Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION (FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS) BATES, District Judge. On April 18, 1988, the United States Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, was devastated by a massive car bomb that ushered in two decades of terrorist attacks on the United States and its citizens. Sixty-three persons, including seventeen U.S. citizens, were killed, and over one hundred others were injured. Now, in this civil action, over eighty plaintiffs — victims of the bombing and their families — seek to assign liability for their injuries to the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran”) and its agent the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (“MOIS”). Below, the Court sets forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law as to those claims. The Court will proceed in three steps. First, it will present its findings as to the causes of the bombing — specifically, its findings that Iran and MOIS were indeed responsible for supporting, funding, and otherwise carrying out the unconscionable attack. Second, the Court will detail the personal accounts of the plaintiffs in this action — stories that supply the necessary human dimension to the stark, horrifying skeleton of the bombing itself. Third, and finally, the Court will set forth its legal and remedial conclusions to bring this litigation to a close with some measure of relief for the plaintiffs. Given recent developments in the law, that relief will not include punitive damages, but does consist of a total award of $123,061,657 in compensatory damages to this group of plaintiffs. To be sure, neither this Memorandum Opinion nor this litigation can truly afford satisfactory relief from or bring closure to the terror and tragedy intentionally caused by the bombing. As the witnesses often recognized, no amount of monetary or other relief can ever bring back those who were killed or restore the past twenty years of the lives of those who have been injured and have suffered. But as those same witnesses frequently observed, perhaps it is only through the financial impact of damage awards in cases such as this that the governments (and their agents) responsible for terrorist conduct such as the bombing of the American Embassy in Beirut will be dissuaded from similar conduct in the future. FINDINGS OF FACT I. CAUSES OF THE EMBASSY BOMBING A. Lebanon Before 1984 and the Emergence of Hizbollah The country of Lebanon consists of dozens of different ethnic and religious groups, including Sunni Muslims, Shifite Muslims, Maronite Christians, and Druze. In the first part of the twentieth century, Lebanon’s political system was structured to provide for the sharing of power among the different ethnic and religious groups. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. I at 94-95. By 1975, however, the political power sharing arrangements did not reflect the country’s actual demographics, causing general unrest among the population. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. I at 95-96. These tensions culminated in the outbreak, in 1975, of what became a fifteen-year civil war. In the early years of the civil war, the United States and its nationals were not specifically targeted by the warring factions. See Tr. Vol. I at 123. This changed after the occurrence of two historically significant events. First, in 1979, the Shah of Iran, an ally of the United States, was overthrown by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his followers, who set up a fundamentalist Islamic regime in Iran. One of the revolutionaries’ objectives was to establish Iran as the preeminent power in the Middle East by, among other things, forcing the United States and other Western nations out of the region. Second, in the summer of 1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon, putatively in order to prevent the Palestinian Liberation Organization (“PLO”) from conducting terrorist activities across Lebanon’s border with Israel. See Tr. Vol. I at 100. Southern Lebanon at that time was home to a substantial portion of Lebanon’s Shi'ite population. See Tr. Vol. I at 96. Together, the 1979 Iranian revolution and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon led to a radicalization of Lebanon’s Shi‘ite community. As Dr. Patrick Clawson, Deputy Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (see Tr. Vol. II at 3) and an expert in Iranian politics, the Iranian economy, and Iranian sponsorship of terrorism, testified: [T]he Lebanese Shi‘a community had historically been politically quietistic and had deep links with Iran, a fellow Shi'a country.... [A]fter the Iranian Revolution in 1979, there’s a lot of interest by this new Iranian government encouraging political activism among the Lebanese Shi'ites. Tr. Vol. II at 9. Iran’s efforts met with “mixed success” until the 1982 Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. Id. With the invasion, the “Israelis quickly alienate[d] the Shi'ite population,” which in turn became “much more receptive to the Iranian message of anti-Western, anti-Israeli propaganda.” Tr. Vol. II at 9-10; see also Exh. 34(1) at 2 (declassified 1984 CIA document noting that “[t]he [1979] Iranian revolution ... and the Israeli invasion of predominantly-Shi'a southern Lebanon galvanized the Shi‘a and set the stage for the emergence of radical groups prone to terrorism”). The United States was a principal target of propaganda because by this time it “had become identified with the Israelis and ... [was] seen as an enemy of Islam and as an enemy of Iran because [of its support for] the Iraqis in the war against Iran.” Exh. 19 (Transcript of Deposition of Robert Oakley) at 15. It was in this context that Iran began pouring money and personnel into southern Lebanon to empower and train the Lebanese Shi'ites — who traditionally had been economically oppressed — to aid Iran in its goals of eradicating Westerners from the country and establishing an Islamic state. See Exh. 19 at 20-22, 50-52; Tr. Vol. II at 12-18; see also Exh. 34(7) at 2. Of principal importance in this regard, Iran began cultivating the development of a terrorist group among the Shi'ites that went by various names, including Hizbol-lah, Islamic Jihad, Right Against Wrong, and the Revolutionary Justice Organization. See Exh. 19 (Oakley Depo. Tr.) at 46; see also Oakley Depo. Exh. 10 (also at Exh. 29) at 304. Among other things, Iran provided Hiz-bollah with military arms, training, and other supplies, and issued propaganda to encourage Lebanese Shi'ites to join the organization. Exh. 34(5) at 2; see Exh. 34(1) at 2 (CIA analysis finding that Iran provided “training and military support to the radical Shfa groups based in the Bek-ka Valley”). In fact, soldiers from Iran’s elite military unit, the Revolutionary Guard, set up headquarters in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley to train Hizbollah recruits. Oakley Depo. Exh. 9 (also at Exh. 28); Exh. 10 (also Exh. 29) at 304; Exh. 34(5) at 2. By early 1985, the U.S. Government had “fresh and convincing evidence that radical elements highly placed within ... the government of Iran [were] giving operational policy advice to terrorists in Lebanon, specifically terrorists operating under the name ‘Islamic Jihad’ or Hizbollah.” Exh. 27 at 1; (also at Oakley Depo. Exh. 8). Iran also provided Hizbollah with financial support. Indeed, while support of Hizbollah was not specifically provided for in Iran’s annual budget, “Hisballah, the supreme religious leader and the president openly acknowledged that Iran was providing financial support, in fact proudly acknowledged that Iran was providing the financial support” for Hizbollah. Tr. Vol. II at 30. Dr. Clawson estimated that in 1983, the year of the Beirut Embassy bombing, Iran spent in the range of $50 million to $150 million on its terrorist efforts. Tr. Vol. II at 31. Beginning in the early 1980s, Hizbollah undertook a series of terrorist acts directed at Westerners. See Tr. Vol. II at 15-16; 24; see also Exh. 31 (chronology of Hizbollah terrorist activities targeting United States interests in Lebanon from 1982 — 1988). One of the first events was the July 1982 kidnaping of David Dodge, then the Acting President of the American University of Beirut. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. I at 124-25. This was a significant development, as “after the American embassy or maybe even more than the American embassy, the American University of Beirut is the symbol of America in Lebanon, indeed a very proud symbol in many respects.” Id. at 124. Other acts of terror against Western interests followed: the bombings of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks and French paratrooper base in October 1983 (see, e.g., Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F.Supp.2d 46 (D.D.C.2003)); the murder of Malcolm Kerr, President of the American University of Beirut, in January 1984; the United States Embassy Annex bombing in September 1984; and the kidnaping, from 1982 to 1991, of 50 Western hostages, including American, British, French and German nationals. See Exh. 34(8) at 3; Exh. 29 at 305-307; see also Exh. 19 (Oakley Depo. Tr.) at 27-28, quoting Oakley Depo. Exh. 3; see generally Tr. Vol. II at 22-30. Hizbollah accomplished its terrorist acts not just with the support of the Iranian government generally, but with the specific assistance of MOIS. An Iranian government ministry, MOIS was formally established by law in 1983 or 1984, although it had previously existed as an offshoot of the secret police under the regime of the former Shah of Iran. See Tr. Vol. II at 32-33. At the time, it was the second-most respected intelligence agency in the Middle East, after the Israeli intelligence apparatus. See id. at 33. As part of its operations, MOIS acted, and continues to act, as “a prime conduit to terrorist and extremist groups.” Exh. 34(8) at 2. See also Exh. 19 (Oakley Depo. Tr.) at 47; Oakley Depo. Exh. 10 (also at Exh. 34). In Lebanon in particular, MOIS supported Hizbollah, nurturing it with “financial assistance, arms and training.” Oakley Depo. Attach. 10 at 304 (also at Exh. 29); see also Tr. Vol. II at 12; Exh. 34(8) at 1-2. With this support, Hizbollah evolved into “one of the most capable and professional terrorist organizations in the world.” Exh. 34(8) at 2. B. The April 18,1983 Bombing On April 18, 1983, at approximately 1:05 p.m., an unidentified driver crashed a vehicle laden with hundreds of pounds of explosives into the main entrance of the United States Embassy in Beirut. See generally Exhs. 2-10; Exh. 11. Upon crashing into the Embassy, the vehicle exploded with a force so powerful that seven floors in the center section of the crescent-shaped building collapsed, or “pancaked.” See Exh. 17 at 3-4. Portions of the Embassy, including the Marine security guard post, the cafeteria, the United States Information Service library, the personnel section, and the consular section, were completely destroyed by the blast. Other parts of the building were severely damaged. See Tr. Vol. I at 131, 133; see also Exh. 16 at 6-17; see generally Exhs. 2-11. As a result of the blast and the resulting damage and destruction of portions of the Embassy, sixty-three people, including seventeen U.S. citizens, were killed. Over one hundred others were injured. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. I at 117, 135; see also Exhs. 2-11. The bombing was the first large-scale attack against a United States Embassy anywhere in the world. Exh. 19 (Oakley Depo. Tr.) at 22; see also Tr. Vol. I at 121-22; Exh. 35 at 13. At the time, it was not immediately clear who was responsible for the bombing. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. II at 27-28; Tr. Vol. I. At 121. But by 1984, the U.S. State Department, in its annual publication Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983, noted that “radical Lebanese Shi‘a using the nom-de-guerre Islamic Jihad’ and “operating] with Iranian support and encouragement” were “responsible for the suicide attack[s] against the U.S. Embassy.” Exh. 20 at 11 (also at Oakley Depo. Exh. 1); see Exh. 22 (discussing Islamic Jihad, or Hizbollah’s, terrorist activities, including, inter alia, the 1983 Beirut Embassy bombing, as “part of a major terrorist campaign aimed at the elimination of U.S. and western influence in Lebanon”); Oakley Depo. Tr. at 23-25. In connection with the evidentiary hearing in this matter, Ambassador Robert Oakley, the coordinator of the State Department’s counter-terrorism efforts who was tasked with assessing who was behind the 1983 Beirut Embassy bombing (see Exh. 19 (Oakley Depo. Tr.) at 9), testified that it was ultimately “very clear that Islamic Jihad [Hizbollah] was behind the bombing in 1983.” Id. at 21. Ambassador Oakley further expressed “confiden[ce] that the government of Iran was involved directly in the Hisballah organization, which was created, armed, trained, protected, provided technical assistance by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.” Id. at 21. Among other things, the complexity of the attack upon the U.S. Embassy in Beirut evidenced Iran’s central role in the attack. Dr. Clawson testified: [Tjhere’s no question that Iran was responsible for the selection of the target, provided much of the information for how to carry out the bombing, the expertise for how to build the bomb, the political direction that said that this was an important target to bomb, provided financial support for the bombers. It has the Iranians’ fingerprints all over it.... [T]his was quite a sophisticated and large bomb against a well-guarded target. And at the time, the people from the Shi‘a community who claimed responsibility for this were just getting into the business of having a militia and having — and engaging in some kinds of bombings. They hadn’t done a whole lot. They didn’t have established expertise; they didn’t have a group of people locally whom they could draw upon to do this. And furthermore, at this time they were so dependant upon financial support from Iran, they had no independent means of financial support, and furthermore, they were so dependant upon political guidance from Iran, Iran was quite directly ordering what targets to do, what not to do. Tr. Vol. II at 20-21. The bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in April 1983 represented a turning point with respect to Iran-sponsored terrorism conducted in Lebanon by Hizbollah. As Ambassador Oakley testified: I think it was a seminal event in anti-U.S. terrorism and Lebanon seems to be the easiest place for the Iranians to operate. As I’ve said before, they had several purposes, one was to drive the United States out of Lebanon, its military forces and also as you see subsequently from the attacks on professors at the — and the President of the American University in Beirut, a cultural influence. Same thing is true of the French who were supporting universities there and also had military forces there as part of the Multinational Force. The Iranians wanted to drive us out so they could put in an Iranian Shi'a revolutionary state. The second thing they wanted to do is to punish the United States for its support of Iraq, against Iran in the Iraq/Iran war, which at that stage was at its peak and the Iranians were at the losing end of it at that stage so they wanted to make it very, very clear they were going after us. The third thing they wanted to do was — all of these were helped by blowing up our embassy, was to show the power which Iran and its supporters could generate. And here you have something that’s not quite as powerful, but almost as the removal of the Shah as supported by the United States and indirectly by Israel. And finally they wanted to cement their relationship within the entire Middle East by showing what they could do against us, which made them a force throughout the Moslem world, if you will. Here they were taking on the great power, taking on the great Satan in a very clear way and yet doing it with plausible deni-ability by saying, Look, these Lebanese feel so strongly against the United States they are willing to take this type of action. So it serves several different purposes for the government of Iran and did so with a degree of success. [Although] we stood our ground, we weren’t driven out of Lebanon at this stage. It was only later on when they blew up the [Marine] barracks, which was a huge shock to the American people that finally public and political pressure convinced the Reagan administration they should pull the U.S. forces out of Lebanon. Exh. 19 (Oakley Depo. Tr.) at 50-52. On January 19, 1984, President Reagan designated Iran a state sponsor of terrorism. See Exh. 32. This designation was in response to Iran’s role in sponsoring a number of terrorist acts in Lebanon, including the April 18, 1983, Embassy bombing at issue here. See Tr. Vol. II at 28. Iran has ever since remained on the State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(d)(2003); 31 C.F.R. § 596.201 (2003). In fact, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, “[f]or over two decades, Iran’s involvement in international terrorism has been unmatched by any other state. Iran remains the world’s most capable and persistent state sponsor of terrorism.” Exh. 34(8) at 1. See also Exh. 29 at 304 (“Iran is currently one of the world’s most active states supporting international terrorism and subversion against other countries.”); Tr. Vol. II at 34 (Dr. Clawson responding, when asked whether Iran and MOIS continue to sponsor terrorism, “[o]h yes sir. No question about that.”) II. PLAINTIFFS Plaintiffs in this matter consist of individuals who were either personally injured in the April 1983 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, or who are family members of those killed or injured in the attack. The Court will discuss the testimony of each plaintiff in the order in which he or she testified, and will then discuss the testimony of expert witness Dr. Larry Pastor. A. Anne Dammarell Plaintiff Anne Dammarell was assigned to the United States Embassy in Beirut as a General Development Officer with the United States Agency for International Development (“AID”). See Tr. Vol. I at 14-15; see also Exh. 12. She was born January 2,1938, in Cincinnati, Ohio. She is a United States citizen and presently resides in Washington, D.C. See Tr. Vol. I at 12. Ms. Dammarell graduated from Our Lady of Cincinnati College in 1960, with a Bachelors Degree in English, and a minor in History and Philosophy. See Tr. Vol. I at 13. After graduation, Ms. Dammarell worked for Procter and Gamble as a market researcher, and thereafter traveled through Europe; worked as an au pair in France; and taught English as a second language in Spain. See id. In 1965, Ms. Dammarell joined AID, in the Office of International Training, in Washington, D.C. See Tr. Vol. I at 14. A few years later, Ms. Dammarell transferred to the Afghan desk, where she remained until 1980. See id. In the fall of 1980, Ms. Dammarell was posted overseas to the United States Embassy in Beirut, as a program officer with the then three-person AID mission. See id. at 14-15. She managed AID’S contacts with non-governmental organizations for a $5 million development program. See id. at 15. According to Ms. Dammarell, “Beirut was not a nine-to-five job by any stretch of the imagination. I think people who were there wanted to be there. They had a sense of mission and dedication, and you worked anytime to get the work done.” Id. at 15-16. Ms. Dammarell was evacuated from Beirut following the Israeli invasion in the summer of 1982, returning to the city in July 1982. See id. at 21-23; Exh. 12 at 1. In the following months, the AID mission at the Embassy increased to 17 people, and the Embassy staff in general increased as the United States’ efforts to bring peace to Lebanon intensified. See Tr. Vol. I at 27, 28. Ms. Dammarell extended her stay twice, in part to help train her replacement. See id. at 28. She was scheduled to leave Beirut on April 25, one week after the Embassy bombing. See id. April 18, 1983 was overcast and rainy. See Tr. Vol. I at 30. Ms. Dammarell spent the morning at home, interviewing contractors to move her belongings back to the United States the following week. See id. at 31. She arrived at the Embassy around noon, and planned on writing a report for William McIntyre, her supervisor. See id. She met Robert Pearson, who was coming out of the Embassy when she arrived, and the two decided to have lunch in the Embassy cafeteria to discuss her going away party. See id. at 31-32. The cafeteria was located on the same floor as and to the left of the main entry to the Embassy. See id. at 30. Mr. Pearson and Ms. Dammarell opted to sit in the front of the cafeteria, closest to the Cor-niche, which was a place Ms. Dammarell did not ordinarily sit. See id. at 31-32. As the pair discussed the possibility of peace, Ms. Dammarell: [H]eard a huge noise, an explosion, and I felt intense heat. And the only way I can describe that heat is if you’ve ever had an oven going full blast and you opened the door and the heat jumps out at you. That’s how I felt, except it wasn’t just my face; it was my entire body. The silence followed that — it happened all at once. It was the big noise, dead silence, tremendous heat, and then a sensation of being shocked, meaning as you put your finger in a wall electrical outlet, you can get a little shock ... I had that through my entire body, from my head to my toes.... The odd thing is I made up a story. It had nothing to do with reality, but I assumed that we were struck by lightning ... and I thought ... the contractors decided to save money ... and they’re going to put all the electrical system ... in the cafeteria, and I sat next to that and one of the wires came down and hit me and I’ve been electrocuted.... And then I thought -well, I’m dead. So I’m going to lean over and tell Bob that I’m dead. And when I tried to do that, I realized I didn’t have a body. And then I thought -isolation like I’ve never felt before.... I remember thinking, well, I can’t touch anybody. I can’t talk to Bob. I can’t see or hear. And this was not ... what ... they told me what death was going to be like and that I simply couldn’t endure the pain, the isolation. It was clear. I said — in my mind’s eye I said I couldn’t endure this. And when I did that, I got angry. And then the next thing I remember was being outside, waking up. I was very alert. I wasn’t groggy. And my jaw ached. It ached terribly. And I remembered thinking I’m glad I didn’t have all that dental work, because clearly my teeth are going to fall out. Tr. Vol. I at 33-34. Ms. Dammarell had been blown out of and along the cafeteria wall, landing somewhere outside the Embassy. See Tr. Vol. I at 33-35. After regaining consciousness, she: [Ljooked up [and] felt what I thought was a slab. I had thought it was a wall. And I’m claustrophobic, so I began to panic.... And I said, now, just calm down and you can get out of it.... I thought, well, I’ll see how heavy this wall is, so I thought I was going to pick up my arms and push, and I realized that I was telling ... my brain ... to do that, but I couldn’t get my arms to move. They were like jello. And it seemed a very slow process, but eventually I did raise them, and when I pushed against what was on my face, it crumbled .... And when I could pick away some of the debris and see the sky — it was a blue sky — I relaxed because I knew I’d get a supply of air. Id. at 35. Ms. Dammarell lay there for a bit, seeing “thick” and “tacky” blood on her right hand and attempting, but failing, to move her arms to pull herself out from under the debris. Tr. Vol. I at 35-36. She called out for Robert Pearson, and when he did not respond, assumed that he was dead. See id. at 36, 37. Ms. Dammarell heard people moaning, and turned her head to the right, towards the noise. See id. She saw smoke and flames in the distance, but did not worry because the fire was far away. See id. She turned her head to the left and saw: [F]ire coming towards me that was small, close to the ground, yellow, and getting nearer.... I thought I was going to be burned to death. I thought my hair would catch fire, and that would be the end of me. I looked up to see this big, black curl of smoke.... [I]t was thick and full and puffy, and I thought if I could inhale the smoke, I would suffocate before being burned to death. And I thought that would be easier. And the cloud began to dissipate, so that wasn’t possible, to be suffocated. And so I was trying -I suppose ‘prepare for death’ would be a way of saying it. But I didn’t have any ... deep religious insight ... but I remember feeling a deep sense of remorse; I wish I had been a better person, and that was a sadness, a deep sadness. Id. at 36-37. At one point, Ms. Dammarell looked at her left side and saw a “mass of red blood.” She assumed that her heart had been “ripped open” only to realize that she would not be alive if that were true. Tr. Vol. I at 37. She then assumed that the blood was due to her lung collapsing, and tried to remember that to tell her eventual rescuers. See id. at 37-38. Finally, several young men located Ms. Dammarell. They removed an air conditioner that had pinned her legs down, and picked her up. See Tr. Vol. I at 38. That was the first time Ms. Dammarell felt “searing pain.” Id. When they picked Ms. Dammarell up, she “seemed to go rigid.” Id. Ms. Dammarell’s rescuers ran with her towards the street and “toss[ed her] in [to an ambulance] like a sack of cement.” Id. at 39. She tried in vain to tell the attendant that her lung was collapsed, but could not make herself understood. See id. Ms. Dammarell was transported to the American University of Beirut (“AUB”) Hospital. See id. Once at AUB, she was placed on a gurney and rushed into the hospital. Her body got “stiffer and stiffer and more rigid, and so it got to a point where [she could] only look up.” Tr. Vol. I at 40. Ms. Dammarell was able to see and hear the commotion around her. See id. A nurse came and took her blood pressure, and for a moment she felt “really good.” Id. Ms. Dammarell then noticed that her gurney was being pushed “further and further and further down” the hallway; she assumed that she must be seriously injured and was going to die. Id. At one point, a doctor she knew approached her. Ms. Dammarell, still focused on what she thought was a punctured lung, tried to tell him about her lung. The doctor told her not to worry because she was “far better off than most people.” Tr. Vol. I at 41. A friend from Catholic Relief Services saw Ms. Damma-rell and told her that he would tell the Embassy that she was alive. See id. Ms. Dammarell was eventually given a glucose drip. She felt the pain of the needle, but generally did not feel much pain from her injuries, recalling that “[t]he body goes into some sort of shock under these types of trauma.... And it’s remarkable ... what you don’t feel until later on.” Id. at 41-42. While lying there, Ms. Dammarell heard Robert Pearson’s voice, the first indication she had that he had survived the bombing. Tr. Vol. I at 42. Late in the afternoon, Ms. Dammarell was finally taken to be x-rayed. See Tr. Vol. I at 42. When the technicians moved her to take the x-rays, Ms. Dammarell began to feel “the horrible pain that [she] can now associate with broken bones.” Id. at 42-13. The technicians then wanted to move Ms. Dammarell from the gurney to a bed, but Ms. Dammarell “wouldn’t let them touch [her].” Id. An American doctor intervened and told the technicians to leave her alone. See id. She does not remember how long she stayed on the gurney. See id. That night, Ms. Dammarell was placed in a room with a Lebanese roommate. See Tr. Vol. I at 43. She was not given any pain medication because she had a concussion. See id. at 43-44. Around midnight, an Embassy colleague, Diane Dillard, found her. She informed Ms. Dammarell that William McIntyre had been killed and generally informed her of others who were killed or injured. See id. at 44, 64. Ms. Dammarell asked Ms. Dillard to tell her friends in Rome that she would not be meeting them the following week. See id. While the Embassy lacked any means of communication, Ms. Dillard assured Ms. Dammarell that she would do so, simply to reassure her. See id. The next day, April 19, Ms. Dammarell was informed that she needed an operation. See Tr. Vol. I at 45. The operation was postponed because others who were injured needed immediate surgery. See id. at 46. Ms. Dammarell received a private room that evening, but had difficulty sleeping because she feared that the hospital would be bombed. See id. Ms. Dam-marell also remembers feeling euphoric at being alive, a feeling that lasted for months. See id. For the next few days, Ms. Dammarell was attended to by a rotating group of women, on whom Ms. Dammarell depended on because she “could do literally nothing for [herself].” Tr. Vol. I at 46-47. Many people from the Embassy and the community came to visit, a process that Ms. Dammarell was thankful for, but found “exhausting.” Id. at 47-48. From her visitors, she learned the identities of some of the individuals who had been killed and injured. See id. at 64. She also viewed for the first time news video of the bombing, which included scenes of her being carried out of the wreckage. See id. at 65. At some point, Ms. Dammarell was told that she could go to Germany for surgery, and have a family member meet her there. See id. at 47-48. Ms. Damma-rell agreed to go and asked for her sister, Elizabeth, to meet her. See id. at 48. Ms. Dammarell felt very “alone and frightened and vulnerable” because she had little control over her life, and no control over her body. Id. at 48-49. She wanted her sister to join her because she knew her sister loved her and would take care of her. See id. at 49. The night before her flight to Germany, Ms. Dammarell was given a barbiturate to help her sleep. See Tr. Vol. I at 49. She was worried about the pain she would feel during her transport, because touching one part of her body made pain radiate throughout. See id. The barbiturate caused nightmares, and Ms. Dammarell awoke exhausted. See id. The following morning, the United States government transported Ms. Dammarell to the airport for a government flight to Germany. See id. at 49-50. Ms. Dammarell was transported to the United States military hospital in Wiesbaden, Germany. See Tr. Vol. I at 50; see also Exh. 12 at 3. At the hospital nurses, for the first time, cleaned the black tar-like residue of the bombing off of her. See id. After being cleaned, Ms. Dammarell asked for, and received, a chefs salad, the same meal that she ate the day of the bombing. See id. at 50-51. While in Germany, Ms. Dammarell still felt a “sense of joy,” even though she knew people had been killed and injured in the bombing. Id. at 54; see, also Tr. Vol. II at 71-72 (expert testimony of Dr. Larry Pastor indicating that a “sense of euphoria” or “honeymoon stage” is a common post-trauma reaction based on a “tremendous relief as to what could have happened, but didn’t”). She became worried that she was unable to mourn and asked to see a psychiatrist, who told her that she would first have to focus on physically healing before she could focus on the loss of life. See Tr. Vol. I at 54; Tr. Vol. II at 70. Ms. Dammarell was told that if she had surgery in Germany, she would have to remain there for months until she recuperated. See Tr. Vol. I at 51. She opted instead to be transported to Georgetown University Hospital (“Georgetown”) in Washington, D.C. See id. at 52. From the various examinations she received, Ms. Dammarell ultimately learned that she had nineteen broken bones: her left foot was broken in three places; her left ribs were broken; her pelvic bone was broken; both arms were broken; two fingers in her left hand were broken; her collar bone was broken and her scapula was broken. See id. at 45. In May 1983, Ms. Dammarell underwent three operations on her left arm at Georgetown. See id. at 52, 59. The pain following the first operation was “searing.” Id. at 52-53. She received morphine every four hours, but after the first hour or two, she “moaned and moaned.” See id. The next year she had an operation on her left hand and the following year she had an operation on her left foot. See id. During one of her procedures, Ms. Dammarell also had glass surgically removed from her neck. See id. Ms. Dammarell testified that while she received “excellent care” at Georgetown, she needed a “mother or ombudsman” to supervise her treatment and ensure that she was being looked at “from head to toe.” Tr. Vol. I at 54. While she received any treatment she asked for, she felt like no one was looking at the “whole picture.” Id. at 54-55. During her recuperation, Ms. Damma-rell felt a “drive to be normal.” Tr. Vol. I at 53. She realized in Germany that she could not walk when a nurse tried to help her into a wheelchair. See id. at 55-56. She received physical therapy at Georgetown to relearn. Similarly, when Ms. Dammarell was asked to fill out a food menu at Georgetown, she realized that she could not write. Ms. Dammarell received occupational therapy at Georgetown to relearn these skills. See id. at 55. Overall, Ms. Dammarell felt that the “minute one problem was solved,” another would present itself, and as if she had “gone back to kindergarten.” Tr. Vol. I at 55. What bothered her most during her time in the hospital was “a sense of not being protected.” Id. She testified that on one occasion, she heard noises outside the hospital that she interpreted as gunshots, only to be informed by the nurse that it was construction. See id.; see also Tr. Vol. II at 54 (Dr. Larry Pastor testifying that aversion to stimuli such as sounds that make a victim re-experience a traumatic event is one of the symptom clusters found in trauma victims). Ms. Dammarell first went outside in May 1983. See Tr. Vol. I at 59; see also Exh. 12 at 5. In the summer of 1983, Ms. Dammarell began receiving out-patient treatment, returning to the hospital every day. See Tr. Vol. I at 60. She rented a house near Georgetown, and two of her nieces came to care for her. See id. During this time, Ms. Dammarell began to experience anxiety attacks, and feared that someone would attack and kill her. See id. at 60-61. She also began to experience nightmares, involving the occurrence of a variety of tragedies that resulted in her death. See id. at 61; see generally Tr. Vol. II at 53-55 (Dr. Larry Pastor testifying that anxiety attacks, flashbacks, and nightmares are among manifestations of symptom clusters associated with aftermath of trauma). To address the anxiety attacks and nightmares, Ms. Dammarell began seeing a psychiatrist. See Tr. Vol. I at 61. Additionally, Ms. Dammarell became very concerned that she would not be able to return to work and would become a burden to her family. See Tr. Vol. I at 67. When a State Department psychiatrist informed her that she might not be able to go to her next scheduled posting in Sri Lanka, that “pushed a panic button.” Id. Ms. Dammarell became determined to recover and assume her post, in part because it gave her a feeling of control over her life. See id. at 67-68. During the next several months, Ms. Dammarell concentrated primarily on her treatment. See Tr. Vol. I at 56. During this time, she received a visit from Robert Pugh, the Embassy’s Deputy Chief of Mission, who gave Ms. Dammarell, for the first time, a detailed explanation of the bombing. See id. at 64-65. In January 1984, Ms. Dammarell was declared medically fit, and assumed her post as an AID Program Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Sri Lanka. See Tr. Vol. I at 68. At this time, Ms. Dammarell could walk, but not run, and was incapable of rolling over. See id. When she arrived in Sri Lanka, the country’s civil war was heating up. See id. When AID contractors were kidnaped, Ms. Dammarell was so frightened that she “did not sleep for two or three days.” Id. at 69; see also Tr. Vol. II at 54, 59 (Dr. Larry Pastor testifying that sleeplessness is part of cluster of trauma-related disabilities, as are fears and anxieties in connection with events mirroring circumstances of underlying traumatizing event). When people asked Ms. Dam-marell if she was well, she “lied through [her] teeth” and said yes, because of the Foreign Service’s cultural belief that its members “have stiff upper lips and [can] do anything and [can] come through it unscathed and ... will succeed.” Tr. Vol. I at 69-70. Ms. Dammarell realized in Sri Lanka that she “really wasn’t functioning.” Tr. Vol. I at 70, 80. She testified that she “wasn’t sleeping. I was anxious, I was worried. I was afraid of being bombed again. I was having these dreadful nightmares that I couldn’t stop.” Id. at 80. When a colleague suggested that she might have “survivor’s guilt,” Ms. Damma-rell dismissed the suggestion. Id. Ms. Dammarell completed her three-year tour in Sri Lanka in 1987, and returned to Washington, D.C. See id. at 70. After working for several months with AID in Washington, D.C., Ms. Dammarell opted to retire early, at the age of fifty. See id. Her retirement became effective in January 1988. See id. Before the bombing, Ms. Dammarell had expected to serve overseas in the foreign service and retire at age 65. After retiring, Ms. Dammarell spent two years in Cairo, Egypt, teaching English as a second language. See Tr. Vol. I at 71. She remained in Egypt until the first Persian Gulf War began in 1991. See id. Upon returning to the United States, Ms. Dammarell enrolled at Georgetown University, and ultimately received a Masters in International Studies. See Tr. Vol. I at 72, 78. In her Master’s-level studies, Ms. Dammarell was primarily interested in learning about Beirut, and the Embassy bombing. See id. at 72. As Ms. Damma-rell testified: I wanted to get rid of Beirut [and] the nightmares and everything else, and part of that getting rid of is the process ... [of] trying to forgive the person who did it to me, and I could do it with the driver. I couldn’t do it with whoever thought of it. And I was so ignorant. I didn’t know a lot.... I thought maybe if I studied I could find out. Id. at 73-74. Ms. Dammarell eventually learned through her research that Iran was behind the bombing. See id. at 73. It was also through this research that Ms. Dammarell first learned of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). See id. at 74-75. Ms. Dammarell testified that the descriptions of the syndrome “seemed very familiar. I was grateful, actually, when I found out that it was a known entity. It wasn’t something that I was just hallucinating; it wasn’t just me.” Id. at 75. Ms. Dammarell chose to write her Master’s Thesis on the effects of the Embassy bombing on its survivors. See Tr. Vol. I at 74, 78; Exh. 14 (Dammarell thesis). Ms. Dammarell found that most of the materials she reviewed in her research dealt with the October 1983 bombing of the United States Marine Corps barracks, with very little literature dealing directly with the Embassy bombing. See Tr. Vol. I at 75. Ms. Dammarell thought that focusing on the Embassy bombing “[w]ould be useful ... it’s written down and it’s outside of me and it’s on paper and it’s there. So if anybody really wanted to look into the matter they could; there would be a document they could go to.” Id. at 79. After receiving her Master’s Degree, Ms. Dammarell worked with family members of the victims of the 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Id. at 59. Since the Beirut Embassy attack, Ms. Dammarell has had an “acute awareness of being vulnerable.” Tr. Vol. I at 82. She testified that: [A]fter the bombing ... I was super-aware of people when I would be at the airport boarding a plane. I would look at the people in front of me and say, well, these may be the last people on Earth I see. And then I would go and look at people if they had like a big bulgy briefcase, I would say, now, is there a bomb in that? ... I would go into a room, and I did this at State Department, and rearrange the furniture so that my desk wasn’t near the glass. I had a hissy fit in the post office when nobody would come and open up a box that was not identified by anybody. ... All of that was a result of living in Beirut. Since 9/11, the things that I’ve just mentioned are not at all unusual.... So what was odd, strange behavior then is not odd, strange behavior now. Id. at 81-82; see also Tr. Vol. II at 50-51 (Dr. Larry Pastor testifying that hyperar-ousal and related symptoms such as “exaggerated startle response, constant anxiety, being on edge, hypervigilence, [and] scanning the environment” are among manifestations of one of three primary symptom clusters characterizing PTSD). In November 2000, Ms. Dammarell saw an article in The Washington Post regarding lawsuits against Iran for claims of state-sponsored terrorism. See Tr. Vol. I at 82-83. Ms. Dammarell and several other litigants decided to investigate whether Iran could be sued for sponsoring the 1983 Beirut Embassy bombing. See id. at 83-84. When Ms. Dammarell discovered she could sue Iran she opted to do so: I resented the fact that nobody was held responsible. It was a front-page item for a while, it slipped off the front page, and I had the impression that nobody really cared to pursue it to find out who did it and why. It wasn’t politically expedient to do that, didn’t really matter because we were government workers and we wouldn’t be a threat in any way. I wanted an authority figure; I wanted an open public discussion. I wanted to identify who was responsible, to get it outside of me. It was no longer just me and my neurosis or me and my thinking or not thinking straightly. It was clear-cut and here, outside. I had the naive belief when I first started that we would actually face the government of Iran, that somehow there would be some sort of discussion. And of course, that would not be. That will not. That’s how I wanted it to be. I wanted it to be open and public, well-known, and somebody of authority would say, well, now, this isn’t a very nice thing to have had happen. Id. at 85-86. The economic damages suffered by Ms. Dammarell are set forth in the expert report of Steven A. Wolf. See Exh. 39 at 18 and Tab 5. B. Daniel Pellegrino Plaintiff Daniel Pellegrino served as a Naval Intelligence Specialist in the Defense Attaehé’s Office at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. See Tr. Vol. II at 111-112.; see also Exh. 40; Exh. 14 at 213. Mr. Pelle-grino was born November 28, 1950 in Cambridge, New York, and is a United States citizen. See Tr. Vol. II at 109. At the time of his testimony, Mr. Pellegrino resided at the United States Embassy compound in Tokyo, Japan. See id. at 108. Mr. Pellegrino graduated from Greenwich Central High School in Greenwich, New York, in June 1968 and joined the Army the next month, as a private. See Tr. Vol. II at 109. Mr. Pellegrino specialized in the area of intelligence, with his subsequent postings at various bases in the United States and Vietnam. See id. at 110. Mr. Pellegrino left the Army in July 1971. See id. Subsequently, he was briefly employed as a Sky Marshall; attended Hudson Valley Community College in New York; and worked for the Postal Service as a clerk-carrier. See id. at 111. Mr. Pellegrino left the postal service in November 1976, and re-joined the military, this time the Navy, as a seaman. See Tr. Vol. II at 111. He was subsequently stationed at various bases in the United States, Japan and Korea. See id. at 112. During this time, he received Russian language, naval intelligence, and attaché training. See id. at 111, 112. While stationed in Korea, Mr. Pellegrino inquired about obtaining a position in the Naval Attaché Office of a United States Embassy. See Tr. Vol. II at 112. He was offered postings in Ankara, Turkey, and Beirut, Lebanon. See id. Mr. Pellegrino chose Beirut because it was a shorter tour and would satisfy his sea obligation with the Navy. See id. He arrived in Beirut in April 1982, as the Intelligence Assistant in the Naval Attaché Office. See id. at 112-113. On the morning of April 18, 1983, Mr. Pellegrino arrived at the Embassy, grabbed a snack, and went to work in his office on the sixth floor. See Tr. Vol. II at 115. He broke for lunch around noon, and ate in the cafeteria with friends, including Dorothy Pech and Beth Samuel. See id. Mr. Pellegrino left the cafeteria around 1:00. See id. He passed by Post 1, where Marine Robert McMaugh was on duty. While Mr. Pellegrino would normally stop to speak with Mr. McMaugh, on this occasion he did not stop, and instead immediately returned to his office. See id. at 115-116. Mr. Pellegrino spoke with his supervisor, Colonel Winchell Craig, for a few minutes, and then made a phone call to cancel a flight. See id. at 116. At that moment, the bomb exploded. See id. As Mr. Pellegrino testified, he heard: [A] tremendous explosion, and I thought I had blinked. The office looked normal, and then when I opened my eyes, which I thought was a blink away, it was completely changed. It was just completely devastated. The ceiling had come down, the windows were gone, the air conditioner came out, the door was off its hinges, the walls were all sprayed with shrapnel or glass or debris, and lots of smoke, tear gas. Tr. Vol. II at 117. Mr. Pellegrino, who had been sitting in his chair, was thrown out of his chair and up against the wall behind him. See id. Mr. Pellegrino could not tell at this point whether he had been injured. See Tr. Vol. II at 117. He was puzzled because he saw a “fair amount of blood,” but “felt no pain.” Id. at 117-118. Mr. Pellegrino put his hands up to his ears, and when he brought them down, saw blood all over them and his shirt. See id. at 118. He then realized that he had been cut on his head, nose, side of his face, neck, and hands, and had glass embedded in his skin. See id. at 118, 122. Mr. Pellegrino initially assumed that his office had taken a direct hit from a rocket propelled grenade or airplane missile. See Tr. Vol. II at 118. While he was trying to determine the cause of the damage, a Marine came into his office and handed him a first aid pouch to stop the bleeding on his head. See id. at 118-119. Mr. Pellegrino initially hesitated to leave his office, even though his training dictated that he head towards the center of the Embassy, because he feared either that another round would hit the Embassy or a second bomb would detonate, a common practice in Beirut. See id. at 119. Eventually, Mr. Pel-legrino left his office and made his way to the center of the Embassy, where other people were waiting, including Colonel Craig. See id. While waiting for instructions, Mr. Pel-legrino asked Colonel Craig for a paper towel, which he used to blow his nose. As Mr. Pellegrino testified “it just came out all blood.” Tr. Vol. II at 119. Eventually, Mr. Pellegrino followed other individuals down to the fourth floor, where they attempted to exit the Embassy through a window. See id. at 120. The window was blocked by a beam that could not be moved, forcing the group to walk down to the second floor, where Mr. Pellegrino was able to exit the Embassy by climbing out a window and down a ladder. See id. Once on the ground, Mr. Pellegrino saw a crater, twenty to forty feet in diameter, in front of the Embassy, and realized that the Embassy had been hit by a car bomb. See id. at 120. Mr. Pellegrino was taken to AUB Hospital by ambulance. See Tr. Vol. II at 121. At the hospital, Mr. Pellegrino was directed to a waiting room with other bombing victims. See id. He recalls seeing one victim who “came in with his arm open, and it looked just like something out of a textbook as far as you could see the upper layer [of] skin, the bottom layer.” Id. A doctor ordered that Mr. Pellegrino be given two tetanus shots. Id. Mr. Pellegrino testified that “the shots hurt. And at that point, then I think my wounds started hurting. I really didn’t feel anything up until that time. Those two shots sort of made my pain come up.” Id. After that, Mr. Pellegrino was examined and received stitches. See id. at 122. After receiving treatment, Mr. Pellegri-no left the hospital, dodging reporters along the way, and saw Colonel Craig. See Tr. Vol. II at 123. Colonel Craig transported Mr. Pellegrino to the Colonel’s apartment, where he spent the night. See id. at 123-24. He was able to telephone his parents that evening to tell them he was alive. See id. at 124. Mr. Pellegrino could not sleep that night because his experiences that day “hark[ened] back to Vietnam.” Id. He knew that his parents would be worried for him, and he “said some prayers because ... a lot of people had gotten killed.” Id. The following day, Mr. Pellegrino returned to the Embassy, and eventually returned to his duties, which were relocated first to the Deputy Chief of Mission’s apartment and then to the British Embassy. See Tr. Vol. II at 124-26. Mr. Pelle-grino remained in Beirut until October, 1983. See id. at 126. In the following years, Mr. Pellegrino was posted to bases in the United States, Diego Garcia, Korea, and Japan. See Tr. Vol. II at 127-28. He retired from the military in October 1993. See id. at 128. Mr. Pellegrino’s retirement was prompted by lack of promotions. See id. at 136. Prior to Beirut, Mr. Pellegrino had been regularly promoted; subsequent to Beirut, the promotions stopped. See id.; see also Tr. Vol. II at 75 (psychiatric expert Larry Pastor testifying that “one could predict overall lower occupational achievement and more difficulties along the way” among those with PTSD and similar trauma-related disorders stemming from Embassy bombing). Mr. Pellegrino testified that he stopped receiving promotions because after the bombing “I wasn’t the same person I was when I got [to Beirut]. I think just overall I was a different kind of person, completely changed.” Id. at 136; see also Tr. Vol. II at 55 (Dr. Larry Pastor testifying that deterioration of performance in major life areas, including in the workplace, is one of ten symptom clusters often seen in aftermath of trauma). In December 1993, Mr. Pellegrino began working for the Department of Veterans Affairs in Albany, New York. See Tr. Vol. II at 128. He remained with the Department until 1997, when he joined the State Department as an Office Manager. See id. Since 1997, Mr. Pellegrino has been posted to Moscow, the Ivory Coast, and most recently Japan. See id. at 129. After the bombing, Mr. Pellegrino suffered psychological effects: I know my temper was very short most of the time. Little things would make me very angry. We were advised ... to keep a weapon in our apartments, and I — instead of just keeping it unloaded in the chamber, I kept it loaded all of the time. I was always hyper-aware of where I was going or what I was doing. Kept a low profile.... I think I had problems with concentration at times. I never slept well. I’ve really never slept well since Beirut.... I know I didn’t sleep well, and when I did, things were bothering me ... [like s]afety, physical safety, and someone may come crashing through the door. Kidnaping was — the whole time I was [in Beirut], kidnaping was a threat.... Tr. Vol. II at 129-130, 131, 133; see generally Tr. Vol. II at 53-56 (Dr. Larry Pastor discussing symptom clusters involved in PTSD, with specific symptoms including, inter alia, sleeplessness; nightmares; fearfulness; avoidance of sights, smells and other stimuli that might trigger a re-experiencing of traumatic event; difficulty in emotionally connecting with others, moodiness and irritability; hypervigilence; and preoccupation with underlying trauma). Mr. Pellegrino never sought counseling to treat these issues, because he feared that his security clearance would be taken away: I had a security clearance, and I think in those days if you had walked in and said something like that, then you would automatically have lost your security clearance. I had in mind that I wanted to continue with my career, so I chose not to say anything. Id. at 132. In retrospect, Mr. Pellegrino believes that he would have benefitted from counseling. See id. at 133. Mr. Pellegrino believes that the bombing negatively impacted at least one of his post-Beirut postings with the State Department. See Tr. Vol. II at 133. Specifically, at his Moscow posting, Mr. Pellegrino’s office at the Embassy was a windowless room within a windowless room. See id. at 133-34. Because Mr. Pellegrino had escaped from the Beirut Embassy through a window, the windowless rooms made him feel “trapped,” thus effecting his performance. See id. at 134. Accordingly, he “did not perform as well as [he] could have and had trouble concentrating and learning new things.” Id. Mr. Pellegrino testified that he decided to participate in this lawsuit because he wanted “to come up here and try and speak for the people who can’t speak. And that refers to the people that were killed back on April 18, 1983, and I’m here to respectfully request that this Court assign accountability and responsibility to that act, that murderous act, on that day.” Tr. Vol. II at 135. The economic damages suffered by Mr. Pellegrino are set forth in the expert report of Steven A. Wolf. See Exh. 39 at 25 and Tab 8. C. Dorothy Pech Plaintiff Dorothy Pech was posted to the U.S. Embassy in Beirut as secretary to the Deputy Chief of Mission. See Tr. Vol. III at 9-10; see also Exh. 41; Exh. 14 at 206. She was born November 6, 1929 in Portsmouth, Ohio, and is a United States citizen. See Tr. Vol. III at 6. She currently resides in Vienna, Virginia. See id. at 5. Ms. Pech graduated from Southeastern High School in Detroit, Michigan, in 1948. See Tr. Vol. III at 6. After graduating from high school, Ms. Pech worked for various employers as a secretary. See id. In 1952, Ms. Pech joined the State Department Foreign Service, as a secretary. See Tr. Vol. III at 6-7. In the following years, she was assigned to the United States Embassies in India and Ethiopia. See id. at 7. Ms. Pech remained in Ethiopia until April 1956, when she resigned her position to marry. See id. Ms. Pech thereafter lived with her family in Switzerland, Michigan, and Virginia, and was largely out of the work force. See id. at 7-8. In 1969, Ms. Pech rejoined the work force, as a secretary for Marymount College. See Tr. Vol. III at 8. She returned to the State Department in 1975, and subsequently rejoined the Foreign Service. In 1982, Ms. Pech was transferred to the United States Embassy in Beirut as secretary to the Deputy Chief of Mission. See Tr. Vol. III at 9-10. On the morning of April 18, 1983, when Ms. Pech first arrived at the Embassy, she spoke with Corporal Robert McMaugh, the Marine on duty at Post 1. Ms. Pech testified, “I looked at him and [said], how are you doing, Bob? [He replied,] Oh, I don’t feel too good. I said, oh, you guys are going out too much. And I said, well, maybe it will be a short day. And I will always remember that, because he was blown away ... later.” Tr. Vol. III at 13. Ms. Pech spent the morning in her office at the Embassy working and also attempting to make travel arrangements for her son to visit Beirut. See Tr. Vol. III at 13-14. Ms. Pech took lunch at 12:00 in the Embassy cafeteria with Beth Samuel and a few others. See id at 14. Ms. Pech left the cafeteria at about 12:55, and went to the Embassy’s budget and fiscal section to cash a check. See id. at 14-15. Ms. Pech testified that she had: [J]ust finished writing the check when everything — I thought [it] was an earthquake .... And the checkbook fell, and I fell down and something — we’ll never know, I guess a piece of the wall — hit me, a big large gap across the forehead, and you start bleeding a lot. But very oddly, very calm ... [the cashier] helped me up.... Of course, he was spared, being in that little box of his ... and we went out in the hall and just kind of stood there. And somebody said, sit down, I think you’ve lost your eye. Tr. Vol. III at 15. Once in the hallway, Ms. Pech testified that she saw that the: Marines were trying to get a Lebanese friend of mine, who had been also in personnel, she had literally been scalped. It was horrible. They were trying to get her out.... And there was a ... high metal gate they were trying to get her over and then get us out. We all started kind of lining up, but it jammed .... We simply couldn’t get out so easily. And so we were just kind of standing there and bleeding, and most of us, after all, were able to stand, which was something. And one person got very excited, and I just said, please keep quiet, you’ll make the rest of us — and she did. And then ... a Red Cross person ... came and said, there’s another way we can get you out. So just a few of us ... decided to go_ [W]e went one floor ... down, although the stair, the elevator, everything was very, very bad. But we could get down that flight.... But then we had to jump, oh, maybe three, four feet across to the other building to get to the ladder to go down, and I was just — I was bleeding. Someone had given me a handkerchief, and I couldn’t see at all. I said, I can’t do that. I said, it’s just too hard. Well, it was either that or not, you know. So I did, and somebody grabbed me and proceeded to go down the ladder just, you know, backwards, just dripping, dripping. And I got to the ground floor and then realized what devastation had happened. Tr. Vol. III at 16-17. Ms. Pech was immediately “hustled ... into [a] taxi” for transport to AUB Hospital. Tr. Vol. III at 17. As the taxi passed the front of the Embassy, Ms. Pech “saw someone hanging from the Embassy and ... all the smoke and the debris and the noise.” Id. Ms. Pech testified that at the hospital: Those of us who could walk, we were all in one huge ... room, and many people had, you know, glass and stuff like that all around, some bleeding and stuff, and I was bleeding pretty bad. But at some point they gave me something to kind of stop it from dripping.... And finally [they] got to me and ... the doctor came and he said, now just lie down and don’t move. So they give you nothing. Nothing.... So I said, okay, you know, just lying there, but my leg was jumping in sort of shock, and then someone held it down a bit.... And [the doctor] said in English, oh, if this had been a breath more it would have been very serious. I said, speak Arabic so I don’t understand. And he proceeded to sew me up. Apparently, when you’re in that shock, you don’t feel the pain until later. Tr. Vol. III at 17-18; see Exh. 41 at 2. As a result of her injury, Ms. Pech temporarily lost sight in her left eye, regaining it three weeks after the Embassy bombing. See Tr. Vol. III at 23. The injury may have permanently harmed her eyesight in that eye. See id. at 25. In addition to her physical injuries, Ms. Pech lost a number of friends in the bombing. One friend, Mrs. Amal, had planned a party for the Saturday following the bombing. Instead of a party, Ms. Pech attended Mrs. Amal’s funeral. See id. at 28-29. After receiving treatment, Ms. Pech went back to her apartment. See Tr. Vol. III at 19. While Ms. Pech considered herself “tough and always very independent,” she was unable to remain in her apartment alone. Id. at 19-20. She called Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Pugh, who picked her up and took her to his apartment. See id. at 20. She remained at Mr. Pugh’s apartment for the next several days, helping with the phones and typing up cables listing the names of those killed and injured in the bombing. See id. Ms. Pech did not have contact with her family until two days after the bombing. See Tr. Vol. III at 21-22. During those days, her family did not know whether she had survived. They had contacted the State Department, but were told only that Ms. Pech had been “accounted for.” Id. at 21. Several days after the bombing, the bodies of the United States citizens killed in the attack were transported back to the United States from the Beirut airport. See Tr. Vol. III at 22. Ms. Pech attended the ceremony in B