Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION MCKINLEY, District Judge. This matter is before the Court for habeas corpus review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner, David Leroy Skaggs [hereinafter “Skaggs”], was sentenced to death after a jury found him guilty of the murders of an elderly Glasgow, Kentucky couple. Skaggs’ direct appeal was affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court. The Kentucky Supreme Court also rejected several collateral attacks on the judgment and sentencing. Fully briefed, this matter is now ripe for decision. For the reasons set forth below, Skaggs’ petition for writ of habeas corpus [DN2] is denied. BACKGROUND FACTS The background facts of this case were fairly documented by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 672, 675-76 (Ky.1985): Herman Matthews was a 76-year-old, semi-retired scrap metal dealer. His wife was 67 years old and frequently helped in the business. Their home was connected to their place of business. He conducted a cash business and always carried large sums of cash on the premises. On May 6, 1981, a neighbor discovered the body of Herman Matthews in his place of business. Later the police found the body of Mae Matthews in the living room. Herman Matthews was shot three times, once in the right chest, once in the lower back and once in the left arm. He also suffered a head injury consistent with being hit with a hammer and not with falling. The head injury and gunshot wounds to the chest and back were each capable of causing death independently of other injuries. Mrs. Matthews suffered two gunshot wounds, one in the left upper chest and one in the left abdomen. One wound occurred while she was standing and the other while she was lying down. The police investigation led to Columbus, Indiana where they questioned Skaggs. After having him execute a waiver of rights form, the officers noticed dried blood on Skaggs shoes. While the police were examining the shoes, Skaggs fled. After a 20 minute foot chase in which warning shots were fired, Skaggs was apprehended. He was arrested on Indiana charges and returned to the local jail. On May 14, still in Indiana, the Kentucky police again questioned Skaggs after again advising him of his rights. He told them he was present at the time of the Matthewses killings, but an accomplice, John Davis, pulled the trigger. On May 15, during the trip to Glasgow, Kentucky, Skaggs told police that the footprint on the door of the Matthews house was his and that he had attempted to kick in the door to burglarize. Police investigation indicated that the alleged accomplice, Davis, was not involved with the crimes. In view of this information, on May 18, 1981, the police again questioned Skaggs and told him that he had a right to an attorney and that one had been appointed for him if he wanted the police to call the attorney. Skaggs indicated that he did not want an attorney, and during the subsequent interrogation, he confessed to having committed the murders of Herman and Mae Matthews during the course of a robbery and stated that he had acted alone. After a jury trial, Skaggs was convicted of the murders of Herman and Mae Matthews, and he was also found guilty on two counts of robbery and burglary. At the sentencing phase of the murder conviction, the jury was unable to agree on the penalties for the two murders and was subsequently discharged. Approximately three months later, on June 22, 1982, the penalty phase was retried and a new jury selected. Much of the same evidence introduced at the guilt phase of the first trial was introduced at the retrial of the penalty phase. The final judgment sentencing Skaggs to death for the murder of Herman and Mae Matthews was entered on July 15, 1982. Skaggs now seeks a writ of habeas corpus from this Court alleging thirty-three grounds of constitutional error. In discussing the various issues, the Court will set forth further facts as appropriate. Arguments I. Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment Rights Were Violated When Petitioner Was Denied Access to Competent Psychological Assistance At the guilt phase of the trial, Skaggs presented an insanity defense through the testimony of Elya Bresler [“Bresler”]. Bres-ler, who testified that he was a forensic pathologist, diagnosed that Skaggs suffered from two mental illnesses: a major depressive disorder and a paranoid personality disorder. Bresler testified that both these disorders constituted mental diseases or defects that would affect Skaggs’ ability to reason and his ability to learn right from wrong. Bresler testified that, at the time of the offense, it was “unlikely” that Skaggs was acting “intentionally.” Bresler indicated that, as a result of his mental condition, Skaggs lacked a substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. TE IX at 1228-29. Bresler also testified that Skaggs was “constantly” acting under extreme emotional disturbance. Id. at 1230-31. In rebuttal, the Commonwealth called psychiatrist Dr. Pran Ravani [“Ravani”]. Rava-ni had examined Skaggs after Skaggs had been referred to the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Hospital. Ravani testified that Skaggs had a history of alcohol abuse, but no personality disorder or physical illness as a result of the abuse. Ravani also testified that Skaggs had a schizophrenic trend, but not to the point where it could be diagnosed as schizophrenia. Ravani opined that Skaggs did possess the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Although the jury rejected Skaggs’ insanity defense and ultimately found Skaggs guilty on all counts, it was unable to reach a verdict in the penalty phase and was discharged. On June 22, 1982, the penalty phase of Skaggs’ case proceeded to trial for the second time. Bresler’s and Ravani’s testimony was essentially the same as their testimony at the guilt phase of the first trial. The jury recommended that Skaggs be sentenced to death for the murders of Herman and Mae Matthews. On July 13, 1982, the trial court accepted the jury’s recommendations and sentenced Skaggs to death. Sometime after the trial and conviction, Skaggs discovered that Bresler had testified falsely concerning his credentials and that he was not a licensed clinical psychologist. In March 1984, Skaggs filed a Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 10.02/10.06 motion for new trial based on this newly discovered evidence. Although the trial court acknowledged Bresler’s lack of credentials, it overruled Skaggs’ motion for a new trial. Skaggs’ appeal to the Kentucky Court of Appeals from denial of the motion was transferred to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In 1994, Skaggs brought a second motion for a new trial pursuant to RCr 10.02 and Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. The bases of the motion were psychological evaluations conducted by Charles Yonts [“Yonts”], a certified psychologist, and Dr. Eric S. Engum [“Engum”], a clinical neurop-sychologist. Skaggs claimed Engum’s and Yont’s diagnoses were radically different from the diagnosis and conclusions presented to the jury through Bresler. The trial court overruled Skaggs’ motion and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the decision on appeal. In support of his due process claim that he was denied access to competent psychological assistance, Skaggs relies primarily on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). In Ake, the Supreme Court held that “fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to ‘an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary system.’ ” Id. at 77, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Ake entitles a defendant access to a competent psychological expert to help ascertain the viability of' an insanity defense and “to present testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State’s psychiatric witnesses.” Id. at 82, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Skaggs maintains that the selection of Bresler as his mental health expert effectively denied him the right to competent psychological assistance to fairly present his claim of insanity. In the present case, the Court finds that the selection of Bresler as mental health expert did not deny Skaggs the opportunity to fairly present his claim. First, the due process clause is violated only if the alleged constitutional violation is the result of conduct fairly attributable to the state. Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1142 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S.Ct. 116, 116 L.Ed.2d 85 (1991). Here, the Kentucky Supreme Court found, and the record fairly supports, that Skaggs himself was responsible for Bresler’s selection. [Skaggs] was offered, but rejected, the services of a state psychiatrist. He was granted funds to select an expert of his own choosing. He selected Elya Bresler and offered him as an expert witness without first making any investigation of his credentials. Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Ky.1985); see also Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 803 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Ky.1990) (“[T]he trial court, after having offered to appoint a psychiatrist, acceded to the defendant’s preference for an allocation of funds. The court could have done no more in providing access to competent psychiatric assistance____”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 844, 112 S.Ct. 140, 116 L.Ed.2d 106 (1991). These factual findings are fairly supported in the state court record. Moreover, Skaggs has failed to set forth evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness accorded these findings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Finally, assuming arguendo that Bresler’s testimony violated Skaggs’ due process right to a fair trial, the error was harmless where it cannot be said that the testimony had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). Bresler’s testimony was favorable to Skaggs and the jury was unaware of his lack of credentials. As noted by the Kentucky Supreme Court, “There is nothing in [the] record to indicate that, had [Skaggs] known the truth about Mr. Bresler, he could have found a bona fide psychologist or psychiatrist whose testimony would have been more helpful to him than was the testimony of Bresler.” Skaggs, No. 84-SC-1181-TG at 5. II. Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights Were Violated When the Jury Was Precluded From Hearing Relevant Mitigating Evidence ■ Skaggs’ second argument revisits his claim that Bresler’s testimony denied him the due process right to a fair trial. Here, Skaggs’ focus is on the penalty phase of his trial. Skaggs maintains he was denied his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when the State precluded the jury from considering relevant mitigating evidence. Skaggs asserts that the jury was precluded from considering “the very substantial mitigating evidence” set forth in the reports of Drs. Engum and Yonts because Bresler lied about his credentials and ability to perform the psychological tests Skaggs required. As correctly noted by Respondent, however, Ake does not guarantee a constitutional right of access to psychiatric counsel in the sentencing phase of trial under the present circumstances. In Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1120 (6th Cir.1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 970, 111 S.Ct. 1608, 113 L.Ed.2d 669 (1991), the Sixth Circuit held that Ake “only guarantees a defendant the right to a psychiatrist at the sentencing phase to oppose the government’s psychiatric testimony.” This situation does not arise unless the State presents psychiatric evidence to show an aggravating factor. Id. “Without a psychiatrist’s assistance, the defendant cannot offer a well-informed expert’s opposing view, and thereby loses a significant opportunity to raise in the jurors’ minds questions about the State’s proof of an aggravating factor.” Id. (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 84, 105 S.Ct. 1087) (Emphasis added in Kordenbrock). In the present case, the State utilized Dr. Ravani’s expertise only to rebut the testimony of Bresler; Ravani’s testimony was not needed to show an aggravating factor. In this situation, Ake does not provide a constitutional basis for Skaggs’ claim. Moreover, the Court finds no constitutional violation under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). In Lockett, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer not be precluded from considering any aspect of a defendant’s character which is mitigating. Id. at 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954. However, Lockett and its progeny stand only for the proposition that a State may not cut off in an absolute manner the presentation of mitigating evidence, either by statute or by judicial instruction, or by limiting the inquiries to which it is relevant so severely that the evidence could never be part of the sentencing decision at all. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 361, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 456, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990)) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In the present case, the record gives no indication that the sentencing court precluded the presentation of relevant mitigating evidence or that it prevented the jury from considering relevant evidence offered in mitigation. The penalty phase instructions directed the jury specifically to consider extreme mental or emotional disturbance, mental disease or defect, intoxication, Skaggs’ character, plus “any other fact or circumstance which you consider mitigating.” TR VIII at 1164, 1171. Under the circumstances, the Court finds no constitutional defect. III. Petitioner Was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel As Guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the petitioner must demonstrate cause by showing that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The objective standard of reasonableness is “highly deferential” and includes a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 688, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The assistance required of counsel is not that of the most astute counsel, but rather that of “reasonably effective assistance.” Id. at 687,104 S.Ct. 2052. Nonetheless, counsel still has “a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575, 1579-81 (6th Cir.1992). Second, the petitioner must also demonstrate prejudice by showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. In this respect, the Court must ascertain whether counsel’s conduct “so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) (clarifying that “an analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective. To set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s error may grant the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him.”) Although a state court’s findings of fact are entitled to the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness, the cause and prejudice components of the Strickland test and the state court’s ultimate conclusion regarding counsel’s effectiveness present mixed questions of law and fact that the Court must review de novo. Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d at 1579. A. Defense Counsel Failed To Investigate the Qualifications of Defense “Expert” Elya Bresler Skaggs maintains that significant mitigating evidence was not discovered and was not presented to the jury as a result of trial counsel’s reliance on Bresler. Skaggs asserts that defense counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient because counsel failed to inquire into Bresler’s qualifications. As a result, Skaggs argues, the jury that sentenced him to death failed to hear evidence of his mental retardation, his deficits in all areas of cognitive functioning, his impairment in brain behavior relationships, evidence that he functioned in the brain damaged range, his borderline psychotic condition, and the abuse he suffered at the hands of his father. See Petitioner’s Brief at 45. Although Skaggs does not contend that any of this evidence would have caused the jury to find him not guilty, Skaggs insists that this evidence would have caused the jury to return a sentence other than death. On December 15, 1997, the Court held an evidentiary hearing to supplement the record regarding this claim. Former defense counsel Donna Boyte [“Boyte”] testified that she and co-counsel Joe Kirwan [“Kirwan”] were having difficulty finding a psychologist who could meet the trial deadline. Boyte and Kirwan then contacted Bresler, who was available. Boyte had used Bresler in another trial in 1979. When questioned about Bres-ler’s performance in the 1979 case, Boyte responded, “He did fine.... Basically we were presenting an insanity EED defense, and he did okay. I mean he was okay. He wasn’t great.” Transcript of Hearing at 7. Boyte recollected that, at the time of the other trial, Bresler was working as a psychologist for a comprehensive care facility in eastern Kentucky. When asked what type of investigation she did into Bresler’s background and qualifications before utilizing Bresler as a witness on Skaggs’ behalf, Boyte responded, “Absolutely none. He was suggesting [sic] to us by Bill Radigan and I think Vince Aprile had used him, and we just assumed he was fine.” Id. at 6. Boyte indicated that at the time she and Kirwan called Bresler as a witness, they did not realize that he was not a bona fide expert. Id. at 9. Boyte also testified regarding counsels’ decision not to have Bresler testify at the penalty phase of the first trial, but to request the trial court for funds to recall Bresler for the penalty phase retrial. Q. ... Is there — was there some reason that [Bresler] wasn’t called at the penalty phase of the initial trial? A. Yes. Joe Kirwan and I talked after [Bresler’s] testimony. My recollection is that Elliott [sic] Bresler’s testimony came fairly late in the trial, the guilt phase; and he was awful. He was incoherent. He was talking about things that didn’t make sense. You couldn’t stop him. You couldn’t reel him back in. People in the audience were laughing at him. So Joe and I talked afterwards. Our initial intent had been to recall him at the penalty phase. We discussed it and decided we would be in better shape not calling him than we would be if we called him. So we did not recall him at the penalty phase. ill * * * * * Q. You said ... that you were dissatisfied with the testimony of Elliott Bresler [sic] and his performance. Did you look for someone else to replace him with for the retrial? A. No. ... [W]e didn’t — we had such a hard time getting any money for somebody for the first trial, we didn’t think the Court would give us any more money. We did make a request for more money for Elliott [sic] Bresler, really and truly thinking that the judge would deny that and maybe we’d have an issue on that. But, no, we did not make a request for money for another expert. We didn’t know what we would put in the motion that we would say, Judge, you know, we think our expert came off really badly. We didn’t figure that was grounds for money for another expert. Id. at 8,18-19. Kirwan likewise testified that he conducted no investigation into Bresler’s credentials, but that he was aware that Bresler had previously done work for the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy. Id. at 21. Kirwan was also familiar with Bresler because Bresler had testified in another Warren County death penalty ease. Id. at 22, 24. Kirwan stated that he remembered meeting with Bresler at least one time prior to Skaggs’ trial to discuss the case. Id. at 22. Kirwan also testified that, at the time, he was totally unaware that Bresler was not a bona fide expert. Id. at 23. Under the circumstances, the Court finds that Skaggs cannot established that trial counsels’ failure to investigate Bresler’s qualifications fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Counsel selected Bresler based on his availability, his previous contact with the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy and counsel’s experience with Bresler in prior death penalty eases. Counsel thus reasonably concluded that Bresler was qualified to testify regarding Skaggs’ mental condition. In light of this fact; counsel’s failure to confirm Bresler’s credentials was not unreasonable. Moreover, the Court cannot say that it was unreasonable for counsel not to investigate Bresler’s credentials following Bresler’s poor performance at the guilt phase of the first trial. Although hindsight suggests this would have been an appropriate and reasonable response, the Court cannot say that it is extraordinary for a properly credentialed expert to testify poorly on behalf of his client. Having found that counsel’s decision not to investigate Bresler’s credentials does not satisfy the first prong of Stñckland, the Court need not address whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. B. Defense Counsel Failed to Object to Erroneous First Degree Robbery Instructions Skaggs next assigns reversible error to defense counsel’s failure to object to erroneous first degree robbery instructions. Skaggs maintains the instructions permitted the jury to convict him without finding that his use of force was intended to accomplish a theft. The jury instruction pertaining to the first degree robbery charge of Herman Matthews read: You will find defendant, David Leroy Skaggs, guilty under this instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: (a) That in this county on or about May 6, 1981, and before the finding of'the indictment herein, he took, or stole, a sum of money, or other property from Herman Matthews; (b) That in the course of so doing and mth the intent he shot and killed Herman Matthews with a pistol; AND (c) That in so doing David Skaggs was not insane under Instruction No. 10. TR VII at 890 [Emphasis added]. Skaggs maintains that, properly worded, the robbery instruction should have read “that in the course of so doing and with the intent to accomplish the theft he shot and killed Herman Matthews with a pistol.” Skaggs maintains that counsel’s failure to object to this arguably erroneous instruction allowed the jury to find him guilty of robbery without finding the requisite intent to accomplish the theft. Skaggs asserts that correct jury instructions on robbery were critically important because his death sentence was predicated on a jury finding of murder committed during the course of robbery. As previously noted, the second prong of Strickland requires Skaggs to show prejudice — that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993), the Supreme Court further explained this requirement: Under our decisions, a criminal defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.... Thus, an analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective. To set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s error may grant the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him. [Internal citations and quotation marks omitted] In addressing this issue, the Kentucky Supreme Court found and the record fairly supports that “the sole motive for the crimes was the acquisition of money, and that the theft was in fact accomplished.” Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 803 S.W.2d 573, 575 (1990). Because the Court is convinced that the robbery verdict would not have changed had more “precise” instructions been given, Skaggs cannot show that “but for” counsel’s failure to object to the instruction the jury would not have found Skaggs guilty of first degree robbery. Thus, Skaggs cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. C. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Object To The Trial Court’s Definition Of “Aggravating Circumstances” At the penalty phase of Skaggs’ trial, the court gave an mstruction which defined “aggravating circumstances” as “factors to show death is the appropriate sentence.” Skaggs alleges that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this mstruction. Skaggs maintains that the erroneous instruction mandated imposition of the death penalty upon finding an aggravating circumstance. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the Kentucky Supreme Court’s finding that the jury was “well aware of its option not to impose the death penalty, even if it found aggravating circumstances to exist.” Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 803 S.W.2d 573, 575 (1990) (Emphasis in original) (quoting Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 672, 679 (1985)). Instruction Number 3 states that it is within the jury’s discretion to recommend the death penalty, but only upon a finding of aggravating circumstances. TR VIII at 1166, 1173. Instruction Number 4(b) reads: If upon the whole case you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, you shall recommend a sentence of imprisonment instead. Id. Furthermore, in their closing arguments during the penalty phase retrial, both prosecution and defense counsel informed the jury that it was within their discretion whether to impose the death penalty, even upon finding aggravating circumstances. Therefore, the Court finds that Skaggs again cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. The jury was well-informed that imposition of the death penalty was discretionary, even upon finding aggravating circumstances. The Court simply is unable to hold that but for counsel’s error in failing to object, the result would have been different. D. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective In Failing to Move to Supress Skaggs’ Confession and Other Evidence Obtained as a Result of Skaggs’ Unlawful Detention Although Skaggs briefly sets forth the facts surrounding this issue in his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Skaggs fails to further address this issue in his brief in support of his habeas petition or in his traverse to the answer. The Kentucky Supreme Court found this same issue defaulted because Skaggs failed to sufficiently plead the issue in his RCr 11.42 motion so as identify the factual contentions raised. Skaggs, 803 S.W.2d at 576. In summarily dismissing this claim, the Court noted that RCr 11.42(2) requires that the motion state specific grounds for relief and facts supporting those grounds. The Court need not address the merits of this claim. Absent a showing of cause and prejudice, a federal court may not reach the merits of a claim that has been proeedurally defaulted in state court. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). “[T]he existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). To show actual prejudice resulting from the asserted error, the petitioner must establish “actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). The actual prejudice requirement is not satisfied if there is strong evidence of the petitioner’s guilt and a lack of evidence for his claim. Id. at 172, 102 S.Ct. 1584. In the present case, Petitioner has failed to set forth any facts establishing cause for the default. He has also failed to show actual prejudice from the claimed error. IV. Skaggs Was Deprived Of Due Process Guaranteed By The Fourteenth Amendment Since His Conviction Was Obtained By the Perjured Testimony Of A Prosecution Witness Skaggs maintains that his conviction was predicated upon the perjured testimony of Glenn Morgan Baxter, a ballistics examiner employed by the Kentucky State Police. Baxter testified during the guilt phase of Skaggs’ first trial that the gun possessed by Skaggs was the same weapon used in the murders of Mr. and Mrs. Matthews. Specifically, Skaggs alleges that Baxter falsely stated his credentials at trial. In response to the prosecution’s questions concerning Baxter’s qualifications as a ballistics expert, Baxter stated under oath: I have a Batchelor [sic] of Science Degree from Morehead State University. After being hired by the State Police, we have on-the-job type training where we do prepared studies and examinations under a qualified firearms examiner. After a period of working with these type of environment, we are then sent to other laboratories throughout the United States for work experience and educational benefits from other qualified examiners. Some of these other schools are the FBI Academy, Washington D.C. Police Department, Chicago Police Department, New York City Police Department, and several others. After this period of time, we then go the manufacturers’ schools where we have practical experience and knowledge of the working components of the firearms and ammunition components. After this time, we then come back to the crime laboratory, work eases under a qualified examiner, and then go the court systems to be qualified as an expert. This period of training usually lasts about two years. TE VIII at 1138-39. [Emphasis added] On April 3, 1987, Skaggs filed in the state court a motion for new trial. Skaggs based the motion on newly discovered evidence that Baxter had committed perjury at Skaggs’ trial. Petitioner’s Brief at 56. Specifically, Skaggs alleged learning that Baxter had committed perjury in two respects: by testifying that he had a bachelor of science degree and by testifying that the degree related to firearms examination. Review of the record and relevant state law findings convinces the Court that there is no “reasonable likelihood” that Baxter’s false testimony concerning his degree could have affected the judgment of the jury. See Wernert v. Arn, 819 F.2d 613, 617 (6th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011, 108 S.Ct. 711, 98 L.Ed.2d 662 (1988) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (“[A] conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.”); Ramos v. Walker, 744 F.Supp. 422, 429 (E.D.N.Y.1990) (“[C]ourt must determine whether it can be said ... that disclosure of the witness’ true credentials would give rise to a reasonable probability that the result would have been different.”). Baxter falsely stated that he had a bachelor’s degree from Morehead State University; contrary to Petitioner’s allegations; Baxter did not state nor could the jury reasonably infer that Baxter’s degree related to firearms work. Moreover, Baxter did have a great deal of on-the-job experience as a firearms examiner and had attended numerous courses and classes on the subject. Baxter’s on-the-job experience and training, in itself, likely was enough to qualify Baxter as an expert. Furthermore, it does not appear that Baxter’s testimony was essential to the jury’s finding of guilt. Skaggs confessed to the killings and showed the police where the murder weapon was hidden. Moreover, Skaggs’ main defense was insanity. Whether or not Skaggs shot the victims with the subject gun was really not in issue. In light of the overwhelming evidence of Skaggs’ guilt, the Court cannot find that disclosure of the fact that Baxter did not graduate from college would give rise to a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different verdict, particularly in light of Baxter’s obvious qualifications to testify as a ballistics expert. V. Skaggs’ Confessions Were Involuntarg And Obtained In Violation Of His Right To Counsel Skaggs next alleges constitutional error resulting from the state court’s refusal to suppress certain incriminating statements made by Skaggs to police officers. The trial court held an extensive suppression hearing on this same issue based on a record identical to that which the Court now considers. The trial court’s decision was affirmed on direct appeal by the Kentucky Supreme Court. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the Court will presume the state courts’ findings of fact are correct, see Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982); Hart v. Marion Correctional Inst., 927 F.2d 256, 257 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 816, 112 S.Ct. 70, 116 L.Ed.2d 44 (1991), unless the Court finds that the facts are not “fairly supported by the record.” Sumner, id The facts surrounding the subject statements are as follows. Following the murders, the police investigation led to Columbus, Indiana where police questioned Skaggs after having Skaggs execute a waiver of rights form. During the questioning, officers noticed dried blood on Skaggs’ shoes. While police were examining the shoes, Skaggs fled. Skaggs was subsequently apprehended, arrested on state charges and returned to the local jail. On May 14, 1981, while still in Indiana, Kentucky State Police officers resumed questioning Skaggs after advising him of his rights. Skaggs told officers that he was present at the time of the killings, but that another person — John Davis — pulled the trigger. On May 15, officers transported Skaggs to Glasgow, Kentucky. During the trip, one of the officers discussed spiritual matters with Skaggs and advised Skaggs that he could obtain foregiveness for his acts and that telling the truth would help him. Skaggs told police that the footprint on the door of the victims’ home was his. Skaggs said he left the footprint while attempting to kick in the door to burglarize the home the morning before the killing. On the morning of May 18, Skaggs appeared in the Barren Circuit Court for a preliminary hearing. Skaggs advised the Court that he did not want an attorney to represent him and was ordered back to jail. Shortly thereafter, the judge reconsidered and appointed the local public defender, Robert Alexander [“Alexander”], to represent Skaggs. Soon thereafter, but before Skaggs and his appointed counsel had consulted, police went to the Barren County Jail and told Skaggs they wanted to question him further. The police advised Skaggs that the Court had appointed Alexander to represent him and offered to call the attorney before further questioning. Skaggs told the officers he did not want an attorney present. Skaggs then made a taped statement acknowledging that he alone did the killing. Skaggs further told the officers where to locate some of the stolen property and the gun used in the killings. Police subsequently recovered the property and gun. Officers transcribed the taped statement and returned to the jail the next day to have Skaggs sign the statement. At that time, Skaggs met with Alexander. Skaggs advised Alexander that police had agreed to recommend a life sentence if Skaggs told the truth and pled guilty to the charges. After examining the statement, Alexander advised Skaggs not to sign the statement unless the agreement to recommend a life sentence was mentioned therein. The police did not respond to Alexander’s suggestion and Skaggs did not sign the statement. A. Voluntariness A defendant’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are implicated where a confession is alleged to be involuntary because of some element of police coercion. United States v. Rigsby, 943 F.2d 631, 635 (6th Cir.1991) (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 908, 112 S.Ct. 1269, 117 L.Ed.2d 496 (1992); see also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) (“[Certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). To evaluate the voluntariness of a confession, the Court must examine the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the confession. Rigsby, 943 F.2d at 635. A voluntary confession results from “an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,” and is not the product of a will “overborne.” Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961). In considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court must consider “the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation, and determine[ ] their psychological impact on an accused’s ability to resist pressures to confess.” Rigsby, 943 F.2d at 635 (quoting United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 546 (6th Cir.1977)). In this regard, the Sixth Circuit has set forth three prerequisites to finding that a confession is coerced. Id. First, the evidence must establish that the police activity was objectively coercive; second, the coercion must be sufficient to overbear the defendant’s will, and; third, the defendant’s will, in fact, must have been overborne as a result of the coercive police activity. Id. Although state court factual findings on this issue are entitled to a presumption of correctness if fairly supported by the record, resolution of the ultimate issue of voluntariness is subject to de novo review. Miller 474 U.S. at 110-11, 106 S.Ct. 445. Skaggs maintains that his confessions were involuntary because they were induced by threats of the electric chair, by appeal to his religious devotion and by promises of a life sentence. Regarding the promises of a life sentence, the state court found and the record fairly supports that the Kentucky police did not promise Skaggs that they would or had the authority to recommend a life sentence. This finding, therefore, is controlling. See Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 85, 104 S.Ct. 378, 78 L.Ed.2d 187 (1983) (where state court findings have support in the record, those findings must control even though the federal habeas court may be inclined to render other findings which also have support in the record). Regarding the coercive effect of the officer’s alleged appeal to Skaggs’ religious sensibilities during the trip back to Kentucky, the Court finds insufficient evidence to conclude the religious discussion rendered Skaggs’ subsequent confession involuntary. At the November 20, 1981 suppression hearing, Skaggs testified concerning the religious conversation on the trip: Q. On the way back to Kentucky did you have any conversation with either Detective O’Dell or Harlow? A. I didn’t what you say speak to either one of them for any certain, you know, long period of time. I think we just discussed several different things just by talking more or less about the highways and things, you know, atmosphere around. Of course Detective O’Dell and I got off on the subject of something about the bible. We got to talking about God and this and that. Other than that, that is about all I mentioned. I asked him something about who I would need for an attorney. He said “David, in your case you won’t even need a lawyer.” He said “all you’ll have to do is go to court and plead guilty, get your life sentence and go on to prison.” I said “yes, I hate to go to the penitentiary for something I didn’t do.” I said “I’m going to go ahead and go on with it.” I said “I don’t want to.” He said “David, it is best just to go ahead and get it off of your chest” and I said “Yes, I know.” So I forgot about it. Q. How long did you all talk about the bible? A. Wasn’t very long. Q. Anything specifically that you remember about the conversation you had with Detective O’Dell? A. Only that he helped me a lot. He told me that God was going my way, which was true. Q. What else did he say, if you remember? A. I don’t remember, to be exact. TE II at 189-90. This simply is insufficient evidence for the Court to conclude that the religious speech was objectively coercive, that it was sufficient to overbear Skaggs’ will, or that it did, in fact, do so. Moreover, although there is evidence, albeit disputed, that Skaggs suffers mild mental impairment, Skaggs was thirty years old at the time of the crimes and no stranger to the law. At all times relevant, Skaggs was fully apprised of his rights. Notably, the length of time between the religious conversation on May 15 and Skaggs’ subsequent confession on May 18 obviates against finding that the religious conversation had any appreciable effect on Skaggs’ subsequent decision to confess to the crimes. Although Skaggs maintains that the religious colloquy was reminiscent of Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), the Supreme Court decided Brewer on Sixth Amendment grounds. Moreover, the speech in Brewer bears little resemblance to the religious “discussion” described by Skaggs at the suppression hearing. Finally, Skaggs alleges that his first confession was involuntary because police threatened him with the electric chair and told him that the residents of Barren County (where the homicides occurred) were just waiting for him to be returned. Upon reviewing the totality of circumstances surrounding the first confession, the Court cannot conclude that the alleged threats would have been sufficient to render Skaggs’ statements involuntary. First, Skaggs had extensive experience with the criminal justice system and was probably well aware of the possible consequences of a murder conviction. Moreover, any such threats would likely have coercive effect only if coupled with the promise of leniency. As previously noted, the state court found and the record fairly supports that the police did not offer Skaggs a deal. Finally, assuming arguendo that the alleged threats were sufficient to render Skaggs’ first confession involuntary, the Court would find introduction of the first confession harmless error where the inculpa-tory portions of the first confession were repeated in Skaggs’ May 18 confession. B. Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination Skaggs also maintains that he involuntarily waived his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination during custodial interrogations on May 14 and May 18, 1981. Skaggs maintains that his waivers were involuntary because they were the product of misrepresentation and coercive police inducement. Specifically, Skaggs argues that the interrogating officers’ promises of leniency and appeal to his religious sensibilities rendered his Fifth Amendment waivers involuntary. The question of whether Skaggs voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment rights is a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review. Williams v. Clarke, 40 F.3d 1529, 1543 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1033, 115 S.Ct. 1397, 131 L.Ed.2d 247 (1995). However, state court findings of fact on this issue are entitled to a presumption of correctness if fairly supported by the record. Id. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against compulsory self-incrimination. The privilege against self-incrimination “is fully applicable during a period of custodial interrogation.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-61, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Miranda states that incriminating statements obtained during custodial interrogation are not admissible unless the suspect validly waives his Fifth Amendment privilege before making the statements. Id. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The standard for reviewing the voluntariness of an asserted Miranda waiver is essentially the same as that for reviewing the voluntariness of a confession. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987). First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with full knowledge of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances’ surrounding the interrogation reveal both an uncoereed choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. Id. As previously noted, the state court found and the record fairly supports that the interrogating officers did not promise Skaggs they would, or had authority to, recommend a life sentence. Therefore, the Court limits its consideration to whether the officers’ appeal to Skaggs’ religious sensibilities was so coercive in nature as to nullify Skaggs’ waiver of his right against self-incrimination. First, the May 15 religious discussion could not possibly have affected the volun-tariness of Skaggs’ May 14 waiver. In addition, the lapse of three days between the May 15 discussion and Skaggs’ waiver on May 18 also obviates against finding that the religious discussion had any effect on that confession. Moreover, Skaggs’ familiarity with the criminal justice system supports that he fully understood that the statements he chose to make could, and most likely would, be used against him. Skaggs was well aware of his right to remain silent and the consequences that might result from his decision not to do so. C. Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel Skaggs next argues that the state court should have suppressed his confessions because they were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Skaggs asserts that he had two attorneys: one in Indiana, where he was initially interrogated, and one in Kentucky. In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that after an accused “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [he] is not subject to further interrogation ... unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges and conversations with the police.” Id. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880. Unlike the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, however, the Edwards rule is not offense-specific: “once a suspect invokes the Miranda right to counsel for interrogation regarding one offense, he may not be reapproached regarding any offense unless counsel is present.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) (Emphasis in original). Additionally, the Sixth Circuit recently held that the broad sweep of the Edwards rule does not apply to suspects who are not in continuous custody. Kyger v. Carlton, 146 F.3d 374, 380 (6th Cir.1998); see also United States v. Barlow, 41 F.3d 935, 945-46 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1030, 115 S.Ct. 1389, 131 L.Ed.2d 241 (1995); United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257 (9th Cir.1992); Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 397 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059, 109 S.Ct. 1329, 103 L.Ed.2d 597 (1989); McFadden v. Garraghty, 820 F.2d 654, 661 (4th Cir.1987); United States ex. rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 125 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010, 107 S.Ct. 3240, 97 L.Ed.2d 745 (1987); see also McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177, 111 S.Ct. 2204 (“If the police do subsequently initiate an encounter in the absence of counsel (assuming there has been no break in custody), the suspect’s statements are presumed involuntary....”) (Emphasis added). Skaggs first maintains his May 14 confession was obtained in derogation of an existing attorney-client relationship. Skaggs notes that the police were well aware that he had counsel representing him in Indiana on other pending charges, but that the police chose to interrogate him about the murders without counsel present. This argument is fatally flawed. First, the state court found and the record fairly supports that, at all times relevant, Skaggs was informed of his Miranda rights, but that Skaggs consistently refused the assistance of counsel. There simply is no evidence that Skaggs ever invoked his Miranda right to counsel. Skaggs also maintains that his May 18 confession was obtained in deprivation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. This argument also is without merit. Again, the state court found and the record fairly supports that Skaggs never invoked his right to counsel despite repeated warnings. Moreover, an accused’s invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a judicial proceeding is not equivalent to the expression necessary to trigger the right to counsel pursuant to Miranda, McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178-79, 111 S.Ct. 2204. D. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Skaggs next argues the state court should have suppressed his May 18 confession because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the “initiation of adversary judicial proceedings.” Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) (citing United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187, 188, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984)). “[I]f police initiate interrogation after a defendant’s assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.” Id. at 636, 106 S.Ct. 1404. In the present case, the facts support that the district court judge appointed Skaggs counsel at his arraignment and that Skaggs was subsequently interrogated by the police in the absence of counsel. However, the state court found and the record fairly supports that Skaggs never invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; rather, the state court appointed counsel sua sponte following request by the county prosecutor. Skaggs basically argues that it was unnecessary for him to actually invoke his Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the rule of Michigan v. Jackson to apply. However, a review of Jackson and its progeny convinces the Court that invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a necessary prerequisite to application of the rule. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 179, 111 S.Ct. 2204 (“[Michigan v. Jackson held] that after the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches and is invoked, any statements obtained from the accused during subsequent police-initiated custodial questioning regarding the charge at issue (even if the accused purports to waive his rights) are inadmissible.”) (Emphasis added); see also Montoya v. Collins, 955 F.2d 279, 282-83 (5th Cir.) (“The rule of Jackson is invoked by the defendant’s assertion ... of the right to counsel.... [A]n ‘assertion’ means some kind of positive statement or other action that informs a reasonable person of the defendant’s ‘desire to deal with the police only through counsel.’ ”), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1036, 113 S.Ct. 820, 121 L.Ed.2d 692 (1992); but see Stokes v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1567, 1579 (11th Cir.1992) (finding parties’ dispute concerning defendant’s request for counsel immaterial to issue regarding Sixth Amendment right to counsel where defendant was appointed counsel at arraignment). Moreover, a review of the record and state court findings convinces the Court that Skaggs “knowingly and voluntarily” waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel prior to the May 18 interrogation and resulting confession. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988) (“As a general matter ... an accused who is admonished with the warnings prescribed by this Court in [Miranda ], has been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on this basis will be considered a knowing and intelligent one.”) (Internal citation omitted). VI. The Trial Court Unfairly Limited the Questions Asked By the Defense During Voir Dire Skaggs argues that during the first trial the court improperly limited defense questions concerning whether prospective jurors would consider an insanity defense. The trial court conducts voir dire examination of prospective jurors in order to protect the defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury and a fair trial. In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), the Court affirmed the significance of adequate voir dire upon the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial: [P]art of the guarantee of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors. ‘Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his [constitutional] right to an impartial jury will be honored. Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge’s responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.’ Hence, ‘[t]he exercise [of the trial court’s] discretion, and the restriction upon inquiries at the request of counsel, [are] subject to the essential demands of fairness.’ Id. at 729-30, 112 S.Ct. 2222 (Internal citations omitted). Moreover, the Morgan Court further emphasized that “[a]ny juror to whom mitigating factors are ... irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial.” Id. at 739,112 S.Ct. 2222. In this regard, courts have recognized that defendants have the right to have prospective jurors questioned about their ability to objectively and fairly evaluate evidence of insanity or mental capacity. United States v. Birdsell, 775 F.2d 645, 652 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1119, 106 S.Ct. 1979, 90 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 70 (9th Cir.1977). However, the trial judge may limit questioning of jurors without necessarily prejudicing the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. [T]he ‘determination of impartiality, in which demeanor plays such an important part, is particularly within the province of the trial judge.’ Thus, the State’s obligation to the defendant to impanel an impartial jury generally can be satisfied by less than an inquiry into a specific prejudice feared by the defendant. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594-95, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976). In the present ease, the trial court allowed defense counsel opportunity to voir dire prospective jurors regarding possible bias concerning the insanity defense. Skaggs’ allegation of improper limitation on voir dire is based on the trial court’s decision to sustain an objection to the following query by defense counsel: How many of you, after hearing the evidence, if you believe that David committed the crime, but that he was legally insane at the time, how many of you could return a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity? TE IV at 511. However, the transcript shows that following the objection defense counsel rephrased the question: Are there any of you who believe a person should be punished by imprisonment or death for a crime that was committed at a period during which he was insane or mentally ill? Id. at 511-512. The transcript indicates there was no response to this question. Moreover, a review of the relevant portions of the transcript gives no indication that the trial court otherwise limited the scope of voir dire on this issue or that the trial court’s comments intimidated prospective jurors into silence. Thus, the Court finds insufficient basis to conclude that the trial court unfairly limited defense counsel’s efforts to voir dire prospective jurors concerning their possible bias toward the insanity defense. Skaggs also alleges that the court improperly limited the scope of voir dire at the retrial of the penalty phase. Skaggs argues that the trial court should have compelled jurors who had formed an opinion as to the appropriate penalty to disclose that opinion so that Skaggs could determine juror bias. Skaggs maintains that the trial court’s failure to compel Jurors Wells and Jones to reveal any preformed opinions violated Skaggs’ due process right to exercise his peremptory challenges as established by Kentucky procedural law. Initially, the Court agrees with Petitioner that the state cannot limit voir dire to the extent that it is impossible to establish the basis of a challenge for cause. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. at 733-34, 112 S.Ct. 2222. However, a review of the transcript indicates that the trial court fully and fairly allowed defense counsel to question Juror Wells regarding the possibility that he had any preformed opinion about the appropriateness of the death penalty. Following initial voir dire of Wells, the trial court recalled Wells in response to a misunderstanding regarding his testimony. The trial court then questioned Wells a second time regarding his ability to disregard anything he may have heard about the case in the papers and to follow the court’s instructions regarding all possible penalties. Following Well’s affirmative response to this question, defense counsel indicated to the court that he had no further questions for Wells. The Court finds no indication that the trial court limited the voir dire of prospective juror Wells or that Wells had any preformed opinions concerning the appropriate penalty that would prevent him from following the court’s instructions on this matter. Likewise, the transcript indicates that the trial court allowed defense counsel full and fair opportunity to voir dire Juror Jones regarding any preformed opinions she may have had concerning the appropriateness of the death penalty. In addition, the transcript indicates no basis to conclude that Jones had any preformed opinions regarding the appropriateness of the death penalty that would have prevented her from following the court’s instructions and justified her dismissal for cause. In light of these findings, the Court need not address whether the trial court arbitrarily deprived Skaggs his due process right to exercise his peremptory challenges in accordance with state procedural law. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88-91, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988); Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 252, 259-60 (1993). VII. The Trial Court Deprived Skaggs of a Fair Trial By Refusing to Grant a Change of Venue for the Guilt Phase of the Trial Skaggs also alleges that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial when the trial judge refused to grant a change of venue in the face of extensive pretrial publicity. Skaggs refers the Court to numerous allegedly prejudicial and inflammatory reports contained in newspaper articles and radio and TV broadcasts prior to his first trial. Skaggs also refers the Court to