherine’s previous goals and objectives (none of which had been achieved), direct occupational therapy one time each week, and a 19-day extended school year program in Ms. Yourman’s SDC for the communicatively handicapped. In August 1999, Katherine’s parents contracted with Dr. llene Lee, a psychologist in private practice, to provide behavioral consultation services for the family. In September 1999, Katherine began attending the “after-school” program at ABC Academy (“ABC”) three days each week for a total of 12 to 15 hours each week during the 1999-2000 school year. ABC was a private preschool located outside Kentfield that served children from preschool through the second grade. Katherine was enrolled at ABC Academy for “day care” purposes and to provide her with opportunities to interact with nondis-abled, same-age peers. Katherine’s “after-school” program included nondisabled preschool-age children. Katherine also went on to attend ABC’s summer school program, taught by Jamaica Stevens, for six weeks (between three and four days each week for a total of 12 to 15 hours each week) during the summer of 2000. In September 1999, Katherine’s parents contacted Paula Cline from Kentfield School District (“Kentfield”) and inquired whether Kentfield would provide transportation from Marindale to ABC. Their request was denied. Beginning in either February or March 2000, Katherine’s parents sought private speech and language therapy services at the recommendation of Dr. Lee. Two different speech and language pathologists, Janet Rizzi and, then, Teri-Lyn Cousley, provided a number of therapy sessions for Katherine. In the spring of 2000, Cynthia G. contacted Ms. Cline to discuss transportation for Katherine from Marindale to her afternoon placement at ABC and to discuss whether Kentfield would provide an aide to work with Katherine at ABC. On March 6, 2000, an IEP meeting was convened to discuss Ms. G.’s requests. The IEP agreed that the Early Intervention Program (“EIP”) staff would take “an informal look” at Katherine’s program at ABC to determine if she required an aide at ABC. After observation of Katherine at ABC by members of the EIP staff, and a subsequent IEP meeting in April 2000, the IEP team denied both of Ms. G.’s requests — an aide at ABC and transportation services. Also in April 2000, Ms. Yourman assessed Katherine in preparation for the upcoming annual IEP meeting. Ms. Your-man administered a number of tests, which indicated that Katherine’s expressive language had improved in her SDC over the past year; however, the tests also indicated that Katherine was not quite ready for participation in a full inclusion placement in a regular kindergarten and that she required a structured environment for further improvement. Katherine’s parents sent a letter dated April 25, 2000, about one week before Katherine’s annual IEP meeting was scheduled to convene, to the superintendent of Kentfield. The letter expressed, among other things, their concern that placing Katherine in a special day class would not be in her best interests and that the G.’s were seeking to have Katherine placed in the regular kindergarten classroom at Bacich Elementary (“Ba-cich”), a Kentfield elementary school. Katherine’s annual IEP meeting convened on May 1, 2000, and again on May 25, 2000. The parties, however, failed to reach an agreement with regard to Katherine’s placement for the 2000-2001 school year or the 2000 ESY. Katherine’s parents were of the position that Katherine should be enrolled at Bacich during the 2000-2001 school year; for the 2000 ESY, they desired Katherine to be placed at ABC for six weeks, provided an aide, and provided speech therapy by Patricia Toboni, occupational therapy at ABC, and audio integration training. Kentfield’s representatives, however, were apparently of the view that Katherine should remain in Ms. Yourman’s SDC. Over the summer, Katherine’s parents procured private speech and language services, as well as “auditory integration training,” and continued Katherine’s placement at ABC. She did not attend any Kentfield program, nor did she receive any related services from Kentfield during the summer of 2000. On August 7, 2000, Kentfield sent a letter to Katherine’s parents regarding the proposed placement for the 2000-2001 school year. Kentfield offered placement in the morning, kindergarten special day class at Coleman Elementary School taught by an experienced and qualified special day class instructor, and an inclusion experience in the regular education kindergarten class at Bacich from 12:00 p.m. to 2:15 p.m. every day. In addition, Kentfield offered direct speech and language services, three sessions per week, thirty minutes per session; speech therapy consultations with a teacher, once every two weeks, thirty minutes; direct occupational therapy services, two sessions per week, thirty minutes per session; occupational therapy consultation with a teacher, sixty minutes per month; transportation services; Ms. Yourman’s consultation with each of Katherine’s teachers for a total of 15-30 minutes per week; and the current SDC teacher’s consultation with the regular education teacher, 15-30 minutes per week. Katherine’s parents rejected this proposed placement. They enrolled her instead at Trinity Lutheran School (“Trinity”), a private school, for the 2000-2001 school year and engaged private support services. B. Procedural History 1. Due Process Hearing Before, and Decision by, SEHO Hearing Officer In early June 2000, both Katherine and the District separately requested a due process hearing. Trevor Skarda, Hearing Officer (the “HO”) for the California Special Education Hearing Office (“SEHO”), presided over the consolidated hearing. The hearing took place over the course of eleven days in August, September, and October 2000. The HO heard testimony from seventeen witnesses and considered extensive documentary evidence. The parties submitted closing memoranda, and the hearing was deemed closed as of December 12, 2000. On January 5, 2001, the HO issued a 33-page written decision (the “Decision” or “Dec.”). The HO found that the District failed to provide Katherine with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) for the 1999-2000 school year and the 2000 ESY. (Dec. at 13-24, 32.) Specifically, the HO found that the District committed a procedural violation of the IDEA by failing adequately to discuss with Katherine’s parents opportunities for “mainstreaming” — placement in a regular academic setting. (Id. at 17.) This failure, the HO found, resulted in the loss of educational opportunity for Katherine, and therefore it constituted a denial of an FAPE. (Id.) The HO also found that Katherine’s placement was “substantively” inappropriate because it was not designed to meet Katherine’s unique needs, it was not reasonably calculated to provide her with some educational benefit, it did not comport with her IEP, and it was not provided in the least restrictive environment. (Id. at 17-24.) But the HO also found that the District did offer Katherine an FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year. (Id. at 24-27, 32.) In particular, the HO reviewed the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing and concluded that a full inclusion placement, the alternative urged by Katherine’s parents, even supplemented with appropriate aides and services, would provide Katherine with no educational benefit. (Id. at 24-27.) In light of this finding, the HO concluded that a full inclusion placement would not provide Katherine with an FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year, and therefore the District complied with its obligations under the IDEA. (Id. at 27.) The HO ordered the District to reimburse Katherine’s parents for one-half of the tuition they paid to ABC and Katherine’s transportation costs, but he denied Katherine’s request for reimbursement of expenditures for private speech and language therapy sessions, consultation services provided by Dr. Lee, occupational therapy services, and auditory integration training. (Id. at 28-32.) The HO also found that Katherine was not entitled to compensatory education services. (Id. at 32.) The HO apprised the parties that they had the right to appeal the Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction within 90 days of receipt of the Decision. (Id. at 33.) 2. Litigation in This Court Katherine filed a Complaint against the District in this Court on April 4, 2001, seeking review of the HO’s Decision pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). Katherine seeks an order that the HO’s Decision be set aside; a declaration that the District denied her an FAPE for the 2000 ESY and the 2000-2001 school year, including the 2001 ESY, by failing to offer her a full inclusion placement, including appropriate related services; reimbursement of costs her parents incurred as a result of the private placement and provision of private services; and for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, both in the underlying administrative action and in the instant action. On June 13, 2001, the District filed an Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint (the “Answer”), and it also filed a Counterclaim for Relief from Administrative Decision Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415 & FRCP 13(a) & (c) (the “Counterclaim”). The Counterclaim asserts a single counterclaim, which is also brought pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). This counterclaim challenges the HO’s findings in his Decision that the District failed to provide Katherine an FAPE for the 1999-2000 school year and for the 2000 ESY and that Katherine was entitled to reimbursement for one-half tuition and transportation. The Counterclaim prays that the Court, inter alia, vacate the portion of the Decision challenged by the Counterclaim and permanently enjoin SEHO from ordering or causing the District to retroactively fund Katherine’s private school placement, services, transportation, and related costs; issue a declaratory judgment that the Decision violated the provisions of the IDEA; and award to the District any costs, fees, and damages to which the District is entitled by law and which the Court deems reasonable. Katherine filed Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant’s Counter-claim (the “Reply”) on July 10, 2001. The Reply asserts affirmative defenses, including: that the Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; that the District’s counterclaim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations; and that the counterclaim is moot. On September 27, 2001, Katherine filed a Motion to Supplement Administrative Record, in which she asked the Court to allow her to augment the record from the administrative hearing below with evidence not included in the record. The Court denied Katherine’s motion in an Order filed on June 11, 2002. On October 1, 2002, the District filed Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, and on October 2, 2002, Katherine filed Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement (sic). Each motion sought summary judgment on each party’s respective claim. Both motions, however, were woefully deficient with regard to providing evidentiary citations in support of the factual assertions set forth therein. The motions also raised certain procedural barriers to appropriate resolution of the parties’ claims. Accordingly, in an Order Denying Without Prejudice Motions for Summary Judgment (the “Order Denying Motions Without Prejudice”), filed on January 13, 2003, the Court denied the motions without prejudice to their being renewed with sufficient evidentiary citations and according to certain procedural parameters. In its Order, the Court established a briefing schedule that provided for the parties’ filing motions for summary judgment on their respective claims and cross-motions for summary judgment on the opposing party’s claims. Pursuant to that briefing schedule, the parties have filed the motions and cross-motions that are presently before the Court. The District has also filed two objections to evidence and a request for judicial notice. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Motions for Summary Judgment Generally Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is warranted against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the “absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the movant meets this burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts demonstrating a genuine factual issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The nonmoving party “cannot rely on the mere possibility of a factual dispute ... to avert summary judgment.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 701 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir.1983) (summary judgment properly granted where defendant failed to present any admissible evidence to support its position); accord Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (“A summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on conelusory allegations unsupported by factual data.”). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Thus, an opposition that fails to identify and reference triable facts is insufficient to preclude the Court’s granting of a properly supported summary judgment motion. See Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. La. Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1545 (9th Cir.1988) (per curiam). Nonetheless, any inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. That the evidence may be available in a party’s voluminous exhibits is of no consequence. The Court is not obligated to consider matters not specifically brought to its attention. See Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Cal. Prac. Guide: Fed. Civ. Proc. Before Trial § 14.145.2 (Rutter Group 1993). The opposition to a summary judgment motion must designate and reference specific triable facts. Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that “when a party relies on deposition testimony in a summary judgment motion without citing to page and line numbers, the trial court in its discretion may exclude the evidence”); Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 990-91 n. 2 (9th Cir.1991) (“[T]he law of this circuit ... recognizes that a district court is under no obligation to mine the full record for triable issues of fact.”) (citation omitted); La. Hydrolec, 854 F.2d at 1545 (“In the absence of specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial, a properly supported summary judgment motion should be granted.”); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1034 (D.C.Cir.1988) (“Appellant’s failure to designate and reference triable facts was, in light of the language of Rule 56(c) and governing precedent, fatal to its opposition.”); Nissho-Iwai Am. Corp. v. Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1307 (5th Cir.1988) (rejecting notion that “the entire record must be searched and found bereft of a genuine issue of material fact before summary judgment may be properly entered”). Thus, it is immaterial that evidence helpful to plaintiff may have been presented somewhere in the record. B. IDEA Claims 1. Standard of Review of State Administrative Decision The IDEA confers on any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made in a state administrative due process hearing regarding the provision of an FAPE the right to bring an original civil action in a state court of competent jurisdiction or in federal district court to review the findings and decision. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). The party challenging the decision bears the burden of persuasion on its claim. Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir.1994). The district court’s review of the decision is somewhat deferential. “Because Congress intended states to have the primary responsibility for formulating each individual child’s education, [courts] must defer to their ‘specialized knowledge and experience’ by giving ‘due weight’ to the decisions of the states’ administrative bodies.” Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 888 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting in part Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-08, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982)). This review, which has been characterized as a “modified de novo review” or “involved oversight,” requires the district court to carefully consider the administrative agency’s findings. Susan N. v. Wilson Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 751, 758 (3rd Cir.1995). “The amount of deference accorded the hearing officer’s findings increases where they are thorough and careful.” Capistrano Uni fied Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir.1995). After such consideration, “the court is free to accept or reject the findings in part or in whole.” Susan N., 70 F.3d at 758. 2. Consideration of Evidence In reviewing an administrative decision, “the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2) (B). While 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) empowers the district court to hear testimony not presented during the administrative hearing, the court has wide discretion in determining what additional evidence shall be considered. See Town of Burlington v. Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 791 (1st Cir.1984), aff'd sub nom. Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington v. Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985). The Ninth Circuit has construed “additional” to mean “supplemental” evidence. Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1993). The court may exercise its discretion and allow supplementation in cases due to “gaps in the administrative transcript owing to mechanical failure, unavailability of a witness, an improper exclusion of evidence by the administrative agency, and evidence concerning relevant events occurring subsequent to the administrative hearing.” Id. (quoting Town of Burlington, 736 F.2d at 790). However, “additional” evidence is not evidence which merely repeats or embellishes evidence or testimony presented below. Id. In addition, the court must be mindful “of not allowing a party to undercut the statutory role of administrative expertise, the unfairness involved in one party’s reserving its best evidence for trial, the reason the witness did not testify at the administrative hearing, and the conservation of judicial resources.” Id. In short, “the trial court ... must be careful not to allow such [additional] evidence to change the character of the hearing from one of review to a trial de novo.” Id.; see also Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J., 267 F.3d at 877 (“Complete de novo review ... is inappropriate.”). DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff’s Motion and Defendants’ Cross-motion Plaintiffs Motion and Defendants’ Cross-motion seek summary judgment in the respective moving parties’ favors on Katherine’s claim. The motions present the following issues: First, did the HO properly apply the appropriate analytical framework and consider all of the facts presented in evaluating whether Katherine was provided an FAPE for the 2000 ESY and the 2000-2001 school year? Second, under the appropriate analytical framework, does the evidence in the record support a finding as a matter of law that Katherine was provided an FAPE, or does it support a finding that she was not provided an FAPE? The Court addresses these issues in turn. 1. Did the HO Properly Apply the Appropriate Analytical Framework and Consider Ml of the Facts Presented in Evaluating Whether Katherine Was Provided an FAPE for the 2000 ESY and the 2000-2001 School Year? Neither Katherine nor the District take issue with the HO’s articulation of the framework for analyzing whether Katherine was provided an FAPE. Where they part company is on the issues of whether he correctly applied the appropriate framework and whether he considered all the facts presented at the hearing. Despite the parties’ agreement as to the appropriate analytical framework, the Court will review whether the framework articulated by the HO was correct. It will then turn to the areas of dispute between the parties. a. Accuracy of HO’s Articulation of the Appropriate Framework for Determining, for Purposes of IDEA Claims, Whether an FAPE Was Provided The HO, citing Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982), set out the following general framework for determining whether Katherine was provided an FAPE for the relevant time periods: “the analysis of whether a student has been provided a FAPE is twofold, requiring the hearing officer to determine whether the procedural safeguards of the IDEA have been satisfied and to determine whether the FAPE provided was substantively appropriate.” (Dec. at 15.) With regard to “procedural appropriateness,” the HO observed, placement must be provided consistent with the various procedural protections for the student and the student’s parents established under the IDEA, such as the parents’ right to participate in the development of the student’s IEP. (Id. at 14-15.) Noncompliance with procedural directives, however, does not require a finding of denial of an FAPE unless it results in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringes on his or her parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP process. (Id. at 15.) With regard to “substantive appropriateness,” according to the HO, an appropriate placement must (1) be designed to meet the student’s unique needs; (2) be reasonably calculated to provide him or her with some educational benefit; (3) comport with his or her IEP; and (4) be provided in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”). (Id. at 14.) The HO stated that in determining whether the placement is in the least restrictive environment, under Ninth Circuit law, he was to employ a balancing test in which four factors were to be considered: (1) the educational benefits available to the disabled student in a regular classroom, supplemented with appropriate aides and services, as compared with the educational benefits of a special education classroom; (2) the nonacademic benefits of interaction with children who are not disabled; (3) the effect of the disabled student’s presence on the teacher and the other children in the regular classroom; and (4) the cost of mainstreaming the disabled student in a regular classroom. (IcL at 25.) Despite the parties’ wholesale embracement of the HO’s articulation of the applicable analytical framework, the HO’s overarching substantive/procedural analytical paradigm finds no support in the relevant authorities. Although the HO cited Row-ley for the aforementioned two-step inquiry involving “procedural appropriateness” and “substantive appropriateness” of the placement provided the disabled student, Rowley establishes a somewhat different two-step inquiry: [A] court’s inquiry in suits brought under § 1415[ (i)(2) ] is twofold. First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the [IDEA]? And second, is the individualized education program developed through the [IDEA’S] procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits? If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more. 458 U.S. at 206-07, 102 S.Ct. 3084 (emphasis added). Rowley thus creates an analytical distinction between (1) whether the school district complied with the IDEA’S various procedural requirements and (2) whether the IEP developed for the disabled student is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. Id. It does not, as the HO apparently believed, (see Dec. at 15), distinguish between the procedural appropriateness and the substantive appropriateness of the child’s placement. Turning to the application of this framework in the instant case, Katherine has never placed in issue whether the IEP developed for her was reasonably calculated to enable her to receive educational benefits — the second step of the Rowley inquiry. She has argued only that certain procedures under the IDEA were not honored: with regard to the 1999-2000 school year and the 2000 ESY, she claims that the District failed to comply with several procedural safeguards established for her and her parents’ protection under the IDEA, resulting in denial of educational opportunity; with regard to the 2000-2001 school year, she argues that the placement she was offered was not in the least restrictive setting. The HO evidently construed Katherine’s first challenge (concerning compliance with various IDEA procedural safeguards) as relevant to the “procedural appropriateness” of her placement and the second (concerning the LRE mandate) as relevant to the distinct issue of the “substantive appropriateness” of her placement. Review of relevant Ninth Circuit authorities, however, makes clear that both of these challenges to the District’s compliance with its obligations under the IDEA are “procedural,” falling under the first step of the Rowley inquiry. In Poolaw v. Bishop, 67 F.3d 830 (9th Cir.1995), the Ninth Circuit applied the two-step analytical framework of Rowley to determine whether the defendant school district had complied with its obligations under the IDEA. Poolaw, 67 F.3d at 834. As part of its review the court, inter alia, considered the plaintiffs’ argument that the district had failed to mainstream the disabled student to the maximum extent appropriate as required by 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (now 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A)). Id. Significantly, the court addressed this argument by expressly placing it under the “procedural compliance” prong — the first step — of the two-step Rowley analytical framework. Id. at 834-36. Katherine’s argument that the District failed to honor the IDEA’S procedural safeguards is no less, and no more, a procedural challenge for purposes of the Row-ley framework. In W.G. v. Board, of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23, Missoula, Montana, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant school district had flouted the procedural safeguards of the IDEA and Montana law by developing the IEP at issue without the input and participation of the student and the student’s parents, the student’s regular classroom teacher, or any representative of the private school which the student was attending. 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir.1992). The Ninth Circuit expressly considered this challenge under the first step of the Roivley test, the “procedural compliance” inquiry. Id. at 1485. Because it concluded that the district had failed to comply with the IDEA’S procedures, it did not address the second step of the Rowley analysis — whether the resulting IEP was reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. Id. These authorities demonstrate that although the HO may have found it useful to distinguish between the procedural appropriateness and the substantive appropriateness of Katherine’s placement for purposes of his discussion of the relevant issues, the distinction itself has no basis in law, at least insofar as the HO purported to apply the Rowley analytical framework. Both of Katherine’s challenges — that the District failed to honor certain procedural safeguards and that the District failed to offer Katherine placement in the least restrictive environment — fall under the first step of the Roivley inquiry. The HO was correct that “[procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process do result in the denial of a FAPE,” (Dec. at 15). The Ninth Circuit has expressed the rule cited by the HO in this way: “Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE. However, procedural inadequacies that result in the loss of educational opportunity, or seriously infringe the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process, clearly result in the denial of a FAPE.” W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484 (citations omitted). (“Procedural flaws,” as the foregoing discussion makes clear, include not just violations of the IDEA’S procedural safeguards, but also noncompliance with other procedural obligations imposed by the IDEA, such as the LRE requirement.) By its plain language, this rule does not posit that procedural inadequacies must result in the loss of educational opportunity or seriously infringe the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process for a denial of an FAPE to be found; it posits only that such results are clearly sufficient to constitute a denial of an FAPE. Accordingly, denial of an FAPE can be found in other situations contemplated by the IDEA, such as where the educational instruction provided fails to address the child’s unique needs, where the school district fails to provide adequate support services so the child can benefit from the instruction, where the instruction and services are not provided at public expense and under public supervision, where they do not meet the state’s educational requirements, or where they do not comport with the child’s IEP. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-89, 102 S.Ct. 3034; Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir.1995). Denial of an FAPE can also occur, as discussed above, where the child’s placement does not comply with the IDEA’S requirement that it be in the least restrictive environment. Compliance with this last obligation is determined in the Ninth Circuit by balancing the following four factors first articulated in Sacramento City Unified School District, Board of Education v. Rachel H.: (1) the educational benefits of placement full-time in a regular class; (2) the non-academic benefits of such placement; (3) the effect the student has on the teacher and children in the regular class; and (4) the costs of mainstreaming the student. 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir.1994). Accordingly, although the HO’s distinction between procedural appropriateness and substantive appropriateness and his underlying multi-pronged tests for procedural and substantive appropriateness were not based on any specific analytical construct established by the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit, the substantive tests he invoked for determining whether Katherine was denied an FAPE — i.e., the four-prong test for “substantive appropriateness,” the related four-factor balancing test for whether Katherine was placed in the least restrictive environment required by the IDEA, and the two-part test for whether “procedural flaws” result in a denial of an FAPE — were fully supported by the applicable authorities. The Court therefore concludes that the HO’s articulation of the relevant analytical approach was consistent with applicable law and, therefore, appropriate. b. HO’s Application of Relevant Factors for Determining Whether Katherine Was Denied an FAPE for the 2000-2001 School Year Katherine argues that, with regard to the HO’s analysis and findings for the 2000 ESY and the 2000-2001 school year, the HO failed to conduct a full analysis because he failed to consider all four factors articulated in Rachel H. relevant to determining whether the District’s placement of Katherine would have been in the least restrictive environment. Instead, according to Katherine, the HO considered only the first factor, namely whether placement in a full inclusion setting would have resulted in educational benefit for Katherine. The District responds that under Poolaw v. Bishop, 67 F.3d 830 (9th Cir.1995), the HO acted properly because not all four factors are equal. According to the District, “[i]f a hearing officer or a court finds that a child cannot receive meaningful educational benefit in a regular classroom placement, this finding trumps the other [Rachel H.] factors, irrespective of whether they weigh in favor of mainstreaming.” (Defs.’ Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. at 12.) At the outset, the Court notes that although Katherine takes issue with the HO’s analysis and findings regarding the 2000 ESY, as well as those for the 2000-2001 school year, Katherine presents no substantive argument or analysis regarding the HO’s discussion of the 2000 ESY. Indeed, it is a mystery why Katherine is challenging the HO’s conclusion that she was entitled to a full inclusion placement for the 2000 ESY (which conclusion was based on his belief that the 2000 ESY was not a new school year, but merely a continuation of the 1999-2000 school year), since the HO nevertheless concluded that she was denied an FAPE for the 2000 ESY. (Dec. at 24.) Even though the HO awarded Katherine only a fraction of the costs for which she sought reimbursement for the 2000 ESY, the HO’s decision to do so did not turn on his conclusion that Katherine was not entitled to a .full inclusion placement for the 2000 ESY. (See id. at 28-32.) Katherine does not explain in any respect why she believes the HO erred by not awarding her all the costs she sought for the 2000 ESY or by concluding that she was not entitled to a full inclusion placement for the 2000 ESY; the entirety of her arguments in her motion for summary judgment are directed to the HO’s findings and analysis for the 2000-2001 school year. Since Katherine bears the burden of proof in challenging the HO’s findings and decision, Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir.1994), the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion and GRANTS Defendants’ Cross-motion with respect to the portion of Katherine’s claim relating to the 2000 ESY. Turning to the 2000-2001 school year, Katherine is correct that the HO considered only the first factor of the four-factor balancing test articulated in Rachel H. (The HO did, however, state in a footnote that the District did not dispute the last of the Rachel H. factors; thus, the HO concluded, the issue of costs of mainstreaming Katherine was “not relevant.” (Dec. at 25 n. 26.)) The question, then, is whether the HO’s decision to do so was appropriate. Both Katherine’s arguments and the District’s arguments have a degree of merit. On the one hand, Katherine is correct that Rachel H. envisions consideration and balancing of all four of the relevant factors. See Poolaw, 67 F.3d at 836-37 (noting that the Ninth Circuit in Rachel H. held that a court “should consider” the four factors and analyzing the facts at issue with respect to each of the four factors). On the other hand, the District is correct that Poolaw strongly suggests that where a court finds that mainstreaming will provide no educational benefit— that is, that the first factor weighs entirely against a finding that the school district has failed to provide the student with instruction and services in the least restrictive environment — that finding can be dis-positive of the entire LRE analysis, even if the other three factors weigh in favor of mainstreaming. See id. (noting that “the IDEA is primarily concerned with the long term educational welfare of disabled students” and dismissing the non-academic benefits of mainstreaming the plaintiff-student and the lack of any detrimental effect on classroom and teacher where mainstreaming would provide no educational benefit). Accordingly, the Court concludes that although the HO should have considered all four of the relevant factors for, if nothing else, the sake of thoroughness, the HO properly determined that his finding that mainstreaming would provide Katherine with no educational benefit was dis-positive of the entire LRE analysis. But the mere fact that the HO could properly base his overall LRE determination on his analysis of the first factor does not mean that his analysis is entitled to deference. If the HO did not consider all the material evidence in the record that would be relevant to his analysis of the first factor, the HO’s analysis would not be entitled to deference. The Court now turns to a consideration of the HO’s review of the relevant evidence. c. HO’s Consideration of Evidence in Evaluating the First Factor of the Four-factor Rachel H. Test for Compliance with the IDEA’S Mainstreaming Requirement The thrust of Katherine’s assault on the HO’s analysis of whether the District provided her with an FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year is that the HO failed to consider the testimony of four key witnesses — Pat Territo, Jamaica Stevens, Patricia Toboni, and Patty Reader-Harrison, — placed too much weight on the testimony of certain other witnesses, and too easily dismissed the testimony of several others. The District does not deny that the HO failed to consider the testimony of the four witnesses, but it contends that the testimony of three of them were not entitled to much credence. The District also asserts that the HO properly dismissed the testimony of certain witnesses and properly credited the testimony of certain others. The Court agrees with Katherine that the HO’s failure to consider the testimony of the four witnesses mentioned above was significant and inexcusable, regardless of whether their testimony was ultimately persuasive. Ms. Territo was the director of ABC, and Ms. Stevens was Katherine’s teacher at ABC for the summer of 2000. Ms. Toboni was a private speech therapist retained by Katherine’s family to provide her with speech and language therapy using the Links to Language program. And Ms. Reader-Harrison was the instructional aide hired by Katherine’s family for assistance at Trinity. Surely these four witnesses’ testimony was worth consideration and discussion. In light of the HO’s failure to address the testimony of these four witnesses, the Court concludes that the HO’s ultimate finding regarding the first Rachel H. factor — that mainstreaming would not provide Katherine with any educational benefit — -is not entitled to deference. The Court now conducts a de novo review of the HO’s analysis and the record to determine whether the District’s putative placement of Katherine for the 2000-2001 school year was in the least restrictive environment consistent with the IDEA. 2. Does the Evidence in the Record Support a Finding that Katherine Was Provided an FAPE for the 2000-2001 School Year? As Katherine correctly observes, (PL’s Mot. at 5), the IDEA does not require that a child with special needs receive the absolute best or “potential maximizing” education, but rather a “basic floor of opportunity” consisting of access to specialized instruction and related services that are individually designed to provide educational benefit. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201, 102 S.Ct. 3034. Consequently, since Katherine is challenging the District’s placement of her for the 2000-2001 school year, to prevail on her motion she will have to show that, based on the evidence in the administrative record, as a matter of law it is more likely than not that a full inclusion setting would have provided her with educational benefit constituting at least that basic floor of opportunity. See Clyde K., 35 F.3d at 1399. The Court must determine whether Katherine has successfully made this showing. Even though the Court has concluded that the HO’s finding that Katherine would not receive any benefit from a fully mainstreamed placement for the 2000-2001 school year is not entitled to deference, the Court need not dismiss all of the HO’s findings and observations; it may properly credit them where they are well-reasoned and well-supported. The Court will therefore defer to the HO’s findings and conclusions where appropriate and weigh them in conjunction with its review of the evidence in the record, including the testimony that the HO failed to consider. a. Evaluation of Testimony Considered by the HO i. Clara Yourman The HO’s Decision suggests that he found most persuasive the testimony of Clara Yourman, Katherine’s special day class teacher for the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 school years. The HO stated that “Ms. Yourman presented as an exceptional witness.” (Dec. at 25.) The HO observed that Ms. Yourman testified that Katherine would not receive educational benefit from placement in the regular Kindergarten classroom at Bacich with an instructional aide and modifications to the curriculum. (Id. at 25-26.) Her opinion evidently rested on her assessment of Katherine’s deficits in the areas of expressive and receptive language, as well as auditory processing, and her conclusion that Katherine had not yet acquired the necessary academic readiness skills to be successful in a full inclusion kindergarten. (Id. at 26.) The HO noted that this view was expressed by all of the District’s employees who testified at the hearing. (Id.) Katherine contends that the HO should not have accorded Ms. Yourman’s testimony much weight. Her criticism of Ms. Yourman’s testimony rests exclusively on the observation that Ms. Yourman “had neither seen the regular education classroom proposed by the District, nor observed Katie in the regular education program at Trinity Lutheran School.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 10.) But Katherine does not provide any explanation as to why these facts undermine the persuasiveness of Ms. Yourman’s testimony. Moreover, Katherine’s citation to the HO’s Decision for the foregoing proposition is inapposite: the cited pages, pages 26 and 27 of the Decision, do not contain any statement to the effect that Ms. Yourman had neither seen the regular education classroom proposed by the District nor observed Katherine in the regular education program at Trinity. At any rate, surely two years of closely working with Katherine, as well as her conducting several tests on Katherine to determine her readiness for Kindergarten, provided Ms. Yourman with tremendous insight into whether she would gain any educational benefit from placement in a full inclusion setting. Moreover, the Court is conscious that the HO was able to observe and listen to Ms. Yourman testify in person, whereas the Court’s review of her testimony is confined to reading a transcript. The HO thus was in a better position than the Court presently is to determine whether Ms. Yourman’s opinion was worth crediting. And the Court can understand why Ms. Yourman was perceived to be an impressive witness: she had an impressive background in terms of education and experience, she spoke knowledgeably about Katherine’s development and the challenges she faced, and she evidently possessed an understanding of the skills Katherine would need to possess to benefit educationally from a full inclusion kindergarten placement. The Court therefore defers to the HO’s evaluation of Ms. Yourman’s testimony and gives substantial weight to Ms. Yourman’s opinion about whether Katherine would benefit educationally from full mainstreaming, ii. llene Lee The next witness whose testimony the HO addressed was Dr. llene Lee, the family’s behavioral consultant. Dr. Lee opined that Katherine would be successful in a full inclusion program with a one-on-one aide. The HO dismissed Dr. Lee’s opinion, however, on the ground that she also opined that no child should be placed in a special day class. (Dec. at 26.) Katherine does not make any effort to dispute the validity of the HO’s dismissal of Dr. Lee’s opinion. The Court agrees with the HO’s decision effectively to assign Dr. Lee’s opinion no weight: if Dr. Lee believed that no child should be placed in a special day class, but there was at least a possibility that the least restrictive environment for Katherine would be a special day class (along with special programs or services), there was no reason to conclude that Dr. Lee’s opinion was objective and informative with regard to Katherine’s particular situation. iii. Robert Koegel The next witness whose testimony the HO addressed was Dr. Robert Koegel. Dr. Koegel was an expert in the field of autism and a professor at the University of California at Santa Barbara, as well as the founder and director of the University’s Autism Research Center. Dr. Koegel watched a video of Katherine shot while she was at ABC, reviewed her records and assessments, and briefly observed her in her current program at Trinity. Based on his observations, record review, and video review, he testified that he believed Katherine could be successful in a regular education program with a one-on-one aide. Although the HO did not explicitly say so, the HO evidently did not accord Dr. Koegel’s opinion substantial weight. The HO specifically cited the facts that Dr. Koegel did not talk to Ms. Yourman, the individual who worked the most with Katherine over the previous two school years, and that he did not observe the proposed kindergarten program at Bacich. (Id.) The HO also noted that Dr. Koegel was of the opinion that full inclusion should always be attempted first, that one cannot know if a child can be fully included until one tries. (Id. at 26-27.) Apparently, these considerations undermined the persuasiveness of Dr. Koegel’s testimony in the eyes of the HO. Katherine argues that the HO erred by not according Dr. Koegel’s opinion more weight. In her opening brief for her motion for summary judgment, Katherine effectively reiterates Dr. Koegel’s qualifications and the basis for his opinion. (See PL’s Mot. at 15-16.) She also points out that, contrary to the HO’s understanding, Dr. Koegel never testified that a full inclusion placement should always be attempted. (Id. at 16.) The District responds that Dr. Koegel did in fact believe that all children with disabilities should be in inclusive placements. (Defs.’ Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. at 13.) The District goes on to argue that the HO properly rejected Dr. Koegel’s opinion based on his categorical approach to placement of disabled children because the IDEA contemplates formulation of individualized programs, not categorical' ones. (Id. at 13-14.) Review of the administrative transcript reveals that Katherine is correct that, contrary to the HO’s understanding of his testimony, Dr. Koegel did not testify that disabled children should always be placed in fully inclusive environments. (See Received Transcript (“RT”) Oct. 17, 2000, at 124:4-24.) Nevertheless, the sole scenario that Dr. Koegel described in which full inclusion would not be appropriate — a scenario that was hypothetical, as Dr. Koegel was unable to describe such a scenario from actual experience — appeared so exceptional as to be fairly unrealistic: A child who who [sic] is um very low functioning in terms of uh being nonverbal and uh also very low functioning cognitively on both standardized tests and behavioral assessments, um and where um the support services in the special day class were very strong, and the support services in the full inclusion classroom were very weak. In that case, um and that particular child is not a child I worked with directly, but in that case I think I would’ve probably recommended the special day class. (Id. at 124:17-24.) The scenario thus entailed not only the existence of a child with severe verbal cognitive disabilities, but also a dramatic discrepancy between the quality of the support services in the special day class and those in the full inclusion classroom. (Id.) There was no suggestion, however, that these conditions are even remotely commonplace. Accordingly, although Dr. Koegel’s views about the suitability of disabled children for placement in a full inclusion setting may not have been literally categorical, they were near-categorical. Given these views, the HO properly discounted Dr. Koegel’s opinion. The IDEA envisions a case-by-case evaluation of the least .restrictive environment for each child. If Congress intended the least restrictive environment for all children to be full inclusion settings, it would have said so. Dr. Koegel’s virtually categorical view that disabled children should be placed in full inclusion settings is at odds with the FAPE inquiry envisioned by the IDEA, and thus his opinion regarding Katherine’s suitability for a full inclusion placement must be accorded little weight. iv. Robert Patterson The last witness whose testimony the HO considered with regard to Katherine’s placement for the 2000-2001 school year was Dr. Robert Patterson. The HO evidently found his testimony and opinions persuasive, as he stated in his Decision that “Dr. Patterson presented as an excellent witness.” (Dec. at 27.) Dr. Patterson was a licensed psychologist, a licensed marriage, family, and child counselor, and a licensed educational pathologist. He also had a doctorate in psychology and family therapy. Dr. Patterson explained that he did not believe Katherine could be successful at the present time in a full inclusion setting, even with a one-on-one aide and other support services. He opined that Katherine had not yet acquired the pre-academic skills to succeed and that an aide in a full inclusion setting would need to be a teacher. Even then, Dr. Patterson testified, she would likely regress. The Court’s review of Dr. Patterson’s testimony and the weight the HO accorded his testimony is similar to the Court’s review of Ms. Yourman’s testimony and the weight the HO accorded her testimony. Similar to her criticism of Ms. Yourman’s testimony, Katherine’s sole criticism of Dr. Patterson’s testimony is that he “never personally observed Katie and had never spoken to anyone who had worked with Katie in a regular education setting.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 10.) But also similar to her criticism of Ms. Yourman’s testimony, Katherine fails to explain why these facts undermine the persuasiveness of his testimony and opinions. In addition, Katherine fails to provide an evidentiary citation for her contention that Dr. Patterson never personally observed Katie and had never spoken to anyone who had worked with Katie in a regular education setting, and therefore the Court, consistent with its Order Denying Motions Without Prejudice, will disregard the contention. Moreover, as with Ms. Yourman, the Court is conscious that the HO was able to observe and listen to Dr. Patterson in person, whereas the Court’s review of his testimony is confined to reading a transcript. The HO thus was in a better position than the Court presently is to determine whether Dr. Patterson’s opinion was worth crediting. Finally, as with Ms. Yourman, the Court understands why the HO found Dr. Patterson to be an impressive witness: Dr. Patterson has strong qualifications and experience, and he clearly displayed a thorough knowledge of the subject matter that he was discussing. The Court therefore defers to the HO’s evaluation of Dr. Patterson’s testimony and gives substantial weight to Dr. Patterson’s opinion about whether Katherine would benefit educationally from full mainstreaming. b. Evaluation of Testimony Not Considered by the HO i. Pat Territo Katherine contends that the HO should have considered the testimony of Pat Ter-rito, the director of ABC. Ms. Territo offered extensive testimony about Katherine’s interaction with other students and her participation in various activities at ABC. Ms. Territo opined that Katherine was ready for a regular education kindergarten. Although Katherine construes Ms. Ter-rito’s testimony as relevant to whether Katherine would gain educational (i.e., academic) benefits from placement in a full inclusion setting — -the first factor of the four-factor Rachel H. test, — a review of her testimony makes clear that her testimony bears only on the non-academic benefits that Katherine might gain — the second factor of the Rachel H. test. As the District correctly points out, the program at ABC in which Katherine was enrolled was not academic. Ms. Territo testified that the morning program at ABC, from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., was the “learning” part of their day, while the afternoon program — the program in which Katherine was enrolled- — was “less structured,” offering “extended care.” (RT Sept. 25, 2000 at 28:24-29:3.) To be sure, Ms. Territo explained that the “philosophy” of ABC was that “children learn through play,” (id. at 29:5-8), but clearly this type of learning at ABC was not educational or academic in the sense of the first factor of the Rachel H. framework. As Ms. Territo explained later on in her testimony, the morning program was “kind of our really organized, uh, academic learning time. We don’t do anything like that in the afternoon.” (Id. at 47:14-15.) Moreover, Ms. Territo testified that she had no understanding of any special learning needs that Katherine might have. (Id. at 57:25-27.) Not surprisingly, when Ms. Territo was asked about the basis for her opinion that Katherine was ready for a full inclusion kindergarten placement, she testified that she based her opinion on the skills that she deemed necessary to succeed in kindergarten, which were (in her view) “listening, following directions, being able to stay focused,” (id. at 40:26-27); there was no discussion whatever of the considerations specifically relevant to Katherine’s learning in an academic classroom environment, in contrast to, for example, Ms. Yourman’s testimony. Based on this review, the Court concludes that Ms. Territo’s testimony was indeed relevant to the LRE inquiry, but only with respect to the second of the Rachel H. factors. It had no bearing on the first factor, regarding the potential for educational/academic benefit. ii. Jamaica Stevens Katherine argues that the HO should have considered the testimony of Jamaica Stevens, Katherine’s teacher at ABC for the summer of 2000. Katherine refers the Court to Ms. Stevens’ observations of Katherine’s participation in various activities in ABC. Ms. Stevens opined that Katherine was learning socially because she had friends and because the other children had accepted her and her problem-solving skills had improved. The Court concludes that, as with Ms. Territo’s testimony, Ms. Stevens’ testimony is relevant to the non-academic benefits available to Katherine from a full inclusion placement but not to the educational (academic) benefits; that is, it is relevant to the second Rachel H. factor but not to the first. As discussed above, the program in which Katherine was enrolled at ABC was not academic. Further, Ms. Stevens testified that the ABC summer program was even less academic than the ABC preschool program throughout the year. (RT Sept. 12, 2000 at 26:14-17.) Moreover, Ms. Stevens testified that she had no experience working with special education students and had taken only one, relatively superficial course on working with children with special needs. (Id. at 30:22-27.) Finally, when asked about Katherine’s academic performance during the summer of 2000, Ms. Stevens replied, “I really can’t say anything on that one. I know, I mean, I know that she can write her name.... And I know that she can follow directions when it comes to something like an art project or a cooking project. But I’ve never really done an academic project with her, so I can’t.” (Id. at 27:9-14, 18-21.) Accordingly, even though Ms. Stevens may have believed that children constantly learn through everyday experience, (see id. at 33:21-26), it is clear that Ms. Stevens’ observations of Katherine and her opinions of Katherine are not relevant to the issue of whether Katherine would have benefit-ted academically from a full inclusion setting. Accordingly, Ms. Stevens’ opinions are not entitled to any weight in the Court’s consideration of the first Rachel H. factor, although they are relevant to the Court’s consideration of the second Rachel H. factor. iii. Patricia Toboni Katherine contends that the HO should have considered the testimony of Patricia Toboni, a private speech therapist retained by Katherine’s family to provide her with speech and language therapy using the Links to Language program. Ms. Toboni was a licensed speech and language pathologist with a Masters degree in Communicative Disorders. Ms. Toboni had experience working with children with Pervasive Development Disorder. She worked with Katherine from May 2000 through the time of the due process hearing. She was familiar with both special day classes and regular education classes. Ms. Toboni opined that Katherine could gain academic benefits from a regular education placement because Katherine had demonstrated the cognitive and linguistic capacity to respond to structure, to res