Full opinion text
AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ATLAS, District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I.INTRODUCTION........................................................ 767 A. Procedural History................................................... 767 B. History of the Ordinance.............................................. 770 II.SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD..................................... 772 III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE............ 773 A. Businesses Entitled to Heightened First Amendment Scrutiny........... 774 1. Content-Based Regulations Receive Strict Scrutiny................... 774 2. Content-Neutral Regulations Receive Intermediate Scrutiny .......... 774 3. Distinguishing Content-Based from Content-Neutral Regulations...... 776 4. The Relevance of Turner Broadcasting System v. F.C.C................ 779 B. Businesses Not Entitled to Heightened First Amendment Scrutiny Receive Rational Basis Review for All Provisions of the Ordinance .............. 780 C. Can the Ordinance’s Validity Be Determined Through Summary Judgment? ............................................................... 782 1. In General ........................................................ 782 2. Chil Soung’s § 1983 and § 1985 Claims............................... 3. Other Issues Plaintiffs Claim Have Not Been Addressed by the City’s Summary Judgment Motion ........................................ 784 785 IV. GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO THE CITY’S EVIDENCE.................... 785 V.OBJECTIONS TO SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE ORDINANCE......... 787 A. Coverage of the Ordinance............................................ 787 1. Vagueness......................................................... 2. Overbreadth....................................................... 787 789 3. Enterprises Containing Coin-Operated Machines..................... 790 4. Extension of Ordinance’s Coverage to Adult Mini-Theatres ........... 791 B. Locational Restrictions ............................................... 792 1. Abstention Question ............................................... 793 2. Local and State Statutory Arguments................................ 795 a. Zoning and the Houston City Charter............................. 795 b. Locational Restrictions on Enterprises Containing Coin-Operated Machines...................................................... 798 3. First Amendment Challenge........................................ 800 a. Increased Distance Requirements:............ 800 The New 1,500 Foot Rules i. Content-Based or Content-Neutral?........................... 800 ii. Conclusion as to Validity of Increased Distance Requirements for Protected Businesses......................................... 813 b. Public Parks.................................................... 814 i. Content-Based or Content-Neutral?........................... 814 ii. Narrowly Tailored to Serve Substantial Governmental Interests? 815 iii. Alternative Avenues of Communication........................ 815 iv. Conclusion as to Validity of New Provision Regarding Public Parks....................................................... 815 c. Multifamily Dwellings........................................... 815 i. Content-Based or Content-Neutral? ................. 815 ii. Narrowly Tailored to Serve Substantial Governmental Interests? 816 iii. Alternative Avenues of Communication........................ 816 iv. Conclusion as to Validity of New Formula Regarding Multifamily Dwellings................................................. 817 C. Amortization......................................................... 817 1. Guidelines for Providing Amortization Extensions.................... 818 2. Time Limits on Amortization Decisionmaker......................... 820 3. Adequacy of Amortization.......................................... 821 4. Amortization for Adult Arcades and Mini-Theatres................... 821 5. Amortization for Plaintiffs in 4330 Richmond........................ 822 6. Measure of Compensation.......................................... 822 7. Length of Amortization Period...................................... 823 D. Notice Provision...................................................... 823 E. Structural, Visibility, and Lighting Requirements....................... 824 1. Permissibility of Non-Locational Regulation of Sexually Oriented Businesses Under Texas State Law.................................. 824 2. What These New Requirements Prohibit............................. 824 3. Legislative Justification for These Requirements..................... 826 4. Patrons’ Right to Privacy............................. 827 5. Economic Harm to Plaintiffs....................................... 828 F. Signage and Exterior Portions Restrictions............................. 829 1. The Restrictions................. 829 2. The Continued Applicability of SDJ................................. 832 3. Extension of Signage Restrictions to Enterprises in Multi-Unit Centers 834 4. State Law Requirements for Revising Signage Restrictions.....,...... 835 G. Entertainer and Manager Permit Requirement.......................... 836 1. Permissibility of Individual Permit Requirement..................... 838 2. Content-Based or Content-Neutral?................................. 839 3. Narrowly Tailored to Serve Substantial Governmental Interests?....... 840 4. Public Disclosure of Permit Application Information Under Texas Public Information Act............................................. 841 5. Prior Restraint.................................................... 843 a. Procedural Safeguards........................................... 843 i. Application Processing Period................................. 844 ii. Prompt Judicial Review ...................................... 846 iii. Burden on City to Justify Permit Denials in Court.............. 846 b. Criminal Background Check..................................... 847 c. Texas Constitution.............................................. 847 6. “As Applied” Challenge ............................................ 848 7. Conspicuous Display Requirement ........................... 848 H. No-Touch and Three-Foot Rules................................ 850 1. Content-Based or Content-Neutral?.......................... 850 a. Legislative Justification for these Requirements............ 851 b. Economic Impact ........................................ 851 2. Narrowly Tailored to Serve Substantial Governmental Interests? 853 3. Interference With Expressive Content........................ 855 4. Vagueness and Arbitrary Enforcement........................ 856 5. Texas Constitution.......................................... 857 VI. CONCLUSION.................................................... 857 I. INTRODUCTION One hundred five individuals and eighty-eight Houston-area adult entertainment establishments — cabarets, movie the-atres, arcades, mini-theatres, video stores, bookstores, modeling studios, and tanning salons — have brought this action challenging the City of Houston’s most recent amendments to its sexually oriented business regulatory ordinance. Plaintiffs attack Ordinance 97-75 (hereinafter “Ordinance”), enacted on January 15, 1997, primarily on the ground that it violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, but also on other federal and state constitutional, as well as federal, state, and local statutory grounds. Pending before the Court are numerous motions for summary judgment filed by Defendant City of Houston and all Plaintiffs. These motions, which are described in more detail below, are granted in part and denied in part. A. Procedural History During a pretrial conference held on June 12, 1997, the parties agreed that this ease would proceed most efficiently if the Court would first consider all legal issues not requiring extensive factual development through discovery. At that conference, the City of Houston agreed not to enforce the Ordinance during a designated period in which the Court would consider whether all or part of this challenge could be resolved through legal briefs and documentary evidence without a trial. At the Court’s direction, the parties have submitted extensive briefing on the legality of various provisions of the Ordinance. Limited discovery was permitted on various issues. The City of Houston has filed a “comprehensive” Motion for Summary Judgment, in which it argues that the entire Ordinance is valid as a matter of law and that no genuine issues of material fact exist which require a trial in this case. In accordance with the previously entered scheduling orders, Plaintiffs have filed two sets of responses, the first set addressing all issues other than the Ordinance’s new locational restrictions on sexually oriented businesses and the second set addressing the locational restrictions. Plaintiffs, who include the original plaintiffs in this action as well as numerous intervenors who joined later in the litigation, are divided into the following nine groups, each of which is represented by a different set of attorneys and has filed separate briefs: N.W. Enterprises; FTU; Dee & Dee Enterprises; A.H.D.; Marketing Organization; Mark Thai Do; Elgin Investment; Chil Soung ; and KQ Investments. In their original responses, most Plaintiffs primarily argued that numerous factual issues preclude resolution of this case through summary judgment on the current record. However, two sets of Plaintiffs, the A.H.D. and the FTU Plaintiffs, also filed cross-motions for summary judgment with their original responses, contending that the Court could invalidate the Ordinance in whole or in part as a matter of law. In order to expedite its consideration of the legal issues presented in this case, the Court ordered at the pretrial conference held on October 17, 1997, that any other Plaintiffs who believe summary judgment in their favor is appropriate in whole or in part should promptly submit cross-motions for summary judgment. All the remaining Plaintiffs submitted such cross-motions. The City has filed a reply to each response as well as responses to the cross-motions. Plaintiffs have filed replies to the City’s responses. Except as noted where relevant, Plaintiffs have generally incorporated all of one another’s responses and arguments challenging the Ordinance. In addition to these motions and cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties have raised numerous objections to each other’s proffered evidence and have filed motions to strike various briefs and exhibits. The Court will address these motions below where relevant. After detailed consideration of the parties’ briefs, exhibits, all other matters of record in this case, and the relevant authorities, the Court concludes that Ordinance 97-75 is valid and enforceable except in several respects discussed below and that no parties have yet raised any material issues of genuine fact necessitating resolution through a trial. Thus, the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 120] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment [Docs. # 170,173, 218, 221, 258, 268, 270, 289, and 290] are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART in accordance with this Opinion. B. History of the Ordinance An understanding of Plaintiffs’ challenge to Ordinance 97-75 requires a brief recounting of the history of Houston’s regulation of sexually oriented businesses, which are also referred to by the parties and the Court as “adult businesses.” The first attempt, brought to this Court’s attention, by the City of Houston to regulate sexually oriented businesses was in 1977, before the development of most of the current First Amendment law on the subject of adult entertainment. Ordinances 77-1259 and 77-1260 prohibited the operation of adult commercial establishments within two thousand feet of any church, school, or other educational or charitable institution. A federal district court declared these ordinances unconstitutional on the grounds that they were vague and overbroad, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and denied the adult businesses due process and equal protection. See Universal Amusement Co., Inc. v. Hofheinz, 616 F.2d 202, 204 (5th Cir.1980). In 1983, the City again attempted to regulate sexually oriented businesses by enacting the first version of its current ordinance. Ordinance 83-1812, Exhibit A to the City’s Motion [Doe. # 120], prohibited such businesses as adult cabarets, adult modeling studios, and adult encounter parlors from operating within 750 feet of any “school or church or place of worship,” within 1,000 feet of any other sexually oriented business, or on any tract of land for which 75% or more of the tracts within a 1,000 foot radius were residential. The ordinance also placed severe restrictions on the businesses’ exterior decor and signage. Due to then existing state law restrictions on municipal regulatory power, that ordinance did not apply to adult bookstores, movie theatres, or cabarets that were licensed by the state to sell alcoholic beverages. In 1985, the City enacted Ordinance 85-1337, Exhibit B to the City’s Motion [Doc. # 120], which imposed restrictions on adult arcades, including requirements that adult arcades maintain visible interiors, managers’ stations, and minimal levels of lighting. This ordinance was upheld against constitutional attack in Rahmani v. State, 748 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1081, 109 S.Ct. 2102, 104 L.Ed.2d 663 (1989). In response to a 1985 change in state law permitting cities to regulate adult businesses licensed by the state to serve alcoholic beverages, the City enacted another ordinance in 1986 to extend the locational and other restrictions of the , 1983 ordinance to adult lounges, (“topless clubs”). See Ordinance 86-323, Exhibit C to the City’s Motion [Doc. 9 120]. The 1986 Ordinance also added licensed daycare centers to the list of protected land uses from which the businesses could not operate within 750 feet. At least twenty-three topless clubs that were forced to close or relocate as a result of this ordinance brought a federal lawsuit seeking to enjoin its enforcement. In SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 636 F.Supp. 1359 (S.D.Tex.1986) (McDonald, J.), the district court upheld this ordinance against various constitutional and other legal challenges, with the exception of several minor provisions. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court. See SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied sub nom. M.E.F. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston, 489 U.S. 1052, 109 S.Ct. 1310, 103 L.Ed.2d 579 (1989). In response to a 1989 change in state law permitting cities to regulate adult bookstores and movie theatres, the City enacted Ordinance 91-187, Exhibit D to the City’s Motion [Doc. # 120], which expanded the scope of the previous ordinances to cover adult bookstores and adult movie theatres. A number of affected businesses brought a constitutional challenge against this ordinance in federal court. In 4330 Richmond Ave. et al. v. City of Houston, No. 91-0665 (S.D.Tex. July 11, 1997) (Rainey, J.), the district court upheld Ordinance 91-187 except in two minor respects. That case is currently on appeal to the Fifth Circuit. On January 15, 1997, the City enacted Ordinance 97-75, the subject of the current lawsuit. This Ordinance increases the locational restrictions on all sexually oriented businesses, expands the scope of regulation to cover “adult mini-theatres,” imposes new structural requirements on sexually oriented businesses, expands the reach of signage restrictions, and adds new regulations affecting individuals working in sexually oriented businesses. The new locational restrictions imposed by Ordinance 97-75 include an increase in the minimum distance between sexually oriented businesses and protected land uses from 750 feet to 1,500 feet; the addition of “public parks” to the list of protected land uses; an increase from 1,000 to 1,500 feet in the radius for calculating whether 75% or more of surrounding tracts are residential in character ; and a revision in the method for calculating the percentage of residential tracts. The Ordinance requires that applicants for licenses to open sexually oriented businesses publish newspaper notices warning the public of their applications. Also, the Ordinance requires adult mini-theatres and other sexually oriented businesses to conform to new structural, visibility, and lighting requirements. These provisions will require many businesses to remodel their interior spaces and eliminate doors and private rooms. In addition, the adult arcades and mini-theatres must seal their interior walls to eliminate so-called “glory holes” through which patrons purportedly engage in anonymous sex. The Ordinance extends the application of previous signage limitations to sexually oriented businesses located in multi-tenant complexes. Ordinance 97-75 also requires managers and entertainers who work in sexually oriented businesses to obtain individual permits, for which they must divulge personal information and undergo criminal background checks, and to wear personal identification cards at all times while they are working. Finally, the Ordinance prohibits touching between entertainers and patrons and requires that entertainers, while working, stay at least three feet away from patrons. In this action, Plaintiffs challenge the validity of numerous provisions of Ordinance 97-75 on various federal, state, and local law grounds discussed below. II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must determine whether “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc); Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir.1990). The facts are to be reviewed with all inferences drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion. See Bozé, 912 F.2d at 804 (citing Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir.1986)). However, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmovant “only when there is an actual controversy— that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Laughlin v. Olszewski 102 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir.1996). The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a material fact issue with respect to those issues on which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial. If the movant meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate with “significant probative evidence” that there is an issue of material fact so as to warrant a trial. See Texas Manufactured Hous. Ass’n v. Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 2497, 138 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1997); Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 586, 136 L.Ed.2d 515 (1996); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Avenell, 66 F.3d 715, 718-19 (5th Cir.1995); Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.1994). The nonmovant’s burden may not be satisfied by conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, metaphysical doubt as to the facts, or a scintilla of evidence. See Grimes v. Texas Dept. of Mental Health, 102 F.3d 137, 139-40 (5th Cir.1996); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing of the existence of an element essential to the party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548). III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE Plaintiffs primarily attack Ordinance 97-75 as an infringement upon their First Amendment right to free speech. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has held that some types of adult entertainment qualify as constitutionally protected speech and have accordingly applied heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment to government restrictions on: nude dancing, see Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981); adult bookstores and adult video stores, see FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990); and adult movie theatres, see City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 69-70, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976). Under these cases, most, but not all, of the Plaintiffs in this action are entitled to receive the Court’s heightened First Amendment scrutiny of various provisions of Ordinance 97-75. In sum, regulations that affect First Amendment interests and are content-based are evaluated under “strict scrutiny”; regulations that affect First Amendment interests but are content-neutral are evaluated under “intermediate scrutiny.” See City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47, 106 S.Ct. 925. To the extent that a regulation does not affect First Amendment or other constitutional interests and does not make distinctions on the basis of any protected classes, it is reviewed under the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny, the rational basis test. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441-42, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974); SDJ, 837 F.2d at 1273. A. Businesses Entitled to Heightened First Amendment Scrutiny In City of Renton, the Supreme Court upheld a local ordinance that restricted the permissible locations for constitutionally protected adult movie theatres and described the contours of the applicable First Amendment test as follows: [Regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment. On the other hand, so-called “content-neutral” time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. 475 U.S. at 46-47, 106 S.Ct. 925 (citations omitted). Under this test, a court must first consider whether a challenged time, place, and manner regulation is content-based or content-neutral. 1. Content-Based Regulations Receive Strict Scrutiny A regulation is “content-based” if it was intended to “suppress the expression of unpopular views,” id. at 48, 106 S.Ct. 925, or if it “distinguish[es] favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed,” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) {Turner I). If a court determines that a regulation is eon-tent-based, then that regulation must be subjected to strict scrutiny, is presumptively impermissible, and may only be upheld if the government entity demonstrates a compelling reason for the regulation. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991) (in order to justify differential treatment of speech on the basis of content, “the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end”) (quoting Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987)); City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47, 106 S.Ct. 925. 2. Content-Neutral Regulations Receive Intermediate Scrutiny On the other hand, regulation of adult entertainment is “content-neutral” if it is “ justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’ ” City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 48, 106 S.Ct. 925 (quoting Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976)), and if the legislative body’s “predominate concerns” in enacting it were to address the undesirable secondary effects of adult businesses, for example, concerns such as preventing crime, “proteet[ing] the city’s retail trade, maintain[ing] property values, and generally ‘protec[ting] and preserving] the quality of [the city’s] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life,’ ” id. Even if the legislative body’s motivation in enacting various restrictions on adult businesses was based in part by a desire to suppress expressive activity, that fact alone would not render those provisions content-based, and thus invalid, so long as the legislative body’s predominate motivation was to regulate secondary effects. In City of Renton, the Supreme Court specifically held that the relevant inquiry is to determine the City Council’s “predominate” intent and that an ordinance is not invalid if restricting the adult businesses’ First Amendment rights was merely “a motivating factor” in the City’s decision to enact the ordinance. 475 U.S. at 47-48, 106 S.Ct. 925 (emphasis in original). If a court determines that a regulation that affects protected speech is content-neutral, then the court must apply intermediate scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, a court may uphold the regulation only if it is: (1) narrowly tailored (2) to serve a substantial governmental interest and (3)does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication A regulation is “sufficiently well tailored” to meet the narrow tailoring requirement if it “effectively promotes the government’s stated interest,” SDJ, 837 F.2d at 1276, and does not “burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests,” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 1186, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997) (Turner II); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). As for the second element of the City of Renton intermediate scrutiny test, municipal regulation of sexually oriented businesses serves a “substantial governmental interest” when it is designed to combat negative secondary effects associated with those businesses. See SDJ, 837 F.2d at 1274. See also TK’s Video v. Denton County, Texas, 24 F.3d 705, 709-10 (5th Cir.1994). As for the third City of Renton element, an ordinance does not unreasonably limit “alternative avenues of communication” if it provides adult businesses with “a reasonable opportunity to own and operate their businesses.” Woodall, 49 F.3d at 1126. Plaintiffs’ primary line of attack is to argue that Ordinance 97-75 is invalid in full and should be struck down in its entirety under the First Amendment because it is a content-based restraint on speech, enacted by the Houston City Council for the primary purpose of significantly reducing, if not shutting down entirely, the city’s sexually oriented business industry. With respect to each challenged provision of the Ordinance, Plaintiffs argue that the provision should be invalidated under strict scrutiny as a content-based restriction. In the alternative, with respect to each challenged provision, Plaintiffs argue that, even if the provision is content-neutral, it is nevertheless invalid because (i) it is not narrowly tailored, (ii) the City Council did not base its enactment on reasonably reliable evidence that the provision would serve a substantial governmental interest, and, (iii) with respect to the Ordinance’s new locational restrictions, there is not a sufficient number of adequate alternative sites to which the businesses may relocate under the Ordinance. 3. Distinguishing Content-Based from Content-Neutral Regulations In assessing whether various provisions of Ordinance 97-75 were designed to address undesirable secondary effects, and thus are content-neutral, or were instead intended to suppress speech, and thus are content-based, the Court must give great deference to the stated goals of the City Council. “It is the legislature, and not the courts, which determines how much testimony is enough to require city action in redressing a perceived problem.” SDJ, 636 F.Supp. at 1367. In the preamble to Ordinance 97-75, the City Council included the following language through which it intended to show that the new restrictions on adult businesses and individuals working in adult businesses were enacted to address negative secondary effects created by the businesses: WHEREAS, the City Council finds that sexually oriented businesses can exert dehumanizing influences on churches, schools, and day care centers, can have negative effects on property values, [and] can contribute to increased criminal activities in the surrounding areas ... and ... WHEREAS, the City Council finds that sexually oriented businesses provide enhanced opportunities for employee participation in various forms of criminal activities, including prostitution, lewd conduct, indecent exposure, obscenity law violations and related crimes that are associated with sexual conduct or sexually-oriented materials; and WHEREAS, the City has a substantial public concern that its residents be protected from criminal activity and be protected from casual sexual activity that facilitates the spread of sexually transmitted diseases ... Preamble to Ordinance 97-75, at 2, 4. Although these statements of purpose in the Ordinance’s preamble are clearly relevant to the Court’s determination of whether various provisions are content-neutral, the Court may not rely exclusively on the City Council’s conclusory statements regarding its intent. Instead, the Court must also consider whether the City Council relied on evidence in the legislative record from which it could have reasonably determined that negative secondary effects associated with adult businesses actually exist and that the proposed regulations would in some way address these effects. See Lakeland Lounge, 973 F.2d at 1259; SDJ, 837 F.2d at 1274. In Lakeland Lounge, the Fifth Circuit set forth several factors by which courts could judge the trustworthiness of language in an ordinance’s preamble that purports to establish that a City’s legislative motivation was to combat undesirable secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses. The court explained that: [Preamble] language might not save a statute that was formulated without specific attention to secondary effects. Nevertheless, in context here, where (1) the drafters of the ordinance did rely upon studies of secondary effects, (2) a majority of the council members did receive some information about the secondary effects during an open hearing of the planning board, and (3) nothing in the record otherwise suggests impermissible motives on the part of the council members, the language of the preamble shows the city council’s awareness of the studies upon which the planning staff relied when framing the ordinance and reflects that a reasonable legislature with constitutional motives could have enacted the ordinance. Lakeland Lounge, 973 F.2d at 1259 (citing SDJ, 837 F.2d at 1274). In SDJ, the Fifth Circuit set forth the following standard for evaluating whether restrictions on sexually oriented businesses are content-based or content-neutral: [U]nlike our review under a standard of rationality, we will not hypothesize [a permissible] objective or accept a naked assertion. Rather, we intrude into the regulatory decision process to the extent that we insist upon objective evidence of purpose — a study or findings. Insisting upon findings reduces the risk that a purported effort to regulate effect is a mask for regulation of content. That is, evidence of legitimate purpose is supported by proof that secondary effects actually exist and are the result of the business subject to the regulation. At the same time, it is apparent that as we increase the required precision in findings, we increasingly encounter the difficulties we found unacceptable in [Shelton v.] City of College Station, [780 F.2d 475 (5th Cir.1986) (en banc) ]. Our task in setting the level of review is to strike for that point of equilibrium that vindicates first amendment values at the least cost to a state’s decisional arrangements. Thus, as the Court explained in City of Renton, a city may establish its “substantial interest” in the regulation by compiling a record with evidence that it may be “reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.” [475 U.S. at 51-52,106 S.Ct. 925] We do not ask whether the regulator subjectively believed or was motivated by other concerns, but rather whether an objective lawmaker could have so concluded, supported by an actual basis for the conclusion. Legitimate purpose may be shown by reasonable inferences from specific testimony of individuals, local studies, or the experiences of other cities. This level of scrutiny best accommodates the need to ensure proper purposes with the limited competence of courts to discern ephemeral legislative motivations. SDJ, 837 F.2d at 1274 (emphasis added). In City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 51, 106 S.Ct. 925, the Supreme Court established that a city may enact restrictions on adult businesses without “eonduct[ing] new studies or producing] evidence independent of that already generated by other cities.” However, if a City Council relies on studies from other cities, it must have had a basis for believing that such studies are applicable to that city’s own problems. See id. at 51-52, 106 S.Ct. 925 (evidence from other cities must be “reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses”). Thus, in the ease at bar, the City of Houston must demonstrate that, in adopting the various provisions of Ordinance 97-75, City Council members had a reasonable basis for believing that these provisions would address negative secondary effects actually and currently attributable to sexually oriented businesses in Houston. The Court cannot merely surmise this fact from vague references to evidence in other cities or surmise the current validity of the City Council’s purported beliefs regarding specific secondary effects from previous evidence used to support earlier versions of the Ordinance. The City claims that the existence of negative secondary effects justifying Ordinance 97-75 has already been established as a matter of law in SDJ. This Court disagrees. In SDJ, the Fifth Circuit determined that the evidence before the City Council in 1983 and 1986 specifically supported the passage of Ordinance 86-323. However that evidence, which was eleven to fourteen years old at the time the City enacted Ordinance 97-75, does not address the additional or continuing secondary effects that the City claims currently exist and justify all its new regulations. In order to extend its prior restrictions on protected businesses, the City must demonstrate that the City Council had before it and considered evidence that unwanted secondary effects still exist and that the City Council had a reasonable basis for believing that the new restrictions it enacted would specifically address these effects. In order for the Court to determine that a given provision of Ordinance 97-75 is content-neutral, the justification for that new provision must have existed in the evidence the City Council considered at the time it enacted the Ordinance, not merely in evidence compiled later in the course of litigation. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2275, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996) (in defending government action against constitutional attack, the government’s “justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation”). This issue raises no difficulty in the case at bar, however, because, in its attempt to show that the new restrictions enacted in Ordinance 97-75 are content-neutral, the City states that it relies solely on the legislative record that was produced by and available to the Houston City Council’s Sexually ’ Oriented Business Committee in the course of its deliberations and that was available to the full City Council at the time it approved Ordinance 97-75. Because the City does not attempt to justify factually any provision of Ordinance 97-75 as content-neutral by reference to evidence that is not contained in this legislative record, for each challenged provision of Ordinance 97-75, the Court has carefully examined the legislative record to determine whether the Houston City Council had any basis for claiming that the provision was enacted for the purpose of addressing negative secondary effects of adult businesses. 4. The Relevance of Turner Broadcasting System v. F.C.C. A number of Plaintiffs argue at length that First Amendment law has materially changed since the time the Supreme Court decided City of Renton and the Fifth Circuit decided SDJ. Specifically, they urge that, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Turner Broadcasting System v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997) (Turner II), financial impact of a regulation is now relevant to the First Amendment analysis. Under City of Renton and Woodall, 49 F.3d at 1122, economic impact on adult businesses is not relevant, at least with respect to the issue of whether a regulation allows reasonable “alternative avenues of communication” for adult entertainment. See City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 54, 106 S.Ct. 925 (“The inquiry for First Amendment purposes is not concerned with economic impact”) (quoting American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 78, 96 S.Ct. 2440 (Powell, J., concurring)). In contrast, in Turner II, in judging the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, the Supreme Court engaged in a detailed consideration of the competing financial interests of cable and broadcast television system operators. This Court is not persuaded that Turner II has altered First Amendment doctrine in any way relevant to the case at bar. First and most importantly, Turner II involved an entirely different First Amendment context: commercial speech. In contrast, the challenge presented here primarily concerns adult entertainment, a type of speech that has been consistently afforded less constitutional protection than other forms of speech. See City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 49 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. 925 (“ ‘it is manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate’ ”) (quoting American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 70, 96 S.Ct. 2440 (plurality opinion)); Woodall, 49 F.3d at 1122 (“[e]rotie non-obscene printed matter, films, and live entertainment are sheltered by the First Amendment, but enjoy less protection than some other forms of speech, such as political speech”); TK’s Video, 24 F.3d at 707; SDJ, 837 F.2d at 1273. Because Turner II concerns a context other than adult entertainment, until and unless the Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit reinterprets First Amendment doctrine pertaining to adult entertainment in light of Turner II, this Court is bound by controlling authority specifically related to the adult entertainment context. As the Supreme Court recently explained, lower courts should not conclude that more recent [Supreme Court] cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent. ... “[I]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [lower courts] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 2017, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijos v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989)). Furthermore, in Turner II, the Supreme Court considered whether Congress had before it sufficient evidence that broadcast television operators had significant enough financial need to justify the challenged statutory provisions. See Turner II, 117 S.Ct. at 1196. In contrast, here, Plaintiffs appear to argue that the financial harm they will suffer as a result of various provisions of the Ordinance should itself invalidate those provisions. The Court rejects this argument. In the First Amendment context of adult entertainment, the Court’s examination of the legislative record must center on the issue of whether the City Council had before it sufficient evidence of negative secondary effects that would justify its new restrictions on the plaintiff businesses. The Court declines to delve into the minutiae of the financial impact of Ordinance 97-75 and thus engage in a speculative interpretation of Turner II. Instead, the Court concludes that, in light of City of Renton and Woodall, economic impact is not itself dispos-itive of the constitutionality of restrictions on adult businesses. However, without relying on Turner II, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that evidence that the City Council was aware that a given provision of the Ordinance would have a significant, perhaps devastating, financial' impact on the affected businesses is at least relevant to the Court’s determination of whether that provision is content-neutral or was instead enacted for the primary purpose of restraining speech. Cf. Simon and Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115, 112 S.Ct. 501 (“[a] statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech”) (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447, 111 S.Ct. 1438, 113 L.Ed.2d 494 (1991)). In other words, if the Houston City Council knew that, although a given provision of Ordinance 97-75 did not expressly ban adult businesses, its financial impact was nonetheless likely to put a large proportion of them out of business, that fact would be relevant to, although not dispositive of, the issue of whether that provision is content-neutral. B. Businesses Not Entitled to Heightened First Amendment Scrutiny Receive Rational Basis Review for All Provisions of the Ordinance All the Plaintiffs in this case contend that, because they are protected by the First Amendment, they are entitled to receive the Court’s heightened scrutiny of the challenged provisions of Ordinance 97-75. The Court does not agree, however, that all the Plaintiffs are entitled to this protection under current case law. As mentioned earlier, the only types of adult businesses to which the Supreme Court has expressly extended First Amendment protection are adult bookstores, adult movie theatres, adult video stores, and enterprises that feature nude dancing. In the case at bar, Plaintiffs also include other types of sexually oriented businesses, such as adult modeling studios, adult tanning salons, and adult encounter parlors that do not appear to provide printed entertainment or live or recorded entertainment that features dancing. For the reasons described below, the Court concludes that these other types of adult businesses are not covered by the First Amendment. Rational basis review will be applied to all provisions of Ordinance 97-75 applicable to these non-protected businesses. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-42, 105 S.Ct. 3249; Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 7-8, 94 S.Ct. 1536; SDJ, 837 F.2d at 1273. In FW/PBS, the Supreme Court noted that adult businesses that do not “purvey[ ] sexually explicit speech,” such as “escort agencies and sexual encounter centers,” are not protected by the First Amendment. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 224, 110 S.Ct. 596 (emphasis added). Although the issue of precisely which adult businesses receive heightened constitutional scrutiny has not been addressed by the Supreme Court or in recent Fifth Circuit cases, in Stansberry v. Holmes, 613 F.2d 1285, 1286-88 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth Circuit expressly declined to extend First Amendment protection to “massage parlors, nude studios, modeling studios, love parlors, and other similar commercial enterprises.” There the court concluded that, because the Supreme Court had not extended heightened protection to these types of businesses, “no First Amendment interests are at stake here.” Id. at 1288. In Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566, 111 S.Ct. 2456, a plurality of the Supreme Court reluctantly reaffirmed that nude dancing receives constitutional protection, concluding that “nude dancing ... is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so.” However, in reaching this decision, the Court expressly rejected the proposition that nudity itself constitutes protected expressive activity. See id. at 570, 111 S.Ct. 2456. In Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248, 1254 (5th Cir.1995), the Fifth Circuit explained that “nudity is protected speech only when combined with some other mode of expression which itself is entitled to first amendment protection.” See also DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 107 F.3d 403, 408-410 (6th Cir.1997) (court must make a case-by-ease factual inquiry to determine whether erotic entertainment qualifies as speech for First Amendment purposes). The adult enterprises that are Plaintiffs in this case but that do not fall within a category of businesses that has previously been afforded First Amendment protection, including the adult modeling studios, adult tanning salons, and adult encounter parlors, appear to assume that they may piggyback on the First Amendment claims of the other Plaintiffs simply because they provide services involving nudity. However, these businesses have not provided any arguments as to why they should receive First Amendment protection; nor have they provided any evidence from which the Court may conclude that they convey any constitutionally protected “modes of expression.” The Court therefore declines to extend heightened constitutional review to the challenged provisions of Ordinance 97-75, as applied to adult modeling studios, adult tanning salons, and adult encounter parlors. In describing heightened First Amendment review in SDJ, the Fifth Circuit explained the extreme level of deference courts must provide when applying rational basis review: “[Ujnlike our review under a standard of rationality, we will not hypothesize such [a permissible] objective or accept a naked assertion.” 837 F.2d at 1274. Thus, when an entity does not receive special constitutional protection and rational basis review applies, the Court may hypothesize permissible objectives and accept naked assertions. The Court therefore holds that all provisions of the Ordinance are constitutionally valid as applied to enterprises that are not protected by the First Amendment. The Court accepts the City’s contentions that the Ordinance as a whole is a valid exercise of its police power with respect to these enterprises. See Stansberry, 613 F.2d at 1288-89 (upholding locational, restrictions on adult businesses not protected by the First Amendment as a valid exercise of County’s police power). C. Can the Ordinance’s Validity Be Determined Through Summary Judgment? 1. In General In their original responses to the City’s Motion, Plaintiffs strenuously argued that this case raises a variety of factual issues that preclude resolution through summary judgment. In both City of Renton and American Mini Theatres, the Supreme Court concluded that “‘the interests furthered by [the challenged] ordinance[s] are both important and substantial.’” City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50, 106 S.Ct. 925 (quoting American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 2440 (Powell, J., concurring)). However, Plaintiffs contend that the Court’s conclusions in these eases, as well as the Fifth Circuit’s decision to uphold a prior version of Ordinance 97-75 in SDJ do not render the issue of whether Ordinance 97-75 is constitutional one of law and do not mandate the same finding in this case. Instead, Plaintiffs insist that this Court must carefully examine the City’s proffered justification for each provision challenged here. As reflected in the previous section regarding the applicable legal standards, the Court agrees that the question of whether each challenged provision of the Ordinance is content-based or content-neutral, and thus is subject to strict or intermediate scrutiny for the Plaintiffs receiving First Amendment protection, is a factual matter that must be resolved upon the particularities of the current record. See SDJ, 837 F.2d at 1275 (noting that while the Fifth Circuit held in one case that the City of Galveston “had failed to prove a justifiable interest in [its adult business] regulation ... the record in [££>/] supports exactly the opposite conclusion”). The Court therefore concludes that it must evaluate the validity of the changes enacted in Ordinance 97-75 based on the current legislative record. In order for the City to rely on records established in support of previous versions of the Ordinance, the City at least must identify from the current legislative record evidence that City Council members, their staffs, or the City’s Legal Department specifically considered how evidence from the prior legislative histories supported the newly enacted provisions. Except with respect to a few challenged provisions, the City failed to make this showing. Although the answer as to whether a particular regulation of protected businesses is content-neutral varies from ease to case and thus generally is a factual issue, the mere existence of a factual dispute will not defeat a proper summary judgment motion. A trial is only necessary where there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Stafford v. True, 123 F.3d 291, 294 (5th Cir.1997). A non-movant is entitled to a trial only by demonstrating that it has “significant probative evidence” in support of its rendition of the facts, Texas Manufactured Hous. Ass’n, 101 F.3d at 1099, or by showing, pursuant Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(f)', how it could obtain such evidence through further discovery. In fact, in City of Renton itself, the Supreme Court approved the district court’s granting of summary judgment for the City, after concluding that the district court made a proper factual finding. See also FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 221, 110 S.Ct. 596 (“[f]ollowing expedited discovery, petitioners’ constitutional claims were resolved through cross-motions for summary judgment”). A number of Plaintiffs urge this Court, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f), to defer ruling on the pending summary judgment motions until the parties have had the opportunity to conduct further discovery. As described in the sections that follow, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the need at this time for additional discovery. Plaintiffs’ requests for further discovery are therefore denied. 2. Chil Soung’s § 1983 and § 1985 Claims The Chil Soung Plaintiffs argue that the City’s summary judgment motion does not purport to address their conspiracy claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and that they therefore have no obligation to address this claim at this time. The City responds that its Motion and briefing address all issues raised meaningfully by all Plaintiffs’ pleadings. See City of Houston’s Reply to Chil Soung’s Response [Doc. # 208], at 1-2. The Court concludes that the Chil Soung Plaintiffs have not meaningfully pursued their conspiracy claim and the claim as pleaded fails to state a legally viable cause of action. These Plaintiffs have been on notice of the City’s position and yet have failed to provide any detailed arguments on this claim. Because the Chil Soung Plaintiffs did not seek leave to amend their Complaint and did not set forth their legal theory in response to the City’s Motion, their right to amend their Complaint and assert a new theory is waived. See Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police Department, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir.1997) (court may dismiss claim when plaintiff simply “ ‘declares the adequacy of [her] complaint’ in ‘response to [a] motion to dismiss’ ” rather than amending complaint to provide more detailed basis for claim) (quoting Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir.1986)). In any event, as for Chil Soung’s § 1983 conspiracy claim, the Court holds, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff cannot state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In order to establish a claim of conspiracy under § 1983, Plaintiffs must prove that the City entered into a willful agreement with another person to deprive Plaintiffs of a constitutional right. See Daniel v. Ferguson, 839 F.2d 1124, 1131 (5th Cir.1988). Plaintiffs’ conspiracy theory is not viable as a matter of law because the commission of a conspiracy requires two independent legal personalities, see Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir.1994); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir.1952), and Plaintiffs have not alleged any person with whom the City has conspired. See id. (“a corporation cannot conspire with itself anymore than a private individual can [and] the acts of the agent are the acts of the corporation”). As for CM Soung’s claim brought under § 1985, the Court finds this claim to be frivolous. The Fifth Circuit has recently made clear that a party may bring a claim under § 1985(3) only to challenge a conspiracy that is alleged to be motivated by racial animus. See Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v. Sawyer, 90 F.3d 118, 124 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1248, 137 L.Ed.2d 329 (declining “to extend the reach of section 1985(3) to include conspiracies motivated by religious, as opposed, to racial animus”). The current challenge displays no hint of an argument that Ordinance 97-75 was in any way motivated by racial animus. The Court therefore will not allow this claim to proceed. 3. Other Issues Plaintiffs Claim Have Not Been Addressed by the City’s Summary Judgment Motion Several groups of Plaintiffs deny that the City’s Motion covers all issues raised by their Complaints. See, e.g., FTU’s Response [Doc. # 170], at 3-5; FTU’s Supplemental Cross-Motion [Doc. #270], at 2-3; Dee & Dee’s Response [Doc. # 178], at 54-59; Dee & Dee’s Locational Response [Doc. #214], at 16-18. The Court disagrees. In its Motion, the City seeks a ruling that the Ordinance, as a matter of law, is valid in its entirety. Therefore the City has addressed all of Plaintiffs’ claims. The only oMssions that Plaintiffs note in the Motion’s coverage are the City’s failure to address various specific arguments raised by certain Plaintiffs. The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ attempts to characterize numerous detailed arguments, many of which have been addressed by the parties’ briefing and by the Court in this Opinion, as discrete causes of action. Instead, the Court finds all of Plaintiffs’ detailed arguments to be subsumed within Plaintiffs’ more general attack to each of the challenged provisions of the Ordinance. Moreover, since the City contends that its Motion establishes the validity of the Ordinance in its entirety, it is Plaintiffs’ burden to point out to the Court any issues or claims that the City’s Motion fails to address. The Court has considered all Plaintiffs’ responses and the City’s replies in determining whether the arguments that Plaintiffs claim the City has not addressed in its Motion actually raise any genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. Any arguments raised by Plaintiffs that are not addressed explicitly in this Opinion are rejected. IV. GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO THE CITY’S EVIDENCE The City has submitted what it claims to be the Ordinance’s entire legislative record, including all evidence considered by the City Council in passing the Ordinance as well as minutes, transcripts, and videotapes of the Council’s Sexually Oriented Business Committee’s meetings and public hearings and selected legislative history for prior versions of the Ordinance. See Exhibits A-D, 1-43 to the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 120], Supplement to City’s Motion [Doc. # 158]. To support their claim that Ordinance 97-75 is a content-based restriction on speech and should be subjected to strict scrutiny, or in- the alternative that the Ordinance is content-neutral but does not serve substantial governmental interests, Plaintiffs wage a multitude of attacks against the legislative record submitted by the City. For example, Plaintiffs argue that the entire legislative record should be stricken because it is replete with hearsay; contains numerous unauthenticated documents; contains unqualified and unreliable expert testimony; contains conclusory evidence; contains evidence that is not reasonably believable, and, to the extent that it does not address actual secondary effects caused by sexually oriented businesses, is not relevant. See Dee & Dee’s Motion to Strike [Doc. # 168]; FTU’s Objections to City’s Evidence [Doc. # 166]; A.H.D.’s Objections to City’s Evidence [Doc. # 174]. For the following reasons, the Court rejects all of these arguments. First, most of the materials contained within the legislative record do not constitute hearsay because they are not offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted within them. Instead, they are offered solely to reveal the scope of the City Council’s Sexually Oriented Business Committee’s investigation and deliberations and to disclose the evidence considered by the Committee in formulating the provisions of Ordinance 97-75. In other words, the City has not offered minutes and transcripts of Committee meetings and public hearings and evidence considered by Committee members in order to prove that sexually oriented businesses in Houston actually have the adverse impact the City claims to believe that they have. Instead, the City has offered them for the purpose of proving to the Court that the City Council, through its Committee and the City’s legal staff, considered adequate amounts and types of evidence to support the new restrictions contained in the Ordinance. Second, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ arguments that the exhibits comprising the legislative record must be stricken because they are not properly authenticated. In order to authenticate the exhibits as the legislative record,' the City submitted an affidavit by the Sexually Oriented Business Committee’s custodian of records, Elizabeth Dal-heim, in which she avers that these exhibits “are a true and correct copy of the documents received, created and/or maintained by the Committee” in the course of its, deliberations. Affidavit of Elizabeth Dalhein, Attachment to City’s Motion [Doc. # 120]. The Court finds this authentication sufficient for the purposes for which the evidence is offered, namely to show the Court what evidence the Committee considered and what transpired during the Committee’s meetings and hearings. It is not necessary for the City to have individually authenticated each piece of evidence that the Committee considered, nor was it necessary for the Committee to have only considered evidence that was itself properly authenticated so as to be admissible in court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs have not raised any serious question as to whether the minutes and transcripts are genuine and as to whether the prior legislative materials submitted by the City actually are materials previously created by the City in support of its earlier sexually oriented business ordinances. Plaintiffs’ concerns regarding the authenticity or reliability