Full opinion text
DECISION AND ORDER This case was referred to Magistrate Judge Leslie G. Foschio, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), on May 14, 1998. On November 15, 1999, defendants ITT Standard and United Steelworkers Local 897 filed motions for summary judgment. On January 24, 2000, plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Counsel for plaintiffs supplemental affidavits in opposition to the motions for summary judgment on March 22, 2000 and July 28, 2000. Defendant ITT Standard moved to strike plaintiffs’ supplemental affidavits as untimely. On March 20, 2001, Magistrate Judge Foschio filed a combined Report and Recommendation and a Decision and Order: (1) ordering that defendant ITT standard’s motion to strike be granted in part and denied in part; (2) recommending that defendant ITT Standard’s motion for summary judgment be granted as to plaintiffs Miller and Williams, but denied as to plaintiff Lee; and (3) recommending that defendant United Steelworkers’ motion for summary judgment be granted as to plaintiffs Miller and Williams, but denied as to plaintiff Lee. Both parties filed objections and the Court heard oral argument on July 27, 2001. Plaintiffs object to the Magistrate Judge’s Decision and Order granting in part defendant ITT Standard’s motion to strike their July 28, 2000 submission. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), the district court “may reconsider any pretrial matter under this subparagraph (A), where it has been shown that the magistrate’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge’s Decision and Order was neither clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ objections to the Decision and Order are denied. Both plaintiffs and defendants object to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, which recommends that summary judgment be denied in part and granted in part. Specifically, defendants object to those portions of the Report and Recommendation that recommend denying their motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff Lee, and plaintiffs Miller and Williams object to those portions of the Report and Recommendation that recommend granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to them. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this Court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which objections have been made. Upon a de novo review, and after reviewing the submissions and hearing argument from the parties, the Court hereby adopts Magistrate Judge Foschio’s recommendation that summary judgment be granted to the defendants as to the claims raised by plaintiffs Miller and Williams. As to the claims raised by plaintiff Lee, the Court notes that on February 8, 2002, counsel for defendant ITT Standard filed a suggestion upon the record of the death of plaintiff Lee. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1), the successors or representatives of plaintiff Lee shall have until May 9, 2002 to file a motion for substitution. The Court will reserve decision on defendants’ summary judgment motions as to plaintiff Lee pending a motion for substitution. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein and in Magistrate Judge Foschio’s Report and Recommendation, defendants’ motions for summary judgment are granted as to plaintiff Miller and plaintiff Williams. The Court reserves decision on the motions for summary judgment as to defendant Lee pending a motion for substitution. Plaintiffs’ objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Decision and Order granting in part defendant ITT Standard’s motion to strike are denied. IT IS SO ORDERED PLEASE take notice of the entry of an ORDER filed on 4/2/02, of which the within is a copy, and entered 4/3/02 upon the official docket in this case. (Document No. 56.) REPORT and RECOMMENDATION DECISION and ORDER FOSCHIO, United States Magistrate Judge. JURISDICTION This case was referred to the undersigned on May 14, 1998, by Honorable Richard J. Arcara for report and recommendation on dispositive motions. The matter is presently before the court on motions for summary judgment filed on November 15, 1999 by Defendant ITT Standard (Docket Item No. 16), and by Defendant United Steelworkers Local 897 (Docket Item No. 18), and to strike filed on March 23, 2000 by Defendant ITT Standard (Docket Item No. 32). BACKGROUND Plaintiffs James Lee, Anthony Miller and Terry Williams, employees of Defendant ITT Standard (“ITT”), and members of the United Steelworkers Local 897 (“the Union”), until their terminations in 1996, commenced this action on March 17, 1998, alleging they were wrongfully discharged on the basis of race (African American). Plaintiffs Miller and Williams also allege wrongful discharge based on disability. Plaintiffs assert four causes of action including violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“ § 1981”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., (“the ADA”), and the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (“N.Y. Exec. Law § 296”). Answers filed on May 8, 1998 by the Union and on May 15, 1998 by ITT assert that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim as to either defendant and request dismissal, costs, and attorney fees. On November 25, 1998, the parties stipulated to a Protective Order to maintain the confidentiality of certain discovery (Docket Item No. 12) (“Confidentiality Order”). Following discovery, ITT and the Union each moved for summary judgment on November 15, 1999. ITT’s motion was accompanied by the Declarations of Adam W. Perry, Esq. (“Perry Declaration”), and Will Shine (“Shine Declaration”), exhibits, a Statement of Uncontested Facts (“Defendant ITT’s Fact Statement”), and a Memorandum of Law (Docket Item No. 17) (“Defendant ITT’s Memorandum”). The Union’s motion was accompanied by a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Docket Item No. 19) (“Defendant Union’s Fact Statement”), a Memorandum of Law (Docket Item No. 20) (“Defendant Union’s Memorandum”), and the Affidavit of Guy Masocco (Docket Item No. 21) (“Masocco Affidavit”) with attached exhibits. On January 24, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (Docket Item No. 24) (“Plaintiffs’' Memorandum”), a volume of documents (Docket Item No. 25) containing Plaintiffs’ Rule 56 Statement of Disputed Facts (“Plaintiffs’ Rule 56 Fact Statement”), Affidavits by Plaintiffs James Lee (“Lee Affidavit”), Anthony Miller (“Miller Affidavit”), and Terry Williams (“Williams’s Affidavit”), and by Plaintiffs’ attorney Harvey P. Sanders, Esq. (“Sanders Affidavit I”), and exhibits. On February 17, 2000, certain documents pertaining to Plaintiffs’ opposition to summary judgment, originally filed in the public record, were removed from the public record and, pursuant to the Confidentiality Order, filed under seal (Docket Item No. 26). On February 22, 2000, both ITT and the Union filed papers in further support of their respective summary judgment motions. In particular, ITT filed a Reply Memorandum of Law (Docket Item No. 27) (“Defendant ITT’s Reply Memorandum”), and a volume of documents (Docket Item No. 28), containing Reply Declarations of Adam W. Perry, Esq. (“Perry Reply Declaration”) and Will Shine (“Shine Reply Declaration”), and exhibits. The Union filed a Reply Memorandum of Law (Docket Item No. 29) (“Defendant Union’s Reply Memorandum”), and the Reply Affidavit of Guy Masocco (Docket Item No. 30) (“Masocco Reply Affidavit”). On March 22, 2000, Plaintiffs filed the Affidavit of Harvey P. Sanders, Esq. (Docket Item No. 31) (“Sanders Affidavit II”), with attached exhibits. In the affidavit, Sanders explains that the attached exhibits were originally omitted from the other exhibits Plaintiffs had submitted in opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motions. On March 23, 2000, Defendant ITT moved to strike such exhibits or, alternatively, for an Order permitting ITT to submit additional papers addressing Plaintiffs’ recent submissions (Docket Item No. 32). The motion to strike was accompanied by the attached Declaration of Adam W. Perry, Esq., in Support of Motion to Strike (“Perry Declaration in Support of Motion to Strike”). In response to the motion to strike, Plaintiffs filed, on March 31, 2000, the Affidavit of Harvey P. Sanders, Esq. (Docket Item No. 33) (“Sanders Affidavit Opposing Motion to Strike”). On July 28, 2000, Plaintiffs filed the Supplemental Affidavit of Harvey P. Sanders, Esq. (Docket Item No. 34) (“Sanders Supplemental Affidavit”), directing the court’s attention to newly discovered facts Plaintiffs maintain are relevant to their case. Defendant ITT filed, on August 8, 2000, the Declaration of Adam W. Perry, Esq., in Response to the Plaintiffs’ Second Untimely Submission (Docket Item No. 35) (“Perry Declaration Opposing Plaintiffs’ Second Untimely Submission”). Oral argument was deemed unnecessary. Based on the following, Defendant ITT’s motion for summary judgment (Docket Item No. 16) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; Defendant Union’s motion for summary judgment (Docket Item No. 18) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant ITT’s motion to strike (Docket Item No. 32) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. FACTS Plaintiffs James Lee, Anthony Miller and Terry Williams, who are African American, allege ITT wrongfully terminated their employment on the basis of their race. Plaintiffs Miller and Williams also allege they were terminated on the basis of their disabilities. Following their terminations, Plaintiffs filed grievances with the Union challenging their terminations. However, the Union determined not to pursue any of Plaintiffs’ grievances to arbitration; consequently, Plaintiffs allege that by such failure, the Union breached its duty of fair representation to each of them. Plaintiffs assert that since at least 1987, ITT and the Union have routinely discriminated against African American employees by excluding such employees from certain departments and jobs, including welding and inspection jobs, and with regard to hiring and pay. Plaintiffs maintain that ITT has manipulated Article VII of the most recent collective bargaining Agreement between ITT and the Union (“CBA”), entitled Reduction in Force/Recall, to discriminate against African American employees by “bumping” them out of choice job assignments. Plaintiffs also assert that African American employees have been disciplined for offenses, including disciplinary and attendance problems, for which white employees are not. Plaintiffs allege that the Union has not represented African American employees as vigorously as it represents white employees. According to Plaintiffs, since 1987, only one African American has served as Union steward and none have served as Union officers. Gary Majchr-zak, the Union’s grievance chairman at the time of the Plaintiffs’ terminations, allegedly did not treat African American employees the same as white employees, as evidenced by the fact that Majchrzak would, when walking around the plant, visit with white employees, but not African American employees. Plaintiffs allege that ITT and the Union have pressured African American employees to sign “last chance agreements” to settle grievances. The terms of the last chance agreements provide that any subsequent disciplinary problems would lead directly to discharge. According to Plaintiffs, non-minority employees have not been forced to sign such last chance agreements and, where they have, the agreements are not enforced. Plaintiffs also alleged that since 1994, ITT has failed to provide necessary accommodations to employees with disabilities, especially in cases where the disabled employee is African American. Additional facts pertaining to each of the three Plaintiffs’ respective cases are set forth below. James Lee Plaintiff James Lee (“Lee”), commenced employment with ITT’s predecessor in April 1977. Lee’s work record contains a number of disciplinary violations. In particular, in May, 1980, Lee was given a three-day suspension for abusive language. A one-day suspension was assessed in July 1982 for insubordination. Lee was indefinitely suspended in October 1989 for threatening a supervisor, but was allowed to return to work with a warning that any future threats would result in his discharge. In April 1990, Lee was suspended for three days for poor attendance, Lee was given a last and final warning in June 1990 for threatening a supervisor. In October 1990, Lee was discharged for poor attendance. Upon the Union’s arbitration of a grievance related to the discharge, Lee was reinstated. Lee was suspended for three days in March 1994 for poor work performance. In January 1995, Lee was suspended and discharged for insubordination. According to an incident report prepared by ITT Human Resources Manager Will Shine (“Lee’s Incident Report”), on January 5, 1995, Shine observed Lee with a plate of food at his work station in ITT’s machine shop. Shine maintains that upon directing Lee to bring the food to the cafeteria, Lee became insubordinate claiming that other employees ate at their work stations and threatened to shoot Shine. Shine directed Lee to report to the Personnel Office. Shine walked through the machine shop but did not observe any other employee with food at his work station. According to Shine, he questioned the foreman, John Maher, who stated that other employees occasionally were caught with food at their work stations and were “encouraged to restrict their eating to lunch and break periods.” Lee’s Incident Report. As Shine proceeded to the Personnel Office to meet with Lee, he observed that Lee remained in the machine shop. However, Shine later met with Lee in the Personnel Office where Lee denied threatening Shine and claimed he put his food away as instructed. Shine indefinitely suspended Lee for insubordination based on violations of Shop Rule 3b (failing to follow a directive) and the Work Place Violence Policy. The Union pursued Lee’s grievance filed in connection with the discharge to arbitration and, on July 26, 1995, a settlement was reached whereby ITT reinstated Lee in exchange for Lee’s execution of a Last Chance Agreement (“Lee’s Last Chance Agreement”). Lee’s Last Chance Agreement provides that Lee admitted he violated ITT Shop Rules by failing to take Shine’s directive and the Work Place Violence Policy by threatening to shoot Shine. Lee’s Last Chance Agreement further provides that upon any violation of any ITT Shop Rule or the Work Place Violence Policy within two years of his reinstatement, Lee would be discharged. When Lee reported to work at 6:45 A.M. on March 19, 1996, he was unable to locate his time card and walked out. According to Lee, he left ITT because he was returning from sick leave and did not know to which department he was to report. Lee maintains that he was advised to speak with Mr. Shine, but that Mr. Shine was not expected until 8:30 A.M. Lee maintains that rather than wait for 1% hours, he would run an errand, specifically, he decided to go to a pharmacy and have a prescription filled for his wife. According to Lee, he returned at 9:00 A.M. and was told he had been suspended. In contrast, Defendants maintain that Lee informed ITT security and supervisory personnel that if ITT wanted him, they could call him at home. According to Defendants, upon returning home, Lee telephoned the Union’s office and was told to come in. Lee responded that if ITT wanted him, he could be reached at home. Following his discharge, Lee filed a grievance with the Union. However, the Union did not pursue the grievance to arbitration given Lee’s disciplinary record and the fact that he was working pursuant to a last chance agreement, and the Union advised Lee of its decision not to pursue Lee’s case on April 12,1996. Anthony Miller Plaintiff Anthony Miller (“Miller”), began working for ITT in September 1987; his most recent position with ITT was as a shipping clerk. Miller’s disciplinary record at ITT included a three-day suspension in 1990 for poor work attendance, a three-day suspension in 1993 for an extended absence taken without permission and violating the 48-hour reporting rule. The 1993 incident resulted in a final warning that future misconduct would result in discharge. On March 18, 1996 Miller sustained a shoulder injury. Miller claims that the injury occurred at work between 2:00 P.M. and 3:00 P.M., when he, assisted by an unidentified truck driver, lifted a unit weighing between 200 and 300 pounds. Miller did not remember the name of the truck driver, but thought the driver was from the Preston trucking company (“Preston”). Despite pain in his shoulder, Miller completed his shift, however, he called in the next day, requesting a personal day to rest. Miller’s shoulder pain increased and he sought treatment on March 19, 1996 at Millard Fillmore Hospital in Buffalo. Miller called in to work on March 19,1996, and reported he would not be in based on a work-related injury. Miller then notified Shine and returned to work the following week. Because Miller claimed his shoulder injury was work-related, ITT commenced an investigation for workers’ compensation purposes. However, ITT’s Vehicle Log for March 18, 1996 did not indicate any truck from Preston was on the premises during the time frame in which Miller claimed he sustained his shoulder injury. Inquiries to other trucking companies whose trucks were on ITT’s premises during the relevant time period did not reveal the identity of the trucker whom Miller alleged assisted him in moving the unit. According to Miller’s supervisor, Doreen Nawojski, Miller was assigned to a UPS machine on March 18, 1996, and she did not observe Miller manually moving any equipment. Miller went to ITT on March 22, 1996, and completed a work accident report. Miller claims that when returned to work on March 25, 1996, he was forced to perform his regular duties, although light duty assignments, which he was supposed to receive, were available. Miller was suspended from work on April 28,1996 and was terminated on April 18, 1996. On July 20, 1996, Miller applied for workers’ compensation benefits. Miller filed a grievance with the Union regarding his discharge. The Union investigated the grievance, but ultimately decided not to pursue it to arbitration as the lack of evidence in Miller’s favor rendered his case weak. Terry Williams Plaintiff Terry Williams (“Williams”), commenced working for ITT in October 1984, and was employed as a machinist at the time of his discharge. Williams was previously discharged in 1994 for poor attendance. Williams’s absentee rate between 1987 to the date of his discharge in 1994 ranged from 11% to 69%. Williams attributes his high rate of absenteeism to his history of several medical problems, “including a blood disorder in 1995, a collapsed lung suffered at work in 1992, a smashed foot suffered at work, gastritis, carpal tunnel syndrome, and a chronic central disk protrusion — C5 and C6 degeneration that continues to this date.” Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 7 (citing Williams Deposition Testimony at 20-24; Williams’s Affidavit, ¶ 2). The Union pursued a grievance related to Williams’s 1994 discharge to arbitration, eventually reaching a settlement providing for Williams to be reinstated as of April 21, 1995, with some back pay and benefits. Following Williams’s reinstatement, ITT disciplined Williams for three days in May 1996 for insubordination and use of abusive language. Williams was also indefinitely suspended in July 1996 for threatening a supervisor. After that suspension, the Union intervened and secured Williams’s reinstatement on July 18, 1996, with a final warning. Williams called in sick on September 13, 1996. Williams remained ill on September 14, 1996, but did not inform ITT he would not be reporting to work that day. Nor did Williams call in on his next two scheduled work days, i.e., September 16 and 17, 1996, which he also missed based on illness. Williams also failed to report to work as scheduled on September 18, 1996, although he did call in at 11:30 A.M. to report his absence. The parties do not dispute that the CBA agreement contains a “48-hour call in” provision which provides: Seniority shall be broken and employment terminated for any of the following reasons: * X * * * X (b) Failure to notify the Company within forty-eight (48) hours after the start of his shift of the reason for any absence. The forty-eight (48) hour call-in requirement shall be reinstituted any time an employee fails to return to work as reported by his most recent call-in. This shall not apply if failure to notify the Company was for good cause. CBA, Art. VI, § 6.03(b) (“§ 6.03(b)”) (attached as Ex. A to Masocco Affidavit). On September 18, 1996, ITT indefinitely suspended Williams on the basis that his failure to call in was a clear violation of § 6.03(b). Williams maintains that he has demonstrated good cause for violating § 6.03(b), specifically, that on September 16, 1996, he sought medical treatment from his physician who prescribed medication which made Williams drowsy and rendered Williams, who did not have a telephone, unable to walk to the nearest public telephone, located several blocks from his home, to call in and report his absence from work. In support of his position, Williams presented a note from his physician verifying that Williams’s medication would make him drowsy. Nevertheless, on October 1, 1996, ITT terminated Williams. Williams filed a grievance which the Union attempted to settle. However, the Union ultimately determined there was no merit to the grievance, particularly in light of the final warning issued in July 1996, and withdrew the grievance. DISCUSSION 1. Motion to Strike Initially, the court addresses Defendant ITT’s motion to strike. In its reply papers in further support of summary judgment, ITT contends that Plaintiffs, in response to Defendants’ summary judgment motions, cite to many pages of deposition testimony which are not among Plaintiffs’ response papers. Perry Reply Affidavit, ¶ 3 and attached Ex. D. As a sur-reply, Plaintiffs filed an attorney affidavit, Sanders Affidavit II, attached to which are exhibits containing the missing pages to which Plaintiffs refer in their response papers. ITT moved to strike the affidavit and the attached exhibits as untimely submitted or, alternatively, for an order permitting ITT to submit additional papers addressing such submissions. In support of the motion to strike, ITT argues that Plaintiffs submitted the missing pages of deposition testimony referenced in Plaintiffs’ response papers more than 30 days after the Scheduling Order dated December 7, 1999 (Docket Item No. 23) permitted. Perry Affidavit in Support of Motion to Strike, ¶¶ 2-3. Plaintiffs have not moved for permission to submit the additional papers, nor have they provided any reason or demonstrated good cause for failing to timely file such papers. Id., ¶ 4. ITT further maintains that consideration of Plaintiffs’ late submissions without providing Defendants an opportunity to respond is unfair. Id., ¶¶ 5-6. Alternatively, ITT asks for permission to submit additional papers addressing Plaintiffs’ late submissions. Id., ¶ 7. In response, Plaintiffs argue that their late submissions contain no new arguments but, rather, consist only of excerpts from deposition transcripts previously referenced in Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law and Plaintiffs’ Rule 56 Fact Statement and were intended to be annexed to such papers when originally filed. Sanders Affidavit Opposing Motion to Strike, ¶¶ 2-3. Plaintiffs further assert such late submissions have not resulted in prejudice to ITT as ITT was in possession of the referenced deposition transcripts and has responded to Plaintiffs’ arguments relative to such submissions. Id., 3. Accordingly, Plaintiffs provided the referenced missing pages for the court’s consideration. Id. In an attorney affidavit subsequently filed on July 28, 2000, Plaintiffs advised the court that ITT had rehired a former white employee who had been terminated for violating the 48 hour rule, whose attendance record allegedly was worse than Williams’s, who had prior terminations for workplace violence, and who had signed a “last chance agreement.” Sanders Supplemental Affidavit, ¶ 2. Defendant ITT also requests the court strike this most recent submission as Plaintiffs did not seek permission from the court to file papers for which the court’s scheduling order makes no provision. Perry Declaration Opposing Plaintiffs’ Second Untimely Submission, ¶ 4. ITT further objects to the fact that the affidavit is based upon Plaintiffs’ attorney’s “personal knowledge or upon information and belief,” id., ¶ 2, arguing that such statements suggest Sanders is a witness in this case. Id., ¶ 6. District courts may grant extensions of time in purely procedural matters upon a showing of “excusable neglect.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(2); LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir.1995) (upholding district court’s enlargement of time for attorney to file bill of costs of time on ground of excusable neglect where counsel awarded attorney fees was on vacation when circuit court affirmed award, and bill of costs was filed nine days late). “ ‘[Ejxcusable neglect’ under Rule 6(b) is a somewhat ‘elastic concept’ and is not limited strictly to omissions caused by circumstances beyond the control of movant.’ Rather, it may encompass delays ‘caused by inadvertence, mistake or carelessness,’ at least when the delay was not long, there is no bad faith, there is no prejudice to the opposing party, and movant’s excuse has some merit.” LoSacco, supra (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 388, 392, 394-95, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)). In the instant case, the court will not strike Plaintiffs’ late submissions consisting of pages of the deposition testimony omitted from Plaintiffs’ original response papers filed in opposition to summary judgment, but will strike Plaintiffs’ later submissions filed July 28, 2000, regarding the alleged rehiring of a former ITT employee. Plaintiffs’ failure to attach the relevant pages of deposition testimony to their original responding papers qualifies as excusable neglect under the factors articulated in Pioneer, supra, and LoSacco, supra. Specifically, such failure was the result of “inadvertence, mistake or carelessness.” The delay was not unduly long. In fact, although ITT maintains that such papers were filed more than 30 days after the February 21, 2000 deadline, Perry Affidavit in Support of Motion to Strike, ¶¶ 2-3, the court takes judicial notice that according to the 2000 calendar which depicts February as having 29 days, Plaintiffs’ submissions, filed on March 22, 2000, were filed exactly 30 days late. There is no indication the delay was the result of bad faith, and ITT neither argues otherwise, nor points to anything indicating bad faith. Plaintiffs further explain, and ITT does not challenge, that the failure to provide the missing deposition testimony pages earlier caused ITT no prejudice. The papers merely provide the asserted documentation Plaintiffs referenced in their responding papers and contain no new arguments. ITT does not deny that they have the entire deposition transcripts. Nor does ITT maintain that Plaintiffs’ failure to provide the information rendered it unable to respond to any of Plaintiffs’ response arguments. Finally, although Plaintiffs have not clearly expressed any excuse for the failure to timely submit the missing papers, implicit in their response is that they were inadvertently omitted, an excuse which has some merit. On this record, the court will consider such late submissions on the basis that Plaintiffs’ failure to attach them to their original response papers qualifies under Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b) as excusable neglect. However, Plaintiffs’ later submission regarding the alleged rehiring of a former white ITT employee with a track record similar to Williams, will be stricken. This affidavit, which is made by the Plaintiffs’ attorney and upon information and belief, contains no explanation for the allegations and, as such, consists of only bald assertions. Permitting such an affidavit to be considered in this case would be unduly prejudicial to ITT. As such, Defendant ITT’s motion to strike is DENIED as to the late filing of Plaintiffs’ exhibits originally omitted from their response papers filed in opposition to summary judgment (Docket Item No. 31), and GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ later submission regarding the rehiring of a former ITT employee (Docket Item No. 34). 2. Summary Judgment Summary judgment of a claim or defense will be granted when the moving party demonstrates that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) and (b); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Rattner v. Netburn, 980 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir.1991). The moving party for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact. If there is any evidence in the record based upon any source from which a reasonable inference in the non-moving party’s favor may be drawn, the moving party cannot obtain a summary judgment. Celotex, supra, at 381, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits ... show that there is no issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, supra, at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Whether a fact is material depends on the substantive law of the claim and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “Summary judgment is sparingly used where intent and state of mind are at issue, ... [as] careful scrutiny of the factual allegations may reveal circumstantial evidence to support the required inference of discrimination.” Graham v. Long Island Rail Road, 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.2000) (citing Montana v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 869 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir.1989), Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir.1999); Chertkova v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir.1996); Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir.1994), and Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (2d Cir.1994)). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may -properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’ Such a motion, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, will be ‘made and supported as provided in this rule [FRCP 56],’ and Rule 56(e) therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Catrett, supra, at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56). Thus, “as to issues on which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof, the moving party may simply point out the absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of America, Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 742 (2d Cir.1998). Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a properly supported showing as to the absence of any genuine issue as to all material facts, the nonmov-ing party must, to defeat summary judgment, come forward with evidence that would be sufficient to support a jury verdict in its favor. Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir.1995). In opposing a motion for summary judgment a party “may not simply rely on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible.” Goenaga, supra, at 18 (citing cases). Where the burden of proof on an issue for which summary judgment is sought is on the movant, should the movant fail to meet its initial burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact as to that issue, the non-movant will prevail even if the non-movant submits no eviden-tiary matter establishing there is indeed a genuine issue for trial. Zanghi v. Incorporated Village of Old Brookville, 752 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir.1985). Both Defendants have moved for summary judgment of all claims Plaintiffs have asserted against them in connection with the Company’s termination of their employment. As stated, all Plaintiffs assert Defendants racially discriminated against them in violation of § 1981 (First Cause of Action). Plaintiff Williams also asserts Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of race, in violation of Title VII (Second Cause of Action), and disability, in violation of the ADA (Third Cause of Action). All Plaintiffs assert Defendants discriminated against them in violation of New York Human Rights Law on the basis of race, while Plaintiffs Miller and Williams also assert disability as the basis for alleged discrimination under that statute (Fourth Cause of Action). Claims of employment discrimination under Title VII are subject to a burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. Hicks, supra, at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742. Upon such a showing, it is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. at 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742. The ultimate burden of production then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate “ ‘that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.’ ” Hicks, supra, at 508, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Bur-dine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge in violation of Title VII or § 1981, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) he was performing his duties satisfactorily, (3) he was discharged, and (4) his discharge occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of his membership in the protected class. McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir.1997) (citing Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir.1995); Chambers, supra, at 37; and Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 464 (2d Cir.1989)). A plaintiffs burden to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination to defeat summary judgment is de minimus. McLee, supra, at 134 (citing cases). As the court may not resolve issues of fact on a summary judgment motion, its determination is limited to “whether the proffered admissible evidence shows circumstances that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer a discriminatory motive.” McLee, supra, at 135. Where a case turns on the fourth factor of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test, i.e., whether an adverse employment decision occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, such inference may be established by “showing that the employer subjected him to disparate treatment, that is, treated him less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside his protected group.” Graham, supra, at 38 (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), and Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir.1999)). Whether two employees are similarly situated ordinarily presents a question of fact for the jury. Graham, supra, at 38 (citing cases). The Second Circuit applies an “all material respects” standard in determining whether two employees are similarly situated. Graham, supra, at 39-40. In particular, the standard varies from case to case and must be judged based on (1) whether the plaintiff and those he maintains were similarly situated were subject to the same workplace standards and (2) whether the conduct for which the employer imposed discipline was of comparable seriousness. In other words, there should be an objectively identifiable basis for comparability. Hence the standard for comparing conduct requires a reasonably close resemblance of the facts and circumstances of plaintiffs and comparator’s cases, rather than a showing that both cases are identical. Id. (citing cases) (internal quotation omitted). Further, a showing under the fourth requisite step to establishing a pri-ma facie case of employment discrimination that employees belonging to one racial group received more favorable treatment than similarly situated employees belonging to a different racial group can also serve as evidence that the employer’s proffered legitimate non-discriminatory reason for an adverse job action was a pretext for racial discrimination. Graham, supra, at 43 (citing Hargett v. National Westminster Bank, USA 18 F.3d 836, 839 (2d Cir.1996)). A jury’s finding that the facts demonstrate disparate treatment of similarly situated employees belonging to different racial groups could also support a finding that the employer’s articulated non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action was pretextual, thereby precluding summary judgment under the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test. Graham, supra (citing Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1998)). The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test also applies to claims under § 1981, Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir.1996), and the ADA, Roberts v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, 63 F.Supp.2d 272 (W.D.N.Y.1999). Furthermore, as New York courts require the same standard of proof for claims brought under New York Human Rights Law as those brought under Title VII, Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1304 n. 4 (2d Cir.1995), Plaintiffs’ claims under New York Human Rights Law are subject to the same legal analysis as their Title VII claims. As a threshold matter, the court notes that much of the evidence Plaintiffs submit in opposition to summary judgment is insufficient to overcome Defendants’ motions. In particular, on issues where the non-moving party has the burden of proof, the Plaintiff must provide more than con-clusory and self-serving statements in affidavits to avoid summary judgment. Goenaga, supra, at 18. Also, statements which are nothing more than hearsay are insufficient. Samo v. Douglas-Elliman Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir.1999) (holding hearsay statement “did not constitute competent evidence” and thus could not be considered in opposition to motion for summary judgment); See Raskin v. Wyatt Company, 125 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir.1997) (holding court need consider only admissible evidence when considering summary judgment motion). For example, Plaintiffs refer to numerous statements made in their depositions and affidavits as creating genuine issues of material fact, rendering summary judgment inappropriate. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 10-11 (citing Williams’s Deposition Testimony at 225-29 as establishing that Williams was paid less than a white employee with less seniority; Miller Deposition Testimony at 140 as establishing that Miller had been disciplined for excessive scrap material as compared to white employees; Lee Deposition Testimony at 219-23 and Lee Affidavit, ¶ 7 as establishing that Lee heard union representative Gary Majehrczak make racially derogatory statements on several occasions). Such statements that are not corroborated by other evidence will not be considered with regard to any issue on which Plaintiffs have the ultimate burden of proof. Samo, supra, at 160. 3. Claims Against Union Plaintiffs’ claims with regard to the Union are essentially that the Union breached its duty of fair representation with regard to the conduct on which Plaintiffs’ employment discrimination claims against ITT are predicated, because of Plaintiffs’ race. Defendant Union argues Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the Union and, alternatively, that such claims are time-barred. Defendant Union’s Memorandum of Law at 11-16. The Union specifically maintains that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the Union, the Union maintains that each Plaintiff admits he never complained to the Union or to the Joint Civil Rights Committee about the alleged discrimination, and that Plaintiffs have failed to identify any of the alleged discriminatory practices that occurred within the applicable statute of limitations period. Id. The court addresses the Union’s statute of limitations argument first. Defendant Union maintains that Plaintiffs’ claims as against the Union are time-barred. Defendant Union’s Memorandum at 15-17. The statute of limitations for a breach of a fiduciary duty is six months, DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), and a cause of action against a labor union based on the union’s alleged breach of its duty to fairly represent its members accrues “no later than the time when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that such a breach occurred, even if some possibility of nonjudicial enforcement remained.” Santos v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, 619 F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir.1980). In this case, the last alleged discriminatory event by the Union as to any of the three Plaintiffs occurred on September 18, 1996 when the Union advised Miller that it was withdrawing his grievance based upon the recommendation of Richard Corcoran and the lack of facts contradicting ITT’s claims that Miller had falsified his workers’ compensation claim. As this action was not filed until March 17, 1998, more than six months after the last alleged discriminatory event, the claims against the Union would be time-barred if brought under § 301 of the LMRA. However, Plaintiffs argue that they did not assert any claims against the Union under § 301 of the LMRA. Rather, Plaintiffs assert the same claims against the Union as they assert against ITT, i.e., claims brought under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the ADA and New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 20. As such, Plaintiffs maintain that the applicable statutes of limitations are three years for § 1981 and New York Human Right Law claims and 300 days for ADA and Title VII claims. Id. The Union has not replied to Plaintiffs’ response on this issue. Courts within the Second Circuit have held that a union may also face liability under Title VII, § 1981, and the ADA if it breaches its duty of fair representation. As to such claims, the statute of limitations under Title VII, § 1981, and the ADA — not the six-month statute of limitations for breach of duty of fair representation — controls. Nweke v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 25 F.Supp.2d 203, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Blaizin v. Caldor Store # 88, 1998 WL 420775, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 27,1998) (applying Title VII statute of limitations period for claim that union, by failing to represent plaintiff on grievance, endorsed employer’s discriminatory actions); Morris v. Amalgamated Lithographers of Am., Local One, 994 F.Supp. 161, 171 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (holding Title VII retaliation claim barred under 300-day statute of limitations); and Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 1989 WL 152720, *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 7, 1989) (“A claim for racially discriminatory failure to represent would ... be accorded the three year statute of limitations applicable to § 1981 claims, rather than the brief six-month statute applicable to generic violations of the duty of fair representation”)). Further, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “certain private entities such as labor unions, which bear explicit responsibilities to process grievances, press claims and represent members in disputes over the terms of binding obligations that run from the employer to the employee, are subject to liability under § 1981 for racial discrimination in the enforcement of labor contracts.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 177, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132(1989) (emphasis added). The distinction between a claim that a union breached its duty of fair representation in violation of § 301, and a claim for racially discriminatory failure to represent under § 1981 “is the presence or absence of a discriminatory intent proscribed by § 1981.” Campbell, supra, at *3. The relevant statute of limitations is three years for § 1981 and New York Human Rights Law claims. Tadros v. Coleman, 898 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir.) (three-year statute of limitations applies to § 1981 claim), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 869, 111 S.Ct. 186, 112 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990); Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 714 (2nd Cir.1996) (citing N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 214(2) as providing three-year limitations period for claims under New York Human Rights Law). Accordingly, the § 1981 and New York Human Rights Law claims are not barred as to any of the Plaintiffs. For Title VII and ADA claims, the statute of limitations is 300 days. Van Zant, supra, at 712 (“A complaint alleging discrimination under Title VII must be filed with the EEOC ‘within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment action or, if the claimant has already filed the charge with a state or local equal employment agency, within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory action.’ ”); Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247-48 (2d Cir.1999) (acknowledging that 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) provides for a 300-day limitations period for ADA claims by incorporating by reference 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5). Here, the longer, 300-day statute of limitations for ADA and Title VII claims applies only to Williams’s claims asserted under those statutes, as he is the only one who exhausted the administrative remedies which are a prerequisite to such claims. Claims under the ADA and Title VII must also be filed within 90 days of the plaintiffs receipt of the EEOC’s Notice of Right to Sue and, absent evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the notice is received within three days of the date it was mailed by the EEOC. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n. 1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984), and Sherlock v. Montefiore Medical Center, 84 F.3d 522, 526 (2d Cir.1996). In the instant case, as the EEOC sent its Notice of Right to Sue to Williams on December 23, 1997, Williams’s ADA and Title VII claims, filed on March 17, 1998, were timely filed. Nevertheless, the claims against the Union should, on their merits, be dismissed as to Plaintiffs Miller and Williams, but not as to Lee. Regardless of whether Plaintiffs claim the Union breached its duty of fair representation under § 301 of the LMRA, or that the Union’s motive for such breach was discriminatorily motivated in violation of Title VII, New York Human Rights Law, § 1981 or the ADA, the same test applies. Nweke, supra, at 220-221 (citing cases). “[A] union breaches its duty of fair representation if its actions are either ‘arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.’ ” Air Line Pilots Association v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67, 111 S.Ct. 1127, 113 L.Ed.2d 51 (1991) (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967)). To state a claim for breach of a union’s duty of fair representation, Plaintiffs must establish that the Union breached its duty of fair representation and that the employer violated the collective bargaining agreement. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 572, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976). However, although “a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion, ... the individual [does not have] an absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration regardless of the provisions of the applicable collective bargaining agreement.” Vaca, supra, at 191, 87 S.Ct. 903. To establish a prima facie case that the Union breached its duty of fair representation the Plaintiffs must satisfy a two-prong test including (1) that the Union breached its duty of fair representation by allowing an alleged breach of the collective bargaining agreement to go unrepaired, i.e., by failing to pursue a union member’s grievance to arbitration, and (2) that the Union’s actions were motivated by discriminatory animus. Nweke, supra, at 221 (citing Morris v. Amalgamated Lithographers of America, Local One, 994 F.Supp. 161, 170 (S.D.N.Y.1998)). Nor does a union’s good faith, non-arbitrary failure to take an action that is unlikely to be advantageous subject it to liability for breach of its duty of fair representation. Barr v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 868 F.2d 36, 44 (2d Cir.1989) (citing Vaca, supra, at 190, 87 S.Ct. 903), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 975, 110 S.Ct. 499, 107 L.Ed.2d 502 (1989). Instead, “‘[a] wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.’ ” White v. White Rose Food, 237 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338, 73 S.Ct. 681, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953)). Provided the union’s decision not to pursue arbitration was not arbitrary and was made in good faith, the union’s decision is accorded non-actionable discretion. O’Neill, supra, at 78, 111 S.Ct. 1127. The test is whether the union’s conduct or omissions is “so egregious, so far short of minimum standards of fairness to the employee and so unrelated to legitimate union interests as to be arbitrary,” N.L.R.B. v. Local 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 740 F.2d 141, 147 (2d Cir.1984), and allegations of negligence or errors by a union in processing grievances are insufficient. United Steelworkers of America v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372-73, 110 S.Ct. 1904, 109 L.Ed.2d 362 (1990) (mere negligence does not state a claim of unfair representation); Barr, supra, at 43 (tactical errors such as failing to present witnesses and inadequate representation by union business agent insufficient to demonstrate bad faith or arbitrariness). Further, although a union typically has broad discretion in deciding whether to process a grievance, Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 891 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 567-68, 110 S.Ct. 1339, 108 L.Ed.2d 519 (1990), that discretion is not unlimited and must be “rationally founded.” Barr, supra, at 44. Here, Defendant Union first asserts that none of the Plaintiffs has ever complained to the Union that ITT has denied them certain job opportunities, manipulated the layoff and bumping procedure to bump Plaintiffs from higher-paying jobs, or compensated Plaintiffs at lower rates than white employees received for the same work. Defendant Union’s Memorandum at 11. Nor has any Plaintiff identified that any such incident occurred within the relevant limitations period. Id. Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact and, as such, the Union cannot be held liable for failing to arbitrate such claims, and the court will not further discuss them. The Union also asserts that its decision not to pursue Plaintiffs’ discharges to arbitration was based not on any discriminatory motive but, rather, was based on either an appraisal of the merits of Plaintiffs’ cases, or on honest mistakes in judgment. Defendant Union’s Memorandum at 14. In support of its argument, the Union states that during the period 1987 through 1996, the Union arbitrated three ITT employee discharge cases, two involving Afri-can American employees and one involving a white employee. Id. The Union maintains that it negotiated last chance agreements for white, as well as African American employees. Id. Finally, the Union maintains that in the instant cases it was confronted with terminations for serious infractions or, in Williams’s case, a clear cut termination of the express terms of the CBA, and that the Plaintiffs’ disciplinary records were “less than exemplary.” Id. at 15. Guy Masocco, who served as Union President of Local 897 between 1991 and 1997, and as Grievance Committee Chairman for 12 years prior to becoming president, recites in an affidavit submitted in support of the Union’s summary judgment motion several steps taken by the Union on each Plaintiffs behalf following ITT’s discharge. Masocco Affidavit, ¶ 2. Masoc-co maintains that as Union president, he was involved in the Union’s investigation and decision-making processes regarding the grievances Plaintiffs lodged upon their discharge. Id., ¶¶ 4,11. Initially, Masocco, on behalf of the Union, challenges as untrue Plaintiffs’ contention that since 1987, the Union has had only one African American steward and no African American officers. Masocco Affidavit, ¶ 8. According to Masocco, between 1987 and 1996, Roe Harrison, who is Afri-can American, served as Union steward and was also Chairman of the Grievance Committee for many of those years. Id. Other African Americans who served as Union officers during the relevant period include Richard Miller, Martin Smith and Virginia Mills. Id. In response, Plaintiffs maintain that although two of the three cases arbitrated by the Union in recent years involved Af-rican Americans, ITT did not take disciplinary action against white employees as often as against African American employees, that disciplinary issues concerning white employees were often resolved without arbitration and, thus, there was less need for the Union to seek arbitration for white employees. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 20. Plaintiffs further argue that “[t]he fact that the Union was less inclined to pursue grievances on behalf of African Americans is not surprising, in light of the fact that few Union officials have been African American.” Id. However, Plaintiffs point to nothing in the record that supports these assertions on which Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof. For example, although Plaintiffs assert that “the bias of the Union’s grievance chairman is specifically shown by his own comments,” id., Plaintiffs fail to specify to what comments such statement refers. Plaintiffs do not even identify the Union grievance chairman who allegedly made such comments and such assertion is not clearly apparent from the record. Masocco’s statement that he was the Chairman of the Union’s Grievance Committee for approximately 12 years before becoming President of the Union in 1991, implies that he was not the Union’s Grievance Chairman when any of the Plaintiffs were terminated nor during the period of many of the alleged discriminatory acts. Further, a careful reading of Masocco’s affidavit does not reveal any statement which could be construed as evidencing bias. See Masocco Affidavit, in passim. Masocco first recounts Lee’s long disciplinary record with ITT and its successor, since Lee was hired in April 1977. Masoc-co Affidavit, ¶ 24. That history includes six suspensions for such violations as abusive language, insubordination, threats to supervisors, poor attendance and poor work performance. Id., ¶ 24. Lee had also been previously discharged for poor attendance and insubordination. Id. In connection with his prior discharges, Lee filed grievances which the Union pursued to arbitration. Id. ITT, the Union and Lee reached a settlement for the grievance related to the second discharge providing for Lee’s reinstatement upon his execution of a last chance agreement. Id. Lee, however, claims with regard to his most recent discharge pursuant to the Last Chance Agreement that the Union’s failure to arbitrate his grievance was an act of bad faith. The record shows that the Union took steps to inform itself of the underlying facts as to Lee’s termination. In particular, on March 19, 1996, Lee was suspended by ITT for leaving work without authorization. Masocco Affidavit, ¶ 25. Following a meeting with Lee, ITT and the Union on March 25, 1996, ITT discharged Lee effective that day. Id., ¶ 26. Masocco maintains that the Union’s investigation revealed that when Lee could not find his time card upon reporting to work on March 19, 1996, he left the plant and told ITT security that if ITT wanted him to work that day, he could be reached at home. Id., ¶ 27. Lee subsequently telephoned the Union’s office, was asked to come in to work, and Lee responded that ITT could call him if they wanted him to work. Id., ¶ 28. According to Masocco, it was the Union’s opinion that there was no reason why Lee could not have signed in and waited until the issue of the missing time card was resolved. Id. The Union also decided that given Lee’s disciplinary record and the fact that he was working pursuant to a last chance agreement, it would not pursue Lee’s case, and the Union advised Lee of its decision on April 12, 1996. Id., ¶ 29. However, Lee’s execution of the Last Chance Agreement did not excuse the Union from its duty to fairly represent Lee on his grievance filed subsequent to termination. A last chance agreement is enforceable against the Union and the employee as an amendment to the collective bargaining agreement, and may circumscribe the scope of review which would otherwise be available to an arbitrator in considering a grievance. Coca-Cola Bottling Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, 959 F.2d 1438, 1442 (8th Cir.1992); Tootsie Roll Industries Inc. v. Local Union No. 1, 832 F.2d 81, 84 (7th Cir.1987); Gargiulo v. Castle Coal & Oil Co., Inc., 1992 WL 331108, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.5, 1992). Although a last chance agreement may well place beyond the reach of arbitrator issues that might provide the basis of relief, see, e.g., Tootsie Roll Industries, supra, it is also clear that the employee does not waive his right to an arbitrator’s determination of whether the disputed conduct actually constitutes a violation of the agreement. See United Steelworkers v. Lukens Steel Co., 969 F.2d 1468 (3d Cir.1992) (holding last chance agreement did not preclude arbitration of alleged violation of the agreement). Further, Lee’s Last Chance Agreement does not mandate dismissal upon a violation, Smith v. ITT Standard, 834 F.Supp. 612, 619-20 (W.D.N.Y.1993), and Shine admitted as much. Shine Deposition Testimony at 44. In this case, the court finds that the Union’s decision not to arbitrate Lee’s grievance was arbitrary insofar as the decision was based on Lee’s execution of the Last Chance Agreement. Specifically, Lee’s Last Chance Agreement was executed following Lee’s termination in January 1995 for violating ITT’s Shop Rules by refusing Shine’s directives and the Work Place Violence Policy by threatening Shine with physical harm. Lee’s Last Chance Agreement provides for Lee’s discharge upon any violation of ITT’s Shop Rules 1(a) — (Z) or Work Place Violence Policy within two calendar years of his reinstatement, and the only issue which may be grieved is whether Lee in fact committed the claimed violation. Lee’s Last Chance Agreement, § 4. However, Shine admitted in his deposition that t