Full opinion text
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO ALL CLAIMS, GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANTS’ COUNTERCLAIM, AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WM. MATTHEW BYRNE, Jr., District Judge. In March, 1997, a Danish musical group known as “Aqua” released in Europe an eleven-song album, Aquarium. This album included a song entitled Barbie Girl, in which a woman and man assume the identities of two popular Mattel dolls known as Barbie and Ken. Defendants claim this song parodies the popular toys, with the singers referring to Barbie as a “blond bimbo girl” who loves to party and whose “life is plastic.” Barbie Girl quickly became a hit in Europe and later was released in the United States, where the Aquarium album sold over 1.4 million compact discs (CDs) and cassettes. On September 11,1997, Mattel filed suit in this Court, bringing eleven claims against MCA and other defendants. Defendants, in turn, filed a counterclaim for defamation. On February 19, 1998, this Court denied plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, on the grounds that it was not likely to succeed on the merits. Defendants now move for summary judgment; they also seek to dismiss the foreign defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment as to defendants’ counterclaim for defamation and request reconsideration of the Court’s earlier Order denying a preliminary injunction. Although plaintiff did not file a formal cross-motion for summary judgment on its own claims, during the hearing on April 30, 1998, plaintiffs counsel orally requested that the Court grant summary judgment for Mattel rather than defendants. At the hearing, the Court advised the parties that, because the pre-trial and trial dates were approaching, it would issue a brief order on the motions, followed by this more detailed order. I. MCA’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOREIGN DEFENDANTS MCA Records is a California corporation that sells Aqua’s album in the United States. Universal Music & Video Distribution Inc. is a New York corporation that distributes the album in the United States. This Court’s jurisdiction over those two defendants is not contested. Three foreign defendants have also been sued by Mattel, and those three defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the case against them for lack of personal jurisdiction. All three foreign defendants are affiliated members of the Universal Music Group. (Pl.’s Ex. H.) All three have an active and on-going relationship with each other. (Cacciatore Dep.; Bowen Dep.) Universal Music AJS is a Danish corporation (“Universal Denmark”). Aqua recorded the album in Denmark and is party to a recording agreement with Universal Denmark that gives Universal Denmark the worldwide rights to the Aqua album. Universal Denmark has a preexisting agreement with MCA Records that gives MCA the rights to Aqua and other bands for distribution in all countries except Denmark. Universal Denmark collects a license fee for all sales of the album in the United States. MCA Music Scandinavia A/B (“MCA Scandinavia”) is a Swedish corporation. Through an agreement with Universal Denmark, it owns the music publishing rights to the words and the music of the Barbie Girl song. It receives money from the sale of Aqua’s album anywhere in the world, including those sold in the United States. (Ingestrom Dep. at 40-42.) Universal Music International, Ltd. (“UMI”) is a British holding company that has no rights to the song or to the album. It acts to coordinate information among various international, affiliated companies. However, it does coordinate the release of various musical products by its affiliates all over the world, including in the United States. (Bowen Dep. at 18-23.) Universal Music International then helps “coordinate touring activities and promotional activities” of the released records, including Aqua in the United States and elsewhere around the world. (Id. at 31.) It also sent the Barbie Girl video to MCA in the United States. (Id. at 35.) UMI worked with Universal Denmark to market the Aqua album in the United States and rest of the world. (Id. at 42-71.) A. LIMITED JURISDICTION The Ninth Circuit has adopted “the following three-pronged approach to analyzing limited jurisdiction: (1) The nonresident defendant must do some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. (2) The claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant’s forum-related activities. (3) Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.” Pacific Atlantic Trading Co. v. M/V Main Express, 758 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir.1985). The Ninth Circuit utilizes seven factors under the third prong of the limited jurisdiction test to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir.1981). The following seven factors are relevant: “(A) the extent of the purposeful interjection into the forum state; (B) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (C) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of defendant’s state; (D) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (E) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (F) the importance of the forum to plaintiffs interest in convenient and effective relief; and (G) the existence of an alternative forum.” Id. 1. Purposeful Availment Defendants argue that the foreign defendants have no offices, employees, property, or agents in the forum, and they have not conducted any business in the forum. Defendants rely on Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, for the proposition that “the placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposely directed toward the forum state.” 480 U.S. 102, 112, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987). Defendants also rely on Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580 (9th Cir.1993). In Rano, the plaintiff-copyright licensor of photographs sued a French licensee, asserting jurisdiction on the basis that the licensee knew that plaintiffs photographs ultimately would be distributed in California due to the licensee’s sub-licensing of the photographs to various magazines. Id. at 583-84. The Ninth Circuit rejected an argument that would render all “foreign owners of art who sell their products to publications amenable to personal jurisdiction in every state in which their art is eventually displayed.” Id. However, this case is distinguishable. The three foreign defendants did more than merely have their music product end up in California by happenstance. There were cross-licensing agreements between all of the members of the Universal Group. A coordinated plan existed among of all of the defendants to distribute the Barbie Girl song around the world, including the United States. For example, the artwork for the Barbie Girl recording was delivered to MCA in Los Angles by Universal Denmark in conjunction with the single’s release in the United States. (Wheeler Dep. at 45.) Universal Denmark also has exported single versions of the song to the United States. (Id. at 63-64; Caccia-tore Dep. at 105.) UMI coordinated the release of Aqua’s album with all of the Universal affiliates around the world, including the United States. (Bowen Dep. at 16.) UMI helps determine which Universal record label, if any, should release a specific album into the United States. (Id. at 23.) As part of that process, UMI sent promotional copies of the Barbie Girl video to MCA in the United States. (Id. at 35.) Universal Scandinavia operates under a sub-licensing agreement in the United States. (Ingestrom Dep. at 39.) Thus, under this sub-publishing agreement, Universal Scandinavia would receive royalties for each Aqua album sold in the United States. (Id. at 41.) There would also be royalty payments for each time a song was played on the radio. (Id. at 41-42.) MCA Scandinavia sent albums to the United States to their affiliates in the United States for publicity in the hopes of getting the Aqua album used in commercials or other commercial ventures. (Id. at 46-49.) All of the above contacts show sufficient purposeful availment of the United States by the foreign defendants. The district court cases upon which defendants rely are also distinguishable. In none of them do the defendants actually intend for their activities to have any effect in the forum. Here, the foreign defendants had an intent to affect the forum. Their licensing agreements, and coordination of the release strategies for the Aqua album, coupled with their sending of promotional products to the forum, suggest purposeful availment of the forum. 2. Claim Arises from Forum Activities Defendants argue that the foreign defendants have no meaningful forum-related activities with respect to the claims in this lawsuit. Defendants contend that the foreign defendants do not manufacture, sell or distribute the album in the United States. However, the foreign defendants’ conduct facilitates the activities that occurred in the United States. If plaintiffs claims are true, then the foreign defendants participated actively in the scheme that brought the Barbie Girl song to the United States. 3. Exercise of Jurisdiction Is Reasonable a.Extent of Purposeful Interjection into Forum Defendants rely on FDIC v. British-American Ins. Co. for the proposition that a contract is an insufficient basis to establish purposeful interjection into the forum. 828 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir.1987). However, in FDIC, the governing law of the contract was expressly not the law of the forum, and there were no activities in the forum other than using a forum bank to handle the one-time transaction. Id. In this case, there was far more activity directed at the forum than mere temporary physical presence, as in FDIC. The contacts with the forum included the sending of promotional singles of Barbie Girl into the U.S., and the coordinating of the release of the album in the U.S., as well as receiving royalties from sales of the album in the U.S. Such contacts constitute far more contact than the “random” or “fortuitous” contact envisioned in FDIC. b.Burden on Defendants to Defend in Forum Defendants rely on the Ninth Circuit’s claim that “we have held that litigation against an alien defendant requires a higher jurisdictional barrier than litigation against a citizen from a sister state.” Rano, 987 F.2d at 588. Defendants further argue that witnesses and documents are in Europe, which means that the California forum is burdensome. However, the Ninth Circuit has also noted that “the burden of litigating in a foreign forum has become less significant as a result of advances in communication and transportation.” FDIC, 828 F.2d at 1444. Thus, while it may be somewhat of a burden for the foreign defendants to defend in California, it does not appear to be unreasonably so. c.Extent of Conflict with Sovereignty of Defendants’ Respective States Defendants argue that Danish and Swedish trademark remedies are more limited than those available under U.S. law, and judgements in the U.S. are unlikely to be enforced in either country. “Although not a dispositive consideration, a foreign nation presents a higher sovereignty barrier than another state within the United States.” Id. at 1444. Plaintiff notes that there is no parallel foreign action so there is no risk of inconsistent verdicts. In addition, such a conflict is not dispositive, or else legal action against foreigners in U.S. courts would almost always be prohibited. “Sovereignty concerns weigh more heavily when the defendants have no United States based relationships.” Core-Vent v. Nobel Indus., 11 F.3d 1482, 1489 (9th Cir.1993). In this case, the fact that all of the foreign defendants are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Universal, and the fact that they have all directed actions at the forum state, make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable. d.Forum State’s Interest Defendants argue that the forum state’s interest can be secured merely by proceeding against the two U.S. defendants. Plaintiff claims that Mattel and Universal Studios are both domiciled in California. Plaintiff also points to the fact that most documents and witnesses are located in the forum. Defendants claim that the foreign defendants’ allegedly infringing conduct occurred outside the forum. However, as discussed previously, the foreign defendants engaged in conduct directed at the forum, and were a part of the allegedly infringing conduct that took part in the forum. “California maintains a strong interest in providing an effective means of redress for its residents who are tortuously injured.” Id., 11 F.3d at 1489. Since Mattel is a California resident, California has an interest in resolving this dispute. e.Efficient Judicial Resolution “In evaluating this factor [the Ninth Circuit] has looked primarily at where the witnesses and the evidence are likely to be located.” Id. Defendants claim that all of its employees are located in Europe, so it would be difficult to bring them to the forum for trial. Plaintiff claims that the majority of witnesses and documents are located in the forum. Both sides provide only conclusory statements here, so it is difficult to evaluate their respective positions. f.Importance of Forum to Plaintiffs Interest in Relief While plaintiff would prefer to litigate in California because it is domiciled there, that is not dispositive. Wherever this case is litigated, some parties will have less convenience than others. Plaintiff argues that since its case raises U.S. trademark law, it is more convenient to have a U.S. court, who is familiar with U.S. law, hear the case. This factor does not tilt the balance either way. g.Existence of Alternative Forum Defendants claim that Mattel has the burden to prove that there is not an alternative forum. See Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.1993). Defendants argue that plaintiff could bring this suit in Denmark or Sweden. However, as plaintiff points out, defendants go to great pains to argue that there would be no cause of action in this case in either Sweden or Denmark under their law. Thus, there does not appear to be an alternative forum for this type of trademark suit. 4. Conclusion This Court has personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendants. The foreign defendants are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Universal, and they have participated in numerous actions directed at the forum state in this case. B. LANHAM ACT EXTRATERRITORIALITY In order to apply the Lanham Act to foreign commerce “first, there must be some effect on American foreign commerce; second, the effect must be sufficiently great to present a cognizable injury to plaintiffs under the federal statute; and third, the interests of and links to American foreign commerce must be sufficiently strong in relation to those of other nations to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.” Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir.1985). The third element involves seven factors: “the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged if conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.” Id. 1. Effect on American Foreign Commerce Defendants rely on Zenger-Miller, Inc. v. Training Team, GmbH, 757 F.Supp. 1062 (N.D.Cal.1991). In Zenger-Miller, the defendant was a German corporation that conducted no business in the United States, such that the Court found that the effect on U.S. commerce was minimal, as plaintiff felt most of the effects in its European business. Id. at 1071. Defendants claim that the foreign defendants in this case made money from activities in foreign counties targeted at foreign consumers, and not from targeting consumers in the U.S. Zenger-Miller is distinguishable because in this case, the foreign defendants have directed activity at the United States and have derived profits from their activities in the United States. Plaintiff notes that the Ninth Circuit does recognize that “the Lan-ham Act provides a broad jurisdictional grant that extends to all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.” Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., Inc., 953 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir.1991). The court also noted that “the sale of infringing goods in a foreign country may have a sufficient effect on commerce to invoke Lanham Act jurisdiction.” Id. In this case, the foreign defendants participated in activities resulting in sales of Barbie Girl in the United States, as well as abroad. Jurisdiction therefore exists. 2. Effect Great Enough to Present Cognizable Injury Defendants argue that any injury suffered by plaintiff would be suffered abroad. However, plaintiff argues that defendants’ conduct has caused plaintiff injury in the United States. As long as there is “monetary injury in the United States” to plaintiff, then there is a “cognizable [claim] under the Lanham Act.” Id. at 503. In this case, the foreign defendants’ actions have caused an injury in the United States, sufficient to establish jurisdiction by allegedly infringing plaintiffs trademark. 3. Interests of American Commerce Sufficiently Strong a.Degree of Conflict with Foreign Law Defendants argue that under Danish law, plaintiff would have a more difficult time making its claim for trademark infringement or unfair competition. (Madsen Dec.) In addition, a U.S. judgement would not be enforceable in Danish courts. (Id.) Defendants argue that the same would be true in a Swedish court. See Blimpie Int’l, Inc. v. ICA Menyforetagen AB, 1997 WL 143907 (S.D.N.Y.1997). Plaintiff claims that this fact is irrelevant because it is not proceeding under foreign trademark law, but rather is seeking to enforce U.S. trademark law. Plaintiff argues that since there is no current foreign proceeding, there can be no conflict with foreign law. The Ninth Circuit has noted that if “there are no pending proceedings” abroad, then it would not “be an affront to the foreign country’s sovereignty or law.” Ocean Garden, 953 F.2d at 503. Since there are no proceedings currently in Sweden or Denmark, and because the conduct complained of impacts the U.S. market, there is no real sovereign conflict. b. The Nationality or Allegiance of the Parties In this case plaintiff is a California corporation and the foreign defendants are not. However, the foreign defendants are very closely related' to the U.S. defendants because they are all owned by the same corporate entity and act as each others’ agents. c. Extent by Which Enforcement by Either State Achieves Compliance Defendants argue that this Court’s ruling would not be enforceable abroad. However, plaintiff is seeking damages and injunctive relief relating to activities within the U.S., which would be enforceable. Plaintiff is not seeking relief for defendants’ sales of the Barbie Girl song in Europe; it is only seeking relief for United States sales. This Court could enforce its order against the foreign defendants’ activities that target the U.S. d. Relative Significance of Effects on the United States Plaintiff claims that there has been a significant harm in the U.S. because of the high number of albums sold. There is certainly enough harm alleged to show significance of harm in the U.S. e.Purpose to Harm or Affect U.S. Commerce Defendants claim that they have caused no effect in the United States. However, the evidence suggests that defendants have engaged in activities targeting the United States. f. Foreseeability of Such Effect Since the other factors come out in plaintiffs favor, defendants’ actions were thus foreseeable. See id. at 504. g. Relative Importance to Violations Charged Plaintiff is a U.S. corporation, and has been harmed in the United States. That is sufficient for this factor. See id. 4. Conclusion There have been sufficient activities geared toward the United States, and sufficient impact in the United States for there to be a cause of action under the Lanham Act. C. FORUM NON CONVENIENS “A party moving to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens must show two things: (1) the existence of an adequate alternative forum, and (2) that the balance of private and public interest factors favors dismissal. This showing must overcome the great deference due plaintiffs because a showing of convenience by a party who has sued in his home forum will usually outweigh the inconvenience the defendant may have shown.” Lockman Foundation v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 767 (9th Cir.1991). Ordinarily the requirement of an alternative forum is satisfied if “the defendant is amenable to process in the other jurisdiction.” Id. at 768. However, the requirement may not be satisfied “in rare circumstances where the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory.” Id. “Private interest factors include: ease of access to sources of proof; compulsory process to obtain the attendance of hostile witnesses, and the costs of transporting friendly witnesses; and other problems that interfere with an expeditious trial.” Id. at 769. “Public interest factors encompass court congestion, the local interest in resolving the controversy, and the preference for having a forum apply a law with which it is familiar.” Id. at 771. 1. Existence of an Adequate Alternative Forum Defendants contend that plaintiff could litigate its claims in Denmark, Sweden or Great Britain where it claims to have trademark registration. Plaintiff contends that this case involves conduct that occurred in the United States. Therefore, those claims should be litigated in the U.S. 2. Balance of Private and Public Interest Factors Plaintiff points out that the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” Gates Learjet Co. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1334-35 (9th Cir.1984). a. Private Interest Factors Defendants argue that since Barbie Girl was created and initially packaged in Denmark, and since the foreign defendants activities were limited to Europe, that the balance of private factors tilts toward requiring that the ease be prosecuted in Europe. In addition, all witnesses and documents relating to the foreign defendants are located in Europe. There will be a high cost to bringing witnesses from Europe, and this Court cannot compel witnesses from Europe to appear in Court. Finally, defendants contend that any judgement in this Court would not be enforceable in Sweden or Denmark. The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that while a U.S. citizen has no absolute right to sue in a U.S. forum, “a plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled to greater deference when the plaintiff has chosen the home forum.” Jensen, 743 F.2d at 1335. Here, Mattel, a citizen of California, is suing in its home forum. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit requires district courts to consider “that trial preparation had progressed nearly to the point of trial” when attempting to determine whether trial in the U.S. is “more easy, expeditious and inexpensive” than trial abroad. Id. at 1335. Here, most discovery has been completed, and the foreign defendants have been actively participating in the case in this Court. Thus, it does not make sense to dismiss them on the eve of trial. Finally, in looking at where witnesses are located, the court must “keep in mind that the increased speed and ease of travel and communication makes ... no forum as inconvenient today as it was in 1947.” Id. at 1336. Additionally, the Court should consider not merely the number of witnesses and them locations, but the “materiality and importance of the anticipated witnesses’ testimony.” Id. at 1335. b. Public Interest Factors Defendants contend that plaintiff has unnecessarily complicated this case with the addition of the foreign defendants, which contributes to a congested court system. California has little interest in resolving any claims against the foreign defendants. Finally, defendants argue that the issue of whether they infringed any trademarks should be determined under the law of the country where the conduct took place, in Europe. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that U.S. courts have an interest in “protecting its companies from trademark infringement abroad to preserve the state’s economic vitality.” Id. at 1336. In examining the court’s docket “the real issue is not whether a dismissal will reduce a court’s congestion but whether a trial may be speedier in another court because of its less crowded docket.” Id. at 1337. In short, there has not been a sufficient showing to overcome the presumption that plaintiffs choice of forum is the appropriate one. II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT A. STANDARD OF REVIEW Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court shall grant a motion for summary judgment if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Facts are deemed “material” if a dispute over them “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the- absence of a genuine issue of fact for trial. Id. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the moving party satisfies this burden, Rule 56(e) provides: When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided for in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denial of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). In addition, summary judgment is appropriate, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against the party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [opposing party’s] position will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. B. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 1. The Cogan Survey Plaintiff submitted with its opposition a survey,. prepared by Dr. Sandra Co-gan, which includes the responses of 556 individuals interviewed in person at ten shopping malls in six states and purports to show actual confusion among consumers. Defendants object that the survey is inherently biased with leading questions and that it is exeludible as improper opinion testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 703. The Ninth Circuit has held that “surveys are to be admitted as long as they are conducted according to accepted principles.” E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1292 (9th Cir.1992). “Technical unreliability goes to the weight accorded a survey, not its admissibility.” Id. (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir.1982)). The mere presentation of a survey purporting to show confusion, however, does not itself create a triable issue of fact. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir.1984) (finding a survey “so badly flawed that it cannot be used to demonstrate the existence of a question of fact on the likelihood of consumer confusion.”). In Gallo, the district court admitted a survey in which participants were shown photographs of defendant’s cheese label and asked a series of questions, the first being what company “puts out this cheese.” The other two questions asked participants to identify what other products they thought were made by the company they identified in their first answer. Id. The survey found forty percent of participants were confused nationally, with 47% confused in California. Id. at 1292-93. See also Henri’s Food Products Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 357-58 (7th Cir.1983) (finding that the survey question, “who do you think puts out [the product] shown here,” to be valid, “[although the phraseology may not be the best way to ask the question”). The Cogan survey includes a number of questions that circuits courts have found to be inherently leading or biased and therefore should be given little if any weight as evidence of actual confusion. In addition, the few neutral questions presented by the survey show only a minimal amount of consumer confusion. Cf. Universal City, 746 F.2d at 118 (“[T]he fact that there may be a few confused consumers does not create a sufficiently disputed issue of fact regarding likelihood of confusion so as to make summary judgment improper.”). Survey participants either watched a video or listened to an audio recording of the song. They were then asked what the music video or music “is about.” Cogan did not tally the answers of the participants, although an independent review of the participants’ answers reveals that about 421, or 76%, of the individuals explicitly identified the song as about Barbie. The survey conductors then showed either the CD album or the CD single to the participants and asked to “look at this music CD as though you were in a store and thinking about buying a music CD today.” (Cogan Decl., Ex. C, at 11). The survey takers then asked the following question: “3. Who or what company, if any, do you think is connected with or gave permission for the music video and CD (the music CD) you just saw?” If a name was given, participants were then asked why they thought that and what other products were put out by that named company. By Cogan’s count, 20% answered Universal/MCA/Aqua/ or Barbie Girl, 17% answered Barbie/Mattel, 6% answered Music/Entertainment Co., and 47% answered that they did not know. It is unclear from the results of this question how many individuals who answered Mattel thought the company was “connected” with the song and how many thought the company gave its permission. The use of the term “connected with” is not relevant in the context of parody, as parodies evoke the object that they are poking fun of and therefore are often linked or connected to that object in the public’s mind. See Prudential Ins., 694 F.2d at 1156 (holding that the exclusion of a survey, which showed 14-31 percent of the public identified plaintiffs logo with defendant’s, was not prejudicial error “because the survey showed only that the Prudential rock [logo] and the Gibraltar rock [logo] are linked in the public eye”); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994) (observing that parody in the copyright context “can claim legitimacy for some appropriation” of the original work on which it comments). The next question (# 5) was “who or what company or companies do you think put out the music video and CD (music video) you just saw.” Twenty-one (21)% said Universal/MCA/Aqua or Barbie Girl; 4% said Mattel or Barbie; 11% said a Music/Entertainment Co.; and 60% said that they did not know. These results indicate substantially less confusion than seen in the Gallo survey. See 967 F.2d at 1292-93. In calculating her results, Cogan inexplicably combines the responses from question three (17.4%) and question five (2.3%) to find that 20% of the respondents “though Mattel or ‘Barbie’ was the source, connected with, or gave permission for the ‘Barbie Girl’ music video and/or music CD.” (Id. at 17). It is unclear why Cogan combines the answers to questions three and five, as both questions were asked to all 556 participants. Cogan points to no evidence that the individuals in question three who thought Mattel was connected with the song were a different group of people than the smaller number in question five who thought Mattel put out the music video and CD. The Cogan survey conductors then asked the following series of questions: 7a. Do you associate the Barbie Girl name with any other products? 7b. What products do you associate the Barbie Girl name with? 7c. Do you associate the Barbie Girl name on the CD package with the Barbie doll? 7d. Do you think the company which owns the Barbie doll brand gave its permission to use the Barbie name on the music CD package? (Cogan, Ex. C, at 19). To the last question, 39% of respondents answered yes to the last question, 51% answered no, and 10% were not sure. The validity of the results from this leading question is undermined, however, by the fact that, when asked a relatively more neutral question (who is connected with or gave permission for this music), only 17% identified Mattel or Barbie. Universal City is instructive on this point. In that case, plaintiff asked survey participants whether “the Donkey Kong game [was] made with the approval or under the authority of the people who produce the King Kong movies?” 746 F.2d at 118. The Court criticized the question, among other reasons, because “the above-mentioned inquiry was an obvious leading question in that it suggested its own answer. The participants were presented with the Donkey Kong-King Kong connection rather than permitted to make their own associations.... A survey question which begs its answer cannot be a true indicator of the likelihood of consumer confusion.” Id. For the same -reasons, this Court will not give weight to question “7d” as evidence of actual confusion. Defendants object that the survey is fatally flawed. They claim that the very first question, asking what the song was about, polluted the survey because the song is clearly about Barbie and therefore the survey takers “implanted” the Barbie response in the respondent’s minds. (Defs.’ Obj. at 4). Defendants note that most of the survey respondents indicated that the song was about Barbie — a result that is not surprising as the song is a parody of the doll. (See discussion below). Defendants also object that plaintiff did not use a control group to take account of those respondents who are confused “regardless of the stimuli present.” See Winning Ways, Inc. v. Holloway Sportswear, Inc., 913 F.Supp. 1454, 1475-76 (D.Kan.1996) (discounting survey showing 48-58 percent confusion where the survey contained only “numbers that had not been adjusted to account for noise in the market”). Defendants further argue that the single presented to the participants was the Danish version of the song (which lacks the disclaimer) rather than the American version, which has the disclaimer. (See Defs.’ Obj. at 10 (citing Cogan Decl., Ex. C, at 272)). Although the survey contains flaws, “technical unreliability” goes to the weight the Court is to afford the survey, rather than its admissibility. Gallo, 967 F.2d at 1292. In evaluating plaintiff’s case, the Court can consider these flaws when considering the multiple factors of the likelihood of confusion test. 2. The Luther Telephone Survey Plaintiff also seeks to introduce a survey designed by one of its employees, Sujata Luther, the head of Mattel’s Worldwide Consumer and Sales Research department. This survey of 1009 girls ages 5 to 18 years old purports to show that 77% of girls ages 8 to 10 and 49% of girls ages 5 to 7 had heard the song. It also claims that 52% of 5 to 10 years olds like the song “a lot,” while only 20% of 11 to 18 year olds liked it “a lot.” (Pk’s Opp’n at 11; Pruetz Decl., Ex. I). However, the survey’s relevance is unclear: whether young girls like the song does not demonstrate that they are confused over the trademark. As to showing the age of MCA’s consumers, the survey does not indicate whether these listeners are likely to be the actual purchasers of this music. Presumably, many parents buy toys and music products for their younger children, and plaintiff presents no evidence that more easily impressionable children, rather than adults, are the individuals who are buying the products at issue here. 3. Other Objections Plaintiff objects to the declarations of Valerie Folkes, Richard Lanham, Soren Rasted, and Astrid Hansen in their entirety and to portions of the declarations of Bruce Wheeler and Jeffrey Goldman. Plaintiff argues that Lanham’s credentials as a literary consultant are irrelevant “because Mattel did not bring suit against Aqua for the lyrics of its song.” (PL’s Obj. at 2). This objection is without merit. Lanham’s testimony relates to the meaning of the song’s lyrics and its place among other parodies of plaintiffs doll. Plaintiff objects to the Folkes Declaration because Folkes has “no experience in evaluating the merits of. trademark infringement or dilution .claims” and she apparently made certain factual errors in her declaration. (Id. at 3). Folkes, a marketing professor, provides some helpful testimony, however, regarding the widespread use of pink among products targeting young girls. As to Hansen’s declaration, plaintiff objects because he translates a Danish-language radio interview that plaintiff asserts is irrelevant and that includes comments made by a European Mattel official who stated publicly that the company was “all for” the song because it was “funny and good.” (Id. at 4; see also Rasted Decl. at ¶ 14). However, the interview also contains comments by the songwriter about the meaning of the song, which relates to parody. As to Rasted, the individual who wrote Barbie Girl, plaintiff claims that he has been unavailable for a deposition because he has been traveling overseas, “under contract to defendants.” (Id. at 5). Despite this, however, plaintiff has managed to produce in its opposition evidence that it claims contradicts Rasted’s testimony regarding the meaning of the song. In addition, to exclude his testimony might potentially limit defendants’ ability to explain the meaning of their own songs, although the lyrics themselves indicate that the song is a light-hearted comment on the dolls Barbie and Ken. (See discussion below). The Court will not exclude the objeeted-to declarations. C. BARBIE GIRL AS PARODY The crux of plaintiffs argument is that defendants have misappropriated the Barbie trademark by using the word “Barbie” in the song Barbie Girl and its video. Plaintiff claims that this song will lead to confusion among consumers and harm to the Barbie product line itself. Defendants respond, however that Barbie is an icon in American culture and that their alleged parody of her is protected by the First Amendment. “The inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not fact.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n. 7,103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); see also Rendish v. City of Tacoma, 123 F.3d 1216, 1223 (9th Cir.1997), reh’g en banc denied, 134 F.3d 1389 (9th Cir.1998). In this case, this Court must determine whether the song at issue constitutes a parody, thereby raising important First Amendment interests. See Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books, 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir.) (observing that parody has “socially significant value as free speech under the First Amendment”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 27, 138 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1997); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir.) (“Parody is a humorous form of social commentary and literary criticism that dates back as far as Greek antiquity.”), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013, 107 S.Ct. 3254, 97 L.Ed.2d 753 (1987); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437-38 (9th Cir.1986) (“‘Destructive’ parodies play an important role in social and literary criticisms and thus merit protection even though they may discourage or discredit an original author.”). As a threshold matter, the fact a parody makes a profit does not strip it of protection under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that speech “is protected [by the First Amendment] even though it is carried in a form that is ‘sold’ for profit, and even though it may involve a solicitation to purchase or otherwise pay or contribute money.” Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (citations omitted). As the Tenth Circuit observed in analyzing the First Amendment rights of trading cards that parodied famous sports players, [W]e see no principled distinction between speech and merchandise that informs our First Amendment analysis. The fact that expressive materials are sold neither renders the speech unprotected, nor alters the level of protection under the First Amendment. [Plaintiff] need not give away its trading cards in order to bring them within the ambit of the First Amendment. Cardtoons L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir.1996). Nor does a for-profit parody have to identify itself clearly as a parody. As the Supreme Court observed, “[p]arody serves its goals whether labeled or not, and there is no reason to require parody to state the obvious (or even the reasonably perceived).” Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 583 n. 17, 114 S.Ct. 1164. In the song Barbie Girl, two singers (one female, one male) adopt the names of “Barbie” and “Ken” and sing about their “life in plastic.” The names “Barbie” and “Ken” also apply to two popular plastic dolls owned by the plaintiff. A portion of the lyrics sung by Lene Grawford Nystrom, who adopts Barbie’s persona, includes the following: I’m a Barbie girl, in a Barbie world; life is plastic; it’s fantastic You can brush my hair, undress me everywhere. Imagination; Life is your Creation.... I’m a blond bimbo girl, in a fantasy world. Dress me up, make it tight. I’m your dolly.... René Dif, who plays Ken, sings the refrain, “Come on Barbie; Let’s go party,” throughout the song, which lasts just over three minutes. Although the singers adopt the names of the dolls, they do not adopt their likeness, either on the album cover or in the related video. The lead singer impersonating Barbie, Nystrom, has dark hair and a tattoo on her arm. The male singer, Dif, has a clean-shaven head. Neither of these singers match the usual images of Barbie as a blond young woman or Ken as a young man with a full head of hair. Plaintiff describes the song as containing “adult-oriented lyrics” that are inconsistent with Mattel’s “wholesome image.” Plaintiff specifically objects to phrases sung by the pretend Barbie such as “undress me everywhere,” “I’m a blond bimbo girl, in a fantasy world”; “you can touch, you can play, if you say T’m always yours,’ ” and “make me talk, do whatever you please, I can act like a star, I can beg on my knees.” Plaintiff also objects to Ken’s lyrics, which include “kiss me here, touch me there, hanky panky” and “come jump in, bimbo friend, let use do it again, hit the town, fool around, let’s go party.” Mattel’s distaste for the song’s alleged message, of course, cannot alone justify silencing speech critical of its product. Cf. New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir.1992) (noting the potential for injury to public discourse if individuals cannot refer to specific trademarks in their social commentaries). Indeed, parody “inevitably offends others” because it so often “ridicule[s] sacred verities and prevailing mores.” L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 28; see also Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1400 n. 8 (noting that courts should “not take into account whether [an alleged parody] is in good or bad taste”). Plaintiff asserts that this song is not about the doll at all and that therefore cannot be a parody. A review of the song and video, however, demonstrates that the singers are poking fun at Barbie, whom they repeatedly refer to throughout the song. The lyrics spoof the unrealness of Barbie, referring to what many children apparently do with their dolls, including dressing and undressing them, brushing their hair, and making them walk and talk. (See, e.g., Lanham Decl., ¶ 38). In the video, the pretend Ken pulls the pretend Barbie’s arm off; the singers, playing with a fake-looking arm, appear to be poking fun at the fact that Barbie, like all dolls, can be taken apart by her more adventuresome owners. (See id. at ¶ 45). In addition, the song’s lyrics appear to target for parody a woman who is like Barbie — be. a Barbie Girl — one who is plastic, unreal, and easily manipulable by others. The song’s fast tempo and the singers’ exaggerated performances of their respective characters suggest that the lyrics are not to be taken too seriously. As to the meaning of the lyrics, Soren Rasted — a member of Aqua and the song’s “primary writer” — states that he wanted “to compose a humorous song about the ‘Barbie fantasy world.’ ” (Rasted Decl., ¶ 11) (emphasis in original). Rasted has explained in interviews that the song was about more than just the Barbie doll itself but also its “status[J like the royal family, which is not to be tampered with.” (Id. at ¶ 14). The fact that the criticism is lighthearted, rather than heavy-handed, does not lessen the speech’s First Amendment protections. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 969 (observing that parody trading cards “are no less protected [as speech] because they provide humorous rather than serious commentary”); see also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840 (1948) (observing that speech that is entertainment is also protected by the First Amendment because “[t]he line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right”). Plaintiff cites several interviews with band members, in which they make statements such as “[t]he song isn’t about the doll. We’re making fun of the glamourous life,” and “[w]e don’t mean to harm the doll.” (See Pruetz Decl., Ex. F4-F5, at 231, 234). Mattel asserts that the song is not about parodying Barbie and therefore plaintiff cannot claim the protection of the First Amendment. Mattel, however, ignores other comments made by the band members in interviews, in which they state that they wanted “to make Barbie the kind of girl you think of, very high, very childish,” (Pruetz Decl. at F3) and the comments of the song’s writer that the song “is about a Barbie doll, but like most of our songs there is a deeper significance to it. Not that we have to be taken dead seriously, but the Barbie doll has a certain status like the royal family, which is not to be tampered with.” (Rasted Decl., ¶ 14; id., Ex. 8 at 49 (quoting Dif as saying that Barbie Girl is a “happy song with humor and irony”)). Indeed, the song’s writer has stated repeatedly that he was inspired to write the song after riding his bike past a kitsch exhibit of Barbie dolls in his native Denmark. (Pruetz Decl., Ex. F5, at 234; Rasted Decl., ¶¶ 9-10). In addition, he noted the song is “not the normal duets we do on our albums, it’s more like role playing.” (Id.). From the lyrics of the song and the various comments by the Aqua band members, it appears that song was intended to parody both the doll itself and the shallow, plastic values she has come to represent in some circles. Indeed, this song is not the first time that Mattel’s product has been talked about because of its cultural significance: the doll “has been seen as feminist and anti-feminist; as seductive and as wholesome; as intelligent and as a ‘dumb blond.’ Barbie has been hailed as a role model and condemned as the cause of eating disorders.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 3). Nor is this the first song to tweak the wholesome image that Mattel wants for its doll. Plaintiff dismisses such criticism of its product as simply the view of a “few extremists,” but this argument only emphasizes the fact that individuals disagree about the meaning and values associated with the doll (PL’s Opp’n at 7 n. 17) — a fact recognized in a book put out under Mattel’s copyright just a few years ago. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit recently observed that the Barbie trademark was an example of a fanciful mark that has “add[ed] to the splendor of our language by giving us new ways to express ourselves.” Dreamwerks Prod. Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.1998). The Court noted that, just as a “[ljousy, mindless work is a McJob,” and “[a] quick fix is a Band-Aid[,] Glitz and ditz make for a Barbie World.” Id. Plaintiff makes the mistaken assumption however, that to warrant First Amendment protection, the song can only be about the doll and that if it has meaning beyond the doll, defendants are stripped of their First Amendment interests. Plaintiff purportedly bases this argument on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dr. Seuss, in which the Court observed a distinction between “parody (in which the copyrighted work is the target) and satire (in which the copyrighted work is merely a vehicle to poke fun at another target).” 109 F.3d at 1400. The Court made this distinction in the context of copyright infringement, in which the defendants’ book copied the distinctive “stove-pipe hat” worn by a feline character from The Cat in the Hat, a children’s book written by Dr. Seuss (née Theodor S. Geisel). Defendants used this image numerous times throughout the book and also copied Dr. Seuss’ “whimsical poetic style.” Id. at 1397-98. The Court rejected defendants’ fair use defense on the grounds that they had appropriated Dr. Seuss’ work, not to parody it, but rather to use it to satirize something entirely different — the O.J. Simpson trial. Id. at 1399-1401. The book did not hold Dr. Seuss’ “style up to ridicule”; instead, it only copied elements of his Cat in the Hat books “ ‘to get attention’ or maybe even ‘to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh.’ ” Id. at 1401. This case differs significantly from Dr. Seuss. First, unlike the copyright dispute in Dr. Seuss, Mattel’s trademark infringement case is based on defendant’s use of the word “Barbie.” See also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir.1989) (“Because overex-tension of Lanham Act restrictions in the area of titles [of artistic works] might intrude on First Amendment values, we must construe the Act narrowly to avoid such a conflict.”). Defendants do not use the image of the Barbie doll anywhere on their album, nor do the singers make themselves appear to look like the dolls Barbie and Ken, unlike the Dr. Seuss defendants’ use of Geisel’s images and writing style. Instead, they invoke the name of “Barbie,” poking fun at both her and the plastic values she represents. Plaintiff’s broad reading of Dr. Seuss would eviscerate the use of brand names as metaphors for the values they have come to symbolize; only songs and books that poke fun at the product and nothing else would receive First Amendment protection under plaintiffs interpretation. This approach would conflict with binding precedent on the protection afforded to expressive works such as parodies. See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 581, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (observing that “parody often shades into satire when society is lampooned through its creative artifacts” and that individual parodies need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis); Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437-38. As the New Kids Court observed, “[m]uch useful social and commercial discourse would be all but impossible if speakers were under threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a person, company or product by using its trademarks.” 971 F.2d at 307; see also Girl Scouts of U.S. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 808 F.Supp. 1112, 1119 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (“To prevent filmmakers, novelists, painters, and political satirists from including trademarks in their works is to cordon off an important part of modern culture from public discourse.”), aff'd, 996 F.2d 1477, 1478 (2d Cir.1993) (affirming “substantially for the reasons” given in the lower court’s “careful opinion”). As the Dr. Seuss Court itself observed, “[p]arody is regarded as a form of social and literary criticism, having a socially significant value as free speech under the First Amendment.” Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1400. Courts have observed that songs are also “indisputably works of artistic expression” deserving of First Amendment protections. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997; see also Fisher, 794 F.2d 432. Because this Court finds that the song Barbie Girl is a parody, it will also consider defendants’ First Amendment interests in commenting on a popular brand name when evaluating plaintiff’s trademark infringement claims. D. INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS Plaintiff argues that the song Barbie Girl infringes upon its federal trademark in the name “Barbie” and that the song title will likely confuse consumers into believing that the song is part of the Barbie product line. Defendants respond that plaintiff exaggerates the reach of its trademark and cannot silence song parodies that poke fun at its product simply because they use the word “Barbie” in their title or lyrics. The Lanham Act provides that Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering in sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ... shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant____ 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a) (West 1997). The Ninth Circuit has observed that the purpose of trademark has “remained constant and limited: Identification of the manufacturer or sponsor of a good or the provider of a service.” New Kids, 971 F.2d at 305. Trademarks represent “a limited property right in a particular word, phrase, or symbol.” Id. at 306. It does not allow trademark holders to censor or silence all discussion of their products that they find annoying or offensive. Cf. id. at 307 (discussing loss to social discoui’se if-speakers cannot make reference to a product by using its trademark). Before applying trademark law to this case, however, the Court will consider whether the song’s references to Mattel’s doll fall outside the trademark context as a fair use of the term “Barbie.” 1. The New Kids Standard Generally, the Ninth Circuit applies an eight-factor “likelihood of confusion standard” to both common law and federal statutory trademark infringement. See Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1403-04; AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir.1979); but see Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 n. 3 (2d Cir.1989) (noting that this multifaetor test is “at best awkward in the context of parody, which must invoke the original and constitutes artistic expression”). However, in New Kids on the Block, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the “nominative use of a mark — where the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing is pressed into service — lies outside the strictures of trademark law.” 971 F.2d at 308; see also In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Lit., 11 F.3d 1460, 1467 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that VCR manufacturer’s descriptive use of the term “VCR 2” was a fair use as a matter of law). The Ninth Circuit applies a fair use test, rather than the likelihood of confusion test, in cases “where the use of the trademark does not attempt to capitalize on consumer confusion or to appropriate the cachet of one product for a different one[,][s]uch minimal use of a mark — where the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing w pressed in service — lies outside the strictures of trademark law.” 971 F.2d at 308. The New Kids case involved two newspapers that conducted polls by phone about readers’ reactions to the musical group New Kids on the Block. The papers set up “900” numbers and charged their readers anywhere from 50 to 95 cents per minute to respond to the questions in the poll. The band brought a trademark infringement suit against the newspapers. Id. at 304-05. New Kids recognized that the newspaper’s use of the name constituted a “fair use” because it was used to describe the plaintiffs product (i.e. the band) rather than its own (i.e. its reader polls). Id. at 308. The Court reached this result even though the band had their own phone lines for their fans to call. Id. at 309. The Court specifically noted that the case differed from “the classic fair use case where the defendant had used the plaintiffs mark to describe the defendant’s own product.” Id. at 308. Here, defendants’ use of the term “Barbie” refers to the doll and the values it has come to represent. By describing the doll’s “life in plastic” and the various ways young consumers play with the doll (“you can brush my hair, undress me everywhere”), the band Aqua is not speaking specifically about its own product, but rather is commenting on and parodying Mattel’s. Although the title of the song, Barbie Girl, also refers to the product sold by defendants, the use of the term “Barbie” in this context describes a type of girl — one who is vacuous, unreal, and plastic. As noted earlier, the term “Barbie” has acquired a variety of cultural associations, not all of which are positive. The use of the term plays directly upon these associations. Cf. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 580, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (“[T]he heart of any parodists claim to quote from existing material is the use of some elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that author’s work”). The New Kids Court set out a three-part test for a “commercial user ... [to be] entitled to a nominative fair use defense”: First, the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the use must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder. Id. at 308. Defendants meet each of these three elements. First, defendants cannot effectively parody or comment on the Barbie doll without mentioning her by name. See id. at 306 (observing that “it is often virtually impossible to refer to a particular product for purposes of comparison, criticism, ... or any other purpose without using the mark”); see also Rasted Decl. at ¶ 11 (noting that the songwriter’s intent was “to compose a humorous song about the ‘Barbie fantasy world.’ ”); Defs.’ Mot. at 24 (“A principal underlying message of Barbie Girl- — having to do with the vacuous, ‘plastic,’ and frivolous lifestyle suggested by the doll and all of her possessions — simply could not be made without evoking the Barbie doll iconography.”). Second, the song’s use of the term “Barbie” is for purposes of parody. (See Rasted Decl. at ¶¶ 10-14); see also Fisher, 794 F.2d at 435 (noting that Congress has recognized parody as a potential “fair use” activity in the context of copyright law). Referring to Barbie as a “bimbo” living in a plastic world, the song critiques the party-girl image that Barbie has acquired in some quarters. (See Lanham Decl., ¶ 35). The singers do not adopt