Full opinion text
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF BRIMMER, District Judge. Today, the Court considers the legality of 58.5 million acres of roadless area that the United States Forest Service drove through the administrative process in a vehicle smelling of political prestidigitation. In so considering, this Court is not proceeding down an untrammeled path. In this case alone, the Court has already filled thirty-nine pages of the Federal Supplement. See Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 239 F.Supp.2d 1219 (D.Wyo.2002); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 201 F.Supp.2d 1151 (D.Wyo.2002). Additionally, the Roadless Rule has withstood a limited judicial challenge in the Ninth Circuit. See Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 142 F.Supp.2d 1231 (D.Idaho 2001), rev’d, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir.2002). The case is now before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief. After considering the three administrative records in this case, reading the briefs, hearing oral argument, and being fully advised of the premises, the Court FINDS and ORDERS as follows: Statement of Parties and Jurisdiction Plaintiff, Wyoming, is a sovereign State of the United States and has brought this suit in its own right and on behalf of its citizens. Defendant, United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), is a department of the Executive Branch of the United States government. The USDA is responsible for overseeing the activities of the United States Forest Service (“Forest Service”). The Forest Service is an agency of the USDA and is charged with the administration of the National Forests, including several National Forests within Wyoming. Defendant Ann M. Veneman is the Secretary of Agriculture and has been sued in her official capacity for the actions of her predecessor, former Secretary of Agriculture Daniel R. Glickman. Defendant Dale N. Bosworth is Chief of the Forest Service and has been sued in his official capacity for the actions of his predecessor, former Chief Michael Dombeck. These Defendants will be collectively referred to as the “Federal Defendants.” The intervenors are environmental organizations that have advocated the protection of roadless areas before Congress, state legislatures, and the Forest Service for a number of years. Parties that have intervened in this action are the Wyoming Outdoor Council, Wilderness Society, Sierra Club, Biodiversity Associates, Pacific Rivers Council, Natural Resources Defense Council, Defenders of Wildlife, and National Audubon Society (collectively “DefendanNIntervenors”). The Defendant-Intervenors were active participants in the rulemaking process leading to the promulgation of the rules and regulations challenged by Wyoming. The Court exercises federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1831; 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. Venue is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (e). Background In 1897, Congress enacted the Forest Service Organic Act (“Organic Act”). See Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, § 1, 30 Stat. 11, 34-36 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 473^482, 551). The Organic Act, for the first time, established a limited multiple-use mandate for management of the National Forests. See 16 U.S.C. § 475. That multiple-use mandate provides that National Forests may be established and administered to improve and protect the forest within its boundaries and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of Americans. Id. In 1905, after the Forest Service was transferred to the Department of Agriculture, it began actively managing the National Forest System. In 1960, Congress codified the multiple-use mandate when it enacted the Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act (“MUSYA”). See 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531. Currently, the Forest Service manages 191.8 million acres of forest, grass, and shrub lands, which comprises about one-twelfth of the land and waters in the United States. See John Fedkiw, Managing Multiple Uses on National Forests 1905-1995, at 1-4 (1998). In 1924, Congress designated a portion of the Gila National Forest in New Mexico as a wilderness preserve, which was the first “roadless area” in the National Forest System. See H. Michael Anderson & Aliki Moncrief, America’s Unprotected Wilderness, 76 Denv. U.L.Rev. 413, 434 (1999). Thereafter, the Forest Service established regulations for managing “primitive” road-less areas. See id. In 1964, Congress enacted the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36, which established a procedure by which Congress could designate road-less “wilderness” areas in the National Forest System. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a). In 1967, the Forest Service embarked on the Roadless Area Review Evaluation (“RARE I”), which was a nationwide inventory of the National Forest System to identify areas that could be designated as “wilderness” pursuant to the Wilderness Act. See Fedkiw, Managing Multiple Uses on National Forests 1905-1995, at 113-14. The RARE I inventory ended in 1972, with the Forest Service finding that approximately 56 million acres in the National Forests were suitable for wilderness designation. (Id.). However, RARE I was abandoned after a successful National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) challenge to the procedure employed by the Forest Service during the evaluation. Id. at 114; see also Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir.1973), Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F.Supp. 934 (N.D.Cal.1972). In 1977, the Forest Service began a new Roadless Area Review Evaluation (“RARE II”). Fedkiw, Managing Multiple Uses on National Forests 1905-1995, at 115-19. RARE II, like its predecessor, was administratively initiated for the purpose of identifying those roadless and undeveloped areas which could be designated as “wilderness areas” pursuant to the Wilderness Act. Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, 499 F.Supp. 383, 387 (D.Wyo.1980). The RARE II inventory culminated in 1979 with the Forest Service identifying approximately 62 million National Forest acres as potential wilderness. Fedkiw, Managing Multiple Uses on National Forests 1905-1995, at 117. The purpose behind the RARE I and RARE II inventories was to gather information upon which the President could rely in making wilderness area recommendations to Congress pursuant to the Wilderness Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to review potential wilderness areas and make a report to the President so he can recommend designated areas to Congress). Pursuant to the Wilderness Act, Congress has designated 103.6 million roadless “wilderness areas” in the United States. Anderson & Moncrief, America’s Unprotected Wilderness, 76 Denv. U.L.Rev. at 415. After another successful challenge to the procedure employed by the Forest Service in its RARE II inventory, see California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir.1982), the Forest Service’s involvement in the road-less area controversies remained relatively stagnant for the next seventeen years. In February 1999, however, the Forest Service temporarily suspended road construction activities in inventoried National Forest roadless areas while it developed a new road management policy and refocused its attention on the larger issue of public use surrounding the National Forest transportation system. 64 Fed.Reg. 7,290 (Feb. 12, 1999). The “Interim Roadless Rule” went into effect on March 1, 1999. See id. The Interim Roadless Rule imposed an eighteen month moratorium on road construction in inventoried roadless areas. Id.; Wyo. Timber Indus. Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Service, 80 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249 (D.Wyo.2000). The Interim Roadless Rule was the first step in the Executive Branch’s strategy to protect roadless areas. (Admin. Record (“AR”), Doc. 1535, at p. 2). By July 1999, the Forest Service had developed a comprehensive strategy and timeline for the promulgation of the Roadless Rule and Forest Service Transportation Policy. (AR, Doc. 3440). Three months later, President William Jefferson Clinton noted that the temporary moratorium on road construction gave his administration time to assess the ecological, economic, and social value of roadless areas and to evaluate the long-term management options for inventoried roadless areas. (AR, Doc. 1535, at p. 2). I. The Roadless Area Conservation Rule. On October 13, 1999, President Clinton directed the Forest Service to initiate administrative proceedings to protect inventoried roadless areas and to determine whether roadless protection was warranted for any uninventoried roadless areas. (Id). President Clinton’s directive set the Forest Service’s administrative machinery in process. A. The Scoping Process. On October 19, 1999, the Forest Service issued a Notice of Intent (“NOI”) to prepare a draft environmental impact statement (“EIS”) and to initiate rulemaking. (AR, Doc. 1608, at p. 1). The proposal set forth in the NOI was to promulgate a rule that would initiate a two-part process to protect roadless areas by: (1) immediately restricting certain activities such as road construction in unroaded portions of the RARE II inventoried roadless areas; and (2) determining whether to extend similar protections to uninventoried roadless areas. (Id, at p. 2). The NOI did not provide any information regarding the estimated geographic scope of the proposed rulemaking, nor did it provide any maps to identify the land areas that would be covered by the proposed rule. (See id). 1. The Comment Period. President Clinton directed the Forest Service to issue the final Roadless Rule by the fall of 2000. (AR, Doc. 1549, at p. 2). In turn, Forest Service Chief Michael Dombeck informed his employees of the President’s directive that the final Road-less Rule was expected to be completed in late 2000. (AR, Doc. 330, at p. 1). To this end, Chief Dombeck created a “Roadless Team” to work exclusively on promulgating the Roadless Rule, (AR, Doc. 331). The Roadless Team proceeded according to the following schedule: “Dates — get done during the Clinton Administration (Dec.2000).” (AR, Doc. 123, at p. 3). The Forest Service recognized that if it were to issue the final rule by December 2000, it would have to require “a very short timeframe [sic] for the public to respond to [the] NOI.” (AR, Doc. 1549, at p. 2). As a result, the Roadless Rule NOI provided for a sixty-day comment period, which expired on December 20, 1999. (AR, Doc. 1608, at p. 2). 2. Range of Alternatives. According to Chief Dombeck, the NOI was to be limited to examining only those alternative methods that would meet President Clinton’s goals. (AR, Doc. 330, at p. 1). Thus, the Forest Service would only examine “alternatives that limit or eliminate certain activities in inventoried road-less areas such as road construction.” (AR, Doc. 330, at p. 1). The NOI provided four alternatives that could be considered in the draft EIS: (1) prohibiting road construction activities in inventoried roadless areas; (2) prohibiting road construction activities and commercial timber harvest in inventoried roadless areas; (3) prohibiting the implementation of all activities that did not contribute to enhancing ecological values, subject to valid existing rights, in inventoried roadless areas; and (4) making no changes (no action alternative). 3. Public Participation. During the scoping process, the Forest Service held 187 public meetings across the nation concerning the Roadless Rule. (AR, Doc. 4609, at p. 1-7). On December 3, 1999 — -forty-three days into the comment period — the Forest Service published notice of the local scoping meetings to be held in Wyoming. (AR, Doc. 149, at pp. 4, 6). These meetings overlapped each other and were held on the last thirteen days of the sixty-day comment period. (AR, Doc. 149). On December 14, 1999, Wyoming submitted comments prepared by Governor Jim Geringer that described the fundamental defects with the NOI and scoping period. (AR, Doc. 207, at pp. 6-8). Specifically, Governor Geringer criticized the “extraordinarily short” time for the public to consider the proposed rule, and what he perceived as the Forest Service’s predetermined outcome. (Id.). In addition, the Forest Service received numerous requests to extend the scoping comment period from States, individuals, businesses, and members of Congress. (AR, Doc. 1549). However, the Forest Service refused to extend the comment period, even though it did not have any maps of the inventoried roadless areas and was strategizing on how to respond to requests for maps just ten days prior to the close of the comment period. (AR, Doc. 2748, 2765). The Road-less Team was reluctant to extend the comment period because they had to meet the strict EIS timelines imposed by Chief Dombeck. (AR, Doc. 2765, at p. 2). The Roadless Team also figured they would have another opportunity to update the roadless area data between the draft EIS and final EIS. (Id.). On December 20, 1999, the NOI comment period closed on schedule. During those sixty days, approximately 517,000 comments were submitted on the Roadless Rule NOI. (AR, Doc. 4609, at p. 1-7). B. The Draft EIS and Proposed Road-less Rule. 1. Events Before the Publication of the Draft EIS. One month after the close of the NOI comment period, the Forest Service announced that maps of the proposed road-less areas were available. (AR, Doc. 76, at p. 1). However, the Forest Service also acknowledged that these maps did not contain the best data available, even though it had access to better data for the maps. (AR, Doc. 2610). The maps that the Forest Service distributed provided little, if any, substantive information on the inventoried roadless areas. (See AR, Doc. 274). On February 8, 2000, Wyoming requested “cooperating agency status” pursuant to the Council for Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) regulations. (AR, Doc. 1889, at pp. 6-7). The CEQ encouraged federal agencies to work with state and tribal governments. (AR, Doc. 3544, at pp. 2-3; 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.6, 1508.5). Prior to Wyoming’s request for cooperating agency status, the Roadless Team recognized that it had “an obligation to consider and routinely solicit cooperating agency status.” (AR, Doc. 2292, at p. 1). Nevertheless, the Forest Service did not respond to Wyoming’s request for cooperating agency status and impliedly rejected that request when it issued the draft EIS. (AR, Doc. 1889, at p. 1). 2. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement. On May 10, 2000, the Forest Service published the draft EIS and the proposed Roadless Rule. (AR, Doc. 1350). The draft EIS identified 54 million acres of inventoried roadless areas that were subject to the proposed rule. (Id., at p. 2). The proposed rule was made up of two parts: (1) the “Prohibition Rule” and (2) the “Procedural Rule.” The “Prohibition Rule” banned road construction and reconstruction within inventoried roadless areas. (Id., at pp. 5-6, 14). The “Procedural Rule” required local forest managers to identify other uninventoried roadless areas and to designate whether those areas also warranted protection. (Id., at pp. 6-7,14). 3. The Draft EIS Comment Period. Originally, Chief Dombeck stated that because the Roadless Rule would amend or lead to the amendment of local forest plans it would have to provide a ninety-day public comment period in order to comply with the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”). (AR, Doc. 3440, at p. 4; see also 36 C.F.R. § 219). However, the Forest Service only provided a sixty-nine day comment period for the draft EIS and proposed Roadless Rule. (AR, Doc. 4608, at p. S-2). During this comment period, the Forest Service held over 400 public meetings. (Id.). Between May 22 and June 27, 2000, sixteen of these meetings were held in Wyoming. (AR, Doc. 1350, at p. 34). At the meetings held in Wyoming, the public was given three minutes to comment on the proposed Roadless Rule. (AR, Doc. 4580, at pp. 1, 11). Additionally, the local Forest Service employees who conducted the meetings did not have enough information to answer questions. (Id.). Several attendees of these public meetings described them as a “sham.” (AR, Doc. 4580, at p. 1). Governor Geringer expressed these, and other, concerns to Chief Dombeck. (AR, Doc. 4580, at pp. 1-3). Governor Geringer believed that the Forest Service was simply going through the NEPA motions to reach a predetermined outcome. (AR, Doc. 4580, at p. 2). The Forest Service provided maps during this comment period; however, the maps were of such a large scale — a continental scale — that they actually provided less detail than a standard highway map. The maps did not identify the unroaded areas that were subject to the Procedural Rule or the “roaded” areas that were subject to the Roadless (Prohibition) Rule. (See generally AR, Doc. 4110 (maps of inventoried roadless areas)). The Wyoming State Engineer’s Office commented that the “maps provided in the [draft EIS] lack sufficient detail to be of help [in] determining what specific roads and areas are affected.” (AR, Doc. 4580, at p. 30). Numerous states and various agencies requested an extension of the draft EIS comment period because of: (1) the lack of maps and inaccuracies in the maps provided, (AR, Doc. 4580, at pp. 24-40; AR Doc. 4111, at pp. 80-81, 161, 500, 589); (2) the size of the draft EIS and proposed Road-less Rule, (AR, Doc. 4580); (3) confusion over what “roaded” areas were covered by the proposed Roadless Rule, (AR, Doc. 4580, at p. 30); (4) concerns regarding the narrow range of alternatives the Forest Service analyzed in the draft EIS, (AR, Doc. 4580, at p. 33; AR, Doc. 4111, at pp. 80-81, 161, 500, 589); and (5) concerns regarding the lack of a site-specific analysis (i.e., the issues involving Wyoming’s natural resources were lumped in the same category as issues involving Aabama’s natural resources), (AR, Doc. 4580, at pp. 25-26). The Forest Service refused to extend the comment period, which was contrary to its usual policy of liberally granting extensions on important issues. The Forest Service received approximately 1,155,000 public comments on the Roadless Rule draft EIS. (AR, Doc. 4609, at p. 1-7). Nevertheless, the comment period closed after sixty-nine days on July 17, 2000, as scheduled. C. The Final Environmental Impact Statement. In November 2000, the Forest Service issued the Roadless Rule final EIS. (AR, Doc. 4609). The final EIS departed from the draft EIS and proposed Roadless Rule in four material aspects: (1) the final EIS broadened the scope of the Roadless Rule to apply to all inventoried roadless areas, not just the “unroaded portions” of the inventoried roadless areas, (AR, Doc. 4609, at p. xi); (2) the final EIS adopted an even more restrictive Roadless Rule Alternative, which prohibited road construction and timber harvest (except for stewardship purposes) in all inventoried roadless areas (AR, Doc. 4609, at p. 2-13); (3) the Forest Service added an additional 4.2 million acres of inventoried roadless areas subject to the Roadless Rule, thereby increasing the geographic scope of the Roadless Rule to 58.6 million acres (increasing the road-less area in Wyoming by 39,000 acres), (AR, Doc. 4608, at p. S-l; AR, Doc. 4609, App. A, at p. A-4); and (4) the final EIS eliminated all analyses related to the “Procedural Rule” part of the Roadless Rule, which was incorporated into the final Forest Service Planning Regulations issued on November 9, 2000, (AR, Doc. 4609, at p. xi). The maps accompanying the final EIS generally identified the inventoried road-less areas within each state that were subject to the Roadless Rule. (See AR, Doc. 4110, at pp. 3-213). The maps did not, however, provide sufficient information to identify existing roads within the “road-less” area and did not identify the additional 4.2 million acres of “roadless” area identified in the final EIS. (See id.). The maps contained in the final EIS did not contain this information because the Road-less Team did not have information such as the number of classified roads within the inventoried roadless areas and total acres of classified road impacts. (AR, Doc. 5590, at pp. 1, 2, 9). Interestingly, the Forest Service’s deadline imposed for gathering this basic information was not until after the scheduled date of publication of the Record of Decision. (AR, Doc. 5590, at p. 2). D. The Final Roadless Rule and Record of Decision. On January 5, 2001, the Secretary of Agriculture signed the Record of Decision (“ROD”). The final Roadless Rule was published in the Federal Register on January 12, 2001. (AR, Doc. 5796). The Roadless Rule prohibits road construction in inventoried roadless areas of the National Forest System unless the road construction falls within an exception to the general prohibition. 36 C.F.R. § 294.12(a). The exceptions permit road construction in inventoried roadless areas: (1) to protect public health and safety in cases of an imminent threat of flood, fire, or other catastrophic event that, without intervention, would cause property damage; (2) to conduct an environmental cleanup pursuant to federal pollution statutes; (3) pursuant to reserved or outstanding rights, or as provided for by statute or treaty; or (4) when needed in conjunction with the continuation, extension, or renewal of a mineral lease. 36 C.F.R. § 294.12(b)(l)-(3),(7). The Roadless Rule also prohibits timber harvesting in inventoried roadless areas subject to certain limited exceptions. See 36 C.F.R. § 294.13. In all, the Roadless Rule affects 58.5 million acres (or 31%) of the National Forest System lands. This constitutes approximately two percent of America’s land mass. The Roadless Rule affects 3.25 million acres (or 35%) of the 9.2 million acres of National Forest System land in Wyoming. II. . National Forest Management Planning Regulations. The NFMA provides procedural guidelines to structure the planning of Forest Service lands. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g). The National Forest Management Planning Regulations (“Planning Regulations”) were originally promulgated in 1979 and substantially revised in 1982. 65 Fed.Reg. 67,516 n. 1. Between 1982 and 1999, the Forest Service implemented 127 forest plans pursuant to the 1982 Planning Regulations. Id. On October 5, 1999, the Forest Service proposed a rule to comprehensively revise the 1982 Planning Regulations. 64 Fed. Reg. 54,074. The Forest Service held a comment period for these proposed revised Planning Regulations. 65 Fed.Reg. 67,517. Wyoming raised a number of concerns regarding the proposed rule, including its concern that the proposed planning regulations violated the NFMA. and the MUSYA. (Pl.’s Opening Br., Exh. 78). Nevertheless, the Forest Service published the final Planning Regulations on November 9, 2000 (“2000 Planning Rule”). 65 Fed.Reg. 67,514. The 2000 Planning Regulations set forth a process for amending and revising land and natural resource management plans and for- selecting and implementing site-specific actions. 36 C.F.R. § 219.1. Among other things, the 2000 Planning Regulations established the elements of the general planning process. 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.1 to 219.25. The most controversial part of the 2000 Planning Regulations was that they allegedly altered the management mission of the Forest Service. The Forest Service mission was changed from “multiple use” management to “ecological sustainability” management. (AR, Doc. 1078). This shift, Wyoming and other commentators contended, violated both the NFMA and the MUSYA. Additionally, many believed this shift in the Forest Service’s management mission exceeded their authority and displaced Congress’ intent expressed in the NFMA and the MUSYA. The 2000 Planning Regulations are not currently in effect. On May 17, 2001, the Forest Service published a proposed rule stating that it was not sufficiently prepared to fully implement the 2000 Planning Regulations because “serious concerns” had arisen regarding the ecological sustainability mission. 66 Fed.Reg. 27,-555. On November 27, 2002, the Forest Service proposed some revised planning regulations for public comment. 67 Fed. Reg. 72,770 to 72,816. The public comment for that rule extended until March 6, 2003. 67 Fed.Reg. 72,770. III. The Road Management Rule. After notice and a comment period, the Road Management Rule went into effect on January 12, 2001. 66 Fed.Reg. 3,206 to 3,207. The Road Management Rule requires development of a transportation atlas for each National Forest administrative unit. Id.; 36 C.F.R. § 212.2. The Road Management Rule mandates a “science-based process” to analyze the National Forest road system and establishes standards for the road system. See 36 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). The Road Management Rule was designed to remove the emphasis on transportation development and road construction in the National Forest system and to signal a shift to maintaining needed roads and decommissioning unneeded roads. Id. IV. Transportation Policy. Concurrent with the Road Management Rule, the Forest Service proposed a new Transportation Policy. 66 Fed.Reg. 3,219 to 3,241. The Transportation Policy amended the management guidelines set forth in the Forest Service Manual. Id. Among other things, the Transportation Policy prohibits road construction within inventoried roadless areas unless a science-based roads analysis is conducted pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Transportation Policy. 66 Fed.Reg. 3,236; 66 Fed.Reg. 65,797-98. Additionally, the exceptions in the Transportation Policy for building a road are narrower than the exceptions in the Roadless Rule. 66 Fed. Reg. 3,236. The Transportation Policy went into effect on January 12, 2001. Standard of Review review of an agency’s final action is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 to 706; Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). Under the APA, a federal court may set aside informal agency action if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). An agency decision is arbitrary or capricious if: (1) the agency entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the issue; (2) the agency offered an explanation for its decision that was counter to the evidence before it; (3) the agency relied on factors that Congress did not intend for it to consider; or (4) the agency’s decision is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to the product of agency expertise. Colo. Envtl. Coalition v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir.1999). The Tenth Circuit has held that informal agency action must be set aside if it fails to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements. Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1573-74 (10th Cir.1994). In applying this deferential standard of review, a federal court is required to review the whole administrative record, or those parts of the record cited by the parties. Utahns For Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir.2002). The court reviews the administrative record to ensure the agency’s decision was based on consideration of the relevant factors and was not the result of a clear error in judgment. Colo. Envtl. Coalition, 185 F.3d at 1167. In so reviewing, the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Utahns for Better Transp., 305 F.3d at 1164. The essential function of judicial review under the APA is for the federal court to determine whether the agency: (1) acted within its scope of authority; (2) complied with prescribed procedures; and (3)acted in accordance with law (i.e., did not act arbitrarily or capriciously). Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at 1574. In the end, administrative decisions may only be set aside for substantial procedural or substantive reasons. Utahns for Better Transp., 305 F.3d at 1164. However, courts and agencies alike should be mindful that an “agency’s rulemaking power is not the power to make law, it is only the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.” Sundance Assoc., Inc. v. Reno, 139 F.3d 804, 808 (10th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Analysis The parties have presented several issues in their briefs. The Court will first address Federal Defendants’ and Defendant-Intervenors’ contention that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Next, the Court will address Wyoming’s argument that the Roadless Rule was promulgated in violation of several federal environmental statutes. Finally, the Court will consider the appropriate injunctive relief. I. Justiciability Claims. Federal Defendants and Defendant-In-tervenors argue that Wyoming’s claims challenging the 2000 Planning Regulations, the Road Management Rule, and the Transportation Policy are not ripe for judicial review. Defendants also argue that Wyoming does not have standing to challenge the Roadless Rule. Each claim will be discussed in turn. A. Wyoming’s Challenges to the Planning Regulations, Road Management Rule, and Transportation Policy. Wyoming argues that the 2000 Planning Regulations, Road Management Rule, and Transportation Policy violate NEPA, the NFMA, the Wilderness Act, the Wyoming Wilderness Act, the MUSYA, the National Historic Preservation Act, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act. (Pl.’s Opening Br., at pp. 63, 70, 71-74). The Federal Defendants respond that these claims are not ripe for judicial review. (Fed. Defs.’ Resp. Br., at pp. 28-31). Defendant-Intervenors make essentially the same justiciability argument. (Def.-Intervenors’ Resp. Br., at pp. 18-20). 1. Ripeness. “Ripeness” is a justiciability doctrine that is used to determine when judicial review is appropriate. Judicial review is premature when an injury is speculative. Coalition for Sustainable Res. v. U.S. Forest Service, 259 F.3d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir.2001). To determine whether an agency’s decision is ripe, a court must examine: (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial review; and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding consideration. Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733, 118 S.Ct. 1665, 140 L.Ed.2d 921 (1998). In making the ripeness determination, the district court may consider whether: (1) delayed review would cause hardship to the plaintiffs; (2) judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administrative action; and (3) the courts would benefit from further factual development of the issues presented. Id. at 733, 118 S.Ct. 1665. In the administrative law context, the purpose behind the ripeness doctrine is to prevent courts from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies. Id. at 732-33, 118 S.Ct. 1665. 2. Application. Wyoming’s challenges to the 2000 Planning Regulations are not ripe for judicial review because those rules are currently in the process of being revised. To the extent that Wyoming is challenging the Road Management Rule and Transportation Policy, those claims are not ripe for judicial review because they merely present an abstract disagreement over the Forest Service’s administrative process for revising and amending forest plans and its transportation system. See Coalition for Sustainable Res., 259 F.3d at 1252-53. Likewise, Wyoming cannot establish any present injury from the Road Management Rule or Transportation Policy because neither rule, in isolation, has any on-the-ground impact for road construction activities. 3. Conclusion. For the aforementioned reasons, Wyoming’s request for declaratory relief with respect to the 2000 Planning Regulations, the Road Management Rule, and the Transportation Policy is DENIED. B. Wyoming’s Standing to Challenge the Roadless Rule. Federal Defendants argue that Wyoming’s challenge to the Roadless Rule should be dismissed because the potential injury to the national and state forests in Wyoming could not be redressed by setting aside the Roadless Rule. (Fed. Defs.’ Resp. Br., at pp. 22-28). Defendant-In-tervenors argue that Wyoming lacks standing because it has only alleged economic injury, which is not within the zone-of-interests protected by NEPA. (Def.-In-tervenors’ Resp. Br., at pp. 11-20). Wyoming replies that it has standing because it seeks to protect state lands and National Forests within its borders from the irreparable environmental consequences that will result from the Forest Service’s uninformed implementation of the Roadless Rule. (Pl.’s Reply Br., at pp. 4-13). 1. Article III Standing Requirements. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2. A federal court only has jurisdiction to hear “cases” or “controversies.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Standing is a jurisdictional doctrine that is an essential part of Article Ill’s case-or-controversy requirement. Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Jurisdiction is a threshold question that must be addressed before reaching the merits of any ease. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). This rule is inflexible and without exception. Id. The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of proving it exists. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. To have standing, the party invoking federal jurisdiction must prove: (1) it has suffered an injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected concrete interest that is not conjectural; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 447 (10th Cir.1996). In a NEPA case, the standing analysis is slightly more complex. a. Injury-in-Fact Prong. Under the injury-in-fact prong of the standing doctrine, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the agency increased the plaintiffs risk of actual, threatened, or environmental harm by failing to comply with NEPA; and (2) this increased risk of environmental harm injured the plaintiffs concrete interests. Id. at 449; Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 287 F.3d 1256, 1265 (10th Cir.2002). “A litigant shows an injury to its concrete interest by demonstrating either a geographical nexus to or actual use of the site of agency action.” Id. b. Causation Prong. Under the causation prong of the standing doctrine, a plaintiff must show its actual or threatened harm is “fairly traceable to the agency’s failure to comply with NEPA.” Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 451. The plaintiffs burden of demonstrating traceability is fairly low where the plaintiffs injury in fact consists of a procedural injury under NEPA. Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance v. Babbitt, 96 F.Supp.2d 1288, 1294 (D.Wyo.2000). When an agency fails to perform, or performs an inadequate NEPA analysis, the harm that is traceable to the agency’s deficient analysis is the agency’s uninformed decisionmak-ing. Sierra Club, 287 F.3d at 1265. c. Redressability Prong. With respect to redressability, the plaintiff must prove that its injury would be redressed by a favorable decision requiring the agency to comply with NEPA procedures. Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 452. The redressability requirement is fairly low in NEPA cases because the plaintiff is only required to demonstrate that the agency could have proceeded on a more informed basis if it would have complied with NEPA. Jackson Hole, 96 F.Supp.2d at 1294. The plaintiff is. not required to demonstrate that the agency would change its decision upon NEPA compliance. Id Ordinarily, this element is easily satisfied in NEPA cases because a federal court can enjoin the implementation of the rule that is based on a deficient NEPA analysis until the agency can better inform itself of the consequences of its actions. Sierra Club, 287 F.3d at 1265. 2. Application. Wyoming has standing because it was adversely aggrieved by the Forest Service’s failure to follow mandatory NEPA procedures when it promulgated the Roadless Rule, which necessarily increased the environmental risks to state and federal forests within Wyoming. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990); Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 448-49. a. Injury in Fact. Wyoming has presented evidence that the Roadless Rule will increase the risk of environmental harm to its thousands of acres of state forest land that are adjacent to, or intermingled with, lands designated by the Forest Service as inventoried road-less areas. (Pl.’s Reply Br., Exh. 2). De-fendanUIntervenors’ standing arguments fail because those arguments are based on the flawed premise that the sole injury Wyoming has alleged is an injury to its economic interests. (Def.-Intervenors’ Resp. Br., at p. 14). Wyoming has been injured within the scope of NEPA in two fundamental ways. First, Wyoming’s risk of actual or threatened harm was increased by the Forest Service’s promulgation of the Road-less Rule because the Roadless Rule may damage Wyoming’s environmental resources. For decades, the Forest Service has actively managed the National Forests to prevent the spread of forest disease, insect infestations, and wildfires. Many of the National Forest acres that were previously managed in Wyoming have been designated as roadless areas. (Pl.’s Reply Br., Exh. 2). As a result, there is a real and substantial possibility that forest disease, insect infestation, and wildfires from the non-managed National Forests in Wyoming will spread into Wyoming’s state forests that are contiguous to those National Forests. For example, the Medicine Bow-Routt National Forest has several “blow down” sections that have become infected with the spruce bark beetle. (Id.). Additionally, the downed timber in these areas creates the risk of catastrophic wildfire. (Id., at ¶¶ 7-8). The Forest Service had planned some timber salvage in certain areas of the Medicine Bow-Routt National Forest to reduce the risk of wildfire and the impact of the spruce bark beetle infestation. However, because of the designation of certain areas in the Medicine Bow-Routt National Forest as roadless areas, such active forest management is no longer feasible. Consequently, the decrease in active forest management in the Medicine Bow-Routt National Forest substantially increases the risk of spruce beetle infestation and wildfire spread to forested lands in Wyoming contiguous to that National Forest. Second, the Tenth Circuit has held that “harm to the environment may be presumed when the agency fails to comply with the required NEPA procedure.” Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1115 (10th Cir.2002). As described more fully below, the Forest Service failed to comply with NEPA in promulgating the Roadless Rule. Wyoming has demonstrated injury to its concrete interests for purposes of standing because it has shown actual or threatened injury to its natural resources, which have a close geographic nexus to the inventoried roadless areas. See Sierra Club, 287 F.3d at 1265. b. Causation. Neither Federal Defendants nor Defendant-Intervenors have argued that Wyoming’s injuries were not caused by the Roadless Rule. The Court notes, however, that the Forest Service’s failure to consider certain environmental impacts, such as the cumulative impacts of the Roadless Rule, increased the risk of injury to Wyoming’s natural resources because the Forest Service was proceeding on an uninformed basis. See Jackson Hole, 96 F.Supp.2d at 1294. c. Redressability. Federal Defendants argue that the increased risk of injury to Wyoming’s lands is not redressable because fuel treatments and responses to spruce bark beetles within National Forest lands are entirely within the discretion of the Forest Service. (Fed. Defs.’ Resp. Br., at pp. 23-26). This argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, while the Forest Service does have discretion in its management of the National Forests, the Roadless Rule takes away that discretion. For example, the Roadless Rule does not provide for an exception that would permit the Forest Service to build a road into the inventoried roadless area in the Medicine Bow-Routt National Forest (or any national forest) to treat a particularly pervasive insect infestation, such as the case of the spruce bark beetle. Therefore, without access to the inventoried roadless areas, the local foresters have one choice in how to manage the problem: let nature run its course. Second, Wyoming has demonstrated a procedural injury by the Forest Service’s failure to comply with NEPA. Therefore, setting aside the Roadless Rule would redress Wyoming’s injuries because the Forest Service would then be proceeding on a more informed basis. 3. Conclusion. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court FINDS Wyoming has satisfied all the Article III jurisdictional requirements to maintain its challenge to the Roadless Rule. II. Wyoming’s Claims Challenging the Roadless Rule. Wyoming argues that the Roadless Rule was promulgated in violation of NEPA, the Wilderness Act, the NFMA, the MUSYA, the Wyoming Wilderness Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Each argument will be discussed in turn. A. Wyoming’s National Environmental Policy Act Claims. Wyoming argues that the Roadless Rule was promulgated in violation of NEPA. (Pl.’s Opening Br., at pp. 48-62). Federal Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors respond that the Forest Service involved Wyoming, and the public generally, in one of the most extensive public involvement campaigns ever undertaken in the history of administrative law and that the Forest Service met, if not exceeded, all statutory and regulatory requirements. (Fed. Defs.’ Resp. Br., at pp. 40-61; Def.-Intervenors’ Resp. Br., at pp. 20-46). 1. NEPA Overview. ' a. NEPA’s Statutory Mandate and Structure. NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their actions, disclose those impacts to the public, and then explain how their actions will address those impacts. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983). NEPA prescribes the process, not the end result, of agency action. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989). If the agency follows the NEPA process, as set forth in the agency’s implementing regulations, the public is ensured that the agency was informed of the environmental consequences of its final action. Colo. Envtl. Coalition v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1172 (10th Cir.1999). In this regard, the Tenth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that NEPA only requires an agency to take a “hard look” at environmental consequences before taking a major federal action that significantly affects the quality of the human environment. Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. U.S. Forest Service, 297 F.3d 1012, 1022 (10th Cir.2002) [hereinafter “Save Our Canyons ”]. To ensure that federal agencies take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of their actions, NEPA requires an agency to prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”). Friends of the Bow v. Thompson, 124 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1997). “An EIS is a detailed statement of the environmental impact of a proposed action.” Id. The Tenth Circuit has described the NEPA process an agency follows in preparing an EIS: Initially, any agency announces its intent to study a proposed action through a process called scoping, during which the agency solicits comments and input from the public and other state and federal agencies with the goal of identifying specific issues to be addressed and studied. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7. After assessing the input from the scoping process, the government then prepares a draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), id. § 1502.9(a), which is then presented to the public and other government agencies for notice and comment. Id. § 1503.1(a). After evaluating the feedback received during the notice and comment process, the agency prepares a [final EIS (FEIS) ]. Id. § 1502.9(b). If after preparing either a DEIS or FEIS, the proposed action substantially changes in a way “relevant to environmental concerns,” or if new information comes to light about environmental impacts, an agency must prepare a supplemental EIS (SEIS). Id. § 1502.9(c)(1). Save Our Canyons, 297 F.3d at 1022. In the end, the agency must address the following in its EIS: (1) the purpose and need for the proposed action; (2) environmental impacts resulting from the actions; (3) alternatives to the proposed action; (4) the relationship between short-term uses and long-term productivity; and (5) the amount of resources that must be devoted to the proposed action. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.10. b. Judicial Review of NEPA Compliance. The role of the judiciary in the NEPA process is twofold. First, the court must ensure that the agency has taken a hard look at the environmental consequences of its actions and has adequately disclosed those impacts to the public. Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 97-98, 103 S.Ct. 2246; Middle Rio Conservancy Dist. v. Norton, 294 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir.2002). Second, the court must ensure that the agency’s decisions were not arbitrary or capricious. Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 97-98, 103 S.Ct. 2246; Utahns for Better Transp., 305 F.3d at 1163. In reviewing the adequacy of an EIS, a federal court simply examines whether the agency objectively presented all the topics required by NEPA. Colo Envtl. Coalition, 185 F.3d at 1172. In so reviewing, the court must make a pragmatic judgment about whether the preparation of the EIS and its ultimate form and content fostered informed public participation and informed decisionmaking. Id. While a federal agency is entitled to a presumption of regularity in arriving at its decision, the court is not simply a “rubber stamp” for agency action and will set aside agency action if it is in contravention of the agency’s own rules or congressional mandate. See Glisson v. U.S. Forest Service, 876 F.Supp. 1016, 1023-24 (S.D.Ill.1993). In other words, the court will not accept pro forma compliance with NEPA procedures, nor post hoc rationalizations as to why and how the agency complied with NEPA. See Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (10th Cir.2002); Utahns for Better Transp., 305 F.3d at 1165. 2. Wyoming’s Specific Claims Against the Forest Service. Wyoming argues the Forest Service violated NEPA in six ways when it promulgated the Roadless Rule. Each contention will be addressed in turn. a. The Forest Service’s Procedure in Implementing the Roadless Rule. Wyoming argues that the Forest Service’s process in implementing the Road-less Rule was fundamentally flawed as a result of its “mad dash to complete the Roadless Initiative before President Clinton left office.” (Pl.’s Opening Br., at p. 48). Federal Defendants respond that the Forest Service provided adequate information to the public during the rulemaking process. (Fed. Defs.’ Resp. Br., at pp. 42-45). Defendant-Intervenors contend that Wyoming has blurred the distinct phases of the NEPA process, which has resulted in its confusion regarding the NEPA requirements at each stage. (Def.-Interve-nors’ Resp. Br., at pp. 20-27). i. The Dissemination of Information During the Scoping Period. Wyoming argues that the information disseminated to the public during the scoping period and development of the EIS was “woefully inadequate” and that the Forest Service should have extended the scoping period until it made better information available. (Pl.’s Opening Br., at p. 49-51). The scoping period is an “early and open” process for determining the scope of the issues to be addressed in the EIS and for identifying significant issues related to the rulemaking. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1508.25. During the scoping process, an agency is required to invite the participation of federal agencies, states, local governments, and Indian tribes that may be affected by the agency action. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7(a)(1). The agency determines the scope of the proposed action by considering three types of actions, three types of alternatives, and three types of impacts. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7(a)(2), 1508.25(a)-(c). The agency is then required to allocate assignments for preparation of the EIS among itself and cooperating agencies. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7(a)(4), (6). The clear import of § 1501.7(a)’s mandatory language is that the agency undertaking the action shall engage with other governmental entities in an open and public manner so that they may work together in preparing the EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7(a). When a federal agency is required to invite the participation of other governmental entities and allocate responsibilities to those governmental entities, that participation and delegation of duty must be meaningful. ii. Application. Wyoming contends that although it was one of the states most affected by the Roadless Rule, it could not meaningfully participate in the scoping process because the Forest Service did not provide it with adequate information. Specifically, Wyoming did not know where the alleged road-less areas were because the Forest Service did not provide any maps until after the scoping period had ended. The Forest Service’s NOI to prepare the draft EIS did not provide any information regarding the estimated geographic ambit of the proposed rule nor any maps of the inventoried roadless area. The Court agrees that Wyoming and other affected states could not meaningfully “participate” in determining the scope and significant issues to be analyzed in the EIS, which requires consideration of the mitigating measures and impacts of the alleged action, without knowing specifically what roadless areas the rule covered. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7(a)(l)-(2), 1508.25(b)-(c). For example, Wyoming could not meaningfully provide input on the scope of the proposed EIS by commenting on the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the Roadless Rule in Wyoming when it did not know what areas in Wyoming were to be designated as road-less. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7(a)(l)-(2), 1508.25(c)(l)-(S). According to DefendanWIntervenors, the Roadless Rule was the “most significant land conservation initiative in nearly a century.” (Def.-Intervenors’ Resp. Br., at p. 1). With NEPA’s purpose in mind— adequate and full disclosure — maps accurately depicting the areas covered by the Roadless Rule are the most basic and fundamental information needed to begin the scoping process. Wyoming could not meaningfully participate in defining the scope of a rule when it did not know what lands within its borders would be impacted by the rule. The Administrative Record is replete with the Forest Service’s own admissions that its data was incomplete, outdated, and simply inaccurate. Notwithstanding these admissions, the Forest Service would not extend the scoping period because of the significant time constraints that it imposed on itself. From the outset, the Forest Service’s plan was to proceed according to its predetermined schedule, which was imposed before the scoping process began, with the hope that the updated roadless information would be included in the final EIS. in. Conclusion. To the Court, the facts evidence mere pro forma compliance with NEPA’s scoping procedures and requirements. Therefore, the Court finds that the Forest Service’s refusal to extend the scoping period, notwithstanding the protests of nearly all of the affected states, for the sole reason of meeting a self-imposed deadline was arbitrary and capricious. This is particularly true in this case because the Forest Service was aware that better information was available, even within the Forest Service itself, but simply refused to use that information because it did not comport with the arbitrary deadline by which the final rule had to be promulgated. b. Denial of Cooperating Agency Status. Wyoming argues that the Forest Service’s decision to deny it cooperating agency status was arbitrary and capricious. (Pl.’s Opening Br., at p. 51-52). Federal Defendants respond that the decision to grant cooperating agency status is completely discretionary; therefore, the Forest Service cannot be faulted for its failure to exercise its discretion. (Fed. Defs.’ Br., at p. 50). Defendant-Intervenors did not respond to this argument. i. The Grant of Cooperating Agency Status to States. The NEPA regulations emphasize inter-agency cooperation early in the NEPA process by designating as cooperating agencies those agencies that have expertise in the field or are affected by the lead agency’s actions. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6. A state may become a cooperating agency only through agreement with the lead federal agency. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.5. However, just over two months before the Road-less Rule NOI was published, the Director of the CEQ urged agencies to more actively solicit the participation of state governments as cooperating agencies during the scoping process because cooperating agency relationships with state agencies help to achieve the purposes of NEPA. (AR, Doc. 3544, at pp. 2-3). ii. Application. The Court agrees with Federal Defendants that the Forest Service, acting as lead agency, had the discretion to grant or deny the states cooperating agency status. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.5. The Court also agrees with the Director of the CEQ that granting cooperating agency status serves the purposes of NEPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 4831(a). Wyoming requested cooperating agency status early in the scoping process; however, the Forest Service did not even see fit to respond to that request until after the draft EIS was released. (AR, Doc. 1889). When it did respond, the' Forest Service still did not provide Wyoming with a reason why it denied the state cooperating agency status. However, the director of the roadless project indicated that cooperating agency status was denied because states would want to work at too great of a “level of detail.” (AR, Doc. 3085). The Court finds that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Wyoming, and the nine other states most affected by the Roadless Rule, cooperating agency status. This finding is not premised on a conclusion that the Forest Service had a duty to grant cooperating agency status to any of the states that requested that status, nor does it provide a judicial gloss on the lead federal agency’s discretionary authority to grant cooperating agency status. Rather, the finding is based on the fact that the Roadless Rule affected 53.37 million acres of land, or 92% of the total inventoried roadless areas, in those ten most affected states, and the Forest Service did not find it worth its time to explain why it was denying cooperating agency status to those states. Moreover, the logistics of coordinating with ten states would not have been insurmountable. The roadless team director’s statement that cooperating agency status was being denied because the Forest Service did not want to work at the “level of detail” as the states affected by the Roadless Rule also evidences: (1) that the Forest Service was not proceeding with all the relevant and valuable information that was available on the environmental consequences of its action; and (2) that the Forest Service was omitting relevant and valuable information for the sole reason of administrative simplicity. With regard to the latter, it is also important to note that the Forest Service adopted the top-down administrative approach to the implementation of the Road-less Rule and defined the scope of the project itself, so it cannot now complain of the administrative difficulties associated with the implementation of the Roadless Rule. iii. Conclusion. There is not one good reason in the administrative record before the Court explaining why cooperating agency status was denied to the ten most affected states, including Wyoming, especially in light of the CEQ’s direction that federal agencies should actively solicit participation of the states in order to comply with NEPA’s statutory mandate. Absent any such explanation, the Court must again conclude that Wyoming was right in characterizing the Forest Service’s process as a “mad dash to complete the Roadless Initiative before President Clinton left office.” The Forest Service dared not let any of the ten most affected states have cooperating agency status, lest its “mad dash” would be slowed to a walk. For these reasons, the Court finds that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying cooperating agency status to the ten states most affected by the Roadless Rule. c. The Forest Service’s Failure to Consider a Reasonable Range of Alternatives. Wyoming argues that the Forest Service failed to consider a reasonable range of alternatives to its proposed action. (Pl.’s Opening Br., at pp. 52-55). Federal Defendants respond that the Forest Service considered a “wide range” of alternatives in light of its defined purpose for the Roadless Rule. (Fed. Defs.’ Br., at pp. 52-57). Defendanh-Intervenors argue that the Forest Service only had a duty to consider alternatives that prohibited road construction in roadless areas because the purpose of the Roadless Rule was to create a cohesive national policy that eliminated activities, such as road construction, which cause the degradation of roadless areas. i. NEPA’s Alternatives Requirement. Early in the NEPA process, a federal agency is required to “[s]tudy, develop, and describe” alternatives to its proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(E); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2(c). If the federal agency prepares an EIS, NEPA requires the federal agency to rigorously explore and objectively evaluate reasonable alternatives to its proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a); Utahns for Better Transp., 305 F.3d at 1166. The requisite level of detail and the number of alternatives an agency must consider depends on the nature and scope of the agency’s proposed action. Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1289 (1st Cir.1996). The alternatives requirement is the linchpin of NEPA, and the alternatives section is “the heart” of the EIS. Save Our Canyons, 297 F.3d at 1030; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. To comply with NEPA, an agency must give each reasonable alternative “substantial treatment” in the EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(b); Save Our Canyons, 297 F.3d at 1030. A “reasonable alternative” is one that .is non-speculative and bounded by some notion of feasibility. Utahns for Better Transp., 305 F.3d at 1172. When the agency eliminates an alternative from detailed study, it must briefly discuss the reason for eliminating that alternative. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a); Utahns for Better Transp., 305 F.3d at 1166. The existence of a reasonable, but unexamined, alternative renders the EIS inadequate. Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1287. In the Tenth Circuit, federal courts are required to “look closely” at the EIS’s purpose to determine whether the agency considered reasonable alternatives. Save Our Canyons, 297 F.3d at 1030. It is well established that an agency cannot define the purpose of its project so narrowly that it precludes consideration of reasonable alternatives. Davis, 302 F.3d at 1119. This is because “[o]ne obvious way for an agency to slip past the structures of NEPA is to contrive a purpose so slender as to define competing ‘reasonable alternatives’ out of consideration (and even out of existence).” Id. (quoting Simmons v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 120 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir.1997)). In reviewing an agency’s choice of alternatives, and the extent to which the EIS addresses each alternative, federal courts in the Tenth Circuit employ the “rule of reason.” Custer County Action Ass’n, 256 F.3d at 1040. The rule of reason requires the court to determine whether the EIS contained a sufficient discussion of the relevant issues and opposing viewpoints to enable the agency to take a hard look at the environmental conseq