Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM ORDER McLAUGHLIN, District Judge. On December 6, 1999, Plaintiff Orville Lines, acting pro se, filed the instant action. This matter was assigned to United States District Judge Sean J. McLaughlin and was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter for report and recommendation in accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Rules 72.1.3 and 72.1.4 of the Local Rules for Magistrates. Plaintiff is an out-of-state sexual offender who transferred his parole to Pennsylvania. Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging his subjection to the community notification provisions of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law and alleging that his rights to due process and equal protection have been violated by the statute. As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. [Doc. No. 7, p. 4.] Defendant Wargo moved for summary judgment claiming that Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated and that, alternatively, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Through newly obtained counsel, Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, raising for the first time the applicability of Pennsylvania’s Interstate Compact Concerning Parole (the “Parole Compact”), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, § 321 (West 1999), and Doe v. Ward, 124 F.Supp.2d 900 (W.D.Pa.2000) (holding that the community notification provisions of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law as applied to out-of-state offenders violate the Parole Compact). On August 5, 2002, Magistrate Judge Baxter heard oral argument from the parties on the pending summary judgment motion. On August 30, 2002, Magistrate Judge Baxter issued a Report and Recommendation finding, in part, that the disparate treatment of out-of-state offenders under Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law violated the Parole Compact. Nevertheless, though the subject of the Parole Compact had been briefed by Plaintiff and addressed by both parties at the oral argument, the issue of whether there was an implied cause of action (and therefore, an implied remedy) under the Compact had not been briefed or argued and was brought up by the Court sua sponte in the Report and Recommendation. Magistrate Judge Baxter concluded that, despite the apparent conflict between Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law and the Parole Compact, Plaintiff could not maintain a private cause of action to enforce the Compact’s provisions. Further, the Report and Recommendation found that Plaintiffs rights to equal protection and procedural due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment were violated. The Report concluded by finding that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because he acted in accordance with an apparently valid statute. Plaintiffs counsel has filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation, asserting that (1) the Court erred in concluding that the Interstate Compact of Probation and Parole does not create a federal right enforceable through § 1983, and (2) the Court erred in concluding that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. Additionally, the Objections note that Plaintiffs original prayer for injunctive and declaratory relief remains pending as it was not addressed in the Report and Recommendation. [Doc. No. 31.] Defendant filed no Objections to the Report and Recommendation, but has filed a Reply to Plaintiffs Objections. Defendant responds to Plaintiffs arguments on the implied cause of action and qualified immunity. He also disputes the contention that the declaratory and injunctive relief components of the original prayer for relief remain pending in this case. Defendant argues that' such relief is now moot because “there is no basis to assume that Plaintiff will again be subjected to community notification by this trooper.” [Doc. No. 32.] We now consider these matters de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Initially, however, we digress briefly to clarify the relevant statutory provisions which are presently at issue. Factual and Legal Background Plaintiff is a convicted sex offender who received a sentence of 20 years imprisonment by a Maryland Court following his conviction on a charge of second degree rape. After serving approximately 10 and % years of his jail sentence, he was paroled. The terms of his parole in Maryland did not require him to be subjected to community notification. Pursuant to the Parole Compact, Plaintiffs parole was transferred to Pennsylvania so that Plaintiff could reside near his mother in Oil City, Pennsylvania. In the meantime, Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law was signed into law on October 24, 1995. In general the statute, as amended in 1996, see Pub.L. 300, No. 46, § 2 (May 22, 1996) (hereinafter referred to as “Megan’s Law I”), required (1) registration with the Pennsylvania State Police by individuals convicted of certain enumerated sexual offenses, and (2) community notification for those sexual offenders who were deemed to be “sexually violent predators” within the meaning of the Act. See generally 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9791-9799.6 (West 1998). With regard to those individuals convicted of sexually violent offenses under Pennsylvania law, the statute provided for specific procedures whereby a sexual offender would be evaluated for the purpose of determining, prior to sentencing, whether he/she was considered a “sexually violent predator.” See id. at § 9794. These procedures included an initial mandatory assessment by a state board, followed by a hearing before the original trial court, at which time the court would consider the board’s assessment and the defendant would have the right to be represented by legal counsel and the opportunity to present evidence and/or cross-examine any witnesses produced by the Commonwealth. Id. at § 9794(c)-(e). If the defendant had been convicted of certain enumerated offenses, then he/she was presumed by both the board and the court to be a sexually violent predator; the defendant faced the burden of rebutting this presumption by presenting clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Id. at § 9794(b). Once assessed as a “sexually violent predator,” a defendant would be subject to community notification, meaning that the local law enforcement agency would advise certain persons and agencies within the community of defendant’s presence in the community, including the defendant’s identity, photograph, residence, the nature of his offense, and a statement that he had been designated by court order as a sexually violent predator. Id. at § 9798(a)-(b). In addition to the community notification requirements, persons designated “sexually violent predators” under Megan’s Law I faced a mandatory maximum penalty of life imprisonment for their predicate offenses and a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment if convicted of a subsequent sexually violent offense. Id. at §§ 9799.4(a) and (c)-(d). At the time of Plaintiffs transfer to this Commonwealth, Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law I also contained the following provision concerning out-of-state sexual offenders: (c) Offenders from other states. — As a condition of obtaining residency in Pennsylvania under the interstate compact for the supervision of parolees and pro-bations, sexual offenders from other states shall be required to register and abide by the requirements of this sub-chapter and, where the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole determines it is necessary to protect the public, shall submit to public notification as provided in section 9798 (relating to other notification). 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795(c) (West 1998). The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole had adopted a policy at that time requiring community notification in all out-of-state parole supervision cases involving sex offenders such as Plaintiff, though it did not officially require that such persons be specifically identified as sexually violent predators. Plaintiff was ultimately released from custody on or about November 28, 1996. The day after his release Plaintiff complied with the registration requirements of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9793 (West 1998), and reported his then current address and telephone number to law enforcement authorities. By letter dated December 4, 1997, Captain Ernest R. Spittler, Director of Records and Identification Division of the Pennsylvania State Police Headquarters in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania advised the State Police Barracks in Seneca, Pennsylvania that Plaintiff was an individual residing within that jurisdiction and met the criteria of an “out-of-state offender” as determined by the Parole Board. Sargent Beggs, Crime Unit Supervisor of the Seneca Barracks, received the correspondence on or about December 8, 1997 along with several reproduction-ready copies of a “Megan’s Law Out-Of-State Offender Community Notification Flier” which included Plaintiffs photograph, full name and current address. In addition, the flier contained the following language: This is to inform you that the below listed individual has been designated for “Community Notification” by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole outlined in title 42, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, Chapter 97, Sub-chapter H, Sexually Violent Offenders, pursuant to Subsection 9795(c)[.] The subject was convicted of Pennsylvania Crimes Code Section: 3121 or in the case of Out-of-State Offenders, the appropriate equivalent. * * * Community Notification is ReQUIRED FOR THIS DESIGNATION* * * (See Ex. B to Declaration of David Wargo, Def.’s Mot. for Summ. Judg. [Doc. No. 17].) Sargent Beggs was further advised that the community notification must be accomplished within 72 hours of receipt of the correspondence, consistent with 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9798(c) (West 1998). Accordingly, Sargent Beggs instructed Trooper Swatzler and Defendant Wargo to make the required community notifications. On December 8 and 10, 1997, in accordance with the notification procedures of Megan’s law, Defendant Wargo distributed copies of the flier to various local schools, law enforcement agencies, and neighbors of Plaintiff. In late 1998, subsequent to the conduct which forms the basis of this lawsuit, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted Act 1998-171. This Act amended Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, § 331.33 (West 1999) so as to add a new provision mandating community notification in all cases involving out-of-state sexual offenders under supervision in Pennsylvania pursuant to the Parole Compact. See id. at § 331.33(d)(3) as amended by Pub.L. 1298, No. 171, § 1 (Dec. 21, 1998). In addition, in May of 2000 the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted comprehensive amendments to Megan’s Law (“Megan’s Law II”) which, in relevant part, deleted former 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795(c) and made public notification mandatory for out-of-state sexual offenders paroled in Pennsylvania pursuant to Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, § 331.33. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9798(e) (West.Supp.2002), as amended by Pub.L. 74, No. 18 § 3 (May 10, 2000). Megan’s Law II also substantially revised the procedures whereby in-state offenders are evaluated “sexually violent predator” status. This case originally came on as a pro se § 1983 action challenging the Plaintiffs subjection to community notification under Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law and alleging various violations of Plaintiffs constitutional rights as a result thereof. Plaintiff subsequently obtained counsel and filed a counseled response to the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, in which he refined his constitutional challenges, pursuing more specifically the equal protection and due process arguments addressed by Magistrate Judge Baxter’s Report and Recommendation. In so doing, however, Plaintiff directed his constitutional claims at the community notification and out-of-state offender provisions in Megan’s Law II and Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, § 331.33 (West 1999), as amended, both of which are technically irrelevant in that they post-date the conduct which forms the basis of Plaintiffs complaint. Because this discrepancy was never brought to the Magistrate Judge’s attention, the litigation proceeded along these lines at oral argument as well. Therefore Magistrate Judge Baxter’s opinion analyzes Plaintiffs due process and equal protection claims in terms of § 331.33 and Megan’s Law II, rather than the provisions outlined above which were in effect at the time of Defendant Wargo’s conduct. Notwithstanding this discrepancy, this Court has considered the Report and Recommendation, as well as the Plaintiffs objections thereto, in the context of the applicable provisions of Megan’s Law I. Ultimately, the constitutional arguments raised by the parties were sufficiently joined such that this Court can conduct a meaningful de novo review of the Magistrate’s analysis and conclusions in the light of the applicable statutory law. In addition, Megan’s Law I and II are similar in an important respect: they both provide some procedural mechanism whereby a defendant convicted of a sexually violent offense within the Commonwealth could challenge his status as a “sexually violent predator,” and therefore avoid the resultant consequences of community notification. No such provisions appear in either Megan’s Law I or II with respect to out-of-state offenders insofar as their subjection to community notification is concerned. On the other hand, the Court notes one important distinction between Megan’s Law I and II as it concerns Plaintiffs constitutional claims: Megan’s Law II by its terms mandates community notification for out-of-state sexual offenders, whereas Megan’s Law I on its face did not. To the extent that Plaintiffs constitutional claims are premised on a facial attack on the Pennsylvania statute, the distinction is significant, particularly insofar as the defense of qualified immunity is concerned. (See the Court’s discussion, infra.) Technically speaking, Megan’s Law I did not mandate community notification for out-of-state sexual offenders, but instead gave discretion to the Pennsylvania Parole Board to determine whether such public notification was appropriate in light of public safety concerns. We have accepted the Defendant’s representation that, at the time of Wargo’s conduct, the Parole Board had a policy of requiring all out-of-state sexual offenders to submit to community notification; therefore, as a practical matter, Plaintiff was subjected to community notification, premised solely on his status as an out-of-state sexual offender, pursuant to either an official or de facto governmental policy. We therefore construe Plaintiffs constitutional claims as challenges to Megan’s Law I, as applied to him. The Court finds this approach to be in the best interests of justice, given the fact that Plaintiff fairly-raised his constitutional challenges in his pro se complaint, the issues have been sufficiently joined by both parties, the essential facts are not in dispute, the arguments are basically legal in nature, and the Court’s constitutional analysis is largely the same as that undertaken by the Magistrate Judge. The Interstate Compact Concerning Parole Plaintiffs first objection is that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that the Parole Compact does not create a federal right enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002), the Supreme Court clarified that nothing short of a right “unambiguously conferred” by Congress would support a cause of action under § 1983. 536 U.S. at 282-83, 122 S.Ct. at 2275. Regardless whether a plaintiff is seeking to enforce a federal statutory right through a private cause of action implicit in the statute itself or through § 1983, there must first be a determination that “Congress intended to create a federal right.” Id. (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, “[f]or a statute to create such private rights, its text must be ‘phrased in terms of the persons benefitted.’ ” Id. (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 692 n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). Where there is no indication from the text and structure of a statute that Congress intended to create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit, whether under § 1983 or under an implied right of action. 536 U.S. at 286-87, 122 S.Ct. at 2277. For the reasons set forth by Magistrate Judge Baxter in her Report and Recommendation, we agree that the Parole Compact manifests no Congressional intent to create a federal right or remedy. Because we discern no intent by Congress to confer a new individual right on parolees like Plaintiff, § 1983 does not supply a viable cause of action for claims premised upon a violation of the Parole Compact. See Gonzaga University, 536 U.S. at 285, 122 S.Ct. at 2276 (Section 1983 merely provides a mechanism for enforcing individual rights secured elsewhere; therefore, one cannot go into court and claim a violation of § 1983 because “ § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything”) (citations omitted). Plaintiff likens the Parole Compact to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (“IADA”), 18 U.S.C.A.App. § 2, which — according to Plaintiff — -has been “routinely held to create federal rights enforceable by the group of individuals its provisions benefit.” (Pl.’s Obj. to Rep. and Recommendation [Doc. No. 31] at p. 4.) The Court has examined Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 121 S.Ct. 2079, 150 L.Ed.2d 188 (2001) and Yellen v. Cooper, 828 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir.1987), both of which are cited by Plaintiff and involved application of the IADA; however, we find these cases to be inapposite to the case at bar and, therefore, not persuasive. In Alabama v. Bozeman, the Supreme Court considered a criminal defendant’s challenge to his underlying state court conviction based on a violation of a provision of the IADA. 533 U.S. at 148-49, 121 S.Ct. 2079. Under Article IV(e) of the IADA, the State of Alabama — having lodged a detainer against Bozeman (a federal prisoner) and secured his presence for purposes of prosecuting state firearms charges — was prohibited from returning Bozeman to federal custody before the state trial was completed. See generally id. at 151-53, 121 S.Ct. 2079. Although the express language of Article IV(e) required the dismissal of Bozeman’s charges with prejudice as a result of the State’s violation, Bozeman had nevertheless been tried and convicted in Alabama state court, the state court having rejected his motion to dismiss the case. See id. The Supreme Court affirmed the Alabama Supreme Court’s ruling dismissing the underlying charges. Id. at 149, 121 S.Ct. 2079. Because the procedural posture of the case involved Bozeman’s challenge to his underlying criminal conviction, the Court had no occasion to discuss whether Congress intended to create any new federal rights or — for that matter — any private right of action under the IADA. Plaintiffs reliance on Yellen is similarly misplaced. In that case, a Colorado state prisoner (Seth Yellen) had been transferred pursuant to Article IV of the IADA to stand trial for armed robbery and related charges in Michigan. Following his conviction on those charges, Yellen later filed a § 1983 claim asserting that his federal rights to due process and equal protection had been violated by virtue of the failure by Colorado officials to inform him of certain pre-transfer rights which were afforded him under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act and extended under the IADA. 828 F.2d at 1473-74. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial judge’s dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that Yel-len had waived his pretransfer rights by requesting a speedy trial on Michigan charges. Id. at 1473-74. However, the Yellen Court did not specifically analyze the IADA, or the creation of statutory rights or remedies thereunder, in fight of the principles set forth in Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66, 96 S.Ct. 2080, 46 L.Ed.2d 26 (1976) and subsequent Supreme Court pronouncements. Moreover, although the plaintiff in Yellen brought suit under § 1983, his underlying complaint was premised upon the violation of federal constitutional — not statutory — rights. Thus, Yellen in no way supports the proposition that Congress intended to confer individual rights to parolees under the Parole Compact. Finally, having reviewed the language of the IADA, the Court finds that statute to be materially distinguishable from the Parole Compact such that no meaningful comparison can be made between the two. While the IADA bespeaks certain rights afforded to prisoners subject to the Act, the Parole Compact speaks only of the obligations among the States. Accordingly, having reviewed the matter de novo, this Court concurs with Magistrate Judge Baxter’s recommendation that no private rights or remedies are afforded Plaintiff under the Parole Compact. Qualified Immunity Plaintiff also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Defendant Wargo is entitled to qualified immunity. In her Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Baxter found that Defendant Wargo is protected by this defense because he carried out the community notification in compliance with a statute that was valid at the time of his conduct. Plaintiff maintains, however, that it is immaterial that Wargo conducted the community notification in accordance with Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law because, according to Plaintiff, at the time that Wargo acted, “clearly established due process and equal protection jurisprudence demonstrated that the acts required by the statute were patently unconstitutional.” (Pl.’s Obj. [Doc. No. 31] at p. 7.) Courts have recognized that when a statute authorizes official conduct which patently violates fundamental constitutional principles, an officer enforcing the statute is not entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir.1994). On the other hand, where an official acts pursuant to a statute that he reasonably believes to be valid and lawful, the official will be immune from liability even if the statute is subsequently found to be unconstitutional. See id. (recognizing the general principle that “where a police officer has probable cause to arrest someone under a statute that a reasonable officer could believe is constitutional, the officer will be immune from liability even if the statute is later held to be unconstitutional”). Thus, the question becomes whether the defendant official acted in accordance with a statute that was patently unconstitutional or whether, to the contrary, the statute was one that a reasonable officer in his position could have believed was lawful and valid. Plaintiff maintains that the contours of his equal protection claim were clearly elucidated as early as 1969 when the Supreme Court decided Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). In Shapiro, the Supreme Court affirmed a series of rulings striking down three statutory provisions that denied welfare assistance to residents of Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania who had resided within those respective jurisdictions less than one year immediately preceding their applications for assistance. Proponents of the statutory waiting-periods had attempted to justify them primarily as a means of protecting the public fisc for the benefit of long-time residents by deterring the influx of indigent newcomers. Id. at 627-28, 89 S.Ct. 1322. Recognizing that the right to travel throughout the United States is a basic constitutional right, the Court observed that the deterrence of indigent immigration could not serve as a justification for the laws because such a purpose would be constitutionally impermissible. See id. at 631, 89 S.Ct. 1322 (“If a law has ‘no other purpose ... than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise .them, then it (is) patently unconstitutional.’ ”) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968)). Thus, according to Plaintiff, Shapiro made it clear that states may not treat recently migrated individuals differently from longstanding residents, especially not for the purpose of deterring their migration. See id. 394 U.S. at 629-30, 89 S.Ct. 1322. We do not agree that Shapiro renders Defendant Wargo’s conduct patently unconstitutional because—as the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation illustrates—the legal analysis of Plaintiffs equal protection claim requires a degree of intellectual gymnastics far beyond a mere face-value reading of Shapiro. The critical determination driving the Magistrate Judge’s equal protection analysis is her finding that the community notification provisions of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law II infringed Plaintiffs fundamental right to engage in interstate travel. We concur with, and adopt, this basic premise with the following modification: the community notification to which Plaintiff was subjected in accordance with Megan’s Law I, as it was applied in this case, violated his fundamental right to travel. It is the abridgement of this fundamental right that triggers strict scrutiny review and thus requires the Defendant to show that the disputed governmental action was narrowly tailored to serve some compelling state interest. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 184, 188-89 (3d Cir.1998). The Magistrate Judge’s determination that Plaintiffs fundamental right to travel was burdened in this case is, in turn, driven largely by the Supreme Court’s decision in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (1999), wherein the Court clarified that the fundamental right to travel encompasses the right of individuals to establish residency within a new state and, upon doing so, to be treated like other citizens of that state. 526 U.S. at 500, 119 S.Ct. 1518. Significantly, though, Saenz was not decided until 1999—well after Defendant Wargo conducted the community notification in this case. Furthermore, there was historically disagreement even within the Supreme Court itself with respect to the appropriate constitutional jurisprudence applicable to claims brought by newly established state citizens, as a comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions in Saenz demonstrates. Although the Saenz majority analyzed the “right to travel” claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed with this approach: ... I cannot see how the right to become a citizen of another State is a necessary “component” of the right to travel, or why the Court tries to marry these separate and distinct rights. A person is no longer “traveling” in any sense of the word when he finishes his journey to a State which he plans to make his home ... The right to travel and the right to become a citizen are distinct, their relationship is not reciprocal, and one is not a “component” of the other.... At most, restrictions on an individual’s right to become a citizen indirectly affect his calculus in deciding whether to exercise his right to travel in the first place, but such an attenuated and uncertain relationship is no ground for folding one right into the other. 526 U.S. at 513-14, 119 S.Ct. 1518 (Rehnquist, Chief J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the fundamental proposition that a “citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State.” Id. (Rehnquist, Chief J., dissenting) (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 16 Wall. 36, 80, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1872)). However, Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that these claims should be analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause in terms of whether they impermissibly “penalize” individuals for having exercised their right to travel. Id. at 514-15, 119 S.Ct. 1518. Thus, while the majority opinion in Saenz is now binding precedent, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent illustrates that there has been disagreement even as to which constitutional provisions are implicated by the type of “right to travel” claim presented in this case. This debate is not without significance because, under the Equal Protection line of cases including Shapiro, courts have not ■been uniform in applying strict scrutiny in “right to travel” cases. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, the Supreme Court’s traditional approach had been to analyze, under equal protection principles, whether certain state imposed restrictions “amounted to ‘deprivations of very important benefits and rights’ that operated to indirectly ‘penalize the right to travel.’” 526 U.S. at 515, 119 S.Ct. 1518 (citing Attorney General of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 907, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986) (plurality opinion)). Thus, in some cases, the restriction of certain benefits or services has been deemed a “penalty” to newly migrated state residents, thereby triggering a strict scrutiny review. See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (striking down state imposed 1-year residency requirement as a prerequisite to receiving welfare benefits); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (striking down state law which conditioned the right to vote in state elections on 1-year residency requirement); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 280-83, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974) (1-year county residency requirement which was prerequisite for entitlement to nonemer-gency hospitalization or emergency care struck down). “In other cases,” however, “the Court [has] recognized that laws dividing new and old residents had little to do with the right to travel and merely triggered an inquiry into whether the resulting classification rationally furthered a legitimate government purpose.” 526 U.S. at 515, 119 S.Ct. 1518 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60, n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982); Hooper v. Bernalillo Cty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618, 105 S.Ct. 2862, 86 L.Ed.2d 487 (1985)). This Circuit has similarly acknowledged the lack of uniformity in the Supreme Court’s approach to “right to travel” cases prior to Saenz. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir.1998) (“Regrettably ... the law with respect to the constitutional implications of the right to travel is unsettled and in need of clarification. The Court has at times subjected durational residence laws that impinge on the right to travel to strict scrutiny ... and at other times to what appears to be some form of a heightened rational basis test.”) (internal and concluding citations omitted). The equal protection analysis in this case is further complicated by Plaintiffs status as a convicted parolee. Neither Shapiro nor Saenz (nor any of the cases analyzed therein) involve challenges to a state law that implícate a parolee’s right to travel. In fact, as a general proposition, convicted persons (including parolees) enjoy no fundamental right to travel. See Bagley v. Harvey, 718 F.2d 921, 924 (9th Cir.1983); Alonzo v. Rozanski, 808 F.2d 637 (7th Cir.1986). While the Magistrate Judge ultimately reasoned that Plaintiffs right to travel was revived by virtue of his approved parole transfer-a conclusion which this Court is willing to accept-we have located no case law which sheds specific light on the extent to which a parolee’s constitutional right to travel is revived by operation of transfers accepted under the Parole Compact. Nor have we located any cases analyzing the community notification provisions of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law I or II in the context of an equal protection challenge raised by an out-of-state sexual offender. In addition, once one accepts the proposition that Plaintiff did have a “revived” constitutional right to travel—and that Wargo’s community notification subjected Plaintiff to disparate treatment (as compared to in-state sexual offenders) in a manner which burdened that right—the inquiry still is not over. It then becomes necessary to consider whether the government has a compelling purpose justifying the disparate treatment and whether the classification is narrowly drawn to achieve that purpose. To an officer acting under instructions to enforce a facially valid law, it is not always self-evident whether his application of the law would pass or fail a strict scrutiny review. This is especially true given the fact that Megan’s Law I required the Parole Board to determine whether community notification was appropriate in Plaintiffs case. A reasonable officer in Defendant Wargo’s position could well believe that his conduct in carrying out the Parole Board’s determination did not offend equal protection principles. We likewise conclude that Defendant Wargo is entitled to qualified immunity as it relates to Plaintiffs due process claim. Although the Pennsylvania Constitution and case law clearly acknowledge reputation as among those fundamental interests protected by state due process principles, see Pa. Const. Art. I, § 11; Simon v. Commonwealth, 659 A.2d 631, 637 (Pa.Cmwlth 1995), it was not until Commonwealth v. Halye, 719 A.2d 763 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) that a Pennsylvania appellate court specifically addressed constitutional due process principles in the context of the community notification provisions of Megan’s Law. In Halye, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9794 (West 1998) violated federal due process principles by impermissi-bly shifting to the defendant the burden of rebutting his status as a sexually violent predator, and it struck down all provisions of Megan’s Law I relating to “sexually violent predators.” 719 A.2d at 768. Among the court’s concerns was the fact that, under Megan’s Law I, persons designated “sexually violent offenders” were significantly impacted in their ability to maintain a private life by virtue of the community notification procedures, and they also faced significantly enhanced penalties, including a mandatory maximum sentencing requirement of life imprisonment. Id. The latter concern did not apply to out-of-state sexual offenders like Plaintiff, since out-of-state sex offenders were not subjected to the mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment. In sum, not only was Halye decided after the date of Defendant Wargo’s conduct, but it involves concerns about certain penalties that did not apply in Plaintiffs case. Plaintiff, however, refers us to E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir.1997), for the proposition that, as of 1997, it was clearly established that “subjecting an individual to community notification without first providing procedural safeguards is unconstitutional.” (Pl.’s Obj. at p. 8.) In E.B. the Third Circuit held that the notification provisions of New Jersey’s Megan’s Law require the state to justify the relevant classification and notification plan by clear and convincing evidence. 119 F.3d at 1081. Thus, E.B. concerned the Third Circuit’s interpretation of an entirely different Megan’s Law statute as promulgated by the New Jersey legislature. Instrumental in the court’s due process analysis was its conclusion that the New Jersey State Constitution afforded a constitutional liberty interest in privacy deserving of due process protection, see 119 F.3d at 1105 — an issue similar to, but analytically distinct from, that which we face here. This Court, therefore, is not persuaded that E.B. renders Defendant Wargo’s conduct objectively unreasonable. Moreover, E.B. (like Halye) did not address the unique situation posed by Plaintiffs status as an out-of-state sexual offender. At the time that Defendant Wargo carried out the community notification regarding Plaintiff, Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law I gave the Commonwealth parole board the discretion to determine whether or not an out-of-state sexual offender whose parole was being transferred to Pennsylvania should be subject to community notification. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9795(c) (West 1998). As a practical matter, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole had a policy of requiring community notification for all such out-of-state parolees; however, the statute itself did not mandate community notification in these situations, nor did it specifically require or prohibit any particular due process relative to community notification for out-of-state parolees. Defendant Wargo was not in a position to know what specific process, if any, had been afforded in connection with the Parole Board’s determination. Simply stated, a reasonable officer in Defendant Wargo’s position would not necessarily have known that he was assisting in the deprivation of Plaintiffs due process rights simply by carrying out the public notification mandated by the Pennsylvania Parole Board. Generally speaking, when a statute or ordinance authorizes particular conduct, courts have considered this factor to be one which militates in favor of the conclusion that a reasonable official would find the conduct lawful. Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1209 (citing cases). Here, the relevant provision of Megan’s Law I gave the Pennsylvania Parole Board discretion to determine whether public notification of Plaintiffs criminal history was in the best interest of public safety. Pursuant to that provision and its own policy, the Parole Board directed the State Police to engage in community notification in Plaintiffs case. Defendant Wargo was then required to enforce this specific mandate. A reasonable officer in Wargo’s position could have believed his own participation to be not only lawful, but required by law. “In the end, ... an officer who reasonably relies on the legislature’s determination that a statute is constitutional should be shielded from personal liability.” See Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1210. We think this case is no exception. While we ultimately agree with Magistrate Judge Baxter’s recommendation that Plaintiff has established a violation of both his equal protection and due process rights, the legal analysis that brings us to that conclusion is not so transparent as to suggest a patent constitutional defect in the community notification procedures carried out here—particularly when those procedures are viewed in the light of then-existing law. The Court therefore finds that Defendant Wargo is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity in this case. Prayer for Injunctive Relief Finally, Plaintiff asserts that, even if the Court grants qualified immunity to Defendant, there are extant claims for declaratory and injunctive relief which must remain open. In his pro se complaint, Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment “that the [DJefendant’s acts, policies, and practices described herein violate the Plaintiffs rights under the U.S. Constitution.” (Pl.’s Compl. [Doc. No. 7] at p. 3.) Plaintiff also requested injunctive relief that: a. requires the Pa. State Police, including Defendant Wargo[,] to clarify to the Oil City Police, media, director of day care, school officials, neighbors or the Plaintiff, and anyone else that was misinformed that: The Plaintiff is not a dangerous child molester, nor a sexual[ly] violent predator, nor sentenced under Megan's law, nor on a life time of parole, no[r] has any court of law deemed the Plaintiff to be any of these; b. prohibits the defendant, agents and employee’s [sic], and all other person’s [sic] in active concert and participation with him from harassing, threatening, punishing, or retaliating in any way against the Plaintiff because he filed this action. (See id. at p. 4.) Insofar as Plaintiffs request for declaratory relief is concerned, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, as adopted by this Court, functionally serves as a declaration that the community notification carried out in this case violated Plaintiffs federal equal protection and due process rights. The Court’s Order herein effectively closes that aspect of the case, as no purpose is served by additional litigation; the essential issues have been fully litigated and decided. With regard to Plaintiffs request for injunctive relief, we conclude that such relief is inappropriate here. In-junctive relief in any form is an “extraordinary remedy” that should be granted only in “limited circumstances.” AT & T v. Winback and Conserve Prog. Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1426-27 (3d Cir.1994) (citations omitted). The test for granting a permanent injunction is the same as the test for granting a preliminary injunction. United States v. Miami University, 91 F.Supp.2d 1132 (S.D.Ohio 2000), aff'd, 294 F.3d 797 (6th Cir.2002). In making a determination on a preliminary injunction, a district court must consider: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the extent of irreparable injury from the alleged misconduct; (3) the extent of irreparable harm to the defendant if the injunction issues, and (4) the effect on public interest. Clean Ocean Action v. York, 57 F.3d 328, 331 (3d Cir.1995). The standard applicable to permanent injunctions differs only in that the plaintiff must show actual success on the merits rather than a mere likelihood of success. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n. 12, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (citing Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 392, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981)). Irreparable injury is established by showing that the plaintiff will suffer harm that “cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following . trial.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir.1989) (“The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.”). The plaintiff bears this burden of making a “clear showing of immediate irreparable injury,” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir.1989) (citation omitted), which is more than merely serious or substantial harm. ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir.1987). The case law provides some assistance in determining that injury which is irreparable under this standard: “The word irreparable connotes ‘that which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down again, atoned for ... Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir.1994) (citation omitted). Additionally, “the claimed injury cannot merely be possible, speculative or remote.” Dice v. Clinicorp, Inc., 887 F.Supp. 803, 809 (W.D.Pa.1995). “Establishing a risk of irreparable harm is not enough.” Id. (citing ECRI, 809 F.2d at 226). Plaintiffs pro se prayer for injunctive relief is inappropriately defined. There is simply no possibility of future irreparable injury as Plaintiffs injury was already complete when this action was filed. Additionally, Plaintiff no longer resides in the Oil City area. Thus, Plaintiff is not entitled to an injunctive order directing Defendant Wargo to clarify the information made public in 1997 as part of the community notification process. Prohibiting Defendant from retaliating against Plaintiff for the filing of this action is also not appropriate here as an injunction cannot be issued “simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury,” Ademo, 40 F.3d at 655, and there is nothing to indicate that this Plaintiff will ever come into contact with this Defendant again. Because Plaintiff cannot show irreparable injury (or the existence of future harm) Plaintiffs request for a permanent injunction is denied. THEREFORE, this_day of January, 2003, following a de novo review of the pleadings and record in this case, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Baxter recommending that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted is adopted as the opinion of this Court to the extent set forth herein. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as discussed in the body of this Memorandum Order, Plaintiffs prayer for injunctive relief is denied and Plaintiffs prayer for declaratory judgment is granted. MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION BAXTER, United States Magistrate Judge. I RECOMMENDATION It is respectfully recommended that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [Document # 17] be granted. II REPORT Plaintiff is an out-of-state sexual offender who transferred his parole to Pennsylvania. Plaintiff brings this § 1988 action challenging his subjection to the community notification provisions of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law. Since the institution of this action, Plaintiff has been re-incarcerated in Maryland on an unrelated parole violation. In his complaint, filed pro se, Plaintiff alleges: On or about 12-8-97, Defendant Wargo carried out a public notification under Megan’s Law which was initiated by a David Rockwell of the Pa. Parole Board. Defendant Wargo handed out posters to the plaintiffs neighbors, a day care center, and local schools. Defendant War-go misinformed the public, media, and Oil City Police of the following: A. That the Plaintiff is a dangerous child molester B. That the plaintiff is sentenced under Megan’s Law C. That the Plaintiff was deemed by a court of law to be a sexual violent predator. D. That the Plaintiff is on a life time of parole E. That all of this information is a matter of public record, and F. That the Plaintiff has no rights. The facts are that the Plaintiff is none of the above, nor has any court of law ever deemed the Plaintiff to be any of these. Document # 7, unnumbered page 2. The only Defendant named in this action is Officer David Wargo, one of two state troopers who carried out the community notification. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Wargo’s actions violate his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as compensatory damages. While still acting pro se, Plaintiff filed a pre-trial narrative claiming his rights were violated under the Ex Post Facto clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Document # 14. Defendant has moved for summary judgment claiming that Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process have not been violated and that alternatively, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Document # 17. In the motion for summary judgment, Defendant does not address Plaintiffs Fourth, Fifth, Sixth or Eighth Amendment claims, or the Ex Post Facto and Privileges and Immunities claims. Plaintiff, through his newly obtained counsel, filed a brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, raising for the first time the issue of the Interstate Compact on Parole and Probation (and Doe v. Ward, 124 F.Supp.2d 900 (W.D.Pa. 2000), which held that the community notification provisions of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law violate the Interstate Compact). Defendant has not filed a reply to the opposition brief. On August 5, 2002, this Court heard oral argument from the parties on the pending motion for summary judgment. A. Factual Background In December of 1984, Plaintiff was convicted in Maryland of rape in the second degree and sentenced to twenty years in prison. In January of 1995 (after serving 10/6 years), Plaintiff was paroled on the Maryland charge. The terms of his Maryland parole did not require that he be subjected to community notification. Plaintiff was required to serve an additional (and unrelated) twenty-two month sentence and was finally released from custody on November 28,1996. In January of 1995, Plaintiff was permitted to transfer his parole to Pennsylvania (where his mother resides), pursuant to the Interstate Compact on Probation and Parole. The day after his eventual release Plaintiff complied with the registration requirements of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law and reported his current address and telephone number to law enforcement officials. Between November 1996 and April 1997, Plaintiff obtained employment, property, a vehicle, and industrial sewing equipment in an effort to start an upholstery shop by January of 1998. In his. pre-trial narrative statement, Plaintiff claims that between April of 1997 and December of 1997, he completed psychological counseling and was determined by the counselor not to be a sexually violent predator. On December 8, 1997, approximately 13 months after his release, Defendant Wargo carried out a community notification by distributing fliers to members of the community and school officials in Plaintiffs hometown, which stated that Plaintiff was a Megan’s Law sexual offender subject to community notification under the statutory provisions governing sexually violent offenders. The fliers contained Plaintiffs name, address and photo. B. Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law The statute sets forth the purpose of the registration of sexual offenders: It is hereby declared to be the intention of the General Assembly to protect the safety and general welfare of the people of this Commonwealth by providing for registration and community notification regarding sexually violent predators who are about to be released from custody and will live in or near their neighborhood. 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 9791(b) (emphasis added). To accomplish this goal, the current version of the law creates two separate levels of notification: 1) registration with the local law enforcement agencies and 2) community notification. This case revolves around the community notification provision as applied to in-state offenders and out-of-state offenders. The community notification provisions apply only to in-state offenders adjudicated as “sexually violent predators” and all out-of-state offenders (regardless of their offense) who have transferred their probation to the Commonwealth. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9798 and 61 Pa.Cons.Stat. Ann. § 331.33(d)(3)(i). The community notification is carried out by the chief law enforcement officer of the area through fliers that contain the offender’s photo, name, address and some indication that he is a Megan’s Law offender. Prior to ordering community notification of an in-state offender, the Act provides a comprehensive assessment procedure to determine whether the offender is a sexually violent predator. First, the State Sexual Offenders Board evaluates the in-state of fender. The Board reviews the nature of the offense, the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender’s character and history. The Board submits a written report containing its assessment to the district attorney. If upon reviewing the Board’s assessment, the district attorney believes community notification is warranted, he must file a praecipe with the Court of Common Pleas, request a hearing, and serve the praecipe and the Board’s report on defense counsel. An adversarial hearing, with full trial procedures, is held to determine whether the offender is a sexually violent predator. 9795.4(e). At this hearing, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the offender is a “sexually violent predator.” The offender has a right to be heard, and to call and cross-examine witnesses, including expert witnesses. He has a right to counsel, with counsel appointed if he cannot afford a private attorney. By contrast, Megan’s Law requires that all out-of-state offenders (who transfer parole to Pennsylvania) be subject to the community notification provisions, regardless of their offense of conviction or their potential dangerousness to the community. The Act provides that any “individual ... who is paroled to the Commonwealth pursuant to the interstate compact or the supervision of parolees and probationers shall, in addition to the [registration] requirements. .., be subject to the requirements of section 33 of the act ... ”. 9795.4(e)(2). The referenced provision provides that the parolee must “submit to mandatory registration and public notification of all current addresses.” 331.33(d) (3) (i). There is no procedural mechanism by which an out-of-state offender is determined to pose a danger to the community, thereby triggering the community notification provisions. While an in-state offender is given the benefit of adjudicatory process to determine if he will be subject to community notification, the out-of-state offender who transfers his parole automatically triggers the community notification provisions. C. Standard of Review Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is an assertion that Plaintiffs claims are legally insufficient. Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff could not offer facts in support of his claim; nor does Defendant offer evidence to dispute facts alleged by Plaintiff. The only evidence offered by Defendant is his own declaration asserting that he acted in good faith in carrying out the community notification. Defendant’s declaration only goes to the defense of qualified immunity and is irrelevant to the purely legal questions of whether Plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated and whether the community notification requirements for out-of-state offenders violate the Interstate Compact of Parole and Probation. At the oral argument, the parties agreed that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is more properly a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and this Court will review it as such. See Document # 28, Transcript, pages 21 and 48. A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is treated using the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Eisen v. Temple University, 2002 WL 1565284 (E.D.Pa. June 28, 2002), citing Turbe v. Government of Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir.1991). Dismissal is warranted only if it appears beyond doubt that the party asserting the claim “can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitled him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 796 (3d Cir.2001). A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338(1989); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The motion cannot be granted unless the court is satisfied “that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will prevail at the end but only whether he should be entitled to offer evidence to support his claim. Neitzke; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a pleading must set forth a claim for relief which contains a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Therefore, in order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must set forth sufficient information to suggest that there is some recognized legal theory upon which relief can be granted. Pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears “ ‘beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’ ” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should be done so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant’s unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); Nicholson v. U.S., 141 F.2d 552, 554 (3d Cir.1969)(petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”); U.S. v. Rodney, 956 F.2d 295 (D.C.Cir.1992); Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir.1991). Plaintiff was a pro se litigant when this action was filed, the complaint will be reviewed with some degree of leniency. D. Interstate Compact on Probation and Parole Analysis 1. Applicability Plaintiff has advanced several constitutional arguments in support of his position. Although not raised in either the complaint or in Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, this Court must first address the issue of the Parole Compact. This Court has a well-established duty “to avoid passing upon a constitutional question if the case may be disposed of on some other ground.” Spicer v. Hilton, 618 F.2d 232, 239 (3d Cir.1980). The Third Circuit has unequivocally stated that the compulsion to avoid premature constitutional decisions is so strong that this court has previously held that it supersedes even our customary concern with orderly presentation on the issues. That is also true where, as here, the non-constitutional basis for the decision was [not] raised in the pleadings... Id. at 240-241 (“The Supreme Court has on several occasions even applied the doctrine when the non-constitutional ground was not presented by the parties but was first noticed by the Court itself.”). In the Opposition Brief to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs counsel raised the issue of the inconsistencies between the Pennsylvania statute and the Interstate Compact on Parole and Probation for the first time. At the hearing on this motion, Defendant agreed that the Parole Compact issue must be addressed at the outset. Document # 28. 2. Jurisdiction Before this Court may consider the Interstate Compact issue, it must initially determine whether the Compact is a state or federal law. This question is jurisdic-tionally determinative. While “the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue of whether the interstate parole compact is federal law,” the Honorable Robert Cind-rich of this district court has held that the Interstate Compact on Probation and Parole is both a state and federal law. Doe v. Ward, 124 F.Supp.2d 900, 910 (W.D.Pa.2000). We agree with Judge Cindrich’s jurisdictional analysis: The [Supreme] Court explained in Cuyler [v. Adams 449 U.S. 433, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981) ] that an interstate compact is transformed into federal law when 1) it falls within the scope of the Constitution’s Compact Clause, 2) it has received congressional consent, and 3) its subject matter is appropriate for congressional legislation. The interstate compact satisfies each of these conditions. First the need to assert cross-border control of people subject to the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system, whether individuals with detainers or parolees, is a matter that falls within the scope of the Constitution’s Compact Clause. Second, the interstate parole compact has received congressional consent. In fact, the legislative source of the congressional consent is the same for both the IAD [Interstate Agreement on Detainers- — the subject of Cuyler] and the interstate parole compact. Lastly, the subject matter is appropriate for congressional legislation, as the need for interstate co-operation to monitor and control parolees is the same as it is for inmates with detainers. Accordingly, we hold that the Parole Compact, as a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact, is a federal law as well as state law. We further hold, therefore, that this court has subject matter jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Parole Compact. Doe, 12