Full opinion text
DECISION and ORDER FOSCHIO, United States Magistrate Judge. JURISDICTION The parties executed a consent to proceed before the undersigned on March 6, 1995. By order of March 18,1996, this court denied Plaintiffs motion to reconsider the District Court’s judgment dismissing his claims as to two defendants and granting summary judgment to another. Following appeal, the Second Circuit, on January 5, 1998, vacated the decision of this court, and remanded for further proceedings. The matter is presently before the court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, filed February 18, 1998 (Docket Item No. 47), and Plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment (“Plaintiffs Cross-Motion”), filed May 1, 1998 (Docket Item No. 57). BACKGROUND Plaintiff, Thomas Wright, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 19, 1993 alleging that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated by Defendants Coughlin, Selsky, Kelly, Bennedict, and Kihl in relation to disciplinary hearings conducted at the Attica Correctional Facility on May 31, 1990 by Defendant Bennedict and June 5, 1991 by Defendant Kihl. On March 1, 1994, Defendants Selsky and Coughlin moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and Defendant Bennedict moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6). Thereafter, on June 2,1994, Defendants Selsky and Coughlin filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). On June 3, 1994, Defendant Kihl filed a similar motion. On December 1, 1994, District ' Judge Skretny issued a Decision and Order granting Defendants Coughlin, Selsky, Bennedict, and Kihl’s motions to dismiss. Judge Skret-ny found that Defendant Coughlin did not have any personal involvement in the matter at issue in this case, a necessary prerequisite to a finding of liability under § 1983, that the claim as to Defendant Bennedict was untimely, and that Defendants Selsjcy, as the Depu■ty Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, and Kihl, as the disciplinary hearing officer who conducted Plaintiffs second disciplinary hearing at Attica, were entitled to absolute immunity for their actions. This matter was referred to the undersigned by Judge Skret-ny on December 6, 1994 (Docket Item No. 28) for a report and recommendation on all remaining dispositive motions. Thereafter, on April 27, 1995, Plaintiff moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) seeking to vacate Judge Skretny’s order as to Defendants Selsky and Kihl on the ground that, under recently decided Second Circuit precedent, Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47 (2d Cir.1994), and Tulloch v. Coughlin, 50 F.3d 114 (2d Cir.1995), neither Defendant was entitled to absolute immunity. Defendant Kelly moved for summary judgment on July 31, 1995 (Docket Item No. 34), Plaintiff filed an affidavit in opposition to Kelly’s motion on September 28, 1995 (Docket Item No. 41) (“Plaintiffs Affidavit”). Although noting that, based upon Young and Tulloch, Defendants Selsky and Kihl were entitled to qualified rather than absolute immunity, this court denied Plaintiffs motion to vacate and granted Defendant Kelly’s motion for summary judgment by Decision and Order dated March 18,1996 (Docket Item No. 42), finding Plaintiffs disciplinary confinement was not “atypical and significant,” a threshold requirement to application of federal due process protections established in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), Wright v. Coughlin, 93-CV-601S(F) (slip op. W.D.N.Y. March 18, 1996) at 13-14. Plaintiff appealed the denial of his motion to vacate, asserting that the court erred in finding that his disciplinary confinement was not an atypical and significant hardship, thus rendering consideration of the merits of his due process claim unnecessary. Specifically, Plaintiff contended the court failed to consider duration as a factor in detennining whether his confinement constituted an atypical and significant hardship. Plaintiff further argued that the court should not have granted summary judgment as disputed evidentia-ry issues remained. The Second Circuit vacated this court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings in light of its recent holdings in Brooks v. DiFasi 112 F.3d 46 (2d Cir.1997), and Miller v. Selsky, 111 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1997). Wright v. Coughlin, 132 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir.1998). The Court of Appeals directed that on remand the duration of Plaintiffs SHU confinement as well as any distinctions between disciplinary and administrative confinement should be considered. Wright, supra, at 137. The court also found error in the grant of summary judgment to Defendants on the basis that this court had credited only the affidavit of Defendant Kelly in concluding that the conditions of Plaintiffs confinement were not “atypical and significant,” and, therefore, had failed to assess the record in the light most favorable to. the non-moving party. Id., at 138. Following remand, Defendants moved, on February 18, 1998, for summary judgment (Docket Item No. 47) and submitted a memorandum in support of the motion (Docket Item No. 50). Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment on May 1,1998 (Docket Item No. 57), together with a memorandum in support of that motion. Defendants also submitted a memorandum in further support of the motion for summary judgment on May 22,1998 (Docket Item No. 60). For the reasons which follow, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. FACTS On May 26, 1990, a disturbance broke out in the C-Block yard at the Attica Correctional Facility where Plaintiff was then housed. Believing that a corrections officer had murdered an inmate, other inmates staged a demonstration that turned violent. Fires were set, benches burned, and windows broken, until the disturbance was brought under control during the morning of May 27, 1990. According to Plaintiff, he went to the C-Block yard on May 26th to jog and play chess. Knowing nothing about the demonstration about to take place, at approximately 7:00 P.M. he noticed that the other inmates in the yard had ceased all recreational activities. When the demonstration began, the corrections officers left the yard. The demonstration then began to turn violent. At approximately 9:00 P.M., corrections officers began to call some of the inmates back inside, leaving several inmates in the C-Block yard. At 7:00 A.M;, on May 27, 1990, the disturbance ended after discussions with the Attica Superintendent, and the inmates went back inside the prison: Although Plaintiff stated that he merely remained in. the yard with the other inmates, playing chess and talking during the disturbance, he was charged in two separate misbehavior reports, with a penal law offense, rioting, arson, and property damage. Specifically, Plaintiff was charged with taking part in a riot and causing damage by breaking windows and burning benches. These charges were based on the personal observations of two corrections officers, one of whom also stated that Plaintiff organized other inmates in gathering the benches for burning, and the other who stated that Plaintiff,. carrying a weight bar, repeatedly struck and broke at least fifty windows. A disciplinary hearing on the misbehavior reports was held by Defendant Bennedict on May ’31, 1990, following which Plaintiff was found guilty of all offéhses 'and sentenced to 365 days in the disciplinary Special Housing Unit (“SHU”), the loss of 180 days of good time credit, restitution in the amount of $175, and the loss of telephone and commissary privileges. On June 6, 1990, Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal of the hearing disposition with Thomas A. Coughlin, Commissioner of the Department of Corrections. Coughlin subsequently delegated review of Plaintiffs claimed violations to Defendant, Donald Sel-sky, Deputy Commissioner of Special Housing and Discipline. On June 11, 1990, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant Walter'Kelly, Superintendent of Attica Correctional Facility, claiming that he was wrongfully charged with the offense's relating to the prison disturbance, describing thé alleged due process violations during the disciplinary hearing, and requesting Defendant Kelly’s assistance'. Defendant Bennett’s disciplinary hearing disposition was affirmed by Defendant Sel-sky on August 6,1990. Plaintiff then filed an Article-78 proceeding in New.York Supreme Court, Wyoming County. On May 20, 1991, the Hon. Mark H. Dadd, Acting Supreme Court Justice, vacated the disciplinary hearing decision, including.the loss of good time credits, on the ground that the hearing officer, Defendant Bennedict, -had improperly failed to investigate the contents of videotapes of the prison disturbance, and directed that a new hearing be held. A second disciplinary hearing was subsequently held on June 5,1991 at which Defendant Kihl presided as hearing officer. At that hearing, Kihl viewed the existing videotapes but, for security reasons, did not permit Plaintiff to also .view the tapes. While one witness was called, as Plaintiff had requested, -lühl did not allow two other witnesses requested by Plaintiff to testify, believing that the testimony of-the witnesses would be used solely to corroborate the testimony of the witness who had testified. At the conclusion - of the hearing, Plaintiff was again found guilty of all charges and received a penalty of 168 days of disciplinary' SHU, 120 days of keeploek, and the loss of telephone and commissary privileges. Kihl did not impose any loss of good time credits. Plaintiff appealed Kihl’s decision to Selsky on the grounds that Kihl was biased against him and Kohl’s determination was not based upon substantial evidence. Plaintiff also argued that the hearing was improperly conducted as he was not allowed to personally view the videotapes of the prison disturbance, and he had been denied the testimony of two witnesses. Defendant Selsky, however, affirmed Kihl’s disposition on August 21, 1991. Plaintiff initiated a second Article 78 proceeding to set aside Kihl’s determination. On January 23, 1992, Acting Justice Dadd again found that Plaintiff was denied a fair and impartial hearing based on Kihl’s refusal to call two witnesses whom Plaintiff had requested and ordered the hearing determination expunged from Plaintiffs record. At the time of the court’s decision, Plaintiff had been released from the SHU, having served his full sentence. As a result of the guilty determinations, Plaintiff served a total of 288 days in restrictive confinement, including 168 days in the Special Housing Unit and 120 days in keep-lock confinement. DISCUSSION Summary judgment will be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 when the moving party demonstrates that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Rattner v. Netburn, 930 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir.1991). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. If there is any evidence in the record based upon any source from which a reasonable inference in the nonmoving party’s favor may be drawn, the moving party cannot obtain a summary judgment. Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 249 (2d Cir.1985). The function of a district court in considering a summary judgment motion is not to resolve disputed issues of fact, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue to be tried. Rattner, supra, at 209. While the court must view the inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), a party may not “rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1570, 94 L.Ed.2d 762 (1987). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must set forth “specific facts” showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, supra, at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 587 (2d Cir.1988). “Mere conelusory allegations or denials” in legal memoranda or oral argument are not evidence and cannot by themselves create a genuine issue of material fact where none would otherwise exist. Lipton v. The Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir.1995); Allen v. Coughlin, 64 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1995); Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 91, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985). Plaintiffs acting pro se ordinarily are entitled to “special latitude” when defending against a motion for summary judgment. Jermosen v. Coughlin, 1995 WL 144155, *3 (S.D.N.Y.1995). The court, nevertheless, must grant summary judgment if a pro se plaintiff fails to make a sufficient showing of concrete evidence on an essential element of the case for which he would bear the burden of proof at trial. Id.; see also Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933, 111 S.Ct. 2056,114 L.Ed.2d 461 (1991). Unless the nonmoving party provides the court with “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in [the nonmoving party’s] favor,” summary judgment is appropriate. Anderson, supra, at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Plaintiff has alleged that his civil rights were violated by Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to § 1983, damages may be sought against any person who, under color of state law, subjects an individual to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. In this case, Plaintiff claims that his right to due process, as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment, was violated during the conduct of the two disciplinary hearings which led to his SHU confinement. Plaintiff also asserts that the two prior state court determinations which annulled these disciplinary decisions are res judicata in this action. Defendants contend that Plaintiff is not entitled to federal due process and, alternatively, that Plaintiffs due process rights were not violated. Defendants also claim qualified immunity requires they be granted summary judgment. The court will address these points in order. 1. Due Process Claim In this case, Plaintiff contends that his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when (1) Defendant Bennett deprived him of due process at his May 30, 1990 disciplinary hearing; (2) Defendant Kihl deprived him of due process at his June 5, 1991 disciplinary hearing; (3) Defendant Selsky affirmed the dispositions of both hearings; and (4) Defendant Kelly failed to intervene in his case after Plaintiff wrote Kelly a letter arguing against the charges placed against him as a result of the disturbance of May 26, 1990. Complaint, filed July 17, 1993 (Docket Item No. 1), ¶¶ 14,17, 24, 28, 29, 30. To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he possessed a protected liberty or property interest, and that he was deprived of that interest without due process, Bedoya v. Coughlin, 91 F.3d 349, 351-52 (2d Cir.1996), and Frazier v. Coughlin, 81 F.3d 313, 316 (2d Cir.1996). The burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that a protected liberty interest existed and was infringed upon. Frazier, supra, at 317. Therefore, before addressing Plaintiffs claims regarding Defendants’ conduct, the court must first determine whether Plaintiff can establish a protected liberty interest as, if Plaintiff has not established such an interest, his cause of action must be dismissed regardless of whether Defendants failed to act in accordance with federally required procedures. See Frazier, supra, at 317-318. Such protected liberty interests are “generally limited to freedom from restraint.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). In Sandin, the Supreme Court created a new standard for determining the existence of a protected liberty interest in cases involving due process claims arising from prison disciplinary procedures. According to Sandin, in the administration of prison discipline, a liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clause will generally arise only where, as a punishmenDfor alleged misconduct, a prisoner is to be involuntarily placed in confinement which is “ ‘qualitatively different’ from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of a crime and results in ‘stigmatizing consequences.’ ” Sandin, supra, at 479 n. 4, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980)). For a liberty interest to arise under state law sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause, a prisoner must establish both that the confinement or restraint creates an “atypical and significant hardship” as established in Sandin, supra, at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, and that the state has granted its inmates, by regulation or by statute, a protected liberty interest in remaining free from that confinement or restraint. Frazier, supra, at 317. In the present ease, it is clear that the state regulations which govern Plaintiffs disciplinary hearings restrict Defendants’ right to impose a disciplinary sentence on Plaintiff, as such a sentence may only be imposed upon an adverse disposition at a hearing conducted in accordance with the regulations. Accordingly, because they circumscribe Defendants’ discretion to impose punishment, these regulations create a protected liberty interest in remaining free from disciplinary confinement. See Branham v. Meachum, 77 F.3d 626, 629 (2d Cir.1996). The state regulations at issue grant to an inmate an interest in remaining free from disciplinary confinement. However, to attach the protections of .the Due Process Clause to this interest, Sandin also requires an evaluation of whether the conditions of the Plaintiffs disciplinary SHU and long-term keeplock unit confinement “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, supra, at 484, 487, 115 S.Ct. 2293. In Sandin, the Court held that a prisoner’s liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise either from the “Due Process Clause of its own force,” Sandin, supra, 480, or where the restraint “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. Finding as the relevant basis for comparison the conditions and duration of administrative segregation and protective custody existing at the inmate’s prison as the form of discretionary confinement to which federal due process requirements established by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) do not attach, Sandin, supra, at 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293, the Court held that the plaintiffs 30 day SHU punishment at issue in that case did not “work a major disruption in his environment,” id., and was “within the range of confinement to be normally expected for one serving an indeterminate term of 30 years to life.” Sandin, supra, at 487, 115 S.Ct. 2293. In so holding, the Court expressly stated that punishment of incarcerated prisoners for violations of prison rules and regulations “effectuates prison management and prisoner rehabilitative goals.” Sandin, supra, at 485, 115 S.Ct. 2293. Accordingly, “[discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected parameters of the sentence impose by a court of law.” Id. It is therefore only where the prisoner’s conditions of disciplinary confinement become an “atypical and significant hardship” based on a liberty interest created by state law that federal due process standards must be met. Sandin has been held retroactively applicable to prison disciplinary hearings and resultant § 1983 suits such as the instant one, which was pending on the date Sandin was decided. Zamakshari v. Dvoskin, 899 F.Supp. 1097, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Uzzell v. Scully, 893 F.Supp. 259, 263 (S.D.N.Y.1995). Miller v. Selsky, 111 F.3d 7, 9 (2d Cir.1997), held that while Sandin did not create a per se rule that disciplinary confinement may never implicate a liberty interest, where a prisoner fails to show the conditions to which he was subjected were “atypical and significant,” summary judgment may nevertheless be granted. Husbands v. McClellan, 990 F.Supp. 214, 217 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (dismissing plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment due process claim where plaintiff failed to show challenged SHU conditions met Sandin’s requirements for relief under the Fourteenth Amendment). In determining whether a prisoner has a liberty interest in remaining free from segregated eonfinement, courts are required to make factual findings with respect to the conditions of such confinement at issue in each case. Wright, supra, at 137; Sealey v. Giltner, 116 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir.1997); Brooks, supra, at 49; Miller, supra, at 8-9. In applying Sandin, several factors are to be used in determining whether the particular restrictions imposed on the inmate are atypical and significant, including: (1) the effect of the segregation on the length of the plaintiffs prison confinement; (2) the extent to which the conditions at issue differ from other routine prison conditions; and (3) the duration of the inmate’s disciplinary confinement compared to the potential duration a prisoner may experience while in discretionary confinement. Wright, supra, at 136. A. Effect On Length of Prison Confinement Here, Plaintiffs temporary loss of good time credits resulting from Bennedict’s disciplinary sentence did not affect the length of his prison confinement, and therefore did not deprive him of a liberty interest. See Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 22, 1998 (Docket Item No. 60), at 5. Where an inmate’s good time credits are completely restored after a successful administrative appeal and before their loss could have any effect on the duration of the inmate’s sentence, no liberty interest arises. See Sandin, supra, at 486-87, 115 S.Ct. 2293; Black v. Selsky, 15 F.Supp.2d 311, 316 (W.D.N.Y.1998); Husbands, supra, at 217; Cespedes v. Coughlin, 956 F.Supp. 454, 472-75 (S.D.N.Y.1997). In the present case, the first hearing determination that Plaintiff should lose 180 days of good time credit was nullified and expunged from his record as a result of the state court Article 78 proceeding and was not imposed. See Exhibit 2 to Plaintiffs Cross-Motion. Therefore, Plaintiffs disciplinary confinement did not affect the length of his sentence and no liberty interest attaches on that basis. B. Comparison to General Prison Conditions A § 1983 plaintiff alleging that disciplinary confinement deprived him of a liberty interest must show that the “conditions of his confinement in the SHU were dramatically different from the basic conditions of [his] indeterminate sentence.” Frazier, supra, at 317 (quoting Sandin, supra at 485, 115 S.Ct. 2293). In assessing whether an inmate subjected to disciplinary confinement was deprived of a protected liberty interest, the Court in Sandin compared inmates in the SHU for disciplinary purposes to inmates in both the general inmate population, and administrative segregation and protective custody. See Sandin, supra, at 485-86, 115 S.Ct. 2293. (1) Plaintiffs asserted claims of atypi-cality In this case, Plaintiff has asserted grounds which he contends establish the requisite degree of atypicality between his SHU confinement and the conditions of general confinement. Specifically, Plaintiff has alleged a liberty interest based on (1) inadequate food, recreation, and daily living conditions in SHU cells, (2) loss of telephone, commissary, and programming privileges, (3) denial of education and access to religious services, and (4) inadequate library resources and legal assistance. The court finds that none of these alleged differences is sufficient as a matter of law or Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to these alleged differences. Defendants have submitted the affidavit of Anthony J. Annucci, Deputy Commissioner and Coimsel for the New York State Department of Correctional Services (“Annucci Affidavit”), in which Deputy Commissioner An-nucei, based on relevant DOCS directives, records, regulations and policy guidelines, and relying on his own personal knowledge, describes in detail why the conditions of confinement in SHU to which Plaintiff was subjected did not differ markedly from the conditions of confinement in the general prison population. Affidavit of Anthony J. Annucci, filed February 18, 1998 (Docket Item No. 49), ¶¶ 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19. In his affidavit, the Deputy Commissioner stated Inmates placed in SHU for any reason except protective custody under [N.Y.Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7,] § 301.5 are allowed out of their cells for one hour of outdoor exercise daily ... a minimum of two showers a week ... and unlimited legal visits and one non-legal visit per week. All inmates placed in SHU may be provided with counseling services on a daily basis ... are given the opportunity to participate in a cell study program to the extent possible based on the inmate’s overall behavioral adjustment ... are provided with daily access to sick call ... and are permitted books and periodicals from the facility’s law library. Annucci Affidavit, ¶ 11. Defendants have also provided the Affirmation of Walter R. Kelly, Superintendent of Attica, reiterating these conditions and adding that prisoners in SHU are able to send and receive mail, and receive the same meals as the general inmate population. Affidavit of Walter R. Kelly, filed August 15, 1995 (Docket Item No. 36) (“Kelly Affirmation”), ¶ 5. In his Affidavit, dated September 21, 1995, Plaintiff claims that during his confinement in disciplinary SHU he was “forced to an empty cell without personal belongings [sic] ... without any food except that provided by his calloused [sic] custodians.” Plaintiffs Affidavit, ¶ 7. Plaintiff later claimed, in his Memorandum dated September 21, 1995, that the meals served to inmates in SHU pose a significant hardship as they consist of “bland, unwholesome, and cold meals” which are “frequently contaminated by bacteria from sitting out in unsanitary conditions.” Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 52. In contrast, according to Plaintiff, the meals in the general population are hot, and the inmates have a choice of food which may be supplemented by food obtained from the commissary. Id., ¶ 53. Plaintiff stated that on several occasions while he was incarcerated in disciplinary SHU he suffered severe diarrhea and nausea immediately after eating. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 52. According to Plaintiff, his requests for medicine to treat these ailments were “laughed at.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff claimed that SHU corrections officers tampered with his food during his incarceration in disciplinary SHU, resulting in psychological and physical problems. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 32. In his Affidavit, Plaintiff claims that while confined in disciplinary SHU and long-term keeploek at Attica prison he was denied recreation. Plaintiffs Affidavit, ¶ 7. However, in his Memorandum, Plaintiff stated that inmates in SHU are permitted one hour per day for recreation, and claimed that SHU inmates do not have a suitable recreation area in comparison to the general prison population. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 56. According to Plaintiff, the recreation room contains no equipment, games, or recreational items, and there are no other inmates to play games with. Id. With regard to the long-term keeploek confinement area, Plaintiff claims that as a result of alleged violence occurring in that area, he was required to forego the allotted recreation period. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 12. In contrast, Plaintiff states that inmates in the general population have three separate times during the day designated for recreation, and use the prison’s yards or gym for this purpose. The yards include a weight lifting area, handball court, basketball court, and other recreational items. Id. at 57. As to the daily living conditions, Plaintiff asserts that in disciplinary confinement inmates are denied personal property, as they are only permitted to possess certain designated items. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 59. In his Affidavit, Plaintiff stated that while confined in disciplinary SHU he was “without personal belongings but five books,” and that he was deprived of personal clothing “even in winter.” Plaintiffs Affidavit, ¶ 7. In contrast, according to Plaintiff, inmates in administrative or protective confinement are permitted to keep all or part of their personal property, including personal clothing, bedding, reading and writing material, cooking equipment, and bowls and food from the commissary. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 60. Plaintiff also maintains that corrections officers assigned to the SHU area would frequently leave the windows open during the winter, requiring Plaintiff to wear all of his designated clothing to bed each night. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 59. Plaintiff claims that while in disciplinary SHU and long-term keeploek, his cell was “the situs of outright hardship, hostility, suffering, stress, hunger, and unsanitary conditions,” including the presence of mice and roaches, harassment and hostility from SHU corrections officers, the loss of telephone, commissary, programming, and package privileges, and the denial of conjugal visits. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 27; Plaintiffs Affidavit, ¶ 7. Plaintiff claims that as a result of these conditions, he was forced to seek treatment for “obvious physical, as well as psychological infirmities,” Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 11, and “serious psychological disorders,” Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 32, resulting from his SHU confinement. Plaintiffs Affidavit, ¶ 6. Plaintiff also claims in his Affidavit that his college programming was “irreparably disrupted, and, plaintiff did not graduate because he spent almost one year locked-down without any access to programming whatsoever.” Plaintiffs Affidavit, ¶ 4; Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶25. Plaintiff has also alleged denial of access to religious services “of which he was devotely [sic] committed to.” Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶¶ 25, 63. While incarcerated in disciplinary SHU and long-term keeploek, Plaintiff claims that he had no access to the legal assistant who was participating in his criminal appeal, resulting in the affirmance of his criminal appeal. Plaintiffs Affidavit, ¶ 4. Plaintiff also claims that the law library and general library services offered at the prison were not adequate. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 41. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that inmates in SHU are permitted only two legal books every other day, and that he was denied full access to legal assistance as he was limited in the amount of writing paper, functioning pens, and carbon papers he received. Id. According to Plaintiff, the general library consists of “outdated, torn, mutilated and wholly undesirable” books which “are of little, if any value to those inmates who care to utilize this service.” Id., ¶¶ 46, 47. As to the self study program, Plaintiff claims that SHU inmates are forced to wait as long as weeks before they receive the requested books, and in some cases the wrong materials are brought to the inmate. Id., ¶ 48. Plaintiffs assertions as to atypicality based on the conditions in disciplinary SHU as compared to general prison conditions fail to raise a genuine issue of fact, as Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he suffered an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life under established precedent. Further, as will be discussed, Plaintiff has also failed to provide sufficient probative evidence under Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e) necessary to oppose Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (2) Plaintiffs assertions of atypicality are insufficient as a matter of law Plaintiffs claims of atypical conditions regarding (1) recreational opportunities, (2) daily living conditions, lack of access to personal property, and conjugal visits, (3) telephone, package, and commissary privileges, (4) education, programming, and access to religious services, and (5) legal assistance fail to establish a valid basis upon which Sandin’s requirements can be satisfied. Lawful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Arce v. Walker, 139 F.3d 329, 333 (2d Cir.1998). The Due Process Clause does not protect against “every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact” on inmates, Sandin, supra, at 478, 115 S.Ct. 2293, if those changes are “within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.” Arce, supra, at 333. In the present case, based on the supposed differences between the conditions in Plaintiffs SHU and those of the general prison population, Plaintiff has failed to show that the conditions of confinement in SHU were dramatically different from the basic conditions of his indeterminate sentence, Frazier, supra, at 317. a. Recreation Plaintiffs allegations as to atypicality based on a denial of exercise privileges, even if true, fail to establish a valid basis upon which Sandin’s requirements can be satisfied. While serving his five and one half month sentence in SHU, Plaintiff was permitted one hour per day for recreation compared to the three hours daily allotted non-SHU prisoners. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 56. Courts have held that a claim of temporary denial of exercise privileges is insufficient to establish atypicality. See Sandin, supra; Arce, supra, at 336; Frazier, supra, at 317. Although Plaintiff attempts to raise a genuine issue of fact by describing the conditions of the Attica SHU recreation room, Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 56, based on the relevant caselaw, holding that a denial of recreation is insufficient to establish a federally protected liberty interest, Plaintiffs allegations of the inadequate conditions or quality of the recreation area provided to an SHU inmate, even if true, cannot be the basis for finding a protected liberty interest. b.Daily living conditions in disciplinary SHU cell and long-term keeplock While Plaintiff attempts to assert in his Memorandum that he was deprived of all of his personal property, a close reading of the Memorandum indicates that Plaintiff was permitted to keep a portion of his personal property while in disciplinary confinement. Plaintiff states that he was permitted his own undergarments, socks, shirts, and winter coat. Plaintiff’s Memorandum, ¶ 59. According to Plaintiff, non-SHU inmates retain rights to possess personal bedding, reading and writing material, cooking equipment including a hot pot and bowl, as well as commissary food, a tape player, radio, reading light, water, books, and musical instruments. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 60. As stated, lawful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen, Wolff, supra, at 555, 94 S.Ct. 2963, and the inmate’s right to personal property is one such right. See Spaight v. Cinchon, 1998 WL 167297, *5 (N.D.N.Y.1998) (“even assuming that the conditions of confinement were more restrictive in SHU and that plaintiff did not have all of his personal property,” administrative confinement to which plaintiff was subjected was not atypical and significant under Sandin.) As Plaintiff was permitted to keep a portion of his personal property while confined in SHU, and as the asserted restrictions on possession of other types of personal property are within the range of the normal and typical restrictions on prisoners, Plaintiffs general assertion of deprivation of his personal property, e.g., personal cooking pot, is insufficient to meet his burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact on this ground. Additionally, Plaintiffs claim asserting atypicality on the basis of a denial of conjugal visits is also insufficient on its face, as inmates do not have a protected liberty interest in receiving conjugal visits. Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir.1996). See also Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 836, 115 S.Ct. 117, 130 L.Ed.2d 63 (1994). Thus, no finding of an atypical or serious difference between the specific SHU discipline conditions at issue here and general prison life at Attica can be predicated on this alleged deprivation. c. Telephone, package, and commissary privileges Plaintiff claims that he was temporarily denied telephone, package, and commissary privileges while incarcerated in disciplinary SHU and long-term keeplock. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶25. Courts have held that the denial of such privileges does not represent the type of deprivation which could reasonably be viewed as imposing an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate. Frazier, supra, at 317 (telephone, package, commissary, and recreation); Husbands, supra, at 217 (telephone, package, commissary, and recreation); Black, supra, at 315 (telephone, package, and commissary). Plaintiffs claim of atypicality based on the denial of telephone, commissary, and package privileges is therefore an insufficient ground upon which to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the presence of an atypical and significant hardship. d. Education, programming, and religious services In his Affidavit, Plaintiff claims that his college programming was “irreparably disrupted, and, plaintiff did not graduate because he spent almost one year locked down without any access to programming whatsoever.” Plaintiffs Affidavit, ¶ 4; Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 25. Although N.Y.Correct.Law § 136 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1998) requires that each inmate be provided a program of education, as the court noted in Giano v. Cuomo, 1998 WL 760262, *3-4 (N.D.N.Y.1998), the statute does not specify any detailed educational requirements and does not, in itself, confer a liberty interest in a full-time education. Giano, supra, at *3. Prison officials need not provide an educational program tailored to the specific needs and circumstances of the inmate. Gi-ano, supra, at *3 (“neither § 136 nor DOCS policies require a prison to provide an inmate with specialized educational programs”); Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F.Supp. 1019, 1041 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (“only the provision of no education at all or education that was wholly unsuited to the goals of a particular inmate’s socialization and rehabilitation trigger due process protections” under § 136); Jones v. Grunewarld, 644 F.Supp. 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (§ 136 does not provide an inmate a protected property interest in a' scholarship); Lane v. Reid, 575 F.Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that § 136 does not provide inmate a protected property interest in full-. time program of education). Federal courts have, moreover, consistently found that prisoners have, no protected liberty -interests in prison vocational, rehabilitation and educational programs based on the Fourteenth Amendment. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. 274, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976) (holding that state actions which carry adverse consequences for prison inmates do not automatically activate federal due process considerations, and dismissing plaintiffs claim that his prison classification constituted a due process violation because it disqualified him from institutional rehabilitation programs); Lee v. Governor of State of New York, 87 F.3d 55, 58 (2d Cir.1996) (rule rendering inmates ineligible for temporary release program does not work “atypical and significant hardship” required under Sandin in order to establish liberty interest); Sutherland v. McCall, 709 F.2d 730, 733 (D.C.Cir.1983) (fact that’ plaintiff was rendered ineligible for prison rehabilitative programs pending parole revocation hearing did not rise to level of violation of constitutionally protected due process interest); West v. Keane, 1997 WL 266977, *4 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (noting that “in the scheme of the inmates’ regulated prison life, the cancellation of a specific rehabilitative or vocational program does not cause the sort of ‘major disruption’ of Plaintiffs environment that rises to the level of a due process violation”); Castronova v. United States, 1995 WL 604327 (W.D.N.Y. Aug.29, 1995) (the presence of a parole detainer in a prisoner’s file, which foreclosed prisoner’s participation in rehabilitative and -educational programs within the state prison, did not give rise to a federal-constitutional due process claim because as a general rule a prisoner does not hold a protected interest in loss of such programs). Thus, withdrawal of educational programs, as a basis.of atypical conditions under Sandin, is insufficient as a matter of law and summary judgment cannot be avoided on this ground. Plaintiffs claim of atypicality alleging a denial of access to religious services, Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 25, is not' a sufficient basis upon which to raise a genuine issue of material' fact. A claim of temporary denial of access to religious services incident to the administration of prison discipline has been held insufficient to support a finding of atypicality. Arce, supra, at 336. Accordingly, Plaintiffs assertions of atypicality based on the denial of prison rehabilitative programming, education, and access to religious services fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact. e. Legal assistance . Plaintiff also claims that he was denied access to the prison law library as a factor demonstrating the existence of atypical conditions. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶¶ 40-43. Although the Constitution guarantees prisoners meaningful access to_ courts, and, for pro se plaintiffs, reasonable access to a law library, see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Morello v. James, 810 F.2d 344, 346-47 (2d Cir.1987); Ramirez v. Holmes, 921 F.Supp, 204, 206 (S.D.N.Y.1996), such right to access a library is not unlimited, and prison officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the use of prison law libraries. Harris v. Keane, 962 F.Supp. 397, 404-05 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (citing Morello, supra, at 347). Furthermore, several courts have refused to find atypical conditions where a prison inmate’s claim of atypicality is based in part on a denial of access to the prison law library. See, e.g., Nogueras v. Coughlin, 1996 WL 487951, *5 (S.D.N.Y.1996); Luis v. Coughlin, 935 F.Supp. 218, 221 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Christianson v. Clarke, 932 F.Supp. 1178, 1182-83 (D.Neb.1996); Rosario v. Selsky, 1995 WL 764178, *5 (S.D.N.Y.1995); Carter v. Carriero, 905 F.Supp. 99, 103 (W.D.N.Y.1995). In the present case, Plaintiff claims that he was denied access to the prison law library during his incarceration in disciplinary SHU and long-term keeplock, resulting in affir-mance of his criminal appeal, and his inability to file a supplemental brief in support of a new trial. Plaintiffs Affidavit, ¶ 4. However, Plaintiffs claim is contradicted by the statement in his Memorandum that “prisoners in SHU are permitted ... two legal books every other day.” Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 41. In addition, Plaintiff stated that “had Plaintiff ... not solicited the Wyoming County Legal Aid Services for their assistance in obtaining redress from the apparent errors committed by [the] current Defendants ... Plaintiff would have served a greater, if not the entire portion of his 365 day sentence,” Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 43, suggesting that Plaintiff nevertheless had access to legal assistance during his incarceration in disciplinary SHU and long-term keeplock. Given the undisputed fact that Plaintiff had outside legal assistance in connection with the two state proceedings attacking his disciplinary confinement, his generalized assertions of lack of access to legal assistance ring hollow. Plaintiff also claims that he was limited in the amount of writing paper, pens, and carbon papers he received. Plaintiffs Memorandum, 41. However1, Plaintiff has presented no specific evidence concerning the extent of these alleged deprivations. In alleging atypicality on these grounds, Plaintiff has made no showing that inmates in non-disciplinary confinement, ie., general prison population and administrative SHU confinement, were not also subject to such limitations. “Restrictions on ... access to law libraries apply to all inmates confined to SHU regardless of the reason that they have been placed there.” Nogueras, supra, at *5. As Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the limited access to legal materials was a condition dramatically different from the basic conditions of his indeterminate sentence, Frazier, supra, at 317, a finding that Plaintiff suffered an atypical and significant hardship while confined in disciplinary SHU and long-term keeplock is unwarranted based on such limitations. See, e.g., Carter, supra, at 103 (Plaintiffs claims of atypicality based on law library access, educational opportunities, visitation, telephone use, personal property, employment eligibility, work release, and furloughs insufficient, as these restrictions apply to all SHU confinement, whether disciplinary or non-disciplinary). Moreover, Plaintiffs own statements in the Affidavit and Memorandum, plaintiff fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the limitations placed on his access to the law library and legal materials as a basis for finding serious atypical conditions were imposed upon him while in SHU. Therefore, such limitations as may have occurred drnlng Plaintiffs SHU and long-term keeplock sentences cannot be the predicate for finding his challenged confinement to be an atypical and significant hardship. Plaintiffs claims of atypicality based on (1) recreation, (2) daily living conditions in SHU cells and long-term keeplock including loss of personal items and conjugal relations, (3) telephone, package, and commissary privileges, (4) education, programming, and access to religious services, and (5) access to the law library and legal materials fail to present any sufficient basis upon which to show the existence of serious atypical differences in confinement conditions as a matter of law. The alleged disparate conditions upon which Pláintiff relies to meet Sandin’s requirement relate to aspects of confinement involving no federally recognized right of access under the Due Process Clause. When compared to conditions available to non-disciplinary SHU inmates at Attica as described by Plaintiff, the deprivations at issue here do not impose so severe a hardship as to invoke federal due process requirements prior to imposition of the SHU punishment at issue. In the alternative, Plaintiffs claims are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden in opposing a motion for summary judgment. (3) Plaintiff has failed to submit evidence sufficient to avoid summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) requires that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment “not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court stated in Celotex, “[rjule 56(e) therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, supra, at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Summary judgment must be granted if a pro se plaintiff fails to make a sufficient showing of concrete evidence on an essential element of the case for which he would bear the burden of proof at trial. Anderson, supra, at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Jermosen, supra, at *3. As discussed, under Sandin, Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the conditions of the Attica SHU and long-term keeploek area imposed atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin, supra, 480. Plaintiffs generalized assertions of atypicality based on the differences in (1) food, (2) recreation, (3) daily living conditions in disciplinary SHU cells and long-term keeploek, and (4) library resources compared to non-SHU inmates fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact. As such, they are insufficient to require a trial to determine whether the Sandin standards have been met. a. Food Plaintiffs allegations of poor nutritional content, contamination by bacteria, physical illness, and food tampering consist of generalized, eonclusory allegations and are therefore insufficient to successfully oppose Defendants’ motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) and Anderson. Plaintiffs claims in each instance are unsupported by the affidavits of other inmates or other probative evidence. See, e.g., Brown, supra, at 670 (summary judgment granted, as plaintiff inmate failed to submit affidavits of other inmates, or medical evidence of health problems, plaintiff failed to raise genuine issue of material fact as to alleged contamination of drinking water at prison); Saulter v. Hanslmaier, 1997 WL 177887, *3 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment where plaintiff inmate failed to set forth specific facts regarding claim that dormitory housed “sick and infested” inmates, and therefore failed to assert protected liberty interest). As stated, Plaintiff must produce concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could render a verdict in his favor, stating specific facts, and not simply legal or constitutional conclusions. Anderson, supra, at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Guzman v. Kelly, 1996 WL 291985, *3; Jermosen, supra, at *3. Here, Plaintiffs generalized personal assertions lack any particularity as to date, time, nature of the food in question, records of complaints, the characterization of unwholesomeness, or other minimal indicia of probativeness. This obvious lack of even the slightest degree of particularity renders the proferred evidence unspecific and therefore insufficient to avoid summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, supra, at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Plaintiffs bald assertions, if allowed, would be tantamount to reasserting generalized allegations in the Complaint to defeat summary judgment contrary to Rule 56(e) (“adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations ... of the adverse party’s pleading”). As Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact whether the conditions of his disciplinary SHU confinement were “dramatically different” from the basic conditions of his indeterminate sentence while at Attica on this ground, Frazier, supra, at 317, summary judgment is appropriate. b. Recreation Plaintiffs claims of atypicality on the basis of a denial of recreational opportunities in long-term keeplock are also insufficient. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, supra, at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A close reading of the Plaintiffs Affidavit and Memorandum indicates that Plaintiff was not denied the ability to exercise during his four and one-half month sentence in long-term keeplock as a result of any action by Defendants, rather, he chose to forego the opportunity to do so because of his personal dislike of the conditions available, or the alleged violence occurring in the long-term keeplock unit. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶¶ 12, 56-57. In his Memorandum, Plaintiff states only that while incarcerated in long-term keeplock he was “constrained to forego” his one hour recreation period. Id., ¶ 12. Such a generalized and conclusory statement, which fails to allege specific details of incidents of the denial of recreation and exercise or personal involvement by any of the Defendants in alleged deprivation, is insufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment. In addition, Plaintiffs generalized personal assertions of violence in the long-term keeplock area are, for the same reason, insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact relevant to his inadequate recreation contention. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, supra, at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. c. Daily living conditions As to the daily living conditions in the disciplinary SHU cells and long-term keep-lock, Plaintiff has not provided affidavits by other SHU inmates or other evidence of such conditions, and has accordingly failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the cell conditions in disciplinary SHU. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, supra, at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Plaintiffs claim that corrections officers would frequently leave the SHU windows open during the winter, requiring Plaintiff to wear all of his designated clothes to bed each night, Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶¶33, 59, is unsupported by the affidavits of other SHU inmates or other admissible evidence of such conditions, and fails to particularize any dates when such action occurred. Again, the absence of any specific evidence to give substance to these general assertions requires summary judgment be granted. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, supra, at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Plaintiffs general assertions of infestation of his cell with mice and roaches and harassment and hostility from SHU guards are likewise insufficient. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶¶ 27, 32. Although Plaintiff refers in his Affidavit to the need for “psychiatric therapy,” Plaintiffs Affidavit, ¶ 6, and in his memorandum to “obvious physical, as well as psychological infirmities,” Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 11, and “serious psychological disorders,” Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 32, resulting from these conditions, such general assertions also fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact, as Plaintiff has provided no inmate affidavits, grievances, medical treatment records or other corroborative evidence sufficient to render Plaintiffs evidence specific. Such generalized assertions are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e). Plaintiff also alleges that violence regularly occurs in the long-term keeplock unit, including fighting which many times involves the use of weapons. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 11. According to Plaintiff, weaker inmates are forced to engage in perverse acts in the long-term keeplock area. Id. Again, Plaintiff provides no information as to specific incidents of violence or “perverse acts” in this area, or any other evidence corroborative of his claim sufficient to meet the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), and has therefore failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the conditions allegedly occurring in the long-term keeplock recreation area upon which atypicality on this ground may be based. d. Library resources As to Plaintiffs claims regarding the inadequacy of the general library, Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶¶ 41, 46-47, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the conditions of the general library, including the “outdated, torn, mutilated and wholly undesirable” books, or delay in receiving materials through the self-study program, are confined to SHU inmates and unlike the conditions experienced by the Attica prison population in general. As with Plaintiffs other attempts to create material issues of fact on the issue of atypical conditions in the Attica disciplinary SHU and long-term keeplock, Plaintiffs allegations, while sworn, are con-clusory and unspecific. As such, they are insufficient to require a trial to determine whether the Sandin standards have been met. As discussed, _ in attempting to establish atypicality by comparing the conditions of disciplinary SHU and long-term keeplock with those of the general prison population, Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiffs claims as to recreation, daily living conditions, possession of personal items, telephone, package, and commissary privileges, education, programming, and religious services, and legal assistance are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to atypicality as a matter of law. Furthermore, Plaintiffs claims of atypi-cality based on the food, recreation, daily living conditions, and library resources are insufficient under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) to oppose Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. However, Plaintiff also contends that atypicality exists as the conditions of administrative confinement or protective custody at Attica differ significantly from those of the disciplinary SHU and long-term keeplock area. (4) Comparison to administrative and protective custody confinement According to Defendants, inmates may be placed in SHU as-a result of a disciplinary hearing imposing confinement in SHU as a penalty, for administrative reasons, for protective custody, as a keeplock admission, or for any other reason. Annucci Affidavit, ¶ 10. Based on the affidavit of Deputy Commissioner Annucci, in New York, disciplinary SHU differs from administrative SHU in only two ways. First, disciplinary SHU inmates must complete a thirty day period of “satisfactory adjustment” before they are eligible for additional privileges, while administrative admittees receive such privileges at the beginning of their confinement in SHU. Second, administrative SHU inmates have their status reviewed every seven days for their first two months of SHU confinement and every thirty days thereafter by a three member committee to ascertain whether further administrative confinement is needed. Annucci Affidavit, ¶ 12. As to recreation, showers, legal and non-legal visits, cell study program, and access to both general and legal library resources, Defendants state there are no differences between administrative SHU confinement and disciplinary SHU confinement. Annucci Affidavit, ¶ 11. Plaintiff states that while administrative or protective custody SHU inmates receive monthly review for prospective release, disciplinary SHU inmates receive no such review. Plaintiffs Memorandum, ¶ 10. Plaintiff also states that while inmates in administrative SHU and protective custody are allowed to possess personal property, inmates in disciplinary SHU are not permitted to do so. Id Finally, Plaintiff asserts that administrative and protective custody inmates are afforded use of a telephone, while disciplinary SHU inmates are not permitted such use. Id There is no material difference between the parties as to these basic aspects of nondisciplinary and disciplinary SHU confinements. a. Availability of periodic review for administrative SHU As discussed, the Supreme Court in San-din held that a determination of whether a § 1983 plaintiff was deprived of a liberty interest should include a comparison between the conditions in disciplinary confinement and those of administrative and protective custody confinement. Sandin, supra at 485, 115 S.Ct. 2293. In this ease, the Second Circuit directed that such a factual comparison of administrative and disciplinary confinement be conducted on remand, Wright, supra, at 137, suggesting that “[ajecess to periodic confinement reviews ... might differentiate disciplinary from administrative confinement.” Wright, supra, a