Full opinion text
DECISION AND ORDER LARIMER, District Judge. INTRODUCTION “Parvis e glandibus ' quercus “tall oaks from little acorns grow.” Like the proverbial oak tree, this case has grown from a simple employment dispute over one teacher’s interschool transfer, into a gargantuan, broad-based campaign against an entire school system. Although an oak tree, as a provider of shade and a symbol of strength, might seem an inapt simile for this torturous case, it is fitting in another sense as well, for the mountains of paper that have been expended in this litigation probably amount to a good-sized tree’s worth. It is more than unfortunate that what should have been a straightforward case involving a discrete set of facts and a few individuals has been transformed into a vehicle by which plaintiff Donald Murphy (“Murphy”) and his attorney have sought to launch a virtual crusade, involving nearly every aspect of plaintiffs employment (and a good many things that have nothing at all to do with plaintiff or his employment), against his employer, the Rochester City School District (“RCSD” or “the District”), plaintiffs labor union, and over two dozen individuals, thereby necessitating the expenditure of untold resources by the parties, their attorneys, and this Court. This action is part of a group of cases against the Rochester City School District and other defendants, filed by the same attorney, alleging a host of civil rights violations and other unlawful acts of every stripe against the plaintiffs, all of whom are or were teachers employed by the RCSD. Several of those actions have been dismissed after the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. See Seils v. RCSD, 192 F.Supp.2d 100 (W.D.N.Y.2002), and Bliss v. RCSD, 196 F.Supp.2d 314 (W.D.N.Y.2002) (dismissing three consolidated cases). Defendants have moved for summary judgment in this action as well, and plaintiff has moved for “partial” summary judgment on the issue of liability, and for injunctive relief. Defendants’ motions are granted and the complaint is dismissed. BACKGROUND This action in some ways relates to another action, Murphy v. Board of Educ. of RCSD, 93-CV-6158L, filed a decade ago by plaintiff in 1993. In that action, plaintiff, a teacher in the RCSD, sued the District, the Rochester Teachers Association (“RTA”), and six individuals, alleging various violations of his civil rights, as well as a number of claims under New York law, in connection with certain events that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Court dismissed that action in December 1997 after being informed by the parties that the case had settled. In October 1999, however, plaintiff filed a motion seeking to vacate the Court’s dismissal order and to compel defendants to comply with the settlement agreement. In addition, plaintiff sought to file a “supplemental” complaint, and add additional parties. The Court denied that motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on December 16, 1999, on the grounds that the action was a contract dispute between two residents of New York and, therefore, there was no diversity or other basis for federal jurisdiction, stating that “[i]f plaintiff wishes to file a new action in federal court, he may do so assuming that he has the requisite federal jurisdiction and assuming such a complaint does not breach the terms of the settlement agreement between the parties.” Murphy v. Board of Educ. of RCSD, 79 F.Supp.2d 239, 242 (W.D.N.Y.1999). Plaintiff then filed this action on January 24, 2000. In addition to the RCSD and the RTA, plaintiff has also sued the Board of Education of the RCSD (“the Board”), the individual members of the Board (nine of whom are named in the complaint), and nineteen other individuals who either are or were employed by the RCSD or the RTA. The amended complaint, which was filed on January 27, 2000, asserts twelve causes of action, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3); § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law (“HRL”), Exec. L. § 796; the New York Civil Rights Law (“CRL”); and several other theories under New York common law and the New York Constitution. Plaintiff seeks a sweeping array of various forms of relief, including: a declaratory judgment; injunctive relief, together with a “mechanism for the enforcement of the injunctions” based upon a detañed plan to be drafted by defendants showing precisely how they wül cease their alleged discrimination against plaintiff; back pay, front pay, and benefits; a whopping $1.75 million in “compensatory” damages; punitive damages; pre- and post-judgment interest; and attorney’s fees and costs. DISCUSSION I. Summary Judgment — General Standards In Discrimination Cases The standard for deciding summary judgment motions is well established. Rule 56(c) provides that a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings and supplemental evidentiary materials “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Under the rule, the burden is on the moving party to inform the Court of the basis for its motion and to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After the moving party has carried its burden, the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). “[T]he non-moving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. When reviewing the record to determine whether a rational fact-finder could find for the non-moving party, however, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Maguire v. Citicorp Retail Services, Inc., 147 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir.1998). The general principles underlying a motion for summary judgment fully apply to discrimination actions. Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir.2000), petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3680 (Apr. 17, 2003). Although courts are understandably cautious about granting summary judgment in cases where motive, intent or state of mind is at issue, Montana v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n of Rochester, 869 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir.1989); Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1114 (2d Cir.1988), “the salutary purposes of summary judgment-avoiding protracted, expensive and harassing trials-apply no less to discrimination cases than to ... other areas of litigation.” Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 91, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985); see also Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir.) (“It is now beyond cavü that summary judgment may be appropriate even in the fact-intensive context of discrimination cases”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 993, 122 S.Ct. 460, 151 L.Ed.2d 378 (2001); Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 40 (2d Cir.1994) (“summary judgment remains avaüable to reject discrimination claims in cases lacking genuine issues of material fact”). Consequently, once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party in a discrimination action must come forward with evidence upon which a rational fact-finder could return a verdict in his favor. For a plaintiff in a discrimination case to survive a motion for summary judgment, he must do more than present “conclusory allegations of discrimination,” Meiri, 759 F.2d at 998; he must offer “concrete particulars” to substantiate his claim. Id. II. Plaintiff’s Discrimination Claims Against the RCSD A. Claims Based on Plaintiff’s Transfers, Assignments, Etc. Plaintiff, a white male born in 1956, alleges that defendants have discriminated against him on account of his “race, and/or sex, and/or age, and/or national origin, and/or disability .... ” Amended Complaint ¶ 45. It is difficult to say precisely how he alleges that defendants have done so, however, because in setting forth his allegations of discrimination plaintiff has managed to be simultaneously prolix and vague. Plaintiff has essentially catalogued every employment-related grievance (of which there are many) from December 31, 1997 to the time of the filing of the complaint and beyond, and alleged in concluso-ry fashion that these resulted from defendants’ “policy, pattern, practice, custom and usage” of discriminating against whites, males, older employees, etc. Since plaintiffs papers for the most part do not differentiate between these claims, they will be discussed collectively. I also note that while plaintiff alleges all these various types of discrimination, some of them (such as age discrimination) receive scant, or no, mention in plaintiffs motion papers. This suggests that such claims are little more than boilerplate allegations that bear little or no relation to the facts of this case. This tack is also indicative of the scattershot approach taken by plaintiff. No instance of perceived ill treatment is too trivial to be listed among the alleged violations of-plaintiffs rights, and every one of those instances is ascribed to discrimination, which in turn is asserted, in sweeping and conclusory fashion, to be based on plaintiffs membership in virtually every class protected by law: his sex, race, national origin, age, and alleged disability. This alone does not mean, of course, that plaintiffs allegations are untrue. I suppose that it is possible that plaintiff has been unfortunate enough to be employed in a school district where virtually everyone in a position of authority, including his own union leaders, is extraordinarily prejudiced, against white people, men, older persons, and the disabled, not to mention persons of certain national origins. It is even possible that defendants harbor such prejudices notwithstanding the fact that many of them fall into these very categories. To survive summary judgment, however, plaintiff must present some evidence of such discrimination. He has failed to do so and, therefore, the complaint must be dismissed. Plaintiffs discrimination claims are subject to the well-known burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and its progeny. First, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. See Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1228, 117 S.Ct. 1819, 137 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1997). In order to establish a prima facie case, plaintiff must show: (1) that he belongs to a protected class; (2) that he is qualified for his position; (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the surrounding circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of his membership in that class. Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 42; Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37. If the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, “the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, clear, specific and non-discriminatory reason” for the adverse action. Holt, 95 F.3d at 129. If the defendant satisfies this burden of production, the plaintiff has the ultimate burden to prove that the employer’s reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. See id. “In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, at the third step plaintiff must put forth adequate evidence to support a rational finding that the legitimate non-discriminatory reasons proffered by the employer were false, and that more likely than not the employee’s ... [membership in a protected class] was the real reason” for the adverse action. Id. Although I am not convinced that plaintiff has even made out a prima facie case of discrimination, because he has not alleged “surrounding circumstances givfing] rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of his membership” in a protected class, I will assume arguendo that he has done so, since defendants have proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their actions. See United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) (“Where the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant”); Wado v. Xerox Corp., 991 F.Supp. 174, 187 (W.D.N.Y.1998) (where defendant proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for plaintiffs’ terminations, court would “assume that [each plaintiff] ha[d] made out a prima facie case, and proceed to consider whether the plaintiff ha[d] presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact about whether Xerox’s proffered reason [wa]s a pretext for discrimination”), aff'd, 196 F.3d 358 (2d Cir.1999). Because defendants have proffered such reasons (which will be discussed in more detail below), however, the burden is on plaintiff to come forward with sufficient evidence to give rise to an issue of fact about whether defendants’ proffered reasons are pretextual. Plaintiff has failed utterly to meet that burden. Many of his allegations concerning alleged discrimination do not even involve plaintiff directly. Instead, plaintiff goes on at length about alleged systemic (mostly race) discrimination throughout the RCSD, without relating these allegations to any action taken against plaintiff. For example, plaintiff asserts that “RCSD personnel have instructed that only RCSD students 'of color’ be given invitations to participate in the RCSD’s PRISM Program,” Plaintiffs Rule 56 Statement ¶ 536 (emphasis added), which is a program intended to encourage students to pursue careers in medicine. In addition, as in Bliss, plaintiff devotes considerable discussion to the District’s alleged use of a methodology known as the “Singleton formula” in the hiring, placement and transfer of employees, but he proffers no evidence that he was in any way affected by the use of this formula. See Bliss, 196 F.Supp.2d at 327 (noting that plaintiff in that action “does not allege that she was adversely impacted by the application of such formula within any of the last eleven years prior to the commencement of this action”). As both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court have stated, however, “at an irreducible minimum, Article III requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.” Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc., v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 382 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff therefore lacks standing to challenge the alleged use of the Singleton formula. Similarly, Murphy’s complaints about the PRISM Program that affects students is irrelevant since it does not affect him. This is not to say that evidence of discrimination against others can never be relevant to an individual’s discrimination claim, but at some point there must be some logical connection drawn between that other discrimination and the alleged discrimination against the plaintiff. As I stated in Seils, plaintiffs allegations about racial discrimination within the RCSD “relate to matters occurring in other places, at other times, sometimes years previously and involving matters wholly unrelated to the claims at issue here.” Seils, 192 F.Supp.2d at 115-16. Equally unavailing is plaintiffs attempt to use “statistical” evidence to bolster his claim. Plaintiff cites the results of a study published by the Eric Clearinghouse on Teaching and Teacher Education, showing that in 1990-91, 9.2% of public school teachers in the United States were Black/African American, and 3.1% were Hispanic. Plaintiffs Rule 56 Statement, Ex. 241. Plaintiff also states that a review of the 2000 and 2001 yearbooks from Benjamin Franklin High School (“Franklin”) (where plaintiff currently teaches) indicates that “[t]he new full time hires and transfers into the Franklin Career Academy are predominantly minorities' — 9 out of 15 persons,” or 60%. Plaintiffs Rule 56 Statement ¶ 596. Plaintiff then argues that the disparity between that 60% figure and the 12% figure reported in the Eric Clearinghouse study “reflect[s] an ongoing pattern, practice, custom and usage of the RCSD and the RTA hiring and placing teachers by race or national origin.” Plaintiffs Rule 56 Statement ¶ 597. That plaintiff could even make such an argument is little short of astonishing. To compare the results of a 1991 nationwide study with a sampling of fifteen teachers taken from a high school yearbook ten years later is absurd enough. See Mayor of City of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 621, 94 S.Ct. 1323, 39 L.Ed.2d 630 (1974) (statistics regarding racial composition of thirteen-member school board nominating panel were meaningless); Coleman v. Prudential Relocation, 975 F.Supp. 234, 240 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (statistical evidence about reduction in force in which nine out of nineteen employees were terminated was meaningless due to small number of people involved). With no knowledge of the circumstances relating to the hiring or placement of those fifteen persons, however (such as who else applied for their positions), this “evidence” is probative of nothing whatsoever. To the extent that plaintiff does discuss his own individual circumstances, his claim also fails for the simple reason that he has not presented evidence that would support a finding that he suffered any adverse employment action, under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 42. First, most of the acts of which plaintiff complains cannot reasonably be considered adverse for purposes of a discrimination claim. Plaintiffs major source of discontent appears to be his various transfers to and from certain schools, particularly his transfers to Thomas Jefferson Middle School (“Jefferson”), where plaintiff taught during several different periods of time. These various transfers and assignments over the years cannot be considered “adverse,” however. They may not have been to plaintiffs liking, but more than that is required. See Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 771 n. 8 (5th Cir.2001) (“the focus is on the objective qualities of the positions, rather than an employee’s subjective preference for one position over another. That subjective preference, alone, is an insufficient basis for finding an adverse employment action”); Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Florida, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir.2001) (“the employee’s subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer’s action is not controlling; the employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances”); Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C.Cir.1999) (“Mere idiosyncra-cies of personal preference are not sufficient to state an injury”); Doe v. Dekalb County Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir.1998) (finding “no case, in [the 11th] or any other circuit, in which a court explicitly relied on the subjective preferences of a plaintiff to hold that plaintiff had suffered an adverse employment action”); Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir.1996) (“not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action”); Flaherty v. Gas Research Institute, 31 F.3d 451, 456 (7th Cir.1994) (a “bruised ego” is not enough). As the Seventh Circuit has stated: Obviously a purely lateral transfer, that is, a transfer that does not involve a demotion in form or substance, cannot rise to the level of a materially adverse employment action. A transfer involving no reduction in pay and no more than a minor change in working conditions will not do, either. Otherwise every trivial personnel action that an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, already staggering under an avalanche of filings too heavy for it to cope with, would be crushed, and serious complaints would be lost among the trivial. Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir.1996) (cited with approval in Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 641 (2d Cir.2000)). If ever there was a case of a “chip-on-the-shoulder” plaintiff, this is it. To be adverse, an employment action must involve the deprivation of “some ‘tangible job benefits’ such as ‘compensation, terms, conditions or privileges’ of employment.’ ” Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1213, 114 S.Ct. 2693, 129 L.Ed.2d 824 (1994)). Adverse employment actions are considered material if they are “of such quality or quantity that a reasonable employee would find the conditions of her employment altered for the worse.” Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 997, 118 S.Ct. 563, 139 L.Ed.2d 404 (1997). Here, plaintiff has failed to present any evidence, aside from his own personal preferences, showing that any of his transfers or reassignments could be considered adverse under these standards. While I recognize that a transfer may constitute an adverse action under some circumstances, such as where it “results in a change in responsibilities so significant as to constitute a setback to the plaintiffs career,” Galabya, 202 F.3d at 641, no such circumstances exist here. Plaintiff asserts that his displacement from Franklin caused him to lose a number of committee posts, such as memberships on Franklin’s School-Based Planning Team, the Technology Committee, and the Building Committee, and his position as yearbook advis- or, but these were simply ancillary to his employment at Franklin. Plaintiffs “loss” of those positions was merely an inevitable consequence of his reassignment. It is a given that if an employee is transferred from one place of employment to another, those responsibilities that are inherently and inextricably tied to the former place of employment cannot be transferred with him. It is unremarkable, for example, that plaintiff was no longer the yearbook advis- or at Franklin after he was transferred elsewhere. That does not mean that he suffered some loss amounting to an adverse action; it was, instead, simply a necessary corollary of his transfer. Although plaintiff claims that his removal from Franklin “has been devastating to [him] and [his] career,” Plaintiffs Aff. ¶ 125, he has not presented facts to support that assertion, or to rebut the District’s contention that plaintiffs transfers did not result in any change in his job description, days or hours of employment, duties, salary or benefits, or opportunities for promotion. Evangelista Aff. ¶¶ 59-60. Plaintiff may have been subjectively “devastated]” by his transfer, but as explained, that is not sufficient to state a claim. “[T]he plaintiff must show that the transfer created a ‘materially significant disadvantage.’ ” Id. (quoting Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir.1994)). Plaintiff has failed to do so. There is one action taken toward plaintiff that could be considered adverse: he was suspended, with pay, on October 1, 1998, and did not teach for the rest of that academic year. The suspension occurred after Jefferson’s then-Acting Principal Larry Ellison reported to the RCSD’s human resources department that plaintiff had made certain comments to him, including “I hate middle school students” and “they know I am going to hurt a kid,” and that plaintiff had improperly sent several special education students out of his classroom, allowing them to roam the halls freely. Ellison Aff. (Docket #200) ¶¶11, 23-27. Although plaintiff was informed that he was being suspended pending an investigation, see RCSD’s Ex. 9, it appears that no further action was taken other than to find an alternative placement for plaintiff. Affidavit of Alessio Evangelista (Docket # 198) ¶ 74. Plaintiff continued to receive full pay and benefits throughout this period. That claim, however, is time-barred. Under Title VII, a claimant must file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 300 days after, the alleged discriminatory event. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e). When a plaintiff has not done so, the claim is timé-barred. Butts v. City of New York Dept. of Housing, 990 F.2d 1397, 1401 (2d Cir.1993). “This statutory requirement, is rigorously enforced and bars untimely claims of discrimination.” Talyansky v. Mercury Print Productions, Inc., 25 F.Supp.2d 151, 153 (W.D.N.Y.1998), aff'd, 199 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1118, 120 S.Ct. 939, 145 L.Ed.2d 817 (2000). In the case at bar, plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC on October 18, 1999. See RCSD’s Ex. 63. Therefore, plaintiff’s claims for acts that occurred pri- or to December 22, 1998, i.e. more than 300 days before October 18, 1999, are time-barred. Since plaintiffs- suspension occurred in October 1998, it is time-barred. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 2072, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if they occurred outside of the time when a plaintiff files his EEOC charge, even if the acts are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges); Elmenayer v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 318 F.3d 130, (2d Cir.2003) (applying Morgan to find that employer’s rejection of employee’s proposed accommodation of his religious practices consisted of discrete acts rather than a continuing violation, and claim arising out of that rejection was therefore untimely). In addition to these defects, none of the circumstances surrounding plaintiffs transfers, his suspension, or any other actions taken by defendants toward plaintiff, suggest that they were motivated by race discrimination. For instance, in the Spring of 1998, at which time plaintiff was teaching at Franklin, the District decided to reduce the number of teaching positions at Franklin. This transfer appears to have been the principal action that led to this lawsuit. Defendants contend that this decision was motivated by declining student enrollment and budgetary constraints. In a memorandum dated May 11, 1998, Maurice Bell, RCSD’s Supervising Director of Education, informed Franklin Principal Clark Powell that based on a projected enrollment of 957 students for the coming academic year, and the student-teacher ratio of 22.15:1 that had been approved in the budget process, Franklin was being assigned 43.2 full-time equivalent (“FTE”) regular teachers for the coming year. RCSD’s Exhibits (Docket # 206), Ex. 34. The previous year, utilizing almost the same student-teacher ratio, but with a projected enrollment of 1165 students, Franklin had been assigned 52.6 FTE teachers. RCSD’s Ex. 33. Powell was thus forced to eliminate a number of teaching positions at Franklin. In doing so, he decided to reduce the number of teachers in several tenure areas, including English, foreign languages, math, social studies, science and technology. Powell Aff. (Docket # 199), ¶ 16. Powell states in his affidavit that based on a number of considerations, he decided to displace two of Franklin’s three technology teachers. The two teachers chosen to be displaced were Thomas DeMond, a black male born in 1950, and plaintiff, who, as stated, was born in 1956. The sole remaining technology teacher was Robert Kowalski, a white male born in 1945, who was also the most senior technology teacher, having been hired in 1970. DeMond, who was hired in 1991, had the least seniority among the three technology teachers, followed by plaintiff, who was hired in 1984. Defendants contend, and plaintiff has presented no evidence to the contrary, that since 1998, there has been only one technology teacher at Franklin, so plaintiff was never “replaced” there by anyone. In response, plaintiff alleges that the RCSD defendants’ proffered reason for plaintiffs displacement from his technology position-declining Franklin enrollment-is proven false by two documents: a March 9, 1998 memorandum from Bell to then-Superintendent Clifford Janey, and a document entitled “Position Control Template” (“template”) for Franklin that appears to have been prepared, for, or used at, an RCSD meeting on May 27, 1998 to discuss middle- and secondary-school staffing for the coming academic year. Plaintiffs Exs. 38, 39. The March 9 memo states in part, “As per your request, please find the staffing pattern, by position title, of Franklin High School from the 1993-94 school year through the- current school year.” The attached chart indicates a total enrollment at Franklin of 1179 (957 “regular” and 222 special education students) for 1997-98. Plaintiffs Ex. 38. The May 27, 1998 template states, in part, that enrollment at Franklin for 1998-99 was projected to total 1268 (957 regular and 311 special education students). Plaintiffs Ex. 39. Thus, plaintiff argues, enrollment at Franklin was expected to increase, not decrease, in 1998-99. Although defendants contend that the numbers contained in Bell’s March 9 memo to Janey were erroneous, whether they were or not is really beside the point, because it is beyond dispute that Bell did tell Powell-the person who made the decision to displace plaintiff (as well as De-Mond and other teachers)-that Franklin’s enrollment was projected to decrease in the Fall of 1998, and that the number of FTE teachers allocated to Franklin would drop from 52.6 to 43.2, based on the same student-to-teacher ratio as the year before. Thus, as far as Powell was concerned, staffing cuts had to be made. Regardless of precisely how many students actually did attend Franklin during this period, then, it is clear that Powell was forced to, and did, reduce his staffing by displacing a number of teachers, including plaintiff. Furthermore, regardless of whether enrollment at Franklin was expected to go up, down, or stay the same, plaintiffs discrimination claims must fail for one simple reason: there is no evidence of discriminatory animus on the part of any of the defendants. As stated, when Powell decided to displace two technology teachers, the two that he chose were plaintiff and DeMond, who is black. The sole remaining technology teacher was Kowalski, who is white, and the oldest of the three. It is simply incomprehensible how Powell could have been motivated by bias against whites or older employees in making these decisions, in the face of this evidence. After learning that he was being displaced from his technology position at Franklin, plaintiff sought to be assigned to either the In-School Suspension Room or the Tardy Room. Defendants contend that plaintiff was overqualified for the Tardy Room position, which was held by a papa-professional during the 1998-99 school year. Affidavit of Alessio Evangelista (Docket # 198) ¶ 44. Plaintiff was qualified for the In-School Suspension Room position, but there is no basis on which to conclude that he was entitled to that position. Ultimately Principal Powell assigned Gregory Wilkes, a white male math teacher born in 1962, to the position. Powell Aff. ¶ 42. Powell states that he preferred Wilkes over plaintiff because Wilkes, as an experienced math teacher, would be available to teach math, and because, in Powell’s estimation, Wilkes’s personality made him better suited for the In-School Suspension Room position, which . required someone who could get along well with students, parents, administrators, and other teachers. Powell Aff. ¶¶ 42, 43. Plaintiff again claims that discrimination was the reason he was not selected for this position, but this claim is as defective as plaintiffs claim regarding his displacement. Although plaintiff broadly asserts that he had a right or entitlement to various positions, the evidence does not support that conclusory assertion. For instance, plaintiff states at page 14 of his memorandum of law that he “was entitled to the In School Suspension Room and/or Tardy Room jobs at [Franklin] in the 98/99 school year pursuant to the RCSD/RTA contract, RCSD policy and practice and/or applicable arbitration decision ...,” but he fails to explain specifically what it was that “entitled” him to those positions, nor has he rebutted defendants’ contention that these jobs were typically filled by nontenured teachers or paraprofessionals. He also fails to explain how the selection of a white male to the In-School Suspension Room position evinces discrimination toward plaintiff. Plaintiff does cite two exhibits in support of his assertion that he was entitled to these jobs, but they do not show that he was. The first is an arbitration decision involving a different individual, under different circumstances from plaintiff, and is based on an entirely different set of facts. Plaintiffs Ex. 48. The second is an October 5, 1998 letter from plaintiff to the supervising director of the District’s Human Resources Department, requesting that plaintiff be transferred from Jefferson, because plaintiff alleged that he had been assaulted there the week before. Plaintiffs Ex. 56. How either of these documents is supposed to show that plaintiff was entitled to the In-School Suspension Room or Tardy Room position is not apparent. Unfortunately, however, this is typical of plaintiffs assertions and arguments, most of which consist of a broad allegation of wrongdoing by defendants, followed by a citation to an array of documents, often of dubious relevance to plaintiffs arguments, with no explanation of how those documents support plaintiffs assertions. In any event, as with his claim concerning the technology position, plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that unlawful discrimination had anything to do with these matters. While plaintiff spends considerable time discussing why he believes he should have been given certain jobs, notably absent from his papers is why his race, age, sex, etc. were in any way connected with these events. The same is true of plaintiffs claim concerning his suspension. While plaintiff denies that he ever threatened to hurt a student, there is no dispute that Principal Ellison reported to the District’s human resources department that Murphy had. made such statements, and it was certainly appropriate under the circumstances to suspend plaintiff pending an investigation. There is not a shred of evidence that plaintiffs race, age or sex played any part in the decision to suspend him. The record shows, in fact, that defendants have at times displayed remarkable forbearance in dealing with plaintiff. There is evidence, for instance, that plaintiff physically assaulted one of his students, yet he was apparently not punished. Wilhelmina Glover, the principal at Thomas while plaintiff taught there, states that on October 13, 1999, several students reported to the vice principal that Murphy had shoved a sixth-grade female student in his class. When Glover went to plaintiffs room to talk to him about this incident, Murphy immediately (and conveniently) complained of difficulty breathing, and went to the nurse’s office. A short time later he was wheelchaired out of the building, and did not return that day. Glover states that afterwards, she spoke to plaintiffs students about the incident, and asked them to prepare written statements about what they had witnessed, as well as their general comments about Murphy’s class. One student wrote, “Mr. Mu-rupy [sic] Ihad [sic] push me I went to open the door and he push real hard.” Some students who had witnessed the incident wrote that: a student “was dancing around because she had to use the bathroom so [Murphy] shuffed [sic] her into the hallway and Mr. Murpy [sic] said that he don’t care if she use the bathroom on herself’; Murphy “grade [sic] [the student who had to use the bathroom] by her arm and shoved her in the room”; “The teacher went to the door and put me and 2 other girls out. When he was puting [sic] us out he hit one girl”; and Murphy “grabbed [the student] by her arm, and pushed ....” RCSD’s Ex. 56. Had defendants been looking for an excuse to take action against plaintiff, this certainly presented them with an opportunity to do so. It appears, however, that plaintiff was not disciplined. He left Thomas about a week after this incident, complaining of illness, spent most of the rest of that school year on sick leave (at full pay), and returned to teach at Franklin in September 2000. This hardly suggests that defendants sought to discriminate against plaintiff. In short, plaintiff has essentially taken a simple employment dispute and attempted to shoehorn it into the framework of the antidiscrimination laws. Plaintiff may be unhappy with his assignments during his employment with the RCSD, but for his claims in this action to survive, there must be some evidence of unlawful discrimination. There is none. See Lizardo v. Denny’s, Inc., 270 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir.2001) (“Plaintiffs have done little more than cite to their mistreatment and ask the court to conclude that it must have been related to their race. This is not sufficient”). B. Plaintiffs Hostile Work Environment Claim Plaintiff also attempts to assert a claim of discrimination based on the theory that defendants have maintained a hostile work environment for plaintiff and other teachers based on their race “and/or” sex. This claim must also be dismissed. In order to prevail on a claim that sexual harassment has caused a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, a plaintiff must establish two elements. First, the plaintiff must show that his workplace was permeated with “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult ... that [wa]s sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff must demonstrate “either that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents were sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of her working environment.” Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the plaintiff must show that a specific basis exists for imputing the conduct that created the hostile environment to the employer. Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir.2003); Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373 (2d Cir.2002); Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir.1997). The key, of course, is that the acts must relate to some discriminatory activity. In Harris, the Supreme Court set forth a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to determining whether a given workplace is permeated with discrimination so “severe or pervasive” as to support a Title VII claim. These include: (1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether the conduct was physically threatening or humihating, or a “mere offensive utterance”; (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with plaintiffs work; and (5) what psychological harm, if any, resulted to the plaintiff. 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367. The Second Circuit has instructed that the court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a plaintiff has submitted evidence sufficient to support a finding that a hostile work environment relating to discrimination existed. See Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir.1997) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367), and to evaluate the “quantity, frequency, and severity” of the incidents, see id. (citing Vore v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 32 F.3d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir.1994)). The factors must be considered “cumulatively,” so that the court can “obtain a realistic view of the work environment.” Id. (quoting Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 444 (7th Cir.1994)). The requirements for a hostile work environment claim based on the plaintiffs race are similar. “The conduct must be intimidating, hostile, or offensive, with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult permeating the workplace.” Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 347 (2d Cir.1998). It is axiomatic that a plaintiff “must produce evidence that [ ]he was discriminated against because of [his] race.” Richardson, 180 F.3d at 440; see, e.g., Narvarte v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 2000 WL 547031, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2000) (claims of overzealous monitoring of plaintiffs arrival times and negative performance evaluations do not demonstrate discrimination on account of race.); Murray-Dahnir v. Loews Corp., 1999 WL 639699, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1999) (claims that plaintiff was forced to work longer hours without adequate staff support and that supervisor “ceased direct communications” and reprimanded plaintiff “ ‘publicly and unjustifiably’ on ‘numerous occasions’ ” failed to establish a hostile work environment claim). In assessing such claims, the court must also be mindful that “Title VII is not a ‘general civility code.’ ” Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435, 452 (2d Cir.1999) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998)), cert denied, 530 U.S. 1242, 120 S.Ct. 2688, 147 L.Ed.2d 960 (2000). While Title VII “protects employees from improper discriminatory intimidation[,] it does not reach so far as to protect plaintiffs from undiscriminating intimidation by bullish and abusive supervisors.” Curtis v. Airborne Freight Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 234, 250 (S.D.N.Y.2000). Plaintiff has completely failed to make out a hostile work environment claim-under these standards. Difficult or stressful working conditions are not tantamount to a “hostile” work environment caused by acts of discrimination. While his allegations about conditions in his workplace indicate that his working conditions were not always pleasant, there is simply no evidence that race or sex discrimination was a factor. Plaintiffs chief complaint seems to be that he and other teachers were subjected to the danger of student violence, but there is no evidence that white or male teachers were particularly at risk in that regard, nor is there any evidence to support plaintiffs conclusory allegation that the District turned a blind eye to violence only when it was perpetrated against white teachers. See Bliss, 196 F.Supp.2d at 325 (stating that plaintiff teacher who alleged that she had been assaulted by student “has failed to set forth sufficient evidence that discrimination against Caucasians was more than likely the reason for the district’s alleged failure to act concerning these student-teacher problems”); Seils, 192 F.Supp.2d at 118 (stating that plaintiff “has simply not shown that any of the actions perpetrated by her students or their parents occurred because [she] was Caucasian,” and agreeing with RCSD that plaintiff “was treated the way she was because [she] was a teacher, and not because she was of any particular ethnic background”). Plaintiff also asserts, in what amounts to a diatribe against defendant Powell, a series of allegations that range from the merely silly (such as the allegation that Powell “insisted that [Franklin] have a ‘Gospel Choir,’ ” which was run by “black staff with no musical training,” Plaintiffs Aff. ¶ 408) to the scurrilous and arguably defamatory. Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that: he has heard Powell use vulgar and abusive language, including the words “fuck,” “nigger,” and “bitch,” directed toward teachers, administrators and students, including black women, Plaintiffs Aff. ¶ 407; plaintiff has observed Powell reeking of alcohol and “falling down drunk” at school, Plaintiffs Aff. ¶ 409; plaintiff has heard students refer to Powell as a “crackhead,” meaning someone who uses crack cocaine, Plaintiffs Aff. ¶ 418; Powell often walked around the school with his pants fly open, Plaintiffs Aff. ¶ 420-22; and Powell “was investigated as a suspect in a series of rapes of elementary age school children in the vicinity of Franklin High School,” and the police sketch of the rapist so closely resembled Powell that “someone” circulated a flyer through the school juxtaposing the police sketch with a photograph of Powell, a copy of which plaintiff has submitted. Plaintiffs Aff. ¶¶ 425, 426; Plaintiffs Ex. 166. The only thing that these allegations make clear is that plaintiff completely misapprehends the nature of a hostile work environment claim. Hostile work environment claims are merely a subset of disparate treatment claims. See Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 356 (2d Cir.2001) (“Disparate treatment prohibited by Title VII also encompasses sexual harassment that results in a hostile or abusive work environment”) (internal quote omitted), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922, 122 S.Ct. 2586, 153 L.Ed.2d 776 (2002). Therefore, in order to establish such a claim, the plaintiff must show not only that his work environment was intolerable, but also that it was discriminatory. See Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 153 (2d Cir.2000) (plaintiff alleging hostile work environment must “show that the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult ...’”) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367). Assuming the truth of plaintiffs allegations (and leaving aside the fact that many of them, such as students’ hearsay comments about Powell, would be inadmissible at trial, and hence are not competent material for a Rule 56 affidavit, see Howley, 217 F.3d at 155), all that plaintiff has shown here is that some RCSD schools are, at times at least, very difficult and challenging places to work. There is no evidence that white or male teachers were singled out for harassment, however, and in fact some of plaintiffs own evidence, such as Powell’s alleged use of vulgar language directed at, or referring to, black females, suggests precisely the opposite. I recognize that in order for a hostile work environment to exist, “offensive remarks or behavior [need not] be directed at individuals who are members of the plaintiffs own protected class.” Cruz, 202 F.3d at 570. However, Powell’s alleged use of the words “nigger” and “bitch” directed at black and female employees do not give rise to an issue of fact about whether plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment. For one thing, Cruz and other cases that have expressed or applied that principle typically involve plaintiffs who are members of one minority alleging remarks or behavior directed toward members of other minorities. See, e.g., id. (“Remarks targeting members of other minorities, for example, may contribute to the overall hostility of the working environment for a minority employee”); Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 66, 70 n. 9 (2d Cir.2000) (African-American plaintiffs; supervisor had “delivered a veritable barrage of racial epithets” directed at blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans); Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir.1997) (finding that harassment of other minorities was relevant to whether a black police officer experienced a racially hostile or abusive working environment). The rationale behind this rule has far less application, however, when a non-minority plaintiff alleges that his supervisor has directed hostility toward minority employees. An African-American employee, for example, might well feel threatened by a supervisor’s expressed hostility toward Hispanics; it would not be unreasonable to assume that the supervisor might be prejudiced against other minorities as well. But it is difficult to see why a white employee would feel similarly threatened when his African-American supervisor directs racial epithets at other blacks. In Sidari v. Orleans County, No. 95-CV-7250, 2000 WL 33407343 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2000), the court did hold that an Italian-American corrections officer who claimed that he had been discriminated against on account of his national origin could introduce evidence that the defendants had discriminated against African-American and Hispanic jail inmates. The court based its decision, however, on plaintiffs allegations that one defendant had: referred to plaintiff as “a nigger turned inside out”; stated that “there was no difference between blacks and Italians,” that “Italians are niggers,” and “they are the same thing”; and otherwise equated Italians in general, and plaintiff in particular, with blacks. Based on these allegations, the court found that “the evidence of racial discrimination against jail inmates is in fact related and relevant to the discrimination that plaintiff Paul Sidari alleges he experienced, and that such racial discrimination could reasonably have affected plaintiffs working environment.” 2000 WL 33407343, at *4. In contrast, in the case at bar, there is nothing that would tend to link Powell’s alleged vulgarities referring to women and blacks to prejudice against men or whites. At most, plaintiffs evidence about Powell’s behavior simply suggests that he was abusive toward, and probably disliked by, many of the people around him, but not because of his or their race, sex, or other legally protected characteristics. Viewed in context of all the evidence, Powell’s alleged use of certain vulgarities or expletives adds to plaintiffs portrayal of Powell as a foulmouthed, ill-tempered person, but it does not show that plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment for purposes of his discrimination claims. III. Plaintiffs Disability Discrimination Claims The Second Circuit analyzes claims of intentional discrimination under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. See Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown (“RECAP ”), 294 F.3d 35, 48-49 (2d Cir.) (“We analyze claims of intentional discrimination under the ... ADA ... and the Rehabilitation Act under the familiar McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden-shifting analysis established for employment discrimination cases under Title VII ...”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813, 123 S.Ct. 74, 154 L.Ed.2d 16 (2002). Thus, the initial burden is on plaintiff to state a prima facie case. Id. To state a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he is an individual with a disability within the meaning of the statute; (2) that his employer is subject to the ADA and had notice of the disability; (3) that the plaintiff was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his position, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) that he was fired or suffered adverse employment action because of the disability. Heyman v. Queens Vill. Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty. Adolescent Program, Inc., 198 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir.1999); Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Serv., 140 F.3d 144, 149-50 (2d Cir.1998); Ryan v. Grae & Ryhicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 869-70 (2d Cir.1998). The elements of a Rehabilitation Act claim are “identical,” Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir.1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 864, 121 S.Ct. 156, 148 L.Ed.2d 104 (2000), except that under the Rehabilitation Act, the defendant must have discriminated against the plaintiff “solely” because of the plaintiffs disability, whereas under the ADA, it is enough if the plaintiffs disability was a motivating factor in the discrimination. RECAP, 294 F.3d at 48-49; Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d Cir.2000); First Step, Inc. v. City of New London, 247 F.Supp.2d 135, 150 (D.Conn.2003); see also Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 722 (2d Cir.1994) (setting forth elements of prima facie case under Rehabilitation Act), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1147, 115 S.Ct. 1095, 130 L.Ed.2d 1063 (1995). The first thing plaintiff must show, then, is that he is disabled. See Chille v. United Airlines, 192 F.Supp.2d 27, 29 (W.D.N.Y.2001) (“To state a claim under the ADA, it is elemental that plaintiff must allege that she suffers from a ‘disability’ as defined by the Act”). The ADA defines “disability” as: “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual”; “a record of such an impairment”; or “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Major life activities include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). An activity is “substantially limited” when an individual cannot perform an activity that an average person in the general population could perform, or faces significant restrictions in the “condition, manner, or duration under which the individual can ... perform [the] activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i)-(ii). In the case at bar, plaintiffs alleged disability is his asthma. His motion papers, however, do not attempt to address the particular requirements of the ADA, and instead argue simply in general terms that plaintiff is disabled as a result of his asthma. Plaintiff does not, for example, discuss whether asthma is a “physical impairment” for purposes of the ADA, or, if so, whether it substantially limits any of his major life activities. Defendants do not appear to dispute that plaintiff does have asthma, and it is clear that asthma constitutes a physical impairment. Regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission define physical or mental impairment as, inter alia, “any physiological disorder or condition ... affecting [the] ... respiratory [system].” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). “Asthma is a physiological disorder or condition that affects the respiratory system,” and hence is a physical impairment. Heilweil, 32 F.3d at 723. Plaintiff must therefore show that this impairment “substantially limits one or more of [his] major life activities.” As stated, plaintiff has not said what particular life activities he alleges are substantially limited due to his asthma, but based on plaintiffs factual allegations, it appears that he claims that his asthma substantially limits his ability to breathe and to work. While the determination of whether an individual is disabled must be should be made on a case-by-case basis, see Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566, 119 S.Ct. 2162, 144 L.Ed.2d 518 (1999), “[m]any courts addressing the issue ... have found that asthma does not substantially limit the particular plaintiffs ability to work or breathe and therefore does not- constitute a disability under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.” Castro v. Local 1199, Nat’l Health and Human Servs. Employees Union, 964 F.Supp. 719, 724 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (collecting cases); see also Nugent v. Rogosin Inst., 105 F.Supp.2d 106, 113 (E.D.N.Y.2000) (“[n]umerous other courts have ... held that an asthmatic condition which only prevents plaintiff from working at one job, or a narrow category of jobs, is not a qualifying disability under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act”; collecting cases). I must also keep in mind that the Supreme Court has instructed courts that in determining whether plaintiff is disabled, any “measures that mitigate the individual’s impairment” must be taken into account. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). In other words, the court should consider the extent to which plaintiff is able to control his asthmatic symptoms. See, e.g., Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313 (2d Cir.1999) (stating that court “must evaluate Muller’s disability [asthma] with reference to the applicable corrective measures, in this case, his inhalers and other medications,” that “the jury was precluded from speculating about how severe Muller’s asthma would be but for his medications,” and holding that evidence did not support finding of disability); see also Bobrowsky v. New York City Bd. of Educ., No. 97CV874, 1999 WL 737919, at *4 n. 2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1999) (observing that following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton, “a plaintiff with treatable asthma may not qualify as ‘disabled’ within the meaning of the ADA,” but finding it unnecessary to decide the issue), aff'd, 213 F.3d 625 (2d Cir.2000). Even prior to Sutton, the Second Circuit found that a plaintiff who suffered from asthma was not disabled in Heilweil, 32 F.3d 718. In that case, the plaintiff, who had been diagnosed as an asthmatic, was hired by a hospital to work as a manager. When she was transferred to the hospital’s blood bank, the plaintiffs asthma symptoms worsened, and her physician told her that the air quality at the blood bank was the principal cause of her ailments and advised her to stay away from it. After discussing the matter, the plaintiff and her supervisor agreed that the plaintiff would continue to perform her blood bank duties until her supervisor could find a replacement for her, after which the plaintiff would be given time to find new employment, either at the hospital or elsewhere. For the next several months, she never entered the blood bank, and administered it from the outside. The plaintiff stated that her health rapidly improved, and she attributed the improvement to the change in her work routine. When the plaintiff refused to meet with the new medical director at the blood bank, however, the hospital demoted and then terminated her. The plaintiff then filed an action against the hospital under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 720-21. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s finding that the plaintiff was not a handicapped person within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 721. The court reasoned that because the plaintiffs respiratory problems were exacerbated only when she worked in the blood bank, her medical condition did not substantially limit one or more of her life activities. In particular, the court, noting that the plaintiff stated that she felt “fine, now” because she had not been in the blood bank for several months, id. at 723, held that the plaintiffs asthma did not significantly affect the plaintiffs ability to breathe. Id. Stating that “[a]n impairment that disqualifies a person from only a narrow range of jobs is not considered a substantially limiting one,” id., the court also held that the plaintiffs ability to work was not substantially limited, because the “plaintiff was medically restricted from working in only one place in the hospital-the blood bank.” Id. at 724. The court stated that “a person found unsuitable for a particular position has not thereby demonstrated an impairment substantially limiting such person’s major life activity of working.” Id. at 723. Summarizing its holding, the Court of Appeals stated that the inability to satisfy the requirements of a particular assignment does not mean such a person is regarded as handicapped. Such inability does not constitute the necessary substantial limitation of a “major life activity” required to meet the definition of a handicapped person under the Act. To meet that definition, the employee’s impairment must limit her emplo