Full opinion text
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION GRITZNER, District Judge. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Clerk’s No 2). Attorney for Plaintiff is Robert Montgomery; attorneys for Defendants are Kirke Quinn, representing Perry Community School District and those associated with the school district, and Harry Perkins III, representing the City of Perry and those associated with the City. A hearing was requested by Plaintiff on an expedited basis, and the Court scheduled a hearing as soon as was reasonable for the parties. Evidence was received and oral argument presented in that hearing on April 15-16, 2004. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction is now fully submitted to the Court. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff, John Doe (“Doe”), filed a Complaint in this Court on March 18, 2004. The Complaint listed as Defendants the Perry Community School District (“the District”), Randy McCaulley, individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of Perry Community School District (“Superintendent McCaulley”), Dan Mar-burger, individually and in his official capacity as Principal of Perry High School (“Principal Marburger”), Bob Gittens, individually and in his official capacity as Associate Principal of Perry High School (“Mr.Gittens”), Jerry “Pat” Jans, individually and in his official capacity as School Resource Officer in the Perry Community School District, and individually and in his official capacity as a police officer for the Perry, Iowa, Police Department (“Officer Jans”), and the City of Perry (“Perry” or “the City”). Jurisdiction was invoked under the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as this is a civil action asserting claims arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, for violations of constitutional and civil rights, including those contained in the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and for violation of Title IX, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1681. The other ancillary state claims are brought pursuant to the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Simultaneous with the filing of his Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Defendants have resisted Plaintiffs motion and resist issuance of any sort of preliminary injunction in the matter. Plaintiff requested expedited relief on the motion, which the Court has attempted to satisfy while still allowing Defendants sufficient opportunity to meet the charges leveled against them and adequately defend against the pending motion. To this end, the Court scheduled and heard oral argument on the motion in a hearing that stretched into two days, on April 15-16, 2004. Plaintiff and all Defendants were represented by counsel, and both sides had opportunity to present witness and exhibit evidence relevant to the pending motion. In his motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter a preliminary injunction that accomplishes the following: (1) Enjoins the Defendant, Perry Community School District and its administrators and officials, from taking any adverse action against the Plaintiff, including suspension, in response to his speaking out in the halls of the school in protest against . hate-based discrimination or threats, including specifically, hate-based statements, harassment, discrimination, • or threats lodged against the Plaintiff individually. (2) Enjoining the Defendant City of Perry Police Department, Defendant Police Officer Jans, and any and all other officers within the department, including any officer assigned as a Student Resource Officer at Perry High School, from arresting, and/or charging, and/or taking adverse action against Plaintiff in response to his speaking up, in or on the premises of Perry High School, against hate-based discrimination and/or harassment, including specifically, hate-based discrimination, and/or harassment, and/or statements and/or threats directed specifically ' toward the Plaintiff by other students, teachers, administrators, or employees of Defendant school. In addition, at the hearing the Plaintiff further requested the additional remedy that the Court include in the preliminary injunction an order requiring the Defendants to “affirmatively enforce the harassment policy [of the school district] with regard to intolerance and harassment against homosexuals,” insofar as such in-junctive relief is available under Title IX and section 1983. The motion is fully submitted, and the Court analyzes the Plaintiffs motion in light of the evidence received and the corresponding filings made by the parties. BACKGROUND FACTS The matter currently before the Court relates solely to the request for a preliminary injunction, essentially involving the exercise of the Plaintiffs rights of expression. In order to understand the background for these more specific issues, a more general overview of the Plaintiffs claims must be provided. However, the consideration of the majority of the Plaintiffs claims is left to another day. Doe is an 18-year-old student in his senior year of high school at Perry High School, located in Perry, Iowa. He participated in school athletics as a member of the football and wrestling teams at the school and otherwise participated fully in the educational offerings of Perry High School throughout most of the time period that makes up the current action. Due in large part to the incidents giving rise to the environment that prompted the current lawsuit by Plaintiff, Doe is currently receiving instruction at his home in anticipation of graduating from high school concurrently with the members of his high school class. He receives 45 minutes of instruction three days a week from a teacher provided by the District. The remaining outside work is to be completed by Doe. Doe desires to return to high school provided it is a safe environment for him. The District is a public school district duly organized under the laws of the State of Iowa and doing business in Dallas County, Iowa. The District is responsible for educating students in the surrounding community. It controls and manages the public schools in Perry, Iowa, including Perry High School (“the School”), where the events that form the basis of this action allegedly took place. Superintendent McCaulley was working as an employee and agent of the District as Superintendent of the District at all times material to the present action. He supervises all teachers, administrators, coaches, student resource officers, and other employees within the District. Superintendent McCaulley is further in charge of establishing and/or enforcing the rules, regulations, and policies of the schools within the District, and overseeing the discipline of students at the schools. Superintendent McCaulley is a person for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was allegedly operating at all times material as an employee of the District in his official capacity under the color of state law. Principal Marburger was working as an employee and agent of the District as the Principal of Perry High School at all times material to the present action. He supervises, or assists in supervising, all teachers, administrators, coaches, student resource officers, and other employees at Perry High School. Principal Marburger is further in charge of establishing and/or enforcing the rules, regulations, and policies at Perry High School, and overseeing the discipline of students at the school. Principal Marburger is a person for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was allegedly operating at all times material as an employee of the District in his official capacity under the color of state law. Mr. Gittens was working as an employee and agent of the District as the Associate Principal of Perry High School at all times material to the present action. He supervises, or assists in supervising, all teachers, administrators, coaches, student resource officers, and other ■ employees at Perry High School. Mr. Gittens further assists in establishing and/or enforcing the rules, regulations, and policies of the Perry High School, and takes care of approximately 95 percent of the discipline of students at the school. He is also an assistant wrestling coach at the school. Mr. Gittens is a person for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was allegedly operating at all times material as an employee of the District in his official capacity under the color of state law. Officer Jans was working as an employee and agent of the District as a Resource Officer at Perry High School at all times material to the present action. He was contemporaneously employed as a police officer with the City of Perry, Iowa, Police Department. Officer Jans is a person for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was allegedly operating at all times material as an employee of the District in his official capacity under the color of state law. Perry is a municipal corporation organized and authorized to operate under the laws of Iowa. City headquarters are located in Perry, Dallas County, Iowa. The City is responsible for maintaining and operating the Perry City Police Department. Doe alleges that for the past three plus years he has been the victim of hate-based discrimination and harassment, including hate-based assaults and threats of violence, within the Perry High School community as a result of his perceived sexual orientation. Plaintiff alleges that he is perceived as homosexual, and as a result, he has been subjected to severe verbal and physical harassment, demeaning behavior and treatment, and that he has suffered physical and emotional damage arising from a hostile environment that pervades Perry High School. Doe claims this hostile environment has been fostered, or at least acquiesced in, by Defendants, and that Defendants have failed to provide him with a safe learning environment. According to Doe, it was out of a copcern for his safety that he brought the present action and opted to be home schooled. Without delineating every specific incident of harassment or discrimination alleged by Plaintiff, the Court notes that Doe was allegedly subjected to severe and pervasive harassment throughout his tenure as a student at Perry High School. Doe alleges harassment from no less than forty individual students at the school, in addition to discriminatory and demeaning treatment by teachers and administrators at the school. Perry High School has a total average population of approximately 600 students. Plaintiff claims the number of incidents perpetrated against him have ranged in the dozens if not hundreds. The majority of the alleged instances of harassment involving other students consist primarily of the use of anti-gay epithets or homophobic comments aimed at Plaintiff. The epithets used include, but are not limited to, “gay”, “queer”, “homo”, “pussy”, “fag”, and “faggot”. On one specific occasion, a fellow student and team mate on the wrestling team removed Doe’s cell phone from his bag at a wrestling match and typed the phrase “Huge Homo” on the greeting screen. For this, the student was originally punished by the School. Doe also had his locker posters vandalized and defaced on a regular basis with similar anti-gay sentiments. In addition, Doe alleges he has been threatened on multiple occasions based on his perceived sexual orientation where the perpetrators stated they would “fuck [Plaintiff] up”, “kick [Plaintiffs] ass”, along with other voiced threats of physical harm. On several occasions Doe was allegedly physically assaulted by fellow students because of his perceived sexual orientation. This included being pushed in the halls and lunch areas of the school and being urinated on in the shower room. In addition, Doe was allegedly taunted about his perceived sexual orientation and proclivities. While some of this conduct occurred in conjunction with football and wrestling activities, much of it also is said to have occurred in the halls, lunch areas, classrooms, and grounds of Perry High School. Doe further alleges discriminatory conduct on the part of teachers and administrators of the School. He claims that in response to numerous complaints brought by himself to School officials, no disciplinary action was taken against the offending students. Doe also states that he was told by Gittens and/or Principal Marburger that the incidents were “no big deal”, or that he should “get tougher skin”, “get used to it”, and “grow up”. Additionally, Doe alleges that teachers and School officials were present or overhead some of the harassing conduct to which he was subjected, and they took no steps to end the conduct. Plaintiff also contends that School officials undertook no effective discipline in response to the myriad reports of harassment he brought to them attention. Doe further alleges one teacher criticized him for speaking out and that the teacher further stated he had “the biggest mouth in the south.” Doe also contends the District did not properly react to a letter sent to the District by Doe’s doctor, wherein the doctor referenced Plaintiffs suicidal tendencies and made the assessment that Doe’s stress, fear, and anxiousness were exacerbated by the hostile environment prevalent at Perry High School. The altercation that will be the crux of Plaintiffs argument on the pending motion for preliminary injunction occurred at Perry High School on May 8, 2003. This incident occurred near the end of Plaintiffs junior year at the school. As can best be determined on the record, a student known to Plaintiff yelled “bad ass” at Doe as he was leaving the parking lot on May 7. Doe did not respond. The following day, May 8, Doe heard reports at school that this same student was telling-people that he would “fuck [Doe] up any time and that [Doe] was a pussy and ... a fucking queer.” In reaction to the current matter, Doe approached Officer Jans in his position as School Resource Officer at Perry High School. Doe informed Officer Jans of the harassment and threats by the fellow student and requested his advice in how to stop this treatment and keep himself out of trouble. According to Doe, Officer Jans told him that he had two options. First, he could ignore the offending student and let it be; or second, he could confront the student where there are a lot of people present, ask him if he had indeed made the statements attributed to him, and then make him look bad in public. Officer Jans admits to meeting with Doe on this date and discussing alternatives for addressing the issue, and he admits that the second option was to discuss the issue with the fellow student in the presence of others that could witness the conversation; but he denies he urged Plaintiff to attempt to humiliate the other student in public during such confrontation. Admittedly, Officer Jans at no time told Doe to engage in a physical confrontation with the alleged harasser. Doe returned to class following the conversation with Officer Jans. Later in the day, Doe approached the alleged harasser in the halls between class periods. Doe “chose to confront him” and called the other student over and asked if he had “been talking shit.” The other student allegedly responded in the affirmative and told Doe that he would “fuck you up anytime” and called Doe a “fucking fag.” The alleged harasser then walked away from Doe. Doe then followed him to his locker and again confronted him. The other student again let forth a string of expletives and anti-gay epithets directed toward Doe and, as Doe was getting ready to walk away, pushed Doe. Doe pushed him back. The other student then swung at Doe and hit him. This was followed by another flurry of pushes between Doe and his alleged harasser. Jim Ellenberger, a teacher at Perry High School, witnessed the two boys squared off against each other. He witnessed pushing between the boys and immediately placed himself between the two. At the same time, Mr. Emmert, another teacher at the school, arrived and helped Mr. Ellenberger break up the altercation. Mr. Ellenberger escorted Doe to the office area at the school, while Mr. Emmert followed with the other student. Mr. Ellenberger states that Doe immediately calmed down and accompanied him to the office area without further complication. According to Mr. Ellenberger and other witnesses, the alleged harasser remained incensed and made several inflammatory remarks, including anti-gay epithets, as he was being led to the office a short distance behind Doe and Mr. Ellen-berger. None of the witnesses overheard the confrontation between Doe and his alleged harasser that led to the altercation, nor were any of the witnesses able to determine if there was an initial aggressor in the altercation. Doe suffered minor injuries to his neck and ear during the altercation. Principal Marburger and Officer Jans were involved in the discipline of the two boys involved in the altercation. Both Doe and his alleged harasser were given a three day out-of-school suspension. In addition, both boys were then arrested by Officer Jans and charged with disorderly conduct for participating in the altercation. As a result of the altercation, both Doe and his parents filed discrimination complaints with the District. These complaints were investigated by Lynda Hoo-bin, the compliance or equity officer assigned by the District to investigate all such complaints. In a summary disposition of Doe’s complaint, Ms. Hoobin determined the complaint inconclusive. Doe alleges that the incessant harassment by Perry High School students, coupled with the lack of effective and consistent discipline by the District and School administrators, has led to an environment filled with harassment, intimidation, and assaultive behavior such that he no longer feels safe at the school. He contends that the conduct of Defendants has crippled his ability to be provided with a safe learning environment and receive the education to which he is entitled. Doe claims that the harassment has caused him to miss a significant amount of classes in an attempt to avoid the harassment, thereby negatively affecting his grades and participation in the education opportunities at the school. Doe asserts further that the harassing conduct of fellow students and the lack of help from school officials forced him to quit the wrestling team earlier this year. He further avers that the stress of the harassing environment has aggravated a physical and psychological disorder that he suffers. Doe claims Defendants have denied him equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, infringed upon his First Amendment right to freedom of speech, committed education discrimination and harassment under Title IX, denied other constitutional and civil rights to which he is entitled, and violated additional state and common law protections and rights. ANALYSIS The motion for preliminary injunction filed by Doe seeks relief in three respects: (1) that the District and its officials be enjoined from taking any adverse action against Plaintiff in response to his speaking out in the halls of the school against hate-based discriipination or threats; (2) that the Perry Police Department and its officers be enjoined from arresting, charging, or taking any other adverse action against Plaintiff in response to his speaking out in the halls of the school against hate-based discrimination or threats; and (3) that the Court order the District to affirmatively and fairly enforce its harassment policy with respect to harassment and discrimination against homosexuals or those perceived to be homosexual. Plaintiff concedes that he is not asking the Court to enjoin Defendants from performing their functions or to keep law enforcement from intervening if Plaintiff or anyone else commits a public offense that is not protected speech. A. Standard for Preliminary Injunction Doe has moved for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. “A preliminary injunction is extraordinary relief and must be carefully considered.” Books, Inc. v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa, 978 F.Supp. 1247, 1253 (S.D.Iowa 1997). In deciding a motion for preliminary injunction, the Court considers the following factors: (1) The probability of success on the merits; (2) The threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (3) The balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on the other interested parties; and (4) Whether the issuance of an injunction is in the public interest. United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1178-79 (8th Cir.1998) (citations omitted); see also Bandag, Inc. v. Jack’s Tire & Oil, Inc., 190 F.3d 924, 926 (8th Cir.1999); Dataphase Sys. Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir.1981); Iowa Paint Mfg. Co. v. Hirshfield’s Paint Mfg., Inc., 296 F.Supp.2d 983, 988 (S.D.Iowa 2003). These four factors have come to be known as the Dataphase factors. See United Indus. Corp., 140 F.3d at 1178-79. None of these factors is dispositive in itself in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction. Id. at 1179; see also Baker Elec. Co-op. Inc. v. Chaske, 28 F.3d 1466, 1472 (8th Cir.1994); Calvin Klein Cosmetics v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d 665, 667 (8th Cir.1987). Indeed, these factors are not intended to create a rigid formula in assessing a motion for preliminary injunction. Baker Elec. Co-op., Inc., 28 F.3d at 1472. Instead, each factor must be considered in determining “whether the balance of equities weighs toward granting the injunction.” United Indus. Corp., 140 F.3d at 1179; see also Dakota Indus. Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 988 F.2d 61, 64 (8th Cir.1993). Moreover, these factors are not to be applied with any sort of mathematical precision. Dataphase Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d at 113. Each case is unique and should be determined on its own facts. Iowa Paint Mfg. Co., 296 F.Supp.2d at 988. Therefore, the Court’s approach needs to “be flexible enough to encompass the particular circumstances of each case.” Dataphase Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d at 113; see also Hubbard Feeds, Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement, Inc., 182 F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir.1999) (‘When applying the Dataphase factors, ... ‘a court should flexibly weigh the case’s particular circumstances ....”) (quoting United Indus. Corp., 140 F.3d at 1179 (citations omitted)). However, if the Plaintiff is unable to show a likelihood of success on the merits or the threat of irreparable injury, the third and fourth Dataphase factors are insufficient on their own to support a preliminary injunction. Microware Sys. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 1207, 1218-19 (S.D.Iowa 2000). The burden is on the movant to show that a motion for preliminary injunction should be granted. Baker Elec. Co-op., Inc., 28 F.3d at 1472; see also Sports Design & Dev., Inc. v. Schoneboom, 871 F.Supp. 1158, 1163 (N.D.Iowa 1995) (finding “ ‘plaintiff bears the burden of proof concerning the four factors.’ ”) (quoting Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 811 F.2d 414, 418 (8th Cir.1987)). This is a heavy burden, United Indus. Corp., 140 F.3d at 1179, especially where “ ‘granting the preliminary injunction will give [the movant] substantially the relief it would obtain after a trial on the merits.’ ” Sanborn Mfg. Co. v. Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co., 997 F.2d 484, 486 (8th Cir.1993) (quoting Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Ever Best Ltd., 944 F.2d 438, 440 (8th Cir.1991)). “Caution must therefore be exercised in a court’s deliberation, and ‘the essential inquiry in weighing the propriety of issuing a preliminary injunction is whether the balance of other factors tips decidedly toward the movant and the movant has also raised questions so serious and difficult as to call for more deliberate investigation.’ ” United Indus. Corp., 140 F.3d at 1179 (quoting General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 624-25 (8th Cir.1987)); see Dataphase Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d at 113 (“At base, the question is whether the balance of equities so favors the movant that justice requires the court to intervene to preserve the status quo until the merits are determined.”). “Although injunctive relief should be designed to grant the full relief needed to remedy the injury to the prevailing party, it should not go beyond the extent of the established violation.” Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass’n, 10 F.3d 207, 217 (4th Cir.1993). Moreover, “injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than is necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979). B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits Plaintiff has asserted claims for violation of his First Amendment rights of free speech and expression, as well as claims based on equal protection, due process, and false arrest. All of these claims have been brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, or 1986. In addition, Doe has also asserted a claim for money damages pursuant to Title IX. To ultimately succeed under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct complained of was “committed by a person acting under color of state law,” and that such conduct deprived Plaintiff of “a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Roe v. Humke, 128 F.3d 1213, 1215 (8th Cir.1997) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988)). Moreover, on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the seminal Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court notes a federal court may intervene when the actions of local school districts run contrary to the Constitution. Colin ex rel. Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F.Supp.2d 1135, 1141 (C.D.Cal.2000); see, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (desegregating public schools and finding that separate is not equal). While Doe’s First Amendment claim is seemingly at the center of whether the Court should issue a preliminary injunction based on what Plaintiff requests in the injunction, Plaintiff contends all of the issues asserted are interrelated and must be considered by the Court in making its determination. While the Court finds this position tenuous legal analysis, the Court does find there is value at this stage of the proceeding, and under the unique cireum-stances of this case, to assess the Plaintiffs contentions on each of his claims and review what effect, if any, that has on the over-all determination of the propriety of a preliminary injunction as requested by Plaintiff. The Court observes that “ ‘adjudication of a motion for a preliminary injunction is not a decision on the merits of the underlying case.’ ” Branstad v. Glickman, 118 F.Supp.2d 925, 939 (N.D.Iowa 2000) (quoting Hubbard Feeds, 182 F.3d at 603). Rather, the assessment of the likelihood of success on the merits factor essentially requires the movant find support for its position in governing law. Id. (quoting Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, 878 F.Supp. 1224, 1247 (N.D.Iowa 1995)). 1. First Amendment Claim The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, states that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const, amend. I. While the First Amendment prohibits the government from limiting or prohibiting speech, this guarantee is not absolute. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942); see also Vives v. City of New York, 305 F.Supp.2d 289, 298 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (“The primacy of the First Amendment is not, of course, absolute—it does not provide for unfettered free expression.”). For example, the First Amendment does not protect “certain categories of speech including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children.” Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 245-46, 122 S.Ct. 1389. In addition, “fighting words” are not protected speech, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572, 62 S.Ct. 766), nor are “true threats,” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003), because “[a] state may punish words ‘which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.’ ” Vives, 305 F.Supp.2d at 289 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572, 62 S.Ct. 766). “Fighting words” are “words that are likely to provoke a violent reaction when heard by an ordinary citizen,” id., while “true threats” are “serious expression[s] of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals,” Black, 538 U.S. at 359, 123 S.Ct. 1536. Thus, fighting words and threats of violence fall into the realm of speech that the government can proscribe or limit without offending the First Amendment. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) (fighting words); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (true threats). The government is permitted to regulate speech falling into the aforementioned categories because “such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572, 62 S.Ct. 766. Specifically, the government can restrict conduct that involves speech if the limitation is narrowly tailored and advances an important government interest. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381-91, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992). Indeed, “[wjhere the government does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.” Id. at 390, 112 S.Ct. 2538. The First Amendment does, however, protect communications outside of the nonprotected speech categories even if that speech is “distasteful or discomforting”. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S.Ct. 17, 63 L.Ed. 1173 (1919). Even this speech is protected and may not be punished. See Black, 538 U.S. at 367, 123 S.Ct. 1536 (finding statute prohibiting cross burning was unconstitutional insofar as it presumed the act of burning a cross was prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (finding cross burning statute unconstitutional as it discriminated in the basis of content and viewpoint); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) (protecting the right to burn the American flag as protected under the First Amendment even though such an expression is found by many to be disrespectful and distasteful). “While it is difficult to articulate generalized standards as to the quantum and quality of proof necessary to justify abridgment of First Amendment rights,” it is a heavy burden. Gay Lib v. Univ. of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848, 854, 855 n. 15 (8th Cir.1977). It is universally accepted that students at public schools do not “shed their First Amendment rights of freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). “Moreover, it is also axiomatic that the First Amendment must flourish as much in the academic setting as anywhere else.” Gay Lib, 558 F.2d at 857 (citing Papish v. Univ. of Missouri Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 671, 93 S.Ct. 1197, 35 L.Ed.2d 618 (1973), and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960)). In addition, “[sjchool officials do not possess absolute authority over their students.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511, 89 S.Ct. 733. “Courts have historically recognized the tension between a public school’s responsibility to maintain a safe environment conducive to learning and its equally compelling mandate to allow for the exercise of constitutional expression.” Chambers, 145 F.Supp.2d at 1071. School officials may, therefore, restrict student speech or expression where it would “materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511, 89 S.Ct. 733 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.1966)). Courts have recognized that the constitutional rights of students in public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (finding public school students do not have the same expansive rights under the Fourth Amendment to be free from search and seizures); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117-18, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (stating “nowhere [has the Court] suggested that students, teachers, or anyone else has an absolute constitutional right to use all parts of a school building or its immediate environs for his unlimited expressive purposes.”). The freedom to advocate a particular idea is by no means absolute and must be balanced against society’s countervailing interest of establishing a proper learning environment for this nation’s youth and teaching them social mores and values. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681, 106 S.Ct. 3159; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09, 89 S.Ct. 733; cf. Colin, 83 F.Supp.2d at 1141 (“Though the state education system has the awesome responsibility of inculcating moral and political values, that does not permit educators to act as ‘thought police’ inhibiting all discussion that is not approved by, and in accord with the official position of the state.”). For example, the Eighth Circuit has applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Watts in finding that a school district can proscribe threats of violence in the school setting. Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir.2002). The court determined that a threat exists when a “reasonable recipient” would interpret the “purported threat as a serious expression of an intent to cause a present or future harm,” and that these threats can be prohibited by the school. Id. at 622-23 (quotations and citations omitted). In addition, schools may also discipline a student for using sexually explicit language in a school assembly. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 683, 106 S.Ct. 3159; see also Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 758 (6th Cir.1989) (affirming punishment of a student by school officials after the student insulted a vice principal during a speech at a mandatory school assembly and finding the discipline did not violate the First Amendment). In finding this speech was not protected under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court reasoned that “the schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in [an environment] that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech.” Bethel, 478 U.S. at 683, 106 S.Ct. 3159; see also F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978) (finding FCC could regulate indecent communications broadcast over the radio during hours when children would be listening because there is a state interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive language). In finding school officials could not ban students from wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War, the Supreme Court in Tinker found that such expression or speech could not be prohibited merely because school officials had an “urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might result from the expression,” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510, 89 S.Ct. 733; because other students made hostile remarks to those students wearing armbands, id. at 508, 89 S.Ct. 733; because students argued in classrooms about the issue rather than paying attention, id. at 518, 89 S.Ct. 733 (Black, J., dissenting); or because student reactions to the black armbands might lead other students to cause a disturbance or initiate an argument or other violence, id. at 508, 89 S.Ct. 733. In short, “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.” Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically restricted school officials’ authority to restrict student expression only to circumstances where the speech or expression would interfere greatly with schoolwork or the school’s ability to discipline. Id. at 511, 89 S.Ct. 733. In Tinker, the Supreme Court reiterated the views expressed earlier by the Court in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949). It stated: Any variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949); and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom — this kind of openness — that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 89 S.Ct. 733. In Terminiello, the Supreme Court concluded it was a violation of the First Amendment to arrest a speaker because his speech “stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest.” Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 5, 69 S.Ct. 894. The Court stated further that a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, ... is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.... There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of idea, either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political community groups. Id. at 4-5, 69 S.Ct. 894 (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff cited extensively to Vives v. City of New York in both his written filings and in oral argument on the motion. Vives is a recent federal court decision where the plaintiff was arrested and charged with violating a city statute that essentially outlawed communications made with the intent to “annoy” or “alarm”. Vives, 305 F.Supp.2d at 293-94. Vives mailed communications to people of the Jewish faith intending to alarm them and was arrested for that conduct when one of the recipients contacted law enforcement and stated she found the communication “alarming and/or annoying.” Id. Vives initiated a legal action alleging the arrest violated his First Amendment rights. Id. at 293. The court concluded that the communications were “firmly protected by the First Amendment, and may not be proscribed or punished.” Id. at 306. The court further found Vives could possibly be entitled to damages for the violation of his First Amendment rights. Id. at 304. At the center of the Vives case, however, was a statute that ultimately was found to violate the Constitution. In this case, however, there is no such offending policy, rule, regulation, or statute. On the contrary, the policy most relevant to the May 8 altercation is the School policy prohibiting fighting. This policy is both content neutral and viewpoint neutral. The school has a strong interest in maintaining order over student behavior to promote a quality learning environment, and the anti-fighting policy helps to promote this interest. As Defendants state, “[r]egardless of the message a student is trying to convey or defend, the physical act embodying the expressive component exempts it from constitutional protection .... ” Defendants have stated that they have no objection to Plaintiff expressing himself regarding his perceived sexuality in the school hallways. Moreover, Defendants stated they have no intention to interfere with the Plaintiffs exercise of his First Amendment rights. Indeed, Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court with any evidence tending to show that Defendants had in the past interfered with or restrained Doe’s right to speak or express himself in response to any harassment he has been subjected to. The only possible direct interference with Plaintiffs expressive liberties came when expression of Doe’s rights led to a fight in which he was involved. In his verified affidavit, Officer Jans recounted the events surrounding the May 8 altercation as follows: On this date between 3rd and 4th hours in the Perry High School [Doe] attempted to talk to [Student 1] about things [Doe] had heard [Student 1] was saying. [Student 1] kept walking past [Doe] to his locker when [Doe] was attempting to talk to him. [Doe] followed [Student 1] to his locker and attempted to get answers to his questions .... [Student 1] was reported as throwing punches. Plaintiff argues that this account proves that he was doing nothing more “simply exercising his expressive liberties by speaking up and out against a fellow student who was engaging in hate-based statements and threats.” Doe further notes that he allegedly engaged in the described conduct on the advice of Officer Jans. Plaintiff fails to note, however, that he did more than merely speak out. He was also witnessed pushing his alleged harasser, and in fact Doe himself stated he pushed the other student at least three times, though characterized as in defense. The evidence indicates that the District officials’ response and that of Officer Jans was based on the conduct of fighting, and not as a way to punish Doe for speaking out against harassment or to restrain Doe in the future from speaking out. Furthermore, Doe did more than just speak out against the harassment he was subjected to. In Doe’s own account of the altercation, he followed his alleged harasser to his locker, even after the other student originally avoided a confrontation by ignoring Doe and continuing past him to his locker. Thus, while Tinker and Terminiello protect speech that may cause others to anger, Doe in this case did intrude in the lives of others and did more than condemn the crowd. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514, 89 S.Ct. 733 (finding students with armbands “neither interrupted school activities nor sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others.”); Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 3, 69 S.Ct. 894 (finding a statute unconstitutional after an individual was arrested for speaking at an engagement where he deliberately antagonized and condemned a waiting, already hostile crowd). In addition, “[t]he undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially acceptable behavior.” Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681, 106 S.Ct. 3159. Doe argues that on May 8, the actions of District officials and Officer Jans functioned as a restraint on his First Amendment freedoms. Doe urges the Court to infer that the purpose of the disciplinary action was to stifle Doe’s expressive liberties. Prior to May 8, Doe asserts that he was restrained, albeit an implied restraint, based on Defendants’ failure to adequately respond to his complaints of harassment. He contends the inaction of District officials prior to May had a chilling effect on his First Amendment rights. The Court finds that in the absence of direct evidence of interference by Defendants in Plaintiffs efforts to express himself, the alleged implied restraint that existed prior to the May 8 events is insufficient to find a likelihood of success on the merits. In addition, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to make the required showing that the disciplinary actions stemming from the May 8 altercation were intended to interfere with his First Amendment rights. While the investigation into the May 8 altercation may not have been thorough, this alone is not enough for the Court to presume or even infer that the true purpose of Defendants in undertaking the disciplinary measures employed was to silence Plaintiff. Defendants punished both students equally without regard to level of culpability. The Supreme Court has “recognized that maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary measures,” which the courts should respect. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-40, 105 S.Ct. 733. This Court finds the most rational and reasonable inference in the present case is that Defendants were disciplining Doe based on the conduct he engaged in, i.e., fighting, and not anything he may have said to his alleged harasser. There is even less proof that Defendants intended the school suspension and arrest to restrain Doe from speaking out in the future about harassment based on sexual orientation. In short, the Court is unable to find Plaintiff has exhibited a likelihood of success on his First Amendment claims. Moreover, Doe has not adequately shown a restraint on his First Amendment rights that would warrant the relief requested as related to protecting those rights. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs requested relief would grant legal protection to established categorical exceptions of the First Amendment. By essentially granting Doe immunity from school punishment for speaking out, the Court could potentially grant Doe the unfettered ability of engaging his expressive liberties in the form of fighting words or direct threats, both exceptions to First Amendment protections. See Wildman ex rel. Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir.2001) (recognizing that the “right to express opinions on school premises is not absolute”). While the Court has the ability to fashion a preliminary injunction that would have avoided this situation, the Court need not address Defendants’ contentions any further than noted as the Court has already determined above that the current record does not demonstrate Doe is likely to succeed on the merits of his First Amendment claim. Defendants also assert that Tinker and Bethel together stand for the proposition that “a school retains the right to discipline a student for (1) expression which would substantially disrupt or interfere with the educational atmosphere, or (2) expression which is lewd or offensive.” Defendants argue that Plaintiffs requested relief would violate these school settings principles. Again, the Court need not address Defendants’ contentions on this issue any further because of the Court’s essential findings. 2. Equal Protection and Due Process Claims The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state shall not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV. The Constitution “neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Indeed, “[djiscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.” Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38, 48 S.Ct. 423, 72 L.Ed. 770 (1928). “Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek assistance.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (addressing the constitutionality of a statute that discriminated against homosexuals). The Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to prevent arbitrary gender-based discrimination. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971) (finding that “[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause”). In addition, discrimination based on “gender-based generalizations” is violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975). This means that state sponsored educational institutions may not discriminate based upon an alleged gender stereotype. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982). In addition, discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. See Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 109 F.Supp.2d 1081, 1088 (D.Minn.2000); see also Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 457 (7th Cir.1996) (finding “the Constitution prohibits intentional invidious discrimination between otherwise similarly situated persons based on one’s membership in a definable minority, absent at least a rational basis for the discrimination” and “[t]here can be little doubt that homosexuals are an identifiable minority subjected to discrimination in our society”). In the Eighth Circuit, discrimination based on sexual orientation is subject to rational basis review. Montgomery, 109 F.Supp.2d at 1089 (citing Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260-61 (8th Cir.1996)). Under the rational basis standard, a plaintiff has the burden of showing that the challenged state action is “not rationally related to any legitimate government purpose.” Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 260-61; see also Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 458 (7th Cir.1996) (finding under rational basis review there is no constitutional violation if “ ‘there is any conceivable state of facts’ that would establish a rational basis for the state action.”) (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)). In Montgomery, a student brought an action against the school district for failure to prevent harassment by other students over a period of several years where the harassment was allegedly based on plaintiffs sexual orientation. Montgomery, 109 F.Supp.2d at 1084-86. The plaintiff asserted claims under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1088-89. The court found the plaintiff could assert a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection Clause based on the school district’s failure to prevent harassment and discrimination based on sexual orientation. Id.; see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 633-36, 116 S.Ct. 1620. In a case strikingly similar to the present action before this Court, the Seventh Circuit also found that a school district’s failure to protect a student from student-on-student harassment based on sexual orientation was constitutionally prohibited. See Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 458; cf. Henkle v. Gregory, 150 F.Supp.2d 1067 (D.Nev.2001) (discussing the claims brought by a high school student against the school district and individual officials based on the alleged violation of his rights when defendants ignored his complaints of harassment based on his sexual orientation). The plaintiff in Nabozny was subjected to outrageous and egregious harassment and physical abuse by his fellow students because he was homosexual. Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 451-52. Nabozny repeatedly reported the harassment to school officials, but them response to his complaints was not only non-existent, but overall disheartening. Id. at 452. Not only did they fail to discipline the offending students and protect Nabozny,. but school officials also laughed off his repeated requests despite the escalating nature and inherent danger in the harassment and physical abuse Na-bozny experienced. Id. In Nabozny, the plaintiff presented evidence that other forms of harassment and physical assaults received a much different response from the school than did Naboz-ny’s complaints. Id. at 454-55. The court noted that while the school district may have otherwise enforced its harassment policy, the evidence suggested it “made an exception to their normal practice in Na-bozny’s case,” apparently because his harassment was based on sexual orientation. Id. at 454. Because “[i]t is well settled law that departures from established practices may evince discriminatory intent,” the court found plaintiffs evidence was sufficient to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause for defendant’s failure to protect him from harassment based on his sexual orientation. Id. at 455, 458. In the present case, Doe has made credible assertions that he has been subjected to numerous incidents of harassment, threats, and physical assaults over a period of more than three years. Doe asserts the evidence will establish that Defendants deliberately ignored his repeated complaints about the harassment, and that meanwhile, the District and its officials took affirmative steps to prevent other forms of harassment when brought to their attention. Plaintiff asserts that, similar to the defendants in Nabozny and Montgomery, the Defendants here can offer no rational basis for permitting student to harass Doe as a result of his perceived sexual orientation while protecting other students from similar forms of harassment. At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiffs evidence as to the different reactions of Defendants to different harassment is minimal. There was some testimonial evidence presented that a lengthy suspension was issued to a student that called some female students “dykes” during class. In addition, School officials testified that they took seriously discipline for harassment and physical assault based on gender or race, but further denied they treated Doe’s complaints any differently. Doe has, however, presented some evidence that his complaints went largely unheeded by Defendants. Other than two occasions, the May 8 altercation and the cell phone screen incident, disciplinary measures taken against alleged harassers did not involve any sort of suspension. In addition, the discipline for the cell phone screen incident was reduced from the punishment as originally determined. On the other hand, reaction by school officials was not totally lacking as it was in Nabozny and Montgomery. Indeed, School officials read the District harassment policy to the entire student body of Perry High School at the beginning of this past school year. This was to be the students’ only warning. Prior to this, when complaints were received from Doe, District officials claimed they met with the offending student, discussed the incident, and gave a warning that future harassment would not be tolerated. Doe does not present any evidence that this warning was not successful. To the contrary, one witness testified that while the students that were spoken to stopped engaging in harassing conduct for a time, someone else was always there to fill the void. However, there is some indication according to the evidence on the record that the Defendants’ response to Doe’s complaints was inferior to their response to other complaints. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the current record is insufficient to find a likelihood of success on the merits of his equal protection claim. The Court further finds, however, that the relief Doe requests in his preliminary injunction is not related to his likelihood of success on this issue. The evidence in the record indicates the School is already enforcing its harassment policy, and counsel for Defendants stated it was Defendants’ intention to enforce their harassment policy. The other relief sought in the preliminary injunction is related to Plaintiffs First Amendment claim. Doe has not presented any evidence whereby the Court can assess his likelihood of success on the merits on his due process claim. 3. Title IX Claims Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides the following: No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving financial assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Magistrate Judge Jarvey of the Northern District of Iowa explained that Courts have interpreted Title IX to prohibit gender discrimination against students enrolled in federally supported educational programs and employees involved in such programs. Murray v. N.Y. Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 248 (1995). Under Title IX, an aggrieved individual has an implied right of action, see Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688-89, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1953-54, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), for both injunctive relief and money damages. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 71-73, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 1035-37, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992). Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that if Courts are to give Title IX “the scope that its origins dictate, [they] must accord it a sweep as broad as its language.” North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521, 102 S.Ct. 1912, 1917-18, 72 L.Ed.2d 299 (1982). Wright ex rel. Wright v. Mason City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 940 F.Supp. 1412, 1415-16 (N.D.Iowa 1996). Thus, under Title IX a student can state a claim for monetary damages by asserting the school district intentionally failed to intervene to end the sexual harassment of a student. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75, 112 S.Ct. 1028. As the Supreme Court reasoned, “Congress surely did not intend for federal monies to be expended to support the intentional actions it sought by statute to proscribe.” Id.; see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 631, 643, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999) (Davis I) (acknowledging that student-on-student harassment may give rise to a private right of action against a school district under Title IX). Franklin analogized sexual harassment in schools to that of sexual harassment taking place in the workplace, and concluded that students should have the same protection in schools that employees have in the workplace. Id. In adopting the Franklin analysis in a case involving the alleged sexual harassment of a student by fellow classmates, the Eleventh Circuit made the following observation: The damage caused by sexual harassment ... is arguably greater in the classroom than in the workplace, because the harassment has a greater and longer lasting impact on its young victims, and it institutionalizes sexual harassment as accepted behavior. Moreover, as economically difficult as it may be for adults to leave a hostile workplace, it is virtually impossible for children to leave their assigned school. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th Cir.1996) (Davis II), rev’d on other grounds, 526 U.S. 629, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999). Both Wright and the two Davis decisions held that “when a federally funded educational institution knowingly fails to take steps to remedy a hostile environment created by one student’s sexual harassment of another,” a violation of Title IX has occurred as “the harassed student has been ‘denied the benefits of, or been subjected to discrimination under the educational program.’” Wright, 940 F.Supp. at 1417 (citing Davis II, 74 F.3d at 1194); Davis II, 74 F.3d at 1193 (“Title IX encompasses a claim for damages due to a sexually hostile educational environment created by a fellow student or students when the su