Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION LIMBAUGH, Senior District Judge. This is an admiralty action involving the allision of the M/V ANNE HOLLY with the Eads Bridge, and the secondary allision by one or more barges in the M/V ANNE HOLLY’S tow with the ADMIRAL, on April 4, 1998. Pending before the Court are three lawsuits, two of which are consolidated Complaints for Exoneration and/or Limitation of Liability filed pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. by American Milling Co. and Winterville , and a negligence action brought by President Casino and certain barge owners against defendant John 0. Johnson filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1). In the exoneration/limitation cases, the claimants include President Casino, certain barge owners, the City of St. Louis, and numerous individuals alleged to have been aboard the ADMIRAL and suffered personal injuries when it was struck by one or more of the runaway barges. Counterclaims and crossclaims for indemnity and/or contribution have been filed by American Milling and Winterville against the President Casino for failure to take reasonable steps to protect the ADMIRAL from runaway barge(s) allisions. At all material times, American Milling Co., UN Ltd., H & B Marine, Inc. and American Milling, LP (hereinafter referred collectively as American Milling) was the owner and operator of the M/V ANNE HOLLY, an inland river towboat. American Milling’s base of operations is located in Alton, Illinois. At all material times, Winterville Marine Services (hereinafter referred to as Win-terville) was a marine service company providing crewing services for American Milling and other towboat owners and operators. At the time of the subject allision(s), Winterville was providing the crew for the M/V ANNE HOLLY. Winterville is based out of Greenville, Mississippi. At all material times, President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc, (hereinafter referred to as President Casino) was the owner and operator of the ADMIRAL, a moored vessel upon which is situated a gambling casino. At the time of the subject allision(s), the ADMIRAL was moored to the Missouri bank of the Upper Mississippi River (UMR) immediately below the Eads Bridge, within the City of St. Louis, Missouri. At all material times, defendant John 0. Johnson was a licensed riverboat pilot and captain employed by Winterville and working as the river towboat captain aboard the M/V ANNE HOLLY. At all material times, claimants Pinnacle Barge Co. LLP and/or Pinnacle Transportation, Brennan Marine, Riverland Resources, and Robert B. Miller & Associates (hereinafter referred to collectively as the “barge claimants”) were owners of barges in the tow of the M/V ANNE HOLLY at the time of the April 4, 1998 allision(s). Specifically, Pinnacle Barge owned and/or operated Barges PIN 348B and PMC 8101B; Brennan Marine owned and/or operated Barges MWO 211 and ABC 767; Riverland Resources operated Barge SB 15B; and Robert B. Miller & Associates owned and/or operated Barges RM41, CGB 219, and ITEL 206. At all material times, City of St. Louis was a political subdivision of the State of Missouri and owned that part of the levee where the ADMIRAL was moored on April 4,1998. At all material times, the approximately 150 personal injury claimants not specifically named herein were alleged patrons of the ADMIRAL at the time of the accident. Since the Court bifurcated the proceedings in this admiralty action, conducting a separate trial on the issues of liability and limitation, the personal injury claimants’ claims were not addressed at this time. Their individual claims will be addressed in a future proceeding. Trial of this case was bifurcated. Due to the complex nature of this litigation, the Court elected to separate the issues of liability and limitation concerning the primary allision with the Eads Bridge and the secondary allision with the ADMIRAL, from issues of liability concerning the personal injury claimants’ claims. Thus, a separate trial on the issues of liability and limitation commenced on June 18, 2000 and concluded after recesses, on September 28, 2000. An extended post-trial briefing period followed and the matter is now ripe for disposition. As stated previously, this opinion will only address the issues of liability and limitation of liability. The issues of damages and (if deemed applicable) prejudgment interest will be addressed separately at a later date. In order to present properly the Court’s final determinations, background data in accordance with this Court’s factual findings regarding the MV ANNE HOLLY, the M/V ANNE HOLLY’S crew, American Milling and Winter-ville’s marine operations and working relationship, the ADMIRAL, the St. Louis Harbor, and the Eads Bridge is provided along with the Court’s findings of fact pertaining to the M/V ANNE HOLLY’s voyage on April 3-4, 1998 through the St. Louis Harbor and allisions with the Eads Bridge and the ADMIRAL Finally, the Court’s factual findings are provided regarding certain post-April 4, 1998 events concerning the subject allisions. After due consideration of the testimony and exhibits introduced at trial, and the parties’ stipulations and briefs, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Rule 52 Fed.R.Civ.P. All objections to trial evidence taken with the case are overruled with the exception of the objections made to certain National Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB) exhibits and Coast Guard exhibits, as well as certain exhibits pertaining to the “no contest” plea entered by Capt. Johnson in connection with a Coast Guard disciplinary action. The subject NTSB and Coast Guard administrative exhibits (not including the “no contest” plea exhibits) were all offered by President Casino and are as follows: A-4, B-4, B-10, C-3, C-10, E-9, F-9, G-4, G-9, J-9, and L-9. The NTSB is granted authority to investigate certain marine casualties pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1131(a)(1)(E). The investigative authority granted to the NTSB is limited to “factfinding proceedings” with broad powers granted to the Chairman of the Board of Inquiry to designate parties to the investigation, and to conduct interviews of witnesses. No party or witness to a NTSB investigation can be represented by an attorney or by any person who also represents claimants or insurers. 49 C.F.R. § 845.1 et. seq. With regard to NTSB reports, 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) provides: “No part of a report of the Board, related to an accident or an investigation of an accident, may be admitted into evidence or used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.” The NTSB exhibits offered into evidence consist of interviews with various witnesses in connection with the events of April 4, 1998, as well as the NTSB hearing transcript. The Court finds these exhibits inadmissible under Rule 801 F.R.E. These documents contain statements by persons not represented by counsel and questioned by persons other than judicial or legal officers of a court. These statements are offered solely for the truth of the matter asserted; i.e. the legal liability (negligence) of parties involved in this litigation. As to documents offered pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1) against Capt. Johnson, the Court finds that such documents are not admissible for impeachment purposes as Capt Johnson’s trial testimony was consistent with all prior testimony at these administrative hearings. Nor does this Court consider these documents admissible under Rule 804 F.R.E. American Milling was not designated a party in interest to the NTSB hearing, and therefore, did not have the right to participate and develop the testimony offered through direct, cross, or redirect examination. Subsequent to the subject allision(s), the Coast Guard also conducted an investigation pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 6301. Offered into evidence by President Casino is Exhibit C-10, a transcript of the Coast Guard investigatory hearing conducted on April 8, 1998. The admissibility of a documents produced in the course of a Coast Guard casualty investigation is governed by 46 U.S.C. § 6308, which states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no part of a report of a marine casualty investigation conducted under § 6301 of this title, including findings of fact, opinions, recommendations, deliberations or conclusions, shall be admissible as evidence or subject to discovery in any civil or administrative proceeding other than administrative proceedings initiated by the United States ... The purpose of § 6308 is made clear by the regulations governing Coast Guard § 6301 investigations: “An investigation of marine casualties and accidents and the determinations made are for the purpose of taking appropriate measures promoting safety of life and property at sea and are not intended to fix civil or criminal responsibility.” 46 C.F.R. § 4.07-l(b). The Court finds that Exhibit C-10 is inadmissible and will be excluded from consideration by this Court. Finally, the Court needs to consider President Casino’s Exhibits S-2, T-2, U-2, V-2 and W-2. These exhibits all concern the Coast Guard’s charge of negligence against Capt. Johnson, and his subsequent plea of “no contest” to the charge at a license suspension or revocation hearing. These exhibits have been admitted over objections to them. Pursuant to Rule 410 F.R.E., evidence of a plea of nolo conten-dere is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea. Thus, these exhibits are admissible only to establish that the Coast Guard initiated an action against Capt. Johnson to suspend his pilot’s license following the allision(s) of April 4, 1998, and that Capt. Johnson entered a plea of “no contest” in connection with the Coast Guard’s action to suspend his pilot’s license. This was a fact testified to at trial. These exhibits have not influenced in any way the Court’s final decision in the matter at hand, nor may these exhibits be used to collaterally estop Capt. Johnson from defending against the claims of negligence levied against him by President Casino and other claimants. FINDINGS OF FACT The M/V ANNE HOLLY The MTV ANNE HOLLY is a diesel-powered inland river towboat of steel construction, measuring approximately 154 ft. in length and 40 ft. in width. It is a twin-screw river towboat built in 1973 by the Mississippi Marine Towboat Co. in Green-ville, Mississippi. At the time of the allision with the Eads Bridge, all equipment and systems aboard were operating properly with the exception of the port engine shaft tachometer (a device which enables one to read the port engine’s rpms from the pilot house). In lieu of the port engine shaft tachometer, hand tachometer readings were utilized. The marine radios, the main propulsion system, the steering system, and the navigational fights were all functional. The M/V ANNE HOLLY is an open wheel rather than a kort nozzle towboat. Although kort nozzle towboats normally generate more horsepower, open wheel towboats are preferred on the UMR due to better steering agility. An open wheel towboat’s superior maneuverability is an attribute when navigating the numerous bridges, locks, and dams on the Mississippi River, especially the UMR. The M/V ANNE HOLLY was equipped with flat plate rudders: two steering rudders located aft of the propellers, and four flanking rudders located forward of the propellers which steered the boat when its engines were ahead. Although the M/V ANNE HOLLY’s engines were identified by their manufacturer’s identification plates as “EMD 16-645 E7” engines, in reality they were “EMD 16-645 E5” engines. The difference being that E7 engines have an oil strainer and other certain accessories while the E5 engines did not have these additions. Both the E5 and E7 model engines have a rated horsepower (hp) of 2850-2875 when the engine’s rpms were at 900 and the “rack” setting is .98. The “rack” is an internal component in each engine which regulates the amount of fuel delivered to each of the engine’s 16 cylinders. A stop inside the Woodward governor (a device which regulates each engine’s rpms.) determines the maximum amount of fuel delivered to each engine. At the time of the allision with the Eads Bridge, the M/V ANNE HOLLY’s rack stops were set at .92. This allowed the engines to develop more than their rated hp. at 900 rpms; i.e., at a rack setting of .92 and the engines’ rpms at 900, each engine would develop approximately 3030 hp. (“overload”). It was American Milling and Winter-ville’s policy to have the crews regulate the engines, and components, to the manufacturers’ specifications. Consequently, the air pressure on the governor was set for 70 lbs. at 900 rpms. Under certain conditions, after consultation with management personnel, or in cases of sudden emergency upon the captain or pilot’s request, the engines were permitted to operate in excess of 900 rpms (“overspeed”). The M/V ANNE HOLLY is also equipped with an “overspeed trip”. This safety device shuts fuel off to the engines when the engines reach a certain rpm, which in the case of the M/V ANNE HOLLY was 990 rpms. Such an event might occur if a propeller were lost and the engine’s rpms suddenly began to accelerate. Without the overspeed trip the engine would literally blow apart. American Milling acquired the M/V ANNE HOLLY in 1989. Prior to April 4, 1998, regular maintenance and repairs had been done on her. The starboard port main engines were overhauled in 1993 and 1997. Manufacturer maintenance schedules recommend an overhaul at 25,000 plus hours; as of April 4, 1998, the port engine had operated 2629 hours since its last overhaul and the starboard engine had operated 19,582 hours. Both reduction gears were rebuilt in 1997. Significant rudder work was performed during dry-dock in 1997. As previously found by this Court, as of April 4, 1998, the M/V ANNE HOLLY was in reasonable maritime shape and had a remaining useful life of 15 years. The Crew of the MIV ANNE HOLLY The crew assigned to the M/V ANNE HOLLY on April 4, 1998 included: Captain John O. Johnson, Captain Robert Hoelscher (acting as pilot), Mate Chris Davis, Chief Engineer Charles Brown, Assistant Engineer/Oiler Jim Brown, three deckhands, and a cook. Capt. Johnson began his marine river career in 1958 as a 15 year old deckhand. At 17, he was piloting vessels under supervision; by age 20 he was piloting vessels himself. In 1969, he made his first of many trips as a pilot on the UMR through the Eads Bridge. From 1969-1988 he worked for several inland river towboat companies including Port Arthur Towing, Brent Towing, Lawson & Lawson, Luhr Bros., Dixie Carriers and General Marine Towing. During these years he regularly navigated through the St. Louis Harbor. He had two stints of employment with Winterville. From 1988-89 he was employed by Winterville and served primarily as a pilot on three vessels: M/V MARGARET D; M/V MELISSA L and the M/V AETNA. All three of these boats operated on the UMR. From 1989-1992 Capt. Johnson did trip work primarily as a pilot on the UMR through the St. Louis Harbor for Marquette Transportation and American River Transportation. He regularly piloted boats pushing unit tows and barge line tows. In 1993, he rejoined Winterville and served as a captain or pilot on several vessels, including the M/V ANNE HOLLY, navigating the UMR through the St. Louis Harbor. Although he piloted other towboats from time to time, from 1995 to the date of the subject allision(s), he mostly served aboard the M/V ANNE HOLLY as pilot or captain. From 1995-98, while serving aboard the M/V ANNE HOLLY, Capt. Johnson successfully transited numerous times the UMR through the St. Louis Harbor, southbound and northbound. He had piloted mixed tows of loaded and empty barges, as many as 15, in varying river stages, including high water (20 ft or more on the St. Louis gauge) and flood water (30 ft. or more on the St. Louis gauge). From 1995-97 alone, he had navigated the St. Louis Harbor at least twelve (12) times. In almost thirty (30) years of piloting towboats on the Mississippi River, Captain Johnson had only one accident. Prior to the allision(s) of April 4, 1998, he had been involved in only one other allision — sometime in the late 1980s, while piloting the M/V ROYAL VIKING southbound on the Lower Mississippi River (LMR) at Huntington Point, one of the engines failed causing him to lose power to steer the bend, and he allided with the Texas Eastern Oil Dock at Mile 555. No charge of negligence by the United States Coast Guard or any Coast Guard license suspension or revocation proceeding was ever initiated with regard to the Texas Eastern Oil Dock allision (or any other marine incident) involving Captain Johnson. Captain Robert Hoelscher, at the time of the subject allision(s), had been piloting the Mississippi River for approximately twenty (20) years. The majority of these years had been spent on the UMR moving 15 barge tows between St. Louis and St. Paul, Minnesota. Consequently, he was familiar with navigating the St. Louis Harbor. Since 1993 he had been employed by Winterville serving aboard the M/V ANNE HOLLY. Chief Engineer Charles Brown had worked as an engineer aboard towing vessels since 1975, and primarily aboard the M/V ANNE HOLLY since 1993. Prior to serving on the M/V ANNE HOLLY, Chief Engineer Brown had served upon the M/V CHARLES F. DITTMEYER, JR. which had the same engines as the M/V ANNE HOLLY. Furthermore, he had participated in the overhaul of the M/V ANNE HOLLY’s starboard main engine in 1992. The remaining crewmembers, at the time of the subject allision(s), had worked aboard towing vessels for several years. They had been assigned together as crew-members for several years. They had served together aboard the M/V ANNE HOLLY numerous times. American Milling and Winterville’s Marine Operations and Relationship American Milling owns and operates towboats on the Mississippi River. David Jump is American Milling’s President. Ric Lamb became American Milling’s operations manager in 1990 and was employed in that capacity on April 4, 1998. Lou Draper, with over twenty (20) years marine experience, was American Milling’s port engineer as of April 4, 1998. Beginning in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, American Milling operated a number of towboats, including the M/V ANNE HOLLY, on the UMR. Usually its towboats were fully-found chartered and engaged in tramp-towing. Up until the end of the 1992 UMR towing season, American Milling had operated 8-9 towboats and employed crews to man them. After the 1992 UMR towing season, American Milling decreased its towboat fleet size to three (3) and decided to retain the services of a professional crewing service to provide the manpower on these towboats. Based upon the recommendation of one of its long-time charterers, East Side River Transportation, American Milling contacted Winterville about utilizing its crewing service. Winterville had been organized in 1988 by James Nowell to provide marine management services, including the provision of crews for towboats. Prior to organizing Winterville, Nowell had been employed by various towing companies working the UMR. He was involved in all aspects of marine operations for these towing companies, including interviewing and hiring towboat pilots. After contacting several towboat companies which had used Winterville’s crewing services, and discussing at length with Nowell Winterville’s ability to meet American Milling’s crewing needs, American Milling and Winterville entered into a crewing agreement under which Winter-ville provided crews beginning with the 1993 UMR towing season. At the time of the subject allision(s), a crewing agreement between American Milling and Win-terville was in effect. At the time of the subject allision(s), a fully-found charter existed between American Milling and East Side River Transportation (East Side). Under the charter, American Milling received a daily rate of $4000.00 per day for the M/V ANNE HOLLY. East Side was responsible for all fuel costs. As previously stated, a crew agreement existed between American Milling and Winterville. Under the crewing agreement, American Milling paid Winter-ville $2050.00 per day for each day the M/V ANNE HOLLY worked the UMR. Winterville employed the crew (after assessing qualifications) and paid the crew’s salary, including withholding applicable taxes. It provided the crew with transportation to and from the M/V ANNE HOLLY. It further provided the crew with a telephone and side-band radio. American Milling was consulted prior to hiring a pilot for any American Milling boat. Although American Milling left hiring decisions to Winterville, it did retain the right to request that Winterville have a crew change on any particular American Milling vessel, or to have a crew member removed from a boat. Prior to the start of the UMR towing season, it was the usual practice for American Milling personnel to meet with the Winterville crews. These meeting included Ric Lamb, Lou Draper, the boat’s captain, pilot, and chief engineer. Generally, Winterville assigned the same crew to the same boat on a regular basis to encourage a solid working relationship among the crew members and familiarity with the boat. Lamb and Draper provided the crews with information regarding maintenance work and/or repair work during the off-season, navigation conditions existing in the area, any known bulletins issued by the Coast Guard such as notices to mariners regarding locations where helper tugs are recommended or required. They would also review with the crew any changes in operating policy and procedures. During the UMR towing season, Lamb would board a vessel more than once to check on the boat’s condition and the crew. Lamb had regularly boarded the MTV ANNE HOLLY during past UMR towing seasons to confer with the crew and check the boat’s condition. Otherwise, Lamb and Nowell were available to a crew twenty-four (24) hours a day, by cell phone, to address any problems or emergencies that might arise during a trip. American Milling required daily pilothouse and engine room logs be maintained while a boat was in service. The captain or pilot recorded the location and time barges were taken into or removed from the tow, use of any helper tugs, and any accidents or incidents involving the towboat or its tow. The chief engineer was required to record information about the main engines and other machinery aboard the boat in the engine room log. Pilothouse logs were faxed to American Milling, Winterville, and East Side everyday at 4:00 a.m. Engine room logs were faxed to American Milling everyday at 4:00 a.m. as well. American Milling and Winterville management personnel reviewed the logs daily to monitor the towboat’s location, miles traveled, fuel and oh consumption, and if any problems with the boat or crew were noted. It is Winterville’s regular policy to leave navigation decisions to its captains and pilots. These include decisions regarding tow size, tow composition, the use of helper tugs, whether it is safe to proceed in light of river conditions, and other decisions affecting the safety of the crew and tow. It is marine custom and practice to leave such decisions up to the captain or pilot since they are considered to be in the best position to make these decisions based upon experience and first-hand knowledge of river conditions. The ADMIRAL The ADMIRAL is a licensed floating gambling casino moored to the Missouri bank of the UMR immediately below the Eads Bridge, within the City of St. Louis. It had been located at Mile 179.9 since 1983 pursuant to a permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers under the River and Harbors Authorization Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 403. As a permanently moored gambling casino, it sits in a navigable channel of the Mississippi River, yet no longer retains certain attributes of similar vessels: engines to power motion and steering, life jackets, and marine radio equipment to communicate with the Coast Guard. In 1983 when the President Casino renovated the ADMIRAL as a gambling enterprise (it had formerly been an entertainment vessel), it sought to modify its 1983 permit (Permit No.P-1550) with regard to its mooring. President Casino’s engineering consultant and a stockholder, William Ashton, had only considered whether the ADMIRAL could withstand the normal forces of current, wind, and drift when petitioning for the modification of Permit No.P-1550. The modification sought did not reference any type of protective structure from more significant impacts involving runaway barges or boats. The Army Corps of Engineers approved, in writing on November 23, 1994, President Casino’s permit modification. Colonel Thomas Suermann, United States Army District Engineer, allowed for the requested mooring modification; however, he further stipulated: “Additionally, I have deemed it necessary that the S.S. ADMIRAL must em-place a protection cell to provide protection from the ice flow, debris and breakaway tows. The cell constructed is to be able to provide protection to the gaming vessel for a breakaway tow with 15 fully-loaded barges traveling at two miles per hour under normal vessel operating conditions. The cell shall be placed to protect the bow of the starboard side of the gaming vessel. President Casino must submit preliminary plans for the location and design of the protection cell to the regulatory branch no later than thirty (30) days from receipt of this letter.” William Ashton addressed the matter on President Casino’s behalf, and despite concerns by himself and other President Casino management personnel regarding runaway barge allisions, he ultimately recommended to the Coast Guard that no cell be built. Based upon Ashton’s recommendation, and its belief that President Casino was intending to move the ADMIRAL to a new location in the near future, Captain Scott Cooper of the U.S. Coast Guard, on July 10, 1995, wrote the Corps of Engineers that a protective cell would not significantly improve safety on the S.S. ADMIRAL. President Casino never submitted any plans for a protective cell as required by modified Permit No. P-1550. The President Casino did not move the ADMIRAL to its present location until 2001-2002. The Army Corps of Engineers never issued a subsequent letter affirmatively removing the protective cell requirement nor did it ever take any action against the President Casino (prior to April 4, 1998) for not constructing a protective cell. However, a subsequent permit (issued pri- or to April 4, 1998), Permit No. P-2027 authorizing the President Casino to moor an additional support barge and a casino riverboat, stated (among other things): “All general and special conditions pertinent to previous Department of Army permits the permittee possesses still apply and are hereby incorporated by reference into Permit P-2027.” Prior to April 4, 1998, within the last fifteen (15) years, the ADMIRAL had been struck, during high or flood water, by runaway barges on several occasions. On February 23, 1985, the northbound tow of the MTV CRESCENT CITY struck the Missouri pier of the Eads Bridge. Part of the tow broke loose, drifted southbound, striking the ADMIRAL and causing it damage. On April 23, 1991, the northbound tow of the M/V WENDY ANN struck the Eads Bridge, drifted downstream, and hit the ADMIRAL’S bow. Finally, on May 5, 1994, the M/V ROBERT LOVE’s northbound tow hit the Missouri pier of the Eads Bridge, drifted downstream, and hit the ADMIRAL’S bow. The St. Louis Harbor The St. Louis Harbor has been described as one of the most difficult and hazardous areas in the Mississippi River to navigate, especially in high or flood waters. The physical layout of the St. Louis Harbor, and its navigational obstacles, were expertly detailed in 1971 by United States District Court Chief Judge William C. Ready in Petition of Canal Barge Co. (M/V ELAINE JONES), 323 F.Supp. 805 (N.D.Miss.1971). The testimony and credible evidence adduced in the present case indicates that these characteristics remain unchanged except that the Veterans Bridge is now called the Martin Luther King (MLR) Bridge. This Court adopts Judge Ready’s description as follows: 3. St. Louis Harbor, the site of this accident, because of the presence of six river bridges, their close proximity and construction, coupled with the meander of the river and its currents, enjoys a reputation among river people of being a difficult area or passage to safely navigate, particularly in high water. A vessel southbound, as was the ELAINE JONES, after departing Lock 27, is first confronted with the Merchants Bridge (Mile 183), and then the McKinley Bridge (Mile 182.5), which present limited horizontal clearance. Immediately after passing the McKinley Bridge, the vessel must line up for safe passage of the Veterans Bridge (Mile 180.2) and then the Eads Bridge (Mile 180). Just down river from the Eads Bridge are the Poplar Street Bridge (Mile 179.3) and the MacArthur Bridge, also known as the “City bridge (Mile 179). For south-bound traffic, a gradual bend in the river from left to right occurs above the *809 Veterans Bridge and extends to below the MacArthur Bridge. Contributing to the navigation problem is the presence of Eads Bridge which, due to its arched construction, affords a limited amount of clearance in high water through which vessels can safely pass. Also, during high water, i.e. 20 feet or more on the St. Louis gauge, the current immediately above Veterans Bridge runs from the right descending bank to the left descending bank, from the Missouri shore toward the Illinois shore. This high water current condition, called a left-hand “set” or “draft,” has a pronounced effect of moving a southbound boat and tow toward the Illinois bank rather than straight ahead. These navigation conditions exist whenever the river is at 20 feet or more on the St. Louis gauge and are facts known to experienced mariners navigating towboats through that section of the Mississippi River. 5.... As the river stage exceeds 20 feet, the force of the aforementioned set to the left of above Veterans Bridge likewise increases; and also as the rate of rise in the river accelerates, the force of the set becomes more violent. Although a sudden rise of the river increases the severity of the set, this is an operating factor known to persons experienced in navigating St. Louis Harbor during high water. Moreover, the experienced navigator of a downbound vessel can reasonably predict the severity of current in St. Louis Harbor by observing upriver conditions at Wood River, Illinois, and water levels at Lock 27. 6. The above left set or cross-current is not encountered by downbound vessels except in high water. At all other times the current in the immediate area runs straight down the river. When navigating the harbor downbound in low water (10 feet or less), it is an acceptable practice for a vessel to approach the Veterans and Eads Bridges in line with their green lights and pass under both along the mid-channel sailing line, as depicted on the U.S. Engineers’ official chart (Ex. 13). See App. A. This sailing line is the normal low water configuration for passage of a descending vessel. When navigating the harbor downbound in high water, it is the commonly accepted practice, in order to compensate for the left hand set encountered just above Veterans Bridge, to approach Veterans Bridge well to the right of the mid-channel sailing line, or favoring the Missouri shore. By this means, the vessel and tow are not forced by the crosscurrent to the left of the mid-channel sailing line, as it runs immediately beneath both the Veterans and Eads Bridges. Thus, a downbound vessel and tow that in high water approach the Veterans and Eads Bridges within one-quarter of a mile north of Veterans Bridge on the mid-channel sailing line are too wide or ‘out of shape’ to safely navigate the passage beneath the two bridges.” Id. at 808-09. Although Judge Keady’s detailed description of the St. Louis Harbor described a voyage southbound, the Court finds its description equally applicable to a northbound vessel’s voyage; i.e., the direction and effect of the currents or sets through the Eads Bridge on a northbound tow versus a southbound tow is almost totally opposite. The credible evidence at trial shows that as it is the customary practice for pilots navigating southbound through the St. Louis Harbor in high water to have their tows favoring the right descending pier (Missouri) as they set up to run the MLK Bridge and then through the Eads Bridge, it is equally customary for these same experienced pilots navigating northbound under similar circumstances to set up to transit the Eads Bridge by guiding the head of their tow towards the left descending pier (Illinois) of the center span of the Eads Bridge. A northbound tow must proceed upriver in alignment with the current. If the vessel does not remain relatively straight with the current flow, it will move to port or starboard depending upon which side of the tow is presented to the current. Therefore, it is necessary that as the tow clears the Poplar Street Bridge and approaches the channel span of the Eads Bridge it steer slightly to port in order to turn into the current coming through the span. Ideally, the tow should be as straight with the current as possible and perpendicular to the bridge when the tow starts through it. This is because as the tow proceeds into and through the channel span and becomes perpendicular to it, the current flow is on the starboard side of the tow and drafts the tow from the Illinois side of the bridge toward the center of the bridge as the tow continues upriver. As testified to by Captain Michael Rushing, an inland river towboat pilot and captain of many years experience navigating the UMR, including the St. Louis Harbor (northbound and southbound), the transit of a northbound vessel through the Eads Bridge requires the vessel to cross from the Illinois side of the center of the river from below the bridge, to the Missouri side of the center of the river, when above the bridge, in order for it to navigate safely through and against the flow of current through the channel span. A significant dispute at trial concerned the accuracy of President Casino’s Exhibit Z-ll which purportedly illustrated the St. Louis Harbor' and the currents within it. After careful review of all admissible evidence and testimony, the Court finds that the severe angles of the river and current directions as depicted in this exhibit conflict with the well-established description provided by Judge Ready in Petition of Canal Barge Co., supra, as well as the credible testimony of Captains Rushing, Beacom, Johnson, and Hoelscher; all inland riverboat captains with considerable experience on the UMR including the St. Louis Harbor. Even President Casino’s mariner experts, Captains Sam Schropp and James Jamison corroborated the direction of the significant sets as described by Judge Ready. The only expert testimony supporting President Casino Exhibit Z-ll was that of Dr. Charles Morris. Dr. Morris assumed the currents shown in President Casino Exhibit Z-ll were correct without performing any independent study of the currents. He offered testimony based on an assumed accuracy of President Casino Exhibit Z-ll without having ever been on a towboat, especially one navigating on the UMR northbound through the St. Louis Harbor. Finally, this exhibit fails to comport with the description of the St. Louis Harbor and its currents/sets as set forth by the Coast Guard in President Casino Exhibits 14 (St. Louis Harbor Study — Effects of River Stage, Horsepower, Time of Day, Pilot Familiarity and Pilot Ability on Safety of Navigation in St. Louis Harbor, May 1986-November 1986) and X3 (Analysis of Bridge Collision Accidents in Saint Louis Harbor, April 1985). Eads Bridge The Eads Bridge, located at Mile 180, has three spans supported by four piers. The center or channel span is the customary navigation span. It is approximately 520 ft. in width and, at flood stage, has a vertical clearance of 66 ft. 6 in. Each pier is marked with a red pier light. Two green lights (dayboard lights) mark the center of the channel span, one on the upstream (northbound) side and one on the downstream (southbound) side. There are also three white lights in a vertical line located above the green lights on both the upstream and downstream side. Of all the bridges in the St. Louis Harbor, the Eads Bridge is considered to be the most hazardous to navigate, especially during high or flood waters, due to the limited horizontal clearance of the channel span. M/V ANNE HOLLY’S Northbound Voyage on the UMR through the St. Louis Harbor on April 4, 1998 On March 30, 1998 the MTV ANNE HOLLY, under the command of Capt. John (Johnny) Johnson, proceeded southbound on the UMR from MacGregor, Iowa to St. Louis with a tow of twelve (12) loaded barges. Due to high water conditions, Capt. Johnson had radioed Lamb earlier that he would take a tow of twelve (12) loaded barges, not fifteen (15) loaded barges as originally planned. The M/V ANNE HOLLY arrived north of St. Louis the night of April 3, 1998. In effect at that time was a Coast Guard notice restricting navigation between Mile 184 through Mile 179 on tows longer than 600 ft. from proceeding south through the St. Louis Harbor except in daylight hours. The M/V ANNE HOLLY, with Capt. Johnson piloting, waited until the early morning hours to continue proceeding southbound through the St. Louis Harbor. Capt. Johnson did not encounter any problems due to the water being at flood stage, such as large amounts of drift (river debris), while navigating southbound through the St. Louis Harbor. After dropping off its tow, the M/V ANNE HOLLY got its new tow orders by fax from East Side. Throughout the afternoon of April 4, 1998, the M/V ANNE HOLLY built its northbound tow of fourteen (14) barges by first picking up three (3) barges (1 loaded, 2 empty) from the Lewis & Clark fleet at UMR Mile 175. It then proceeded north to the George Street fleet at UMR Mile 177 to pick up the remaining eleven (11) barges. Although Capt. Hoelscher was piloting the M/V ANNE HOLLY at this time, Capt. Johnson determined the configuration of the northbound tow. The northbound tow was a mix of eleven (11) box barges and three (3) rake barges. Capt. Johnson placed the loaded heavier barges toward the rear for better steerage. Two rake barges were placed at the head of the tow as the port and center lead barges. The third rake barge was placed in the starboard string immediately ahead of a loaded box barge. Two empty box barges were placed in front of the rake load in the starboard string. This configuration, although not the best for “optimal” pushing capability, was consistent with marine industry practice and afforded the best possible configuration for this tow. The vessel and its tow was approximately 1154 ft. long and 105 ft. wide — five (5) barges long in the port string, five (5) barges long in the center string, and four (4) barges long in the starboard string. See, Attachment l. Among the barges in the tow during the northbound UMR trip were: Claimant Pinnacle Barge Co. barges PIN 348B and PMC 8101B; Claimant Brennan Marine barges MW0211 and ABC 767; Claimant Riverland Resources barge SB 15B; and Claimant Robert B. Miller & Associates barges RM 41, CGB 219, and ITEL 206. Prior to leaving the George Street fleet and pushing the fourteen (14) barge tow upriver, Captains Johnson and Hoelscher conferred regarding the tow configuration, navigation conditions, and the capability of the MTV ANNE HOLLY to successfully navigate the St. Louis Harbor northbound. Both were well-aware of the Coast Guard’s latest notice restricting southbound traffic to daylight hours only, and that all towboats navigating the St. Louis Harbor (southbound and northbound) had to have a minimum of 250 hp. for every loaded barge (1500 tons) in tow. They both felt that there would be no problem with the M/V ANNE HOLLY pushing the tow northbound through the St. Louis Harbor. As the M/V ANNE HOLLY was preparing to pull out from the George Street fleet, the M/V FRANCES was headed southbound towards the George Street fleet. The M/V FRANCES, under the command of Capt. Ken Simmons, a veteran inland riverboat captain with twenty (20) years experience piloting the St. Louis Harbor, was the only Paragon Marine Service harbor boat working the night shift on April 4, 1998 due to a pilot’s strike. At approximately 6:15 p.m., Capt. Simmons observed the M/V ANNE HOLLY and her tow at the George Street fleet. He called Capt. Johnson, whom he had known for many years from towing barges up and down the UMR through the St. Louis Harbor, and inquired as to whether he would need any assistance in getting his tow underway. Capt. Johnson responded that everything was fine and he did not require assistance. Capt. Simmons ended the brief conversation by informing Capt. Johnson that the M/V FRANCES was headed northbound to assist a barge in leaving a dock facility, and he would be returning southbound with the barge to a lower anchor fleet on the Illinois side of the river opposite the George Street fleet. At 6:30 p.m. Capt. Johnson logged out and the M/V ANNE HOLLY got underway. All navigational lights, including the search lights and the peep light, were operational. It took approximately fifteen (15) minutes for Capt. Johnson to release his tow from the fleet and maneuver out into the river. Upon departure, and for some time upriver, the deck crew remained on the tow stringing out sounder cords and checking the tightness of the rigging securing the tow. They also watched for any problems with the barges or with the river. For safety reasons, as the tow approached each bridge, Capt. Johnson would call the deck crew off the tow. As the M/V FRANCES proceeded southbound with its barge in tow, Capt. Simmons observed the M/V ANNE HOLLY at Mile 178.1 headed northbound approaching the Cahokia Power Plant located at Mile 178.5. The river was above flood stage and Capt. Simmons could see moderate to heavy drift in the river. Captains Simmons and Johnson spoke on (radio) Channel 13 to agree to a “passing arrangement”. They agreed to pass “port to port”. At approximately 7:15 p.m., the tows passed each other at Mile 178.5 without any problems. Capt. Simmons clearly saw the M/V ANNE HOLLY’s navigational or “running lights” were functioning properly. He estimated the speed of the M/V ANNE HOLLY’s speed over the ground to be “a good three miles an hour”. He saw nothing unusual about her, the tow, or her navigation path northbound. Both vessels proceeded on course. The next time the two captains spoke was shortly before 7:30 p.m. Upon passing through the MacArthur Bridge and Poplar Street Bridge, Capt. Johnson radioed Capt. Simmons to inquire about the availability of a tug to provide assistance if he should require assistance as he continued upriver. Capt. Simmons informed him that no tug was presently available because he was the only tug working the area. Capt. Johnson responded that he was not having any difficulty pushing through the bridges and wouldn’t be needing a helper tug. Capt. Simmons did not detect any concern or anxiety on the part of Capt. Johnson during their brief conversation. Capt. Johnson continued northbound having had no problems pushing the M/V ANNE HOLLY through the MacArthur and Poplar Street bridges. Since the force of the current is stronger at these two bridges than at the Eads Bridge, he figured that if he had no problem pushing his tow through those two bridges, he would encounter no problems pushing the tow through the Eads Bridge. After the M/V ANNE HOLLY and her tow had proceeded through the center spans of the MacArthur and Poplar Street bridges, she continued upriver with the jack staff of the tow pointed toward the left descending pier of the Eads Bridge. Capt. Johnson maintained a position between the dayboard marking the right ascending side of the channel span and the Illinois pier of the channel span. This positioning placed the M/V ANNE HOLLY and her tow on the Illinois side of the river. As the M/V ANNE HOLLY approached the Eads Bridge closer to its Illinois side, Capt. Johnson made a port steer about 400 ft. below the bridge in order to bring the boat and tow perpendicular with the bridge as the tow proceeded through it. This was to enable the M/V ANNE HOLLY to turn into the current coming through the channel span. As the first tier of barges cleared the bridge, Capt. Johnson noticed a slight vibration. As the second tier of barges cleared the bridge, Capt. Johnson noticed that not only had the vibration continued but that the pace upriver was slowing. He radioed Chief Engineer Brown to check on the engines. He wanted to know if the engines were operating at their maximum rpms. Chief Brown checked the engines with a new hand-held tachometer and informed him that the port main engine rpms were 904 and the starboard engine rpms were 900. These readings were entered into the engine room’s log. These rpm readings indicated that the M/V ANNE HOLLY was running (at the least) at her rated horsepower of 5600. As the third tier of barges proceeded through the Eads Bridge, the tow of the M/V ANNE HOLLY “stalled out”. With the forward momentum of the tow stopped, combined with the strength of the current along the starboard side of the tow, the tow began to move toward the right descending (Missouri) pier of the Eads Bridge. Capt. Johnson pulled back the throttles, knocked the boat out of gear, tried to radio the ADMIRAL of his situation (failed to get an immediate response), and finally, attempted to land the tow on the Missouri pier of the Eads Bridge as “gently” as possible. At this point, contact with the bridge was inevitable; it was just a question of the force of the impact. Capt. Johnson hoped to keep the tow intact as the stern of the third barge from the head of the port string allided with the right descending bridge pier. When the tow allided with the bridge (at approximately the break coupling), the wires holding the tow together parted and the eight (8) barges which were positioned in the tow between the break coupling and the head of the tow topped around and floated downstream in the current. Capt. Johnson logged the allision with the Eads Bridge at 7:30 p.m. He broad-casted a “May-Day” call on Channel 13 and then radioed the United States Coast Guard Group UMR in Keokuk, Iowa. Capt. Simmons heard the “May-Day” call and started immediately northbound while attempting to reach Capt. Johnson on the radio. As Capt. Simmons approached the lower end of the MacArthur Bridge, he spotted the ADMIRAL topping out. One of the runaway barges had hit the ADMIRAL’S bow causing damage to the bow and her moorings to break loose. This resulted in the ADMIRAL drifting from the Missouri shore into the river where she topped around in the swift current. A second barge hit an entry ramp that had already broken loose and was submerged in the water. As he saw the ADMIRAL topping out, Capt. Simmons called Capt. Johnson and instructed him to release his remaining tow and go assist the ADMIRAL. Capt. Johnson maneuvered the M/V ANNE HOLLY quickly downriver to face up the bow of the ADMIRAL and hold her in place. The crew of the M/V ANNE HOLLY boarded the ADMIRAL and assisted off-loading her patrons. Meanwhile, the M/V FRANCES assisted in catching the runaway barges. Capt. Simmons noted the time he began his emergency efforts as approximately 7:30 p.m. in his vessel and pilothouse logs. Besides the ADMIRAL, several of the barges sustained damage to themselves or their cargo as a result of the allision(s) on April 4,1998. Post April 4, 1998 Events Following the allision(s) of April 4, 1998, the National Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB) and the Coast Guard initiated investigations. The NTSB interviewed numerous individuals on a “fact-finding” mission to try to establish a probable cause for the accident. Meanwhile, the Coast Guard, as the licensing authority for inland river towboat pilots, charged Capt. Johnson with negligence for “[flailing to take adequate precautions to prevent an allision of subject vessel’s tow [M/V ANNE HOLLY] with the Eads Bridge near mile 180.0 on the Upper Mississippi River — a navigable water of the United States.” At his license suspension and/or revocation hearing on September 3, 1998, Capt. Johnson pleaded “no contest” to the charge of negligence and the Coast Guard suspended his riverboat pilot’s license for two (2) months, remitted on six (6) months probation. Also, four days after the subject allision(s), the M/V ANNE HOLLY successfully towed a fifteen (15) barge tow (twelve loaded and three empty) northbound through the St. Louis Harbor in river conditions similar to the ones existing on April 4, 1998 (flood stage and drift present). This time the M/V ANNE HOLLY was piloted by Capt. Harvey through the St. Louis Harbor, including the Eads Bridge. A videotape of the M/V ANNE HOLLY’s run on April 8, 1998 (American Milling Exhibit 80) shows Capt. Harvey’s approach to the Eads Bridge to be virtually identical to the approach testified to by Capt. Johnson. Tachometer readings of the M/V ANNE HOLLY’s engines recorded identical rpms: 904 rpms for the port engine and 900 rpms on the starboard engine. The computations and recordings logged by Chief Engineer Brown indicate the speed of the M/V ANNE HOLLY on April 8, 1998 was 3.64 mile per hour. No repairs or adjustments were made to any of the M/V ANNE HOLLY’s machinery between April 4, 1998 and April 8, 1998. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to its admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 and Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, American Milling and Winterville have invoked this Court’s admiralty and maritime jurisdiction pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 183 et. seq. Both American Milling and Winterville seek to exonerate themselves from liability, or in the alternative, to limit their liability with respect to the allision with the Eads Bridge, and subsequent allision by the M/V ANNE HOLLY’s barges with the ADMIRAL. Captain John Johnson seeks to exonerate himself from the President Casino and Barge Claimants’ charge of negligence in connection with the events of April 4, 1998. The present case involves complicated mixed questions of law and fact. There are several legal theories of liability that may apply, and as explained below, each involving certain maritime presumptions and shifting burdens of proof. Further complicating this case is the fact that two (2) allisions took place the evening of April 4, 1998, each requiring an independent analysis. However, for the sake of clarity and ease of presentation, this opinion will first set forth the certain general admiralty principles present in the case in total, then address the application of these principles with regard to the issue of exoneration or limitation of liability. For the most part, the allision of the M/V ANNE HOLLY with the Eads Bridge will be dealt with first, then the allision of the barges with the ADMIRAL. Liability for allisions/collisions is governed by a collection of legal presumptions and shifting burdens of proof. The mere occurrence of an allision does not automatically impart liability to the vessel or her owner. Turecamo Maritime v. Weeks Dredge No. 516, 872 F.Supp. 1215, 1229 (S.D.N.Y.1994). Liability requires a finding of “fault” that caused or contributed to the damage incurred. Id., at 1229. Liability in admiralty collision cases generally stem from the following sources: 1) negligence in the navigation or deviation from generally accepted concepts of prudent seamanship and reasonable care; 2) violation of statutory and/or regulatory rules governing navigation and management of vessels (and other maritime structures such as bridges over navigable waters); and 3) non-compliance with well-established, recognized customs or practices in the marine industry. Folkstone Maritime Ltd. v. CSX Corp., 64 F.3d 1037, 1046 (7th Cir.1995). Whatever the source of the liability, the “fault” must have been a contributing cause of the incident. Folkstone Maritime, at 1046; Lone Star Industries v. Mays Towing, 927 F.2d 1453 (8th Cir.1991). As stated before, the “fault” which produces liability must be the proximate cause of the allision/collision. To give rise to liability, the culpable act or omission must have been substantial and a material factor in causing the collision. American River Trans Co. v. KAVO KALIAKRA S.S., 148 F.3d 446 (5th Cir.1998). Whether an act is the proximate cause of a collision depends on two factors: 1) the existence of a direct causal nexus between the negligent act or omission; i.e. the harm would not have occurred “but for” the act; and 2) whether the resulting harm was a “natural” and “probable” consequence of the act or omission. See, Horn v. B.A.S.S., 92 F.3d 609, 611-12 (8th Cir.1996). If an intervening act breaks the chain of causation, then it is considered to be a “superceding cause” and cuts off the liability of the first negligent act. See, Exxon Co. v. Sofec, 517 U.S. 830, 837, 116 S.Ct. 1813, 135 L.Ed.2d 113 (1996)(finding that superceding cause applies in admiralty when a party’s “negligence in fact substantially contributed to the plaintiffs injury, but the injury was actually brought about by a later cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.”); see also, Lone Star Industries, supra. Thus, not all intervening acts are considered to be su-perceding. If an intervening act does not break the causal nexus, a court can hold both actors liable for the resulting injury. Maritime law recognizes certain legal presumptions in order to assist a court in determining the proximate cause of an allision/collision and imposing liability for the allision/collision. As in any civil case, the injured party in an admiralty case has the initial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant vessel was negligent and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. It is well-established that when a moving vessel collides with an anchored vessel or a fixed object (such as a bridge), there is a presumption that the moving vessel is at fault. The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186, 15 S.Ct. 804, 39 L.Ed. 943 (1895); The Louisiana, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 164, 18 L.Ed. 85 (1865); Bunge Corp. v. Freeport Marine Repair, 240 F.3d 919, 923 (11th Cir.2001); Bunge Corp. v. M/V FURNESS BRIDGE, 558 F.2d 790, 794-95 (5th Cir.1977); Petition of M/V ELAINE JONES, 480 F.2d 11, 17 (5th Cir.1973); Claim of Gypsum Carrier, 465 F.Supp. 1050, 1061-62 (S.D.Ga.1979). This presumption is enough to make a prima facie case of negligence against the moving vessel. Brown and Root Marine Operators, Inc. v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 377 F.2d 724, 726 (5th Cir.1967); Gypsum Carrier, at 1061—62; Canal Barge as owner & operator of the M/V ELAINE JONES, 323 F.Supp. 805, 819 (N.D.Miss.1971). The burden of proof shifts to the moving vessel which can rebut the presumption only by proving 1) that it was without fault (i.e., used all reasonable care to avoid the collision); 2) the stationary object was at fault; or 3) the allision/collision was the result of an “inevitable accident”. Bunge Corp. v. Freeport Marine Repair, at 923; Illinois Constructors Corp. v. Logan Transportation, 715 F.Supp. 872, 879 (N.D.Ill.1989); Bunge Corp. v. M/V FURNESS BRIDGE, at 795. The presumption operates not only against the moving vessel, but against all parties involved in the management of the vessel. Bunge Corp. v. Freeport Marine Repair, at 923. Another rebuttable legal presumption that regularly governs maritime cases is known as the “Pennsylvania rule”. Under the Pennsylvania rule, if a vessel involved in a collision was in actual violation of a statutory or regulatory rule intended to prevent collisions, the burden shifts to the violating vessel to show that its statutory fault was not a contributing cause of the accident. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 136, 22 L.Ed. 148 (1873); Alter Barge Line, Inc. v. TPC Transportation Co., 801 F.2d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir.1986); Ingram Barge Co. v. Valley Line Co., 470 F.Supp. 140, 147 (E.D.Mo.1979), aff'd 615 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.1979); Three Rivers Rock Co. v. The M/V MARTIN, 401 F.Supp. 15, 18 (E.D.Mo.1975). Although the Pennsylvania rule originally applied only to collisions between ships, it is now applicable in all maritime accidents. See, In the Matter of Adventure Bound Sports, 837 F.Supp. 1244, 1253 n. 14 (S.D.Ga.1993) (citations omitted); see also, Folkstone Maritime, supra, (applying Pennsylvania rule to allision between vessel and drawbridge); Complaint of Wasson, 495 F.2d 571 (7th Cir.1974)(applying Pennsylvania rule to allision between boat and bridge); United States v. Norfolk-Berkley Bridge Corp., 29 F.2d 115 (E.D.Va.1928)(applying Pennsylvania rule to allision between towed vessel and bridge). For the Pennsylvania rule to apply, three factors must be proven: 1) proof by a preponderance of the evidence of a violation of a statute or regulation that imposes a mandatory duty; 2) the statute or regulation must involve marine safety or navigation; and 3) the injury suffered must be of a nature that the statute or regulation was intended to prevent. Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Kirby Inland Marine, Inc. of Mississippi, 296 F.3d 671, 674 (8th Cir.2002); Folkstone Maritime, at 1047. Although the rule (as originally set forth in The Pennsylvania, supra.) refers to a statutory violation, it is commonly applied to violations of navigational rules. Turecamo Maritime, supra. The Pennsylvania rule may be rebutted by a showing that the violation was not a contributing cause of the injury; i.e. the other party is solely responsible for the accident. See, Folkstone Maritime, at 1047; Alter Barge Line, at 1029; Consolidated Grain and Barge v. Wisconsin Barge Line, 522 F.Supp. 842 (E.D.Mo.1981). Thus, when the stationary object that has been struck by the moving vessel is in violation of a navigational statute or rifle intended to prevent such an allision, the usual presumption of fault that attaches to a moving vessel under the Oregon rule is shifted back to the stationary object under the Pennsylvania rule, and the stationary object must prove that its failure to comply with the statute or rule could not have contributed to the injury. Another legal presumption applicable in maritime cases is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Res ipsa loquitur creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence in certain instances where: 1) the injured party was without fault; 2) the instrumentality causing the injury was under the exclusive control of the defendant; and 3) the mishap is of the type that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence. Lone Star Industries v. Mays Towing Co., at 1456-58 citing Stevens v. The White City, 285 U.S. 195, 52 S.Ct. 347, 76 L.Ed. 699 (1932) and Agri-Trans Corp. v. Peavey Co., 742 F.2d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir.1984); American River Transportation v. Paragon Marine Services, 213 F.Supp.2d. 1035, 1058 (E.D.Mo.2002), aff'd 329 F.3d 946 (8th Cir.2003). Under the Limitation of Liability Act, a vessel owner is entitled to exoneration only if the vessel and its owner are free from fault or negligence in the allision. American River Transportation v. Paragon Marine Services, at 1063 citing Muer v. Karbel, 146 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir.1998); see also, Illinois Constructors Corp., at 880. Otherwise, a court must engage in a two-step analysis to determine if a vessel owner is entitled to limit his or her liability under the Act. Firstly, the court must identify what acts