Full opinion text
ORDER DUFFY, District Judge. This matter was tried without a jury beginning on July 15, 2002. The United States has alleged that the at-large method of electing the nine-member Charleston County Council violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (“Section 2”), because it results in the unlawful dilution of minority voting strength. The Court-having heard the arguments, read the submissions of counsel, and considered the evidence including court-room testimony, deposition testimony, and exhibits-enters judgment for the United States of America and partial judgment for Plaintiffs Moultrie, Freeman, McGill, and Flower based on the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. As an initial matter it is important to clarify what this Order rigorously says about the at-large electoral system of Charleston County and what it unequivocally does not say about her citizens. The Court recognizes that its decision does not merely operate mechanically against a political subdivision of the State of South Carolina but in fact against individual citizens whose lives in various measure are today changed. While the Court is otherwise disinclined to editorialize, those individuals, whether white or black, who have had no voice in this debate but whose liberties are invariably altered by its resolution, deserve as clear and direct an explanation of this action as can be reasonably provided. There is a fundamental gravity to any decision of a federal court which calls into question actions taken by the people through the legislative process of their local and state communities. Federalism and separation of powers demand vigilant consideration. With that said, this Order is radically not a condemnation of the citizenry of Charleston County but rather a recognition that the specific bulwark of an at-large system, in twisted concert with the particular geographic and historical realities of this County, unlawfully and institutionally inhibit a community of voters in Charleston County from equal access to the electoral process. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the “essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect preferred representatives.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). In other words, a violation of Section 2 may arise from the structure of the electoral process itself plus the effects of past discrimination without regard to any present discriminatory intent. This case is one such instance. Undoubtedly there are bigots among us, and while their stories uncomfortably texture the four corners of the Court’s decision, this Order is little about them. If the trial on the merits demonstrated anything, it is that Charleston County can celebrate a rich legacy of individuals selflessly working towards a true community among its many races. Notwithstanding, the current at-large system, as it exists in a county of this size, unlawfully exacerbates the disadvantaged political posture inherited by generations of African-Americans through centuries of institutional discrimination. INTRODUCTION Procedural History The United States brought this action on January 17, 2001. The United States did not allege a violation of Section 2’s intent standard. Private plaintiffs, who are four citizens registered to vote in Charleston County elections, filed their suit on February 28, 2001, alleging that Charleston County’s at-large method of election violates the results and intent standards of Section 2. The Court consolidated the two cases on April 6, 2001. On March 5, 2002, the United States moved for partial summary judgment as to the three preconditions set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25(1986). On March 29, 2002, the United States also moved to enjoin the County from holding elections for open seats on the Charleston County Council until a proper remedy could be implemented under Section 2. On April 1, 2002, the private Plaintiffs also filed motions for a partial summary judgment on the Gingles preconditions and for a preliminary injunction. On April 2, 2002, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on the third Gingles precondition and on the totality of circumstances. Magistrate Judge Robert S. Carr heard oral argument on those motions on April 17, 2002. In a written Report and Recommendation dated April 26, 2002, Magistrate Judge Carr recommended that (1) the United States’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Gingles preeondi-tions be granted, (2) the Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the totality of the circumstances be denied, and (3) the United States’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction be denied. Defendants objected only to Magistrate Judge Carr’s recommendation that partial summary judgment be granted the United States as to the third Gingles precondition. They did not object to the other recommendations, including those related to the first two Gingles preconditions or that an untimely affidavit filed by one of Defendants’ expert/witness, Dr. Ronald Weber, be stricken from fhese proceedings. The United States objected only to that portion of Magistrate Judge Carr’s Report and Recommendation that concluded that the United States did not meet its burden of demonstrating that a preliminary injunction would serve the public interest. On May 24, 2002, the Court denied the United States’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. In an Order dated July 10, 2002, the Court adopted Magistrate Judge Carr’s Report and Recommendation in toto granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the three Gingles preconditions. Both the Court’s Order, dated July 10, 2002, granting Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and the Magistrate Judge’s Report are incorporated herein by specific reference. The trial in this case commenced on July 15, 2002, and concluded on August 16, 2002. On September 18, 2002 the Court denied the United States’ renewed motion for preliminary injunction against the November 5, 2002 general election for positions on the Charleston County Council. Jurisdiction and Standing The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973j, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345. The voting rights claims advanced by the United States in this action are premised solely upon Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d), “[wjhenever any person has engaged ... in any act or practice prohibited by [Section 2] ... the Attorney General may institute for the United States, or in the name of the United States, an action for preventive relief, including an application for a temporary or permanent injunction ... or other order.” Thus, the United States has standing to challenge Charleston County’s at-large method of election for its County Council to protect the voting rights of the County’s African-American citizens. Private Plaintiffs also have standing to pursue their claims. See Wilson v. Minor, 220 F.3d 1297, 1303 n. 11 (11th Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995) and stating “the essential point remains that in order to have standing one must reside in the area directly affected by the allegedly illegal voting scheme”). DISCUSSION: FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. Factual Background Demographic Information and Statistical Background Charleston County is the third most populous of South Carolina’s 46 counties and has the second highest total number of African American residents. (U.S.Ex. 106.) According to the 2000 Census of Population, Charleston County has a total population of 309,969. (U.S.Ex. 107.) Of that total, 188,542 (60.8%) persons are white and 106,337 (34.3%) are African American; 15,090 (4.9%) are of other racial/ethnic descent. (Id.) Charleston County’s voting age population is 236,395, of whom 153,250 (64.8%) are white, 72,287 (30.6%) are African American, and 10,858 (4.6%) are of other racial/ethnic descent. (Id.) According to the South Carolina Election Commission, as of November 2000:(1) 177,279 persons were registered to vote in Charleston County, 122,557 (69.1%) of whom were white and 54,722 (30.9%) of whom were nonwhite; and (2) 114,166 persons voted in the November 2000 general election, 82,395 (72.2%) of whom were white, and 31,771 (27.8%) of whom were nonwhite. (U.S.Ex. 441.) African-American voters participate at a lower rate in elections than white voters in Charleston County. (Joint Ex. 2A at Tables 4-5; U.S. Ex. 14 at Table 4; U.S. Ex. 15 at Table 1.) Charleston County encompasses a geographical area of 919 square miles, a significant portion of which is water, and includes the incorporated municipalities of Awendaw, Charleston, Folly Beach, Hollywood, Isle of Palms, James Island, Town of Kiawah, Lincolnville, McClellanville, Meggett, Mount Pleasant, North Charleston, Ravenel, Town of Seabrook and Sullivan’s Island. II. Method of Election for County Council The Charleston County Council governs Charleston County. (U.S. Am. Comp. ¶ 3; Am. Answer ¶ 3.) It is composed of nine members elected at-large in partisan elections to four-year, staggered terms. (U.S. Am. Comp. ¶¶ 4, 6; Am. Answer ¶¶ 3, 5.) Council members qualify from four residency districts in the following fashion: three members reside in the City of Charleston, three members reside in the area between the Ashley and Cooper rivers that is not in the City of Charleston, two members reside in the area west of the Ashley River that is not in the City of Charleston, and one member resides in the area east of the Cooper River. (U.S. Am. Comp. ¶ 6; Am. Answer ¶ 5.) The County’s at-large method of election was created in 1969, and precleared by the United States Attorney General under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. In 1989, Charleston County held a referendum on a proposal to switch from at-large to single-member districts for the County Council. Supporters of at-large elections prevailed by a margin of 52 to 48 % in a referendum with a turnout of less than 13 %. The Evening Post editorialized that voting in the referendum was polarized along racial lines. (U.S. Ex. 16 at 24; Transcript of Record at 971 [hereafter “Tr. at_..”]). Moreover, according to the United States’ expert, Dr. Theodore Arrington, and the Defendants’ expert, Dr. Ronald Weber, voting on the referendum was extremely polarized between white and African American voters: they agree that at least 98% of African-American voters voted “yes” on the referendum and at least 75% of the white voters voted “no.” (U.S. Ex. 14 at 63-64; Joint Ex. 2C, at Ex. A thereto.) Since 1970, 41 persons have been elected to the Charleston County Council, three of whom are African American: Lonnie Hamilton III, Marjorie Amos-Frazier, and Timothy Scott. (U.S.Ex. 30.) Scott is the only current African-American member of the Charleston County Council. Charleston County is one of only three South Carolina counties that elects its entire county council at-large. (U.S. Am. Comp. ¶ 11; Am. Answer ¶ 6.) The other two counties, Hampton and Jasper, are rural counties with total populations of less than 22,000 residents in each county, and comprised of a close balance of African-American and white citizens. (U.S.Exs.78, 106.) Moreover, of the 35 South Carolina counties in which whites were a majority of the population according to the 2000 Census of Population, only one — Charleston County — continues to elect its entire county council at-large. (U.S.Ex. 106.) III. General Overview of the Results Standard of Section 2 As amended in 1982, Section 2(a) of the Voting Rights Act prohibits in part any state or political subdivision from imposing or applying “any standard, practice, or procedure” which “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Section 2 prohibits all forms of voting discrimination that “result in the denial of equal access to any phase of the electoral process for minority group members.” S.Rep. No. 97-417 at 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207 (hereinafter “Senate Report”). As amended in 1982, Section 2 requires proof only of a discriminatory result, not of discriminatory intent. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 394, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991). The essence of a Section 2 results-claim is that an “electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). While the results standard does not provide an assurance of success at the polls for minority preferred candidates, it does provide an assurance of a fair process. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1014, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994). Thus, Section 2 insures that minority voters are free from any election practice “which operate[s], designedly or otherwise” to deny them the same opportunity to participate in all phases of the political process as other citizens enjoy. Senate Report at 28. The critical question, therefore, is “whether the use of a contested electoral practice or structure results in members of a protected group having less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 63, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (citations omitted). “[A]t-large voting in a multimember political unit,” as exists in Charleston County, “may prevent minorities from electing representatives of their choice by diluting their voting strength,” in violation of Section 2. Collins v. City of Norfolk, 883 F.2d 1232, 1236 (4th Cir.1989) (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47-48, 106 S.Ct. 2752). In Gingles, the Supreme Court established three preconditions that a plaintiff challenging an at-large election system under Section 2 must satisfy. “First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50, 106 S.Ct. 2752. “Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.” Id. at 51, 106 S.Ct. 2752. “Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed ...—usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Id. Satisfaction of the three Gingles preconditions is necessary to establish a Section 2 claim, but it alone is not sufficient. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994). The Court must also perform a “totality of circumstances” inquiry. The Supreme Court has looked to the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 extension of the Voting Rights Act for guidance as to the “nature of § 2 violations and [] the proof required to establish these violations.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43, 106 S.Ct. 2752. The Senate Report outlines various factors the Court might consider in analyzing a Section 2 claim. The Senate Factors include: 1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the Democratic process; 2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; 3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process; 5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. Senate Report at 28-29 (footnotes omitted). The Senate also recognized the following “[additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of plaintiffs’ evidence to establish a violation”: • whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group [and] • whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. Id. at 29 (footnotes omitted). IV. Plaintiffs Have Established the Three Gingles Preconditions As noted, this Court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs on the three Gingles preconditions in its Order dated July 10, 2002. Accordingly, the Court reaffirms its findings that (1) the African-American population of Charleston County is sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to constitute a majority in at least one of nine single-member districts in an illustrative plan for Charleston County Council; (2) African-American voters in Charleston County are politically cohesive; and (3) candidates of choice of African-American voters in Charleston County Council contests are usually defeated as a result of white bloc voting. V. The Totality of the Circumstances Inquiry Establishment of the Gingles preconditions presages Section 2 liability. Indeed, “it will be only the very unusual case in which the plaintiffs can establish the existence of the three Gingles factors but still have failed to establish a violation of § 2 under the totality of the circumstances.” Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283, 293 (5th Cir.1996) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs need not prove any particular number of Senate factors or that a majority of them point “one way or the other.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (citing Senate Report at 29). Nor must Plaintiffs demonstrate that white voters “demonstrate an unbending or unalterable hostility to whoever may be the minority group’s representative of choice, but whether, as a practical matter, the usual result of the bloc voting that exists is the defeat of the minority-preferred candidate.” Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1123 (3d Cir.1993). The Court will begin its totality of the circumstances consideration with the two Senate factors identified by the Supreme Court as most important; (1) the “extent to which minority group members have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction” and (2) the “extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n. 15, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (citing Senate Report at 28-29, U.S.C.C.A.N.1982, p. 206). If those factors are present, the other factors “are supportive of, but not essential to, a minority voter’s claim.” Id. A. The Extent of Racially Polarized Voting The Court will first consider the extent to which voting in Charleston County elections is racially polarized. The Supreme Court defines racially polarized voting as a “ ‘consistent relationship between [the] race of the voter and the way in which the voter votes,’ or to put it differently, where ‘black voters and white voters vote differently.’ ” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (internal citations omitted); see also Sanchez v. State of Colo., 97 F.3d 1303, 1312 (10th Cir.1996). Dr. Theodore Arrington, expert for the United States, found that out of 31 contested, County-Council elections studied from 1984 to 2000, voting was racially polarized 29 times (94%). (U.S. Ex. 14 at Table 13.) The findings of Defendants’ own expert, Dr. Ronald Weber, also confirm that voting in Charleston County Council elections is severely and characteristically polarized along racial lines. In 25 of the 33 contested general elections, from 1988 to 2000, African-American and white voters were polarized (75.8%). (Joint Ex. 2B ¶ 7.) This pattern of racially polarized voting is perhaps most dramatically demonstrated by Dr. Weber’s findings that, in general election contests for Charleston County Council with at least one African-American candidate, there was polarization between African-American and white voters 100% of the time. (Id. at Figures 5-6.) Even in general election contests for Charleston County Council involving no African-American candidates, there was polarization between African-American and white voters 87.5% of the time. (Id.) It cannot be overstated that such polarization has resulted in a legally significant quantum of defeats for minority-preferred candidates, as previously concluded by the Court in its Order dated July 10, 2002. (See also Joint Ex. 2A ¶ 53; Joint Ex. 2B at Figure 7.) It is this consistent defeat at the polls that makes such egregious polarization ultimately relevant. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. 2752. “[W]here minority and majority voters consistently prefer different candidates, the majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority, will regularly defeat the choices of minority voters.” Id. at 48, 106 S.Ct. 2752. The Court concludes that this evidence of significant and pervasive polarization militates strongly in favor of finding a Section 2 violation. B. The Extent to Which African-American Persons Have Been Elected to Public Office The second most important Senate factor is the extent to which African-American persons have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. As discussed above, of the 41 persons elected to the Charleston County Council since 1970, just three (7.41%) have been African American: Lonnie Hamilton III, Marjorie Amos-Frazier and Timothy Scott. (U.S.Ex. 30.) Of those three, Timothy Scott is emphatically not the candidate of choice of the county’s African-American voters. Although independently the elections of Hamilton, Scott, and Amos-Frazier are important stories of electoral success for minority candidates, they nonetheless represent a facially inadequate quantum of endogenous success among African-American candidates. Moreover, in all elections exogenous to the county-council races, African-American candidates have fared no better. The following represents the entire universe of African-American-candidate electoral success in all other exogenous, at-large elections within the jurisdiction: • five African-American members of the nine-member Charleston County School Board, elected in the November 1998 General Election. The expert for the United States, Ted Arrington, agreed that all five of these individuals are African-American-preferred candidates (Tr.at 356). • County Probate Judge Bernard Fielding, an African-American, who ran countywide as a Democratic candidate in the November 1990 General Election and was elected. • Hollywood Mayor . Herbert Gadson, who is African American. • Awendaw Mayor William Alston, who is African American. • Lincolnville Mayor Tyrone Aiken, who is African American. • Former State Senator and State Representative Herbert Ulysses Fielding, an African American, who ran at large as a Democratic candidate for the South Carolina House of Representatives in 1970 and was elected in that at-large election. • Charleston City Councilman Louis Waring, an African American, who in 1990 ran at-large as a Democratic candidate for St. Andrews Public Service District Commissioner, and was elected in that special purpose district with a majority white voting age population. • Mount Pleasant Council member Tho-masina Stokes-Marshall, an African American, who ran at-large for and won a seat on the Town Council of Mount Pleasant, a municipality with a nine percent African-American voting age population. Notably, in Charleston County’s entire history, the aforementioned Judge Bernard Fielding, is the only African-American candidate to have ever won a countywide election for any of the seven single-seat offices: probate judge, sheriff, clerk of court, coroner, treasurer, register mesne conveyance and auditor. (Tr. at 101-02, 183-84.) Even still, after his November 1990 election victory to the office of Charleston County Probate Judge, Judge Fielding was not sworn in until the following August of 1991 and only after the South Carolina Supreme Court’s unanimous ruling that rejected an election contest by his opponent. (Tr. at 99-101; see Fielding v. South Carolina Election Comm’n, 305 S.C. 313, 408 S.E.2d 232 (1991).) Evidence of African-American candidate success in school board elections is also of dubious consequence. As stated, following the November 1998 General Election, the Charleston County School Board was comprised of five African-American trustees and four white trustees. However, the Record demonstrates that the success of some African-American, school-board candidates is attributable to special circumstances unique to the school board elections. To wit, two of the five current African-American members were elected in contests where there were fewer white candidates than seats contested: in 1998, Oliver Addison was elected in a contest with no white candidates, and in 2000, Hillary Douglas was elected in a two-seat contest where there were only two white candidates on the ballot, one of which withdrew publicly one month before the election. (U.S. Ex. 23; Tr. at 323-24, 413, 578.) There is sufficient evidence to conclude that two of the other African-American school board members (Lewis, Ketchen-Simpkins) ran against multiple white opponents and won because the white vote was split among the white candidates. (U.S. Ex. 23, Tr. at 333-34, 413). Indeed, Douglas’s contest — a two seat contest with only one white candidate that had not withdrawn — was the only black-white School Board contest from 1990 to the present where an African-American candidate would have been elected if only white voters had voted. (U.S. Exs. 23 and 25.) Dr. Weber found that in some of the school board races, African-American voters had participated in single-shot voting. (Tr. at 2129, 2136.) He also found that African-American school board candidates had won because the white vote was split among several white candidates, a phenomenon that does not occur in County Council races. (Tr. at 2140, 2142, 2145-46.) These special circumstances explain the contemporary and inordinate African American-candidate success that is out of balance with the characteristically poor results for African American candidates in all other jurisdictional elections. In sum, the United States has demonstrated that there has been only a disproportionately small number of African American persons ever elected to the Charleston County Council under the at-large method of election and throughout the jurisdiction. While the individual success of these African-American candidates in Charleston County is of immeasurable consequence to African Americans in Charleston County and the community at-large, they are an unfortunate and paltry offering for purposes of the Court’s Section 2 inquiry. Reinforcing the Court’s consideration of the Gingles preconditions, the two most important Senate factors-the extent of racially polarized voting and the success of minority candidates in the jurisdiction-both weigh markedly in favor of a finding that African Americans suffer unequal access to the electoral process. Although “supportive of, but not essential to, a minority voter’s claim,” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n. 15, 106 S.Ct. 2752, the Court considers the following additional Senate Factors. • C. The extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process. The Court is next concerned with the extent to which African Americans in Charleston County “bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process.” S.Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong.2d Sess. 28, 29 (1992). This factor is satisfied when the plaintiffs can show (1) “disproportionate educational, employment, income level and living conditions arising from past discrimination” and (2) a depressed level of minority participation in politics. Id. at 29 & n. 114. Importantly, Plaintiffs do not have to prove a causal nexus between the two: The Courts have recognized that disproportionate educational employment, income level and living conditions arising from past discrimination tend to depress minority political participation. Where these conditions are shown, and where the level of black participation in politics is depressed, plaintiffs need not prove any further causal nexus between their disparate socio-economic status and the depressed level of political participation. Id. (citations omitted); see also Teague v. Attala County, Miss., 92 F.3d 283, 294 (5th Cir.1996); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 866 (5th Cir.1993). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that inequalities in education, employment, income level and living conditions that arise from past racial discrimination have a deleterious tendency to hinder minority political participation. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 768, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973). 1. Disproportionate education, employment, income level, and living conditions arising from past discrimination. It is plain that African Americans have suffered a pronounced and protracted history of past discrimination. The Court briefly recounts particular indiscretions not for their emotive features but for their necessary place in the totality of the inquiry required by Section 2. The focus, however, will ultimately remain on the present disproportionality in education, employment, income, and living conditions between African Americans and whites resulting from such discrimination and whether African Americans participate politically at depressed levels. During the first half of the twentieth century, African-American citizens in Charleston, as in other areas of South Carolina, were subject to segregation laws which had a discriminatory effect on most aspects of their lives. (U.S. Ex. 11 at 1; U.S. Ex. 16 at 5, 7-8; Tr. at 928.) Among the public institutions most important to future participation in the political process is education. Charleston County’s segregated facilities for African Americans were routinely inferior and the distribution of resources were greatly disparate. Per-pupil expenditures for public education, calculated separately for both African-American and white schools, provide a measure of discrimination in school quality under segregation that is widely accepted by historians. (Tr. at 928-30.) In 1915, Charleston County schools spent five times as much for white pupils as for African Americans. (U.S. Ex. 16 at 6, quoting Louis Harlan, Separate and Unequal: Public School Campaigns and Racism in the Southern Seaboard States, 1901-1915 185 (1968); Tr. at 929.) In the 1930s, expenditures for white students were four times those for African-American students; by the end of the 1940s, the ratio was roughly two to one in favor of white pupils. (U.S. Ex. 16 at 44, App.) Even as late as the 1958-1959 school year, per-pupil expenditures favored whites by a ratio of 1.3 to one. (Id; Tr. at 929.) These deficiencies have greatly diminished the educational capital inherited by the present generation of African Americans. As in so many other communities, racial change did not come quickly or easily to Charleston County. When the United States Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, the Charleston News and Courier editorialized that it would lead to “the most radical upheaval since Reconstruction.” (Quoted in Priv. Pis.’ Ex. 1 at 16.) In its aftermath state and local officials made plans to maintain racial segregation by every legal means, and prominent white leaders organized local Citizens Councils to promote the unity of the white community behind the cause of segregation. Charleston had an active Citizens Council chapter in the 1950s under the leadership of a person subsequently elected to the Charleston County Council. (Priv. Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 16, 41; Tr. at 1147, 1158-59, 1195, 2915.) Prior to the enactment of Title 2 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, facilities open to the public, such as restaurants, doctors’ offices, buses, movie theaters, parks and beaches, were segregated along racial lines. (Tr. at 1285-86, 1287, 1432-34, 1921.) As described by former Charleston County Probate Judge Bernard Fielding, the county during the period before the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was “totally segregated.” (Tr. at 88-89.) Desegregation came to Charleston County, as to the rest of the South, largely as a result of federal court orders. Initially, however, state and local officials sometimes closed facilities rather than eliminate racial segregation. In 1934, an enactment of the South Carolina Legislature which applied only to Charleston County made it a crime for African Americans and whites to use the same recreational facilities. When African-American citizens filed a lawsuit challenging the racial segregation of facilities at Edisto Beach State Park in Charleston County, the State Commission of Forestry closed the park to all citizens. Clark v. Flory, 141 F.Supp. 248 (E.D.S.C.1956). The park was closed until 1966. (Priv. Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 17; Tr. at 708.) The law was not repealed until 1977. 1977 S.C. Acts 306. Over time, however, officials began to accede to court orders, rather than eliminate public services. The successful desegregation of Charleston’s municipal golf course in 1961, for example, resulted from the decision of city officials to comply with a federal court order in Cummings v. City of Charleston, 288 F.2d 817 (4th Cir.1961). In 1961, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the state’s trespass-after-notice law and affirmed the convictions of 24 African-American citizens who refused to leave the lunch counter at the S.H. Kress Store in Charleston County. City of Charleston v. Mitchell, 239 S.C. 376, 123 S.E.2d 512 (1961). The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision by the South Carolina Supreme Court in City of Charleston v. Mitchell, 239 S.C. 376, 123 S.E.2d 512 (1961), on the grounds that enforcement of the state’s anti-trespass law had taken place in such a way as to violate the constitutional rights of the African-American citizens prosecuted in the City of Charleston. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 349, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). Racially discriminatory employment practices, in the private and public sectors, further disadvantaged African Americans economically. (Tr. at 930-32.) Before civil rights demonstrations took place in the City of Charleston in 1963, virtually all business establishments in Charleston County were racially segregated and did not provide equal pay for equal work for all employees. (U.S. Ex. 11 at 7; Tr. at 635-36.) By July 4, 1963, over 500 African-American civil rights demonstrators had been arrested; 229 of them had already been tried and convicted. (Priv. Pis.’ Ex. 1 at 18-19.) As a result of demonstrations, some business establishments in downtown Charleston agreed to serve customers of both races on an equal basis. (U.S. Ex. 11 at 7.) Substantial desegregation throughout Charleston County awaited implementation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Until August 1963, the school system of District 20 in Charleston County was completely segregated by race. Brown v. School District No. 20, 226 F.Supp. 819, 826 (E.D.S.C.1963); (Tr. at 90, 813, 1359-61, 1429.) In August, 1963, a federal court ordered the admission of eleven African-American students to previously all-white schools in Charleston and enjoined the local school board from refusing admission, assignment, or transfer of any other African-American child, on the basis of race or color, to attend any public school operated by the school district. Brown, 226 F.Supp. at 827. Rather than send their children to racially integrated public schools, many white parents chose to have them attend private schools, some of which were organized in the aftermath of public school desegregation. (Tr. at 936-37; U.S. Ex. 16 at 13-14.) The then-President of a local college and later a member of the state legislature, helped found an all-white preparatory school at the college, resisted desegregation of the college itself, and gave public speeches opposing racial integration. (Priv. Pis.’ Ex. 1 at 43.) Financial assistance to parents enrolling their children in private schools was provided in some instances through the state’s tuition grant program. (Priv. Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 19.) As late as 1966, only 185 African-American students were attending desegregated schools in Charleston County. (U.S. Ex. 16 at 13-14; Priv. Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 19, 43-44.) The Charleston County Bar Association was not open to black attorneys until the late 1960s. (Tr. at 87, 89.) As late as 1972, the women’s section of the Charleston County Jail was segregated. (Tr. at 650.) The discriminatory impact of Charleston County’s system of racial segregation is reflected in census data throughout the 20th century. According to the 1950 Census of Population, the median income for African-American families in Charleston County was $672, roughly one third of the median income for white families ($2,007). (Priv. Pis.’ Ex. 1 at 12.) The percentage of non-white unemployed (13.9 % for males, 10.8 % for females) was far higher than among whites, where only 4.4 % of males and 2.7 % of females were listed as unemployed. (Id.) Only 3 % of white households had no running water, compared with 27.5 % of non-white households. (Id.) Among white households, only 12.8 % had no indoor toilets, as compared with 78 % of non-white households. (Id.) This pattern of socio-economic disparity has continued to characterize Charleston County during the latter part of the 20th Century. (Tr. at 933, 1182-84.) According to the 1980 Census, median income for African-American families ($10,907) was still only half that of white families ($20,-400) in Charleston County, and 32.2 % of African-American families lived below the poverty level, as compared with only 6.1 % of white families. Unemployment figures reflected the same sort of disparities: 10.9 % of African-Americans but only 3 7 % of whites were unemployed. (Priv. Pis.’ Ex. 1 at 13.) According to the 1990 Census, which was the most recently available socio-eco-nomic census data at the time of trial, socio-economic disparities continue to divide white and African-American residents of Charleston County. Such differences, as shown in the following table, are dramatic: Comparison of Socio-Economic Status of Blacks and Whites in Charleston County by 1990 Census (income data for 1989) Socio-Economic Indicator Whites Blacks Education: Percent completed less than 5th grade 1.0% 6.6% Percent high school graduate 88.6% 57.6% Percent completed some college 58.0% 30.1% Percent completed bachelor’s degree 28.5% 8.8% Income and employment: Percent unemployed 3.2% 9.8% Median family income $38,052 $18,603 Per capita income $16,339 $7,106 Percent persons below poverty level 7.9% 34.2% Percent families below poverty level 5.0% 31.3% Percent persons below 125% of poverty level 10.6% 41.1% Percent persons below 200% of poverty level 21.3% 60.3% Percent persons with public assistance income 2.3% 16.9% Nativity Percent born in South Carolina 47.7% 86.1% Percent born in other southern states 24.5% 6.8% Total percent born in the South 72.2% 92.9% (U.S.Ex. 68D.) This socio-economic evidence is uncontroverted. (See, e.g., Tr. at 2168-69.) The depressed socio-economic status of African-American citizens of the County-compared to white citizens is a legacy of the prolonged history of discrimination by Charleston County and South Carolina. (See U.S. Ex. 16 at 40 — 43; Tr. at 932-34, 1182-84.) Significantly, Defendants’ expert, Dr. William V. Moore, explicitly recognized, in his report and at trial, the causal relationship between past discrimination and present socio-economic levels: “African Americans suffered disproportionately under the old system, and it does impact on their current socio-economic status in Charleston County, in the State of South Carolina, and in the nation as a whole.” (Defs.’ Ex. 14(A) at 39 (emphasis added); Tr. at 2979.) Similarly, the United States’ expert, Dr. Dan Carter, testified that Charleston County’s history of official discrimination is a “heavy hand” that continues to impact African-American socioeconomic status. (Tr. at 931-35, 981-82.) Anecdotally, Charleston County Grants Administrator Evelyn DeLaine-Hart testified concerning the link between official discrimination and current socio-economic disparities between African Americans and whites in Charleston County. DeLaine-Hart testified that it is difficult to break out of the cycle of poverty because of problems that poor people encounter in areas such as education, child care, transportation, and health. Furthermore, she testified that she has observed poverty within families spanning generations, and that current socio-economic differences suffered by African-American people today are caused in part by past discrimination. (Tr. at 2655-58.) The Court concludes that African Americans in Charleston County suffer disproportionally to white persons in education, employment, income level, and living conditions as a result of discrimination. 2. Political Participation Having found that African Americans suffer disproportionately in areas of education, employment, and living conditions, the Court next considers whether, as a result of such depressed socio-economic levels, African Americans participate politically at a lower rate than white persons. Political scientists generally agree that persons with lower socio-economic and educational status tend to participate in the political process at lower rates and thus the history of economic disadvantage continues to have a racially discriminatory effect. (U.S. Ex. 16 at 42; Tr. at 934-35, 1183 (“Well, as I said, political scientists don’t always agree, they sometimes disagree, but I can’t find any disagreement with the notion that the rates of political participation, voter turnout, particularly, is directly related to income and education.”).) In fact it is this social science understanding that informed Congress’s determination that Plaintiffs need not prove that depressed socio-economic and educational status cause a finding of lower political participation. S.Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong.2d Sess. 28, 29 & n. 114 (1992); see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 768, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973). The evidence establishes that African Americans in Charleston County participate at lower rates than do white persons. Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Arrington, and Defendants’ expert, Dr. Weber, agree that African Americans register to vote at lower rates than whites, and African-American registered voters turn out at lower rates than white registered voters. (Tr. at 300-02; U.S. Ex. 15 at 23-24 & Table 1; Joint Ex. 2A at 24-31; Joint Ex. 2C at 7; see Tr. at 2974 (Dr. Moore acknowledging that white voter turnout at all age levels exceeds that of African-American turnout); Defs.’ Ex. 14A at 40 (Table XXII).) The following table demonstrates the depressed levels of registration and turnout of African-American citizens, as compared to white citizens, in Charleston County between 1988 and 2000. Rates at Which White Persons’ Political Participation Exceeds That of African Americans in Charleston County 1988-2000 Registration Turnout as as Percentage Percentage of Turnout as a of Voting Age Voting Age percentage of Year Population Population registration 1988 NA NA 10.3% 1990 1.1% 5.3% 9.1% 1992 6.5% 9.4% 7.7% 1994 8.9% 11.8% 12.3% 1996 0.6% 8.0% 7.3% 1998 6.0% 4.9% 2.3% 2000 10.7% 13.5% 9.1% Mean 5.6% 8.8% 8.3% (U.S. Ex. 15 at Table 1; see also Joint Ex. 2A at 26, 29 (Tables 4-5)). Although not grossly disproportionate, the Court concludes that African-American voter registration and turnout have been depressed to a meaningful degree as compared to that of whites. Notwithstanding the 1998 election when voter registration and turnout were comparable, the disparity between the races in registration and turnout consistently approached double-digit percentiles. Beyond the statistical evidence that African Americans participate at a lower rate than white persons, the Court received competent testimony that political participation is further impaired by the effect socio-economic disparities have on African-American access to important sources of financial and political power in Charleston County. It is no secret that Charleston County continues to be separated along racial lines in its social, civic, and religious activities. (See, e.g., Tr. at 189-90, 219-20, 556-57, 733, 816, 1379, 1495-1505, 1934, 2328.) This stratification is a direct holdover from more institutional discrimination and segregation and hinders the ability of African-American candidates to solicit the support of white citizens. (See, e.g., Tr. at 125-26.) The on-going racial separation that exists in Charleston County- — socially, economically, religiously, in housing and business patterns — makes it especially difficult for African-American candidates seeking county-wide office to reach out to and communicate with the predominantly white electorate from whom they must obtain substantial support to win an at-large elections. (See, e.g., Tr. at 1434, 1443.) The evidence indicated that the membership of many social and civic organizations in the County is made up of one race or is nearly all-white or nearly all-African-American. (Tr. at 219-20, 556-57, 662, 680-81, 1867-68, 2538-39.) Some prominent African-American citizens of the County testified that they had never been asked to join a predominately white social or civic organization in Charleston County even though these individuals were active in the social and civic organizations in the county’s African-American community. (Tr. at 113-14, 190-91, 1452.) One of these individuals, Bernard Fielding, the former Associate Probate Judge and Probate Judge of the County, a graduate of Boston University Law School, and a local attorney and business owner since the 1950s, (Tr. at 84-85, 91), testified that he has never been invited to join any predominantly-white social or civic organizations, (Tr. at 113-114). Similarly, former State House member and State Senator, McKinley Washington, a public servant for almost 30 years, testified that he has never been asked to join a predominately white civic club such as the Rotary or Elks clubs. (Tr. at 727.) These social and civic organizations are obviously important bases of financial and political power typically targeted by political candidates, including those running for County Council, (see, e.g., Tr. at 215, 219, 245). Personal contacts with individuals and organizations are one of the most important factors in running for County Council. (See Tr. at 214, 732, 784-85, 2547-48.) Many times the people who contribute financially to local candidates are, of course, people the candidates know personally. (See, e.g., Tr. at 1533.) The evidence, as previously considered, supra Section V.C.l at 28 & n. 21, demonstrates that past discrimination continues to result in great disparity between the wealth inherent in the African American community and that of the white community. Defacto separation of the races, therefore, exacerbates the socio-economic legacy of past discrimination by denying an African American candidate full access to the resources of the entire electorate and, further, by forcing her to instead rely on the stunted socio-economic development of her own community. Anecdotally, African-American County Council candidate Rosemarie West, who ran in 2000, testified that she was not invited to speak to groups at Kiawah and Seabrook Islands, while white Democratic County Council candidate Edie Carson was invited. (Tr. at 1310, 1340, 1343.) In contrast, Councilmember Stavrinakis testified that he was invited to speak to numerous majority-white, as well as majority-African-American, social and civic groups during his 1998 campaign. (Tr. at 1495-1505.) Cindy Floyd, too, was invited to speak at candidates forums on the Isle of Palms and Sullivans Island at which her fellow African-American Democratic running mates were not present. (Tr. at 244-245.) Floyd testified that she “wouldn’t imagine” that Freeman and McCoy would have known of these important campaign opportunities. (Id.) Notwithstanding great improvements, it is clear that Charleston County remains to a large extent separated along racial lines and that this separation not only hinders the ability 'of African-American candidates to solicit the votes of white voters, but it further helps to explain the extent to which race infuses and informs the racially polarized voting patterns in Charleston County. On the basis of this evidence, the Plaintiffs have demonstrated that African-American citizens in Charleston County suffer from a depressed socio-economic status in comparison with white citizens, and that this status is a direct legacy of Charleston County’s history of official discrimination. Moreover, the United States has demonstrated that this depressed so-cio-economic status makes it more difficult presently for Charleston County’s African-American citizens to participate in the political process and elect candidates of choice. D. Other Voting Procedures That Enhance the Opportunity for Voting Discrimination The third Senate Factor considers the “extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group.” Senate Report at 29. The evidence shows that this factor weighs heavily in favor of Plaintiffs. In particular, the Court finds that the sheer size of Charleston County greatly exacerbates the effects of the socio-economic disparities between the races and makes this factor unconventionally significant. 1. Unusually Large Election District Charleston County is the largest and second most populated county in South Carolina. (U.S.Exs.76-77, 106.) Charleston County includes a stretch along the Atlantic Ocean of nearly 100 miles and contains several major waterways. (U.S.Ex. 76.) As stated, Charleston County is one of only three South Carolina counties that elects its entire county council at-large. (U.S. Am. Comp. ¶ 11; Am. Answer ¶ 6.) The other two counties, Hampton and Jasper, are rural counties with total populations of less than 22,000 residents in each county and comprised of a close balance of African-American and white citizens. (U.S.Exs.78, 106.) Conversely, Charleston County has a total population that exceeds 300,000 and African Americans only comprise 34.3% (U.S.Ex. 107.) Several witnesses testified that these geographic and demographic features are an impediment to African-American candidates, who typically have fewer resources, and particularly because costly, television advertising and direct mail are deemed important in local campaigns for County Council. (Tr. at 302-03, 784-786; see also 213, 660, 1426, 1488-89, 1490, 1932-34; U.S. Ex. 14 at 51); see Goosby v. Town Bd. of Town of Hempstead, N.Y., 180 F.3d 476, 494 (2d Cir.1999) (“Campaign financing is especially difficult in such a large district for black candidates, who have been able to campaign more effectively in smaller districts in Nassau County.”). Financial resources directly impact a candidate’s ability to win elections. (Tr. at 895.) Several witnesses testified to the financial difficulties African-American candidates generally face in running election campaigns because they have less access to campaign resources than do white candidates. (Tr. at 659-60, 1598-99.) For example, in the 1998 campaign for County Council, African-American Democrat George Freeman raised $1,761. (U.S.Ex. 65E.) For that same election, African-American Democrat Pearl McCoy raised $2,133.91. (U.S. Ex. 65H.) In comparison, white Democrat Cindy Floyd raised and spent $25,961.79 in 1998 during her successful County Council campaign. (U.S. Ex. 65D; Tr. at 225.) As stated, white Democrat Leon Stavrinakis spent $49,627.65 during his successful 1998 County Council race, all but $1,000 of which he raised from other people. (Tr. at 1491; U.S. Ex. 65J.) John Tecklenburg has been active in the Charleston County Democratic Party since 1986. (Tr. at 778-79.) He worked with African-American candidates who ran countywide, particularly Virginia Morgan for County Council and Charles Green for Coroner in the 1992 election, as well as with white candidates. (Tr. at 786-90, 811-12.) In making fund-raising calls for Green and Morgan, Tecklenburg found that usually reliable campaign donors gave no money to Green or Morgan, or gave them less money than they gave to white candidates. (Tr. at 788-89, 811-12.) Likewise, Bernard Fielding testified that it was more difficult to raise campaign funds for African-American candidates than for white candidates in Charleston County, primarily because the white community has many more financial resources than does the African-American community. (Tr. at 128.) Additionally, Charleston County Democratic Chairperson, Diane Aghapour, testified that African-American Democratic candidates need to raise “a lot more money” than their white counterparts to “overcome a certain natural discomfort” that some white voters have with African-American candidates. (Tr. at 895.) The combined effect of socio-economic disparities resulting from past-discrimination; contemporary bias in fund-raising; and the uncommonly large dimension and population of Charleston County works a significant impediment to African Americans’ ability to gain equal access to the electoral process in Charleston County. 2. De facto majority vote requirement Additionally, the United States’ expert, Dr. Arrington, and the Private Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. John Ruoff, (Tr. at 410), agree that staggering of terms, residency districts, and a primary nominating system serve as a de facto majority vote requirement and limit the opportunities for single-shot voting. The staggering of terms and the residency requirements ensure that all contests are either single-seat or two-seat contests. Because the only viable candidates have been Democrats and Republicans, there are no more than two viable candidates for a single-seat or four viable candidates for two seats. (Tr. at 303.) Minority voters cannot single-shot vote in one seat elections. In addition, single-shot voting does not make sense strategically for African-American voters in two-seat contests for Charleston County Council. (Tr. at 303-06, 2021, 2180-81; Ex. 14 at 49-50.) Accordingly, a de facto majority vote requirement makes it more difficult for the African-American community to employ a traditional strategy of bullet voting in order to improve their chances of electing candidates of their choosing. E. Senate Factor 6: Racial Appeals in the Political Process The Court is not greatly impressed with the force of evidence put forward on the sixth Senate factor: the extent to which subtle or overt racial appeals have characterized the political process in the jurisdiction. Not that the United States did not make its case diligently, but by its very nature, the evidence on point, like the evidence of voter intimidation and harassment, tends to be anecdotal and probative more of isolated occasions rather than patterned behavior. Certainly, the Government succeeded in proving individual incidents of subtle or overt racial appeals by a preponderance of the evidence, but the Court ultimately finds their aggregate force to be of moderate value. Most notably, the Court finds that some white candidates in Charleston County have traditionally used pictures of their African-American opponents on their campaign literature to alert white voters to the race of the African-American candidate. (Tr. at 98, 949-51.) For instance, in 1973, Sidi Limehouse used a photograph of his African-American opponent, McKinley Washington, in his campaign literature in a race for an at-large State House seat from Charleston County. Limehouse won that election. (Tr. at 712-14.) In the 1988 Democratic Primary for House District 110, a white candidate distributed campaign literature that displayed a darkened picture of Robert Ford, his African-American opponent. The white candidate prevailed in that primary election. (Tr. at 565-66, 1109-10, 1602; U.S. Ex. 16 at 22 n. 40.) More recently, in the 1990 general election for Charleston County Probate Judge, a white candidate ran political advertisements in the Post and Courier that contained his photograph beside a darkened photograph of his African-American opponent, Bernard Fielding. The white candidate also distributed campaign postcards in the white community with Fielding’s picture on them. (Tr. at 97-98, 954-55, 2921.) In 1992, a white Republican State House candidate distributed campaign literature that included a darkened photograph of his African-American opponent, incumbent State Representative Lucille Whipper. (U.S. Ex. 16 at 22; Tr. at 955-56, 2922-23.) That same year, a white County Coroner candidate distributed campaign literature containing a photograph of her African-American opponent, Deputy Coroner Charles Green. (U.S. Ex. 16 at 22; Tr. at 956-57.) In a 2000 State Legislative race between two white candidates, one campaign distributed literature with a darkened photograph of African-American Charleston County School Board member Elizabeth Aston. (Tr. at 563-65, 898-99.) Aston, however, had never been a resident of the House district in which that candidate ran in 2002, and no white school board members’ photographs were used in this State legislative campaign. (Tr. at 577, 626.) Moreover, Aston did not give permission to the candidate to use her photograph in his campaign literature. (Tr. at 563-65, 898-99.) Dr. Moore testified that he could not recall a single instance where a white candidate in Charleston County used the photo of his or her white opponent in campaign literature. (Tr. at 2924.) Moreover, to help overcome white voter resistance to Mrican-American candidacies, there is evidence that African-American candidates have de-emphasized their race in Charleston County campaigns. For example, in 1980, Louis Waring used his photograph in campaign literature during his unsuccessful race for the St. Andrew’s Public Service Commission. In his successful 1990 race for the same position, however, Waring decided that the use of his picture on his campaign literature “was not conducive to [his] candidacy.” (Tr. at 1369; see also Tr. at 1289, 1367, 1399.) He testified that his photograph in the 1980 campaign had been a hindrance because, without it, some white voters woul