Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER PARKER, Chief Judge. The Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 10), filed December 22, 2000, raised the following issues: 1. Whether the federal government infringed Plaintiffs’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to federal statutes by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, by selectively enforcing the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) against Plaintiffs. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order filed February 25, 2002, this Court ruled that the Defendants did not violate Plaintiffs’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause. 2. Whether, as Plaintiffs contend, several canons of statutory construction instruct that the CSA’s treatment of dimethyltryptamine (DMT) as a controlled substance does not extend also to include hoasea as a controlled substance. The Court rejects this argument and holds that the plain language of CSA chosen by Congress clearly covers hoasea as a controlled substance. 3. Whether by interpreting CSA to prohibit the Plaintiffs’ use of hoasea, the Defendants have violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by restricting Plaintiffs’ religious practices, which focus on the use of hoas-ea. The Court concludes that the Defendants have not infringed Plaintiffs’ rights under the First Amendment because Congress drafted and promulgated CSA as a neutral law of general applicability and the burden it puts on Plaintiffs’ practices does not violate the First Amendment. 4. Whether doctrines of international law direct that Defendants, as representatives of the United States government, should permit the Plaintiffs’ ceremonial use of hoasea. The Court rules that international law principles do not override Congress’ clear application of the CSA to any use of hoasea in the United States. 5. Whether the Defendants have met the heavy burden, imposed by Congress on the government through passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), to prove that the CSA’s restriction on Plaintiffs’ religious practices regarding use of hoasea furthers a compelling governmental interest through the least restrictive means. The Court begins with the observation that Defendants, at this stage of this action, have explicitly conceded that Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case under RFRA, and the Court concludes that, on the basis of the evidence presented thus far, the government has failed to meet its high burden of proof, entitling Plaintiffs to a preliminary injunction based on RFRA. 1. BACKGROUND This case centers on a tea, called hoasca, brewed from two plants native to the Amazon River Basin in South America. The consumption of hoasca plays a central role in the religious ceremonies of the 0 Centro Espirita Beneficíente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV)- Founded in Brazil in 1961, the UDV church blends Christian theology with traditional indigenous religious beliefs. Church doctrine instructs that hoas-ca is a sacrament, and UDV members ingest the tea during church services. About 8,000 people belong to the UDV in Brazil. In 1993, the UDV officially established a branch of the church in the United States. The United States branch of the UDV, headquartered in Santa Fe, New Mexico, has about 130 members. The plants used to make hoasca do not grow in this country, and prior to 1999, UDV leaders in the United States imported the tea from Brazil for use in church ceremonies. On May 21, 1999, the United States Customs Service seized a substantial quantity of hoasca from the UDV in the United States. The federal government takes the position that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. § 801, et seq., prohibits the possession and use of hoasca. One of the plant components of the tea contains dimethyltryptamine (DMT), a hallucinogenic chemical. Under the CSA, DMT is a “Schedule I” controlled substance and hence subject to strict controls. Although the United States has not filed any criminal charges stemming from UDV officials’ possession of hoasca, the government has threatened prosecution for future possession of the tea. In light of the government’s interpretation of the CSA’s application to hoasca, the UDV has ceased using the tea in the United States. The Plaintiffs in the present action are the United States branch of the UDV, as well as several church leaders and members in the United States. On November 21, 2000, the Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Doc. No. 1), alleging violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, Equal Protection principles, the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and international laws and treaties. In addition, the Complaint asserts that the CSA does not apply to hoasca. On December 22, 2000, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 10). This Court held a hearing on the Plaintiffs’ motion October 22 through November 2, 2001, during which the parties presented evidence and arguments on a number of issues. As previously noted, on February 25, 2002, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction as to their Equal Protection claim. This Memorandum Opinion and Order addresses the other grounds on which the Plaintiffs base their Motion for Preliminary Injunction. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under Tenth Circuit law, “[a] movant is entitled to a preliminary injunction if he can establish the following: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the case; (2) irreparable injury to the mov-ant if the preliminary injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the injury to the other party under the preliminary injunction; and (4) the injunction is not adverse to the public interest.” Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir.2001). This Memorandum Opinion and Order focuses on the Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment, RFRA, statutory construction, and international law claims. This Court recognizes that “[i]f the party seeking the preliminary injunction can establish the last three factors ... then the first factor becomes less strict — i.e., instead of showing a substantial likelihood of success, the party need only prove that there are ‘questions going to the merits ... so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful as to make the issue ripe for litigation and deserving of more deliberate investigation.’ ” Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234, 1246-1247 (10th Cir.2001), quoting Federal Lands Legal Consortium v. United States, 195 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir.1999). However, given the breadth of the parties’ briefing in this case, and the extensiveness of the arguments and evidence presented at the hearing, it seems appropriate to consider the substance of the Plaintiffs’ claims at this time. The Court’s decisions in this Memorandum Opinion and Order will not foreclose the parties from presenting additional evidence at a trial on the merits. For example, this Court understands that the Government may wish to contest at a later time whether the Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case under RFRA, and that the Plaintiffs may wish to develop a selective prosecution argument. III. DISCUSSION A. FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ” The Supreme Court has observed that “[i]n addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, [its] cases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993), citing Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). In contrast, a law that is not neutral and is not generally applicable “must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32, 113 S.Ct. 2217. While an evaluation of a free exercise claim typically begins by considering whether the plaintiffs have shown that a governmental action substantially burdens their religious practices, Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989), the Court need not address that preliminary issue in this case. The Government- does not contest, at this stage of litigation, that its interpretation of the CSA which prohibits ceremonial hoasca use substantially burdens the Plaintiffs’ exercise of their religion. Therefore, this Court turns to the question of whether the CSA is a neutral law of general applicability- The Plaintiffs argue that the CSA “cannot be characterized as a neutral law of general applicability,” because the statute “provides a wide variety of exceptions, exemptions and licenses permitting the use of controlled substances in non-religious settings.” Reply, at 31. As support for their argument that the CSA is neither neutral nor generally applicable, the Plaintiffs point to the exemptions set forth in the statute for certain uses of controlled substances. For example, 21 U.S.C. § 872(e) provides that the Attorney General “may authorize the possession, distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances by persons engaged in research.” Elsewhere in the CSA, 21 U.S.C. §§ 822 and 823 outline procedures for the Attorney General to use in registering entities that engage in the manufacture and distribution of controlled substances for medical, scientific, research, and industrial purposes. As the Government observes, the Plaintiffs’ analysis seems to deviate from Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent regarding whether controlled substances laws are neutral and generally applicable. In Smith, the Supreme Court considered an Oregon drag statute which prohibited the possession of peyote, among other substances, and which contained no exception for the religious use of controlled substances. The plaintiffs in Smith had been fired from their jobs for consuming peyote in a ceremonial setting, and the state denied their applications for employment benefits on the basis that the plaintiffs’ dismissal stemmed from their use of a controlled substance. The plaintiffs maintained that Oregon had violated their free exercise rights by enforcing the statutory prohibition against peyote to restrict the plaintiffs’ religious use of the substance. Rejecting the Smith plaintiffs’ argument, the Supreme Court stated that its “decisions have consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’ ” Id. at 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595, quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n. 3, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). The Government stresses that the Oregon law upheld in Smith provides exemptions for the use of controlled substances similar to those outlined in the federal Controlled Substances Act. O.R.S. § 475.125. Thus, according to the Government, “Smith itself effectively answers Plaintiffs’ claim that the medical, scientific, industrial, and research exemptions contained in the Controlled Substances Act render the Act non-neutral and not generally applicable.” Response, at 39. The Tenth Circuit relied on Smith in order to reach its decision in United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (1996). In Meyers, a criminal defendant charged with marijuana offenses under the federal Controlled Substances Act alleged that his adherence to the “Church of Marijuana” required him to distribute the drug. The Tenth Circuit declined to accept Mr. Meyers’s argument that the CSA’s prohibition of marijuana distribution violated his First Amendment rights. The court held that “Meyers’ challenge fails for the same reasons as the respondents challenge in Smith failed, i.e., the right to free exercise of religion under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law incidentally affects religious practice.” Id. at 1481. The comments of the Meyers court reflect an assumption that the CSA is a neutral, generally applicable law within the meaning of Smith. The court stated, for example, that “when, as here, the challenge is to a valid neutral law of general applicability, the law need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest.” Id., citing Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 521, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (emphasis added). Given the opinions in Smith and Meyers, this Court believes that it has little leeway to accept the Plaintiffs’ argument that the CSA is not a neutral, generally applicable law. However, the Plaintiffs contend that this case is distinguishable from Smith and Meyers. The Plaintiffs maintain that Smith and Meyers are distinct from the present case in that the courts in Smith and Meyers were not considering the issue of whether exemptions for scientific research and other uses would render a drug law non-neutral or not generally applicable. In Smith and Meyers, the parties raising First Amendment challenges to controlled substance laws were not contesting the neutrality or general applicability of those laws. Instead, they were claiming that otherwise-valid laws that incidentally burden the practice of a person’s religion could violate that individual’s free exercise rights. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (Observing that the plaintiffs “contend that their religious motivation for using peyote places them beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious practice, and that is concededly constitutional as applied to those who use the drug for other reasons”); Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1481 (Taking note of criminal defendant’s suggestion that even a neutral, generally applicable law must be justified by a compelling government interest if it imposes a burden on religious conduct.) This Court will therefore consider whether the CSA is a neutral, generally applicable law in light of the exceptions that it provides for research and other uses. The United States Supreme Court examined the concepts of neutrality and general applicability in Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472. In Lukumi, a church affiliated with the Santería religion challenged several ordinances that had been enacted by the Hialeah, Florida city council. Animal sacrifice plays a significant role in the practice of Santería. When the plaintiff church announced plans to open a house of worship in Hialeah, the city council passed ordinances banning the ritual killing of animals but permitting the killing of animals in many other contexts. The Supreme Court concluded that Hialeah’s regulatory scheme was neither neutral nor generally applicable. The ordinances failed the neutrality test because, taken together, they amounted to a “religious gerrymander.” Id. at 535, 113 S.Ct. 2217, quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 696, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The city council had essentially prohibited the killing of animals for religious reasons while exempting from prohibition almost all non-religious killing. The Hialeah ordinances were not generally applicable, because they were underinclusive with regard to the laws’ purported goals, ultimately “pursuing] the city’s governmental interests only against conduct motivated by religious belief.” In reaching its decision, the Lukumi court provided helpful guidelines for analyzing the concepts of neutrality and general applicability. This Court will draw on these guidelines in assessing the Plaintiffs’ position. 1. NEUTRALITY Under Lukumi, in order to establish that a law is not neutral, a plaintiff must show “that the object or purpose of [the] law is the suppression of religion or religious conduct.” Id. at 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The Lukumi court explained that “the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face,” but that “[fjacial neutrality is not determinative.” Id. at 533-34, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Because “[t]he Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as overt,” courts should look beyond the surface for indications that the purpose of a law is to suppress religion. Id. at 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The court observed that “the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.” Id. at 535, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The Plaintiffs in the present case do not appear to contend that, on its face, the CSA targets the religious use of drugs. Rather, the Plaintiffs seem to argue that a comparison between the statute’s treatment of secular uses, as opposed to its treatment of religious uses, supports the inference that the CSA’s purpose is to limit the religious use of controlled substances. The Plaintiffs maintain that “the CSA is not neutral as between secular and religious interests,” because the law exempts the secular use of controlled substances in medical, scientific, industrial, and research settings, but bans almost all religious uses of controlled substances. The Plaintiffs’ failure to take into account the full spectrum of potential uses for drugs undercuts their argument, however. For example, the Plaintiffs ignore a very important category of secular drug use — recreational drug use. This Court imagines that there are a number of individuals in the United States who may wish to use a given controlled substance in a setting that is neither scientific nor ceremonial in a religious context. The CSA restricts the freedom of recreational users, as well religious users, to consume controlled substances. This Court cannot reasonably infer from the way that the CSA operates that the purpose of the law is to target religious ceremonial drug use. This case therefore presents much different circumstances from Lukumi, where the Supreme Court found, upon examining the operation of the challenged city ordinances, that “[i]t is a necessary conclusion that almost the only conduct subject to [the ordinances] is the religious exercise of Santería church members.” Id. at 535, 113 S.Ct. 2217. 2. GENERAL APPLICABILITY Discussing the requirement of general applicability, the Lukumi court observed that “[a]ll laws are selective to some extent, but categories of selection are of paramount concern when a law has the incidental effect of burdening religious practice.” Id. at 542, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The “government ... cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief.” Id. at 543, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The ordinances at issue in Lukumi were so deficient that the court declined to “define with precision the standard used to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general application.” Id. However, the Lukumi court made clear that a law is not generally applicable if it was purportedly adopted to protect certain interests, yet “fail[s] to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests in a similar or greater degree than [the banned religious conduct] does.” Id. In Lukumi, for example, the city of Hialeah claimed that one of the goals of the contested ordinances was to prevent cruelty to animals. The Supreme Court noted, though, that “[m]any types of animal deaths or kills for nonreligious reasons are either not prohibited or approved by express provision.” Id. at 543, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Hunting, fishing, rodent extermination, and the euthanasia of stray animals all continued to be legal. The Lukumi court concluded that “[djespite the city’s proffered interest in preventing cruelty to animals, the ordinances are drafted with care to forbid few killings but those occasioned by religious sacrifice.” Id. The Court found that the ordinances were similarly underinclusive with respect to the city’s claimed goal of protecting public health. The Third Circuit examined the general applicability requirement in an opinion cited by both the Plaintiffs and the Government. In Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (1999), a Newark Police Department policy required police officers to shave their beards. The police department allowed exceptions to the shaving policy for officers who had medical reasons for not shaving and for undercover officers. Two police officers challenged the departmental policy on the ground that they are Sunni Muslims and their religion prohibits them from shaving. The Third Circuit found that while the exemption for undercover officers did not diminish the general applicability of the beard policy, the medical exemption did. The Department had adopted the policy to promote a uniform appearance among its officers. The Third Circuit pointed out that “the undercover exception ... does not undermine the Department’s interest in uniformity because undercover officers ‘obviously are not held out to the public as law enforcement personnel].’ ” Id. at 366 (citing reply brief.) In contrast, “the medical exemption raises concern because it indicates that the Department has made a value judgment that secular (i.e., medical) motivations for wearing a beard are important enough to overcome its general interest in uniformity but that religious motivations are not.” Id. at 366. Like the Third Circuit, the District of Nebraska found that a governmental policy failed to meet the general applicability standard elucidated in Lukumi. Rader v. Johnston, 924 F.Supp. 1540 (D.Neb.1996) concerned a University of Nebraska-Kear-ney rule requiring freshmen to live in dormitories on campus. University officials represented that the goals of the policy were to promote diversity and tolerance, encourage academic achievement, and, for financial reasons, to make sure that there were enough students living on campus to fill the dorms. The plaintiff, a devout Christian, requested an exemption from the on-campus housing policy, so that he could live instead in an off-campus Christian housing facility. The plaintiff maintained that the lifestyle in the dorms, where many students drank alcohol and had parties, would interfere with the practice of his religion. When the university denied the plaintiff’s application for an exemption, he brought a claim under the Free Exercise clause. In reaching its decision, the District of Nebraska took note of the many categories of freshmen exempt from the housing rule. The policy enumerated exceptions for married students, students with parents living nearby, part-time students, and students who were older than nineteen at the start of the school year. In addition, university officials granted a significant number of exceptions to students applying for waivers based on a variety of special circumstances. Evidence showed that in practice, the university applied the housing rule to only 1,600 of 2,500 freshmen. The District of Nebraska cited the fact that “[o]ver one third of the freshman students ... are not required to comply with the parietal rule” in determining that “the parietal rule cannot be viewed as generally applicable to all freshman students.” Id. at 1558. The court stressed that “although exceptions are granted by the defendants for a variety of nonreligious reasons, they are not granted for religious reasons.” Id. at 1553. In this case, the Court will follow the approach outlined in Lukumi. In order to evaluate the general applicability of the CSA, this Court will inquire into whether the statute is substantially underinclusive as to its purported aims —whether the CSA “fail[s] to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers” governmental interests “in a similar or greater degree than” the religious ceremonial consumption of controlled substances does. In their memorandum in support of the motion for preliminary injunction, the Plaintiffs emphasize that through the CSA’s registration scheme for drugs used in medical, scientific, industrial, and research settings, huge amounts of controlled substances are produced and distributed. However, this Court believes, as does the Government, that the Lukumi framework requires the Plaintiffs to demonstrate more than that the CSA includes significant exceptions for certain secular uses of controlled substances. Rather, the Plaintiffs must show that the research and scientific exceptions to the CSA jeopardize the same interests that the government uses to justify the restrictions on religious conduct imposed by the CSA. The Court concludes in this case that the secular exceptions specified in the CSA do not implicate the purpose of the law. The Government has suggested that in enacting the CSA, “Congress’s primary target was a secular one: the recreational use of controlled substances.” Reply at 37, citing H.R.Rep. No. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566. This Court agrees that the CSA reflects Congressional concern about the risks to public health and safety associated using controlled substances. Included among the findings at the beginning of the CSA is the statement that “[t]he illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession and improper use of controlled substances have a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people.” 21 U.S.C. § 801(2). As the Third Circuit explained in the City of Newark case, “the Free Exercise Clause does not require the government to apply its laws to activities that it does not have an interest in preventing.” 170 F.3d at 366. Here, allowing certain uses of drugs in controlled scientific, research, and medical environments does not run counter to the government’s interest in promoting public health. The unregulated consumption of drugs in ceremonial settings may present risks of adverse health effects and illegal diversion in a way that the research exceptions do not. See, e.g., Hrg. Tr. at 864, Testimony of Sander Genser (Discussing why controlled research settings ensure relative safety.) This Court concludes that the CSA meets the standard for general applicability, because the law generally applies to the uses of controlled substances that endanger public health. While the Plaintiffs’ initial argument in favor of their free exercise claim focused on the research exemptions set forth in the CSA, the Plaintiffs’ reply brief and trial brief present a different contention — that although some plants growing within the United States contain DMT, “the government has singled out hoasca for suppression and has singled out the adherents of the UDV for threat of criminal prosecution.” Reply, at 34. According to the Plaintiffs, “the Department of Justice, DEA and Customs have made the administrative decision to remain aloof from any thorny decisions regarding the possession and abuse of DMT-containing plants that grow in this country and has chosen, instead, to limit its enforcement efforts to religious use of DMT-containing plants.” Supplemental Trial Memorandum, at 5. The Plaintiffs seems to draw on an Equal Protection theory, arguing that even if the CSA is impartial, the Government is applying it in a way that discriminates against the Plaintiffs on the basis of religion. (See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976), stating that “equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification ... when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class”) During the hearing, the Plaintiffs presented evidence showing that certain plants growing in this country, including phalaris grass, contain DMT. The Plaintiffs’ evidence included a document showing that the United States Department of Agriculture even recommends using one kind of phalaris for erosion control. The Plaintiffs appear to argue that if people are allowed to grow phalaris grass for nonreligious reasons, while the UDV’s supply of hoasca is confiscated, this Court should conclude that the federal government must be discriminating against the Plaintiffs on the basis of religion. The Court does not believe that the evidence about phalaris would necessarily lead to that conclusion. Individuals with phalaris grass in their lawns may possess DMT in some sense. However, if there are no indications that the people with phalaris lawns are consuming the grass, law enforcement might legitimately choose not to prosecute, for reasons other than that the grass is being used for the secular purpose of having a lawn. Federal law enforcement entities might prioritize focusing on the UDV’s hoasca use not because the use is religious, but instead because UDV members make much more extensive use of hoasca by personally ingesting it than a person with a phalaris lawn makes of the grass. Before their tea was confiscated, UDV officials regularly distributed the tea to church members for consumption. Some evidence presented at the hearing suggested that non-religious consumption of plants containing DMT does take place in the United States. This evidence included materials taken from the internet— advertisements for plants containing DMT and testimonials from people claiming to have used teas similar to hoasca. While such evidence might eventually contribute to support an argument that the UDV was selectively prosecuted on the basis of religion, this evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to create an inference that selective prosecution in fact occurred. As the Government observes, the use of DMT reported on the internet differs in scale from the UDV’s use, and the authorities may have chosen to target the UDV for reasons other than religion. The Government notes that “[t]he possibility that an internet account of a single dose may be accurate and could be reliably traced to the perpetrator cannot compare to the actual interception of 3,000 doses of an illegal substance being imported for distribution.” Trial Memorandum, at 13. In its February 25, 2002 Memorandum Opinion and Order addressing the Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim, the Court noted that Plaintiffs’ counsel have represented that following discovery, the Plaintiffs may pursue a claim that the government has impermissibly targeted the UDV in particular for prosecution. By finding that the Plaintiffs’ evidence is not sufficient at this time to support a preliminary injunction based on a selective prosecution theory, the Court does not intend to foreclose further efforts by the Plaintiffs to develop that theory. B. PLAINTIFFS’ ARGUMENT THAT THE CSA DOES NOT EXTEND TO HOASCA This Court has thus far assumed, in considering the Plaintiffs’ claims under the United States Constitution, that the CSA’s ban on DMT applies to hoasca. The Plaintiffs argue, however, that “[e]ven if the Defendants were not violating Plaintiffs’ rights under RFRA and the Free Exercise and the Equal Protection clauses, their actions are nonetheless illegal because hoasca is not a controlled substance” under the CSA. The Plaintiffs acknowledge that “[o]ne of the plants that comprise Hoasca, psychotria viridis, is naturally composed, in very small part, of DMT.” The Plaintiffs also recognize that DMT is scheduled as a controlled substance under the CSA. They maintain, though, that the CSA prohibits only synthetic DMT, and not the DMT occurring naturally in plants. The Plaintiffs premise this argument on the proposition that the language of the CSA is ambiguous as applied to DMT in a natural state. As the United States Supreme Court has made clear, “[t]he starting point for ... interpretation of a statute is 'always its language.” Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989). Thus this Court must first look to the language of the CSA in order to evaluate the Plaintiffs’ arguments. The CSA divides controlled substances into five schedules, classified according to Congressional determinations regarding each drug’s potential for abuse and each drug’s accepted medical uses. The CSA places a number of hallucinogenic drugs into Schedule I, the most strictly regulated category. Schedule 1(c) provides that “[ujnless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation, which contains any quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances” falls within the Schedule I category. Among the hallucinogens listed in Schedule 1(c) is dimethyltryptamine (DMT). This Court agrees with the Government that the language of the CSA clearly covers hoasca. After all, the Plaintiffs do not dispute that one of the plant components of hoasca contains DMT. The Court is constrained to conclude that hoasca tea thus constitutes a “material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity” of DMT, within the plain meaning of the statute. However, the Plaintiffs offer a number of theories of statutory construction to support their argument that the CSA should not be interpreted to apply to plants that contain DMT and to substances derived from those plants. For example, the Plaintiffs stress that Congress is presumed to avoid superfluous drafting. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995). The Plaintiffs observe that the CSA contains a number of instances where Congress expressly banned both a given chemical and the plant in which that chemical is naturally found. Based on this, the Plaintiffs declare that because Congress listed only a chemical substance, DMT, it did not intend that plants containing that substance would also be prohibited. Otherwise, Congress would have engaged in superfluous drafting elsewhere in the CSA by, for example, explicitly scheduling both peyote (a plant) and mescaline (a chemical substance.) The Plaintiffs have also drawn on the following principles to argue that the CSA should not be interpreted to ban hoasca: 1) the canon that courts should not construe statutory provisions to contradict other parts of a statutory scheme, see e.g., United Savs. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988); 2) the principle of “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius ”, see e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993); 3) the rule of lenity, see e.g. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22, 73 S.Ct. 227, 97 L.Ed. 260 (1952); and 4) the principle that courts should construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems, see e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 (1979). The Plaintiffs have presented interesting arguments under all of these theories, and their arguments may well have been persuasive if the statute at issue were any less clear. As the Government points out, however, most of the principles discussed by the Plaintiffs become relevant only if the statutory language is ambiguous. The Supreme Court has noted that: In any event, canons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030-1031, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989); United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 102-103, 18 S.Ct. 3, 4, 42 L.Ed. 394 (1897); Oneale v. Thornton, 6 Cranch 53, 68, 3 L.Ed. 150 (1810). When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: “judicial inquiry is complete.” Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430, 101 S.Ct. 698, 701, 66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981); see also Ron Pair Enterprises, supra, 489 U.S., at 241, 109 S.Ct., at 1030. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992). More recently, the Supreme Court has explained that a court’s “first step ‘is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case,’ ” and that “[t]he inquiry ceases ‘if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’ ” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Company, Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002), quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). Granted, a court should not read a statute literally if a literal construction would “lead to irreconcilable inconsistencies or clearly absurd results that Congress could not have intended.” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Westgate Partners, Ltd., 937 F.2d 526, 531 (10th Cir.1991). However, this Court does not believe that interpreting the CSA to prohibit hoasca use results in absurdity or creates an intemally-contra-dictory statute. The Plaintiffs observe that many plants and animals, including humans, contain DMT; and the Plaintiffs imply that because the CSA cannot be read to ban humans, that the statute must apply only to synthetic DMT. Simply because banning humans would be absurd does not mean that banning any non-synthetic DMT found elsewhere would be absurd. Courts confronted with potentially absurd statutory applications are to consider “alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose.” Oxy USA, Inc. v. Babbitt, 268 F.3d 1001, 1012 (10th Cir.2001), quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982). In this case, interpreting the CSA to apply to the ingestion of a tea containing a hallucinogenic chemical seems reasonable, even if interpreting the CSA to apply to the human body does not. In addition, the Plaintiffs have failed to establish that interpreting the CSA to apply to hoasca would contradict other provisions of the statute. The Plaintiffs have not pointed to any contradictions that directly concern the CSA’s treatment of DMT and substances containing DMT. It is not as if the statute places DMT in one schedule and products made with DMT in another schedule, for example. Rather, the Plaintiffs’ arguments rely on an analysis of the CSA’s approach to other drugs. The Plaintiffs argue that construing the CSA’s prohibition on DMT to apply to hoasca creates a contradiction in the federal peyote exemption scheme. The CSA schedules both peyote, a cactus button, and mescaline, the hallucinogenic chemical found in peyote, but the federal regulatory exemption refers only to peyote, and not to mescaline. The Plaintiffs maintain that “[i]f the listing of a substance encompasses all plants that contain the substance, then the exemption for peyote alone is meaningless: the [Native American Church] would violate the CSA at each of its ceremonies by using a plant that contains ‘mescaline.’ ” Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 33. The Government has effectively countered the Plaintiffs’ argument by pointing out that a member of the Native American Church would not violate the CSA by using peyote, even if peyote contains mescaline, because the federal regulatory exemption explicitly permits church members to use peyote. Because the plain language of the CSA clearly indicates that the statute’s prohibition on DMT extends to hoasca, and because the application of the statute does not result in absurdity or in internal contradictions, this Court concludes that hoas-ca is an illegal substance under the CSA. C. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMITY This Court’s conclusion that the language of the CSA is unambiguous, with respect to the statute’s application to the use of hoasca by the UDV, resolves another of the Plaintiffs’ claims. The Plaintiffs contend that the international law doctrine of comity suggests that the government should not interfere with the UDV’s religious consumption of hoasca. Comity is “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” In the Matter of the Colorado Corp., 531 F.2d 463, 468 (10th Cir.1976), quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95 (1895). The United States Supreme Court has observed that “[c]omity refers to the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of other sovereign states.” Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 543 n. 27, 107 S.Ct. 2542, 96 L.Ed.2d 461 (1987). The Plaintiffs stress that courts have recognized a “canon of statutory construction that requires courts, whenever possible, to construe federal statutes to ensure their application will not violate international law.” Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 493 (D.C.Cir.1984), citing Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118, 2 L.Ed. 200 (1804) (“[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.”) See also, e.g., Grunfeder v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 503, 509 (9th Cir.1984) (“Absent an expression of congressional intent to the contrary, considerations of courtesy and mutuality require our courts to construe domestic legislation in a way that minimizes interference with the purpose or effect of foreign law.”) The Plaintiffs argue that allowing the Government to prohibit the UDV’s ceremonial use of hoasca would conflict with Brazilian law and with a number of international treaties. As Dr. Brito testified during the evidentiary hearing, Brazil permits members of the UDV to consume hoasca for religious reasons. The Plaintiffs also emphasize that international agreements to which the United States is a party, such as the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pledge support for freedom of religious beliefs and practices. Moreover, Plaintiffs direct attention to the International Religious Freedom Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6401-6481, enacted in 1998, which, Plaintiffs say, further reflects Congressional commitment to the promotion of religious freedom throughout the world. According to the Plaintiffs, permitting the ceremonial use of hoasca would “not only show comity to, and enhance our relations with, [Brazil], but will also demonstrate our government’s willingness to give appropriate respect to a multi-cultural international community generally.” Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 44. Even assuming that principles of international law would favor construing an ambiguous controlled substances statute to allow the religious use of hoasca, this Court believes that the CSA does not leave room for the interpretation the Plaintiffs request. As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit eloquently stated in Nahas, “[f]ederal courts must give effect to a valid, unambiguous congressional mandate, even if such effect would conflict with another nation’s laws or violate international law.” 738 F.2d at 495. The sources cited by the Plaintiffs for the proposition that a domestic law should not be interpreted to conflict with international law, such as the Murray and Grunfeder cases, 2 Cranch 64, 2 L.Ed. 208 and 748 F.2d at 509, assume that the domestic law lends itself to more than one interpretation. In this case, the Court has found that, under the plain language of the CSA, the statute’s ban on DMT clearly extends to hoasca. Comity is not an “absolute obligation,” Colorado Corp., 531 F.2d at 468, quoting Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64, 16 S.Ct. 139, and this Court cannot rely on the comity principle to disregard a clear statement from Congress on a matter of domestic law. D. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT CLAIM In Section 111(A) above, this Court evaluated the Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise claim in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith that “the right to free exercise of religion does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability,” even if that law incidentally burdens the practice of religion. United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1480 (10th Cir.1996), citing Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876. Because this Court concluded that the CSA was neutral and generally applicable, the Court found that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction on their First Amendment claim. However, the Plaintiffs also raise a religious freedom claim that has a statutory, rather than Constitutional, basis. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. In the “Congressional findings and declaration of purposes” section of the statute, Congress criticized the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith and stated that RFRA was intended “to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972).” RFRA provides that: Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person - (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b). In order to state a prima facie claim under RFRA, a plaintiff must show “(1) a substantial burden imposed by the federal government on a(2) sincere (3) exercise of religion.” Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir.2001). If the plaintiff meets “the threshold requirements by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the challenged regulation furthers a compelling state interest in the least restrictive manner.” Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1482. In this case, the Government did not dispute, for purposes of the Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, that the Plaintiffs had established a prima facie case under RFRA. Stated differently, the government conceded, at this point in the course of the case, that the CSA imposes a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ sincere exercise of religion. Hence, the hearing began with the Government shouldering the weighty load thrust upon it by Congress in passing RFRA. 1. COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS The Government asserts that it “has at least three compelling interests in prohibiting the importation and use of DMT-containing substances, all of which are implicated by the UDV’s religious use of ayahuasca.” Response, at 15. The Government has alleged a compelling interest in 1) adhering to the 1971 Convention on psychotropic substances; 2) preventing the health and safety risks posed by hoasca; and 3) preventing the diversion of hoasca to non-religious use. Before turning to a specific analysis of whether the Government has met its burden of establishing a compelling interest, this Court notes that there are two significant distinctions between the present case and many other cases in which individuals have challenged drug laws on religious freedom grounds. First, as observed above, the Government concedes for purposes of this motion that the UDV is a religion, that the Plaintiffs sincerely believe in the tenets of the UDV religion, and that the application of the CSA to the UDV’s ceremonial use of hoasca substantially burdens the Plaintiffs’ practice of their religion. In contrast, courts in other RFRA cases concerning drugs have sometimes found that the plaintiffs religious beliefs do not constitute religious beliefs, or that the plaintiff does not sincerely hold the beliefs, or that the government’s action does not actually substantially burden the plaintiffs religious practice. United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir.1996) involved a criminal defendant who moved under RFRA to dismiss the marijuana charges brought against him. Mr. Meyers “testified that he is the founder and Reverend of the Church of Marijuana and that it is his sincere belief that his religion commands him to use, possess, grow and distribute marijuana for the good of mankind and the planet earth.” Id. at 1479. The Tenth Circuit considered whether Mr. Meyers’s convictions were “religious beliefs,” or whether the convictions instead amounted to “a philosophy or way of life.” Id. at 1482. The Tenth Circuit adopted the district court’s finding that, in light of the secular nature of Mr. Meyers’s views on the medical, therapeutic, and social benefits of marijuana, “Meyers’ beliefs more accurately espouse a philosophy and/or way of life rather than a ‘religion.’ ” Id. at 1484. In United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549 (9th Cir.1996), a Ninth Circuit case, three criminal defendants sought to rely on RFRA in defending against a number of marijuana charges. The defendants were adherents to the Rastafarian religion, in which marijuana is a sacrament. The Bauer court emphasized that the availability of RFRA as a defense to the various marijuana charges hinged on whether each particular criminal provision burdened the practice of Rastafarianism. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court had erred in prohibiting the defendants from using RFRA as a defense to simple possession charges. Id. at 1559. However, “[a]s to the counts relating to conspiracy to distribute, possession with intent to distribute, and money laundering, the religious freedom of the defendants was not invaded” because “[njothing before [the court] suggests that Rastafarianism would require this conduct.” Id. In a more recent Ninth Circuit case, the court cited Bauer in holding that a criminal defendant could not draw on RFRA to defend against charges brought under a Guam statute prohibiting the importation of controlled substances. Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.2002). The Guerrero court noted that it was “satisfied that Rastafar-ianism does not require importation of a controlled substance.” Id. at 1223. There is a second major distinction between the present case and the cases involving claims that the principles of religious freedom reflected in the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA should be interpreted as permitting the sacramental use of marijuana. This distinction stems from the significant differences in the characteristics of the drugs at issue. Affirming a trial court’s denial of a criminal defendants’ request to rely in RFRA as a defense to marijuana charges, the Eighth Circuit stated “that the government has a compelling state interest in controlling the use of marijuana.” United States v. Brown, 72 F.3d 134 (8th Cir.1995) (table). As support for this observation, the Brown court cited a number of First Amendment opinions which had emphasized problems associated with marijuana in particular. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 892 F.2d 453, 456-57 (6th Cir.1989) (“Every federal court that has considered this issue has accepted Congress' determination that marijuana poses a real threat to individual health and social welfare and had upheld criminal penalties for possession and distribution even where such penalties may infringe to some extent on the free exercise of religion.”); United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 820, 825 (11th Cir.1982), quoting Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 860-61 (5th Cir.1967) (“It would be difficult to imagine the harm which would result if the criminal statutes against marihuana were nullified as to those who claim the right to possess and traffic in this drug for religious purposes.”) The parties in this case have presented a great deal of evidence on the issue of whether the United States has a compelling interest in prohibiting the UDV’s reli- • gious use of hoasca. Of course, regardless of what this evidence might suggest regarding the dangers associated with hoas-ca, the Court cannot ignore that the legislative branch of the government elected to place materials containing DMT in Schedule I of the CSA, reflecting findings that substances containing DMT have “a high potential for abuse,” and “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States,” and that “[t]here is a lack of accepted safety for use of [DMT] under medical supervision.” • 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1). Discussing another statute concerning controlled substances, the Supreme Court once noted, “[w]hen Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation, even assuming, arguendo, that judges with more exposure to the problem might make wiser choices.” Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427, 94 S.Ct. 700, 38 L.Ed.2d 618 (1974). More recently, the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 493, 121 S.Ct. 1711, 149 L.Ed.2d 722 (2001) suggested that courts should accord a great deal of deference to Congress’s classification scheme in the CSA. The Government argues that “Congress has made an affirmative statutory declaration that materials containing DMT ... are unsafe.” Response, at 27-28. If this Court were employing a more relaxed standard to review the application of the CSA to the UDV’s use of hoasca, it would be very reluctant to question this Congressional finding concerning DMT. However, the Plaintiffs are relying on RFRA, a more recent legislative enactment by Congress, to challenge the extension of the CSA’s ban on DMT to the UDV’s religious consumption of hoasca. Under RFRA, Congress mandated that a court may not limit its inquiry to general observations about the operation of a statute. Rather, “a court is to consider whether the ‘application of the burden’ to the claimant ‘is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest’ and ‘is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (emphasis added).” Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 962. In Kikumura, a case in which a federal prisoner was challenging a decision made by prison officials, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that “under RFRA, a court does not consider the prison regulation in its general application, but rather considers whether there is a compelling government reason, advanced in the least restrictive means, to apply the prison regulation to the individual claimant.” Id. RFRA requires that the Government “demonstrate! ]” its compelling interest and its use of the least restrictive means to accomplish that interest. In enacting RFRA Congress explicitly stated that “the term ‘demonstrates’ means meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2. This Court concludes that the Government has fallen short of meeting its difficult burdens, which Congress requires. The Government has not shown that applying the CSA’s prohibition on DMT to the UDV’s use of hoasca furthers a compelling interest. This Court cannot find, based on the evidence presented by the parties, that the Government has proven that hoasca poses a serious health risk to the members of the UDV who drink the tea in a ceremonial setting. Further, the Government has not shown that permitting members of the UDV to consume hoasca would lead to significant diversion of the substance to non-religious use. The Court bases its determinations on the following' facts. a. HEALTH RISKS TO MEMBERS OF THE UDV The consumption of hoasca tea plays a central role in the practice of the UDV religion. Deck of Jeffrey Bronfman, Exh. A. to Pltf. Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 13. Hoacsa is a sacrament in the UDV. Church doctrine instructs that members can fully perceive and understand God only by drinking the tea. Pltf. Exh. 21, Decl. of David Lenderts, at 4. UDV members drink hoasca only during regular religious services, held on the first and third Saturdays of every month and on ten annual holidays. Deck of Bronfman, at 8. A church leader called a “directing mestre” generally conducts the service. Id. at 9. Ceremonies start at 8 p.m. and last for about four hours. Id. at 8-10. The mes-tre begins the service by distributing measured glasses of tea to each participant. Id. at 10. Activities during UDV services include the recitation of church law by selected congregants, the singing of sacred chants by the mestre, question-and-answer exchanges between the mestre and participants, and a period of religious teaching led by the mestre. Id. at 10. Hoasca is brewed from two plants indigenous to the Amazon River Basin-Bcmisi-eriopsis caapi and Psychotria viridis. Pltf. Exh. 11, Deck of Charles Grob, at 7. Psychotria contains dimethyltryptamine (DMT), a hallucinogenic chemical. Id. By itself, psychotria does not trigger an altered state of consciousness when taken orally, because monoamine oxidase (MAO) enzymes in the digestive system inactivate the DMT psychotria contains. Id. However, banisteriopsis contains harmala alkaloids, known as beta-carbolines, that inhibit MAO’s and prevent the inactivation of DMT. Id.; Deft. Exh. ZZ, Rpt. of Sander Genser, at 6. Ingesting the combination of psychotria and banisteriopsis allows DMT to reach levels in the brain sufficient to produce a significantly altered state of consciousness. Deft. Exh. ZZ, Rpt. of Gen-ser, at 6. Scientists have devoted little research to the physical and psychological effects of ceremonial hoasca consumption. Id. The lack of knowledge about hoasca, relative to many other substances, forms the core of the dispute between the parties in this case. The Plaintiffs’ experts and the Government’s experts have offered differing interpretations of preliminary data, conflicting views on the value of comparisons between hoasca and other hallucinogenic drugs, and contrasting evaluations of whether certain findings signify risks associated with hoasca use. Ultimately, the Plaintiffs contend that evidence does not exist, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, to conclude that the UDV’s religious use of hoasca carries any significant health risk. See, e.g., Hrg. Tr. at 207-08, testimony of Grob. The Government, in contrast, maintains that existing evidence suggests that the ingestion of hoasca poses substantial health concerns. See, e.g., Deft. Exh. ZZ, Rpt. of Genser, at 5. During the evidentiary hearing, the Plaintiffs presented the testimony of Dr. Charles Grob, Professor of Psychiatry at the University of California, Los Angeles. In 1993, Dr. Grob led a team of researchers in conducting a study of the effects of hoasca use on UDV members in Brazil. The study compared fifteen long-term members of the UDV, who had drunk hoasca for several years, with fifteen control subjects who had never used hoasca. Pltf. Exh. 11, Decl. of Grob, at 9-10. The researchers administered personality tests, psychiatric interviews, neuro