Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER BROWN, United States Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff Angie Chen (“Chen”) filed a Second Amended Complaint against Defendant Mayflower Transit, Inc. (“Mayflower”) alleging breach of contract, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 et seq. [Dkt. 48.] This court previously granted summary judgment in favor of Mayflower on the conversion and negligent infliction of emotional distress counts, and denied summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress count. [Dkt. 72, 87.] See Chen v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., No. 99 C 6261, 2002 WL 1632412 (N.D.Ill. July 22, 2002) (Brown, M.J.). Before the court now is Mayflower’s motion for summary judgment on the RICO count (Count Y). [Dkt. 102.] Also before the court is Mayflower’s motion to strike Exhibit 50 to plaintiffs L.R. 56.1 statement [dkt. 113], and Chen’s second motion to strike portions of Mayflower’s L.R. 56.1 statement and affidavits .[dkt. 108]. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). [Dkt. 11.] For the reasons set forth below, Mayflower’s motion for summary judgment is denied, Mayflower’s motion to strike is granted, and Chen’s second motion to strike is denied as moot. FACTUAL BACKGROUND I. Chen’s Move with Mayflower In 1999, Chen decided to move her furniture and household goods from Atlanta, Georgia to Chicago, Illinois. (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶¶ 42, 45.) In late May 1999, Chen contacted AAA Admiral Moving and Storage (“Admiral”), a local moving company affiliated with Mayflower and located in Atlanta. (Id. ¶ 42.) See also Chen, 2002 WL 1632412 at *1; Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s LR Stmt. ¶ 4 [dkt. 78]. A. The Estimate for Chen’s Move On June 4, 1999, an estimator came to Chen’s apartment to inspect her property and determine the cost of her move. See Chen, 2002 WL 1632412 at *1; Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s LR Stmt. ¶ 5 [dkt. 78]. On that same day, Admiral provided Chen with an estimate for the price of her move, which was handwritten on a pre-printed “Estimate/Order for Service” form (the “Handwritten Estimate”). (Pl.’s LR App. Ex. 6, Handwritten Estimate at 1-2.) The Handwritten Estimate contained the handwritten phrase “[guaranteed not to exceed $1,741.89.” (Id. at 1.) According to the Handwritten Estimate, that amount included “total containers packing and unpacking,” “total line haul charges” and certain “other charges,” including charges for the fact that there were stairs at the origin and an elevator at the destination. (Id.) Chen testified that prior to her receipt of the Handwritten Estimate, she was asked whether there was an elevator at her destination and whether a moving truck could park near the entrance of her new apartment, but was not asked about any other conditions at the destination. (Pl.’s LR App. Ex. 5, Chen Dep. at 195-196.) Mayflower admits that Chen was orally informed by the Admiral representative that the price of her move “would not go above $1,741.89,” and that it could be less. (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 43.) Chen testified that she was also told that if she signed the Handwritten Estimate, “Mayflower would get all of [her] stuff from [her] apartment in Atlanta into [her] apartment in Chicago for a price that would not go above $1,741.89.” (Chen Dep. at 197-198.) The Handwritten Estimate stated: “If this shipment is a binding estimate, then this amount covers only the services and quantities shown in the estimate. If items are added to the shipment or additional services are performed, additional cost may result.” (Handwritten Estimate at 1.) The Handwritten Estimate also provided: “A Binding Estimate represents the charges for only those services indicated on the Estimated Charges sheet. It does not include charges for services to be performed at destination, unless specifically set forth. Charges for all additional services will be added to your final bill.” (Id. at 2.) According to one of Mayflower’s representatives, Mayflower’s binding estimates typically do not include services required at the destination. (Pl.’s LR App. Ex. 1, Webb Dep. at 84.) That representative also testified that Mayflower does not require its booking agents to inquire into conditions that might lead to additional charges. (Id. at 77-78.) The Handwritten Estimate was signed by the “Carrier’s Representative.” (Handwritten Estimate at 1.) Chen signed some of the signature blocks on the Handwritten Estimate, including one which stated that she “should sign below only if [she] wish[es] this carrier to perform all the services required.” (Id.) Chen included the date June 4,1999 next to her signature on the Handwritten Estimate. She did not sign the signature block stating that she had received the pamphlet “Your Rights and Responsibilities When You Move.” (Id.) The method of payment was not discussed on June 4. Chen, 2002 WL 1632412 at *1 (citing Chen Dep. at 183-84, 187-92.) However, a section of the Handwritten Estimate reads: “Unless credit approval is completed in advance of shipment, all monies must be paid in U.S. funds by cash,cashier’s check, certified check or money order at or before the time of delivery.” (Handwritten Estimate at 1.) Chen subsequently received a form letter from Admiral confirming June 10 to June 14 for the loading of her goods and June 15 to June 21 for delivery. (Pl.’s LR App. Ex. 7, Admiral Letter to Chen.) That letter also stated: “Payment is due at the time of delivery and can be made in cash, certified check or money order, or a Major Credit Card, or direct billing to company with approved letter of authorization and approved credit check. If you choose to change your payment plan, we ask that you notify our office within 5 working days of your actual move date.” (Id.) (emphasis omitted). The letter did not mention any requirement that Chen seek pre-approval for her credit card. (Id.) Chen testified that she believed that the letter granted her the approval to pay for her move by credit card. (Chen Dep. at 206.) In addition, Chen subsequently signed all of the signature blocks on another estimate. That estimate was typewritten on a pre-printed “Estimate/Order for Service” form that was identical to the Handwritten Estimate form (the “Typed Estimate”). (Def.’s LR App. Ex. A(5), Typed Estimate at 1-2.) Chen included the date of June 15, 1999 next to two of her signatures on the Typed Estimate. The Typed Estimate omitted the phrase “guaranteed not to exceed,” but stated that the total “bound services” amounted to $1,385.19 and the “total estimate” amounted to $1,741.89. (Id. at 1.) The Typed Estimate stated that it was a “binding estimate” as of June 7,1999. (Id.) B. The Loading of Chen’s Goods in Atlanta Chen’s move took place on June 10, 1999. (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 45.) After Admiral loaded Chen’s belongings onto the moving truck, the Admiral representative handed Chen a bill of lading. (Id.; Chen Dep. at 262.) The bill of lading stated that Mayflower “publishes tariffs which set forth the terms, conditions and prices for the transportation services it provides” and that “[t]he applicable tariff provisions are incorporated herein by reference.” (Def.’s LR App. Ex. A(7), Bill of Lading at 2.) The bill of lading further stated that the tariff may be inspected at Mayflower’s offices and that a copy of certain provisions would be provided upon request. (Id.) The bill of lading directed shippers to the ‘Your Rights and Responsibilities When You Move” pamphlet for more information about the tariff. (Id.) It also noted that “[i]n the event of any conflict between the terms of the Order for Service [presumably the Handwritten Estimate or the Typed Estimate] and Bill of Lading, the document last executed shall control.” (Id.) C. The Delivery of Chen’s Goods in Chicago Chen’s property was scheduled to be delivered between June 15 and June 21. (Handwritten Estimate at 1; Typed Estimate at 1; Admiral Letter to Chen.) Her property was to be delivered by Century Moving and Storage (“Century”), another moving company associated with Mayflower which is located in Illinois. (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 48; PL’s LR App. Ex. 24, Fleming Dep. at 19, 21.) Chen’s property did not arrive until June 30, and Chen incurred over $1,100 in expenses for food and lodging while she waited for her shipment to arrive. (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 47.) On the morning of June 30, before her property arrived, Chen received a call from Ann Vinyard, a representative from Century, who informed her that her property would be delivered that day between 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. (Id. ¶ 49; Chen Dep. at 233-34.) A few minutes later, Vinyard called again and asked Chen whether she had cash or a cashier’s check for $1,741.89. (Chen Dep. at 235.) Chen responded that she would be paying by credit card, and that she had been told she had permission to pay by credit card. (Id.) Vinyard advised Chen that she would not be able to pay by credit card and that the driver could not unload her property unless she handed over cash, a cashier’s check or a money order. (Id. at 235-36; Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 49.) Chen told Vinyard that she would try to get a cash advance using her credit card. (Chen Dep. at 237.) Chen then attempted to get the cash together, but was unsuccessful in the short time period available. (Id. at 237-43; Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 53.) After returning to her apartment, Chen called Vinyard and explained to her that she had been unable to raise the cash, but that she still intended to pay by credit card. (Chen Dep. at 246; Def.’s LR Resp. Ex. 6, Audiocassette Tr. at 2.) Vinyard advised Chen that she needed to have obtained pre-approval from Admiral, the company that booked her move, to pay by credit card. (Audiocassette Tr. at 7, 13, 24-26.) Vinyard stated that Century would not allow its driver to unload Chen’s property without receipt of certified funds for the full amount of the move, and that, in fact, Admiral had already authorized storage of the goods. (Id. at 2, 16.) Vin-yard told Chen that if her goods were placed in storage, she would be charged for storage, delivery and warehouse handling costs. (Id. at 16.) In response to Chen’s complaints, Vinyard said that Century’s “hands [we]re tied [because it was] just the hauling agent” and that it “didn’t book [Chen’s] order,” and had very limited authority in that situation. (Id. at 2, 10, 16.) After that conversation, at around 11:00 a.m., the driver of the truck arrived. Chen, 2002 WL 1632412 at *3 (citing Chen Dep. at 272). He told Chen that the truck was too wide for the street and that if a shuttle truck was necessary, Chen’s bill would be twice as much. (Id.) The driver then called Vinyard from Chen’s phone to explain the situation to her. (Chen Dep. at 300-03.) After their conversation, the driver handed the phone to Chen, and Vinyard informed Chen that, due to the additional services required, such as a “long cany” and the size of the elevator, the cost of the move had risen to around $2,500 — approximately $800 over Chen’s “guaranteed not to exceed” estimate. (Id. at 303-04, 311; Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 51; Au-diocassette Tr. at 36.) Vinyard advised Chen, again, that unless she could raise that amount in cash, her goods would be put into storage and she would incur even more charges. (Chen Dep. at 304.) Chen was advised that those charges were for “warehouse delivery fees, the first month’s rent, and a refundable deposit for the second month’s rent.” (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 51; Audiocassette Tr. at 37.) While the truck driver was waiting, Chen called Corrine Swenson, a Mayflower customer service representative at the “800” number. (Chen Dep. at 315-16; Au-diocassette Tr. at 21-29.) Swenson told Chen that payment by credit card had to be approved by the booking agent at least 48 hours before the goods were loaded. (Audiocassette Tr. at 22-23.) Swenson called Admiral to see if Admiral would approve Chen’s credit card and reported that Admiral refused. (Id. at 24-26.) A little bit later, Vinyard called Chen to check on the progress of the move. (Id. at 29.) After Chen advised her that she thought she could obtain the cash to pay for the move with just a little more time, Vinyard advised her that each additional hour that the truck driver had to wait would cost Chen $84.50. (Id. at 29, 33-34, 36.) Vinyard also told Chen that the driver would not unload her goods unless she signed an addendum approving the additional charges including waiting time, stairs and long carries. (Audiocassette Tr. at 30, 36.) When Chen complained about the additional charges, Vinyard directed Chen to the portion of the Estimate/Order for Service form that stated: “If items are added ... or additional services are performed, additional cost may result.” (Id. at 35.) Vinyard then told Chen that the price had now risen to $2,556.69 plus an hour of waiting time at $84.50 — or a total of $2,641.19 — and stated that if Chen’s goods went into storage, Chen would need to raise nearly twice as much, namely, an additional $1,555 for delivery to storage, $249.60 for warehouse handling, $667.04 for the first two months of storage, and undisclosed amounts for delivery out of storage. (Id. at 37-38, 47.) Chen was also told that if she did not pay that sum within 30 days, her goods would be sold at auction after 30 days. (Id. at 37-38.) At 2:30 p.m., Chen called Vinyard and told her that she had raised about $1,100 in cash. (Id at 39, 41.) Vinyard advised Chen that she was on the other line with “headquarters” and that they decided to put Chen’s shipment in storage. (Id. at 39.) Vinyard told Chen that her total charges now stood at $5,122.83, not including the cost of delivery out of storage. (Id. at 48; Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 52.) Vinyard told Chen that the “owner of the company” would give her “a really big discount” and deliver the goods on July 6th if Chen could come up with a cashier’s check for $1,741.89 plus $2,240 for storage and delivery out of storage — a total of $3,981.89. (Audiocassette Tr. at 51-52.) Chen’s goods were put into storage where they remained for approximately three months, until after Chen filed a motion for preliminary injunction. (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 55.) It was subsequently determined that the additional costs (including loading, transportation, storage for 97 days, and final unloading) amounted to $3,521.28, not $5,122.83 or $3,981.89 as quoted previously. (Id. ¶ 56; Audiocas-sette Tr. at 51-52.) II. The Relationship between Mayflower and the Local Moving Companies Mayflower is federally licensed as an interstate motor carrier and has been for over 75 years. (Pl.’s LR Resp. ¶ 1.) Mayflower itself does not sell moves to individual shippers, physically move household goods, provide estimates, own trucks, or employ drivers or laborers to perform moving services. (Id. ¶ 6; Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 1.) Rather, it enters into agreements with independently owned and managed local moving companies to sell moving services. (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 2; Pl.’s LR Resp. ¶ 3.) Mayflower presently has agreements with approximately 400 local moving companies. (Pl.’s LR Resp. ¶ 3.) Those companies are permitted to use Mayflower’s name and logo. (Def.’s LR App. Ex. A(2), Agency Agreement at 2; Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 2; Pl.’s LR Resp. ¶ 9.) The moving work is performed by drivers who are employed by the affiliate companies using trucks that are owned or leased by the affiliates. (PL’s LR Resp. ¶¶ 6, 7.) Mayflower provides those companies with a centralized communications system to coordinate moves, billing and collection services, a customer service department, and the federal authority to operate interstate. (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶¶ 4, 11.) Mayflower occasionally placates complaining customers by providing them with checks, or refers the customer to the affiliate who provided the service for information. (Id. ¶ 12.) Mayflower distributes the revenue collected for a given shipment among the agent booking the shipment, the origin agent, and the hauling agent, with Mayflower retaining on average 13% of the charges for the actual transportation of the shipment. (PL’s LR Resp. ¶ 13.) When cash is collected by an affiliate at delivery, the funds are retained by the affiliate but the affiliate enters the amount collected into Mayflower’s system and that amount is posted as a debit against the affiliate’s account. (Id. ¶ 12.) When Mayflower distributes the revenue from a shipment to the affiliate who provided the service, the revenue is posted to the affiliate’s statement as a credit. (Id.) The accounts of the individual affiliates are cleared on a weekly basis and payment is made either to or from Mayflower. (Id.) Charges that are levied in addition to the estimate (ie., charges that exceed the estimate) are also collected and distributed by Mayflower. (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 15.) Credit card payments are collected directly by Mayflower, although there are some exceptions. (Pl.’s LR Resp. ¶¶ 10-12.) Generally, shippers must obtain preapproval of their credit cards before they may use them to pay for services. (Webb Dep. at 114-17.) On an infrequent basis, shippers are permitted to pay at the point of destination without having obtained preapproval of their credit cards. (Pl.’s LR Resp. ¶ 17) (citing Webb Dep. at 185-86.) Under Mayflower’s policy, shippers seeking preapproval of then-credit cards must generally submit their cards to the booking affiliate companies, who in turn transmit the data to Mayflower’s central credit department. (Pl.’s LR Resp. ¶ 17.) The terms “not to exceed” and “guaranteed not to exceed” are used on occasion by at least some of the local moving companies when booking shipments. (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶¶ 17, 18.) Mayflower is aware that its affiliates use phrases such as “not to exceed” and “guaranteed price” to describe estimates to prospective shippers, and it does not discourage them from doing so. (Id. ¶ 20.) Mayflower and the affiliates know that some shippers are not clear that Mayflower does not intend for the shipper’s estimate to be an absolute cap on cost when the words “not to exceed” or “guaranteed price” are used with an estimate. (PL’s LR App. Ex. 4, Wither-ington Dep. at 215; Fleming Dep. at 265-66.) Shippers with binding estimates can be asked to pay additional amounts at the point of origin or destination. (Webb Dep. at 65-69, 80-82.) At the point of origin, shippers with binding estimates can be required to pay extra amounts to cover necessary services omitted by the booking affiliate company. (Id. at 71.) The need for those services can be made known to the shipper as late as the day of the move. (Id. at 67; PL’s LR App. Ex. 17, Reece Dep. at 21-23.) If a shipper refuses to pay additional amounts imposed at the point of origin, the affiliate may refuse to move the goods. (Webb Dep. at 67-68.) If additional services and payments are required at the destination, the shipper theoretically has three choices: (1) pay for the additional services; (2) pay to have the goods placed in storage; or (3) have the goods unloaded right where they are. (Id. at 80-81.) Mayflower does not specifically instruct affiliates to offer shippers the last option, ie., unloading the goods right where they are. (Id. at 82-83.) At the destination, Mayflower’s typical procedure is that a shipper’s goods will not be unloaded until all additional services required have been paid for. (Id. at 121-122.) Drivers understand that they are not supposed to open the door of their van until they collect any and all additional amounts allegedly owed. (Id. at 122; Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 24.) The local moving companies continue to conduct local (ie., in-state) moves under their own authority, and keep that business completely separate from their relationship with Mayflower. (Webb Dep. at 174-75.) When conducting local moves, local moving companies may identify themselves as Mayflower affiliates and use trucks with the Mayflower logo, but must explain that, for local moves, they are not “Mayflower.” (Id. at 175-76.) Storage of property also falls outside the affiliates’ relationships with Mayflower. (Fleming Dep. at 23-24.) Admiral and Century engage in significant business outside of their relationship with Mayflower. (Id. at 25-26; PL’s LR App. Ex. 26, Sibila Dep. at 26-27.) Mayflower does not have any control over the conduct of that business. (Fleming Dep. at 26; Sibila Dep. at 26-27.) III. Documents Cited by Mayflower Besides the Handwritten and Typewritten Estimates discussed above, two other documents pertaining to Chen’s move warrant discussion: (1) the tariff; and (2) the pamphlet entitled “Your Rights and Responsibilities When You Move.” A. The Tariff The Handwritten Estimate states that the “rules, rates and form of Bill of Lading in Carrier’s Tariff on file with the Surface Transportation Board” are incorporated by reference. (Handwritten Estimate at 2) (emphasis added.) It also provides that “[t]he rules, regulations and carrier’s Provisions regarding estimates set out in the Tariff currently in effect on the date applicable as filed with the Surface Transportation Board of the Department of Transportation shall govern this shipment.” (Id.) (emphasis added.) Mayflower asserts that it is governed by Tariff 400-M (which applies to the industry as a whole) and Tariff 104-F, the “Exceptions” tariff (which is specific to Mayflower). (Def.’s Mem. at 19-20.) Mayflower’s tariff is published by a branch of the American Moving and Storage Association. (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 158.) A Mayflower representative testified that the tariff is not drafted or approved by any public administrative agency or passed by Congress. (Pl.’s LR App. Ex. 3, Pullaro Dep. at 174.) Mayflower can publish exceptions to the tariff on its own initiative, and neither the tariff nor the exceptions are filed with any public agency. (Pullaro Dep. at 163-64, 168, 173.) Mayflower is not aware of any public distribution of the tariff. (Id. at 173.) In recent times, tariffs are “published” on compact disc due to the bulk of the tariffs. (Def.’s LR App. Ex. C, Pullaro Aff. ¶ 5.) At oral argument on Mayflower’s motion, Mayflower’s counsel appeared surprised by the suggestion that anyone would actually request a copy of the tariff. Mayflower’s counsel noted that the tariff is complex and must be studied thoroughly to be understood. The tariff does not define the phrase “not to exceed.” (Webb Dep. at 48.) B. The “Your Rights and Responsibilities When You Move” Pamphlet It is Admiral’s policy to provide shippers with a copy of the pamphlet “Your Rights and Responsibilities When You Move” at the time an estimate is provided. (Sibila Dep. at 110-111.) The text of that document can be changed only with the permission of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. 49 C.F.R. § 375.213(b)(1). The document must be distributed to potential shippers prior to the execution of an order for service of a shipment of household goods. Id. at § 375.213(a)(1). The document explains the binding estimate provision. (Def.’s LR App. Ex. D(2), ‘Tour Rights and Responsibilities When You Move,” Form OCE-100 at 2.) It also informs shippers that they can inspect the tariff at the carrier’s facility. (Id. at 1.) Chen testified that she did not receive a copy of the ‘Tour Rights and Responsibilities When You Move” pamphlet. (Chen Dep. at 215.) The document does not discuss the phrase “not to exceed.” IV. Other Individuals with Similar Experiences Chen has identified eighteen other individuals whom she claims had experiences similar to hers with Mayflower and its affiliates. (Pl.’s LR Stmt. ¶¶ 58-157; PL’s LR App. Exs. 8-23, 25, 31-48.) Richard Stevens, for example, was told that the price of his estimate was fixed and “couldn’t be increased by anything that happened.” (PL’s LR App. Ex. 8, Stevens Dep. at 26.) However, the affiliate conducting Stevens’ move sought additional payment after it determined that the quantity of goods to be moved had been underestimated and there were costs that had not been included in the estimate. (Id. at 29, 33.) Stevens’ price was increased after most of his property had been loaded. (Id.) Marc Reece was given a “not to exceed estimate” and told “[tjhat’s what ‘not-to-exceed’ means; there are no other charges.” (Reece Dep. at 13, 15.) Although an estimator had been to his house, he was told on the day of the move that a shuttle would be required and he would be charged an additional amount. (Id. at 21-22.) He was told that he must pay the increased price or his property would not be moved. (Id. at 22.) Mitchell McClos-key was also given a “not to exceed proposal.” (PL’s LR App. Ex. 35, McCloskey Aff. at 1.) His written proposal stated that “[t]he shipment will be weighed and the charges for service will be based on the actual weight and services performed or $1,555.37, whichever is less.” (Id.) When the movers arrived at his new residence, he was told that his property would not be unloaded unless he paid an increased price to cover “the excessive distance from [his] residence to the moving truck.” (Id.) Peter and Christine Lucke were told that the final cost of their move would “under no circumstances” exceed the guaranteed price estimate. (PL’s LR App. Ex. 33, Lucke Aff. at 1.) When their goods were half-loaded, they were told they must pay an increased price since the amount they were moving had been underestimated. (Id.) Those acts took place between 1998 and 2001. (PL’s LR Stmt. ¶¶ 58-67, 77-85, 111-118; PL’s LR App. Exs. 8, 12, 17-19, 33-36.) LEGAL STANDARD The court may properly grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all facts and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that judgment as a matter of law should be granted in the moving party’s favor. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has met the initial burden, the non-moving party must designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The non-moving party must support its contentions with admissible evidence and may not rest upon the mere allegations in the pleadings or conclusory statements in affidavits. Id. See also Winskunas v. Birnbaum, 23 F.3d 1264 (7th Cir.1994) (non-moving party is required to present evidence of “evidentiary quality” (i.e. admissible documents or attested testimony, such as that found in depositions or in affidavits) demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact). “[NJeither ‘the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties’ ... nor the existence of ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Group, Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir.1997) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505 and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). Thus, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. DISCUSSION I. Mayflower’s Motion for Summary Judgment Section 1962(c) of RICO provides: It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Section 1962(d) of RICO provides: It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section. Id. at § 1962(d). To state a claim under § 1962(c), a RICO plaintiff must show the “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985)). In its motion, Mayflower claims that it is entitled to summary judgment on Chen’s RICO count because Chen cannot establish: (1) the existence of an enterprise distinct from Mayflower or that Mayflower conducted or participated in the enterprise; (2) a pattern of racketeering activity; or (3) the illegality of conduct complained of or the existence of a predicate act. As discussed below, the court concludes that Chen has established facts from which a jury could find that Mayflower has violated RICO. Thus, Mayflower’s motion for summary judgment is denied. A. Existence of a RICO Enterprise 1. Distinctness between Mayflower and the Enterprise Liability under RICO depends upon a showing that two distinct entities exist: “(1) a ‘person;’ and (2) an ‘enterprise’ that is not simply the same ‘person’ referred to by a different name.” Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161, 121 S.Ct. 2087, 150 L.Ed.2d 198 (2001). See also Haroco, Inc. v. American Natl. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 402 (7th Cir.1984) (Section 1962(c) “requires only some separate and distinct existence for the person and the enterprise”). “There need be shown ‘only some separate and distinct existence for the person and the enterprise.’ ” Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 964 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1280 (7th Cir.1989)). Mayflower argues that Chen cannot demonstrate that Mayflower — the “person” she alleges is liable to her under RICO — is sufficiently distinct from the enterprise identified by Chen, i.e., Mayflower and the local moving companies with which it does business. (Def.’s Mot. ¶ 1; Def.’s Mem. at 2, 4-10.) Mayflower argues that the enterprise is insufficiently distinct from Mayflower because “the alleged enterprise consists only of Mayflower and its agents acting within the scope of their authority as agents.” (Def.’s Mem. at 5.) Mayflower further argues that there is no distinct enterprise because the one identified by Chen does not bear a “family resemblance” to the prototypical RICO case. (Id. at 5-6.) Mayflower claims that the Seventh Circuit has “repeatedly held” that “a combination of various members of a corporate family cannot constitute a distinct enterprise.” (Id. at 5.) In this regard, Mayflower argues that it merely deals with its agents in an ordinary way, so that the agents’ role in the enterprise is merely incidental. (Id. at 7-8.) Chen responds that the enterprise and Mayflower are legally different entities with different rights and responsibilities and roles to play. (PL’s Opp’n at 6-8.) Chen further argues that it is irrelevant whether the local moving companies acted within the scope of their authority as agents (id. at 7), and that the agents’ role in the enterprise is not entirely incidental. (Id. at 7-8.) Mayflower replies that it is not enough that the enterprise and Mayflower play distinct roles; rather, the person (Mayflower) must control the enterprise in some way. (Def.’s Reply at 3-4.) Mayflower further argues that the fact that the local moving companies are “independent corporations, incorporated in different states, with different ownership from Mayflower and, generally, from each other” is meaningless in the distinctiveness analysis. (Id. at 5.) In Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225 (7th Cir.1997), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs RICO claim based on its finding that the agents’ role in the defendant’s illegal acts was entirely incidental and thus there was no enterprise. Specifically, the court concluded: “[W]here a large, reputable manufacturer deals with its dealers and other agents in the ordinary way, so that their role in the manufacturer’s illegal acts is entirely incidental, differing not at all from what it would be if these agents were the employees of a totally integrated enterprise, the manufacturer plus its dealers and other agents (or any subset of the members of the corporate family) do not constitute an enterprise within the meaning of the statute.” Id. at 228. The court further indicated that the defendant-person (Chrysler) had not been “empowered to perpetrate warranty fraud by selling through dealers rather than directly to the public.” Id. at 227. The holding in Fitzgerald was in line with the Seventh Circuit’s prior endorsement of the analysis employed by the Third Circuit in Brittingham v. Mobil Corp., 943 F.2d 297 (3d Cir.1991), which stated that an an enterprise must be “more than an association of individuals or entities conducting the normal affairs of a defendant corporation.” See Richmond, 52 F.3d at 647 (quoting Brittingham, 943 F.2d at 301-302). However, in Fitzgerald, the court held open the possibility that a corporation and its agents or affiliates could constitute a RICO enterprise: “Maybe a manufacturer could use its dealers or other agents or affiliates in such a way as to bring about the sort of abuse at which RICO is aimed, in which event it might be possible to characterize the assemblage as a RICO enterprise.” 116 F.3d at 228. Thus, the fact that the local moving companies may be deemed “agents” or “affiliates” of Mayflower does not by itself preclude Chen from establishing her RICO claim. In determining whether the distinctiveness requirement is met, the court noted in Fitzgerald that it was helpful to consider the “family resemblance” between the case at hand and “the prototype situation to which the [RICO] statute is addressed.” Id. at 227. The Seventh Circuit has described the “prototypical RICO case” as one in which a criminal “seizes control of a previously legitimate firm and uses the firm’s resources, contacts, facilities, and appearance of legitimacy to perpetrate more, and less easily discovered, criminal acts than he could do in his own person.... ” Id. at 227. See also Emery v. American General Finance, Inc., 134 F.3d 1321, 1324 (7th Cir.1998) (stating that to meet the distinct enterprise requirement, “the firm must be shown to use its agents or affiliates in a way that bears at least a family resemblance to the paradigmatic RICO case in which a criminal obtains control of a legitimate (or legitimate-appearing) firm and uses the firm as the instrument of his criminality”). The Seventh Circuit recognized, however, that when an enterprise is used to engage in some criminal activity but, for the most part, conducts normal and lawful business, it is only one step away from the prototypical case. Fitzgerald, 116 F.3d at 227. Presumably, such an enterprise is within the family resemblance test. In Cedric Kushner, which was decided several years after Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court held that an individual and his wholly owned corporation could be sufficiently distinct for RICO purposes. 533 U.S. at 163, 166, 121 S.Ct. 2087. The Court in Cedric Kushner concluded that the corporate owner/employee was distinct from his corporation because the corporation was “a legally different entity with different rights and responsibilities due to its different legal status,” and the Court could “find nothing in the statute that requires more ‘separateness’ than that.” Id. at 163, 121 S.Ct. 2087. The Court observed that, “[a]fter all, incorporation’s basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs.” Id. In Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., LLP, 329 F.3d 923 (7th Cir.2003), which was decided subsequent to Cedric Kushner, the Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of the defendant on a RICO claim involving a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiaries. In deciding the issue, the court stated: “A parent and its wholly owned subsidiaries no more have sufficient distinctiveness to trigger RICO liability than to trigger liability for conspiring in violation of the Sherman Act ... unless the enterprise’s decision to operate through subsidiaries rather than divisions somehow facilitated its unlawful activity, which has not been shown here.” Id. at 934 (citations omitted). Bucklew suggests that, although a parent corporation and its subsidiaries will generally not meet the distinctiveness requirement, they may be found distinct if the unlawful activity is facilitated by the enterprise’s decision to operate through subsidiaries. Id. None of the person-enterprise relationships in the cases discussed above is identical to the relationship between the person (Mayflower) and the enterprise (Mayflower and the local moving companies with which it affiliates) identified by Chen in this case. Mayflower has not cited a case showing that the distinctiveness requirement cannot be met by the relationship between Mayflower and the enterprise in this case. The court finds that Chen has produced evidence establishing that Mayflower and the enterprise may be distinct entities. First, the enterprise is not simply Mayflower by another name. The relationship between Mayflower and the other participants in the enterprise is not employer-employee or parent-subsidiary. The agreement between Mayflower and its affiliates specifically notes that “[t]he parties agree that they have not established a partnership, cooperative, joint venture, franchise or any other business relationship.” (Agency Agreement at 5.) In addition, Chen has produced evidence that the affiliates associated with her move do significant business entirely apart from their relationship with Mayflower. Doug Sibila, a representative of Admiral, testified that only 50-60% of its revenue is based on its work derived from its relationship with Mayflower, and that the figure may be less in some years. (Sibila Dep. at 26.) Likewise, Robert Fleming, a representative of Century, testified that approximately 55% of Century’s business, such as local and international moving, packing and unpacking, and storage, is separate from its business with Mayflower. (Fleming Dep. at 23-26.) Further, Chen has produced evidence that Mayflower and the enterprise each play a distinct role within the purported scheme. For instance, the evidence shows that the local moving companies conduct activities for the enterprise such as booking shipments, issuing estimates, providing local marketing services, determining (within an authorized range) what discounts to offer, performing physical services such as packing, unpacking, hauling, loading, unloading, storing the goods, and contributing movers and trucks, which Mayflower does not do. (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶¶ 1, 9; PL’s LR Resp. ¶ 6; Webb Dep. at 37,170-71, 180-82.) Conversely, Mayflower provides the centralized communication system via interstate wire to coordinate moves, provides a customer service department for the shippers, oversees operations, provides guidelines regarding discounts that may be offered by the affiliates, processes payments in connection with the moves (e.g., processes credit transactions and collects and disburses the receipts from the shipments to other participants in the enterprise), provides the federal authority to operate interstate and contributes its name. (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶¶ 3, 4, 7, 11, 15; Pl.’s LR Resp. ¶¶ 10, 12, 17; Webb Dep. at 172, 177-78, 180-81, 184, 187.) The evidence that the two entities play distinct roles and had different rights and responsibilities is important in the distinctness analysis. See Cedric Kushner, 533 U.S. at 163, 121 S.Ct. 2087 (finding corporate owner distinct from corporation which was a legally different entity with different rights and responsibilities). Additionally, unlike the plaintiffs in Fitzgerald and in Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685 (7th Cir.2004), another RICO case recently before the Seventh Circuit, Chen has produced evidence indicating that the enterprise is more than simply an association that conducts the normal affairs of the RICO person (Mayflower). Specifically, the enterprise’s alleged activity is extorting money for additional origin and destination service charges and providing fraudulently low estimates. The enterprise does not constitute Mayflower’s regular business because Mayflower does not physieally conduct moves, decide to impose the additional charges or share in the charges collected from the “additional services,” including shuttles, long carries, and stair and elevator charges; only the enterprise does. (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶¶ 1, 16, 33, 38; PL’s LR Resp. ¶ 6; Webb Dep. at 67, 103, 182, 184-85; Fleming Dep. at 82-83.) Chen has also produced sufficient evidence that Mayflower does not deal with its affiliates in merely the “ordinary way.” Cf. Fitzgerald, 116 F.3d at 228 (court found that where the agents’ role in the enterprise’s illegal acts is entirely incidental, differing in no way from what it would be if the agents were the employees of a totally integrated enterprise, there is no “enterprise” within the meaning of the RICO statute). Rather, in the present case, the affiliates can determine on their own what additional services are necessary (at additional cost to the shippers) and can then collect payment for those additional services. (Webb Dep. at 182-83.) Indeed, the evidence produced shows that the success of the enterprise may depend on the distinctness between Mayflower and the enterprise; specifically, the use of the local moving companies as agents or affiliates permitted the enterprise to take Chen’s goods under the representation that certain terms would be met, and then use the fact that her goods were being handled by a different local company as a basis to refuse to honor the agreement made with Chen and to require additional improper payments from Chen. (See Chen Dep. at 196-98, 304; Audiocassette Tr. at 2, 6, 10, 16, 37-38; PL’s LR App. Ex. 27, Vinyard Dep. at 102.) For instance, when Century’s representative refused to accept Chen’s credit card, she did so on the basis that they “didn’t book [Chen’s] order.” (Audiocassette Tr. at 2.) Likewise, when Chen complained to Mayflower’s customer service representative, Mayflower’s representative told Chen that Admiral (the booking agent) refused to approve Chen’s credit card. (Id. at 24-26.) That evidence indicates that by working through the enterprise, Mayflower was enabled to engage in the alleged racketeering activity in a way that would be impossible if Mayflower had internalized the agent-affiliate function. Cf. Fitzgerald, 116 F.3d at 228. Put differently, the person-enterprise relationship in this case may have “empowered [Mayflower] to perpetrate ... fraud by selling through [its affiliates] rather than directly to the public.” Id. at 227. See also Emery, 134 F.3d at 1324 (affirming dismissal where there was “no allegation that by using subsidiaries rather than divisions [the defendants] somehow made it easier to commit or conceal the fraud of which the plaintiff complains”). Thus, Chen has produced evidence tending to show that more than Mayflower’s “normal affairs” were being conducted by the enterprise, namely, the extortion and sharing of improper additional amounts beyond the initial estimates that would have been proper compensation for the move. Finally, as discussed in more detail below, Chen has produced sufficient evidence that Mayflower directs or controls the enterprise. See Emery, 134 F.3d at 1325. All of these facts establish that Mayflower may be sufficiently distinct from the enterprise identified by Chen. Thus, summary judgment cannot be granted on this ground. 2. Mayflower’s Conduct or Participation in the Enterprise’s Affairs Liability under RICO depends on a showing that the defendant “conducted or participated in the conduct of the ‘enterprise’s affairs’ not just [its] own affairs.” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993). To “ ‘participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs,’ one must have some part in directing those affairs.” Id. at 179, 113 S.Ct. 1163 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)). “In other words, [the defendant] must have participated in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.” United States v. Swan, 250 F.3d 495, 498 (7th Cir.2001). a. The Enterprise’s Affairs Mayflower argues that Chen cannot establish that the alleged wrongdoing was performed on behalf of the enterprise rather than on behalf of Mayflower because Mayflower’s participation in the enterprise’s operation (e.g., by providing centralized communications and customer services and collecting payments) consisted of “everyday business functions” of Mayflower. (Def.’s Mem. at 12.) Chen asserts that she has produced evidence establishing that the alleged wrongdoing was not solely the business of Mayflower, but, instead, was the business of the Mayflower-enterprise. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 12.) The requirement that a RICO defendant have engaged in the enterprise’s affairs rather than just its own is simply another reference to the fact that a RICO defendant must be distinct from the alleged enterprise. See Stachon v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 229 F.3d 673, 676 n. 3 (7th Cir.2000) (stating that “the court has consistently insisted that the RICO defendant or person be separate and distinct from the enterprise ... because liability depends on showing that the defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs, not just their own affairs”) (quotations omitted); Cedric Kushner, 533 U.S. at 163, 121 S.Ct. 2087 (discussing, as part of the distinctness analysis, the principle that liability depends on a showing that the defendant conducted or participated in the enterprise’s affairs rather than its own affairs). Here, Chen has established facts which could support a conclusion that the alleged wrongdoing (Mayflower’s collection and distribution of money obtained through fraud, extortion and theft) was performed on behalf of the enterprise rather than Mayflower and, therefore, was not solely Mayflower’s “own affairs.” For instance, Mayflower is not in the business of issuing estimates to shippers. (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 1.) Thus, the enterprise’s activity of issuing misleadingly low estimates to shippers (fraud) cannot constitute Mayflower’s “own affairs.” Similarly, Mayflower is not in the business of picking up or delivering shippers’ property (indeed, it does not even have the trucks or laborers to perform such services). (Id.; Pl.’s LR Resp. ¶ 6.) Thus, the enterprise’s activity of refusing to load or unload a shipper’s property until additional charges have been paid (extortion and theft) cannot constitute Mayflower’s “own affairs.” Although some of the activities conducted by Mayflower may be “everyday business functions,” as Mayflower contends, the facts discussed above suggest that Mayflower nevertheless conducted or participated in the conduct of the “enterprise’s affairs,” as required by the RICO statute. Richmond and Atkinson v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 808 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.1987), two cases cited by Mayflower in support of its argument, are distinguishable. (Def.’s Mem. at 11-12.) In Richmond, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint because there was no showing that the defendants conducted the affairs of either of the alleged enterprises, rather than their own affairs, through a pattern of racketeering. 52 F.3d at 647. In Atkinson, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on its finding that the alleged RICO violation (the mailing of false loan statements) was solely an activity of the bank and there was no evidence of any other activity on the part of the alleged enterprise. 808 F.2d at 441. In contrast, here, as discussed above, there is evidence that the defendant conducted the enterprise’s affairs in addition to its own. b. Operation or Management of the Enterprise’s Affairs Mayflower also argues that it does not direct or control the enterprise. (Def.’s Reply at 3, 10-11.) Mayflower asserts that, in fact, it is the local moving company affiliates who committed the predicate acts alleged and that those affiliates are not controlled by Mayflower. (Id. at 10.) Citing Reves, Chen argues that the purpose of the “operation or management” test is to prevent the RICO statute from reaching “complete outsiders,” and that Mayflower is not a “complete outsider” to the enterprise, but rather its “center point.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 11) (citing Reves, 507 U.S. at 185, 113 S.Ct. 1163). In Goren v. New Vision International, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 727-28 (7th Cir.1998), the Seventh Circuit observed that the mere existence of a business relationship between the enterprise and the defendant is not sufficient to meet the operation and management test. The court stated that “simply performing services for an enterprise, even with knowledge of the enterprise’s illicit nature, is not enough to subject an individual to RICO liability....” Id. at 728. Similarly, in Swan, the Seventh Circuit concluded that receiving a ghost payroll check, taking on clients who were improperly referred by an alderman, failing to file tax returns and using a false Social Security card did not prove that the defendant operated or managed the alleged enterprise (the City of Chicago). 250 F.3d at 499 (reversing a RICO conviction because the district court failed to properly instruct the jury that RICO requires a finding of operation or management of the enterprise). In the present case, Chen has established facts indicating that, unlike the defendants in the aforementioned cases, Mayflower does participate in the operation or management of the enterprise. The evidence produced shows that Mayflower develops policies and procedures, which its affiliates are required to follow. (Pl.’s LR Resp. ¶ 3.) Mayflower directly controls the customer service department and the disbursement of funds to the local moving company affiliates, including the disbursement of the amounts received for the »additional origin and destination charges. (Def.’s LR Resp. ¶¶ 4, 11, 15, 16; Webb Dep. at 172.) Mayflower also provides its name to the enterprise. (Agency Agreement at 2.) Mayflower is the link between the booking agent who provides the allegedly fraudulent estimate and the hauling agent who extracts the additional charges. In addition, although Mayflower argues that its participation was limited to merely performing services for the enterprise because it was the local moving company agents who committed the alleged predicate acts (e.g., issued fraudulent estimates and unilaterally imposed higher charges at the point of origin or destination), the evidence shows otherwise. Mayflower issues the policies, procedure and guidelines which permits the alleged predicate acts to be committed. Mayflower’s argument that the agents who committed the alleged predicate acts are not controlled by Mayflower because they “are all independent corporations, incorporated in different states, with different ownership from Mayflower” and because “[tjhere is no evidence in the record of any relationship between the members of the Mayflower-enterprise ... no shared ownership and no shared employees” (Def.’s Reply at 10) (citing Pl.’s Opp’n at 7, 12) is also at odds with Mayflower’s argument, discussed above, that the affiliates are acting as Mayflower’s agents. And, significantly, Mayflower recruits and has the power to admit affiliates at will and, when dissatisfied, end its relationship with an affiliate “without cause.” (Agency Agreement at 6; Webb Dep. at 173, 177.) Mayflower’s role in the enterprise therefore goes far beyond the .mere giving of directions or performance of tasks helpful to the enterprise. Indeed, without Mayflower’s involvement, it appears the enterprise would fail to exist altogether. Thus, the evidence produced suggests that Mayflower participates in the enterprise’s operation and “flakes] some part in directing [the enterprise’s] affairs.” Goren, 156 F.3d at 728 (citing Reves, 507 U.S. at 179 n. 3, 113 S.Ct. 1163); see also Swan, 250 F.3d at 498 (quoting Reves, 507 U.S. at 179, 113 S.Ct. 1163). Mayflower is not the “complete outsider” that the operation or management test seeks to exclude. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 185, 113 S.Ct. 1163. Accordingly, summary judgment cannot be granted on this ground, either. B. Pattern of Racketeering Activity Liability under RICO also depends on a showing that Mayflower engaged in a “pattern of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989), the Supreme Court established that a pattern of racketeering activity requires more than simply a certain number of predicate acts. The Court determined that, although at least two “predicate acts” are necessary, they may not be sufficient. Id. at 237, 109 S.Ct. 2893 (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3275). The Court further stated that “[a] pattern is not formed by sporadic activity,” but that a plaintiff must show “that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239, 109 S.Ct. 2893 (quotation omitted). The “pattern” requirement thus contains both a relatedness and a continuity component. To demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO, a plaintiff must prove; (1) two or more predicate acts; (2) that are related; and (3) that involve either a closed period of repeated conduct (closed-ended continuity) or present the threat of repetition in the future (open-ended continuity). Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc. of Peoria, 142 F.3d 1041, 1048 (7th Cir.1998). Mayflower argues that Chen cannot establish a “pattern of racketeering activity” as required under § 1962(c) because she cannot satisfy either the relatedness or the continuity component. (Def.’s Mot. If 2; Def.’s Mem. at 3,13-18.) 1. Relatedness The relatedness component is established when the conduct in question “embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.” H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240, 109 S.Ct. 2893 (citation omitted). Mayflower argues that the other shipping transactions identified by Chen do not satisfy the relatedness component because: “Each incident is highly individualized. Each customer has his or her own individual grievance relating to such different issues as poor service, late deliveries, lost or damaged goods, increases in ‘binding’ estimates, broken-down trucks, and an assortment of other problems and grievances .... ” (Def.’s Mem. at 15.) Mayflower acknowledges, however, that “common denominators among these interstate moves are the making of a binding estimate, the subsequent levying of charges for additional services, and the refusal to unload until the charges are paid.” (Id. at 15-16.) Chen responds that the predicate acts alleged fall into a similar pattern of bait and switch. (PL’s Opp’n at 12-13.) She further asserts that all of the predicate acts involve similar participants, victims, purposes, and methods. (Id. at 12-13.) This court previously determined that Chen met the relatedness requirements at the pleading stage by describing a bait and switch scheme: The purpose and result is to obtain monies in excess of the original estimates by holding the individual’s property until the individual pays the additional amounts. The method is to obtain the individual’s property and subsequently demand additional amounts for claimed additional services, refusing to release the property until the amounts are paid. Chen, 159 F.Supp.2d at 1111. See also Corley, 142 F.3d at 1050 (stating that bait and switch scheme involving substantial number of victims experiencing distinct injuries establishes a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO). Now, Chen has produced sufficient evidence supporting her allegation that Mayflower was conducting (or participating in the conduct of) the enterprise’s affairs, i.e., the bait and switch scheme in which the purpose was to obtain monies in excess of the original estimates by holding the shippers’ property until additional amounts were paid. Moreover, the evidence produced shows that the predicate acts alleged by Chen are sufficiently related. They have similar participants: Mayflower and the affiliated local moving companies. (Pl.’s LR Resp. ¶ 3.) They have similar victims: individual shippers conducting interstate moves of their household goods. They have similar purposes and results: to obtain money in excess of the shipper’s original estimate by refusing to move or unload the shipper’s property until the shipper pays the additional amount. (Webb Dep. at 65-68, 71-72, 80-81, 121-22; Reece Dep. at 21-23; Def.’s LR Resp. ¶24.) And they have similar methods: bait the shipper with false promises that the cost of the move will not exceed a set price and then, at a point of maximum leverage, demand additional money from the shipper. (Reece Dep. at 15, 21-23; Webb Dep. at 71, 80-81, 85; Def.’s LR Resp. ¶ 17; Witherington Dep. at 215; Fleming Dep. at 265-66.) Thus, Chen has established predicate acts that have “the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims or methods of commission.” H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240, 109 S.Ct. 2893 (citation omitted). Mayflower’s argument that the various transactions identified by Chen are not related because the “individual grievance[s]” made by the shippers “relat[e] to such different issues” (e.g., increases in binding estimates, poor service, late deliveries, lost or damaged goods, and broken-down trucks) (Def.’s Mem. at 15) is unpersuasive in light of the similarities in the participants, victims, purposes, results and methods discussed above. Thus, summary judgment cannot be granted on this basis. 2. Continuity To establish a RICO pattern “it must also be shown that the predicates themselves amount to, or ... otherwise constitute a threat of, continuing racketeering activity.” H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240, 109 S.Ct. 2893. The “continuity” requirement “is both a closed- and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition.” Id. at 241, 109 S.Ct. 2893 (citation omitted). a. Closed-ended Continuity Closed-ended continuity may be demonstrated by “a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time.” Id. at 242, 109 S.Ct. 2893. “Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement....” Id. Historically, the Seventh Circuit looked at the following factors to determine whether closed-ended continuity was established: (1) the number and variety of predicate acts; (2) the time period over which the predicate acts were committed; (3) the number of v