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AMENDED ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF UNOCAL CORPORATION, COUNTY OF LOS ANGE-LES, CITY OF COMPTON, AND CITY OF CARSON; DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF CARSON HARBOR VILLAGE, LTD.; AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF CARSON HARBOR VILLAGE MOBILE HOME PARK, RICHARD BRALEY AND WALKER SMITH MORROW, District Judge. Plaintiff Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. (“Carson Harbor”) is the owner and operator of a mobile home park in Carson, California. An undeveloped, open-flow wetlands covers approximately seventeen acres of the mobile home park property. In 1993, while attempting to refinance the property, Carson Harbor discovered hazardous substances contamination. A subsequent environmental assessment revealed tar-like and slag materials in the wetlands. In 1996, Carson Harbor sued defendants Unocal Corporation (“Unocal”), the City of Compton, the City of Carson, and the County of Los Angeles (“the Government Defendants”); Richard G. Braley, Walker Smith, Jr. and Carson Harbor Village Mobile Home Park (“the Partnership Defendants”); and the California Department of Transportation and W. Van Loben Seis (“Caltrans”). Its complaint alleged claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq., the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq., and the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. It also pleaded state law claims for nuisance, trespass, injury to easement, indemnity, and negligent nondisclosure. Carson Harbor alleged that Unocal, which leased and used the property for petroleum production between 1945 and 1983, had dumped the tar-like and slag materials onto the property. It asserted that the Partnership Defendants were liable for the contamination as past owners of the property, and it maintained that the Government Defendants, which conducted operations upstream from the property, were liable for lead deposited on the property through stormwater run-off. Carson Harbor sought to recover the costs of its cleanup, which totaled approximately $285,000, as well as damages arising from its inability to refinance the property. On November 4, 1997, Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on all claims except the state law nuisance and trespass claims asserted against Unocal. See Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 990 F.Supp. 1188 (C.D.Cal.1997). A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, in part, the entry of judgment on the CERCLA and indemnity claims. That decision was subsequently withdrawn, however, and, on October 24, 2001, the court issued an en banc opinion reversing the entry of summary judgment in favor of Unocal and the Government Defendants on the CERCLA claim, and in favor of the Partnership Defendants on the indemnity claim. See Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 873, 888 (9th Cir.2001), cert. denied sub nom. Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Braley, 535 U.S. 971, 122 S.Ct. 1437, 152 L.Ed.2d 381 (2002). The case was remanded to the district court, and assigned to this court for handling. Pursuant to the court’s scheduling order, the Partnership Defendants, the City of Compton, the City of Carson, the County of Los Angeles, Unocal, and plaintiff conducted further discovery necessitated by the Ninth Circuit’s order. Each now moves for summary judgment. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. is a limited partnership owned entirely by James Goldstein and his corporation, Gold-stein Properties, Inc. Goldstein, who is the President and sole shareholder of Gold-stein Properties, is a highly-educated, sophisticated businessman with extensive experience in the purchase of mobile home parks. Carson Harbor is the current owner of the Carson Harbor Village Mobile Home Park, located at 17701 Avalon Boulevard in Carson, California (“the property”). A. The Property The property is a 420 space mobile home park on seventy acres in the City of Carson. It includes approximately seventeen acres of marsh, which bisect the property, traversing it from northwest to southwest. Plaintiff asserts that this area has been designated a protected wetlands and habitat area. The property is subject to deed restrictions designed to preserve the area-in its natural condition. These prohibit construction or dumping on the land, covering the land with non-natural cover, removing natural resources, fishing or trapping animal or aquatic life without the permission of the California Department of Fish and Game, removing timber, or allowing members of the public to trespass upon or use the property. Historically, the site has been used both as a dairy farm and for oil production and storage. Aerial photographs show oil use dating back to 1941. Unocal had an oil and gas lease at the property from 1945 to 1977, when it signed a Quitclaim Deed. It continued to hold a non-exclusive easement across the land subsequent to that time. In 1977, a special use permit issued, that permitted conversion of the site to “a complete mobile home community.” The mobile home park currently there was built in approximately 1978. Carson Harbor purchased the property from the Partnership Defendants in 1983 for $7,980,000. Plaintiff and Carlsberg Financial Corporation acquired title to the property on or about April 1, 1983. Plaintiff purchased Carlsberg’s interest in 1986, and became the sole owner of the property at that time. Carson Harbor’s owner, Goldstein, testified that he did not recall any discussion, inquiry or investigation regarding the environmental condition of the property at the time it was purchased in 1983. Dennis Olson, who conducted a due diligence inspection of the property on plaintiffs behalf, recalls that he looked at the wetlands, but did not physically enter the area to inspect its bottom. Carson Harbor knew that oil operations had been conducted on the property at the time it purchased the site in 1983. It did not perform tests or soil sampling on or beneath the property to determine if there was contamination prior to purchase. B. Tar-Like And Slag Materials In or about 1993, Goldstein wanted to refinance the property at a, lower interest rate, and submitted a loan application to G.E. Capital Corporation. The lender retained Law/Crandall to perform an environmental assessment of the property, which revealed “a tar-like patch in the ravine” at the site. Tar-like and slag materials that contained high levels of lead were discovered in the wetlands area in 1993 or 1994. The tar material was visible on the surface and covered an area approximately 20 feet by 30 feet. Subsequent characterization and excavation revealed that the tar-like and slag materials covered an area approximately 170 feet long and 75 feet wide, and extended to varying depths of approximately one to five feet. The slag material varied in both size and depth, but appeared to be most concentrated near the tar-like deposit. 1. Source Of The Tar And Slag Carson Harbor alleges that Unocal generated and disposed of the tar and slag in the wetlands. Unocal employee Richard Salisbury reported on March 27, 1995, that “[t]here ha[d] been numerous spills to [a] storm drain [entering the property] including at least one in the 1980s from one of our wells.” At his deposition, Salisbury clarified that he knew of only one spill firsthand, but that he had heard of others from past foremen in the field. Salisbury stated that the tar-like material had the same consistency as material that forms at “oil and gas tank farms” when a tank or pipeline leaks and the leaks are absorbed into the soil. Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Hassan Amini, asserts that the tar material was most likely tank bottom sludge from oil production and refining operations conducted by Unocal on or around the property. Specifically, he states that the tar material contained high concentrations of petroleum hydrocarbons, lead, and certain volatile organic compounds (BTEX), all of which are characteristic of materials originating from oil production. He notes further that the slag material had volcanic-like characteristics indicative of material that originated from a high-temperature furnace process and was subjected to abrupt cooling. Amini and plaintiffs second expert, Dr. Robert Ghirelli, as well as James Ross, a senior water resource control engineer at the Regional Water Quality Control Board (“RWQCB”), all believe that the tar-like and slag materials were deposited on the property through some means other than storm drains. Dr. Amini, for example, testified that he did not believe the tar and slag were brought onto the property by stormwater. Carson’s expert, Dr. Robert Morrison, similarly concluded that it was “highly improbable” the tar and slag washed onto the property through the stormwater system. Carson Harbor alleges on information and belief that the tar and slag were generated and deposited on the property between 1961 and 1977. Dr. Amini notes that the wetlands traverse the mobile home community and that removal of the tar-like materials required 100 truckloads. He concludes that this quantity of tar and slag materials could not have been deposited on the property without being noticed and reported by at least some of the mobile home community residents, and thus that the materials were most likely discharged into the wetlands before the mobile home park was constructed in 1977. rphg evidence presented in connection with the 1997 motions for summary judgment, however, caused Judge Ward-law to find that the tar-like and slag materials had been deposited on the property prior to 1947. See Carson Harbor Village, supra, 990 F.Supp. at 1194. Plaintiff concedes that Carson did not cause the tar or slag to be deposited on the property. Frank Sotelo, Compton’s Street Superintendent, contends that Compton also did not participate in disposal of the tar and slag. 2. Investigation Of The Tar And Slag In December 1993, as part of its effort to refinance the property, Carson Harbor hired Park Environmental Corporation to investigate the contamination at the property. Ed Furu supervised the collection and analysis of nineteen soil samples, and presented a summary of his findings to Carson Harbor’s attorney, Richard Close, in a June 10,1994, letter. Furu found that total lead concentrations in the samples ranged from non-detectable to 2,300 parts per million (“ppm”). He also found that WET protocol analysis of five soil samples revealed concentrations of soluble lead ranging from 15 to 86 ppm Carson Harbor subsequently hired McLaren Hart to investigate further and to remediate the contamination. The impacted area was identified through visual inspection and confirmed through followup sampling. A test of a sample of the tar-like material revealed that it had a Total Threshold Limit Concentration (“TTLC”) of lead of 1,600 ppm. A similar test of a sample of slag showed that it had a TTLC lead content of 590 ppm and a Soluble Threshold Limit Concentration (“STLC”) of lead of 12 ppm. McLaren Hart considered various alternatives for remediating the tar-like and slag materials in the wetlands, but concluded, “due primarily to the concentrations of lead in the tar material, the sensitive nature of the wetlands, and the surrounding residential uses of the Property, [that] leaving the material in place was not a feasible solution.” Dr. Amini testified that lead was inherent in the tar-like and slag materials. While he believed that lead from other sources may also have been present in the tar, he was reasonably certain that one sample collected from approximately two feet inside the tar contained only lead that was inherent to the material. Based on this sample, Dr. Amini concluded that the lead inherent to the tar was sufficient to require its removal as a hazardous substance. He noted that the tar had a high viscosity, such that it would eventually seal itself and prevent the sinking of any lead particulate inside the tar. He also testified that the slag had a vesicular texture and porosity that made it possible for lead coming from the surface to sink into the slag as a particulate. C. Whether Additional Lead Was Deposited Through The Storm Drain System On June 10, 1994, Park Environmental completed a limited Site Assessment designed to evaluate the potential presence of lead in the soils within the natural drainage wetlands area of the property. It found there were sufficient lead concentrations to necessitate reporting to regulatory agencies. In defining the impacted area, McLaren Hart had only been concerned with the tar-like and slag materials. On March 23, 1995, however, it sent the RWQCB a letter stating that Park Environmental's soil samples upstream from the tar and slag revealed lead values ranging from 11 to 220 ppm. McLaren Hart represented that Carson Harbor’s immediate removal action would clear the tar-like and slag materials from the property. It cautioned, however, that “[o]ther watershed water quality measures [would have to] be taken by the appropriate authorities to improve the water quality of the surface run-off entering the Carson Harbor Village park.” 1. Ownership And Maintenance Of The Storm Drain System The cities of Compton and Carson, and the County of Los Angeles are public entities that operate a storm drain system. Storm drains serving Compton, Carson and the County join together at various points, and certain of them empty onto the marsh at the northeast corner of Carson Harbor’s property. The drainage area upstream from the property is 2.4 square miles, and contains a mix of industrial and residential properties located in Carson, Compton and certain unincorporated County areas. There are two storm drain inlets located on the north portion of the property. The storm drain system and streambed run through the marsh and connect to an outlet at the other end of the marsh, with the water running northeast to southwest. There are surface water drains, concrete drainage channels, culverts and other outlets on the property that carry water from roadways and areas of the property outside the wetlands into the wetlands area. Defendants contend there is no evidence as to when the storm drains were built. A report submitted to Carson’s Mayor on February 21, 1984, however, indicates that the drains and outlets linked to the debris traps at the northern end of the property were installed by Caltrans as part of the construction of the Artesia (91) Freeway. This project was completed in 1976. The report states that Caltrans relinquished responsibility for maintenance of the drains and debris traps to Carson on May 8, 1980. A December 8, 1983, letter from the Los Angeles County Flood Control District (“LACFCD”) to Carson’s City Engineer indicates that Carson at that point became responsible for maintaining storm drains constructed by Caltrans that were outside its right of way and within the city limits. Carson’s City Engineer acknowledges that Carson had an easement over plaintiffs property from December 1984 to October 1985, when it quitclaimed its interest to the LACFCD. The interest quitclaimed included the easement to operate and maintain storm drain facilities on the property. The City Engineer contends that Carson does not presently own the storm drain system in Carson or operate the storm drain inlets on the northern portion of plaintiffs property. Compton does not appear to dispute that it had or has operational responsibility for certain of the storm drains entering plaintiffs property. 2. Whether Stormwater Is A Source Of The Lead Deposits At The Site According to plaintiffs expert, Dr. Richard Gersberg, there is a 99% probability that the stormwater that flowed onto the property contained lead. Gersberg bases this conclusion not on site specific data, but on several general studies regarding lead contamination in urban and stormwater runoff in Los Angeles County. The head of the County’s Industrial Waste Control Program, Carl Sjo-berg, similarly stated that he would not be surprised to hear of lead in the storm drain system because “there’s been incidents throughout the system over the years where lead has been or may have been a pollutant.” Dr. Gersberg states that lead is removed from water very efficiently by wetlands areas, and thus there is a high likelihood that lead that enters a wetlands is “retained within the site and will accumulate in soils, plants, and biota on the property.” He concludes, based on the size of the discharge pipe at the site, that quite a bit of water could come out of the pipe if it filled up, and that the wetlands could be partially under water during a good rain. Compton’s expert, Edward Faeder, states, by contrast, that “[t]he relatively low soil sample readings at the northeast end of the marsh ... support the observation that stormwater is not the source of [the] marsh lead” because, “[i]f the storm drain inlets were the source of the lead, these soil lead samples from the northeast end should have been substantially higher.” Faeder notes that the average downstream lead levels were not substantially different than the upstream values, and concludes as a result that there was no runoff lead source emptying onto the site. Faeder also asserts that samples taken from the storm drain mouth contained a level of lead that was well below the drinking water standard. Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Amini concedes that he would expect the concentration of lead to be higher in the northeast portion of the property “if the inlet of the marsh where the stormwa-ter is coming in was not a scour area but a depositional area.” He does not state, however, whether the area tested was a “depositional area” or a “scour area.” Faeder opines that dry deposition may account for the nominal, background levels of lead found throughout the site. Gers-berg acknowledges that “dry deposition” may account for some percentage of the lead found on the property, but asserts there is nonetheless a high probability that the lead at the site came from stormwa-ter. Gersberg states that both dry deposition and stormwater flowing from within the trailer park are “obviously” sources of lead in the wetlands, but are insignificant compared with upstream drainage from the storm drain 3. When Lead May Have Been Deposited On The Property By Stormwater The Ninth Circuit held there was “no evidence that there was any lead-contaminated stormwater runoff to the property prior to 1994....” The court considers this statement the law of the case for purposes of this summary judgment proceeding. 4. Adequacy Of On-Site Sampling And Testing As noted, plaintiffs expert, Dr. Gers-berg, relied on general information and studies in forming the conclusion that stormwater likely carried lead onto the property. By contrast, another of plaintiffs experts, Dr. Ghirelli, testified that “some kind of sampling of the stormwater” would be appropriate, while a third, Dr. Richter, testified that a party might “want to sample run-off” if it wished to determine the source of the lead. Carson’s expert, Dr. Robert Morrison, opines that sampling data from the site is not sufficient to permit a reasonable scientific determination that the source of the lead found there is stormwater. While plaintiff’s Dr. Amini concluded that stormwater runoff was the most likely source of the lead detected in the flood control channel, he stated he could not determine, based on existing samples and information, “that off-site stormwater is the source of any lead found at the Carson Harbor Park”- because he had not “gone to exhaustive studies to eliminate other sources of possibilities of lead contamination.” Specifically, Amini admitted that he did not investigate whether any NPDES permits were held by industrial facilities upstream of the property. He also conceded that no attempt had been made to distinguish between naturally occurring lead and lead that was deposited at the site by an outside source. He could not rule out aerial deposition as a source of the lead found in the wetlands, and noted that “there [were] statistical methods that [would] give ... [a] more likely source of the material.” ■ Dr. Amini testified that surface and ground water on the site “are practically in direct communication,” and that in some rare occasions the groundwater may “feed” the. surface water. This would happen, he stated, because “[t]he saturated sediments in the flood control channel ... act like a sponge during the high flood water and high groundwater recharge time, and at the time of the receding of the flood water, [they could] return some of that water back to the channel.” For this reason, Dr. Amini conceded that he could not rale out groundwater as a source of the lead in the wetlands without testing the groundwater. Dr. Gersberg could not say with any reasonable degree of scientific certainty what percentage of lead at the site,- if -any, was deposited by stormwater. He acknowledged that no soil samples had been taken near the stormwater outlets, and that, while a debris sample taken near the property revealed a lead concentration of more than 100 ppm, he could not conclude on the basis of that one sample that the lead on the property had been deposited by stormwater. Gersberg also acknowledged that he could not tell from the sampling data as a whole whether the entirety of the lead came from the tar or from stormwater, that he could not attribute the lead to a specific source, and that it was possible the lead found outside the tar area could have come from sources such as tar, direct deposition, paint, illicit discharges, or on-site stormwater. Neither party has proffered evidence regarding the amount of stormwater flowing onto the property. No stormwater samples were collected, although four surface water samples were taken at the entrance to the property. One water sample was collected from each of the two storm drain inlets on the north portion of the property. These showed lead detection levels of 13 parts per billion and below detection respectively. Water samples from storm drains 1A and 2A registered “non-detect” when tested for organic lead. These samples were taken from a pool of standing water in the storm drain mouth, not from a runoff event. Carson’s expert, Dr. Morrison, states that 13 parts per billion of lead is not significant from a regulatory standpoint, and concludes that the results of the tests from the two storm drains are inconsistent with lead being transported via stormwa-ter into the storm drain channel. Dr. Amini concurs, stating that the results of the storm drain tests could not form the basis for a finding that the lead in the park came from the stormwater. The parties agree that the surface water tests do not provide adequate information to permit the drawing of conclusions regarding the quality of the water that has historically entered the site. 5. NPDES Permits Carson Harbor alleges that stormwater discharge contaminated the wetlands, causing it to incur necessary response costs under CERCLA. A National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit is required to discharge industrial liquids into the storm drain system and to discharge stormwa-ter. Prior to 1990, there were no NPDES permits regulating stormwater runoff on the property because NPDES permits were not required for municipal stormwater and urban runoff prior to that date. In 1990, NPDES Permit No. CA0061654 (“the 1990 permit”) was issued to the County of Los Angeles and certain identified co-permitees, including the cities of Compton and Carson. On July 15, 1996, NPDES Permit CAS 614001 (“the 1996 permit”) was issued, superceding the 1990 permit. The northeast comer storm drain pipe system, the streambed, and the southwest corner storm drain pipe system are all part of, and operated pursuant to, the NPDES permits. (a) City Of Carson Carson’s start date for compliance with the 1990 permit was July 1, 1993. At the time plaintiff filed suit on May 7, 1996, the 1990 Permit was the only NPDES permit under which Carson was operating. John Wisz, Carson’s Civil Engineering manager, states that the city has been in compliance with the 1990 permit at all relevant times, and that it has implemented all Best Management Practices (“BMPs”) required by the permit. Plaintiff did not identify during discovery any BMPs that Carson had failed to implement, asserting only that it did not know of any plan the city had implemented to comply with the permit. Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Ghirelli, opined that Carson had, in fact, complied with the 1990 permit. Ghirelli observed that the Water Board knew about the contamination on Carson Harbor’s property at the time it drafted the 1996 permit, and did not single out the property in the permit for special protection. Rather, the responsibilities the 1996 permit imposed on Carson concern compliance with the Stormwater Management Plan and a County Plan to be developed under the permit. The 1996 permit, moreover, expressly recognizes that Carson is not responsible for discharges it cannot control. Wisz asserts that Carson has been in compliance with the 1996 permit at all relevant times, and that it has implemented each of the required BMPs called for by the permit. Neither Wisz nor Dr. Amini is aware of any RWQCB order stating that Carson has failed to comply with its NPDES permits. Wisz maintains that neither the 1990 nor the 1996 permits required Carson to treat stormwater or prevent stormwater from entering plaintiffs property. Plaintiff does not dispute that Carson’s NPDES permits do not contain effluent limitations for stormwater discharges. Wisz also asserts that Carson is not required to monitor stormwater under either of the permits, and that it is not responsible for runoff from state facilities such as the 1-91 Freeway. Carson Harbor, however, cites a 1983 letter from the LACFCD to Carson’s City Engineer stating that the city is responsible for maintaining storm drains located outside Caltrans property and within the city limits. (b) City Of Compton Compton’s Street Superintendent, Frank Sotelo, contends that the city has implemented BMPs that include: (1) a maintenance program for the storm drain system in the City streets; (2) stenciling warning signs on City streets that pouring hazardous substances into the storm drain system is prohibited; (3) conducting classes under the supervision of CalOSHA on storm drain safety and procedures; (4) regularly sweeping all City streets; (5) maintaining staff who respond to citizen requests; (6) promptly and regularly cleaning the storm drains; (7) promptly responding to citizen requests for drain repairs or maintenance; (8) providing a twenty-four hour stand-by crew to respond to emergencies; (9) sending employees to various water workshops; (10) retaining a professional consultant to advise and assist the City regarding storm drain and storm-water issues; (11) attending monthly per-mittee meetings; (12) participating in the executive Advisory Committee; (18) attending Los Angeles River Watershed Permittee meetings; (14) subscribing to publications providing educational and practical assistance in this area; (15) promoting recycling; and (16) participating in the county-wide Hazardous Waste Management Program. There is no evidence that Compton has violated its NPDES stormwater permits, and plaintiffs expert, Dr. Ghirelli, acknowledged that Compton was in compliance with the 1990 NPDES permit. As of 1997, Sotelo had been employed by Compton for twenty-one years. He testified that throughout his employment, the city had had an ordinance that prohibited the disposal of pollutants, including lead, in the storm drain system. He also asserted that, at all times prior to 1990 when he was employed, Compton had procedures in place to prevent pollutants from entering the storm drain system. In addition to the ordinance, these included regular street sweeping, public trash receptacles, maintenance of the storm drain lines and system, and sand bagging around catch basins in the event of a spill. (c) County Of Los Angeles Gary Hildebrand, a Supervising Civil Engineer for the County of Los Angeles, states that the County developed and implemented BMPs as required by the 1990 permit, with each permittee city responsible for its own BMPs. He also states that the County has complied with BMPs and monitoring requirements under the 1996 permit. (d) All Defendants Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Ghirelli, asserts that the permits require the County, rather than Compton or Carson, to monitor the site. He also notes that the Water Board does not consider individual cities responsible for runoff from state facilities such as Caltrans. In granting the Government Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Carson Harbor’s CWA claims, Judge Wardlaw held that Carson Harbor’s evidence fell “considerably short of meeting its burden on summary judgment that the Government Defendants violated either the 1990 or 1996 permits.” She also found that “[Carson Harbor’s expert] ... acknowledged that all of the Government Defendants were in compliance with the 1990 permit and expressed no opinion with regard to the 1996 permit.” Judge Ward-law granted Carson’s motion for summary judgment on the state law claims — a judgment that was later affirmed by the Ninth Circuit — “[bjecause plaintiff ha[d] not shown that the Government Defendants failed to comply with the [1990 and 1996] permits [and] any pollutants discharged into the stormwater were [thus] allowed pursuant to the authority of the state.” Carson Harbor Village, supra, 990 F.Supp. at 1197. Carson Harbor does not dispute that the Ninth Circuit ultimately held there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the Government Defendants had violated the terms of their NPDES permits. D. Remediation Of The Property 1. Cleanup Of The Tar-Like And Slag Material The RWQCB for the Los Angeles Region supervised Carson Harbor’s remediation of the property. James Ross of the RWQCB never found that the tar and slag constituted “an imminent and substantial threat” to human health or the environment. Rather, he concluded that there was a “low potential for a health threat on the site,” and that the preponderance of the data fell below health risk guidelines. Ross testified that he did not direct Carson Harbor to remove substances from the wetlands, but that it volunteered to remove the tar-like and slag materials. Unocal’s Richard Salisbury, however, prepared a memorandum on May 1, 1995, stating that Ross had confirmed in a meeting that “he wantfed] the ‘slag-like’ and ‘tar-like’ material removed from the creek bed .... [and] that his objective was to remove it as cheaply and non-disruptively as possible.” Ross, moreover, told McLaren Hart in a February 1995 letter— captioned “Remediation Workplan Approval” — that its proposed remedial action had been “approved” by the RWQCB, subject to certain modifications, which included classification of the slag material as hazardous waste and removal of all residual soil contamination except that registering below certain measurement criteria. Dr. Amini testified that Carson Harbor’s remediation effort focused on removal of the tar-like and slag material from the stream channel. All of the tar-like and slag materials were removed, with the exception of some material that was within the root zone of a protected willow tree. McLaren/Hart issued a Closure Report on September 13, 1995, which discussed removal of the tar-like and slag materials from the marsh, as well as verification sampling of lead concentration levels in the excavated area. The report noted that approximately 1,043 tons of tar-like and slag materials had been removed from an approximately 9,000 square foot area that had an average depth of two feet. Following removal of the tar-like and slag materials, McLaren/Hart collected twenty verification samples. These revealed TTLC lead concentrations below 1,000 ppm. Only four samples had a total lead concentration above 50 ppm. Follow-up analysis of these four samples indicated soluble lead concentrations that marginally exceeded the Soluble Threshold Limit Concentration of 5 ppm. McLaren Hart submitted its Closure Report to the RWQCB on October 11, 1995, stating that it had “achieved all the goals of [its] remedial action plan” and therefore “submitted [the] clean closure report in request for closure of the case.” The RWQCB reviewed McLaren Hart’s clean closure report, and conducted independent inspection and testing at the property. On October 18, 1995, the RWQCB sent Carson Harbor a letter captioned “Closure Approval,” which stated; ‘We have reviewed your October 11, 1995, report for the subject site which requests] closure of the project. In addition, staff inspected the site on October 17, 1995, to verify the extent of the removal actions completed. Staff has also taken verification samples from the bottom of the excavated areas, on July 26, 1995, and have determined that the removal is complete to the extent required by this Board. On the basis of the above, we have concluded that all of the requirements established by this Board in our RAP approval letter dated February 27, 1995, have been complied with. In addition, the contamination has been successfully removed[, and] the remaining soil in the bottom of the watercourse poses no further threat to surface waters of the State. We, therefore, conclude that no further action is required at this site.” Ross testified that he would not have sent this letter if he believed that the tar-like and slag material on the property was a continuing threat to surface water. 2. Compliance With The National Contingency Plan Dr. Amini testified that McLaren Hart considered the National Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. Part 300, in undertaking its remediation effort, but did not strictly follow the plan. Amini considered the project a removal action rather than “a full-blown remedial action under CERCLA,” and therefore did not feel “it was necessary to pursue [the] very cumbersome and elaborate procedure prescribed in [the] N.C.P.” He stated that the project “did not require, necessarily, [a] full blown feasibility study, risk assessment, public involvement, and many other requirements ....” Dr. Amini was not aware of any health risk assessments conducted at the site during remediation. Although he recommended that an assessment be conducted, attorney Richard Close decided to defer performing such an evaluation. Dr. Am-ini did not know of any reports that documented Carson Harbor’s consideration of remediation alternatives. He also did not know of anyone who solicited public comment regarding the remedial action plan on plaintiffs behalf. Carson Harbor’s Goldstein similarly did not know of anyone acting on the partnership’s behalf who held public meetings or gave public notice concerning the remedial action plan. Carson Harbor cites a number of letters as evidence that its response action fully complied with the National Contingency Plan. Specifically, it contends it complied with the requirement that it conduct a health risk assessment because it met the cleanup levels prescribed by the RWQCB, and these were designed to protect public health and the environment. Similarly, it contends it complied with the public comment requirement. The admissible evidence plaintiff proffers in support of this assertion indicates that it made State Senator Ralph Dills aware of the problem, leading his representatives to participate in a number of meetings and discussions regarding the situation; and that it held meetings with the interested parties prior to implementation of the remedial action plan. Carson Harbor notes there was sufficient public awareness of the problem that an article was published in a local newspaper regarding contamination at the wetlands. Additionally, it contends it conducted a feasibility study as required by the National Contingency Plan, considering both a “no action” alternative and removal of the tar-like and slag materials. More specifically, Carson Harbor asserts that: (1) the Park Environmental Report and remedial action plan are the functional equivalent of the remedial investigation/feasibility study and remedial design/remedial action plan required by federal law; (2) the RWQCB considered whether the tar and slag needed to be removed, and required their removal; and (3) Dr. Amini testified that “the only feasible alternative was to excavate the tar and slag material and dispose of it offsite.” The purpose of the remedial action was “to outline the procedures for the removal of a ‘tar-like’ and ‘slag’ waste material ... in accordance with the standards of solid waste handling and disposal (California Code of Regulations, Title 14).” The plan discussed the results of the sampling conducted by Park Environmental and McLaren Hart; noting that “the highest concentrations of metals and petroleum hydrocarbons [were] associated with the ‘tar-like’ and ‘slag’ waste material,” it recommended that those materials be removed, and that no action be taken outside their immediate area. Removal was the only remedial alternative identified in the plan. 3. Remediation Of Lead Outside Of The Tar And Slag Area Dr. Amini testified that removal of the tar and slag from the site was the appropriate remedial action, and was the work performed by McLaren Hart. He did not recommend further remediation. Although he knew that lead was present on the property outside the area of the tar and slag, Dr. Amini did not believe the lead posed a danger to aquatic organisms. He also did not know of any existing groundwater quality issues following removal of the tar and slag, and thus did not feel he needed to recommend remediation of other sources. Nonetheless, he remained concerned about possible risk to the groundwater through sources that were not addressed by the removal of the tar and slag. RWQCB’s Ross concluded that the level of contaminants outside the tar and slag area was not unusual or unexpected, and did not pose a significant threat to the environment or the residents of the mobile home park. As a consequence, he did not require that Carson Harbor conduct groundwater testing because “it didn’t appear warranted.” In its letter approving Carson Harbor’s proposed remedial plan, however, the RWQCB noted that the soil remaining after excavation of the tar and slag needed to be below 50 ppm TTLC and 5 ppm STLC. Compton’s expert, Dr. Jenkins, concluded from the existing soil data that, with the exclusion of samples identified as tar or slag, the concentration of lead in the soil samples ranged from 4 to 370 mg/kg, with an average concentration of 63 mg/kg. He stated that these numbers fell well within the ranges of lead reported for soils and wetland sediments. Although Jenkins concluded that the concentrations of lead in the soils should not pose a risk to soil invertebrates or microbes, he found that they exceeded the soil benchmark for plants. Dr. Faeder concluded that the aggregate data was below the average background for the geographic area, despite the existence of “one deviant point.” Goldstein is not aware that any governmental agency required further cleanup or remedial work in the marsh where the tar-like and slag materials were removed, and no subsequent cleanup has been done. Judge Wardlaw previously entered summary judgment in defendants’ favor on Carson Harbor’s RCRA claim, stating that it had failed to establish there was imminent danger to human health or the environment. Plaintiff did not appeal this ruling, and admits that the property poses no imminent or substantial danger to health or the environment. E. Continued Attempts To Refinance The Property Mark Hansen of Hansen-Davies Financial Group was Goldstein’s primary contact regarding the 1993 G.E. Capital loan application. Hansen testified that he had discussions with the lender’s environmental consultant, Law/Crandall, regarding the loan throughout September and November 1993, after the tar-like materials had been discovered, and that he continued to believe during this period that the loan would ultimately close. After the tar-like materials were found, Law/Crandall requested permission to conduct an underground water test at the property. Goldstein had hired Park Environmental to “assist with obtaining refinancing for the park,” and it advised Gold-stein not to allow groundwater testing. Goldstein told Hansen there was no reason to test the groundwater because there was no evidence that it might contain hazardous substances. Goldstein ultimately refused to permit Law/Crandall to conduct the test. While he states he was willing to perform substitute tests demonstrating that the property did not pose a threat, Goldstein acknowledges that loan negotiations terminated because the parties were unable to reach agreement on the underground water test. G.E. representative Brian Mills states the loan did not close because the recommendations in Law/Crandall’s Phase I report were not followed. He also states he told Carson Harbor that G.E. would not go forward with the loan if a “Phase II report” was not prepared. Hansen did not understand that G.E. was prepared to fund the loan if a groundwater test was conducted. Rather, it was “prepared to move forward with the loan if the[ ] environmental consultants concluded that the site didn’t pose an environmental threat.” After the negotiations with G.E. terminated, Goldstein decided there was “no sense in going immediately to seek other lenders with the known environmental problems” on the site. Carson Harbor did have discussions with other lenders at a later point, however, and no lender refused to refinance the property for environmental reasons or requested that plaintiff test the groundwater. Union Bank told Goldstein it did not have the funds necessary to make the loan; Goldstein does not know whether this was the actual reason Union Bank terminated loan discussions. He terminated discussions with other lenders because the loan terms offered were not satisfactory. Bank of America ultimately refinanced the property in September 1997. Carson Harbor obtained $15,895,000 from the refinance. A new Phase I environmental study was conducted, and Bank of America concluded “there were no environmental issues that would preclude them from lending on the property.” F. Rent Increase Granted To Plaintiff On or about January 22, 1997, the Carson Mobile Home Park Rental Review Board granted plaintiff a monthly increase of $58.70 for 407 of the mobile home park’s rent-controlled spaces. The Board found that rent increases of 12.86% to 14.01% per unit would generate an additional $286,690.80 in annual rental income and allow Carson Harbor to maintain a profit level similar to that it had enjoyed following the 1994 rent increase hearing and prior to a rise in operating expenses. The Board’s resolution identified the increased operating expenses that justified the rent hike as (1) the costs incurred in determining how to clean up contamination at the property, obtaining approval of a remediation plan, and implementing necessary remediation, and (2) the payment of disputed property tax assessments following resolution of a tax appeal. It stated that part of the cleanup work had been financed by a $800,000 loan, and that that cost had therefore been allocated by the board over the 28-month life of the loan. While noting that some claims for legal services related to the remediation were not allowed as operating expenses because they involved the preparation and filing of this action, “[t]he Board did ... allocate some attorneys’ fees related to the wetlands remediation as a 1995 operating expense.” Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. City of Carson Mobilehome Park Rental Review Board, 70 Cal.App.4th 281, 294, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 (1999) (“Carson Harbor v. Rental Review Board ”). It also provided that “if any of the costs of preparing, obtaining approval of and implementing a remediation plan and cleaning up contamination in the marsh which were allowed as operating expenses by the Board are recovered in the Applicant’s litigation seeking recovery of those costs, ... the Park will be required to include that recovery, excluding any legal fees recovered, as income in the first rent increase application which follows that recovery and the recovery shall be counted in the income data for the last year for which financial data is submitted with that application.” The board observed that many of the costs Carson Harbor had incurred were unusual rather than normal and recurring expenses, while the rent increase was to continue indefinitely. This is borne out by the fact that tenants have continued to pay the higher rent since 1997. Carson Harbor v. Rental Review Board, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at 294, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 569. Carson Harbor’s rent control attorney, Casparian, states that property owners who are granted a rent increase because of decreased profits cannot receive another until their income drops or their expenses exceed the level considered in granting the increase. Carson Harbor, in fact, received no additional rent increases until 2001. G. Damages Sought By Plaintiff Carson Harbor filed suit on May 7,1996, after it had completed its remediation of the tar-like and slag materials It seeks to recover its incurred response, remedial and removal costs, i.e., (1) $231,797 for engineering and construction costs associated with site remediation; (2) a $52,744 hazardous waste generator fee levied by the State Board of Equalization; and (3) attorneys’ fees of $245,722 incurred in connection with the remediation. Carson Harbor has not produced statements or a detailed accounting of the attorneys’ fees it seeks, so the court cannot determine whether they are “closely related” to its cleanup of the contamination. Carson Harbor also seeks to recover the purported loss in value of the property due to contamination, and the increased interest expense it incurred because it allegedly could not refinance the property due to the presence of hazardous materials. As respects the diminution in value of the property, Goldstein asserts that any present buyer would seek a 20-25% reduction in the purchase price because of the environmental risk. He admits he has not tried to sell the property and has no immediate plans to sell it. Finally, plaintiff seeks to recover attorneys’ fees and costs from the Partnership Defendants pursuant to an indemnity clause in the 1983 purchase agreement between the parties. II. DISCUSSION A. Standard Governing Motions For Summary Judgment A motion for summary judgment must be granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.PROc. 56(c). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. On an issue as to which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, however, the movant can prevail merely by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. See id. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must then set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.PROC. 56(e). In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. Rather, it draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See T.W. Electrical Service, Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir.1987). The evidence presented by the parties must be admissible. Fed.R.Civ.ProC. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. See Falls Riverway Realty, Inc. v. Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.1985); Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir.1979). B. CERCLA Claims 1. Legal Standard Governing CERC-LA Claims Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq., “to provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous substances release into the environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.” 3550 Stevens Creek Associates v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir.1990) (citing Pub.L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980)). To further this purpose, Congress created a private right of action for the recovery of certain response costs against “various types of persons who contributed to the dumping of hazardous waste at a site.” Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir.1989); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). To establish a prima facie right to recovery under § 9607(a), a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the site on which the hazardous substances are contained is a “facility” as defined in CERCLA; (2) a “release” or “threatened release” of a “hazardous substance” from the facility has occurred; (3) the “release” or “threatened release” has caused the plaintiff to incur response costs that were “necessary” and ■ “consistent with the national contingency plan;” and (4) defendants are within one of four classes of persons subject to liability under § 9607(a). See Carson Harbor Village, supra, 270 F.3d at 872; 3550 Stevens Creek, supra, 915 F.2d at 1358. See also Long Beach Unified School District v. Dorothy B. Godwin California Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (9th Cir.1994). 2. CERCLA Claims Against Unocal a. Compliance With The National Contingency Plan A private party may not recover response costs under CERCLA unless the remedial actions generating those costs are consistent with the National Contingency Plan (“NCP”). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). See also Washington State Dep’t. of Transp. v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 59 F.3d 793, 800 (9th Cir.1995) (“[A]ny ‘[non-government] person’ seeking response costs under § 9607(a)(4)(B) must prove that its actions are consistent with the NCP”).. The NCP is a plan promulgated by the EPA that delineates specific steps private parties must take in selecting a remedial action plan and cleaning up hazardous waste. See 40 C.F.R. Part 300. It is “designed to make the party seeking response costs choose a cost-effective course of action to protect public health and the environment.” Washington State Dep’t. of Transp., supra, 59 F.3d at 802. Under EPA regulations, private response action is “consistent with the NCP” if the action, evaluated as a whole, is in “substantial compliance” with certain procedural requirements, and results in a “CERCLA-quality cleanup.” See 40 C.FÍR. § 300.700(c)(3)(i). See also 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(4) (“immaterial or insubstantial deviations” will not render a response action inconsistent with the NCP). The NCP’s procedural requirements include, inter alia, that the party seeking response costs conduct a remedial site investigation (40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(5)(vii)), prepare a remedial investigation and feasibility study (“RI/FS”) (40 C.F.R. § 300.700(e)(5)(viii)), and provide an opportunity for public comment (40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(6)). Unocal argues that Carson Harbor failed substantially to comply with the public comment and RI/FS requirements, and that summary judgment must be granted in its favor on plaintiffs CERCLA claim as a result. (1) Whether Compliance Is An Element Of Liability Several courts have held that a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of NCP compliance to survive the entry of summary judgment on a CERCLA claim. See County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1517-18 (10th Cir.1991) (“... we affirm the district court’s holding that consistency with the NCP is an element of a CERCLA contribution claim, as well as its determination that the New Owners failed, on a fully developed record, to carry their burden of making a prima facie showing of this element on summary judgment”); Public Service Co. of Colorado v. Gates Rubber Co., 22 F.Supp.2d 1180, 1187, n. 4 (D.Colo.1997) (“To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must therefore make a prima facie showing of [consistency with the NCP]”), aff'd., 175 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir.1999); Channel Master Satellite, Systems, Inc. v. JFD Electronics Corp., 748 F.Supp. 373, 381 (E.D.N.C.1990) (“[I]n a cost recovery action such as this, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof to establish, as an essential element of discovery that, inter alia, the response costs for which it seeks compensation are ‘consistent’ with the NCP”). See generally City of Oakland v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. C-98-3963 SC, 2000 WL 1130066, * 3 (N.D.Cal. Aug.8, 2000) (“To establish a prima facie case under CERCLA §§ 107 and 113, a plaintiff must demonstrate that ... a ‘release’ ... caused the plaintiff to incur response costs that are ‘consistent with the national contingency plan’ ”). See also NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Engineering Co., 227 F.3d 776, 791 (7th Cir.2000) (holding that defendant should have challenged plaintiffs NCP compliance at summary judgment to preserve the issue for appeal); Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Hamtramck, 840 F.Supp. 470, 479 (E.D.Mich.1993) (granting summary judgment on a CERCLA claim for declaratory relief because plaintiff “will be unable to meet its burden of showing that its actions were consistent with the NCP”). One court in this circuit has concluded, however, that failure to comply with the NCP “is not a defense to liability, but goes only to the issue of damages,” and that “inconsistency [with the NCP] is [therefore] not a basis for granting summary judgment on the liability question.” Mid Valley Bank v. North Valley Bank, 764 F.Supp. 1377, 1389-90 (E.D.Cal.1991). The Mid Valley court found such a holding dictated by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 840 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.1988). See Mid Valley, supra, 764 F.Supp. at 1390. In Cadillac Fairview, the court stated that “whether a response action is necessary and consistent with the criteria set forth in the contingency plan is a factual one to be determined at the damages stage of a section 107(a) action, rather than by the mechanism of prior governmental approval.” Cadillac Fairview, supra, 840 F.2d at 695. The court cannot agree with the conclusion in Mid Valley that compliance with the NCP is not an element of a prima facie case under CERCLA. The Ninth Circuit has consistently stated that incurring response costs that are necessary and consistent with the NCP is an essential element of a private CERCLA action. See, e.g., Carson Harbor, supra, 270 F.3d at 870-71; 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs., supra, 915 F.2d at 1358; Ascon Properties Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir.1989); Cose v. Getty Oil Co., 4 F.3d 700, 703-04 (9th Cir.1993). But see Washington State Dep’t. of Transp., supra, 59 F.3d at 798 (“The district court granted WSDOT’s motion as to the liability of WNG et al. under CERCLA on the ground that each defendant was a responsible ‘person’ under 42 U.S.C. § 9607. The court stated that the defendants challenged liability only on the basis that WSDOT faded to comply with the NCP. However, failure to comply with the NCP is not a defense to liability, but rather a factual issue affecting damages”). Cadillac Fairview, moreover, is not to the contrary. There, the district court dismissed a private party’s CERCLA claim because it did not await governmental action respecting a site before commencing cleanup. The court held that “in order for a private response action to be ‘consistent with the national contingency plan,’ it must be ‘initiated and coordinated by a governmental entity, and not by a private individual acting alone.’ ” Cadillac Fairview, supra, 840 F.2d at 693-94 (quoting the district court’s order). The circuit court rejected this reasoning. Id. at 694-95. In response to the defendant’s argument that dispensing with a requirement of preliminary government action might result in a defendant paying for cleanup actions, that were “inadequate or ill-conceived,” the court observed that the statute did “not allow recovery of any and all costs of response,” but only those that were “necessary” and “consistent with the national contingency plan.” It noted that whether response action is necessary and consistent with the national contingency plan is a fact question “to be determined at the damages stage of a section 107(a) action, rather than by the mechanism of prior governmental approval,” and observed that defendants would “have ample opportunity at trial to express their concern that the costs incurred by Cadillac Fairview in this case were unnecessary or inconsistent with the national contingency plan.” Id. at 695. As can be seen, Cadillac Fairview stands merely for the proposition that consistency with the NCP is an issue to be determined in the context of a § 9607(a) action for reimbursement, not one to be decided by obtaining governmental agency approval before commencing remediation. While compliance with the NCP is a fact question, it can, like any other fact question, be resolved on summary judgment where the evidence is undisputed. Cf. Carson Harbor Village, supra, 270 F.3d at 872 (citing Cadillac Fairview for the proposition that the necessity of responses costs is a fact question, and that prior governmental approval is not required to render costs necessary). Accordingly, the question is whether the evidence presently in the record raises triable issues of fact regarding Carson Harbor’s compliance with the NCP. (2) “Remedial” v. “Removal” Actions A private party may recover response costs under § 9607(a) for expenses incurred in connection with a “remedial action” or a “removal.” Removal actions are “short-term action[s] taken to halt the immediate risks posed by hazardous wastes” (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. National Semiconductor Corp., 38 F.Supp.2d 802, 810 (N.D.Cal.1999)), while remedial actions are designed to achieve a permanent remedy. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 360, 106 S.Ct. 1103, 89 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (“Governmental response consists of ‘removal,’ or short-term cleanup, § 9601(23), and ‘remedial action,’ or measures to achieve a ‘permanent remedy’ to a particular hazardous waste problem, § 9601(24)”); Channel Master, supra, 748 F.Supp. at 385 (“The courts have consistently found that the removal category was to be used in that limited set of circumstances involving a need for rapid action, while non-urgent situations are to be addressed as remedial actions”); Amland Properties Corp. v. Alcoa, 711 F.Supp. 784, 794 (D.N.J.1989) (“Removal actions are to be taken in response to an immediate threat to the public welfare or to the environment.... Remedial actions, on the other hand, ‘are generally considered long-term or permanent remedies’ ”). Because of the exigency inherent in removal actions, the statutory requirements for NCP compliance relative to such actions are somewhat relaxed. See Morrison Enterprises v. McShares, Inc., 30