Full opinion text
ORDER BLATT, Senior District Judge. INTRODUCTION The Petitioner is an inmate under a sentence of death which was entered by the Court of General Sessions for Spartan-burg County on September 10, 1991. He has filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons that follow, the petition for-writ of habeas corpus is denied. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY As described by the Supreme Court of South Carolina on direct appeal, see State v. Longworth, 313 S.C. 360, 438 S.E.2d 219 (1993), the underlying facts of this case are as follows: [Longworth] was convicted of kidnapping, armed robbery, and two counts of murder in connection with the deaths of Alex Hopps and James Todd Greene, employees of the Westgate Mall Cinema in Spartanburg. [Longworth] was sentenced to death for the murders and kidnapping plus twenty-five years for armed robbery. The murders in this case occurred on the night of January 7, 1991. An off-duty employee, David Hopkins, returned to the Westgate Mall Cinema and found no employees present although films were still being shown. The body of nineteen-year-old Alex Hopps was discovered behind the theatre outside an exit door. He had been shot at close range in the left temple. When Hopkins arrived at the theatre he had seen and recognized [Long-worth’s] co-defendant, David Rocheville, rummaging through James Greene’s car in the parking lot. Greene was the other employee on duty with Alex Hopps and he was missing from the theatre. Police arrested Rocheville at 5:00 a.m. the next morning. A few hours later, Rocheville led police to the body of James Greene which was found in a shallow ditch on the side of a rural road several miles from the cinema. [Longworth] was arrested later that day. [Longworth] consented to be interviewed by police officers after waiving his rights. At the end of the interview, Chief [Deputy James] Murray prepared the following statement from his notes: [Longworth] stated that on January 7, 1991, he left his home at approximately four o’clock p.m. in route to meet his friend, David Rocheville, at a television repair shop where Roche-ville worked. After meeting him, they both traveled to Rocheville’s home in Duncan, South Carolina where Roche-ville cleaned up. They left there in Longworth’s mini van that is actually owned by his father in route to the Continental Café located in the Hill-crest Mall in Spartanburg. They arrived there at approximately 7:30 p.m. where he, Longworth, drank approximately six beers and three kamikazes. While there, they spoke to a bartender by the name of Larry, last name unknown, who works there and knows them. After leaving the café, he and ' Rocheville drove around town in the mini van for a short time, and eventually stopped at an unknown place between Hillcrest and West Gate where they purchased a twelve pack of beer. They continued driving around all the while drinking beer, and decided to rob the West Gate Cinema. They arrived at the West Gate The-atre at an unknown time. But he knows it was before twelve o’clock midnight. Upon entering the theatre, Longworth remembered seeing James Greene, an employee, and, in fact, waved to him. Longworth and Rocheville walked around inside the theater for a short time, and believed the two of them went inside where the movie Dances with Wolves was playing. Longworth remembers that when they entered the theater through the front door, there was no one in the ticket booth. And accordingly, they walked in without having to pay. After being seated in the theater for a short time, they decided it was time to rob the place. As they walked out toward the lobby of the theater, Longworth saw the usher, Alex Hopps, standing near the end of a counter. He went over to him, and they started walking down a hallway talking. His plan was to take the usher outside and knock him unconscious. As they walked down the hallway, he knocked the usher to the floor by sweeping his feet out from under him. He then immediately jumped on him, and placed his hands over the usher’s mouth. Rocheville, who had been given the gun that Longworth had carried into the theater in a shoulder holster hidden under his coat, was watching the activity. As Longworth and the usher walked outside using a side exit near where he and Rocheville had been seated in the theater, they were followed by Rocheville. Once outside, Longworth stated that he grabbed the usher by the right arm and twisted it up behind his back. He then forced the usher to lean over a waist high bar that was in place to, to protect the building or a cooling unit, and then took his left hand pushing the usher or pinning him on the bar. Rocheville then shot the usher in the left side of the head while Longworth was holding him. The weapon used and the one which Longworth earlier had given to him is [a] .44 magnum Ruger, and it was loaded with semi wod cutters. After the shooting, Rocheville returned the weapon to Longworth, and he placed it in the aforementioned shoulder holster. Longworth stated that he did not know the usher although it was pointed out to him that the usher had at one time worked for him at the Converse Theaters when Longworth was an assistant manager. After the shooting, Longworth advised that he and Rocheville walked around to the front of the theater to proceed with the robbery. However, when they arrived at the front, the doors were locked. Longworth stated that he again saw James Greene, and motioned to him to open the doors. Greene complied. Once inside, Longworth stated that he drew this same gun on Greene, and stated something to the effect that he was sorry. But he was going to rob the theater. And requested that Greene open the safe. Greene, upon seeing the gun, became so nervous that it took him three tries to successfully open the safe. Longworth took several money bags from the safe, and then asked Greene if he had made the deposits. Greene responded yes, and Longworth stated don’t lie to me. Greene stated that the deposits were in his personal car. The three of them, Longworth, Greene, and Rocheville then walked to Greene’s vehicle parked at the side of the cinema, obtained the remaining money bags, and gave them all to Rocheville. They then all got into the aforementioned mini van, which was parked next to Greene’s vehicle. Longworth was driving. Rocheville was in the back. And Greene was seated in the passenger side. Longworth stated that he then gave the .44 magnum Ruger to Rocheville, and stated if he moves shoot him referring to Greene. The three of them then proceed to drive up highway-number 176 toward Inman, and then turned right off number 176 onto an unknown road. They drove a short distance and stopped the van. Long-worth then told Greene to get out of the van, walk five paces, get down on your knees, and stare straight ahead. He did as instructed. And at this point, Rocheville got partially out of the van perhaps with one foot on the ground and the other in the van, and shot Greene in the back of the head. Greene then rolled over into the ditch near where he had been kneeling. Id. at 220, 222-24 (footnotes included but renumbered). After the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the appeal, id. at 225-26, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, Longworth v. South Carolina, 513 U.S. 831, 115 S.Ct. 105, 130 L.Ed.2d 53 (1994), the Petitioner filed an application for state post-conviction relief (PCR). The state PCR court permitted discovery and held a lengthy evidentiary hearing. After requesting supplemental briefs, the PCR court directed the Respondents to submit a proposed order, which was substantially adopted by the PCR court in denying relief. The Supreme Court of South Carolina denied review. The Petitioner then filed the instant petition for federal habeas relief, challenging his conviction and sentence on nineteen grounds. This Court stayed the Petitioner’s scheduled execution in March, 2002, in order that his petition could be fully and completely evaluated. By local rule, this matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Joseph R. McCrorey for preliminary determinations. The Petitioner filed a substantive brief, to which the Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment. The Petitioner then filed a reply to the motion and requested partial summary judgment or, in the alternative, an evidentiary hearing on one of the grounds presented. On June 6, 2003, the Magistrate Judge issued a report analyzing the issues presented and recommending that the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment be granted, that the Petitioner’s motion and request be denied, and that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied. The Petitioner filed objections to the report and recommendation on June 30, 2003, to which the Respondents have not responded. The matter is now ripe for decision. DISCUSSION I. Procedural Objections A. § 2251(d) and § 2251(e)(1) Prior to submitting substantive objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and conclusions, the Petitioner submits a lengthy argument concerning the applicability of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d) and (e)(1), which outline the standard of review in § 2254 petitions. Subsection (d) provides that no writ of habeas corpus may issue to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in the State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim- — ■ (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. Likewise, subsection (e)(1) provides that in reviewing applications under § 2254, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. Without challenging specific facts, the Petitioner argues generally that because the PCR court adopted the Respondents’ proposed order, “the Attorney General was the sole author of the order denying petitioner state post-conviction relief,” and, as such, “the state PCR court abdicated it[s] duty to exercise independent judgment in this case.” The argument further asserts that the mere adoption of a proposed order submitted by one party renders the PCR court’s determination to be neither an “adjudication” nor a “decision,” and, consequently, that it is entitled to no deference under § 2254 and that the Magistrate Judge and this Court should review all claims for relief de novo. Facially, this argument is temptingly appealing, as it lends itself to broad pronouncements hailing the importance and uniqueness of the American system of jurisprudence, with which few learned men could disagree. See McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir.1972) (“the independence of the judiciary must not be sacrificed one microscopic portion of a millimeter”); 9A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 2578 (“All courts agree that finding the facts is an important part of the judicial function and that the judge cannot surrender this function to counsel.”). However, as to the legal force of such an argument in the specific context of the standard of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, this claim quickly loses its appeal. The Fourth Circuit has expressly rejected this, very argument on two separate occasions, when it was raised by co-defendants sentenced to death. First, in Young v. Catoe, 205 F.3d 750, 755 & n. 2 (4th Cir.2000), the petitioner argued that “the PCR Court’s adoption in toto of the state’s position evidences the lack of a considered ‘decision’ within the meaning of Paragraphs (1) and (2) of § 2254(d), the existence of such decision being a prerequisite to the operation of the statute.” The Fourth Circuit responded as follows: It is true that, with regard to opinions and orders rendered by the district courts within this circuit, “[t]he adoption of one party’s proposed findings and conclusions is a practice with which we have expressed disapproval on a number of occasions.” Nonetheless, the disposition of a petitioner’s constitutional claims in such a manner is unquestionably an “adjudication” by the state court. If that court addresses the merits of the petitioner’s claim, then § 2254(d) must be applied. Id. at 755 n. 2 (citations omitted) (alteration by Young court). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit cited Young with approval in rejecting this argument in Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir.2003). Bell contends that the district court erred in choosing to apply § 2254(d)’s deferential standard of review, and that “this case must be remanded to the district court for a de novo review of the facts and law with respect to every claim for relief.” Bell bases his claim on the fact that the state PCR court, after receiving post-hearing briefs, invited proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law from both parties; it received none from Bell and largely adopted the State’s proposed memorandum and order .... Although we do not applaud this practice, circuit precedent dictates that it does not provide any basis for applying de novo review. Indeed, we recently-rejected precisely this claim by Kevin Young, one of Bell’s co-perpetrators. See Young v. Catoe, 205 F.3d 750, 755 n. 2 (4th Cir.2000). The Bell decision further notes that this analysis applied regardless of whether the claim was made under § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2). Id. at 233-34. Here, the Petitioner cites neither Young nor Bell in his objections, and proposes no distinction through which this Court could distinguish circuit precedent which appears to be precisely on point. The Court agrees with the Petitioner, as does the Fourth Circuit, that this method of issuing orders is not the preferred method of decision-making. However, without more specific proof there is nothing in the law requiring the Court to review the state PCR court’s decision de novo. Consequently, the Petitioner’s procedural objections are denied. B. Failure to Object to Report and Recommendation In issuing the report and recommendation, the Magistrate Judge addressed each of the Petitioner’s nineteen grounds for relief, and denied each either on the grounds of procedural bypass, on their individual merits, or both. In his objections, the Petitioner only addresses the specific merits of four grounds — Ground 4, Ground 11, Ground 15 and Ground 19. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Within ten days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. (Emphasis added). There is no indication that this provision has any less effect when reviewing a report and recommendation in a capital habeas action. Having already rejected the Petitioner’s general procedural objection, there are no specific objections to fifteen of the nineteen grounds alleged. As a result, this Court does not need to make a de novo review of those claims. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) (“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings.”). Therefore, the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation on Grounds 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17 and 18 is affirmed and adopted. II. Procedural Default: Ground 19 Ground 19 of the petition alleges as follows: The petitioner was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as a result of counsel’s failure to adequately represent petitioner in the guilt and punishment phases of the trial. This claim is evidenced by the following facts: 1) Petitioner’s counsel were incompetent and too inexperienced to provide effective assistance of counsel.... 2) Trial counsel’s failure to raise proper objections at trial, advise petitioner of his rights, and contest important matters of law, resulted in petitioner’s receiving ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.... 3) Petitioner was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because of counsel’s failure to adequately conduct interviews, investigate, prepare, organize, conceive and execute a theory of defense in the guilt phase of these proceedings .... 4) Petitioner was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because of counsel’s failure to adequately conduct interviews, investigate, prepare, organize, conceive and present mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase of the trial. . . . The Magistrate Judge found that the issues in Ground 19 were proeedurally bypassed because they “were not raised on appeal after the denial of the PCR. [Petitioner] makes no argument in his Reply that these claims are exhausted or that he can show cause and prejudice for his failure to properly exhaust.” The Petitioner does not dispute that the ineffective assistance claims were not raised in the PCR appeal. Instead, he argues that the failure to raise these issues is a further example of prior counsel’s ineffective assistance, that he can show “cause and actual prejudice,” and that he can demonstrate a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” A. Generally In general, a federal habeas court may not issue a writ to a state court prisoner where an “adequate and independent” state-law ground justifies the prisoner’s detention, even if there is a colorable federal claim. E.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81-88, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). One such state-law ground is “procedural default,” or the prisoner’s failure to fully raise the issue for the state court to consider. Id.; see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (procedural default exists where “the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims proeedurally barred”); Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 272 & n. 15 (4th Cir.1999); Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350, 1357-58 (4th Cir.1995). Here, the Petitioner’s failure to raise the ineffective assistance issues in appealing the denial of his PCR would prevent this Court from considering the claim in the federal habeas action under the general rule. See also O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999). B. Exceptions There are limited exceptions to this general rule: (1) where the state procedural rule was not “firmly established and regularly followed,” see James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348, 104 S.Ct. 1830, 80 L.Ed.2d 346 (1984); (2) where the prisoner can demonstrate good “cause” for the default and further that he suffered “prejudice” as a result, see Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497; and (3) where the failure to consider the barred claims results in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice,” see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546. These grounds are evaluated under federal law, not state law. E.g. James, 466 U.S. at 348-49, 104 S.Ct. 1830; Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-17, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). The first exception is not implicated here, as the Petitioner makes no argument along these lines. 1. Cause and Prejudice The Supreme Court has held that constitutionally ineffective counsel may give rise to sufficient “cause” to, require a federal habeas court to review procedurally defaulted claims. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). Thus, the Petitioner argues that the failure of his PCR appellate counsel to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claims was in -itself ineffective assistance of counsel, and is therefore “cause” which would permit-this Court to review his claims. However, to make things more complicated, the Supreme Court has recently held that this second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is itself subject to procedural bar, and if this claim was not properly raised before the state court, it cannot serve as “cause.” In Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000), the Court held that “an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel. claim asserted as cause for the procedural default of another claim can itself be procedurally defaulted.” The Edwards decision took its reasoning from the Murray decision, which notes that “if a petitioner could raise his ineffective assistance claim for the first time on federal habeas in order to show cause for a procedural default, the federal habeas court would find itself in the anomalous position of adjudicating an unexhausted constitutional claim for which state court review might still be available.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 489, 106 S.Ct. 2639; see Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451-52, 120 S.Ct. 1587 (discussing Murray). The water becomes even more murky with this closing statement by the Court in Edwards, 529 U.S. at 453, 120 S.Ct. 1587: To hold, as we do, that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim asserted as cause for the procedural default of another claim can itself be procedurally defaulted is not to say that that procedural default may not itself be excused if the prisoner can satisfy the cause-and-prejudice standard with respect to that claim. Thus, it appears that there could be an exception to the exception, which may 'not adequately explain the rule. See id. at 456-58, 120 S.Ct. 1587 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Why should a prisoner, who may well be proceeding pro se, lose his basic claim because he runs afoul of state procedural rules governing the presentation to state courts of the “cause” for his not having followed state procedural rules for the presentation of his basic federal claim?”). Under this analysis, federal habeas courts may in some circumstances (such as here, where the only asserted “cause” is ineffective assistance of counsel) be forced to infinitely consider whether there is “cause” for the failure to raise the argument that PCR counsel failed to raise the argument that trial counsel did not raise a particular argument on appeal; nonetheless, this Court is bound by this precedent precisely on point. From all of this, applied to the case at bar, this Court concludes that Ground 19 (trial and appellate counsel were ineffective) is procedurally defaulted because it was not fully raised and adjudicated on PCR appeal. The Court further concludes that the Petitioner’s asserted “cause” for excusing the procedural default (PCR appellate counsel failed to raise the ineffective assistance of trial/appellate counsel) is procedurally defaulted as well -because it was not raised on PCR appeal. However, under Edwards, if the Petitioner can now establish “cause” for failing to assert the claim giving rise to the underlying “cause” — that is, that PCR counsel failed to argue on PCR appeal that he and trial/appellate counsel were ineffective — -the merits of Ground 19 may still be heard. Unfortunately for the Petitioner, federal law prohibits such a consideration. Pursuant to the statutes governing habeas corpus petitions in capital cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2261(e), “the ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during State or Federal post-conviction proceedings in a capital case shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.” As the Petitioner’s attempt to establish “cause” arises from the Ineffectiveness of PCR counsel to raise certain issues on appeal, this statute prevents it from being raised at all. In addition, the Fourth Circuit has unambiguously held that there is no constitutional right to counsel at the post-conviction relief stage, see Mackall v. Angelone, 131 F.3d 442, 449 (4th Cir.1997) (en banc), and, thus, there can be no error which implicates the Sixth Amendment. There being no established “cause,” this Court may not consider whether the Petitioner was “prejudiced.” See Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d at 1359 (“We are mindful, however, that in Engle [v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982) ], after finding that there was no cause for the default, the Supreme Court ended its inquiry, noting that because ‘we conclude[d] that these respondents lacked cause for their default, we do not consider whether they also suffered actual prejudice.’ ”) (alteration by Engle court); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 620 (4th Cir.1998) (same). Thus, Ground 19 may not be considered on the merits under the “cause and prejudice” standard. 2. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice The final consideration in whether the Court may reach the merits of Ground 19 is whether the failure to review it would constitute a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546. This term has been uniformly interpreted to mean that the Petitioner must prove “actual innocence.” See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338-350, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992) (citing a history of prior decisions); Weeks v. Angelone, 4 F.Supp.2d 497, 507 (E.D.Va.1998), appeal dismissed, 176 F.3d 249 (4th Cir.1999). To meet the miscarriage of justice exception, the petitioner must show that a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). Those petitioners who are sentenced to death may also meet the exception by showing through clear and convincing evidence that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found him eligible for the death penalty. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 336, 112 S.Ct. 2514. Weeks, 4 F.Supp.2d at 510. In considering the applicability of the death penalty, petitioners must focus “on those [objective] elements which render a defendant eligible for the death penalty, and not on additional mitigating evidence which was prevented from being introduced as a result of a claimed constitutional error.” Id. at 512 (quoting Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 347, 112 S.Ct. 2514). In his objections, although the Petitioner asserts that there has been a fundamental miscarriage of justice, he cites none of the above authority and makes no specific argument relating to the standard of law. Many of the specific claims urged by Petitioner in Ground 19 concern the failure to present mitigating evidence or the manner in which such evidence was presented in the sentencing phase. Under Sawyer, this is improper. 505 U.S. at 347, 112 S.Ct. 2514. In addition, many of the specific claims deal with issues not directly related to the Petitioner’s guilt or innocence, or to his eligibility for the death penalty. See Weeks, 4 F.Supp.2d at 513 (“Weeks must show that he was actually ineligible for the death penalty under Virginia law, so that barring the constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have sentenced him to death”). Under South Carolina law, a jury must find the existence of one or more elements from a list of aggravating circumstances for a defendant to be eligible for the death penalty. S.C.Code § 16-3-20(C)(a). In the present case, the State presented evidence and the jury found that the murders were committed while in the commission of kidnaping, § 16 — 3—20(C)(a)(l)(b), while in the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, § 16-3-20(C)(a)(l)(d), and that two or more persons were murdered pursuant to a common plan or scheme, § 16-3-20(C)(a)(9). In cases where more than one aggravating circumstance is found, “the jury’s reliance on an invalid aggravating factor may not ‘infect the formal process of deciding whether death is an appropriate penalty’ if the jury also ‘finds at least one valid aggravating factor.’ ” Smith v. Moore, 137 F.3d 808, 815 (4th Cir.1998) (citation omitted) (applying South Carolina law). The jury’s reliance on other invalid aggravating factors is not fatal so long as the invalid evidence does not have a “substantial and injurious effect and influence on the jury’s verdict.” Id. (citing Tuggle v. Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386, 1391-92 (4th Cir.1996)). In asserting Ground -19, the Petitioner does not argue exactly how the ineffective assistance of counsel affected the jury’s findings with respect to each of the three found aggravating factors, or how the ineffective assistance affected the jury’s findings with respect to guilt or innocence. Some of the alleged errors occurred in conjunction with other alleged grounds for relief, and will be discussed separately herein. In general, however, the Petitioner’s lengthy recitation of trial counsel’s alleged lack of experience and qualification fails to adequately and specifically demonstrate that the jury’s guilty verdict or findings regarding aggravating circumstances would have been different. Likewise, the several specific examples of experts who should have been retained, witnesses who should have been interviewed, lines of questioning which should or should not have been pursued, and investigations which should have been made, do not support the contention that the Petitioner did not commit the crimes or that none of the aggravating circumstances were present. In sum, even assuming that counsel did make errors, the Petitioner has failed to adequately prove that these errors were of a constitutional magnitude, that they “probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent,” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326, 115 S.Ct. 851, or that “no reasonable juror would have found him eligible for the death penalty,” Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 350, 112 S.Ct. 2514. Two particular arguments might possibly satisfy the above standard. The first is the combined claims that trial counsel failed to investigate the Petitioner’s assertion that he neither knew nor worked with the victims in this case, and that the Chief Deputy Sheriff investigating the murders may have been biased against him because Petitioner had previously fired the Chief Deputy’s son from a job. However, even giving the Petitioner the benefit of the doubt and assuming both of these claims to be true, the Court is simply unconvinced that this satisfies the “probably resulted” standard. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326, 115 S.Ct. 851. There was simply too much evidence regarding guilt and the aggravating circumstances, including the Petitioner’s own statement, witnesses placing Rocheville and the Petitioner’s van at the theater, witnesses seeing Rocheville searching Greene’s car, the large-caliber weapon found inside the Petitioner’s father’s car (which the Petitioner drove to the restaurant where he was arrested), the recently-fired shell casings found inside his residence, the large sum of cash found inside a coat within the father’s car, and Hopps’ blood type found on the Petitioner’s clothing. The second claim which could raise constitutional issues is the trial judge’s instruction regarding the scope of cross-examination should the Petitioner choose to testify. The Petitioner claims that the trial judge erred in telling him that, if he took the stand, he would be subject to cross-examination “on any matters regarding [his] personal background, and all matters involved in this case.” Assuming, without deciding, that the Petitioner is correct that this was an improper instruction, the Court cannot conclude that this provides proof that the jury’s verdict or findings at sentencing would be different, under any standard of proof. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge and with the PCR court that trial counsel, by his own testimony, discussed the right to testify with the Petitioner on several occasions prior to trial, and that counsel and the Petitioner had agreed prior to trial that the Petitioner would not make a good witness and, therefore, should not testify. There is no concrete evidence that an erroneous instruction regarding the scope of cross-examination actually affected-the Petitioner’s trial strategy in any way, or consequently any verdict or finding. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326, 115 S.Ct. 851. In sum, the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” would result if the Court did not consider the merits of his procedurally defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the Petitioner’s objections on this issue are overruled, and the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation is affirmed. III. Exculpatory Sentencing Evidence: Ground 15 The Petitioner argues in Ground 15 that “the State failed to disclose to Petitioner or his counsel exculpatory evidence material to the issue of punishment, including evidence of remorse and prior inconsistent statements, in violation of due process.” Specifically, the Petitioner claims that, during post-conviction discovery, “it was learned that in his confession to the police, the petitioner did express remorse for the murders,” in apparent contradiction to the testimony at trial. This claim was raised in the Petitioner’s PCR application, rejected on its merits, and listed in the petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of South Carolina; thus, it is properly before this Court. As noted previously, the standard for reviewing claims on the merits under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is as follows: a federal -court may grant an application for habeas relief on a claim that has been previously adjudicated on the merits in state court only if that adjudication ‘(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’ The Supreme Court has directed that “[ujnder § 2254(d)(l)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause ... a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be unreasonable.” Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir.2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (alterations by the Bell court)). With this standard, the Court reviews the Petitioner’s claim of error. Upon questioning the Petitioner after his arrest, at least three law enforcement officers were present to hear the Petitioner’s statement. Detective Mike Creek testified at trial that the Petitioner said that he did nothing to stop Rocheville from shooting Alex Hopps, even though he could have done something to stop Rocheville. In a post-conviction discovery deposition, Creek recalled that during his statement the Petitioner “was real concerned for his family, for the embarrassment, particularly his sister, I think it was a younger sister. He seemed real concerned about that.” Captain Mike Ennis testified at trial that the Petitioner refused to sign his statement without a lawyer being present. At a post-conviction deposition, Ennis testified that the Petitioner “was making a statement to the effect that this never should have happened, that they worked with the boys, that basically they never should have done what they did.” Ennis further stated that the Petitioner “did more or less make an apologetic statement for what happened, and that statement was something to the effect, and again I can’t be specific, but I remember him making some statement to the effect that it never should have happened, that they never should have done that, that they worked with those two boys and they shouldn’t have done what they done [sic].” The Petitioner also made this “very dramatic statement,” according to Chief Deputy Sheriff James Murray, who testified at trial: “My God, we killed those kids for fifteen hundred dollars.” At a post-conviction discovery deposition, Murray testified that “based on what he said and the way he acted, I would, yeah, I think he was remorseful that it happened.” The Petitioner claims that the combined effect of these three statements demonstrates that he expressed remorse over the murders, and that the jury was never informed of this remorse, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny. He asserts that, had the jury been able to consider this evidence, there is a “reasonable probability” that either the trial or the sentence would have been different. The PCR court and the Magistrate Judge rejected this claim, finding that the only material not heard by the jury were the individual witnesses’ “impressions” of the Petitioner’s demeanor, which are not covered under the Brady line of cases. The Brady decision holds that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Later decisions enhanced this rule, by extending it to draw no distinction between exculpatory and impeaching evidence, to hold that no request has to be made for such information, and that evidence favorable to an accused is “material” and suppression by the government causes constitutional error “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); see Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (giving history of Brady line). Moreover, “the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438, 115 S.Ct. 1555. This includes material known only to the police and not to the prosecutor. Id. This “illustrate[s] the special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). “There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Id. at 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936. With regard to prejudice, “the question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is accordingly shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’ ” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375). As noted by the Magistrate Judge, the Petitioner does not cite any authority for the proposition that the one person’s mental impressions concerning another person’s demeanor while making a statement are covered under Brady; rather, the Petitioner generally assumes that such information is covered under Brady unless it is specifically removed from its scope. He claims that such evidence is Brady material under the theory that a defendant’s expression of remorse is a, fact to be considered by the jury and that a lay person’s opinion, perception or inference of another person’s state of mind is permissible under Rule 701 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. Assuming for the moment that evidence of remorse is favorable to the Petitioner and material to the issue of punishment, the Petitioner can demonstrate neither that the Government suppressed the evidence nor that it was prejudicial. This is primarily because the defense was informed and the jury heard that the Per titioner said, “My God, we killed those kids for fifteen hundred dollars.” It is this statement which gave rise to the various law enforcement officials’ perception that the Petitioner was remorseful. There was no surprise that Murray was going to say this, and there was no surprise that this statement could be taken as one of remorse. In fact, the Petitioner’s counsel even asked Murray on cross-examination whether he took this statement to be one of remorse, to which Murray indicated he did not know exactly what the Petitioner meant. This is not the type of evidence for which the Brady line of cases was intended. The majority of Brady cases concern the prosecution’s knowledge and/or possession of evidence which directly contradicts inculpatory evidence presented at trial. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (contrasting a “terrifying incident” related to the police with the witness’ initial perception that it was “a trivial episode of college kids carrying on”); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 442-43, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (contrasting witness testimony on the size and build of the perpetrator with statements taken at the scene which were “vastly different”); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 152-55, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (contradictory statements by a prosecutor as to whether he promised the defendant not to prosecute him if he cooperated). This is completely unlike the situation at bar, where a statement which could objectively be considered a statement of remorse was admitted at trial for the jury’s consideration, but evidence that the law enforcement officers interviewing the speaker thought he may have been remorseful was not discussed. Moreover, the Petitioner’s interpretation of Brady is not consistent with the established standard of review under § 2254. Contrary to his assertions, it is the Petitioner who must demonstrate that the state court’s decision “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” To assume that mental impressions of others’ intent fall under Brady, without some authority to support it, misunderstands the nature of § 2254 proceedings. From a review of the cases, neither this Court nor apparently either party has discovered United States Supreme Court eases dealing with the applicability of Brady to one person’s mental impressions of another person’s demeanor or intent while making a statement, particularly where the statement is admitted into evidence. There being no “clearly established” federal law on this precise point, the Court cannot conclude that the state court was in error. In addition, it was not unreasonable for the PCR court to conclude that the evidence of remorse, even if believed, would have affected the proceedings. In Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir.2002), the petitioner challenged the prosecution’s failure to produce jail logs and testimony of a jailer who testified at the PCR level that he believed the petitioner to be remorseful when overheard speaking by telephone to his grandfather. The Fourth Circuit summarily rejected this argument, finding as follows: Appellant had recently been captured and interrogated throughout the morning. An individual might- very well sound as if he were remorseful at this time due to a newfound appreciation for the consequences of his action, and the exhaustion caused by being awake and subject to interrogation for an extended period. In the present case, both Ennis and Murray testified that the Petitioner’s remorse, if believed, could be the result of his being arrested. Murray indicated at his PCR deposition that “it’s hard to read into someone’s actions, how they’re feeling at the time they do it. So, it’s just my perception and interpretation. He may have just been mad that he got caught. I don’t know.” Likewise, Ennis noted in his PCR deposition that the remorse the Petitioner expressed could have had another purpose: I took it when he made that statement that as far as him actually feeling that way, I think that he did realize that this was wrong, -that they made a bad mistake and that they really shouldn’t have done what they done [sic], but I think that it was more coming from him at that time, as best I can remember, something more. It was more along the lines of the right thing to say as opposed to him really feeling remorseful and guilty and that sort of thing over what they had done. Given this interpretation and the fact that the Petitioner wás arrested less than 20 hours after having been involved in the murders, it is just as likely that the strain of interrogation and the “newfound appreciation for the consequences of his action” gave rise to whatever remorse was expressed. See Jones, 311 F.3d at 315. In sum, there has been no showing by the Petitioner which leads to the conclusion that the state court has violated any “clearly established federal law,” that there is a “reasonable probability” that the “result of the proceeding would have been different,” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, or that the government’s suppression of this evidence “ ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’ ” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375). Accordingly, this claim is rejected. IV. Mistrial Based on False Statement: Ground 4 In Ground 4, the Petitioner alleges that Chief Deputy Sheriff James Murray “testified to an undisclosed and false statement attributable to the petitioner,” and that the trial court’s failure to declare a mistrial is constitutional error. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that Murray’s statement at trial that the Petitioner “knew what was going to happen” was unfairly prejudicial because no such statement or similar statement was known by the defense prior to trial. This argument was presented both in direct appeal and during the state PCR action, and was listed in the petition for certiorari on PCR appeal. This claim is therefore properly before the Court, and is to be reviewed under the “clearly established” and “unreasonable application” standards of § 2254. Chief Deputy Murray was one of several law enforcement officers present when the Petitioner gave his statement. At trial, after the Petitioner’s statement was introduced into evidence via Murray (who took notes of the interview), the Solicitor asked Murray if he recalled anything else not already related in his testimony: A: Yes, sir, I do recall at one point during the interview he said that something to the effect that no one was suppose [sic] to be killed or was not intended that anyone get killed. Q: Uh-huh. (Affirmative) A: And, and one other thing that, that he had mentioned was that when he had taken Alex [Hopps] outside and put him over the bar, he observed Rocheville raising the gun up to Alex’s head, and he did nothing to stop him. He just watched him. Q: Who did nothing to stop him? A: -Longworth did nothing to stop him. Q: Did he say he knew what was happening? A: He said he knew what was going to happen. Q: All right, sir. A: But he did nothing to stop him. The defense immediately objected on the grounds that they had no prior knowledge that Murray was going to testify that the Petitioner had advance knowledge that Hopps was going to be killed. The trial judge sent the jury out of the courtroom and interrogated Murray at length on this subject: THE COURT: And where in his conversation with you was the defendant when he said he knew what was going to happen? Was it when they took Mr. Hopps outside? WITNESS: As, as he was explaining, right, when they took him outside, and, and bent him over the bar. THE COURT: Okay. But it was not in relation to anything that may of [sic] happened to Mr. Greene? WITNESS: No, sir. THE COURT: Okay. Well, it would appear, Mr. Johnston [defense counsel], •that it is no more than a different phrasing of what you’d already had. MR. JOHNSTON: Your Honor, perhaps I, there’s a misunderstanding as to what I interpreted what Chief Murray said. Perhaps I’m wrong. But the way I interpreted it was he knew what was going to happen in reference to the gun being pointed at him and it being shot. •MR. JOHNSTON: And I think that’s an, a different, an additional statement to the [sic] I saw the gun, and I did nothing to stop it. THE COURT: It clearly is a great deal more than merely I saw the gun and did nothing to stop it. MR. JOHNSTON: Yes, sir. And of course, it’s not written anywhere. THE COURT: And solicitor, the problem is you, of course, are under an obligation to tell him these things. Why didn’t you tell him? SOLICITOR GOSSETT: Your Honor, I, I just asked him the question, and didn’t know exactly how he was gonna phrase it, and basically he quoted what he phrased it in, in his paraphrasing. THE COURT: Well, no, I didn’t take it as a paraphrase. I took it as a quote from the defendant. SOLICITOR GOSSETT: Well, I - THE COURT: Did you paraphrase? WITNESS: No, sir, that was not a quote. No, sir, that was a paraphrase. That wasn’t a quote per se. THE COURT: Oh, then it is, it is error that he said he knew what was going to happen? WITNESS: Is what? THE COURT: That he, he said — I understand you to say he said he knew what was going to happen. WITNESS: He said he saw Rocheville or yeah, Rocheville point the weapon, and he felt he knew what, what was gonna happen. But he did nothing to stop it. THE COURT: Then your, your comment thereafter is, is just a, a, you’ve just embellished what he said? You’ve added an interpretation to what he said, is that, is that accurate? WITNESS: Well, not to what he said. Maybe the way it was said. It’s, it’s, it isn’t a quote per se. But he did say he saw Rocheville point the weapon at him. He felt he knew what he was gonna do. But he did nothing to stop it. That’s pretty much what— THE COURT: Okay. Now, see that’s the third different one we got. We knew that, that he was gonna say that, that he had said I saw Rocheville with the gun, and I did nothing to stop him. THE WITNESS: Okay, sir. THE COURT: Okay. Now, do I understand that all of your, your, your interpretations after that are what you interpret or what he said? THE WITNESS: No. it’s what he said. But not verbatim. THE COURT: Well, sir, you know there’s a, there’s a world of difference between saying I saw Rocheville and I did nothing to stop him. WITNESS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And I knew what was going to happen. WITNESS: He made that statement. THE COURT: All right, sir. That’s what I want to know. WITNESS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Did he make that statement? WITNESS: Yes, sir, he made that statement he did not know whát was or he knew what was going to happen. But he did nothing about it. THE COURT: ... I want to know this now, Chief Murray, and this is— WITNESS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: — this is really really prejudicial. Did he say I knew what was gonna happen or is that your interpretation of the statement the solicitor just made? WITNESS: I think that from what he said that was my interpretation of what he meant. THE COURT: Then, he did not say I knew what was going to happen? WITNESS: It’s very difficult to remember exactly what, what the words were that he said right now. THE COURT: Well, would you agree that seeing Rocheville with the gun and doing nothing to stop him— WITNESS: No, I’d say— THE COURT: — is less prejudicial than I knew what was going to happen? WITNESS: I, I tend to think if, if I’d have to rely on my notes. What my notes said, that’s the accurate description of what happened there. THE COURT: Your notes, the ones you have there— WITNESS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: — say what about he knew what was going to happen? Now, I’m not, I don’t want your interpretation of what he said. I need to know what he said. The jury has to deal with that. Your interpretation is a little different from what, what the man said. WITNESS: Okay. It, it, my notes do not contain that, that remark. THE COURT: And that is an inaccuracy? WITNESS: What, sir? THE COURT: What you have said that that comment was not made by the defendant? WITNESS: If it were made, I do note have it in my notes. THE COURT: And is it no more than your interpretation? WITNESS: I would have to say that that is probably accurate. The court then undertook a review of the record, and concluded that the statement at issue “does not rise naturally from [what was said], and I’m gonna tell the jury that, that he did not say that. Because the testimony as offered by Chief Murray is that he said that.” The Petitioner made a motion for mistrial, and the court indicated that this is what it “wanted [him] to do.” The court then denied the motion, choosing instead to “cure it with my comments to the jury.” The court then brought the jury in and instructed them as follows: THE COURT: Now, Mr. Foreman, and ladies and gentlemen, the, during the testimony that was being presented, the defense counsel objected properly. You had heard testimony from the statement by Chief Murray that the defendant says [sic] I saw Rocheville with the gun, and I did nothing to stop it. That’s part of the statement. The solicitor went on to say did Longworth say I knew what, he knew what was going to happen. And Chief Murray says [sic] yes, he says he knew what was going to happen. And that’s not true. And that’s not in the statement. And I have conferred with Chief Murray here in this courtroom on the record. And that is his interpretation. That is not a statement by the defendant. I must ask you to disregard that, to wipe that comment from your mind. It is improper [sic] thing to be injected into this trial, and you disregard it entirely please. It is so important. The only statement made was I saw Rocheville, and I did nothing to stop him. And that’s the end of it as best I can tell. Disregard anything further from Chief Murray on that point as I have outlined to you. All right. Thank you. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, on direct appeal, found that the solicitor was surprised by Murray’s testimony, and that “the curative instruction was clearly sufficient to ensure the jury did not attribute Chief Murray’s statement to appellant.” State v. Longworth, 438 S.E.2d at 225. Over the Petitioner’s objection, the Supreme Court went on to hold that “even if the jury could have inferred from the trial judge’s instruction that Chief Murray’s ‘interpretation’ was valid, we find no prejudice,” because under accomplice liability “it is immaterial whether appellant knew before hand that Rocheville was going to shoot Hopps.” Id. (citing State v. Bell, 305 S.C. 11, 406 S.E.2d 165 (1991)). The court further held, “nor is such knowledge material to imposition of the death penalty under the law set forth in Tison v. Arizona, [481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987) ].” The state PCR court determined that there was no prosecutorial misconduct, because that issue was raised and rejected on direct appeal. The PCR court further concluded that there was “no showing of the use of ‘perjured’ testimony by the prosecution.” The PCR court accepted Chief Murray’s statement at the PCR hearing that his trial testimony was “to the best of his ability truthful.” There was evidence that the solicitor, in preparing for trial, discovered that the Petitioner may have said something to this effect, but told Murray to stay away from this area because this statement did not appear in Murray’s notes of the interview and may not be admissible. However, when the solicitor specifically asked at trial, “Did he say he knew what was happening?,” Murray said he “just answered it truthfully;” thus, the PCR court determined, there was no false statement. Finally, the PCR court found no Brady violation for failing to turn the statement over to the defense, because it decided that including the testimony, along with the judge’s curative instruction, did not call the verdict or sentence into question, created no “reasonable probability” that the result of the proceeding would have been different, and generally caused no “prejudice” which would violate due process. The Magistrate Judge, after quoting the PCR court’s findings, concluded that “these finding are fully supported by the record.” In his objections, the Petitioner argues that the PCR record demonstrates that the solicitor did in fact have advance knowledge of the statement, and was not surprised as the Supreme Court held on direct appeal. Solicitors Gossett and Pruett testified that they met with Chief Murray and Sheriff Coffey about a week before the trial to discuss the case. Pruett noted that there might be an “obstacle” in imposing the death penalty on Longworth because of the case of Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-99, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), which holds that an accomplice, aider or abetter must know that a killing was going to take place, or otherwise intended for a killing to take place, in order for the death penalty to be imposed. It was at this point, according to Pruett, that Chief Murray raised the fact that the Petitioner said “something like” he knew what was going to happen, despite repeated requests for direct quotes not contained in the written statement or the notes of the interview. ' Pruett explained that, although such testimony would indeed be incriminating, it could not be used because it was not recorded in any manner prior to that point and because Murray’s recollection was “vague.” When asked why the statement was not turned over to the defense, Pruett indicated that he did not believe this particular recollection by Murray was “credible and reliable.” In fact, Pruett says he told Murray to say “no” if asked about it at trial, a fact Murray denied in his own PCR testimony. Gossett was aware of these meetings, as he was present when the above conversations took place. Murray testified at the PCR hearing that he did not recall the solicitors telling him to say “no” if asked about the Petitioner’s foreknowledge, and would not have done so even if asked, because it would have constituted perjury. The Petitioner asserts that Gossett, when examining Murray at trial, “was requesting either a perjured response or a response which Gossett and Pruett had previously determined to be inaccurate, unreliable and not credible,” either of which constitutes prejudice. He claims that the statement was indeed “false,” because the trial court found that it was not a statement made by the Petitioner, and that this Court should give this finding the deference it is due under § 2254(e). Finally, the Petitioner maintains that the statement prejudiced the consideration of sentence, because it “made [him] appear more culpable for the crime than he actually was,” and because the judge’s curative instruction “did not preclude the jury from reaching the same ‘interpretation’ of Officer Murray’s assertion.” The Fourth Circuit, in Boyd v. French, 147 F.3d 319 (4th Cir.1998), clearly outlined the standard for examining perjured testimony. A conviction acquired through the knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution violates due process. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). This is true regardless of whether the prosecution solicited testimony it knew to be f