Full opinion text
ORDER MOODY, District Judge. THIS CAUSE came before this Court upon: 1. Defendant Ballut’s Motion to Dismiss or Strike Counts 1 through 4, 19, 36 through 38, and 40 through 42 (Dkt.# 200) and the government’s response (Dkt.# 347) thereto; 2. Defendant Al-Arian’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Indictment (Dkt.# 245), the government’s response (Dkt.# 346), and Al-Arian’s reply (Dkt.# 425) thereto; 3. Defendant Fariz’s Motion to Dismiss Count 44 of the Indictment (Dkt.# 250) and the government’s response (Dkt.# 347) thereto; 4. Defendant Fariz’s Motion to Strike Surplusage (Dkt.# 251) and the government’s response (Dkt.# 340) thereto; 5. Defendant Fariz’s Motion to Dismiss Count 1 of the Indictment (Dkt.# 255) and the government’s response (Dkt.# 343) thereto; 6. Defendant Fariz’s Motion to Strike as Surplusage as to Count 1, Paragraph 43, Subparagraphs (236), (240), (247), and (253) of the Indictment, and to Dismiss Counts 35, 37, 41, and 43 of the Indictment (Dkt.# 256) and the government’s response (Dkt.# 340) thereto; 7. Defendant Al-Arian’s Amended Motion to Dismiss Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Indictment (Dkt.# 273), the government’s response (Dkt.# 346), and Al-Arian’s reply (Dkt.# 425) thereto; 8. Defendant Fariz’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment (Dkt.# 301) and the government’s response (Dkt.# 345) thereto; 9. Defendant Fariz’s Motion to Quash Section (b) of Paragraph 26 of the Indictment for Failure to State a Legal Basis for Relief (Dkt.# 302) and the government’s response (Dkt.# 344) thereto; 10. Defendant Fariz’s Request for Oral Argument on Defendant’s Pretrial Motions (Dkt.# 303); 11. Defendant Hammoudeh’s Motion to Dismiss Count 1 of the Indictment (Dkt.# 313) and the government’s response (Dkt.# 343) thereto; 12. Defendant Hammoudeh’s Amended Motion to Dismiss Count 1 of the Indictment (Dkt.# 330) and the government’s response (Dkt.# 343) thereto; 13. Defendant Faiz’s Motion for Reconsideration of Magistrate Judge’s Order Denying in Part Fariz’s Motion for Bill of Particulars (Dkt.# 440); and 14. Defendant Ballut’s Motion for Reconsideration of Motion for Bill of Particulars (Dkt.# 441). I. BACKGROUND A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This is a criminal action against alleged members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Shiqaqi Faction (the “PIJ”) who purportedly operated and directed fundraising and other organizational activities in the United States for almost twenty years. The PIJ is a foreign organization that uses violence, principally suicide bombings, and threats of violence to pressure Israel to cede territory to the Palestinian people. On February 19, 2003, the government indicted the Defendants in a 50 count indictment that included counts for: (1) conspiracy to commit racketeering (Count 1); (2) conspiracy to commit murder, maim, or injure persons outside the United States (Count 2); (3) conspiracy to provide material support to or for the benefit of foreign terrorists (Counts 3 and 4); (4) violations of the Travel Act (Counts 5 through 44); (5) violation of the immigration laws of the United States (Counts 45 and 46); (6) obstruction of justice (Count 47); and (7) perjury (Counts 48 through 50). Count 1 of the Indictment alleges a wide ranging pattern of racketeering activity beginning in 1984 lasting through February 2003, including murder, extortion, and money laundering. The Indictment details some 256 overt acts, ranging from soliciting and raising funds to providing management, organizational, and logistical support for the PIJ. The overt act section of the Indictment details numerous suicide bombings and attacks by PIJ members causing the deaths of over 100 people, including 2 American citizens, and injuries to over 350 people, including 7 American citizens. These same overt acts (or parts of them) support the remaining counts of the Indictment. Each of the Defendants filed numerous pretrial motions primarily seeking the dismissal of Counts 1 through 4 of the Indictment and the striking of various overt acts or parts of overt acts as surplusage. The government opposed each motion. On January 21, 2004, this Court held oral argument. Additionally, Defendants Ballut and Fariz filed motions for reconsideration of the Magistrate’s Order denying in part Defendants’ motions for bill of particulars (Dkt.# 428). B. STATUTORY BACKGROUND Center stage in the motions are two statutes (along with the regulations, administrative designations, and executive orders associated with each): (1) the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132 (“AEDPA”); and (2) the International Emergency Eco-nomie Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq. (“IEEPA”). 1. AEDPA AEDPA authorizes the Secretary of State (the “Secretary”), in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, to designate an organization as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (“FTO”). See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a). Designation as a FTO has severe conse-quencés to an organization, its members, and its supporters. For example, after designation, the Secretary of the Treasury may freeze all assets of a FTO in or controlled by a United States financial institution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C). Additionally, representatives and certain members of FTOs may be barred from entry into the United States. See id. § 1182(a)(3)(B). More relevant to this case, the designation of an organization as a FTO has potential criminal ramifications on a FTO’s supporters. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). In passing AEDPA, Congress sought to prevent persons within the United States or subject to United States’ jurisdiction from providing material support to foreign organizations engaged in terrorist activities “to the fullest possible basis, consistent with .the Constitution.” AEDPA Pub.L. No. 104-132, § 301(b). Under Section 2339B(a)(1), a person who; knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). The term “material support” is broadly defined in AEDPA to mean “currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications' equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal, substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.” Id. § 2339A(b); id. § 2239B(g)(4). In passing such a broad prohibition, Congress found that FTOs “are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.” Pub.L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7). ‘ ’ In order to designate an organization a FTO under AEDPA, the Secretary must find that the: (a) organization is foreign; (b) organization engages in “terrorist activity,” “terrorism,” or has the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism; and (c) the terrorism or terrorist activity threatens either the security of United States nationals or national security. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1). AEDPA provides no pre-designation notice to a potential FTO. See id. § 1189(a)(2)(A) (providing pre-designation notice by classified communication only to various congressional leaders). A designation takes effect upon publication. See id. § 1189(a)(2)(B)(i). A designation lasts for two years unless revoked by Congress or the Secretary. See id. §§ 1189(a)(2)(B)(ii), (a)(4)(A), (a)(5), (a)(6). The Secretary may renew a FTO designation every two years. See id. § 1189(a)(4)(B). AEDPA limits the right, scope, basis and time period for judicial review by a FTO. See id. § 1189(b) (limiting judicial review to 30 days after designation based solely on the administrative record, unless the government wants to submit additional classified evidence ex parte, and limiting the scope of review that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit takes of a designation). Further, AEDPA precludes a criminal defendant’s right to “raise any question concerning the validity of the issuance of such designation as a defense or objection at any trial or hearing.” Id. § 1189(a)(8). On October 8, 1997, the Secretary designated PIJ as a FTO under AEDPA. See 62 Fed.Reg. 52,650 (1997). The Secretary’s designation of PIJ as a FTO was renewed in 1999, 2001, and 2003. See 64 Fed.Reg. 55,112 (1999); 66 Fed.Reg. 51,088 (2001); 68 Fed.Reg. 56,860 (2003). Neither Congress nor the Secretary revoked the PIJ’s designation at any time, and the PIJ has not sought judicial review of its designations as a FTO. 2. IEEPA The second statute central to these motions is IEEPA. Under IEEPA, the President is granted the authority “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat ... to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.” 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a). The President’s authority includes the power to investigate, regulate, or prohibit financial transactions. See id. § 1702(a)(1). Section 1705(b) makes it unlawful to willfully violate or attempt to violate any executive order or regulation issued pursuant to IEEPA and provides for imprisonment of up to 10 years for such a violation. See id. § 1705(b). On January 23, 1995, pursuant to IEE-PA, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12947 (the “Executive Order”). See Exec. Order No. 12947, 60 Fed.Reg. 5079 (1995). The Executive Order declared a national emergency with respect to the Middle East peace process that threatened the United States’ national security, .foreign policy, and economy. See id. The Executive Order prohibited financial transactions with any specially designated terrorist (“SDT”). See id. The President also authorized the Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury, to promulgate regulations to carry out the Executive Order. See id. at 5079-80. .The annex to the Executive Order- designates the PIJ as a SDT. See id. at 5080. The Secretary- of the Treasury promulgated regulations that' are contained in Title 31 C.F.R. part 595. Most relevant to this ease, - Section 595.204 makes it unlawful to “deal in property or interests in property of a ... [SDT], including the making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of a[SDT] 31 C.F.R. § 595.204 (footnotes added). The regulations interpret this prohibition to include charitable contributions or “donation[s] of funds, goods, services, or technology to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing, or medicine.” Id. § 595.408(a). The regulations interpret the prohibition against financial transactions to extend to conspiracies and attempts. See id. § 595.205. Not all transactions with a SDT are banned or are criminal. For example, the regulations make clear that there is no liability for a charitable contribution if the contribution is made “without knowledge or reason to know that the donation or contribution is destined to or for the benefit of a[SDT] ....” Id. § 595.408(b). In addition, the regulations exempt certain transactions from the ban, including transactions that: (a) are licensed or authorized; (b) involve personal communications that do not transfer anything of value; (c) involve some types of information and informational materials; or (d) are incidental to travel. See id. §§ 595.101, 595.206, 595.501. IEEPA itself does not explicitly or implicitly provide for judicial review of an executive order, but it does provide a procedure for court review of classified information. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (stating that “[tjhis subsection does not confer or imply a right to judicial review”). The regulations provide a process for administrative review of a designation of an organization as an SDT. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.806 (mistaken identity); § 501.807 (removal of designation as an SDT). Courts have held that judicial review of a designation under IEEPA or its regulations exists and that the Administrative Procedures Act governs that review. See, e.g., Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C.Cir.2003), cert. den. — U.S. —, 124 S.Ct. 1506, 158 L.Ed.2d 153 (2004). There are no limitations on judicial review like those contained in AEDPA. II. DISCUSSION Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 12(b) allows a defendant to “raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial of the general issue.” Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 12(b). Moreover, Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires certain motions be made prior to trial including motions “alleging a defect in the indictment.” Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 12(b)(3)(B). This Court may resolve a motion to dismiss in a criminal case when the “infirmity” in the indictment-is a matter of law and not one of the relevant facts is disputed. See United States v. Korn, 557 F.2d 1089, 1090 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272, 1273 (11th Cir.1982) (concluding that it was appropriate for a district court to rule on a motion to dismiss when parties stipulated undisputed facts). As the Eleventh Circuit has commented, “[tjhere is no summary judgment procedure for criminal cases” and no rule provides a pretrial determination of the sufficiency of the government’s evidence. United States v. Critzer, 951 F.2d 306, 307 (11th Cir.1992) (per curiam). In deciding a motion to dismiss, this Court must deny the motion if the factual allegations of the indictment taken in the light most favorable to the government are.sufficient to charge an offense as a matter of law. See United States v. deVegter, 198 F.3d 1324, 1327 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1354 (11th Cir.1987)). In addition, this Court may strike surplusage from an indictment. See United States v. Huppert, 917 F.2d 507, 511 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Awan, 966 F.2d 1415, 1426 (11th Cir.1992). The standard for striking surplusage is “exacting.” Huppert, 917 F.2d at 511. The standard requires it to be clear that the allegedly surplus language is irrelevant to the charge and is also inflammatory and prejudicial. See id. The Court may reserve ruling on a motion to strike surplusage until hearing the evidence and determining its relevance at trial. See Awan, 966 F.2d at 1426. The motions pending before this Court can be segregated into three categories. First, Defendants’ motions raise a host of statutory construction and constitutional issues purportedly on which this Court should dismiss or strike Counts 1 through 4 (or parts of Counts 1'through 4). Second, Defendants raise a variety of technical or procedural arguments to some of the Counts and acts contained in the Indictment. Third, Defendants Ballut and Fariz have appealed the Magistrate’s order on the bill of particulars (Dkt.#428). This Court will examine each category in turn. A. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF AEDPA AND IEEPA a. First Amendment, Overbreadth, and Vagueness Background Before reaching the statutory construction issues, it is helpful, if not necessary, to understand certain constitutional arguments raised by the parties that affect this Court’s construction of AEDPA and IEE-PA. Defendants have moved to dismiss Counts 1 through 4 of the Indictment, arguing that the Indictment attempts to criminalize their First Amendment rights of speech in support of and association with the PIJ. Defendants assert that Counts 1 through 4 are unconstitutional because they do not require either; (a) a specific intent to further the unlawful activities of the PIJ; or (b) an intent to incite and a likelihood of imminent disorder. Alternatively, Defendants, argue that Counts I through 4 are not content neutral and are subject to analysis under strict scrutiny, which is rarely, if ever, met and is not met in this case. As a corollary to their First Amendment argument, Defendants also claim that the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness invalidate AEDPA or IEEPA in whole or in part. Defendants assert that the statutes swéep so broadly that they include substantial' amounts of constitutionally protected advocacy within their prohibitions. Similarly, Defendants argue that the material terms of each statute are so broadly defined that a person is incapable of knowing when otherwise protected activity becomes criminal. In support of Defendants’ position, Defendants cite to two Ninth Circuit opinions where that court twice concluded that portions of AEDPA are unconstitutionally vague as applied to the plaintiffs in that case. Defendants argue that the same hypothetical utilized by the Ninth Circuit indicates that other sections of AEDPA and IEEPA are similarly vague and unconstitutional. The government responds that the Indictment alleges that Defendants engaged in criminal conduct and activities, not protected speech or association. The government asserts that the Indictment alleges that Defendants conspired with the PIJ and assisted the PIJ in the accomplishment of unlawful activities, including, but not limited to, murder, extortion, and money laundering. According to the government, speech is utilized in the Indictment to show Defendants’ agreement to participate in the conspiracy, and their role, motive, and intent, all of which is allowable under the First Amendment. The government argues that AEDPA and IEEPA need not contain a specific intent to further unlawful activities or be limited to situations where a defendant intends to incite and a likelihood of imminent disorder, because the statutes and the Indictment are aimed at conduct and not speech or association. Similarly, the government asserts that AEDPA and IEEPA need not meet strict scrutiny, but only need meet the intermediate scrutiny standard of United States v. O’Brien, which is far easier to meet and, according to the government, is met by AEDPA and IEEPA. The government also cites to the Ninth Circuit’s Humanitarian cases, where the Ninth Circuit twice applied this analysis and concluded that AEDPA did not violate the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs in those cases. The government also opposes the Defendants’ contentions that AEDPA and IEE-PA are overbroad or vague. The government relies on the presence of “knowingly” or “willfully” mens rea requirements in the statutes to remove protected speech from the prohibited conduct covered under both statutes. Similarly, the government argues that the statutes in the vast number of applications cover only unprotected conduct and only in remote hypothetical situations do AEDPA and IEEPA even come close to impinging upon protected speech. The government cites to a line of Supreme Court cases, which have held in such circumstances that courts should not use the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to invalidate statutes. While it may not be apparent from either parties’ arguments, the dispute between the parties on what analysis applies and the constitutionality of Counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment actually turns on how this Court interprets AEDPA and IEE-PA. The broader this Court interprets AEDPA and IEEPA, the more likely that the statutes receive a higher standard of review and are unconstitutional. For example, if this Court interprets AEDPA and IEEPA as requiring a specific intent to further the illegal activities of the FTO or SDT, then no constitutional problems exist. Similarly, if this Court interprets AEDPA’s and IEEPA’s prohibitions broadly and does not impose a specific intent mens rea requirement, it will likely be forced to perform a vagueness analysis and find portions of AEDPA and IEEPA unconstitutional, as did the Ninth Circuit in the Humanitarian cases, b. Standards for interpreting a statute In interpreting statutes, the Court is to begin with the words of a statutory provision. See Jackson v. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 331 F.3d 790, 794-95 (11th Cir.2003); CBS, Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir.2001). If the plain meaning of a provision is unambiguous, then this Court’s inquiry is usually complete. See Jackson, 331 F.3d at 794. Only when the plain meaning is ambiguous or causes absurd, unintended results is this Court’s analysis incomplete. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69-70, 115 S.Ct. 464, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994); CBS, Inc., 245 F.3d at 1222. If an ambiguity exists or an absurd result occurs, this Court is to resort to the cannons of statutory construction to determine the meaning of a statutory provision by focusing on the broader, statutory context. See X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 70-78, 115 S.Ct. 464; CBS, Inc., 245 F.3d at 1222. Several cannons of statutory construction are useful in this case. First, courts are to interpret statutes in a manner that avoids constitutional difficulty. See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 78, 115 S.Ct. 464 (stating that it is “incumbent ... to read the statute to eliminate [constitutional] doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988). (holding that lower courts run “afoul” of a well established principle of statutory interpretation when they fail to avoid constitutional difficulties and broadly interpret a statute). Second, courts interpret criminal statutes to include broadly applicable scienter requirements. See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 69, 115 S.Ct. 464. In X-Citement Video, the Supreme Court faced almost the same statutory interpretation issues faced in this case. There, the Supreme Court considered the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2252. 513 U.S. at 65-66, 115 S.Ct. 464. Section 2252 of that Act made it unlawful for any person to “knowingly” transport, ship, receive, distribute, or reproduce a visual depiction involving a “minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” Id. at 68, 115 S.Ct. 464. The Ninth Circuit had interpreted “knowingly” to only modify the surrounding verbs, like transport or ship. See id. Under this construction, whether a defendant knew the minority of the performer(s) or even knew whether the -material was sexually explicit was inconsequential. See id. at 68-69, 115 S.Ct. 464. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that, while the Ninth Circuit’s construction of Section 2252 complied with the plain meaning rule, the construction caused absurd results. See id. at 69, 115 S.Ct. 464. Under the Ninth Circuit’s construction, the Court noted that a Federal Express courier who knew that there was film in a package could be convicted even though the courier had no knowledge that the film contained child pornography. See id. To avoid such results, the Court utilized the cannons of statutory construction to imply a “knowing” requirement to each element, including the age of the performers and the sexually explicit nature of the material. See id. at 70-78, 115 S.Ct. 464. The Court stated that in criminal .statutes “the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” Id. at 72, 115 S.Ct. 464. c. Statutory Construction of AEDPA Turning now to AEDPA, Section 2339B(a)(1) makes it unlawful for a person to “knowingly provide[] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so ....” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (footnote added). The Ninth Circuit has twice .in a single case interpreted Section 2339B and found portions to be unconstitutionally vague as applied to the plaintiffs in that case. See Humanitarian II, 352 F.3d at 385, 393; Humanitarian I, 205 F.3d at 1133-36. Humanitarian involved a civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by six organizations and two United States citizens who wished to provide the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (the “PKK”) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the “LTTE”) with support for the political and nonviolent humanitarian activities of each organization. See 205 F.3d at 1133. In Humanitarian I, the Ninth Circuit fáced head on a challenge to Section 2339B on freedom of association, freedom of speech, and vagueness grounds. See id. at 1133-38. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that AEDPA did not impinge upon the plaintiffs’ associational or speech rights. See id. at 133-36. However, the Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s determination that the terms “personnel” and “training” (specified elements of “material support”) were unconstitutionally vague because those terms could impinge on a person’s advocacy rights. See id. at 1137-38. The Ninth Circuit commented that: Someone who advocates the cause of PKK could be seen as supplying them with personnel; it even fits under the government’s rubric of freeing up resources; since having an independent advocate frees up members to engage in terrorist activities instead of advocacy. But advocacy is pure speech protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 1137. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit stated that training was also vague because it could include “a plaintiff who wishes to instruct members of a designated group on how to petition the United Nations to give aid to their group ...Id. at 1138. The government “invite[d]” the Ninth Circuit to cure these vagueness problems by implying “knowingly,” which occurs earlier in the statute, to the material support requirement. The Ninth Circuit rejected this construction, reasoning that such a construction would be judicially rewriting the statute. See id. at 1138. The Ninth Circuit construed “knowingly” as modifying only “provides,” which meant that the scienter requirement was met when the accused had knowledge that he provided something, rather than “knowledge ... that what is provided in fact constitutes material support.” See id. at 1138 n. 5. On subsequent appeal in Humanitarian II, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its prior rulings on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment arguments. 352 F.3d at 385, 393. However, the Humanitarian II panel faced a new Fifth Amendment challenge by the plaintiffs, who argued that the lack of personal guilt requirement in Section 2339B rendered it unconstitutional. See id. at 385. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reconsidered its interpretation of the mens rea requirement in Humanitarian I. See id. Under its new interpretation, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Section 2339B also required proof that a person either knew: (a) that an organization was a FTO; or (b) of an organization’s unlawful activities that caused it to be designated as a FTO. See id. at 400. The Ninth Circuit then reaffirmed its prior holding on the vagueness of “personnel” and “training” without analyzing how the change in the mens rea requirement affected its prior vagueness analysis. See id. at 403-05. This Court agrees with the Ninth Circuit in Humanitarian I that a purely grammatical reading of the plain language of Section 2339B(a)(l) makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly furnish any item contained in the material support categories to an organization that has been designated a FTO. And like Humanitarian II, this Court agrees that this construction renders odd results and raises serious constitutional concerns. For example under Humanitarian I, a donor could be convicted for giving money to a FTO without knowledge that an organization was a FTO or that it committed unlawful activities, and without an intent that the money be used to commit future unlawful activities. Humanitarian II attempted to correct this odd result and accompanying constitutional concerns by interpreting “knowingly” to mean that a person knew: (a) an organization was a FTO; or (b) an organization committed unlawful activities, which caused it to be designated a FTO. See 352 F.3d at 400. But, Humanitarian II’s construction of Section 2339B only cures some of the Fifth Amendment concerns. First, Humanitarian II fails to comply with X-Citement Video’s holding that a mens rea requirement “should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” 513 U.S. at 72, 115 S.Ct. 464. Humanitarian II implies only a mens rea requirement to the FTO element of Section 2339B(a)(l) and not to the material support element. Under Humanitarian II’s construction, a cab driver could be guilty for giving a ride to a FTO member to the UN, if he knows that the person is a member of a FTO or the member or his organization at sometime conducted an unlawful activity in a foreign country. Similarly, a hotel clerk in New York could be committing a crime by providing lodging to that same FTO member under similar circumstances as the cab driver. Because the Humanitarian IVs construction fails to avoid potential Fifth Amendment concerns, this Court rejects its construction of Section 2339B. Second, the Humanitarian II construction does not solve the constitutional vagueness concerns of Section 2339B(a)(l), which can be avoided by implying a mens rea requirement to the “material support or resources” element of Section 2339(B)(a)(1). If this Court accepted the Humanitarian II construction, it would likely have to declare many more categories of “material support” (in addition to “training” and “personnel” determined to be unconstitutionally vague in the Humanitarian cases) unconstitutionally vague for impinging on advocacy rights, including “financial services,” “lodging,” “safe houses,” “communications equipment,” “facilities,” “transportation” and “other physical assets.” Using the Ninth Circuit’s vagueness example on “training,” the statute could likewise punish other innocent conduct, such as where a person in New York City (where the United Nations is located) gave a FTO member a ride from the airport to the United Nations before the member petitioned the United Nations. Such conduct could be punished as providing, “transportation” to a FTO under Section 2339B. The end result of the Ninth Circuit’s statutory construction in Humanitarian II is to render a substantial portion of Section 2339B unconstitutionally vague. But, it is not necessary to do such serious damage to the statute if one follows the analysis used by the United States Supreme Court in X-Citement Video. , This Court concludes that it is more consistent with Congress’s intent, which was to prohibit material support from FTOs to the “fullest possible basis,” to imply a mens rea requirement to the “material support” element of Section 2339B(a)(1). Therefore, this Court concludes that to convict a defendant under Section 2339B(a)(1) the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that: (a) the organization was a FTO or had committed unlawful activities that caused it to be so designated; and (b) what he was furnishing was “material support.” To avoid Fifth Amendment personal guilt problems, this Court concludes that the government must show more than a defendant knew something was within a category of “material support” in order to meet (b). In order to meet (b), the government must show that the defendant knew (had a specific intent) that the support would further the illegal activities of a FTO. This Court does not believe this burden is that great in the typical case. Often, such an intent will be easily inferred. For example, a jury could infer a specific intent to further the illegal activities of a FTO when a defendant knowingly provides weapons, explosives, or lethal substances to an organization that he knows is a FTO because of the nature of the support. Likewise, a jury could infer a specific intent when a defendant knows that the organization continues to commit illegal acts and the defendant provides funds to that organization knowing that money is fungible and, once received, the donee can use the funds for any purpose it chooses. That is, by its nature, money carries an inherent danger for furthering the illegal aims of an organization. Congress said as much when it found that FTOs were “so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.” Pub.L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7). This opinion in no way creates a safe harbor for terrorists or their supporters to try and avoid prosecution through utilization of shell “charitable organizations” or by directing money through the memo line of a check towards lawful activities. This Court believes that a jury can quickly peer through such facades when appropriate. This is especially true if other facts indicate a defendant’s true intent, like where defendants or conspirators utilize codes or unusual transaction practices to transfer funds. Instead, this Court’s holding works to avoid potential constitutional problems and fully accomplish congressional intent, d. Construction of IEEPA, the Executive Order, and the Regulations Section 1705(b) makes it unlawful to “willfully” violate or attempt to violate any regulation or order issued pursuant to IEEPA. 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b). Pursuant to IEEPA, the President issued the Executive Order, and the Executive Order prohibits financial transactions with any SDT. See Exec. Order No. 12947, 60 Fed.Reg. 5079 (1995). Pursuant to the Executive Order, the Secretary of the Treasury promulgated regulations. Section 595.204 of those regulations makes it unlawful to “deal in property or interests in property of a ... [SDT], including the making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of a[SDT] ....” 31 C.F.R. § 595.204 (footnote added). The regulations further interpret this prohibition as including some charitable contributions. See id. § 595.408. While no court has construed the criminal prohibition contained in IEEPA, this Court concludes that a conviction under IEEPA in these circumstances requires similar proof of intent .similar to that required under AEDPA. In other words, this Court concludes that to criminally convict a defendant for violating IEEPA the government must prove a defendant: (a) knew either that an organization was a SDT or committed unlawful activities that caused it to be designated as a SDT; and (b) had a specific intent that the contribution be used to further the unlawful activities of the SDT. This Court’s conclusion is based on the plain language of Section 1705(b), which criminalizes only “willfully” committed violations of the Executive Order and the regulations interpreting the Executive Order. The Supreme Court has interpreted “willfully” in criminal statutes to “differentiate between deliberate and unwitting conduct” and means an act “undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’” Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191, 118 S.Ct. 1939, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998). In Bryan, the Supreme Court approved of a jury instruction that defined “willfully” as: .... intentionally and purposely and with intent to do something the law forbids, that is, with the bad purpose to disregard the law. Now, the person need not be aware of the specific law or rule that his conduct may be violating. But he must act to do something that the law forbids. Id. at 190, 199, 118 S.Ct. 1939. While knowledge of IEEPA, the Executive Order, or the regulations thereunder is not necessary to support a conviction, some “bad purpose” must be demonstrated by the government. This Court concludes that a “bad purpose” cannot be demonstrated by proof of knowledge of past unlawful activity alone. The government must show some additional intent to further- future unlawful activity to support criminal liability. This Court’s interpretation of Section 1705(b) is not contrary to the intent of the Executive Order or its regulations. First, IEEPA contains a separate civil penalty provision that penalizes violations that are not willful. See 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a). It makes sense that the regulations punish some unlawful transactions by a civil penalty only, while punishing worse transgressions both civilly and criminally. Second, the regulations themselves contain an exception for charitable contributions, if the contribution is made without knowledge or reason to know that it was made to or for the benefit of a SDT. See id. § 595.408(b). Such an exception reinforces this Court’s interpretation of a requirement of proof of a specific intent because it shows that the administering agency interprets the prohibition to not reach purely innocent or unwitting conduct. Finally, this Court is concerned that without such a scienter requirement the prohibitions in the Executive Order may be unconstitutionally vague or violate the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of personal guilt. By requiring a specific intent to further the illegal activities of the SDT, this Court avoids considering whether the regulations are unconstitutionally vague or violate the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of personal guilt. e. Judicial Review Before reaching the constitutional issues, this Court has one additional statutory construction issue to determine: whether 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8) precludes judicial review of a constitutional challenge to AEDPA. Section 1189(a)(8) provides that a criminal defendant may not “raise any question concerning the validity of the issuance of such designation as a defense or objection at any trial or hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8). Defendants argue that Section 1189(a)(8) only precludes review of the Secretary’s designation of an organization as a FTO and not a criminal defendant’s ability to raise a constitutional challenge. This Court agrees. In addition to the general rules of statutory construction discussed above, the Supreme Court requires a clear and convincing showing of congressional intent before a court construes a statute to prohibit judicial review because of the serious constitutional concerns that such a prohibition causes. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-74, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974). In Johnson, the Court considered a similar clause to the one in this case which was contained in the Veteran’s Readjustment Act and concluded that the clause prohibited judicial review of a veteran’s benefit claim under the act, but not judicial review of a veteran’s claim that the act itself was unconstitutional. See id. at 373-74, 94 S.Ct. 1160. The most natural reading of Section 1189(a)(8) prohibits a criminal defendant from challenging the designation of an organization as a FTO, but does not prohibit a criminal defendant from challenging AEDPA’s constitutionality. Neither the language, the structure, nor the legislative history of AEDPA suggests that Congress intended to preclude a criminal defendant from asserting that AEDPA is unconstitutional. Moreover, this Court’s construction of Section 1189(a)(8) is reinforced by the Supreme Court’s decision and construction of a similarly worded clause in Johnson. Therefore, this Court concludes that this Court may review the constitutionality of AEDPA. 2. FIRST AMENDMENT Given this Court’s construction of the mens rea requirements of AEDPA and IEEPA, little remains to be- said of Defendants’ First Amendment challenges to Counts 3 and 4. This Court will address two points raised by Defendants as to the Indictment in general. First, this Court agrees with the government that the Indictment does not criminalize “pure speech.” Instead, the overt acts section of the Indictment utilizes the speech of Defendants to show the existence of the conspiracies, the Defendants’ agreement to participate in them, their level of participation or role in them, and the Defendants’ criminal intent. It is well established that the government can use speech to prove elements of crimes such as motive or intent. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489, 113 S.Ct. 2194, 124 L.Ed.2d 436 (1993); United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 930 (11th Cir.1995). As Associate Justice Jackson eloquently stated concurring in Dennis v. United States: The defense of freedom of speech or press has often been raised in conspiracy cases, because, whether committed by Communists, by businessmen, or by common criminals, it usually consists of words written or spoken, evidenced by letters, conversations, speeches or documents. Communication is the essence of every conspiracy, for only by it can common purpose and concert of action be brought about or be proved..., “But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech ... merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language .... Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements ... and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.” . . 341 U.S. 494, 575-76, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951) (quoting Giboney v. Empire, Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949)) (Jackson, J., concurring). Such words are equally applicable to the conspiracies charged in this case. The fact that Defendants’ speech is contained in the overt act section of the Indictment is of little consequence. As the Eleventh Circuit stated in United States v. Lanier, “an overt act need not be criminal, and may indeed be otherwise innocent .... ” 920 F.2d 887, 893 (11th Cir.1991); see also Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957) (holding same). In support of that proposition, the Eleventh Circuit cited to and relied on a Seventh Circuit case that held constitutionally protected speech can constitute an overt act. See id. at 893 n. 48, 77 S.Ct. 1064 (citing to United States v. Donner, 497 F.2d 184, 192 (7th Cir.1974)). The reason that an overt act can include even protected speech is .that it is the agreement that is punishable in a conspiracy charge and not the overt act itself. Therefore, this Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss On “pure speech” grounds. Second, this Court declines Defendants’ invitation to heighten the level of First Amendment protection given to seeking and donating funds. The Supreme Court has repeatedly considered the issue and determined that such activities are more like expressive conduct than pure speech. See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed’l Election Comm’n, — U.S. —, 124 S.Ct. 619, 654-56, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386-88, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). This Court agrees with the Seventh Circuit in Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute and Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development that the Buckley standard applies to determine the constitutionality of a regulation prohibiting contributions to foreign organizations. 291 F.3d 1000, 1026-27 (7th Cir.2002). In Boim, the plaintiffs claimed defendant was liable to them under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 because the defendant violated Section 2339B. See id. at 1027. Section 2333 provided a civil remedy to U.S. nationals injured by acts of international terrorism. See id. The defendant challenged Section 2333 and 2339B’s constitutionality on First Amendment grounds. See id. at 1026-27. The Seventh Circuit held that Buckley’s contribution analysis applied and concluded that Section 2333 (based on a violation of Section 2339B) did not violate the First Amendment. See id. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that Buckley applied because both speech and association components are implicated by regulations that restrict or prohibit a person’s ability to contribute or fundraise on behalf of an organization. Under Buckley and its progeny, a regulation of fundraising is constitutional if it is closely drawn to further a sufficiently important government interest. See McConnell, — U.S. at —, 124 S.Ct. at 654-56; Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 387-88, 120 S.Ct. 897; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612. This Court concludes that AEDPA, IEEPA, and the other statutes at issue in this case easily meet this analysis. The Supreme Court has termed the protection of the foreign policy inter-ests of the United States to be of great importance. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). Likewise, other courts have concluded that the government’s interest in stopping the spread of global terrorism is “paramount” or “substantial.” Boim, 291 F.3d at 1027; Humanitarian I, 205 F.3d at 1135. This Court agrees and would conclude that stopping the spread of terrorism is not just a sufficiently important governmental interest, but is a compelling governmental interest. Similarly, a congressional decision to stop the spread of global terrorism by preventing fundraising and prohibiting support is closely drawn to further this interest. This Court’s construction of AEDPA and IEEPA (requiring proof of a specific intent to further the unlawful activities of a SDT or FTO) reinforces this Court’s conclusion that the prohibitions in AEDPA and IEEPA are closely drawn to further the governmental interest. Therefore, this Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds. 3. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: PIJ’S FTO DESIGNATION UNDER AEDPA AND SDT DESIGNATION UNDER IEEPA Defendants argue that Counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment should be dismissed because the PIJ was denied due process under AEDPA and IEEPA when it was designated, respectively, a FTO and a SDT. Defendants rely primarily on the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, and a district court decision in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, United States v. Rahmani, in support of their argument. The government argues that Mendoza-Lopez is inapplicable to this case because these Defendants lack standing to challenge the PIJs designation and that Rahmani is seriously flawed. This Court concludes for those and additional reasons Defendants may not collaterally attack the designations of the PIJ under AEDPA or IEEPA. In Mendoza-Lopez, the Supreme Court broadly held that “[o]ur cases establish that where a determination made in an administrative proceeding is to play a critical role in the subsequent imposition of a criminal sanction, there must be some meaningful review of the administrative proceeding.” 481 U.S. at 837-38, 107 S.Ct. 2148 (emphasis in original). The Court continued that where defects in the original proceeding foreclosed judicial review, collateral attack of a prior administrative decision in a subsequent criminal proceeding was allowable. See id. at 838-42, 107 S.Ct. 2148. Mendoza-Lopez involved a criminal prosecution for illegal re-entry in which the defendant had been deprived of his right to appeal in the underlying deportation proceeding. See id. at 842, 107 S.Ct. 2148. The Court affirmed the dismissal of an indictment and concluded that in such circumstances a prior deportation determination could not be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding. See id. In reaching its decision in Mendoza-Lopez, the Court distinguished two of its prior cases, Yakus v. United States and Lewis v. United States, which provide this Court with additional guidance in this case. In Yakus, the Supreme Court dealt with the conviction of three defendants for violating the Emergency Price Control Act (the “EPCA”) by selling beef at prices above the maximum prices allowable under a regulation. 321 U.S. at 418-19, 64 S.Ct. 660. The EPCA delegated to a price administrator the authority to make regulations setting maximum prices of certain goods. See id. at 423, 64 S.Ct. 660. The EPCA required someone challenging a regulation to seek administrative review within 60 days. The EPCA limited judicial review of that administrative review to a specially established court, with a short statute of limitations period (30 days). See id. at 428-29, 64 S.Ct. 660. The EPCA allowed criminal liability to attach prior to the expiration of the time periods for administrative review or judicial determination. See id. at 438-39, 64 S.Ct. 660. The Court concluded that the EPCA did not violate the defendant’s due process rights by not allowing a defendant to challenge the regulation in a criminal prosecution because the defendants had the right to challenge the designation elsewhere. See id. at 447, 64 S.Ct. 660. In Lewis, the Supreme Court dealt with whether a defendant could challenge the constitutionality of a prior felony conviction in a subsequent federal prosecution for possession of a firearm. 445 U.S. at 57-58, 100 S.Ct. 915. The Court held that it was constitutional to not allow a defendant to challenge a prior felony conviction in a subsequent federal prosecution because the defendant could challenge the validity of the conviction in another proceeding or otherwise seek removal of the disability before obtaining a firearm. See id. at 65-67, 100 S.Ct. 915. Neither Mendoza-Lopez, Yakus, nor Lewis is exactly apposite to the case at hand. However, this Court concludes that this case is closer to Yakus and Lewis than Mendoza-Lopez. Unlike Mendoza-Lopez and like Yakus, AEDPA and IEE-PA are measures taken to protect the national security of the United States. Similar to Yakus and Lewis, under either AEDPA or IEEPA, a designated organization can seek some judicial review of its designation. Additionally, like in the Humanitarian cases, Defendants could have challenged AEDPA and IEEPA in a civil action. In such circumstances, this Court concludes that Defendants, like the defendants in. Yakus and Lems, cannot collaterally challenge the designation procedure utilized to designate the PIJ. Additionally, a FTO designation is a designation of a third-party and not a designation of Defendants themselves. This Court views that distinction as a critical distinction to the cases under Mendoza-Lopez. Except in rare cases, third parties do not have standing to assert the legal rights or interests of others. See Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 397-98, 118 S.Ct. 1419, 140 L.Ed.2d 551 (1998); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991); Worth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). The limited exception to this general rule occurs only when: (1) a defendant suffers an injury-in-fact; (2) a defendant had a “close relationship” to the third party such that the two share a common interest; and (3) there is some hindrance to the third party’s assertion of its rights. Powers, 499 U.S. at 411, 111 S.Ct. 1364. This Court concludes that the PIJ has suffered no disincentive to assert its rights, like the jurors in Campbell and Powers, and third party standing does not exist in this case. Indeed, the PIJ had every incentive to assert any due process rights that it might possess, so that it could resume fundraising and other activities in the United States. The existence of this incentive is demonstrated by the numerous groups that have challenged their designations under AEDPA. See, e.g., United States v. Sattar, 272 F.Supp.2d 348, 364 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (containing a list of cases). Therefore, this Court concludes that Defendants lack standing.to collaterally attack the procedure utilized to designate the PIJ. Even if this Court concluded that Defendants could challenge the procedure employed in designating the PIJ, this Court would conclude that AEDPA’s and IEE-PA’s designation procedure is facially constitutional. The Supreme Court has stated that “[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). The Supreme Court has also held that aliens are generally not entitled to constitutional rights until they are within the United States’ territory and develop a substantial connection to the United States. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (distinguishing the constitutional rights of an alien who entered the United States with the lack of .constitutional rights for an alien who has not entered the United States); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990) (holding Fifth Amendment protections do not extend to aliens outside the territorial boundaries of the United States). AEDPA’s and IEEPA’s designation procedures are constitutional when'they apply to foreign organizations and individuals without' a substantial connection to the United States. Therefore, Defendants’ facial challenge fails. By AEDPA’s and IEEPA’s very terms, the acts’ designation procedures primarily apply to foreign organizations and individuals. In such limited and exceptional circumstances, this Court holds that the facial analysis of a statute, like AEDPA or IEEPA, should include application to foreign organizations and individuals without a substantial connection to the United States. This Court disagrees with the Rahmani court that such an analysis would “effectively eviscerate the doctrine of facial invalidity.” 209 F.Supp.2d at 1056. Instead, this Court concludes that such an analysis prevents this Court from intruding into an area that “the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility [, which] ... belong[s] to the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.” Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 696, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (stating' that “heightened deference [is due] to the judgments of political branches with respect to matters, of national security.”) Finally, even if Defendants could challenge the designation procedures as applied to the PIJ, this Court would conclude that AEDPA’s and IEEPA’s designation procedures did not violate the due process rights of the PIJ. None of the Defendants argue that the PIJ has property in or a substantial connection to the United States. At best, it appears that the PIJ has members in the United States who themselves own property in the United States. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has twice concluded that a foreign organization’s due process rights were not violated by AEDPA’s designation procedure in such circumstances. See 32 County Sovereignty Committee v. Dep’t of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799-800 (D.C.Cir.2002); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C.Cir.1999). Without any compelling reason why the PIJ should be treated differently, this Court concludes that the PIJ had no right to due process under the Constitution because it has no substantial connection to the United States. Therefore, this Court denies Defendants’ motions to dismiss the Indictment for alleged due process violations of the PIJ’s rights. 4. EX POST FACTO Finally, Defendants argue that Counts 1 through 4 attempt to punish the Defendants for conduct that was not criminal when it took place in violation of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. Defendants argue that this Court should strike any overt act or reference to an act that occurred prior to PIJ’s designation as a FTO (October 8, 1997) or prior to PIJ’s designation as a SDT (January 23, 1995). Alternatively, Defendants argue that this Court should strike any act prior to the respective designation date from Counts 3 and 4. The government responds that the Defendants’ conduct in this case has always been unlawful and that the PIJ’s designation as a SDT and a FTO provided additional bases for criminal liability. The government also responds that conduct prior to either designation date is relevant to Counts 3 and 4 because Defendants are charged with being in conspiracies that continued after the conduct was criminalized and acts prior to the designation dates go to the existence of a conspiracy, the parties’ agreement, and Defendants’ purpose, motive, and intent. Neither of Defendants’ arguments are well taken. Defendants are correct only to the extent that the ex post facto clause prohibits the enactment by Congress of a statute that punishes an act which was innocent when committed. See United States v. Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233, 1244-45 (11th Cir.2002). However, Counts 1 and 2 of the Indictment seek to punish Defendants for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d) and 956(a)(1). Both statutes were enacted (1970 and 1948 respectively) well prior to any act alleged in the Indictment. As to Counts 3 and 4, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the ex post facto clause was not violated when a conspiracy continues after the effective date of a statute making that action illegal. See Hersh, 297 F.3d at 1244-^15. The Indictment alleges overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy after 1995 and 1997. Therefore, this Court denies Defendants’ motions to dismiss or strike on ex post facto grounds. B. TECHNICAL AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES 1. INSUFFICIENCY OF 'THE INDICTMENT Defendants also argue that the Indictment violates their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by giving them insufficient notice of the 'crimes with which they are charged such that Defendants cannot prepare an adequate defense. For example, Defendants claim Count 1 provides insufficient notice of what two predicate acts Defendants knowingly or intentionally agreed would be committed by the conspiracy. Defendants also argue that these infirmities cause a second due process violation because they do not give Defendants notice of the potential penalty in violation of Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 3.43 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Finally, Defendants argue that certain counts and allegations contained in the Indictment should be dismissed or stricken because the government has admitted that it misidentified the speaker or its identification of the speaker is suspect. This Court concludes that Defendants’ motions challenging the sufficiency of the Indictment should be denied. a. Sufficiency of the Indictment Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that an indictment “must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement ....” Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 7(c). An indictment is sufficient if it: (1) sets forth each essential element of the offense so that a defendant has notice of the charges against which he must defend; and (2) enables a defendant to enter a plea which will act as a bar against subsequent prosecutions for the same offense. See United States v. Poirier, 321 F.3d 1024, 1028-29 (11th Cir.2003). The Supreme Court has stated that an indictment normally is sufficient when it “set[s] forth the words of the statute itself .... ” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); see also United States v. Critzer, 951 F.2d 306, 308 (11th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (holding same). Further, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that “ ‘[w]hen analyzing challenges to the sufficiency of an indictment, courts give the indictment a common sense construction, and its validity is to be determined ‘by practical, not technical, considerations.’ ’ ” Poirier, 321 F.3d at 1029 (quoting United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 813 (11th Cir.1984)). This means that it is proper for a court to infer or imply essential elements of a crime. See id. at 1029 (finding indictment sufficient even though indictment failed to allege that documents were “confidential”); United States v. Woodruff, 296 F.3d 1041, 1047 (11th Cir.2002) (inferring knowingly into an indictment); United States v. Gray, 260 F.3d 1267, 1283 (11th Cir.2001) (same). This Court turns to an analysis of each count challenged by De