Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER HART, District Judge. Plaintiff Paul Fenje, M.D. claims that he was improperly terminated from the anesthesiology residency program (“the Program”) at the University of Illinois at Chicago Medical School (the “University”). Named as the defendant in this case is James Feld, M.D., individually and in his official capacity as a University employee involved in the Program. Pending are both parties’ motions for summary judgment and related motions to strike. Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint contains seven counts as follows. Except for Count Seven which is brought against defendant Feld in his individual capacity only, each count is brought against Feld in his individual and official capacity, with only injunctive relief being sought in his official capacity; that is, the official capacity claims are not for damages, which would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Fenje v. Board of Governors of University of Illinois at Chicago Medical School, 2002 WL 959837 *3 (N.D.Ill. May 9, 2002) (“Fenje I”). Count One is a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that plaintiff was denied constitutional due process in that he was denied a pretermination hearing. Count Two is a § 1983 claim that plaintiff was denied due process in that he was denied an adequate posttermination hearing. Count Three is a § 1983 claim that plaintiff was denied due process in that his posttermination hearing was delayed. Count Four is a § 1983 claim that the Resident Agreement plaintiff entered into with the University is facially unconstitutional in violation of due process in that it did not expressly provide for a time period in which to hold a termination hearing. Count Five is a § 1983 due process claim that plaintiffs termination improperly stigmatized him. Count Six is a § 1983 equal protection “class of one” claim. Count Seven is a state law claim that defendant Feld tortiously interfered with plaintiffs contract with the University. On a motion for summary judgment, the entire record is considered with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant and all factual disputes resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Turner v. J.V.D.B. & Associates, Inc., 330 F.3d 991, 994-95 (7th Cir.2003); Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir.2003); Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 653-54 (7th Cir.2002). The burden of establishing a lack of any genuine issue of material fact rests on the movant. Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir.2001); Wollin v. Gondert, 192 F.3d 616, 621-22 (7th Cir.1999). The nonmovant, however, must make a showing sufficient to establish any essential element for which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Binz v. Brandt Construction Co., 301 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir.2002); Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir.2002). The movant need not provide affidavits or deposition testimony showing the nonexistence of such essential elements. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. However, the movant must place his arguments within a factual context and a court is not obliged to address unfocused arguments. Anderson v. Cornejo, 225 F.Supp.2d 834, 845 (N.D.Ill.2002); Oak Ridge Care Center, Inc. v. Racine County, Wis., 896 F.Supp. 867, 876 (E.D.Wis.1995); In re ContiCommodity Services, Inc. Securities Litigation, 733 F.Supp. 1555, 1571 (N.D.Ill.1990), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom., Brown v. United States, 976 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir.1992), aff'd in part sub nom., ContiCommodity Services, Inc. v. Ragan, 63 F.3d 438 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1104, 116 S.Ct. 1318, 134 L.Ed.2d 471 (1996). Additionally, it is not sufficient to show evidence of purportedly disputed facts if those facts are not plausible in light of the entire record. See NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 236 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1104, 115 S.Ct. 2249, 132 L.Ed.2d 257 (1995); Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d 481, 485 (7th Cir.1991); Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 476-77 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852, 109 S.Ct. 137, 102 L.Ed.2d 110 (1988). As the Seventh Circuit has summarized: The party moving for summary judgment carries the initial burden of production to identify “those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir.1996) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citation and internal quotation omitted)). The moving party may discharge this burden by “ ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the nonmov-ant must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). “The non-movant must do more, however, than demonstrate some factual disagreement between the parties; the issue must be ‘material.’ ” Logan, 96 F.3d at 978. “Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not preclude summary judgment even when they are in dispute.” Id. (citation omitted). In determining whether the non-movant has identified a “material” issue of fact for trial, we are guided by the applicable substantive law; “[o]nly disputes that could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” McGinn v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 102 F.3d 295, 298 (7th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). Furthermore, a factual dispute is “genuine” for summary judgment purposes only when there is “sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Hence, a “metaphysical doubt” regarding the existence of a genuine fact issue is not enough to stave off summary judgment, and “the nonmovant fails to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial ‘where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party....’” Logan, 96 F.3d at 978 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). Outlaw, 259 F.3d at 837. I. PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS The parties and, especially, the attorneys involved in this case have had a particularly contentious relationship. At the deposition of plaintiff, repeated and unnecessary interruptions and objections by plaintiffs counsel, as well as evasive answers by plaintiff himself, resulted in the deposition being continued to another date under the supervision of the magistrate judge assigned to the case. Obstructive conduct has again been exhibited in plaintiff’s Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(A) statement (“Pl.56.1(b)(3)(A)”) responding to defendant’s Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement (“Def.56.1(a)(3)”). Plaintiff objects to virtually every assertion contained in defendant’s statement and also moves to strike the entire statement. Most of the- objections are without merit. Even if a party fails to authenticate a document properly or to lay a proper foundation, the opposing party is not acting in good faith in raising such an objection if the party nevertheless knows that the document is authentic. See Erickson v. Baxter Healthcare, Inc., 151 F.Supp.2d 952, 971 (N.D.Ill.2001); In re Interstate Steel Setters, Inc., 65 B.R. 312, 316 (Bankr. N.D.Ill.1986). For example, although a deposition transcript should be certified by the court reporter, objecting that the certification is missing is inappropriate and merely obstructive when the objecting party has no basis for believing the transcript is inauthentic or inaccurate. This is especially true when the certification is not missing. Additionally, such oppositional conduct often does not serve the client because it obscures possible meritorious contentions. Nevertheless, the court will consider the objections that have been raised. However, it is not this bench’s practice to strike any motions or any portion of a Rule 56.1 statement. To the extent a factual statement is not adequately supported, it will not be credited. The objections are generally addressed in the Appendix attached to the end of today’s Opinion (hereinafter “Appendix” or “App.”). The rulings that are recited in the Appendix have been applied in setting forth the facts to be taken as true for purposes of summary judgment. Plaintiffs second objections to defendant’s evidence’in support-of its motions'for summary judgment and motion to strike the same [108] is a more detailed statement of plaintiffs previously filed motion to strike defendant’s Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement of material facts [95]. The earlier motion will be denied as moot. Plaintiffs Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(A) response to defendant’s Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement of material facts [110] appears to be identical to Document [108] except that Document [110]- omits the language requesting that items be struck. Document [110] first sets forth 20 types of objections with supporting case law, then responds -paragraph-by-paragraph to defendant’s statement of facts while referencing the previously recited objections. This is the set of objections that are considered in the Appendix and the objection numbers referenced therein are those contained in Document 110. While referencing the objections is permissible to avoid repeating the same legal argument over and over, as' to the objections raised to a specific paragraph, the specific basis for the objection-still must be made sufficiently clear. Defendant is granted leave to file its response to the objections [118] and that response has been considered. II. DEFENDANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION A. Facts Resolving all genuine factual disputes and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor, and resolving plaintiffs objections in the manner discussed in the Appendix infra, the facts assumed to be true for purposes of defendant’s motion for summary judgment are as follows. Plaintiff Paul Fenje, M.D., presently resides in Canada. In 1994, he graduated from medical school in Ireland. In his September 29, 2003 affidavit, plaintiff represents that he is presently licensed to practice medicine in Ireland, which may constitute licensure for all of the European Union. As of March 3, 2003, though, he testified that he was not then licensed to practice in Great Britain or the United States. When asked why he had no license, he did not mention being licensed in Ireland and instead responded that he still had to complete Part Two of the Medical Council Account Exam. It is undisputed that plaintiff has never been licensed to practice medicine in any state of the United States. Plaintiffs application to the Program also indicates that he attended the University of Toronto where he obtained a B.S. in biochemistry, an M.S. from the Department of Clinical Pharmacology and Biochemistry, and had worked toward a Ph.D. in the Department of Pathology. Defendant James Feld, M.D., is a licensed physician in the state of Illinois. During times pertinent to this litigation, defendant served as the chair of an informal selection committee for the University’s Anesthesiology Residency Training Program (the “Program”). The selection committee makes recommendations as to admission to the Program with the final decision being made by Ronald Albrecht, M.D., who, as Director of the Anesthesiology Department, is technically also the Director of the Department’s Residency Program. However, in the letter to plaintiff confirming plaintiffs acceptance into the Program, Feld inserted the title Director of the Program under his signature. In an affidavit previously submitted in opposition to plaintiffs motions for preliminary relief, defendant expressly stated he was Director of the Program. On defendant’s summary judgment motion, it is taken as true that Feld was the de facto Director of the Program even if he did not have that actual title. In 2000, plaintiff submitted an application to the Program. Just above plaintiffs signature, the application form includes the following: I have read and I understand the instructions for the completion of this application. I certify that the information submitted on these application materials is complete and correct to the best of my knowledge. I understand that any false or misleading information may disqualify me for this position. Included in plaintiffs application was a document labeled as a curriculum vitae. Neither the curriculum vitae nor anything else in the application makes any mention of plaintiff having been in a residency program at Ayr Hospital in Scotland in 1999. Plaintiff later submitted a document labeled as work history (Def.Exh. L-37), which refers to being at Ayr Hospital from August 1, 1999 to October 31, 1999. He describes his work for those three months as follows: “Postgraduate training as an SHO/Resident in Emergency Medicine at Ayr General Hospital, Ayr, Scotland, and studied for Canadian Part 2 exam, and continued writing medically oriented book.” This document, however, was submitted after plaintiff had accepted the offer of the residency at the University. It was submitted to University staff assisting him with an application for a medical license. It was not made part of the application that was seen by the selection committee or Albrecht. Defendant and Albrecht were unaware of the work history document prior to the initial decision to terminate plaintiffs participation in the Program. As part of the admission process for the Program, defendant interviewed plaintiff. At the conclusion of the interview, defendant asked plaintiff if there was anything else defendant should know about plaintiffs background including any trouble in any prior training programs. Defendant asked if there were any “skeletons” in plaintiffs “closet.” Plaintiff responded there were none. A few days after the interview, plaintiff sent a May 10, 2000 e-mail to Department of Anesthesiology Administrator Mickey Leavy with a “letter” that he asked to be printed out and forwarded to defendant, which it was. The letter begins, “This is just to put on paper for your convenience about what we last talked about.” The letter states in part: There are no skeletons of any kind in any of my closets here. I don’t smoke, and rarely drink. I have never used any kind of illegal, illicit or recreational drug of any kind. I have never had any kind of confrontation with Police, been arrested or been charged with any type of felony, misdemeanor, or any kind of criminal activity. Even in traffic offenses, I’ve had one parking ticket and one speeding ticket. In the speeding ticket there was no substance to it but because it was less expensive to simply pay it than take it to court I paid it. In fact, plaintiff had been dismissed from the Ayr Hospital residency and had retained an attorney who pursued legal proceedings related to this dismissal. The Ayr Hospital legal proceedings continued until at least July 2000. In an August 10, 2000 letter to Albrecht, plaintiff mentioned those proceedings. The only reasonable inference is that plaintiff was well aware in May, June, and July 2000 that a dispute existed regarding his residency at Ayr Hospital. Sometime prior to June 19, 2000, defendant and the selection committee recommended to Albrecht that plaintiff be admitted into the Program and Albrecht concurred. Sometime prior to June 19, defendant communicated to plaintiff that he was admitted to the Program and plaintiff indicated his acceptance. Defendant sent plaintiff a June 19, 2000 letter confirming that plaintiff had accepted an offer of a “4-year residency to begin August 1, 2000.” Defendant signed the letter as “Director, Anesthesiology Residency Training Program.” The letter also indicated that the Graduate Medical School office would contact plaintiff about completing the process. On July 17, 2000, plaintiff received his Resident Agreement (the “Agreement”), which he signed and returned. On July 24, the Agreement was signed by Albrecht, who was denominated as “Program Director,” and, in early August, it was signed by the Associate Dean of Graduate Medical Education. The effective date, as stated on the Agreement, was June 23, 2000. The Agreement is for a one-year residency commencing August 1, 2000. There is a provision for reappointment for further time periods upon the recommendation of the Program Director. The Agreement includes the following provisions: 4. Representations: The Resident represents the following: * * * * * b)That he/she possess a valid State of Illinois medical license. Such license will be obtained at the Resident’s own expense. Failure to provide proof of such license as of the commencement date of this Agreement shall prohibit the resident from providing any patient care services subject to any additional rights the University may have pursuant to Section 10 of this Agreement. 10. Termination: This Agreement may be terminated as follows: a) by the University in the event the Resident fails to obtain the appropriate medical license from the State of Illinois within thirty (30) days of the commencement date of this Agreement. In lieu of termination, the University may take such disciplinary action against the Resident it deems appropriate including suspension without pay from the program. b) by the University upon the failure of the Resident to comply with the terms and duties described in this agreement. c) by the Resident upon the University’s failure to comply with the terms of this Agreement provided the Resident furnishes thirty (30) day advance written notice to the University. d) by mutual agreement of the parties as evidenced in writing. 11. Procedural Right: In the event this Agreement is terminated by the University or the Resident is disciplined, the Resident shall have such procedural rights as set forth in Exhibit B attached hereto. Such rights shall not be applicable if said termination is due to Resident’s failure to obtain or retain an appropriate license from the State of Illinois or if covered by paragraphs J, K, or L of exhibit B attached hereto. Exhibit B of the Agreement is a document entitled “Procedural Rights to Suspension/Termination.” Under the title, “Effective date: July 1, 1991” is printed. Dr. Feld was not personally involved in establishing the content of Exhibit B. It provides in part: a. Within fourteen (14) days of written notification of his or her suspension or termination, a Resident may request an informal hearing before a Committee, as more fully described below. The Resident’s request shall be in writing and submitted to the Department Head or such individual acting in a similar capacity depending on the particular program the Resident is enrolled in. b. The written notification of suspension and/or termination shall include an explanation from the Department Head (or such individual acting in a similar capacity depending on the particular program the Resident is enrolled in) of the reason(s) for such suspension or termination. The written notification shall also advise the Resident of his or her right to request an informal hearing pursuant to this Exhibit. c. [Composition of hearing Committee.] d. The Committee shall convene the hearing within ten (10) days of the Resident’s written request and shall notify the resident in writing of the date, time, and place for the hearing as soon as reasonably possible, but no less than 72 hours in advance of the hearing. e. The Resident and the Department Head or his or her designee or Program Director shall be present at the hearing and shall each present such information or materials (oral or written) as they wish to support their case. No other representative shall be present during the hearing. Each shall be permitted to review all materials submitted to the Committee during the hearing. f. [Committee decides by majority.] g. [Requirement of written decision stating reason.] h. A Resident may appeal the Committee’s decision to the Associate Dean of Graduate Medical Education within ten (10) days of receipt of the committee’s decision. The Associate Dean shall render his or her decision in writing within a reasonable time, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days. In the event the Associate Dean intends to reverse the Committee’s decision, he or she first must appoint another Committee, in consultation with the Department Head, to discuss the matter. The Resident may appeal the Associate Dean’s decision to the Dean of the College of Medicine within ten (10) days. The Dean shall render his or her decision within ten (10) days and such decision shall be final. * * * * * * 1. The procedural rights provided under this Exhibit do not relate to departmental determinations relating to certification and/or evaluation of the Resident’s academic or clinical competence. Such certification shall be handled according to the standards of the various specialty boards. After being informed of plaintiffs acceptance in mid-June 2000, Leavy and Marla Dunning of the Office of Graduate Medical Education contacted plaintiff and assisted him with submitting an application for the required medical license. They do not state when they first contacted him. Plaintiff first provided a license application on July 12, 2000. However, that application was incomplete. Letters and e-mails from plaintiff, which are admissible against plaintiff under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2), show that, in mid-August, plaintiff was still attempting to obtain documentation necessary for his application. See Def. Exh. L-26, L-29. It was not until August 30, 2000 that plaintiff had submitted all the documents necessary to obtain a license. On that date, however, Leavy also learned that plaintiffs acceptance into the Program had been withdrawn so she did not submit the materials. Even if the license application had been submitted at that time, it still would have taken additional time thereafter to receive the license. Plaintiff states in an affidavit that the University was at fault for any delays. See PI. Sept. 29, 2003 Aff. ¶¶ 37-43. In his affidavit, though, plaintiff does not refer to any dates nor identify any specific act of a University employee that contributed to the delay. The conclusory statements in plaintiffs affidavit are not supported by specific facts and therefore do not support a genuine factual dispute as to the University, not he, being at fault for any delay in submitting his medical license application. As of late July and early August 2000, Feld was not personally aware that the Agreement had been signed by plaintiff and the University officials. In late July 2000, defendant received an anonymous telephone call suggesting plaintiff had had difficulties during residency training at Ayr Hospital in Scotland. The anonymous caller also suggested contacting attending physician Fiona Gibson and the Medical Director at Ayr Hospital. Defendant thereafter contacted plaintiff, who provided his views on the matter and provided defendant with the names of people that could be contacted at Ayr Hospital. Plaintiff also faxed defendant a letter dated August 1, 2000 in which plaintiff states his position. In the letter, plaintiff mentions a number of his references that should be contacted and also states: In retrospect, I had never considered this incident any kind of a closet skeleton and had thought of it as a personality clash of some kind with Dr. Fiona Gibson but why completely eluded me. Dr. Gibson had concluded I had some kind of Psychiatric obsessive trait because I attended the ER department while not working, simply because I wanted to learn more. Dr. Gibson also concluded I had been having Epileptic Petit Mai seizures because as I speak, I sometimes pause and ponder the question and my response, and rarely blurt out answers without considering the response. ... ¡ I very much hope, you do talk to my lawyer in Ayr, Mr. Brian Murphy,.... Def. Exh. L-21. Defendant only contacted Gibson and the Medical Director who told him plaintiff had been a resident, his competency to deliver patient care had been questioned, and plaintiffs six-month residency had therefore been cut short. After discussing the matter with Al-brecht and other members of the informal selection committee, defendant concluded that plaintiff should not be a resident in the Program. The others agreed as well. Approximately August 4, 2000, defendant telephonically informed plaintiff that a decision had been ■ made to terminate his participation in the Program. Although the Agreement provided that plaintiffs residency began August 1, he had not actually reported for duty yet and had not yet obtained a visa to come to the United States. In a July 26, 2000 e-mail to Leavy, plaintiff had reported he still needed to obtain more documentation for his medical license application, he did not yet have a visa, and he would not be able to begin on August 1. Def. Exh. L-16. .Although plaintiff was orally informed by defendant that his residency was terminated and plaintiff understood that his residency had been terminated as indicated by subsequent communications, see, e.g. Def. Exh. L-25, at the time plaintiff was not provided written notice that his residency was terminated nor was -he advised of his contractual right to a hearing. It is undisputed that defendant’s basis for the termination was plaintiffs failure to be candid, honest, and forthcoming about possible problems in his background, especially in light of the post-interview email/letter again emphasizing there were no problems. Whether plaintiffs performance in the Ayr Hospital residency was actually deficient was not a basis for the termination. After defendant informed plaintiff of the termination, plaintiff sent an August 10, 2000 fax to Albrecht (Def.Exh. L-25) in which plaintiff acknowledges that Feld had ended his participation in the residency Program. Plaintiff mentions the termination related to the Ayr Hospital position, referring to a six-month contract with Ayr Hospital and being terminated after 12 days because Gibson considered him “unsafe.” Plaintiff denies Gibson’s accusations and mentions that he instituted breach of contract proceedings regarding the Ayr Hospital dismissal. Plaintiff closes the letter as follows: In my opinion, Dr. Feld did not carry out as complete an investigation into this as he indicated initially he would. Dr. Feld did not talk to the other Physicians whose names he had asked for and received. Because this will significantly affect my career in Anesthesiology, I respectfully ask that a complete and sufficient inquiry into this be done. Talking only to the one Physician who initiated the accusation and the Medical Director who signed the termination slip, is insufficient in my opinion. In an affidavit, plaintiff states: “Very shortly [after August 4, 2000], I demanded from Drs. Feld and Albrecht that I be given a hearing and an opportunity to be heard regarding my termination from the University’s program; they did not provide me with one pursuant to my requests.” Pl. Aug. 27, 2003 Aff. ¶ 17. Plaintiff does not specify whether these were oral requests or written requests. He does not provide any details as to the language of these requests. Perhaps the purported request to Albrecht is meant to refer to the request in the August 10 letter that there be “a complete and sufficient inquiry.” Particularly in light of Feld’s and Albrecht’s denials that any oral request for a hearing was made to either of them, plaintiffs affidavit is not specific enough to establish that any oral request for a hearing was made in August 2000. In calendar year 2001, plaintiff applied for medical residencies through the Electronic Residency Application Service (“ERAS”). He did not obtain a resident position through that process nor has he in subsequent years. The only offer of employment that plaintiff has received since August 2000 was to work for Western Health Care Corporation in Newfoundland, but he could not take that position because he did not have or obtain the necessary medical license. Plaintiff has not had any paying position since August 2000. The only type of medical training plaintiff has participated in since August 2000 was being in the department of family medicine at Royal Jubilee Hospital in October and November 2000 in order to learn psychiatry. Feld and Albrecht have not told anyone outside the University of plaintiff being terminated from the Program. No employer or other resident program has contacted them for a reference for plaintiff. Plaintiff states in an affidavit that he must explain in employment and residency applications his termination and the gap in his employment and that “friends, family members, and others” know of his termination. Pl. Aug. 27, 2003 Aff. ¶¶ 22-24. Plaintiff, however, does not identify any specific employers or persons with whom he has had such discussions. Moreover, these statements in his affidavit are contradicted by his deposition testimony and other evidence. The 2001 ERAS application makes no mention of plaintiffs residency experience at the University and plaintiff testified at his deposition that he could not recall whether he was interviewed for any resident positions or whether he applied in 2002 or 2003. He also testified at his deposition that he did not know if he informed any other residency program about his experience at the University. Additionally, he testified that he did not know of anyone outside the University who had been told of his experience with the University. Since the statements in the affidavit contradict plaintiffs deposition testimony and no explanation is provided for the changed testimony, these statements in the affidavit will not be credited. Beckel v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., 301 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir.2002); Bahnaman v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 219 F.Supp.2d 921, 926 (N.D.Ill.2002). See also Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-07, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999). There is no credible evidence that anyone other than employees of the University and those involved in this litigation are aware that plaintiff was terminated from the Program, let alone the stated reasons for the termination. Plaintiff provides testimony as to his own belief that his not having been in practice or a training program for a few years and having been terminated from the Program will substantially harm his chances of being admitted into another residency program. Such testimony is not sufficient to show the truth of his belief. Defendant does admit that he would closely scrutinize a residency applicant who had not received medical training for more than one and one-half years. It can be inferred from this that other decisionmak-ers for residency programs would have similar reservations. For purposes of defendant’s summary judgment motion, it will be assumed to be true that plaintiffs ability to obtain admission into another residency program is now more difficult in light of his not having practiced or been in training (other than for a couple months) during the last few years. There is, however, no competent evidence that that situation or his termination from the Program has actually been the cause of his being denied any employment or training opportunity. On May 29, 2002, a preliminary injunction was entered against defendant in his official capacity: ordering that (1) by no later than May 30, 2002, plaintiff is to be temporarily reinstated into the anesthesiology residency program of the University of Illinois at Chicago Medical School; (2) upon reinstatement, plaintiff shall be under indefinite suspension without compensation, benefits, accrual of seniority, the right to any training, or the authority to treat patients; and (3) this order shall remain in force until final judgment is entered in this case or this case is dismissed Judgment dated May 28, 2002[24]. See also Fenje v. Feld, 2002 WL 1160158 *8 (N.D.Ill. May 29, 2002) ("Fenje II”). On plaintiffs motion for preliminary relief, it was found that he had failed to show that he had anjr more than a limited possibility of success, but that he faced the possibility of losing his U.S. Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates certificate if not reinstated whereas there was no significant harm to the University from a “paper” reinstatement of plaintiff. Balancing the likelihood of success and potential harms, it was found that reinstatement to suspended status was appropriate relief. See id. at *6-8. Neither party makes any argument that this reinstatement affected any right to notice, a hearing, or reinstatement that plaintiff otherwise had. Approximately November 1, 2002, plaintiff received a letter signed by Albrecht (Def.Exh. L-36) which the parties agree was the first written notice plaintiff received from the University that his residency had been terminated. The notice also advised plaintiff of his right to request a hearing as to his “status” with the University and the Program. The notice listed three grounds for his termination: (1) providing false and misleading information about past “skeletons,” specifically the failure to disclose problems at Ayr Hospital; (2) being ineligible for employment because still lacking a visa and Illinois medical license after August 1, 2000; and (3) being unqualified to provide anesthesiology services to patients. A hearing was held on March 3, 2003. Present at the hearing were the three members of the hearing panel (David Schwartz, Charles Lurido, and Nancy Burke), Feld, and Fenje. Jose Salazar, who was recording the hearing, was also present. The three panel members were all physicians employed in the Anesthesiology Department. None of them were involved in plaintiffs application process and none had been previously aware that plaintiff had been admitted into the residency Program and then terminated. All three panel members knew Feld from being in the Anesthesiology Department, but were not social friends of Feld. At the hearing, plaintiff was not permitted to have his attorney present nor did any attorney represent the University or present charges. Fenje was permitted to present a written and oral opening statement as well as other documentary evidence and his own testimony. Feld spoke in favor of the termination. Neither side was permitted to present any testimony other than that of Fenje and Feld. Fenje and Feld were permitted to question each other, though Fenje did not ask any questions of Feld. Schwartz instructed the parties to submit documentary evidence to the panel and each other prior to the hearing date. No discovery was permitted specifically for the hearing, but, by March 3, 2003, much of the discovery in this court case had been completed. The hearing panel unanimously upheld the decision to terminate plaintiffs participation in the Program. The decision was based solely on the first ground stated in the November 1, 2002 notice. Schwartz’s March 11, 2003 written decision on behalf of the panel states: It is the unanimous opinion of the hearing committee that Dr. James Feld acted properly on August 4, 2000 by retracting the offer of a residency position in the Department of Anesthesiology for Dr. Fenje. We find this to be so for the following reasons: 1. Dr. Fenje’s Curriculum Vitae is deliberately misleading in that it does not include exact dates of attendance for his training and failed to include his leaving Ayr Hospital after only 12 days of a six month contract. 2. When asked about past experiences at his interview with Dr. Feld, Dr. Fenje did not take this opportunity to correct his omission from his Curriculum Vitae and explain the circumstances of his leaving Ayr Hospital. The hearing committee therefore finds that Dr. Paul Fenje was justly denied a position as a Resident in the Department of Anesthesiology at the University of Illinois at Chicago and, further, that he should not be given residency status. Plaintiff points to no evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred that this decision would have been different had the hearing been held closer to the time his residency was terminated. Plaintiff appealed the panel’s decision to Michael Bailie, Vice Dean of the College of Medicine. Prior to reaching a decision, Bailie had oral conversations with plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff was provided the opportunity to submit an additional written statement but did not. Bailie upheld the decision to terminate plaintiffs participation in the Program. In his June 13, 2003 decision, he explained: The basis for your rejection as a resident at the University of Illinois College of Medicine Department of Anesthesiology was that you failed to provide disclosure of your tenure at Ayr Hospital in your material submitted to the Department. In addition, when given the opportunity to disclose this information to Dr. Feld during and after your interview, you failed to do so. In your statement to me, you indicated that you thought the interview had taken place before you went to Ayr Hospital and that explained why you did not have it on your resume. However, the interview with Dr. Feld did in fact take place well after December 1999. Based upon my findings, I believe that Dr. Feld acted appropriately in denying you the position. Def. Exh. L-81. Again, there is no evidence that Bailie’s decision would have been different had the initial hearing been held closer in time to plaintiffs actual dismissal. Plaintiff provides no competent evidence that he suffered any emotional injury as a result of any delays in providing him with a hearing. The only evidence of emotional injury that plaintiff points to is one sentence of an affidavit. “The University’s delay in offering me a purported hearing regarding my termination from the University’s program for approximately two years has led to emotional distress for me, and I am claiming damages for this in my lawsuit.” Pl. Sept. 29, 2003 Aff. ¶ 44. But when the injured party’s own testimony is the only proof of emotional damages, he must explain the circumstances of his injury in reasonable detail; he cannot rely on mere conclusory statements. Biggs v. Village of Dupo, 892 F.2d 1298, 1304 (7th Cir.1990). Thus, we have said that bare allegations by a plaintiff that the defendant’s conduct made him “depressed,” “humiliated,” or the like are not sufficient to establish injury unless the facts underlying the case are so inherently degrading that it would be reasonable to infer that a person would suffer emotional distress from the defendant’s action. Alston v. King, 231 F.3d 383, 388 (7th Cir.2000); United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 931-32 (7th Cir.1992). Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 929-30 (7th Cir.2003). Plaintiffs statement in his affidavit is insufficient to establish that he suffered any emotional injury caused by delay. B. Deprivation of Property Interest Without Due Process Plaintiff contends he had a property interest in his residency position that entitled him to a pretermination hearing or, alternatively, a timely and adequate post-termination hearing. 1. Existence of Property Interest In order to be entitled to the due process protections raised in Counts One through Four, plaintiff must have had a protectable property interest in the residency position. See Omosegbon v. Wells, 335 F.3d 668, 674-75 (7th Cir.2003). Here, the Agreement had a provision that, absent agreement of the parties, plaintiffs residency could only be terminated for cause. Thus, as long as an enforceable contract existed, plaintiff would have a property interest in his residency. See id.; Lalvani v. Cook County, Ill., 269 F.3d 785, 791 (7th Cir.2001); Fenje I, 2002 WL 959837 at *6. Defendant contends the Agreement does not create a property interest because the contract was contingent. First, defendant points to § 10(a) of the Agreement which permits the University to terminate the Agreement if a medical license is not obtained within 30 days of the commencement of the Agreement. The medical license, however, is not made a condition precedent to the contract being in force. Instead, the Agreement provides that it was effective June 23, 2000 and that the term of plaintiffs employment began August 1, 2000. Failure to obtain the license is a ground for terminating the Agreement 30 days after the residency begins, not a condition that prevents the Agreement from being enforceable. Such a reading is fully consistent with § 4(b) of the Agreement which provides that failure to have a medical license precludes the resident from performing patient services, not that it prevents the residency from commencing. Moreover, it is not provided that the Agreement automatically terminates after 30 days if the license is not obtained. At the University’s option, the Agreement may be either terminated or the University may take disciplinary action, including suspension without pay. Furthermore, plaintiffs residency was not terminated on the ground that he lacked a medical license. Although the lack of a license was mentioned in the November 1, 2002 notice, Feld’s decision was based entirely upon the failure to disclose the Ayr Hospital situation, as were the decisions of the hearing panel and Vice Dean Bailie. Section 10(a) of the Agreement did not prevent plaintiff from having a protectable property interest in his residency. Compare Hannon v. Turnage, 892 F.2d 653, 659 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 821, 111 S.Ct. 69, 112 L.Ed.2d 43 (1990) (no property interest came into being because, under applicable federal statute, Veteran Administration’s appointment of an unlicensed physician was void ab initio). The failure to obtain a medical license should be viewed as a possible cause for terminating the Agreement, which is consistent with plaintiffs interest in the one-year appointment being a property right. Defendant’s other contention is that no property interest was created because the contract was contingent on the truthfulness of the representations contained therein. Again, this is a cause for termination, not a contingency that prevents a property interest from coming into being. See Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 574 (7th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963, 96 S.Ct. 1748, 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976); Rooney v. Secretary of Army, 293 F.Supp.2d 111, 127-28 (D.D.C.2003). 2. Pretermination Hearing Plaintiff contends that he was entitled to a pretermination hearing. Where a public employee has a property interest in a position, the employee ordinarily will have, absent exigent circumstances, a right to notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond prior to termination. Chaney v. Suburban Bus Division of Regional Transportation Authority, 52 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir.1995); Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir.1992). However, due process is a flexible concept. Chaney, 52 F.3d at 628. The procedural due process requirements applicable to a particular situation are highly fact-specific and therefore depend on the particular situation. Sonnleitner v. York, 304 F.3d 704, 713 (7th Cir.2002). In determining the process that is due, the three-part Mathews balancing test is applied for both pretermination and posttermination process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Sonnleitner, 304 F.3d at 712-13. The three factors that are balanced are: “First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest.” Id. at 712 (quoting Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932, 117 S.Ct. 1807, 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893)). Even if it is determined that pretermination process is due, the procedures to be provided may be informal and need not be elaborate. As long as adequate posttermination procedures are available, the pretermination procedures require less. Sonnleitner, 304 F.3d at 711; Head v. Chicago School Reform Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 794, 803-04 (7th Cir.2000); Alston v. King, 157 F.3d 1113, 1117 (7th Cir.1998). Ordinarily, “at a minimum: (1) oral or written notice of the charges; (2) an explanation of the employer’s evidence; and (3) an opportunity for the employee to tell his or her side of the story” is required, as well as an impartial decisionmaker. Head, 225 F.3d at 803-04. Plaintiffs particular' situation is unusual. Ordinarily, a public employee who has a property right in his or her employment is already working in the position at the time of discharge. Here, however, plaintiff had not yet started in the position and had not yet obtained a visa to enter and work in the United States. He had not yet arrived in the city where he was to work. Additionally, he had not yet obtained a medical license necessary to fully perform his duties. These facts cut both ways. On the one hand, plaintiff had less of an interest than an existing employee who suddenly becomes jobless, losing both income and benefits. Plaintiff still had an interest in resolving his situation with the University so that he would know if he must seek other residencies or employment instead, but that would not be quite as strong an interest as some one who was actually employed and being paid and then lost his or her position. On the other hand, the University’s interest is also less than the usual situation since it did not have as urgent a need to dismiss plaintiff in that he was not yet performing any duties nor would he be immediately available to perform any duties. Moreover, while the University has a substantial interest in precluding a possibly unqualified resident from providing patient services, particularly in the high-risk medical field of anesthesiology, cf. Ezekwo v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 785 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1013, 112 S.Ct. 657, 116 L.Ed.2d 749 (1991), here that interest did not bring any urgency to the matter because plaintiff was not yet available, or even permitted, to provide patient services. Defendant had some time to make a decision about terminating plaintiff before he would actually be reporting for duty. Still, the University instead offered the position to a different applicant, so it did have some interest in quickly resolving plaintiffs status so that it could fill the position if necessary. As to any risk of error, that was not a factor that called for more extensive procedures. Here, plaintiff did not dispute that he was asked about problems or skeletons nor did he dispute that he did not reveal the dismissal from Ayr Hospital during the oral interview. His application itself showed whether the Ayr Hospital experience had been disclosed in those papers. If the decision to terminate plaintiffs participation had been made based on whether plaintiff actually provided poor patient services at Ayr Hospital, further investigation and pretermination procedures might have helped. However, that was not the basis for the decision. It is undisputed that the only basis for the termination decision was the failure to disclose the residency and quick dismissal at Ayr Hospital, the facts of which were not in dispute. The only real question was whether the failure to disclose was such an indication of dishonesty that plaintiff did not have the appropriate character to participate in the Program and be an anesthesiologist. Another consideration going to the private interests involved and the appropriateness of pretermination procedures is whether posttermination procedures would also be available, as well as the nature and timing of such proceedings. Sonnleitner, 304 F.3d at 713. Under the terms of Exhibit B of the Agreement, the resident has 14 days to request a hearing and the hearing is to be convened within 10 days, though no express deadline exists for the conclusion of the hearing and issuance of a decision. As to plaintiff, the posttermination hearing was not held until more than two and one-half years after his dismissal. A delay of that long is a factor favoring fuller pretermination procedures. See id. at 713-14. It is unnecessary to determine precisely how the above factors should be balanced. They ordinarily would call for some pretermination procedures, but not the fullest possible hearing. There is, however, another overriding consideration that has not yet been addressed and which establishes that plaintiff was entitled to only minimal procedures. In academic situations, the Supreme Court has held that dismissal on academic grounds, unlike dismissal on disciplinary grounds, requires only minimal due process protections, if any. Board of Curators of University of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 85-91, 98 S.Ct. 948, 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978). No hearing, either pretermination or post-termination, is required. Id. at 89-90, 98 S.Ct. 948. “Academic evaluations of a student, in contrast to disciplinary determinations, bear little resemblance to the judicial and administrative fact-finding proceedings to which we have traditionally attached a full-hearing requirement.... Like the decision of an individual professor as to the proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.” Id. The reluctance to interfere with the academic process is greater the higher the level of education. Id. at 90, 98 S.Ct. 948; Shaboon v. Duncan, 252 F.3d 722, 730 (5th Cir.2001). A medical residency is a hybrid position in which the resident is both a student and an employee. However, it is primarily a learning position for which the limited due process rights afforded an academic decision about a student apply. Shaboon, 252 F.3d at 729-32; Ezekwo, 940 F.2d at 784-85; Davis v. Mann, 882 F.2d 967, 974 (5th Cir.1989). The Supreme Court was clear that no hearing is required regarding academic decisions. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90, 98 S.Ct. 948; Shaboon, 252 F.3d at 730; Ezekwo, 940 F.2d at 785; Davis, 882 F.2d at 975. The Supreme Court did not make clear what minimal procedures are required. As to medical residencies, case law holds that notice of the grounds for the decision and an opportunity to respond is sufficient. Shaboon, 252 F.3d at 730; Ezekwo, 940 F.2d at 785; Davis, 882 F.2d at 975. Academic grounds for dismissal from a residency program include reasons that go to the resident’s fitness to perform as a doctor. Shaboon, 252 F.3d at 731. Issues as to having the proper character to be a doctor are academic grounds. Cf. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 91 at n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 948 (“Personal hygiene and timeliness may be as important factors in a school’s determination of whether a student will make a good medical doctor as the student’s ability to take a case history or diagnose an illness.”). The determination that plaintiff lacked the candor or honest character necessary to be a resident and anesthesiologist was a dismissal based on academic grounds, not a disciplinary decision. Here, prior to his termination, plaintiff was given notice of the potential grounds for his dismissal and an opportunity to present his response and attempt to convince Feld not to dismiss him. That was sufficient process in plaintiffs situation. Additionally, there is no contention that, as of the time of the pretermination process, defendant was not an impartial decisionmaker. In any event, impartiality is presumed and plaintiff has not provided any basis for overcoming that presumption. See Head, 225 F.3d at 803; Bakalis v. Golembeski, 35 F.3d 318, 325-26 (7th Cir.1994); Alexander v. Board of Education of Indian Prairie School District No. 204, 1998 WL 699020 *9 (N.D.Ill. Oct.5, 1998). See also Ryan v. Illinois Department of Children & Family Services, 185 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir.1999). Plaintiff received adequate pretermination process. Count One will be dismissed. 3. Posttermination Hearing Plaintiffs claims concerning the denial of a timely posttermination hearing fail for a number of reasons. As was already discussed in § 11(B)(2) supra regarding pretermination process, plaintiff was entitled to only limited process and was not entitled to a formal hearing. The pretermination process that was provided was sufficient to satisfy due process. In any event, plaintiff was also provided with a formal hearing which more than satisfied the process to which he was entitled. To the extent plaintiff was constitutionally entitled to any further process following defendant’s pretermination decision, plaintiff would be entitled to an impartial decisionmaker. Although plaintiff contends the hearing panel was not impartial, he fails to provide evidence to overcome the presumption of impartiality. Cf. Head, 225 F.3d at 803; Ryan, 185 F.3d at 762. Plaintiff contends that a due process violation occurs where a public entity violates its own rules and procedures, apparently contending the procedural requirements of Exhibit B of the Agreement were not followed. Plaintiff does not identify what procedure was violated, but, even assuming one of the procedures was not followed, this contention is without merit. A procedure required by contract, statute, or regulation does not create a constitutionally protected right nor does violation of a contract, statute, or regulation, by itself, constitute a violation of due process. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 92 n. 8, 98 S.Ct. 948; Hickey v. O’Bannon, 287 F.3d 656, 658 (7th Cir.2002); Fuller v. Dillon, 236 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1072, 121 S.Ct. 2229, 150 L.Ed.2d 220 (2001); Campbell v. City of Champaign, 940 F.2d 1111, 1113 (7th Cir.1991); Webb v. Board of Trustees of Ball State University, 2002 WL 31242240 *5 (S.D.Ind. July 18, 2002); Kelm v. Arlington Heights Park District, 1999 WL 753930 *6 (N.D.Ill. Sept.15, 1999). Even if this were the usual public employment situation where plaintiff would have been entitled to a hearing on his termination, the hearing he was provided complied with those due process rules. Plaintiff was provided notice of the possible grounds for his termination. The University was required to provide copies of the documentary evidence it was presenting and plaintiff was aware of the only live witness other than himself, Feld. Plaintiff was permitted to provide both a written and oral opening statement. He was allowed to present his own documentary evidence and his own testimony, and, although he did not avail himself of the opportunity, he would have been permitted to question Feld. Plaintiff was also permitted to present argument on his behalf. As previously set forth, the hearing panel was impartial. Additionally, the panel set forth in writing the reasons for its decision. The purported hearing deficiencies raised by plaintiff are not constitutionally required in a termination hearing for a public employee. There is no constitutional right to have counsel present at such hearings. See Panozzo v. Rhoads, 905 F.2d 135, 139-40 (7th Cir.1990); Kramarski v. Village of Orland Park, 2002 WL 1827637 *13 (N.D.Ill. Aug.9, 2002). There is no constitutional right to confront witnesses or present live witnesses at such hearings. See Staples v. City of Milwaukee, 142 F.3d 383, 387 (7th Cir.1998); Moses v. City of Evanston, 1995 WL 625431 *3 (N.D.Ill. Oct.23, 1995), aff'd by unpublished order, 97 F.3d 1454 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1117, 117 S.Ct. 961, 136 L.Ed.2d 847 (1997); Hubbard v. Village of Streamwood, 1995 WL 151830 *3 (N.D.Ill. April 3, 1995); Moscowitz v. Brown, 850 F.Supp. 1185, 1195 (S.D.N.Y.1994). Due process does not require that witness statements be provided prior to the hearing or that the opportunity for discovery be provided prior to the hearing. See Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1254-55 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853, 111 S.Ct. 147, 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Moscowitz, 850 F.Supp. at 1195; Peterson v. Unified School District No. 418, 724 F.Supp. 829, 833-34 (D.Kan.1989). It is sufficient that plaintiff was aware of all the evidence that was provided to the hearing panel and had the opportunity to rebut it. See Swank, 898 F.2d at 1254-55. There is also no constitutional requirement that the hearing comport with rules of evidence. Amundsen v. Chicago Park District, 218 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir.2000). Lastly, termination procedures do not violate due process because the decisionmaker is not empowered to award monetary damages. See Schacht v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 175 F.3d 497, 503 (7th Cir.1999). Plaintiffs other contention is that the delay in providing plaintiff written notice and eventually a hearing is a violation of due process. It has previously been held that the pretermination process provided to plaintiff was all that the Constitution required. Therefore, any delay in providing a further hearing would not violate due process. If, however, plaintiff was constitutionally entitled to a posttermination proceeding of some type as well, it would be possible that the two and one-half year delay in providing a posttermination proceeding would itself be a due process violation. See De Vito v. Chicago Park District, 972 F.2d 851, 855-58 (7th Cir.1992). In determining whether such a delay would have been a violation of due process, the factors set forth in FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 242, 108 S.Ct. 1780, 100 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988), would be applied. De Vito, 972 F.2d at 855. In determining how long a delay is justified in affording a post-suspension hearing and decision, it is important to examine the importance of the private interest and the harm to the interest occasioned by the delay; the justification offered by the government for the delay and its relation to the underlying governmental interest; and the likelihood that the interim decision may have been erroneous. Id. (quoting Mallen, 486 U.S. at 242, 108 S.Ct. 1780). Here, plaintiff had a significant interest in resolving his residency status and it was possible, though not necessarily likely, that the pretermination decision would be overturned. Plaintiff had an interest in quickly resolving the situation because substantial delay in his being reinstated may have allowed his medical skills to become stale such that, by March 2003, he no longer had the ability or qualifications to begin a residency even if his dismissal had been overturned. Two and one-half years was too long to wait. Cf. Sonnleitner, 304 F.3d at 714. The question exists, though, as to whose fault was the delay. If the delay was largely attributable to plaintiff, see Yorktown Medical Laboratory, Inc. v. Perales, 948 F.2d 84, 90 (2d Cir.1991), or the University’s delay was otherwise justified, then there could be no due process violation resulting from the delay. Although plaintiff was not promptly provided with written notice of his termination, he was nevertheless entitled to request a hearing any time after his residency was terminated, but no later than 14 days after receiving written notice. The only evidence that plaintiff presents of having requested a hearing prior to November 2002 is the August 10, 2000 fax to Albrecht in which plaintiff states in part: “I respectfully ask that a complete and sufficient inquiry into this be done.” This is not a clear request for a hearing. An “inquiry” would be an investigation by Al-brecht or others at the Uni