Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PAULEY, District Judge. This action consobdates for centralized pretrial proceedings more than twenty putative class actions filed in this Court or transferred here by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. The underlying complaints challenge alleged foreign currency conversion policies by VISA and MasterCard, the two largest credit card networks, and their member banks, including Citigroup, Inc., Bank of America Corporation, Bank One Corporation, J.P. Morgan Chase & Company, Providian Financial Corp., and Household International, Inc. A Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint (“Complaint” or “Compl.”) asserts violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., arising out of abeged price-fixing conspiracies by and among VISA, MasterCard, their member banks, and Diners Club concerning foreign currency conversion fees. The Complaint also asserts claims for violations of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., in the banks’ disclosures to their customers. The defendants move to dismiss the Complaint. In addition, some defendants move to compel arbitration. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is denied in part and granted in part, and the motion to compel arbitration is granted. Background On a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the Complaint are accepted as true. There are various payment alternatives in the consumer payment card industry. One involves payment vehicles known as “general purpose cards.” They enable consumers to purchase goods or services from a merchant without directly accessing or reserving funds at the time of the purchase. (Compl.¶¶ 7, 81.) There are two primary types of general purpose cards: “credit cards” and “charge cards.” Holders of credit cards receive a line of credit from the credit card issuer (generally a bank), and are permitted to charge purchases to their credit cards. Then, they may elect to pay the entire amount due within a fixed period of time, or alternatively pay a portion of the amount and finance the remainder over time. (Compl.HH8, 81.) In contrast, holders of charge cards are required to pay the entire amount due within a set number of days after receiving a monthly billing statement. (Compl.¶¶ 9, 81.) A general purpose card transaction includes several different parties: (1) the consumer cardholder; (2) the third-party merchant who accepts the card as payment for goods and/or services; (3) the network association or corporation that owns and operates the network processing the transactions; (4) the bank that issues the card to the consumer; and (5) the bank that contracts with the merchant to accept the card. (Compl.lHI 79, 82.) A typical transaction entails the following: a merchant accepts a credit card from a customer for the provision of goods and services. The merchant then presents the card transaction data to an “acquirer,” typically a bank, for verification and processing. The acquirer presents the transaction data to the association which, in turn, contacts the issuer to check the cardholder’s credit line. The issuer then indicates to the association that it authorizes or denies the transaction. The association relays the message to the merchant’s acquirer, who then relays the message to the merchant. If the transaction is authorized, the merchant will submit a request for payment to the acquirer, which relays the request, via the association, to the issuer. The issuer pays the acquirer; [and finally] the acquirer pays the merchant and retains a percentage of the purchase price for its services which is shared with the issuer. (Comply 88.) A. VISA and MasterCard Associations VISA and MasterCard are the two largest general purpose card networks in the world. (Compl.1186.) Those networks are owned by defendants VISA U.S.A., Inc. (“VISA U.S.A.”) and VISA International Service Association (“VISA International”) (collectively “VISA”), and defendant MasterCard International, Incorporated (“MasterCard”), respectively. VISA and MasterCard are joint ventures or membership associations owned and operated by their member banks. (CompLUK 35, 38, 90.) Their networks execute transactions that use one of their affiliated general purpose cards. (Compl-¶ 79.) In turn, member banks are authorized to issue VISA and MasterCard branded general purpose cards. They are also granted rights similar to those of a shareholder in a corporation, including the right to vote for a board of directors, participate in the governance of the association, and receive dividends. (CompLIffl 35, 38, 92.) The memberships of the VISA and MasterCard associations are virtually identical reflecting a ninety-five percent (95%) overlap. (Compl.¶ 94.) All the defendants in this action, either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate, are members of both VISA and MasterCard, and issue some type of general purpose card. (Compl.¶¶ 13, 92.) Defendant Citigroup, Inc. (“Citigroup”) issues Citibank VISA and MasterCard credit cards, AT & T Universal VISA and MasterCard credit cards, and Diners Club charge cards. (CompU 41.) Citigroup issues its Citibank cards through its wholly-owned subsidiary defendant Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. (“Citibank (South Dakota)”). (Compl.¶¶ 41-42.) The AT & T Universal credit cards are issued through Citigroup’s wholly-owned subsidiaries defendants Universal Financial Corp. and Universal Bank, N.A. Citigroup’s Diners Club charge cards are issued through its wholly-owned subsidiary Citibank (South Dakota), and Citibank (South Dakota)’s wholly-owned subsidiary defendant Citicorp Diners Club, Inc. (“Diners Club”). (Compl.¶¶ 41, 43-44, 47-48.) Defendant Bank of America Corporation (“BOA Corp.”) issues its VISA and MasterCard credit cards through its wholly-owned subsidiary defendant Bank of America, N.A. (USA) (“BOA”). (Compl.¶¶ 49-50.) Defendant Bank One Corporation (“Bank One”) issues its VISA and MasterCard credit cards through its subsidiary defendant First USA Bank, N.A. (“First USA”). (Compl.¶¶ 54-55.) Defendant J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (“J.P. Morgan Chase”) issues its VISA and MasterCard credit cards through its wholly-owned subsidiaries defendant Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A. and defendant The Chase Manhattan Bank. (Compl.¶¶ 59-60.) Defendant Providian Financial Corp. (“Providian”) issues its VISA and MasterCard credit cards through its wholly-owned subsidiaries defendant Providian National Bank and defendant Providian Bank. (Compl.¶¶ 64-65.) Defendant Household International, Inc. (“Household”) issues its VISA and MasterCard credit cards through its wholly-owned subsidiary defendant Household Finance Corporation. (Compl.¶¶ 66-68.) Defendant MBNA Corporation (“MBNA Corp.”) issues its VISA and MasterCard credit cards through its wholly-owned subsidiary defendant MBNA America Bank, N.A. (“MBNA”). (Compl.¶¶ 70-71.) Collectively these defendants and their subsidiaries and affiliates are referred to as the “Issuing Banks.” (Compl.¶¶ 13, 84.) Both VISA and MasterCard are controlled by a select group of their member banks, which include the Issuing Banks. (CompU 91.) These banks established control by concurrent service on the board of directors and/or important committees of either or both associations. (CompU 91.) In fact, plaintiffs allege that nearly all of the largest card-issuing member banks have had or currently have a representative of their bank on the board of directors or an important policy-influencing committee of both VISA and MasterCard. (Compl.¶ 95.) For example, in 1996 seventeen of the twenty-seven banks on MasterCard’s Business Committee also had a representative on VISA’S Marketing Advisors Committee. Also, twelve of the twenty-one banks with a representative on VESA’s board of directors had a representative on MasterCard’s Business Committee. (Comply 95.) In sum, as of year-end 1996, nineteen banks, including defendants J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, and BOA, had a representative on the board of directors of either VISA or MasterCard and a representative on at least one important committee of the other association. (Comply 96.) Further, the members of VISA and MasterCard are allocated voting and dissolution rights in relation to the total dollar volume of transactions that member transmits through the particular association. The top ten issuers of VISA and MasterCard cards account for a substantial majority of the total volume of credit card purchases. The Issuing Banks are seven of the top ten issuers of VISA and MasterCard credit cards. In the third quarter of 2001, the seven Issuing Banks accounted for $347 billion in receivables compared to $114 billion for the other forty-three issuers that make up the top fifty issuers of VISA and MasterCard cards. (Compl.¶ 93.) In effect, plaintiffs allege, the Issuing Banks control both VISA and MasterCard. (Compl.lffl 74, 95.) As an illustration of this so-called “dual governance,” plaintiffs quote MasterCard’s Executive Vice President and General Counsel in a 1992 letter to the Department of Justice, as follows: “when one board acts with respect to a matter, the results of those actions are disseminated to the members which are members in both organizations. As a result, each of the associations is a fishbowl and officers and board members are aware of what the other is doing, much more so than in the normal corporate environment.” (Comply 97.) B. The Currency Conversion Fees VISA and MasterCard’s electronic networks and settlement systems serve as clearinghouses for general purpose card transactions in foreign' countries using cards issued by their member banks. (Compl.¶¶ 99.) This allows cardholders from the United States to purchase goods or services in foreign countries in that country’s currency. (Comply 99.) That amount is then converted to U.S. dollars by the respective network and billed to the United States cardholder in U.S. dollars. The.prevailing conversion rate for the applicable foreign currency is applied to the cardholders’ transactions. (Compl.¶¶ 79, 85.) As part of the'conversion, cardholders are charged a currency conversion fee ranging from at least one percent (1%) to at most three percent three percent (3%) of the cost of the purchase. (Compl.¶¶ 1, 12, 102.) However, plaintiffs allege that this fee is charged whether or not currency is actually converted or exchanged. (Comply 12, 100.) More specifically, plaintiffs allege that the procedure VISA and MasterCard use to process all foreign currency transactions, sometimes referred to as “netting out,” often leads to the bulk of foreign currency transactions being conducted without an actual purchase of sale of any foreign currency. (Comply 100.) Plaintiffs offer the following example: “if 100 U.S. VISA cardholders in France charge U.S. $10,000 in French francs in goods on March 26, 2001, and 100 French VISA cardholders in the U.S. spend the equivalent of' U.S. $10,000 on the same day, defendant VISA does not actually convert any currency.” (Comply 100.) VISA and MasterCard automatically impose this currency conversion fee on the cardholder at the network level. (Comply 99.) There are two tranches of currency conversion fees charged by VISA and MasterCard. The first, which plaintiffs label the “first tier” fee, is charged by VISA and MasterCard at an identical 1% of the purchase price. (Comply 102.) This 1% first tier fee is paid by the cardholder and retained by the respective associations. (Comp.¶¶ 102, 107.) The “second tier” fee is “typically” two percent (2%), and is often charged on top of the 1% first tier fee. (Comply 102.) This 2% second tier fee is automatically charged by the network, paid by the cardholder, and retained by the cardholder’s issuing bank, (Compl.¶¶ 99, 102.) 1. First Tier Fee In the 1980’s VISA and MasterCard began to impose the first tier fee, and made it payable by the cardholders, not the member banks. (Compile 108, 104.) Plaintiffs contend that although the member banks generally compete against each other on many price terms, such as interest rates, annual fees, and services charged through VISA and MasterCard, they colluded to charge a floor price of 1% as a first tier currency conversion fee. (Comply 106.) Plaintiffs specifically allege that VISA, MasterCard, and their member banks horizontally fixed the amount of this first tier fee, both within and between the associations. (Compl.¶ 105.) The first tier fee has been extremely profitable to VISA and MasterCard. (Comply 107.) Plaintiffs claim that there is no nexus between any purported transaction cost to the VISA or MasterCard networks, or the value of the transaction itself, and the imposition of the first tier fee. The first tier fee is far higher than the nominal transaction cost incurred by the associations. (Comply 108.) The Complaint alleges that the common control of VISA and MasterCard by the largest member banks, and the common issuance of VISA and MasterCard branded cards by those same banks provides the inter-association communication necessary to fix and maintain the fee. (ComplA 109.) Indeed, plaintiffs assert that VISA communicated its intent to set the price of its currency conversion fee at 1% “in a manner calculated to reach MasterCard well in advance of implementation.” (Comply 110.) Specifically, plaintiffs allege that it was no more than four months prior to implementation of the 1% first tier fee that VISA first communicated its intentions to MasterCard. (Comply 110.) On learning of VISA’S plans, the Complaint alleges that MasterCard abandoned its plan to impose a currency conversion fee of twenty-five (25) basis points and instead imposed a 1% fee. (Comply 110.) Plaintiffs contend that this first tier fee is neither necessary to the operation of the VISA and MasterCard networks, nor facilitates a service or product that would not otherwise exist. According to the Complaint, the fee does not enhance price competition for foreign currency transactions; rather it eliminates it. (Comply 111.) Moreover, the fee is not a cost-shifting device among VISA or MasterCard member banks. (Comply 113.) As such, plaintiffs allege that its anti-competitive effect outweighs any pro-competitive benefit. (Comply 112.) Further, plaintiffs allege that the first tier fee is an artificial price floor that restrains trade because the member banks of VISA and MasterCard do not compete against each other within a network, and VISA and MasterCard themselves do not compete against each other. This results in an anti-competitive restraint of trade that harms consumers and sets an artificially high fixed first tier fee. (Comp.¶ 114.) Plaintiffs also contend that competition among the member banks is critical because each bank issues both VISA and MasterCard branded cards. This competition, however, is undermined by the defendants’ collusion to set a fixed price for their currency conversion fees. (Compl.¶ 115.) Lastly, plaintiffs allege that this agreement among the defendants causes VISA and MasterCard to act as an organizational vehicle for violations of the law, and not as an efficiency-enhancing joint venture. (Compl.¶ 116.) 2. Second Tier Fee According to the Complaint, the second tier fee, which “is almost pure profit to the Issuing Banks,” is imposed on top of the first tier floor fixed by VISA, MasterCard, and their members. (Compl.¶¶ 117-18.) “Typically,” that second tier fee represents 2% of the foreign currency transaction. (Compl.¶ 102.) The Complaint asserts that often, the rate is more than 2% of the purchase price because it is calculated based on the total amount of the foreign currency transaction including the 1% first tier fee. (Compl.¶ 128.) According to plaintiffs, the Issuing Banks incur no expense in connection with the second tier fee because it is VISA and MasterCard at the network level that convert the foreign currency. (Compl.¶ 118.) Plaintiffs allege that VISA and MasterCard aided and abetted their respective member banks’ collection of the second tier fees by adding that fee to a cardholders’ charge during the conversion process. Plaintiffs also contend that VISA and MasterCard modified their procedures to enable imposition of the second tier fee. (Comply 118.) The Complaint asserts that absent collusion in the market, imposition of second tier fees would be against the economic self-interest of each Issuing Bank. (Comply 119.) Thus, plaintiffs contend that the Issuing Banks would lose some of their best customers to banks that did not impose the 2% second tier fee were it not for an agreement to act in concert and the attendant concealment of that fee. (Comply 119.) Finally, the Complaint alleges a steady decline in costs occasioned by rapid technological innovations, as well as a decrease in fraud rates, since the imposition of these currency conversion fees. Nevertheless, fees for foreign exchange services have increased dramatically. According to plaintiffs, the reason for such an anomalous scenario is that, the fees were set collusively and free competition has been restrained. (Compl.11 120.) 3. Diners Club Diners Club is another general purpose card electronic network and settlement system that processes Diners Club card transactions. (Comply 121.) Unlike VISA and MasterCard, it is not a joint venture or member association. The Diners Club network is owned and operated by defendant Citicorp Diners Club, Inc. (“Diners Club”), which issues the Diners Club charge card. (CompLUH 48, 121.) The Diners Club network permits U.S. cardholders to make purchases in foreign countries in that nation’s currency while being billed for those foreign transactions in U.S. dollars. (ComplV 121.) Like VISA and MasterCard, Diners Club imposes a currency conversion fee on its cardholders’ foreign currency transactions. According to the Complaint, Diners Club formerly charged a 1% fee on foreign currency transactions, but then increased that fee to 2% “in fine with the recent proliferation” of second tier fees. (Comply 122.) Plaintiffs allege that Diners Club “imposed [this 2% fee] ... under the price-fixed ‘umbrella’ created by their participation in the conspiracy with the VISA and MasterCard Associations and other member banks.” (Compl.1l 122.) Further, plaintiffs allege that Diners Club is an active and integral part of the conspiracy to impose currency conversion fees. (CompU 123.) The Complaint asserts that Diners Club’s parent companies’ substantial involvement in the VISA and MasterCard associations facilitates its participation in the price-fixing agreements. (Comply 123.) Lastly, Diners Club’s fee is alleged to be against its economic self-interest absent an agreement with the other Citibank defendants, VISA, and MasterCard. (Compl. ¶ 124.) C. Non-Disclosures of the Currency Conversion Fees In substance, plaintiffs allege that VISA and MasterCard, together with their member banks, and Diners Club failed to disclose adequately the existence and amount of their currency conversion fees to their cardholders on the monthly billing statements or the solicitations and applications for the general purpose cards. (Compl.1ffl 125, 126.) According to the Complaint, the failure to disclose the currency conversion fees in solicitations is aggravated by the fact that the solicitations are the primary source of information to prospective cardholders about fees, finance charges, and card features. (Comply 126.) Moreover, some of defendants’ monthly statements report a foreign currency transaction without revealing a fee by simply listing the amount of the charge in the foreign currency and the corresponding amount in U.S. dollars. Still other statements identify a “rate” and fail to disclose the addition of currency conversion fees or the date of the conversion. (Comply 127.) The Complaint also alleges that the monthly statements hindered a cardholder’s ability to corroborate the conversion rate utilized on a specific transaction. For example, neither the base exchange rate nor the date of the conversion were disclosed. Further, plaintiffs assert that the statements failed to itemize separately the actual base currency conversion rate, the first tier fees, or the second tier fees. (Comply 128.) According to the Complaint, the only place currency conversion fees were even partially disclosed was in the cardmember agreement or the initial disclosure statement, which were sent to cardholders when they received their cards. (Comply 129.) The Complaint alleges that these “partial disclosures” obscured the fees and violated the disclosure requirements of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). (CompLH 129.) Plaintiffs further allege that the defendants conspired through their memberships in the VISA and MasterCard associations to withhold disclosure of the currency conversion fees in solicitations and billing statements, and confusingly disclosed the fees in cardholder agreements. (Compl.li 130.) Based on these allegations, plaintiffs bring five claims: (I) antitrust violations under Section One of the Sherman Act against all defendants; (II) antitrust violations under Section One of the Sherman Act against VISA and the Issuing Bank defendants; (III) antitrust violations under Section One of the Sherman Act against MasterCard and the Issuing Bank defendants; (IV) violations of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., against all defendants; and (V) violations of South Dakota Consumer Protection Statutes against defendant Citibank (South Dakota). Counts I through III assert two different theories of conspiracy. Count I alleges the first conspiracy theory — an “inter-association” conspiracy between and among Diners Club, VISA (together with its members), and MasterCard (together with its members), to fix currency conversion fees charged to cardholders of “no less than 1% of the transaction amount and frequently more.” (CompLIffl 150,154.) Counts II and III advance the second conspiracy theory — two separate “intra-as-sociation” conspiracies whereby VISA and MasterCard each are claimed to have conspired separately with their respective member banks to fix currency conversion fees charged to cardholders of “no less than 1% of the transaction amount” and “to facilitate and encourage institution— and collection — of second tier currency conversion surcharges.” (Compl.Hfl 157-58.) Count IV alleges that defendants failed to properly disclose the currency conversion fees on purchases made in foreign currencies in violation of TILA disclosure requirements and the regulations promulgated thereunder in Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226. (Compl.1ffl 170-71.) Plaintiffs allege that defendants VISA and MasterCard are liable for the TILA violations because they acted as agents of the Issuing Bank defendants within the meaning of TILA and Regulation Z. (Complin 172-73.) Finally, plaintiffs assert that VISA and MasterCard are liable for the TILA violations because they and their member banks conspired to violate TILA, and because VISA and MasterCard aided and abetted their member banks’ violations of TILA. (Cornpm 174,176.) Defendants move to dismiss Counts I through IV for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Defendants First USA, BOA, and MBNA, and their respective parent corporations join in the omnibus motion to dismiss and also move to stay the claims against them by their respective cardholders and refer those claims to arbitration. ' Lastly, defendants argue that the time to answer or otherwise move on the fifth cause of action is tolled by their motion to dismiss since all of the factual allegations in the Complaint are subject to the motion. Plaintiffs do not contest defendants’ tolling argument, and this Court adopts it. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is denied in part and granted in part, and the motion to compel arbitration is granted. Discussion I. Motion to Compel Arbitration Defendants First USA; Bank One; BOA; BOA Corp.; MBNA; and MBNA Corp. move to stay all claims against them by their respective cardholders and compel arbitration of those claims pursuant to their cardmember agreements. Defendants First USA, BOA, and MBNA issue First USA, Bank of America, and MBNA credit cards, respectively. Defendants Bank One, BOA Corp., and MBNA Corp. are the parent companies of defendants First USA, BOA, and MBNA, respectively, and do not issue credit cards. (Decl. of Janet Z. Hernandez dated March II, 2002, ¶ 2; Decl. of Kimberly S. Gensler dated March 18, 2002, ¶ 3; Decl. of Deborah L. Fisher dated March 19, 2002, (“Fisher Decl.”) ¶2.) When First USA, BOA, and MBNA send credit cards to their cardholders, they forward a cardholder agreement setting forth the terms of the cardholders’ account. The cardholder agreement warns that any use of the credit card constitutes acceptance of the terms of the cardholder agreement. (Fisher Decl. ¶ 6; Decl. of Donna Barrett dated March 7, 2002, (“Barrett Decl.”) ¶¶ 4 — 5; Decl. of Suzan R. Uhlig dated March 18, 2002, (“Uhlig Decl.”) ¶ 9 (advising. that cardholder’s silence constitutes acceptance of the terms).) Although plaintiffs do not specifically allege in their Complaint which plaintiffs are cardmembers of which defendant, the parties agree on the following: (1) plaintiff Caran Ruga is the only named plaintiff to have held a First USA credit card during the relevant time period; (2) plaintiff Robert Ross is the only named plaintiff to have held a BOA credit card during the relevant time period; and (8) “none of the named plaintiffs have used an MBNA credit card to make purchases in a foreign country.” (Letter from plaintiffs’ counsel to counsel for MBNA dated Feb. 19, 2002, cited in Defs.’ Mot. to Compel Arb. at 7 n. 2.) Plaintiffs acknowledge that none of the plaintiffs have an arbitration agreement with MBNA. (Pis.’ Opp. to Mot. to Compel. Arb. at 1.) Thus, without an MBNA card-member as a named plaintiff, there is no need to analyze whether any MBNA card-member’s claims belong in arbitration. Further, the fact that there are no named plaintiffs that are cardmembers of MBNA limits any possible TILA claims against MBNA to claims of secondary liability. The First USA cardholder agreement sent to plaintiff Ruga provides that “[a]ny use of your Card or Account confirms your acceptance of the terms and conditions of this Agreement.” (Barrett Deck ¶ 5.) Plaintiff Ruga accepted the terms of the cardholder agreement by using her First USA credit card. (Barrett Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff Ruga’s cardholder agreement contains an arbitration clause that was typical of all First USA cardholder agreements, which states: Arbitration: Any claim, dispute or controversy (“Claim”) by either you or us against the other, or against the employees, agents or assigns of the other, arising from or relating in any way to this Agreement or your Account, including Claims regarding the applicability of this arbitration clause or the validity of the entire Agreement, shall be resolved by binding arbitration by the National Arbitration Forum, under the Code of Procedure in effect at the time the Claim is filed.... Any arbitration hearing at which you appear will take place at a location within the federal judicial district that includes your billing address at the time the Claim is filed. This arbitration agreement is made pursuant to a transaction involving interstate commerce, and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. Judgement upon any arbitration award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction. This arbitration agreement applies to all Claims now in' existence or that may arise in the future except for Claims by or against any unaffiliated third party to whom ownership of your Account may be assigned after default (unless that party elects to arbitrate). Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any party’s use of (or advancement of any Claims, defenses, or offsets in) bankruptcy or repossession, replevin, judicial foreclosure or any prejudgment or provisional remedy relating to any collateral, security or property interests for contractual debts now or hereafter owed by either party to the other under this Agreement. IN ABSENCE OF THIS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT, YOU AND WE MAY OTHERWISE HAVE HAD A RIGHT OR OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE CLAIMS THROUGH A COURT, AND/OR TO PARTICIPATE OR BE REPRESENTED IN LITIGATION FILED IN COURT BY OTHERS, BUT EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED ABOVE, ALL CLAIMS MUST NOW BE RESOLVED THROUGH ARBITRATION. (Barrett Decl. Ex. 1.) Plaintiff Ruga’s cardholder agreement also contained a choice of law provision selecting Delaware law and federal law where applicable. (Barrett Decl. Ex. 1.) Plaintiff Ross was a BOA cardholder prior to BOA’s inclusion of an arbitration clause in its cardholder agreement. In February 2000, plaintiff Ross received a document titled, “Important Notice Regarding Your Account” (“Important Notice”), with his monthly account statement. The Important Notice advised him of certain changes in the cardholder agreement governing his account, and included a copy of the amended agreement. (Uhlig Decl. ¶7.) The Important Notice also informed plaintiff Ross that these modifications to the agreement would become effective unless he wrote to BOA by March 25, 2000, and requested that his account be closed. Plaintiff Ross never took that initiative. (Uhlig Decl. ¶¶ 9-10.) Among the changes to the BOA cardholder agreement was the addition of an arbitration clause. (Uhlig Decl. -¶ 8 & Ex. 2.) The Important Notice described the changes to the cardholder agreement and included the following: “Any claim, dispute or controversy with us, Bank of America Corporation or our affiliates, or certain other persons will be resolved by arbitration, as set forth in the Agreement. (Refer to Section 7.19.)” (Uhlig Decl. Ex. 2.) Section 7.19 of the amended cardholder agreement, as included in the Important Notice, provided: 7.19 Arbitration. Any dispute, -claim, or controversy (“Claim”) by or between you and us (including each other’s employees, agents or assigns) arising out of or relating to this Agreement, your Account, or the validity or scope of any provision of this Agreement, including the arbitration clause shall, upon election by either you or us, be resolved by binding arbitration. Arbitration shall take place before a single arbitrator on an individual basis without resort to any form of class action. Arbitration may be selected at any time unless a judgement has been rendered or the other party would suffer substantial prejudice by the delay in demanding arbitration. Arbitration, including selection of an arbitrator, shall be conducted in accordance with the rules for arbitration of financial services disputes of JAMS .... If JAMS is unable or unwilling to serve as the provider of arbitration, we may substitute another national arbitration organization with similar procedures. This arbitration section of this Agreement shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. Judgment upon arbitration may be entered in any court having jurisdiction. Arbitration shall be conducted in the federal judicial district in which your billing address is located at the time the claim is filed. If we request arbitration, we will advance applicable JAMS fees and expenses. If the arbitrator rules in favor of one party against the other, the other party shall pay all reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action on behalf of both parties (including any fees and expenses paid by one party on behalf of the other) unless the arbitrator or court decides such an award would cause a substantial injustice based on the facts and legal arguments set forth in the action. YOU UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT IF EITHER YOU OR WE ELECT TO ARBITRATE A CLAIM, THIS ARBITRATION SECTION PRECLUDES YOU AND U.S. FROM HAVING A RIGHT OR OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE CLAIMS THROUGH COURT, OR TO PARTICIPATE OR BE REPRESENTED IN LITIGATION FILED IN COURT BY OTHERS. EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED ABOVE, ALL CLAIMS MUST BE RESOLVED THROUGH ARBITRATION IF YOU OR WE ELECT TO ARBITRATE. (Uhlig Decl. Ex. 2.) Plaintiff Ross’s cardholder agreement also contained a choice of law provision selecting Arizona law and federal law where applicable. (Uhlig Decl. Ex. 2, § 7.18.) When a contract contains a written arbitration clause and concerns a transaction involving commerce, the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2003), governs. 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA establishes a liberal policy in favor of arbitration as a means to reduce the costliness and delays of litigation. See Campaniello Imports, Ltd. v. Saporiti Italia S.p.A., 117 F.3d 655, 664 (2d Cir.1997) (Pollack J., by designation); see also Ol-droyd v. Elmira Savings Bank, FSB, 134 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir.1998) (“There is a strong federal policy favoring arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution”). It is well settled that arbitration is contractual in nature, and “a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960)); accord Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 123 S.Ct. 588, 591, 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002). In accord with the strong policy favoring arbitration, federal courts read arbitration clauses as broadly as possible, and “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Carp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983); accord ACE Capital Re Overseas Ltd. v. Central United Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 2002); Oldroyd, 134 F.3d at 76; Collins & Aikman Prods. Co. v. Bldg. Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 19 (2d Cir.1995). Indeed, arbitration must be compelled “unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 582-83, 80 S.Ct. 1347; accord David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir.1991); Collins & Aikman, 58 F.3d at 19. Section Two of the FAA provides that written agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 3 of the FAA provides that the court must stay any suit or proceeding until arbitration has been completed if the action concerns “any issue referable to arbitration” under a written agreement for such arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 3; accord Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985); McMahan Secs. Co. L.P. v. Forum Capital Mkts., L.P., 35 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir.1994). The FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues [on] which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” E.G.L. Gem Lab, Ltd. v. Gem Quality Inst., Inc., No. 97-7102(LAK), 1998 WL 314767, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jun.15, 1998) (quoting Byrd, 470 U.S. at 218, 105 S.Ct. 1238). This Court must analyze four factors in considering a motion to compel arbitration: first, it must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; second, it must determine the scope of that agreement; third, if federal statutory claims are asserted, it must consider whether Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable; and fourth, if the court concludes that some, but not all, of the claims in the case are arbitrable, it must then decide whether to stay the balance of the proceedings pending arbitration. Oldroyd, 134 F.3d at 75-76; accord Campaniello Imports, 117 F.3d at 665; Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir.1987). There is no dispute about the existence of an arbitration clause in both plaintiffs Ruga and Ross!s cardholder agreements, and that both plaintiffs agreed to it. However, there is a dispute as to who can compel arbitration. Defendants Bank One and BOA Corp. argue that plaintiffs Ruga and Ross’s claims against Bank One and BOA Corp. should be referred to arbitration, despite the fact that neither of them are signatories to the arbitration agreements. Since “whether an entity is a party to the arbitration agreement also is included within the broader issue of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate,” the Court will address the non-signatories issue first. Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P’ship, Inc. v. Smith Cogeneration Int’l, 198 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir.1999). A. Non-Signatories The First USA and BOA arbitration agreements are agreements between the cardholders and First USA and BOA, respectively. Plaintiffs however, allege claims against First USA and BOA, as well as Bank One and BOA Corp., the parent companies of First USA and BOA, respectively. Defendants argue that plaintiffs should be compelled to arbitrate the claims against the parent companies as well as those against First USA and BOA. Although “arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit,” Howsam, 123 S.Ct. at 591 (quoting United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347), an obligation to arbitrate may not be limited to signatories to the agreement containing the arbitration provision. A non-signatory may be. bound to an arbitration agreement under ordinary principles of contract and agency. See Thomson-CSF, S:A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir.1995); Orange Chicken, L.L.C. v. Nambe Mills, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4730(AGS), 2000 WL 1858556, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec:19, 2000); Fluor Daniel Intercontinental, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 98 Civ. 7181(WHP), 1999 WL 637236, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.20, 1999). The Second Circuit has recognized five theories for binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements: 1) incorporation by reference; 2) assumption; 3) agency; 4) veil-piercing/alter-ego; and 5) estoppel. See Smith/Enron Cogeneration, 198 F.3d at 97; Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 776; Massen v. Cliff, No. 02 Civ. 9282(HBP), 2003 WL 2012404, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2003); Fluor Daniel, 1999 WL 637236, at *6. Defendants argue that the plaintiffs are estopped from avoiding arbitration with Bank One and BOA Corp. Courts have bound non-signatories to arbitration agreements under an estoppel theory. Under one branch of this theory, when a non-signatory receives a direct benefit under the agreement containing the arbitration clause, it cannot avoid arbitration merely because it never signed the agreement. This branch of the estoppel theory is inapplicable here because it is the non-signatory who is trying to compel arbitration from a party. See Fluor Daniel, 1999 WL 637236, at *6. Under an alternative estoppel theory recognized by several circuits, courts have been willing to estop a signatory from avoiding arbitration with a non-signatory when the issues the non-signatory is seeking to arbitrate are intertwined with the contract. See Choctaw Gen. Ltd. P’ship v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 271 F.3d 403, 406 (2d Cir.2001); Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 779; Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757-58 (11th Cir.1993); J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A, 863 F.2d 315, 320-21 (4th Cir.1988); McBro Planning & Dev. Co. v. Triangle Elec. Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 342, 344 (11th Cir.1984); Massen, 2003 WL 2012404, at *4; Chase Mortgage Co.-West v. Bankers Trust Co., No. 00 Civ. 8150(MBM), 2001 WL 547224, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2001); Fluor Daniel, 1999 WL 637236, at *6. Thus, a signatory can be required to arbitrate with a non-signatory at the non-signatory’s insistence because of “the close relationship between the entities involved, ... [and] the relationship of the alleged wrongs to the non-signatory’s obligations and duties in the contract ... and [the fact that] the claims were ‘intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations.’” Sunkist, 10 F.3d at 757-58 (quoting Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County School Bldg. Corp., 659 F.2d 836, 841 (7th Cir.1981)); accord Choctaw, 271 F.3d at 406; Fluor Daniel, 1999 WL 637236, at *6. Whether the.claims are intertwined such that a signatory is estopped from avoiding arbitration with a non-signatory, the court must determine: (1) whether the signatory’s claims arise under the “subject matter” of the underlying agreement; and (2) whether there is a “close relationship” between the signatory and the non-signatory. Chase Mortgage, 2001 WL 547224, at *2-3; accord Choctaw, 271 F.3d at 406; Massen, 2003 WL 2012404, at *4; Orange Chicken, 2000 WL 1858556, at *5; Fluor Daniel, 1999 WL 637236, at *6. There are several principled grounds for finding estoppel in this action. First, the alleged wrongs by Bank One and BOA Corp. are “intimately founded in and intertwined with” the underlying agreement between First USA and BOA and their respective cardholders. Bank One and BOA Corp. are being sued for their respective subsidiaries’ TILA violations and conspiracy to fix the prices of currency, conversion fees. Both of these claims are derivative in nature in that the alleged wrongdoers are First USA and BOA, and not Bank One and BOA Corp. Further, plaintiffs’ claims against Bank One and BOA Corp. arise from the cardholder agreements. Specifically, it was plaintiffs’ credit cards, which are the subject matter of the cardholder agreements, that were allegedly unlawfully charged fixed currency conversion fees. Also, the documents provided in connection with plaintiffs’ credit card accounts were allegedly violative of the disclosure obligations in TILA. Effectively, the claims against Bank One and BOA Corp. are the same as those lodged against First USA and BOA, respectively. As such, they arise under the “subject matter” of the agreement. See Chase Mortgage, 2001 WL 547224, at *2; Fluor Daniel, 1999 WL 637236, at *6. Plaintiffs insist that they are not suing the parent companies merely based on their subsidiaries’ actions, but that they also allege that the parent companies were active participants in the conspiracy. This contention, however, does not change the outcome of the analysis. Any participation by Bank One and BOA Corp. in the alleged conspiracy necessarily revolves around their respective subsidiaries’ issuance of credit cards. Those credit cards and their respective accounts are at the heart of the underlying contract containing the arbitration agreement. Therefore, this Court finds that even the allegations that seek to hold Bank One and BOA Corp. hable for their own conduct arise under the “subject matter” of the underlying agreement between plaintiffs and First USA and BOA. Moreover, there is a close relationship between First USA and Bank One, and between BOA and BOA Corp. Bank One is the parent corporation of its wholly-owned subsidiary First USA, and BOA Corp. is the parent corporation of its wholly-owned subsidiary BOA. This more than satisfies the “close relationship” factor. See Chase Mortgage, 2001 WL 547224, at *3; see also Fluor Daniel, 1999 WL 637236, at *6 (finding sufficiently close relationship where non-signatory owned fifty percent of signatory). . Accordingly, this Court finds that, assuming the claims are otherwise arbitrable against First USA and BOA, it is appropriate to compel plaintiffs Ruga and Ross to also arbitrate their claims against Bank One and BOA Corp. under an estoppel theory. B. Scope of Arbitration Agreement As an initial matter, defendants argue that this Court should not reach the question of whether plaintiffs’ claims are within the scope of the arbitration clauses. Defendants contend that this issue of arbitra-bility is a question for the arbitrator in the first instance. “Although the [Supreme] Court has also long recognized and enforced a ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,’ it has made clear that there is an exception to this policy: The question whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the ‘question of arbitrability,’ is ‘an issue for judicial determination [u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’ ” Howsam, 123 S.Ct. at 591 (quoting AT & T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649, 106 S.Ct. 1415; Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983); and citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995)) (emphasis in original). Specifically, the Supreme Court recently reiterated that “a disagreement about whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy is for the court.” Howsam, 123 S.Ct. at 592 (citing AT & T Techs., 475 U.S. at 651-52, 106 S.Ct. 1415; Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 288, 241-43, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962)). “When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), courts generally ... should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.” First Options, 514 U.S. at 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920; accord Cap Gemini Ernst & Young U.S. LLC v. Nackel, No. 02 Civ. 6872(DLC), 2002 WL 31626703, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.21, 2002). However, “[unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.” AT & T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649, 106 S.Ct. 1415; accord Howsam, 123 S.Ct. at 592; Nackel, 2002 WL 31626703, at *2. The First USA arbitration clause provides, in part, Any claim, dispute or controversy (“Claim”) by either you or us against the other, or against the employees, agents or assigns of the other, arising from or relating in any way to this Agreement or your Account, including Claims regarding the applicability of this arbitration clause or the validity of the entire Agreement, shall be resolved by binding arbitration by the National Arbitration Forum, under the Code of Procedure in effect at the time the Claim is filed. (Barrett Decl. Ex. 1 (emphasis added).) The BOA arbitration clause provides, in part, Any dispute, claim, or controversy (“Claim”) by or between you and us (including each other’s employees, agents or assigns) arising out of or relating to this Agreement, your Account, or the validity or scope of any provision of this Agreement, including the arbitration clause shall, upon election by either you or us, be resolved by binding arbitration. (Uhlig Decl. Ex. 2, § 7.19 (emphasis added).) Plaintiffs argue that the language emphasized above cannot be deemed “clear and unmistakable” evidence that either plaintiff Ruga or Ross agreed to have the arbitrator decide the question of arbitrability. This Court disagrees. Both arbitration provisions specifically provide evidence that the plaintiffs “clearly and unmistakably” agreed to have the arbitrator decide the question of arbitra-bility. The First USA clause specifically states that “Claims regarding the applicability of this arbitration clause or the validity of the entire Agreement” shall be arbitrated. The BOA clause specifically states that any claim relating to “the validity or scope of any provision of this Agreement, including the arbitration clause shall” be arbitrated. These provisions evidence the parties’ intent that the arbitrator, not the Court, is to determine arbitrability. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, No. 02-634, — U.S.-, 123 S.Ct. 2402, 2407, 156 L.Ed.2d 414 (2003) (plurality opinion) (“The parties agreed to submit to the arbitrator ‘[a]ll disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this contract or the relationships which result from this contract.’ And the dispute about what the arbitration contract in each case means ... is a dispute ‘relating to this contract’ and the resulting ‘relationships.’ Hence, the parties seem to have agreed that an arbitrator, not a judge, would answer the relevant question.” (emphasis in original)); see also Shaw Group Inc. v. Triplefine Int’l Corp., 322 F.3d 115, 121-22 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that, under New York law, clause stating that “any disputes concerning or arising out of’ contract shall be arbitrated was evidence that parties “clearly and unmistakably” agreed to have the arbitrator decide the question of arbitrability); PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1196, 1199-1200 (2d Cir.1996) (finding that, under New York law, clause stating that “any and all controversies which may arise ... concerning any account, transaction, dispute or the construction, performance, or breach of this or any other agreement ... shall be determined by arbitration,” was evidence that parties “clearly and unmistakably” agreed to have the arbitrator decide the question of arbi-trability); Optibase, Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch Inv. Managers, No. 02 Civ. 9813(LTS), 2003 WL 1587244, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.27, 2003) (finding that, under New York law, clause providing that “any controversies which may arise with [Merrill Lynch]” shall be arbitrated was evidence that parties “clearly and unmistakably” agreed to have the arbitrator decide the question of arbitrability); Nackel, 2002 WL 31626703, at *2 (finding that, under New York law, clause that stated “[A]ny dispute, controversy or claim ... arising out of or relating to or concerning the provisions of this Agreement, any agreement between you and the Firm relating to or arising out of your employment with us or otherwise concerning any rights, obligations, or other aspects of your employment relationship” shall be arbitrated, was evidence that parties “clearly and unmistakably” agreed to have the arbitrator decide the question of arbitrability). However, even if this Court were to determine that the language of the arbitration clauses did not “clearly and unmistakably” evidence an agreement to have the arbitrator decide the question of arbitrability, this Court would find that plaintiffs’ claims are within the scope of the arbitration clauses. As noted above, the arbitration clauses in the First USA and BOA cardholder agreements apply to any claim “arising from or relating in any way to ... [the] Account,” and “arising out of or relating to ... [the] Account,” respectively. Plaintiffs’ claims against First USA and BOA clearly relate to their accounts with their respective banks.- First, the claims allege that unlawful currency conversion fees were charged to plaintiffs’ accounts with First USA and BOA. Second, the alleged TILA violations were contained in documents and solicitations sent to plaintiffs regarding their credit card account or prospective credit card account with First USA and BOA. There is no question that these claims relate to plaintiffs’ accounts at First USA and BOA. The arbitration clauses involved in this action are broad. See, e.g., ACE Capital, 307 F.3d at 26 (“any dispute [that] shall arise between the parties ... with reference to the interpretation of this Agreement or their rights with respect to any transaction involved” held to be broad arbitration clause); Oldroyd, 134 F.3d at 76 (“[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim arising under or in connection with [the agreement]” is a broad arbitration clause); Collins & Aikman, 58 F.3d at 19 (“Any claim or controversy arising out of or relating to th[e] agreement is a broad arbitration clause.”); Newbridge Acquisition I, L.L.C. v. Grupo Corvi, S.A. de D.V., No. 02 Civ. 9839(JSR), 2003 WL 42007, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.6, 2003) (“any and all disputes which may arise out of or in connection with this Agreement” is a broad arbitration clause); Lewis Tree Serv., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 239 F.Supp.2d 332, 336 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (arbitration clause stating “any controversy or claim ... related directly or indirectly to this Agreement” is broad). Where an arbitration clause is broad, a presumption of arbitrability arises and arbitration of even a collateral matter will be ordered if the claim alleged “implicates issues of contract construction or the parties’ rights and obligations under it.” Moreover, “[w]hen parties use expansive language in drafting an arbitration clause, presumably they intend all issues that ‘touch matters’ within the main agreement to be arbitrated, while the intended scope of a narrow arbitration clause is obviously more limited.” ACE Capital, 307 F.3d at 34 (quoting Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A v. Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc., 252 F.3d 218, 224-25 (2d Cir.2001)); accord Specht, 306 F.3d at 35; Fluor Daniel, 1999 WL 637236, at *8-9. This presumption of arbitrability can be overcome only if it may be said with “positive assurance” that the arbitration clause is not susceptible to the interpretation that it brings plaintiffs’ claims within its sweep. Lewis Tree Serv., 239 F.Supp.2d at 336 (citing Oldroyd, 134 F.3d at 76); accord Specht, 306 F.3d at 35 (“[Arbitration is indicated unless it can be said “with positive assurance’ that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.”); Genesco, 815 F.2d at 847 (“[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”). Here, this Court cannot say with positive assurance that the arbitration clauses at issue are not susceptible to an interpretation that plaintiffs Ruga and Ross’s claims “touch matters” within the cardholder agreements. Plaintiffs allege a conspiracy to fix currency conversion fee prices that are charged when they conduct a foreign currency transaction on their credit card. Thereafter, the alleged fixed price fees appear on plaintiffs’ monthly billing statements for their credit card accounts. Further, the terms of plaintiffs’ use of their credit card accounts are governed by the cardholder agreements that contain the arbitration clauses. Thus, when reading the arbitration agreements liberally, due to their broad language, the antitrust claims are related to the cardholder agreements and the plaintiffs’ credit card accounts such that the claims “touch matters” covered by the cardholder agreement. Moreover, in accord with the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, this Court resolves any doubt concerning arbitrability in favor of arbitration. 1. Claims Arising Prior to Contract Plaintiffs argue that they cannot be forced to arbitrate claims that arose prior to the time that the parties entered into an arbitration agreement. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the solicitations containing the TILA violations were sent to plaintiffs prior to plaintiffs’ receipt of any cardholder or arbitration agreement, and certainly prior to plaintiffs’ agreement to the terms of such a provision. However, all of plaintiffs’ claims fall under the scope of the arbitration clauses at issue here. The First USA clause specifically states that the “arbitration agreement applies to all Claims now in existence or that may arise in the future.” Certainly plaintiff Ruga’s TILA violation claim was in existence at the time she agreed to the First USA cardholder agreement. See Lloyd v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., No. 00 Civ. 109, 2001 WL 194300, at *4 (D.Del. Feb. 22, 2001). Further, the BOA clause states that “[a]ny dispute, claim, or controversy ... arising out of or relating to this Agreement, your Account, or the validity or scope of any provision of this Agreement, [shall] be resolved by binding arbitration.” This language is broad enough to include any TILA violation claims that plaintiff Ross had prior to his acceptance of the BOA cardholder agreement. Importantly, this Court cannot say with positive assurance that the BOA arbitration clause cannot be interpreted to include plaintiff Ross’s TILA violation claims that may have arisen prior to the agreement. Thus, applying the strong policy in favor of arbitration and resolving any doubts of arbitrability in favor of arbitration, this Court finds that any TILA violations arising pri- or to the cardholder agreement are nonetheless within the scope of the BOA arbitration clause. See Arriaga v. Cross Country Bank, 168 F.Supp.2d 1189, 1192-93 & n. 6 (S.D.Cal.2001), rejected on other grounds by Ting v. AT & T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 n. 14 (9th Cir.2003) and Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1176 n. 15 (9th Cir.2003). Accordingly, this Court finds that all of plaintiffs Ruga and Ross’s claims against First USA, Bank One, BOA, and BOA Corp. are within the scope of the arbitration agreement in the plaintiffs’ cardholder agreements. C. Federal Statutory Claims Defendants argue that both plaintiffs’ TILA and antitrust claims are arbitrable. Plaintiffs contend that horizontal price-fixing antitrust claims are not amenable to arbitration. For the following reasons, plaintiffs’ arguments are without merit. Notwithstanding the vital public policy purposes served by federal statutes, the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that “[i]t is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991). The Supreme Court instructs Although all statutory claims may not be' appropriate for arbitration, “[h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evidenced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.” In this regard, we note that the burden is on [plaintiff] to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for [his or her statutory] claims. If such an intention exists, it will be discoverable in the text of the [statute], its legislative history, or an “inherent conflict” between arbitration and the [statute’s] underlying purposes. Throughout such an inquiry, it should be kept in mind that “questions of arbitra-bility must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.” Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985), and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)); accord Lewis Tree, 239 F.Supp.2d at 337; Hale v. First USA Bank, N.A., No. 00 Civ. 5406(JGK), 2001 WL 687371, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2001). Applying such an analysis, the Supreme Court has found that claims under the Sherman Act, ADEA, RICO, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Securities Act of 1933 are arbitrable. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (ADEA); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482-83, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989) (Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (RICO and Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Mitsubishi 473 U.S. at 625, 105 S.Ct. 3346 (Sherman Act). 1. TILA Claims Plaintiffs do not dispute the fact that TILA claims are arbitrable, nor could they. Numerous courts have found TILA claims to be arbitrable. See, e.g., Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir.2001); Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 377-78 (3d Cir.2000); Sagal v. First USA Bank, N.A., 69 F.Supp.2d 627, 631 (DJDel.), affd, 254 F.3d 1078 (3d Cir.2001); Defreitas v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 2756, 2001 WL 1313203, at *3 (E.D.La. Oct.25, 2001); Lloyd, 2001 WL 194300, at *3; see also Hale, 2001 WL 687371, at *7 (collecting cases). This Court also concludes that plaintiffs’ TILA claims are arbitrable. 2. Horizontal Price-Fixing Claims In Mitsubishi the Supreme Court held that Sherman Act claims of antitr