Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM DECISION BELOT, District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION.1045 II. SUMMARY OF THE DISPUTE . 1046 III. CERCLA LIABILITY. 1048 A. Covered Person Under CERCLA.-..1052 B. Release of any Hazardous Substance.'..1056 1. APCO.1057 2. Reid Supply Company. 1069 3. Land Tool Company. 1075 4. Tri-Supply..'.1076 C. The Releases Caused Plaintiff to Incur Costs..1076 D. Response Action Compliance with the NCP .'.1076 1. The NCP. 1077 2. General Description of City’s Response Action.:..1078 3. Standard of Review for KDHE Determinations...1081 4. Presumption of NCP Compliance. 1082 5. Defendants’ Contentions.'.1084 6. Conclusion.:.1090 E. Necessity of Response Costs.1090 1. CDM Costs.1092 2. KDHE Costs.'...,.1093 3. Miscellaneous Vendor Costs.'.'.1094 4. Stinson, Mag & Fizzell Costs.......1095 5. City Payroll Costs . 1095 6. Motor Pool Expenses. 1096 7. Summary of Recoverable Costs.•... '._1096 F. Arguments Raised in Defense...1096 IV. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSE COSTS.1097 A. Equitable Factors..'.’.1098 1. Gore Factors.‘.'.1098 2. Other Equitable Factors.-..1101 3. Conclusions Regarding Equitable Factors. 1105 B. Methods for Allocating Response Costs.1106 1. Motion to Strike Testimony of Michael Smith...'... 1107 2. ALT’s Modeling and Allocation ..:.1110 3. Reid’s Allocation. 1113 4. Tri-Supply’s Allocation.1114 5. Land Tool Company’s Allocation.1115 C. Prejudgment Interest....1115 D. Declaratory Judgment. 1117 V. REID’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER. 1118 VI.CONCLUSION....1120 APPENDICES . 1120 I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff City of Wichita (City) brings this private party action against (1) the Trustees of the APCO Oil Corporation Liquidating Trust (ALT); (2) Reid Supply Company, Inc., Charles P. Trombold, David G. Trombold and Walter S. Trom-bold; (3) Land Tool Company and E'H. Land; and (4) Tri-Supply Company, 'Inc., and Gordon Kratz, pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Corn-pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub.L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). The City seeks to recover past response costs from defendants, in the form of contribution pursuant to CERCLA § 113(f). 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)- The City also seeks declaratory relief that two of the defendants, ALT and Reid Supply, are responsible for future response costs, pursuant to CERCLA § 113(g)(2). 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2). At the outset, it is important to comment on the size and complexity of this case and on the level of professionalism of counsel and their support staff. This Memorandum Decision represents the culmination of countless hours and resources expended by each of the parties involved in preparing for and litigating the case, and by the court in attempting to decide the many factual and legal issues. The initial complaint was filed on October 7,1998, and was the first of over 1,440 documents filed in the case. Numerous pretrial rulings were made, either by the magistrate judge or by this court. The trial itself included 8 weeks of testimony concerning CERC-LA’s various complexities and the technical issues related to the parties’ potential liability, and an on-site visit during which the court and counsel viewed first-hand the geographic area at issue. The parties provided the court with an array of computer monitors in the courtroom which allowed the court, counsel, and all 38 witnesses immediate access to the hundreds of exhibits presented during the trial. Technicians were present throughout the trial to operate the computer equipment and were very efficient in doing so. The trial ultimately resulted in a transcript exceeding 5,000 pages. All counsel conveyed a level of preparation and skill in their representation that surpassed the court’s expectations in light of the difficult nature of the subject matter. The court sincerely appreciates the efforts made by all those involved in resolving this case. In reaching its decision, the court has thoroughly considered the record in its entirety, including the voluminous trial transcript, the post-trial briefing and the court’s own assessments of witness credibility. For the reasons stated, the court rules that ALT, Reid Supply Company, Land Tool Company, Walter Trombold, and E.H. Land are liable for past response costs, but only for amounts proportional to the groundwater contamination caused by the respective business entities. The court furthermore declares that ALT and Reid Supply are liable for future groundwater remediation costs in proportion to their individual contributions to the groundwater contamination at the site. Finally, the court declares that ALT and Reid will be liable for any future source control measures at the former APCO and Reid Supply facilities, respectively. II. SUMMARY OF THE DISPUTE In 1986, the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE), an administrative agency of the State of Kansas, collected groundwater samples at multiple locations within the Gilbert and Mosley Site (the Site) and discovered high levels of chlorinated volatile organic compounds, also known as chlorinated solvents. Chlorinated solvents do not occur naturally either in soil or groundwater. They include the commercially-available products Tetrachloroethene or Perchloroethylene (PCE) and Trichloroethene (TCE), and their degraded products, Dichloroethene (DCE) and Vinyl Chloride (VC), neither of which is commercially available. The Site, located near the center of Wichita, Kansas, is named after the intersection of Gilbert Street and Mosley Street, which lies near the middle of the contaminated area. The boundaries of the Site have been delineated through a series of investigations conducted by the KDHE and others since 1986. The Site encompasses an area of roughly four and a half miles from north to south and one to two miles from east to west. It covers approximately 3,850 acres of both residential and commercial property. The Site includes about 8,000 separate parcels of land, and the City itself owns hundreds of parcels within the Site. The groundwater at the Site generally flows in a southerly direction, although it can shift to the south/southwest or the south/southeast in certain locations. The chlorinated solvents moving within the flow of groundwater have created “plumes” of contamination, designated plumes A-F. The plumes lie beneath approximately 1,800 acres of land and contain over 2.75 billion gallons of ground water. See App. C-l. The principal contamination plumes involved in this case are A, B, and E. Following the discovery, the KDHE entered into a Multi-Site Cooperative Agreement with the EPA (EPA/KDHE multi-site agreement), which required investigations pursuant to CERCLA and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), to determine whether the Site, along with other areas, qualified for the EPA’s National Priorities List (NPL). The City became aware of the groundwater contamination upon completion by the KDHE of a Listing Site Investigation in August 1990 and it subsequently entered into an agreement with the KDHE in March 1991 to address the resulting threat to public health and the environment and to avert further economic problems. The agreement was entitled “Settlement Agreement for [RI/FS], and for Certain Remedial Actions to be Determined Following Public Involvement” (City/KDHE agreement). Around that time, the City retained the environmental consulting firm of Camp, Dresser & McKee (CDM) to assist with the project. Following completion of the RI/FS, the KDHE issued its final Corrective Action Decision (CAD) for Interim Groundwater Remediation, in which the KDHE identified the pump and treat system as the preferred remedial alternative for groundwater remediation at the Site. The pump and treat system was being installed at the time of trial. A. Description of Defendants APCO Oil Corporation (APCO) was a public corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Delaware. APCO owned a facility located at 1001 East Lincoln in Wichita until 1971. The East Lincoln location is within the Site. APCO was completely dissolved in 1978 and its assets and liabilities were transferred to ALT, a court created and supervised trust organized and existing under the laws of Delaware, pursuant to an order of the Delaware Court of Chancery. ALT claimed prior to trial that it could not be sued, pursuant to the Chancery Court’s order, that it had no capacity to be sued, pursuant to Rule 17(b), and that it consequently could not be held liable for any judgement against APCO. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 17(b) (“The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law under which it was organized.”). The court ruled in its December 22, 2000, Memorandum and Order that the City’s case against ALT is not barred by the Chancery Court’s order establishing the trust and transferring to it “all funds, assets, properties and claims ... to provide for any other legitimate claims asserted against such liquidating trust,” that CERCLA preempts Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b), and that in any event, ALT has the capacity to be sued under Rule 17(b). ALT filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied. ALT again raises Rule 17(b) in defense. ALT has not presented any new persuasive arguments or authority and the court again adheres to its initial ruling. ALT has the capacity to be sued under Rule 17(b) and is therefore liable for any and all judgments against APCO stemming from the present dispute. Reid Supply was a Kansas corporation engaged in the business of selling and distributing chemicals. Reid Supply owned a facility located at 911 E. Indianapolis from 1975 to 1988. Walter Trom-bold was the sole stockholder and president of Reid Supply during most of the years that it was in business. Two of his sons, David and Charles Trombold, were also involved in the business. Charles began working in the business in 1978 as a corporate officer and director. He became more active in Reid’s operation in the early 1980s and eventually took over for his father as president in 1986. David came to the business in 1981 and held various offices. Reid was dissolved in 1988. Land Tool Company operated a helmet manufacturing business at 650 E. Gilbert Street from 1975 to 1988, at which it handled, stored and used chlorinated solvents, including TCE. E.H. Land owned and operated the company during that time period. Tri-Supply operated a dry cleaning supply facility at 330 S. Commerce, from approximately June 1, 1993, to November 80, 1996, at which it received PCE in bulk and delivered it to Wichita-area customers. Gordon Kratz resided in Illinois and was the president and majority stockholder of Tri-Supply Inc. III. CERCLA LIABILITY Congress enacted CERCLA in the wake of the Love Canal hazardous waste disaster, to establish “ ‘a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.’ ” Morrison Enter, v. McShares, Inc., 302 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir.2002) (quoting Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir.1999)). As amended by SARA in 1986, CERCLA authorizes two types of actions through which a party may recoup costs incurred in hazardous waste cleanup: cost recovery actions under § 107(a) and contribution actions under § 113(f)- See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(f); United States v. Colo. & E. R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir.1995). Section 113(f) incorporates the liability provisions of § 107(a). Therefore, an understanding of the interrelationship between the two sections is helpful. Section 107 imposes liability on four classes of potentially responsible parties (PRPs), including current and former owners of facilities involved in hazardous waste disposal. Tosco Corp. v. Koch Indus., 216 F.3d 886, 891 (10th Cir.2000). Liability under § 107 is strict, joint, and several. Thus, under § 107, once liability is demonstrated, a PRP may be held liable for the entire cost of cleanup, even if multiple PRPs are involved. See Colo. & E. R.R., 50 F.3d at 1535 (“CERCLA, as originally enacted, left a PRP faced with the prospect of being singled out as the defendant in a cost recovery action without any apparent means of fairly apportioning CERCLA costs awarded against it to other PRPs.”). Section 113 supplements § 107 by providing a contribution mechanism for a party saddled with more than its proportionate share of response costs. Thus, an individual PRP which has been left with the entire cleanup cost under § 107, or which voluntarily undertakes it, may seek contribution from and attempt to apportion liability to other PRPs under § 113(f). See Morrison, 302 F.3d at 1133. Unlike § 107, however, § 113 is governed by equitable apportionment principles rather than the confines of joint and several liability. A prima facie showing under § 113 is simply a determination that the defendant PRP would otherwise be held jointly and severally liable under § 107(a). See County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir.1991); Farmland Indus. v. Colo. & E. R.R., 922 F.Supp. 437, 440 (D.Colo.1996). In order to make the required showing, a § 113 plaintiff must establish (1) that defendant is a “covered person” under CERCLA; (2) that a release of any hazardous substance at the site in question has occurred; (3) that the release caused plaintiff to incur costs; (4) that plaintiffs response action or cleanup was consistent with the NCP; and (5) that plaintiffs costs are “necessary” costs of response. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(f); Morrison, 302 F.3d at 1135-36. CERCLA liability may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances and need not be proved by direct evidence. Tosco, 216 F.3d at 892. Because § 107 imposes strict liability upon PRPs regardless of fault, causation is not part of the liability inquiry under § 113. See id. at 891 (“To establish liability under § 9613(f), it is sufficient for the plaintiff to establish a connection between a particular defendant and the incurred response costs vis-a-vis the defendant’s identification as a responsible person as defined in § 9607(a).”); Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 935 & n. 8 (8th Cir.1995); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415, 1417-18 (8th Cir.1990) (stating that courts look only to see if there has been a release or threatened release for which a defendant is responsible); City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods, 258 F.Supp.2d 1263, 1280 (N.D.Okla.2003) (“CERCLA does not impose a causation requirement as a predicate to liability when a defendant falls into one of the classes of liable parties”); Farmland Indus., 922 F.Supp. at 440 (“Neither § 9613(f) nor the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in U.S. v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad Co., 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir.1995), require that such causation be proven to establish liability under CERCLA’s contribution provision.”). In other words, a plaintiff in a § 113 case involving multiple PRPs need not prove a specific causal link between the costs incurred and an individual PRP’s waste. See Tosco, 216 F.3d at 891 (citing United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 264-66 (3d Cir.1992)). Rather, § 113(f) only requires a plaintiff to prove liability or potential liability under § 107(a) and the plaintiffs incurrence of response costs. See Farmland Indus., 922 F.Supp. at 440; La.-Pac. Corp. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., 811 F.Supp. 1421, 1426-30 (E.D.Cal.1993) (statute does not impose a causation element where defendant falls within one of four statutorily defined classes and there has been an actual release). An assessment of liability in this case therefore requires the City to prove each of the five prima facie elements of a § 113 action for each defendant upon which the City seeks to place liability. The court has previously concluded that the City’s action will proceed solely as a contribution action under § 113(f) and adheres to that conclusion here. See City of Wichita v. Aero Holdings, Inc., 177 F.Supp.2d 1153, 1169-73 (D.Kan.2000) (“The court concludes the City is a PRP pursuant to § 107(a)(1) based on its present ownership of a portion of the Coleman B property and the Bus Barn property and that the City is not entitled to maintain its § 107(a) action despite the ‘unique’ nature of this case.”). The City claims that, despite the court’s prior ruling, it is now entitled to maintain a cost recovery action under CERCLA § 107 due to intervening changes in controlling law. Subsequent to commencement of the present suit, Congress amended CERC-LA’s innocent landowner defense. See Small Business Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub.L. 107-118, § 223, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002). In. order to qualify as an innocent landowner, and thereby avoid liability under CERCLA § 107(b), the City must show that when it purchased the properties, it “did not know and had no reason to know” that chlorinated solvents had been disposed of on the land. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (emphasis added); see also id. § 9607(b)(3). The 2002 amendments changed the definition of “had no reason to know” to include the requirement that the innocent purchaser take reasonable steps to stop and prevent further releases at the facility. Id. § 9601(35)(B)(ii)(II). The City contends that this change requires the phrase “did not know and had no reason to know” be read disjunctively, even though the amendments did not expressly change that provision. In other words, the City claims that the relevant language should be read as “did not know [or] had no reason to know.” The effect of such a change would permit a person who buys land with actual knowledge of contamination to successfully assert an innocent landowner defense, and thereby avoid CERCLA liability, so long as that person otherwise complies with the “reason to know” requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B). The City urges its interpretation because a conjunctive reading of section (35)(A) requires both that the City lack actual knowledge and had no reason to know of the contamination at the facilities. The City observes that a person without actual knowledge could not possibly take the “reasonable steps” to stop and prevent releases required by section (35)(B)(i)(II). Thus, it argues, a conjunctive reading of section (35)(A) will prevent anyone from being an innocent landowner because one cannot take steps to stop and prevent releases without actual knowledge of the contamination, and actual knowledge automatically disqualifies one as an innocent landowner. Before analyzing this issue, the court notes that the only other court to have considered the effect of the 2002 amendments concluded that Congress did not intend to make them retroactive. See United States v. Domenic Lombardi Realty, Inc., 290 F.Supp.2d 198, 210 (D.R.I.2003). That issue need not be decided here because, regardless of whether the amendment applies to this case, the City does not qualify as an innocent landowner. Under the City’s reading of the 2002 amendments, section (35)(A) and (35)(B) do appear to be at odds. Nonetheless, a better reading of (35)(B) requires that an innocent landowner make all appropriate inquiries prior to purchasing a piece of property and lack actual knowledge of the pollution at the time of purchase; then, whenever the landowner subsequently discovers the contamination, he must take reasonable steps to control the problem as prescribed in (35)(B)(i)(II). Under this reading, (35)(A) can still be read in a conjunctive fashion, requiring both a lack of actual knowledge and no reason to know of contamination on the property at the time of purchase. This interpretation adheres to the plain meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) as it is written. It is further supported by the legislative history of the 2002 amendments, wherein the changes to section (35)(B) were said to be for the purpose of clarifying existing law, not changing it. S.Rep. No. 107-2, at 12 (2001). The City appears to confuse changes to the innocent landowner defense with the portion of the 2002 amendments that created a bona fide prospective purchaser defense. See Small Business Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub.L. 107-118, § 222, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40), 9607(r). The bona fide prospective purchaser defense does permit a person with actual knowledge to purchase a contaminated facility without becoming liable under CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40), 9607(r); see also S.Rep. No. 107-2 at 11-12. Unfortunately, the City cannot qualify as a bona fide prospective purchaser because the amendment made clear that this new defense would only apply for purchases that occurred after the changes were enacted. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40). In contrast to this new bona fide purchaser defense, neither the 2002 amendments nor the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to change the innocent landowner defense such that those who purchased with actual knowledge of contamination might avoid CERCLA liability. Indeed, although the City argues that its interpretation avoids creating some minor surplusage under section 35(B), the irony is that the City’s interpretation would render the entire bona fide purchaser defense as surplusage because all of the protections of that defense would be duplicated in the innocent landowner defense. The 2002 amendments clearly distinguish between the innocent landowner and the bona fide prospective purchaser, and this court must do the same. Compare Small Business Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act § 222 with id. § 223. Since the City stipulated that it had actual knowledge of TCE contamination at the Bus Barn prior to purchasing the property, the City cannot maintain an innocent landowner defense. Accordingly, the City may not maintain a cost recovery action under CERCLA § 107(a); instead, the City may only bring a contribution action under CERCLA § 113(f). A. Covered Person Under CERCLA The City must initially establish, as part of its prima facie case of CERCLA liability pursuant to § 113, that each of the named defendants was a covered person under CERCLA. See Morrison, 302 F.3d at 1135. “Covered persons” include “any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). The term “facility” includes any building or structure, or “any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). CERCLA defines “disposal” indirectly in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) by referencing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. That Act defines “disposal” to mean “the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). The court concludes that the City has met its burden on the “covered person” element of CERCLA liability with respect to APCO, Reid Supply, Tri-Supply, and Land Tool. APCO owned a facility, located at 1001 E. Lincoln, at which it received, stored, sold and distributed PCE and TCE from approximately 1967 to 1971. Reid Supply owned a warehouse, located at 911 E. Indianapolis, at which it received, stored and distributed PCE and TCE from approximately 1975 until at least 1978. Tri-Supply operated a dry cleaning supply facility at 330 S. Commerce, from approximately June 1, 1993, to November 30, 1996, at which it received at least eight bulk tank truck deliveries of PCE between June 1994, and June, 1995, totaling more than 8,100 gallons, filled and stored 55-gallon drums of PCE, and delivered PCE to Wichita-area customers. Finally, Land Tool operated a helmet manufacturing business at 650 E. Gilbert Street at which it handled, stored and used chlorinated solvents, including TCE. The court also concludes that hazardous substances were disposed of, as defined in RCRA, at defendants’ respective facilities during each defendant’s tenure as owner or operator, as more fully explained in section III.B. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). Besides the business entities from which the City seeks contribution, several individuals are also named as defendants. These include Gordon Kratz, E.H. Land, Walter Trombold, Charles Trombold, and David Trombold. The City seeks to impose liability on these men as operators of their facilities pursuant to CERCLA § 107(a)(2). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). This subsection imposes liability on both owners and operators of facilities when hazardous substances were disposed of during their tenure. Courts have lamented CERCLA’s unfortunate lack of clarity where it circularly defines an “operator” as one who “operates” a facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii); see United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66, 118 S.Ct. 1876, 1887, 141 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998); United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 313-14 (6th Cir.1998); East Bay Mun. Utility Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 142 F.3d 479 (D.C.Cir.1998); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir.1988). Observing the effects of that lack of clarity, the Tenth Circuit noted that other circuits are. split on how to define “operator.” FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., 998 F.2d 842, 846 (10th Cir.1993). Some courts have imposed operator status on persons or entities with the “authority to control” operations at a facility, while others have required “actual control.” See id. Regrettably, FMC failed to adopt either test, finding instead that the defendant would be considered an operator regardless of which standard was used. Id. In Bestfoods, the Supreme Court appeared to clarify the definition of “operator” under CERCLA, finding that “an operator must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution, that is, operations having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental regulations.” Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 67, 118 S.Ct. at 1887. This definition clearly requires actual participation, not merely the potential to do so. See Brighton, 153 F.3d at 314 (interpreting Best-foods as adopting the “actual control” test and rejecting the “authority to control” test). The court notes that in Bestfoods, the alleged operator was a parent corporation whose subsidiary was the owner of the facility in question. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 55, 118 S.Ct. at 1881. Similarly, in Brighton, the alleged operator was a municipality that exerted considerable influence over a privately owned dump site. Brighton, 153 F.3d at 310-12. Nonetheless, the rationale in those cases applies more broadly and, as here, makes just as much sense when applied to individuals. 1. The Trombolds David and Charles Trombold began working at Reid Supply in 1981. Although Charles was on the Reid board of directors and had held a position as a corporate officer since 1978, he was not actively involved in the day-to-day operations and decision-making until he began working at Reid in 1981. Even though the City was able to elicit a statement from Charles that he regularly participated in management meetings from the time he became an officer through the company’s dissolution in 1988, the court finds that Charles’ answer likely focused on the post-1981 period. Charles was simultaneously pursuing two degrees at the University of Kansas until 1980. Immediately thereafter, he studied chemistry at a university in England. Accordingly, he had little, if any, time to participate in the “actual control” of Reid Supply’s affairs to the point that he would be subject to operator liability under CERCLA. As for David Trom-bold, the City makes no allegations that he did anything to subject himself to operator liability before 1981. Thus, prior to 1981, neither David nor Charles held duties at Reid that would qualify them as operators. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii); Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 67, 118 S.Ct. at 1887. In order to be considered covered persons under the relevant CERCLA provisions, David and Charles would have to be considered operators during a time when chlorinated solvents were disposed of at 911 E. Indianapolis. As discussed in much more detail in Section III.B.2, the only releases that the City has proven at the Reid facility occurred primarily from 1975-78 and ceased not later than 1981. None occurred during the time David Trombold worked at Reid. Since any disposals at 911 E. Indianapolis occurred prior to the time that David and Charles Trombold could be considered operators, neither David nor Charles Trombold is a covered person under CERCLA § 107(a)(2). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). Unlike his sons, Walter Trombold was involved with operations at the Reid facility during the period when bulk deliveries were made. Hence, his involvement in Reid’s affairs occurred during a time when PCE was disposed of at 911 E. Indianapolis. Thus, the real question for Walter is whether his activities made him an operator under CERCLA. The City makes much of the fact that Walter was president of Reid Supply and owned most (and at times, all) of Reid’s outstanding stock. However, Walter’s titles and stock ownership suggest only some authority to control, not actual control. Bestfoods rejected authority to control as a basis for operator liability. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 67, 118 S.Ct. at 1887. Instead, an operator must be actively involved in decisions regarding disposal of hazardous substances or environmental compliance. See id. Moreover, courts applying the actual control test have consistently required more than casual or occasional involvement in such decisions. Instead, an operator under CERCLA must make the relevant decisions on a frequent, typically day-to-day, basis. See East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 142 F.3d at 485 (citing United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572, 579-81 (6th Cir.1997); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1504-05 (11th Cir.1996); Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 253-54 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1193 (8th Cir.1994); John S. Boyd Co., Inc. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401, 408 (1st Cir.1993); Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1220-22 (3rd Cir.1993); Joslyn Manuf. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir.1990); Hines Lumber Co., 861 F.2d at 157-59). As president of Reid Supply, Walter Trombold was two layers removed from the day-to-day supervision of operations at 911 E. Indianapolis. The evidence showed that Reid’s warehouse foreman was the person directly responsible for day-to-day operations at the 911 facility. For most of the period in which disposals occurred, that person was Jerry Letterman. The warehouse foreman reported to Reid’s general manager. The general manager was in charge of operations at all of the Reid facilities. During the relevant time frames, Gene Stamm was Reid’s general manager. Stamm reported to Walter Trombold. The evidence does not indicate that Walter Trombold ignored this organizational structure, nor that he otherwise engaged in activities that would rise to the level of control over PCE handling that would give him operator status. In other words, Walter Trombold’s connection with day-to-day operational decisions over PCE handling was too remote to establish operator liability. To rule otherwise would subject corporate officers to operator liability based on their mere authority to control, a standard rejected in Bestfoods. On the other hand, Bestfoods also imposes operator liability on those making decisions about compliance with environmental regulations. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 67, 118 S.Ct. at 1887. Although Walter Trombold was not out on the warehouse floor telling employees how to fill barrels or how to clean up spills, the evidence shows that environmental compliance issues were addressed at weekly management meetings. Furthermore, Gene Stamm presented essentially uncontroverted testimony that Walter Trombold was present at those nieetings, and that no decisions were made at those meetings without Walter’s approval. Based on the frequency of those meetings, and the fact that Walter Trombold was actively involved in deciding matters of environmental compliance, the court finds that he was an operator. Accordingly, Walter Trombold is a covered person under CERCLA § 107(a)(2). 2. Gordon Kratz Gordon Kratz was the president and majority stockholder of Tri-Supply during its tenancy at 330 S. Commerce. The City seeks to hold Kratz liable as an operator based on his activities associated with the 330 S. Commerce facility. Kratz lived in Illinois, and only visited the Wichita facility about once every eight or nine months, staying only a day for each visit. He entrusted the management and environmental compliance of the Wichita facility to his local office manager, Bob Raveill. The City claims Kratz is an operator because he established PCE handling procedures and enforced them at the TriSupply facility. On the contrary, Kratz’s involvement at the Wichita location was nowhere near the day-to-day management and control required of an operator under Bestfoods. Likewise, his so-called. procedures amounted to nothing more than guidance to limit the number of times drums were re-used for PCE storage. Beyond that, he merely admonished Raveill to follow the general safe-handling procedures supplied by the manufacturer, and to avoid any spills. Indeed, Kratz noted the peculiarity of the City’s position at trial when he said “You keep calling it my procedures; but I — I don’t know why.” Kratz’s general admonitions for safe handling hardly rise to the level of control that would give rise to operator liability, nor do they amount to the type of decisions that would impose liability for directing environmental compliance matters. Accordingly, Kratz is not an operator, and not a covered person under CERCLA § 107(a)(2). 3. E. H. Land E. H. Land stipulated that he both owned and operatéd the Land Tool facility during the relevant time periods. Furthermore, the evidence clearly established that chlorinated solvents were disposed of at the Land Tool facility. See infra, section III.B.3. Accordingly, E. H. Land is a covered person under CERCLA § 107(a)(2). B. Release of any Hazardous Substance The City must next establish, as part of its prima facie case of CERCLA liability pursuant to § 113, the occurrence of a release at the defendants’ respective facilities. See Morrison, 302 F.3d at 1133. The term “release” means “any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant).” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)! The term “environment” includes any “surface water, ground water, drinking water supply, land surface or subsurface strata, or ambient air within the United States or under the jurisdiction of the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8). The City contends that a release of the chlorinated solvents PCE and/or TCE occurred at defendants’ respective facilities. To understand the discussion of evidence regarding releases, some background on the activity of chlorinated solvents in the environment is helpful. Chlorinated solvents are hazardous substances. See Bob’s Beverage, Inc. v. Acme, Inc., 264 F.3d 692, 694 (6th Cir.2001). A spill of PCE or TCE which stays on a surface such as concrete tends to evaporate quickly. Once it reaches the soil, however, chlorinated solvents can stay in the soil for years, particularly if the soil is saturated. The contamination gradually moves or “leaches” into the groundwater and then moves along preferential flow paths to the bottom of the aquifer because PCE and TCE are heavier than water. Dechlorination occurs during that slow process. Chlorinated solvents dechlori-nate as the result of a chemical reaction which occurs when the chlorinated solvent loses a chlorine atom, which is then replaced with a hydrogen atom. The chlorinated solvents involved in this case lose one chlorine atom at each step of the dechlorination process: PCE (four chlorine atoms) dechlorinates to TCE (three chlorine atoms); TCE dechlorinates to DCE (two chlorine atoms); DCE dechlori-nates to VC (one chlorine atom) and VC ultimately dechlorinates to ethane, a gaseous hydrocarbon. The process is sequential and the steps are not skipped. There was disagreement regarding whether dechlorination can occur in soil. Olsen, the City’s witness, testified that de-chlorination occurs only in groundwater, when carbon is available, and that it does not occur in soil. Eversman, Reid’s witness, testified on cross-examination by the City’s counsel that in the presence of a carbon source, PCE in the soil can degrade to daughter products, including DCE, by the time it enters the groundwater. The court accepts Eversman’s testimony on this point. There are places at the Site where PCE, TCE and DCE have been found in the soil at a single location, e.g., RSI-7. Coupled with evidence of a PCE spill at the location, the only reasonable explanation for the presence of TCE and DCE is dechlorination because it is undisputed that DCE exists only as the result of the dechlorination process. While the dechlorination process is sequential, it is not inexorable. The presence of oxygen, nitrates, and ferric iron can affect dechlorination. For purposes of this case, however, carbon products and sulfates are the compounds of most concern. Carbon, which generally is found in the form of petroleum, can speed up the dechlorination process. The presence of sulfate, an inorganic compound, has the opposite effect; it can slow the process and even stop dechlorination from DCE to VC. Olsen explained that in the presence of a carbon source, PCE and TCE can degrade, but when the concentration of sulfate is “high enough,” dechlorination stops at DCE until the microorganisms which facilitate dechlorination can get rid of the sulfate. Once that happens, dechlo-rination can proceed to VC and beyond. Eversman agreed that sulfates can inhibit or retard the degradation process. An exhaustive (and exhausting) source of information regarding dechlorination at the Site can be found in exhibits P-2219A and P-2333. With this background in mind, the court will discuss the evidence of chlorinated solvent releases at each of defendants’ facilities. The trial testimony regarding releases consumed many days of testimony, was quite complex, and is difficult to summarize. In retrospect, it is tempting to simply find that releases occurred at each facility without discussing the details of the evidence. Because chlorinated solvents are not found naturally in soil or groundwater, and because they were found in both at each facility, the inevitable conclusion is that releases occurred. The court has resisted this temptation out of respect for the efforts of the parties and the inevitable likelihood of review. 1. APCO From approximately 1967 to 1971, APCO received PCE and TCE by bulk transport truck. It stored, sold and distributed these chlorinated solvents at its 1001 E. Lincoln Property during that five-year period. APCO housed its “Chemicals and Solvents” and “Fuels” divisions in an office building located at the corner of Lincoln and Washington Streets. The chemicals and solvents group utilized a warehouse and loading dock, located just to the southeast of the office building, to store, ship, and receive product, including chlorinated solvents. See App. C-2. APCO also utilized a fenced-in area, located directly to the east of the warehouse, to store empty 55-gallon drums. APCO stored anywhere from 50 to 60 drums in this area, known as the “pen,” including used drums that previously contained chlorinated solvents. APCO employees stacked used drums on their sides in the pen until they could be shipped to a drum-reconditioner for reworking. Some of the used drum heads were in “pretty bad shape” while others “weren’t quite so bad.” The pen also contained a 1,000 .gallon above-ground storage tank, filled • with PCE. Other than the “pen,” which was gravel, almost the entire surface area of the property at 1001 E. Lincoln was concrete. When a chlorinated solvent was delivered to the facility, it was either “drummed” on the loading dock or pumped directly into the above ground storage tank in the pen. If the solvent was to be drummed, the transport driver “would head the tractor directly up toward the loading dock from the north,” and would connect a hose from the transport truck to a nozzle, which could be pointed directly into the drums on the dock. The drums were then filled, weighed, and moved to the back of the dock. Except for the type of nozzle used, the procedure for filling the above ground tank in the “pen” was basically the same. The transport driver would drive up from Lincoln Street into the same area, head the tractor to the east toward the alley, and connect a hose onto the fill pipe of the above ground tank. At least two hose connections occurred every time a chlorinated solvent was delivered. First, the transport driver ran a hose from the discharge pipe on the bottom of the truck’s tank up to a pump located either on the side of the truck or on the tank itself. The driver then ran another hose from the pump to the fill pipe of the above ground tank or onto the dock so that solvent could be drummed. APCO followed the same basic procedure when transferring chlorinated solvent out of its above-ground tank for delivery to outside customers. First, a hose was connected to the discharge pipe on the above-ground tank and then hooked to a portable pump. Another hose was then run from the portable pump into either drums or a tanker truck for filling. Larry Richwine worked as a driver and warehouseman at APCO from 1966 to 1972 and was the only fact witness to have actually observed operations at the facility. The court finds Richwine’s testimony as to APCO’s general operations and tanker-truck delivery procedures generally credible. On the other hand, his testimony as to spill location, frequency, clean-up procedure, and size was highly influenced by one of ALT’S counsel and largely lacking in credibility. According to Richwine, spills of chlorinated solvents occurred as transport hoses were being disconnected at least 50% of the time chlorinated solvents were delivered, for a total of approximately 30 spills. The hoses were always disconnected-and the spills always oecurred-on concrete-covered property immediately north of the above-ground storage tank and immediately north of the loading dock. The spills varied from smaller to larger amounts, Larger spills were either wiped up with rags or absorbed with an absorbent material, while spills of a half-gallon or less were left to evaporate. Shortly before trial, one of ALT’s counsel showed Richwine a photo purporting to depict the surface area that is covered when a half-gallon of liquid is spilled onto concrete. Although Richwine testified about witnessing spills in excess of two to three gallons in his deposition, he changed his trial testimony, based on the photo, to reflect that no more than a gallon or two of chlorinated solvent was ever spilled. Although Richwine indicated prior to his deposition that solvent sometimes “spilled onto the gravel ground when transferring solvent from the above ground tank to drums for delivery,” Richwine insisted in his deposition and at trial that all spills occurred on concrete. The evidence of contamination in the pen area does not support his testimony. The frequent changes and inconsistencies in Richwine’s testimony, and his general demeanor while testifying, made it apparent that he was prepared at trial to say anything he could to assist in ALT’s defense. Richwine lost what little credibility he had remaining when, at the beginning of his redirect examination, he looked directly at defense counsel, immediately before answering the question posed to him, as if seeking some form of direction. Given his ever-evolving testimony and defense counsel’s obvious influence, it is reasonable to infer that Richwine personally observed spills larger and more frequent than those he testified about. The court has no doubt that frequent, sometimes significant spills occurred. The sheer volume of chlorinated solvent that was being stored, shipped, and received at APCO on a daily basis,, combined with APCO’s apparent failure to take spill precautions during solvent transfers, makes frequent spills quite likely. The court concludes' that at least 30 spills of chlorinated solvents-and likely more-occurred at APCO between 1967 and 1971. Most spills occurred on the concrete-covered property between the office building and the loading dock/warehouse as transfer hoses were being disconnected. Due to the nature of APCO’s operations, spills and leaks of chlorinated solvents also occurred on the gravel surface area of the pen and the loading dock itself. Whether these spills occurred as a result of residual solvents leaking from the used drums in the pen, from PCE transfers involving the above ground tank, or from general operations on and around the loading dock, all had the potential to allow chlorinated solvents to seep directly through to the soil and, ultimately, to the groundwater. ALT sought to deflect the damaging effects of Richwine’s testimony in two ways: first, it presented testimony by Steven L. McCabe to the effect that chlorinated solvents cannot pass through concrete into soil. Second, it vigorously challenged the validity of test data taken at the APCO site, which showed the presence of chlorinated solvents in soil and groundwater. McCabe’s opinions apply primarily to APCO and can be dealt with rather summarily. The arguments regarding test data have application throughout the Site, and require more extended discussion. After a series of field observations, concrete core-sample collections, spill tests, crack evaluations, and mathematic computations, McCabe concluded that “the penetration of the CVOC product through the concrete is unlikely given the quality of the materials and the basic mechanisms that control the penetration of liquids through concrete.” The original concrete, however, no longer exists in the areas where Ri-ehwine testified that spills occurred. McCabe’s opinion therefore hinges upon the very large assumption that the concrete existing in the spill areas between 1967 and 1971 would have been similar, in all significant respects, to concrete of the same mid-1960’s vintage still existing on the property immediately north of the loading dock. The court finds McCabe’s testimony highly speculative and largely contrived. As will be explained in greater detail, chlorinated solvents were detected in the soil, only two feet below the ground surface, immediately below where the original concrete existed, in an area where Richwine testified that spills occurred. McCabe could not offer-and the court cannot imagine-any other reasonable explanation for the presence of chlorinated solvents so near the ground surface in that area, except that they passed through the overlying concrete. Indeed, it is the presence of chlorinated solvents in the soil that most clearly confirms, in the court’s view, that significant releases actually occurred at 1001 E. Lincoln. While plausible arguments have been made regarding the extent to which chlorinated solvents in the groundwater underneath 1001 are attributable to upgra-dient sources and about the legitimacy of on-site versus off-site data, there is simply no getting around the presence of chlorinated solvents, at shallow depths, in the soil. Although the parties hotly contest the validity of the test data which showed the presence of chlorinated solvents in soil, the disputes center around the extent of the contamination, not the fact of contamination. It is agreed that chlorinated solvents do not occur naturally in soil and groundwater, and there is no credible evidence that they migrate through the soil from upgradient sources. Not even McCabe suggested that groundwater contaminated with chlorinated solvents from upgradient sources conveniently “wicked up” through 15 feet or more of soil to places where these contaminants had been spilled. The presence of soil contamination is illustrated by soil samples taken at various locations on the APCO property designated APC-5, APC-9, and APC-9A. APC-5 is located directly underneath the concrete covered area between APCO’s office building and its loading dock, the location where, according to Richwine, spills occurred. On-site testing at APC-5 indicated high levels of PCE in the soil at concentrations of 1403 parts per billion (ppb) only two feet below ground. Although off-site testing of the same samples yielded dramatically lower results, the off-site lab result nonetheless confirmed the presence of PCE in the soil at concentrations of 58 ppb, only two feet below the surface. Data from APC-9 and APC-9A also revealed the presence of PCE in the soil at shallow depths. APC-9 and APC-9A are located east of APCO’s warehouse, in the gravel area known as the “pen.” On-site PCE readings at APC-9 indicated the presence of PCE in the soil at concentrations of 13.4 ppb and 76 . ppb at depths of two and four feet, respectively. The off-site lab confirmed the presence of PCE, at 23 ppb, four feet below ground. Similar data from APC-9A indicated the presence of PCE at concentrations of 291 ppb (on-site) and 16 ppb (off-site) two feet below the surface. Considering Richwine’s testimony together with the data collected from APC-5, APC-9 and APC-9A, the court finds overwhelming evidence that chlorinated solvent spills occurred at 1001' E. Lincoln and that at least some of those spills reached the soil. The question then becomes whether, and to what extent, 1001 E. Lincoln is a source of contamination to the groundwater. Resolution of this question requires a somewhat extended review of the evidence pertaining' to the taking and analysis of soil and groundwater samples at APCO and other locations at the Site. In February 1998, CDM subcontracted with Environmental Priority Service (EPS) to perform soil, soil gas, and groundwater sampling at 100,1 E. Lincoln. Pat Martin is the owner of EPS. Martin had a lot of training and experience in the collection and analysis of samples. His job was to take soil and groundwater samples at locations selected by CDM. In March 1998, Martin and his crew collected soil and groundwater samples at 1001 E. Lincoln. Martin utilized an on-site laboratory consisting of a van fitted with a geoprobe and various other equipment for analyzing samples, such as a gas chromatograph. A geoprobe is a hollow tube which is driven through layers of soil and into groundwater. Geoprobing is a relatively quick and inexpensive way to preliminarily locate or screen for the presence of contaminants in soil and/or groundwater at various depths. The soil and/or groundwater samples are analyzed in either on- or off-site laboratories, or both. The laboratory analysis generates test data which reveals concentrations of contaminants such as chlorinated solvents, petroleum and sulfates. The types and concentrations of contaminants, as well as them locations in the soil and groundwater, yield information which, in this case, provided grist for complex and vastly differing opinions regarding sources, concentrations, degradation, direction of movement, areal dispersion and other aspects of chlorinated solvent contamination in the soils and groundwater at the Site. Martin employed a modified version of the EPA SW-846 Method 3810 to analyze soil samples on-site. Method 3810 is described as a “heated headspace method” because it requires the heating of a sample to release volatile compounds for analysis. It is a simple method that allows large numbers of samples to be screened in a relatively short period of time. Due to the variability of the method, however, it is recommended for use only as a screening procedure for other, more accurate and determinative methods. All sampling conducted at 1001 E. Lincoln, including Martin’s use of the modified Method 3810, was to be performed according to a number of quality assurance and quality control (QA/QC) protocols referred to in the Plume B Workplan, the City/ KDHE Agreement, and the 1995 Final Quality Assurance Project Plan for Prede-sign Data Acquisition and Bioremediation Pilot Demonstration (QAPP). Twenty seven borings were taken on and immediately adjacent to the APCO property and over 100 samples were collected. Of the locations sampled, the most notable contamination was detected at APC-3, APC-5, APC-7, APC-9, and groundwater sampling location 910. The court was impressed with Martin’s forthright demeanor and finds that Martin knew what he was doing and did it properly. The court was not impressed with cross-examination whose apparent purpose was to demonstrate that Martin was un-knowledgeable and sloppy. Despite ALT’s criticisms of Martin’s work and the absence of “chain of custody” logs, the court finds that he sufficiently documented his analysis of samples at 1001 E. Lincoln. His field notations include the time of day for placing the sample in the laboratory instrument, the chromatogram readings, the sample identification number, the sample depth, the sample type, and the reported concentrations. Martin’s typed “field sheets and analytical reports” for APC series data points located on or near 1001 E. Lincoln were included in the City’s Data Quality Reports approved by the KDHE. The court finds Martin’s on-site data substantially complies with CERC-LA’s requirements and is reliable to assist in determining ALT’s (and Reid’s) liability. In May 1998, the City retained David Hendron and his company, GeoSyntec Consultants, to assist in determining whether specific properties located within the Site were sources of groundwater contamination. According to Hendron, groundwater flows across the Site generally in a north-to-south direction, with a downward gradient of about five feet per mile. In keeping with the known groundwater flow direction, Hendron generally compared shallow groundwater data from wells upgradient from the subject property with data from on-site wells and those immediately downgradient from the property. If lower concentrations of chlorinated solvents were discovered upgradient than were discovered on-site and immediately downgradient to a property that was known or suspected of having handled chlorinated solvents, Hendron generally deemed that property a source. Hendron focused upon shallow groundwater results because shallow groundwater is generally the first to be impacted. Once chlorinated solvents hit the shallow groundwater at a given location, they tend to sink, because of their density, and to diffuse out into plumes of contamination. Because the contamination generally moves slightly downward within a given plume as it migrates off site, a shallow depth of contamination indicates a likelihood that a nearby property is a source. Hendron compared the data collected from upgradient wells 828-1A and 828-4A to downgradient samples collected from APC-5, APC-7, 828-8B, WM-1, WM-2, APC-9 and APC-9A. Data collected from the upgradient wells showed little or no chlorinated solvents, while data collected on site and immediately downgradient of the APCO property showed significantly higher chlorinated solvent concentrations in both the soil and groundwater. At APC-5, for example, PCE concentrations of 1,403 ppb were discovered in the soil at 2 feet below ground surface (bgs) near the southeast corner of the facility. Groundwater readings taken at monitoring well WM-1, just south of APCO’s property line, revealed concentrations of PCE in the shallow groundwater (18 feet bgs) at 1200 ppb, TCE at 7300 ppb, and eis-l-2-DCE at 17,000 ppb, respectively. Additional geoprobe sampling was performed on the former APCO property in March 2000. The samples were taken at location 910B, directly beneath the location of APCO’s loading dock. The geoprobe readings indicated the following contaminant levels in the shallow groundwater: 1800 ppb PCE, 1500 ppb TCE, 1600 ppb cis-l,2-DCE, and <500 ppb VC. After analyzing the geoprobe results, CDM installed a permanent monitoring well at 910B to monitor the remedial system. Like the geoprobe samples, the monitoring well indicated significant levels of chlorinated solvents in the groundwater at 910B. Shallow groundwater readings taken in May 2002 indicated the presence of not only PCE (1400 ppb), but also of TCE (1600 ppb), DCE (3800 ppb), and VC (130 ppb). Each of these readings dramatically exceeds the Alternate Cleanup Levels (ACLs) established by the KDHE. Hendron asserted- and this court now agrees-that these sampling results, together with the results from APC-7, 828-8B, WM-2, APC-9 and APC-9A, indicate APCO is a source of chlorinated solvent contamination to the groundwater. ALT mounted a vigorous defense to the City’s evidence regarding chlorinated solvent contamination at APCO. According to ALT, the on-site soil data taken at 1001 E. Lincoln is unreliable for both qualitative and quantitative purposes because Martin utilized the modified 3810 method without EPA or KDHE approval and did not perform the required QA/QC protocols and data validation tests required to ensure the reliability of the onsite soil data. ALT points out that Method 3810 requires “[s]tandard quality assurance practices” to be used, including data validation tests on any samples taken such as matrix spikes, matrix spike duplicates, and surrogate spikes. ALT also asserts that Martin and members of his crew did not follow established QA/QC, chain of custody, and data validation procedures as required by Method 3810, the Settlement Agreement, and the QAPP. The court finds that any failure by Martin to perform analyses such as matrix spikes and matrix spike duplicates did not impair either Martin’s credibility or the weight of his testimony. Even ALT’s own expert, Dr. Edward McBean, admitted that APCO is a source. ALT asserts nonetheless that its contribution of contamination to the groundwater is so insignificant that it does not exceed the ACLs. According to McBean, therefore, no significant clean-up is required. McBean considered several factors in reaching his opinions, including solvent handling operations at APCO, the. presence of concrete at the facility, the soil and soil data, adjacent land uses, and the contribution of contamination from upgradient sources. McBean utilized ALOHA and EMSOFT modeling to demonstrate that only minute amounts- of contaminant could reach the soil through concrete. He concluded that a half-gallon spill onto concrete would likely evaporate in 12 minutes in the summer and 81 minutes in the winter. According to McBean, only 1% of the spill would seep into the expansion joints or cracks in the concrete, 94 to 99% of which would ultimately evaporate. Because on-site data largely contradicted McBean’s findings, he rationalized that the quality of the on-site data is so poor that it cannot be relied upon except, for screening purposes, to show the presence or absence of a particular contaminant. To illustrate his opinions, McBean prepared several exhibits graphically depicting the dramatic differences between the on-site and off-site soil laboratory samples from 1001 E. Lincoln. ALT-1536 is a comparison of on-site and off-site soil samp