Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM WEINSTEIN, Senior District Judge. This is an action by nine plaintiffs, representing the estates of persons killed by handguns, and in one case the guardian ad litem of a survivor of a shooting, against many handgun 'manufacturers and distributors. Motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction were filed by a number of distributor defendants. The magistrate judge recommended that the claims against eight defendants be dismissed and that motions to dismiss by fourteen others be denied. See Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Cheryl L. Poliak dated August 6, 1998, redacted by agreement of the parties to exclude sensitive sales information, infra (“Report”). At a hearing the operative portions of the Report were affirmed. See Transcript, September 18, 1998. This Memorandum reflects the basis for the court’s oral decision. The reasoning of the district judge and magistrate judge differ on one point — applicability of the jurisdictional analysis in In re DES Cases, 789 F.Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y.1992), approved in In re New York County DES Litigation, 202 A.D.2d 6, 615 N.Y.S.2d 882, 884 (1st Dep’t 1994), and Harold L. Korn, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Mass Torts, 97 Colum. L.Rev. 2183 (1997). One of the plaintiffs’ substantive theories is that defendants negligently marketed their handguns in various parts of the country and that, foreseeably, these guns made their way into the hands of New York’s and other states’ criminals, who used them to kill and wound. See Hamilton v. ACCU-TEK, 935 F.Supp. 1307, 1330 (E.D.N.Y.1996). Defendants’ negligent marketing practices, plaintiffs contend, created an excessively large nationwide market in, and reservoir of, guns, leading to the individual shootings that are the subject of this case. Id. Plaintiffs have analogized these handguns to pathogens, exposure to which has caused widespread injury and death. Id. at 1313. The rationale for plaintiffs’ claims of widespread adverse effects of handguns is similar to that of mass tort claimants in, for example, the asbestos, Agent Orange, Daikon Shield and silicone breast implant litigations. Plaintiffs’ theory shares a number of other features typical of mass torts, including geographically diffuse tortious conduct and impact, difficulty in tracing a particular plaintiffs injury to a particular defendant’s actions, and problems in determining the number of potential defendants and their relative degrees of culpability. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 Tex. L.Rev. 1587, 1595-97 (1995) (discussing nature and characteristics of mass torts). If handguns are characterized as fungible for purposes of this jurisdictional motion, then, plaintiffs argue, the jurisdictional rule applied in the diethylstilbestrol (DES) litigation in In re DES Cases, 789 F.Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y.1992) and In re New York County DES Litigation, 202 A.D.2d 6, 615 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1st Dep’t 1994), applies. Since sales of a “fungible” product anywhere in the national market would affect sales in the New York market, plaintiffs contend, sellers anywhere could be found for jurisdictional purposes to have been participating substantially in the New York market, and, therefore, to be subject to New York’s long arm jurisdiction. The DES jurisdictional analysis was referred to by the magistrate judge as the “pond theory” since the national market for some products may be considered a “common economic pond that knows no state boundaries,” and introduction of the product into any part of the market would have foreseeable ripple effects throughout the country. See Report at 15-16, infra; In re DES Cases, 789 F.Supp. 552, 576 (E.D.N.Y.1992). To be contrasted is the more traditional “stream of commerce” theory relied upon by the magistrate judge which has lead in some cases to a more restrictive scope of personal jurisdiction. See also Harold L. Korn, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Mass Torts, 97 Colum. L.Rev. 2183 (1997) (noting the potential benefits of Ashley’s wider application). Summarizing the views of the parties and concluding that handguns are not governed by the DES rule, the magistrate judge wrote: [Djefendants contend, and this Court agrees, that the DES pond theory of personal jurisdiction should not be applied here because, unlike DES, handguns are not generic products sold interchangeably. There are numerous models and designs of guns with different calibers and ammunition capacity. Each handgun is marked with the manufacturer’s name and a unique serial number. Once the gun is located, the identification of the manufacturer may be ascertained, and even when the gun itself cannot be located, each weapon leaves a “fingerprint” or “track” on the discharged bullet which can be identified through various ballistics tests. Plaintiffs, however, claim that the guns used to shoot all of the plaintiffs’ decedents are fungible in their non-identifiability .. .arguing that because guns are often not recovered from the scene of a crime, and because, as defendants concede, it is often difficult to conduct ballistics tests without the actual weapon for comparison purposes, guns are a generic product similar to DES. However, even though a positive manufacturer identification cannot be made when the gun from which a bullet was fired is unknown, plaintiffs’ own ballistics expert, Steven Colangelo, testified at his deposition that with respect to the guns that were not recovered, it was possible to eliminate certain manufacturers based on measurements taken of the discharged bullet____In accordance with this testimony, Colangelo, conducted ballistics analyses and produced at his deposition lists of firearms that in his opinion were potentially used at each shooting. In this Court’s view, the fact that guns were used in criminal activity may not always be recovered or identified to a 100% certainty does not transform guns into an inherently generic product. See Report at 17-18, infra (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The term “generic” was used by the magistrate judge as equivalent to the word “fungible.” This identity of definition was appropriate in the DES cases where the chemical formula of the product of each producer was the same for pharmacological purposes. See Edwards v. A.L. Lease & Co., 46 Cal.App.4th 1029, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 262 (1st Dist.1996) (the DES cases “dealt with a fungible product manufactured from the same formula, which was inherently defective for its intended purpose by reason of design”). The dictionary definition of these two terms overlaps. Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed.1979) defines “fungible” as “designat[es] goods, as grain, any unit or part of which can replace another unit ... capable of being used in place of another,” while “generic” refers “to a kind, class or group” with the same characteristics. See also Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.1990). It is the characteristic relevant to the matter at issue that determines whether a product is the same as and substitutable for another, and therefore, whether the two are interchangeable, that is to say, “fungible” for purposes of jurisdictional or substantive law. Two products interchangeable for one purpose may not be for another. Thus, for signalling New Year’s Eve, a blast from an auto horn and one from a saxophone may be equivalent as noise, but few would want to dance to the former. The jurisdictional issue is not encompassed in catch-all words like “generic” or “fungible.” The question is whether the market in the state seeking to exercise personal jurisdiction, S-l, is so affected by market activities in other states, S-2 to S-N, as to affect the policies S-l is seeking to effectuate. Even such diverse products as steel, aluminum, plastic and wood, when competing in the market for structural supports, may be competing in the same market for antitrust and other purposes; producers in S-2 to S-N may be substantially affecting the market and policies of S-l and subject to personal jurisdiction in S-l. It is true that certain types of handguns are more likely to be weapons of choice for a variety of lawful users or for criminals generally and in specific categories. Many criminals would undoubtedly prefer a high-grade, reliable automatic or semi-automatic to a Saturday Night Special, and drug dealer-defendants in this district seem to have a penchant for guns that can spray large quantities of bullets on a single pull of the trigger. See, e.g., Michael J. Folio, The Politics of Strict Liability: Holding Manufacturers of Nondefective Saturday Night Special Handguns Strictly Liable After Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 16 Hamline L.Rev. 147, 158 n. 57 (1992) (noting “fatally-flawed premise, that because Saturday Night Special handguns are cheap, easily concealable, and made of low quality materials they are the weapon of choice among criminals”). But, so too, even in the field of pharmaceuticals, and of DES particularly, the high percentage of the market held by well known brands, while suggesting consumer preference for certain producers, does not negate a pharmacologically generic-fungible characterization. (Having-tried the DES cases, the court takes judicial notice that the pills manufactured by the various manufacturers were not identical, varying in shape, dosage and coloring.) As a convenient killing instrument almost any handgun serves its purpose. For the kinds of criminals responsible for the injury and death of plaintiffs’ relatives, any handgun might suffice — or at least so the proof may show. Arguably, from the point of view of those injured by defendants’ products, differences among the guns used in the shootings are not relevant. Whether public policy requires consideration of fungibility from the point of view of the manufacturer, the lawful purchaser, the criminal, the victim, or some other vantage, is a question intertwined with the nature of the tort law and policy controlling the case. For jurisdictional purposes in this case, the court finds handguns “fungible.” Factual assumptions for jurisdiction purposes are based on information available before the trial is completed or summary judgment on substantive issues decided. On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction over the defendants. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 508, 136 L.Ed.2d 398 (1996). District courts have “considerable procedural leeway” in deciding motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2). Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir.1981). The nature of the plaintiffs burden varies according to the procedure the court uses in deciding the jurisdiction issue. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (elements of jurisdiction “must be supported ... with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation”); Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 854, 111 S.Ct. 150, 112 L.Ed.2d 116 (1990) (“[T]he nature of the plaintiffs obligation varies depending on the procedural posture of the litigation.”); 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1351, at 247-48 (2d ed.1990). Where no discovery has taken place, “a plaintiff may defeat a motion to dismiss based on legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 508, 136 L.Ed.2d 398 (1996). After a full evidentiary hearing, the plaintiffs burden is to establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 567. Where, as here, some discovery has taken place and there has been a limited ev-identiary hearing, plaintiffs must make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. This demonstration “must include an averment of facts, that if credited by the [ultimate trier of fact], would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. (quoting Ball v. Metallurgie Hobokeru-Overpelt, 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 854, 111 S.Ct. 150, 112 L.Ed.2d 116 (1990)). Cf. 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1351 (2d ed. Supp.1990) (for purposes of determining jurisdiction, “courts will take as true the allegations of the nonmoving party and resolve all factual disputes in its favor”) Factual decisions made for purposes of determining jurisdiction need not be resolved the same way on a motion for summary judgment or at trial. Plaintiffs have demonstrated a sufficient basis for jurisdiction over most defendants. So far as the jurisdictional issue in the instant case is concerned, application of the DES rule arguably results in essentially the same conclusion of lack of jurisdiction over specific defendants as was reached by the magistrate judge following traditional jurisdictional analysis. The theory developed for DES cases, has been stated as follows in the form of two principles: I. The court must first determine if the forum state has an appreciable interest in the litigation, i.e., whether the litigation raises issues, whose resolution would be affected by, or have a probable impact on the vindication of, policies expressed in the substantive, procedural or remedial laws of the forum. If there is an appreciable state interest, the assertion of jurisdiction is prima facie constitutional. II. Once a prima facie case is made, the assertion of jurisdiction will be considered constitutional unless, given the actual circumstances of the case, the defendant is unable to mount a defense in the forum state without suffering relatively substantial hardship. Evidence to be considered in determining the defendant’s relative hardship includes, inter alia, (1) the defendant’s available assets; (2) whether the defendant has or is engaged in substantial interstate commerce; (3) whether the defendant is being represented by an indemnitor or is sharing the cost of the defense with an indemnitor or co-defendant; (4) the comparative hardship defendant will incur in defending the suit in another forum; and (5) the comparative hardship to the plaintiff if the case were dismissed or transferred for lack of jurisdiction. In re DES Cases, 789 F.Supp. 552, 587 (E.D.N.Y.1992). Further analysis is not required to show that New York has sufficient interest in the safety of its residents and territory from homicide by handgun to satisfy Principle I. In deciding whether it is fair under the circumstances to require a particular defendant to defend a case in New York, Principle II is applied. Each of the defendants as to which the magistrate judge recommends dismissal is so small in its impact on the market as to have arguably warranted a finding that it would suffer a relatively substantial hardship were jurisdiction over it to be exercised in this case. Assuming some form of market share liability, plaintiffs will suffer some hardship if jurisdiction over any defendant is denied since a percentage of any recovery equivalent to the dismissed defendants’ percentage share of the handgun market will be foregone in the pending New York litigation. The dismissed defendants’ total share of the handgun market, however, is so small that the comparative hardship to the plaintiffs is slight. The fact that Virginia substantive law may apply to one plaintiff whose decedent was killed in Virginia does not affect the applicability of the New York rule on long arm jurisdiction in a case commenced in New York. That another state’s substantive law may apply under New York’s choice of substantive law principles does not negate personal jurisdiction in New York. See, e.g., Bensmiller v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 47 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir.1995) (“ ‘the amenability of a foreign corporation to suit in a federal court in a diversity action is determined in accordance with the law of the state where the court sits’ ”) (quoting Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l., 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir.1963) (en banc)); Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts 420-21 (4th ed.1994). The report of the magistrate judge recommending dismissal of some defendants on jurisdictional grounds is affirmed and adopted. SO ORDERED. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION POLLAJC, United States Magistrate Judge. On July 30, 1996, twenty-eight out of thirty named distributors of firearms (the “distributors”) filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint in this action for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The distributors argue that: 1) plaintiffs have failed to establish personal jurisdiction over the distributors under the long-arm statute; 2) the distributors lack the minimum contacts with New York that are required to satisfy due process concerns; and 3) the standard for personal jurisdiction set forth in the DES litigation, In re DES Cases, 789 F.Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y.1992), app. dismissed, 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir.1993), is inapplicable to this case. In response, plaintiffs argue that the distributors’ direct sales of handguns in New York, when combined with the indirect sales of guns in New York transacted through the “underground market,” are sufficient to assert jurisdiction over the distributors based on the principles enunciated in In re DES Cases. On October 25, 1996, the district court heard oral argument on defendants’ motions to dismiss and referred the motion to the undersigned to supervise discovery and issue a report and recommendation on the issue of personal jurisdiction. BACKGROUND In October 1995 and April 1996, plaintiffs commenced these actions against thirty distributors, alleging that the distributors, all federal firearms licensees, together with certain named firearms manufacturers, have committed the tort of negligently supplying and distributing handguns to an over-saturated national handgun market. Plaintiffs allege that, as a consequence of this tortious act, criminals have obtained handguns which were then used to injure plaintiffs’ decedents, all of whom were New York residents. Plaintiffs allege that despite New York’s restrictive firearms policy, “[hjundreds of thousands of guns acquired under the lax laws of other states are sold each year on the streets in this jurisdiction.” (Pls.’ Mem., dated Dec. 23, 1997, at 5) (citing George D. Newton & Franklin E. Zimring. Firearms and Violence in American Life, National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, A Staff Report (1963) ch. 13, p. 91). Plaintiffs allege that the distributors are the “middle link” in the gun chain, facilitating the flow between manufacturers and retailers or end users. Defendants, many of which are closely held businesses, contend that they are all domiciled in states other than New York, with some located in remote areas of the United States. None are incorporated or licensed to do business in New York and none have offices in the state. Defendants claim that most of the distributors sell handguns in their local region and that only a few of the named distributor defendants sell more than a de minimis number of handguns to retailers in New York. Accordingly, defendants argue that they lack the minimum contacts necessary to confer personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. DISCUSSION On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs bear the initial burden of establishing that the court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 508, 136 L.Ed.2d 398 (1996) (citing Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 507 (2d Cir.1994)). Where, as here, the parties have conducted extensive discovery regarding defendants’ contacts with the forum state, the plaintiffs’ prima facie showing must include facts that, if credited by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to establish jurisdiction. See id. at 567. Because this Court was faced with a dispute as to the accuracy of the facts alleged and a serious challenge by defendants to the novel methodology used by plaintiffs to determine defendants’ contacts with New York, this Court set an evidentiary hearing for July 10, 1998, after outlining a number of issues about which the court had questions and concerns. However, the hearing was canceled after a representation by the distributor defendants and by plaintiffs at the June 3, 1998 conference before this Court (Tr. at 47-52) that both parties preferred to rest on their papers. Accordingly, this Report issues based solely on the parties’ written submissions. In this Report, the Court begins with a traditional analysis and then proceeds to examine both the DES “pond” theory and plaintiffs’ hybrid theory, concluding with a recommendation that for a variety of reasons, the court apply a traditional jurisdictional framework to the instant case. I. The Traditional Analysis In determining whether personal jurisdiction exists in a diversity action, the courts look to the law of the state in which the court is located: “[t]he amenability of a foreign corporation to suit in a federal court in a diversity action is determined in accordance with the law of the state where the court sits, with ‘federal law entering the picture only for the purpose of deciding whether the state’s assertion of jurisdiction contravenes a constitutional guarantee.” Id. at 567 (quoting Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir.1963)). Accordingly, the court must conduct a two part inquiry to determine: 1) whether the defendant is amenable to service of process under the state’s laws; and 2) whether the court’s assertion of jurisdiction over the parties is in accordance with the constitutional requirements of due process. Id. (quoting Savin v. Ranier, 898 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir.1990)); see also Chaiken v. VV Pub. Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1025 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 1169, 140 L.Ed.2d 179 (1998). a. The Long Arm Statute Plaintiffs rely on the New York long arm statute, specifically, C.P.L.R. Section 302(a)(3)(ii), as the basis for jurisdiction over the distributor defendants. This statute provides in pertinent part: [A] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary ... who in person or through an agent ... (3) commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state ... if he ... (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce .... N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii) (McKinney 1990). In order to assert jurisdiction under this section, plaintiffs must show that: (1) defendants committed a tortious act outside New York; (2) defendants’ tortious activity caused injury to person or property inside New York; (3) defendants should have reasonably expected the act to have consequences in the state; and (4) defendants derive substantial revenue from interstate commerce. See Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 997 F.Supp. 367, 372 (W.D.N.Y.1998); Fantis Foods, Inc. v. Standard Importing Co., 49 N.Y.2d 317, 325, 425 N.Y.S.2d 783, 402 N.E.2d 122 (1980). One of the key issues in dispute on this motion is whether, under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii), plaintiffs can establish the third prong, known as the foreseeability requirement, that each defendant “expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state.” This requirement is “intended to ensure some link between a defendant and New York State to make it reasonable to require a defendant to come to New York to answer for tortious conduct committed elsewhere,” Ingraham v. Carroll, 90 N.Y.2d 592, 598, 665 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12, 687 N.E.2d 1293 (1997), but the consequences foreseen need not be those that are the subject of the lawsuit. See In re DES Cases, 789 F.Supp. at 570 (citing Allen v. Auto Specialties Mfg. Co., 45 A.D.2d 331, 357 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550 (3d Dep’t 1974)). Significantly, New York cases addressing the foreseeability requirement after the Supreme Court’s decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) have looked to that case, often integrating the “reasonable anticipation of suit” analysis of World-Wide Volkswagen with the foreseeability requirements of C.P.L.R. § 302. See Penny v. United Fruit Co., 869 F.Supp. 122, 128 (E.D.N.Y.1994) (RJD) (collecting cases); see also In re DES Cases, 789 F.Supp. at 570 (noting that the reasonable expectation analysis is interpreted so as not to conflict with federal due process limits). The “reasonable expectation” test is an objective one, see Allen v. Auto Specialties Mfg. Co., 45 A.D.2d at 332, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 550, and is not satisfied by the mere possibility that a product will find its way into the forum state. See Cortlandt Racquet Club, Inc. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 978 F.Supp. 520, 523 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (citing Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987)). After Asahi, it is clear that foreseeability requires an affirmative or purposeful act invoking the benefits or protections of New York law, see id., or, in other words, there must be evidence of “a discernable effort to directly or indirectly serve the New York market.” Schaadt v. T.W. Kutter, Inc., 169 A.D.2d 969, 970, 564 N.Y.S.2d 865, 866 (3d Dep’t 1991); see also Martinez v. American Standard, 91 A.D.2d 652, 457 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2d Dep’t 1982), aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 873, 470 N.Y.S.2d 367, 458 N.E.2d 826 (1983) (holding that foreseeability is restricted by the purposeful affiliation requirement that defendant “ ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state’”) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)). Foreseeability has been found to be satisfied where a foreign manufacturer enters into an exclusive sales agreement with another corporation to sell its products across the United States, including in the forum state, see Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 997 F.Supp. at 373 (1998); where an internet provider exhibited “tangible manifestations that [it] was attempting to reach a New York market” by stating on its home page that it could help customers across the United States, and by signing up six New York subscribers, American Network, Inc. v. Access America, 975 F.Supp. 494, 498 (S.D.N.Y.1997); where a non-domiciliary defendant sold approximately 5% of its products in New York, and knew that the Tennessee distributor to which its shoes were shipped would distribute to New York retailers, see Darienzo v. Wise Shoe Stores, Inc., 74 A.D.2d 342, 346, 427 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (2d Dep’t 1980); and where a manufacturer shipped a chain hoist to the ultimate purchaser in the forum state. See Prentice v. Demag Material Handling, Ltd., 80 A.D.2d 741, 437 N.Y.S.2d 173 (4th Dep’t 1981). The fourth element of Section 302(a)(3)(ii), substantial interstate revenue, is “ ‘intended to exclude non-domiciliaries whose business operations are of a local character.’ ” Bensusan v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 29 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting Report of the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York for the Judicial Year July 1, 1965 through June 30,1996, Legislative Document (1967) No. 90). Thus, while the statute was not intended to burden non-domiciliaries with remote connections to the state, the Judicial Conference in proposing the section believed that “ ‘it might be fair and desirable to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant ... engaged in interstate commerce, whether or not related to New York, the essential difference being that the [party engaging in interstate commerce] is generally equipped to handle litigation away from his business location.’ ” PC COM, Inc. v. Proteon, Inc., 906 F.Supp. 894, 906 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (quoting Markham v. Gray, 393 F.Supp. 163, 166 (W.D.N.Y.1975)). The determination as to whether interstate commerce is “substantial” is based on either absolute or relative numbers, requiring an assessment of either the percentage of total revenue that is derived from interstate commerce or the absolute amount of interstate commerce revenue. See Ronar, Inc. v. Wallace, 649 F.Supp. 310, 316 (S.D.N.Y.1986). The method used in a particular case should be determined by the specific facts and circumstances of that case, keeping in mind that “the overall nature of the defendant’s business and the extent to which he can fairly be expected to defend lawsuits in foreign forums.” Id. This flexible approach is needed so as not to implicate due process concerns. Id. b. Due Process Once personal jurisdiction is established under state law, the court must next determine whether the assertion of jurisdiction complies with federal due process. The due process requirement for personal jurisdiction is designed to protect parties without meaningful ties to a foreign jurisdiction from being subjected to judgments there. It ‘“gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.’ ” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d at 567 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)). The due process determination involves an assessment first as to whether the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction, see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and second, as to whether the assertion of jurisdiction is reasonable under the circumstances and “comports with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id., at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154. The Second Circuit has recently held that the two prongs of the due process test must be weighed relatively; where a plaintiffs showing on minimum contacts is weak, the reasonableness showing must be greater in order for a forum state to validly assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d at 568-69. The “minimum contacts” portion of the due process analysis protects nonresident defendants from litigating in an inconvenient forum and ensures that federal courts do not exercise jurisdiction “beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292, 100 S.Ct. 559. To serve as a basis for personal jurisdiction, the defendant’s conduct establishing minimum contacts must be purposefully directed toward the forum state, see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 474-76, 105 S.Ct. 2174, and his connection with the state should lead him to “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. 559. Thus, “a foreign corporation ‘purposefully avails’ itself of a particular forum where the corporation places its products into interstate commerce and reasonably foresees that those products will be delivered into that forum.” Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 997 F.Supp. at 374. Thus, “[t]he forum state does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297-98, 100 S.Ct. 559 (emphasis added). However, the law is well-settled that generally, the placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not enough to establish purposeful activity directed toward a state sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Calif., 480 U.S. at 112, 107 S.Ct. 1026; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. 559. Following its decision in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Calif., 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92, split over whether, in products liability cases, merely placing a product into the stream of commerce is sufficient to establish minimum contacts where the manufacturer or retailer is aware that its product may be sold in the forum state. While four of the Justices believed that was sufficient, four others concluded that “merely placing a product into the stream of commerce with knowledge that it may be swept into a particular forum,” is not sufficient and that a further showing of some affirmative act directed at the forum state is required. Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 997 F.Supp. at 375 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Calif., 480 U.S. at 112, 107 S.Ct. 1026). Although the Circuits have subsequently divided over which stream of commerce standard to adopt, the Second Circuit in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d at 567-68, has adopted a different approach that focuses on whether “general” or “specific” jurisdiction is asserted. In establishing minimum contacts, plaintiffs must either establish that “specific” jurisdiction exists through a showing that plaintiffs’ claims arise from or are related to a defendant’s activities in the forum, or that “general” jurisdiction, based on defendant’s “continuous and systematic general business contacts,” exists. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d at 567-568. In determining whether the litigation stems from injuries arising from defendant’s activities in the forum, one court has suggested that the inquiry should focus on whether “the plaintiff would ... have suffered the same injury in the absence of the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, 997 F.Supp. at 376. In a “specific” jurisdiction case, the plaintiff must establish that “the litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities,” and “that the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (citations omitted). When the case is predicated on “general” jurisdiction and the events that give rise to the suit are unrelated to any activities conducted by the defendant in the forum, a more stringent showing of minimum contacts is required than if specific jurisdiction was asserted. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d at 568. For general jurisdiction, the courts have required a showing of “continuous and systematic business contacts” with the forum. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Co., 84 F.3d at 568. Continuous and systematic general business contacts have been found where the defendant had -an office, maintained records, and held corporate meetings in the forum, albeit for a limited period of time. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol., Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952). However, where a defendant merely made a purchase of equipment in the forum state, sent employees into the state for training and sent one officer for contract negotiations, but never operated or solicited business or sold products reaching the forum, general jurisdiction was not found. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404. With respect to the second element in the due process analysis — the reasonableness inquiry — courts look to a five-factor test entailing an evaluation of: (1) the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the ease; (3) the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy; and (5) the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d at 568. Although courts generally should not dismiss a case for lack of personal jurisdiction based on an application of the reasonableness test once minimum contacts or purposeful activity has been established, the Second Circuit recently did so upon a careful evaluation of the above-mentioned factors. In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, a New York corporation sued a non-domiciliary in District Court in Vermont, alleging that the defendant had supplied faulty curtain walls for the construction of a bank owned by plaintiff. The claim of jurisdiction was based on a theory of general jurisdiction where all of the acts related to the suit had occurred in Missouri, Texas and Florida, and the only contact with Vermont was defendant’s general business contacts, which included $4 million in sales to the forum, its relationship with dealers selling its products, visits to those dealers, advertising and support services, and the deliberate targeting of firms in the forum. In affirming the dismissal of defendant from the case based on lack of pérsonal jurisdiction, the Second Circuit held that although these activities satisfied the minimum contacts requirement, traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice would be violated if defendant were to be haled into a Vermont court. In terms of the burden on the defendant, the court found that this factor cut slightly in favor of defendant since none of the records, files, or witnesses were located in the forum, although the court noted that modern communication and transportation methods would ease the burden. The court found that the interest of the forum state, Vermont, in providing redress to its own citizens for out-of-state injuries was not implicated since the plaintiff was a New York citizen. Similarly, other factors, including the interests of the plaintiff in obtaining convenient and effective relief and the efficient administration of justice, would not be served by prosecuting the suit in Vermont given the plaintiffs citizenship and the out-of-state location of the witnesses and evidence. The court noted that Vermont’s statute of limitations, which made the forum the only jurisdiction in which plaintiffs suit could be brought, was not a valid consideration. Finally, no policy argument as to the state’s interest in promoting a particular social policy was articulated by plaintiff and this factor did not weigh in favor of either party. II. The DES “Pond” Theory ' Plaintiffs urge this Court to go beyond the traditional jurisdictional analysis. They argue that “[t]he handgun market distributors are particularly suited to the mass tort jurisdictional analysis set forth by this Court in In Re DES Cases, 789 F.Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y.1992) and followed by the New York State Courts in In re New York County DES Litigation, Carrano v. Abbott Laboratories ” (Pls.’ Mem., dated Dec. 23, 1997, at 30), although they acknowledge that this case “does not fall entirely within the parameters of In re DES Cases.” (Pls.’ Mem., dated June 10, 1998, at 8). In In re DES Cases, the court articulated a jurisdictional analysis for mass torts known as the “pond theory” which stems from a series of cases designed to alleviate the evi-dentiary hurdles faced by plaintiffs who had been injured as a consequence of the use of the diethylstilbestrol (“DES”). These DES plaintiffs could not, due to the generic nature of the product, identify the actual manufacturer responsible for the DES tablets used in any particular case. The pond theory, in part, was a natural extension of the New York Court of Appeals decision in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 539 N.E.2d 1069, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944, 110 S.Ct. 350, 107 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989), where the court adopted a national market share method for apportioning tort liability. Under this market share analysis, each defendant would be held severally liable for a plaintiffs damages based on the proportion of the manufacturer’s share of the total market at the time of exposure. Only those defendants who could establish that they never marketed DES to pregnant women were exempt from liability. In denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in In re DES Cases, the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein, United States District Judge, analyzed the impediments placed in the way of plaintiffs by the “purposeful availment” tests of the World Wide Volkswagen and Asahi Metal Industry eases and sought to distinguish the DES cases from the standard products liability case brought by an individual plaintiff, who has been injured by a particular item, against defendants known to have manufactured or sold that particular item. By contrast, DES was marketed nationally, was a fungible, generic product produced by numerous manufacturers and sold interchangeably to consumers who were unaware of the source of the product they were consuming. In describing the DES market, the court stated that it was “a common economic pond that knows no state boundaries,” so that “substantial interjection of products at any point of the national market has ripple effects in all parts of the market.” 789 F.Supp. at 576. Under these circumstances, the court held that personal jurisdiction may be asserted as long as there is: 1) an appreciable state interest in adjudicating the claim; and 2) no substantial hardship to the defendant. See id. at 587. Suggesting that this principle should be applied not only to the DES cases but also “perhaps in other mass tort cases” id., the court set forth several factors to consider in determining defendant’s hardship, including: 1) the defendant’s available assets; 2) whether the defendant is engaged in substantial interstate commerce; 3) whether the defendant is being represented by an indemnitor or is sharing the cost of the defense with an indemnitor or co-defendant; 4) the comparative hardship to defendant to defend the suit in another forum; and 5) the comparative hardship to plaintiff if the suit were dismissed or transferred for lack of jurisdiction. Id. With respect to the application of the pond theory to the instant ease, there are, on the one hand, several important policy concerns that might argue for an application of the DES framework to this case. For one, due to problems in proving causation against any single handgun distributor, plaintiffs may never be able to bring a lawsuit and seek compensation for the deaths of their loved ones. Even where ballistics analysis could narrow down the potential manufacturers of the gun used in a shooting, plaintiffs would have to search for a forum where all of the parties would be amenable to suit, or, in the alternative be forced to bring multiple suits in order to have full redress. In addition, aside from the obvious interest New York has in providing relief to its citizens who have been victims of torts committed outside the state, see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d at 574, the New York legislature has articulated a strong interest in gun control. (See Pls.’ Mem, dated Dec. 23,1997, at 4-5). However, there are several clear differences between handguns and DES that militate against applying the pond theory to this case. Preliminarily, this Court notes that Judge Weinstein previously told plaintiffs at oral argument: ‘You really do have to rély on the stream of commerce theory, I believe, of the Volkswagen case and the other Supreme Court cases rather than the pond commerce case theory of In re DES Cases.” (Tr. of Hrg. before Hon. Judge Weinstein, dated Oct. 25, 1996, at 45). In support of this position, defendants contend, and this Court agrees, that the DES pond theory of personal jurisdiction should not be applied here because,' unlike DES, handguns are not generic products sold interchangeably. There are numerous models and designs of guns with different calibers and ammunition capacity. Each handgun is marked with the manufacturer’s name and a unique serial number. Once the gun is located, the identification of the manufacturer may be ascertained, and even when the gun itself cannot be located, each weapon leaves a “fingerprint” or “track” on the discharged bullet which can be identified through various ballistics tests. Plaintiffs, however, claim that “the guns used to shoot all of the plaintiffs’ decedents are fungible in their non-identifiability” (Pis.’ Mem., dated June 10, 1998, at 8), arguing that because guns are often not recovered from the scene of a crime, and because, as defendants concede, it is often difficult to conduct ballistics tests without the actual weapon for comparison purposes, guns are a generic product similar to DES. However, even though a positive manufacturer identification cannot be made when the gun from which a bullet was fired is unknown, plaintiffs’ own ballistics expert, Steven Colangelo, testified at his deposition that with respect to the guns that were not recovered, it was possible to eliminate certain manufacturers based on measurements taken of the discharged bullet. (Colangelo Dep., at 109-13, 235-40, 253-58, 283-88, 355-60, Ex. B to Defs.’ Mem., dated June 22,1998). In accordance with this testimony, Colangelo, conducted ballistics analyses and produced at his deposition lists of firearms that in his opinion were potentially used at each, shooting. In this Court’s view, the fact that guns used in criminal activity may not always be recovered or identified to a , 100% certainty does not transform guns into an inherently generic product. The evidentiary difficulties in identifying the defendants responsible for the manufacture of the subject product are not present in this ease to the same extent they were in the DES litigation. In addition, it is questionable whether the handgun market is. a national market in the same way that the DES market was a national one. Some companies manufacturing DES “conducted national advertising” and employed a “national corps of salespersons hawk[ing] the drug in doctors’ offices in every part of the country.” “Even companies producing exclusively for local markets relied on the nationally developed understanding and consensus about DES and used knowledge and chemicals from all parts of the United States.” In re DES Cases, 789 F.Supp. at 557. Thus, the small company selling DES benefitted from the marketing of the large company, and “by competing to establish a territorial niche within the national DES market, every manufacturer directly or indirectly benefitted from [interstate commerce] ... by participating in the national market for a generic good.” Id. at 576. This was possible since all of the companies peddled the same good, and logically, customer preferences therefore played no part of a company’s success. By contrast, customer preferences and loyalty are significant in the market for handguns which are manufactured in countless varieties with countless features. The marketing efforts of one company would, in all likelihood, do little to boost the sales of another. Indeed, there is fierce competition between the manufacturers and distributors of firearms, focused in part on promoting the particular features of their product over their competitors’ products. Therefore, the local distributor with little or no contact with New York would not participate in or benefit from any “national” market in the same sense that the DES distributor or manufacturer would have. It is unclear whether courts are going to apply the In re DES Cases jurisdictional analysis to other mass tort cases. Indeed, at least one court has already rejected this framework for DES litigation. See Boaz v. Boyle & Co., 40 Cal.App.4th 700, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 (2d Dist.1995). In any event, the facts particular to this litigation involving handguns make it an inappropriate candidate for the application of the DES jurisdictional framework. III. Plaintiffs’ Hybrid Theory While appearing to concede that strict application of a DES analysis is inappropriate here, plaintiffs have submitted supplemental letters, dated March 3, 1998 and June 10, 1998, in support of their novel theory of personal jurisdiction, which appears to apply a market share analysis within the confines of the traditional jurisdictional analysis. Essentially, they contend that those distributors who have “sales” of handguns in New York which amount to 1% or more of their total national sales should be subject to personal jurisdiction using the traditional analysis under the long-arm statute. In calculating “sales,” however, plaintiffs use a methodology that includes not only the claimed sales of handguns made by a particular distributor to New York during a specified time period, but also attributes to each distributor defendant a certain percentage of handguns that are initially distributed in states other than New York and then ultimately transported to and resold in New York through the illegal “underground” market. Essentially, plaintiffs provide their own sets of revenue generated in New York by each distributor defendant, calculating both “direct” sales to New York retailers by each defendant, as well as “indirect” sales, which take into account the number of handguns entering New York via the underground market from “feeder states,” to which the distributor defendants sell handguns through retailers located in those states. Plaintiffs argue that both the direct and indirect sales are evidence of minimum contacts with New York. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that it is foreseeable to the defendant distributors that sales of guns to retailers in states with lax gun control laws would result in tortious consequences in New York since the distributors have knowledge from the “expanding public record documenting illegal gun trafficking from Southern States into New York.” (Pis.’ Mem., dated June 10, 1998, at 4). As evidence of this public record, plaintiffs have submitted a report'written by the staff of Congressman Charles E. Schumer, dated April 9, 1997 (the “Schumer- Report;” Ex. D to Barnes Certif.); portions of a report entitled “Crime Gun Trace Analysis Reports: The Illegal Youth Firearms Market in 17 Communities” done by the ATF Youth Crime Interdiction Initiative, dated July, 1997 (the “ATF Report);” Ex. E to Barnes Certif.); the Affidavit of Dr. Howard Andrews, dated May 7, 1997 (Ex. F to Barnes Certif.); and the Affidavit of Dr. Frederick Dunbar, dated May 6, 1997 (Ex. G. to Barnes Certif.). These exhibits indeed detail the existence and effects of the underground market. For example, based on detailed statistics, the Schumer Report concludes that guns used in crimes are most likely to come from states with weak gun control laws including Florida, Texas, South Carolina, and Georgia. The ATF Report details the most frequent source states for successfully traced crime guns recovered in New York City, broken down by age of the possessor of the gun. For youth possessors (ages eighteen to twenty-four) and juveniles (ages seventeen and under), the top five source states are Virginia, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. In his May 7, 1997 affidavit, Dr. Andrews, plaintiffs expert, notes that based on an analysis of the BATF trace database, only 10.7% of the handguns traced in connection with homicides in New York were acquired by sales in New York; 45.08% of all pistols used in homicides in New York State originate in the southeastern states including Alabama, Tennessee, Georgia, South Carolina, Mississippi, North Carolina, Virginia, and Florida. Plaintiffs claim that these findings are consistent with those of the Schumer Report. Regardless of whether this Court takes formal judicial notice of the existence of an underground market, as plaintiffs request, there is significant publicly available evidence such that any firearms distributor, by virtue of being in that business, should know of or foresee the existence of an underground market which transports guns from the Southeast to states in the Northeast, including New York. The Court views plaintiffs’ request to include indirect sales in a minimum contacts analysis as a “hybrid” jurisdictional analysis, combining aspects, of both the traditional C.P.L.R. long arm statute and the In re DES Cases framework. Specifically, plaintiffs analogize indirect sales to the sale of DES insofar as “Defendants’ activities in one part of the country, for example the southeast, have documented trade flow consequences throughout the nation and especially New York.” (Pls.’ Mem., dated June 10, 1998, at 8). Moreover, in taking into account indirect sales, plaintiffs’ analysis by necessity renounces the “purposeful availment” requirement articulated in the World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi—the so-called “stream of commerce” cases—as did the court in In re DES Cases. Plaintiffs’ market share attributions are based on their analysis of trace statistics obtained from ATF. Using ATF data regarding handgun traces requested in connection with homicides committed in New York between 1989 and 1997, plaintiffs have determined that the majority of firearms entering the underground market which are used to commit homicides in New York originate in a limited number of states, generally located in the southeast region of the United States. (Repts. of Howard Andrews, dated April 17, 1998 and June 18, 1997). From their analysis, plaintiffs have attributed a percentage of handguns in eight states as follows: Virginia (13.6%), North Carolina (4.4%), South Carolina (4.8%), Georgia (5.7%), Florida (11.6 %), Ohio (6.4%), Texas (7.4%), and Pennsylvania (4.6%). (Pls.’ Letter, dated Mar. 3, 1998, at 2). Plaintiffs then utilized the information provided by defendants in response to discovery requests as to the geographical location of their sales. Using the percentages developed from ATF statistics, plaintiffs determined the average percentage of gun traces for the states in that locale, and then, using the distributors’ national sales figures, determined the number of weapons that could potentially be transported to New York through the underground market. Plaintiffs’ analysis was hampered by the fact that many of the distributors provided limited or no sales data reflecting state sales figures or provided limited or no information at all. In further support of their argument, plaintiffs have produced an expert report, dated May 1, 1998, which was prepared by Lucy Allen and Jonathan Portes from the National Economic Research Associates (“NERA”). Asked to conduct an economic analysis of the handgun market structure and distribution practices, NERA based its analysis on sales data provided by the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms and a review of literature on the illegal handgun market. According to the NERA Report, the NERA experts reached several conclusions, including: 1) a large proportion of the guns used to commit crimes were sold recently; 2) certain types of guns are more likely to be used by criminals and production of these guns has increased in recent years; 3) there is a substantial amount of interstate smuggling of handguns, most of which is from states with lax gun control laws; and 4) in those states which are the primary sources of weapons used to commit crimes, a disproportionate number of guns are sold relative to the expected level of gun ownership. These findings, plaintiffs contend, support their theory that there is an oversupply of handguns that flow from the South Atlantic states into states like New York where gun sales are heavily regulated and that these weapons imported from other states are then used to commit crimes in New York. Plaintiffs contend that the NERA analysis reinforces plaintiffs’ position that this Court should consider not only actual sales of guns in New York but also the number of firearms that could potentially end up in the New York market from sales in these other states. Based on the data collected and the analysis performed using sales trace data and revenue data, plaintiffs compiled a number of statistics for each distributor reflecting: 1) revenues generated from sales in New York, including revenue derived from indirect sales through the underground market, as a percentage of national revenue; 2) number of guns sold in New York, including direct sales, as a percentage of national sales; 3) number of guns sold in New York using the underground market statistics; and 4) numbers of guns sold nationally. Set forth below are two summary charts of plaintiffs’ statistics. The first reflects for each defendant for the period of 1992 to 1995, the number of handguns sold nationally, the direct sales to New York, and sales to New York adjusted in accordance with plaintiffs’ methodology to reflect underground sales as well. Adjusted Numbers Direct Total Sold Sold in Sales in Distributor Nationally New York New York REDACTED REDACTED The second chart reflects for each distributor, for the period of 1992 to 1995, total national revenue, revenue from direct sales to New York, and the total revenue from New York. Plaintiffs determined each distributor’s revenues derived from sales in New York by selecting an average sales price of $392 per handgun as computed by Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig. Revenue from Direct N.Y. Sales National Adjusted Distributor Revenue N.Y. Revenue REDACTED REDACTED Citing Allen v. Canadian General Elec. Co., Ltd., 65 A.D.2d 39, 410 N.Y.S.2d 707, plaintiffs argue that even those defendants that generate revenues of 1% to 2% from direct and indirect sales to New York should be kept in the case since based on these sales, they should have a “reasonable expectation” that these sales would have an effect in New York. Plaintiffs also argue that this Court should consider the effect that a loss of indirect sales to New York would have on a distributor’s total revenue in determining whether the distributor earns enough revenue in New York for general jurisdiction. Based on this analysis, plaintiffs contend that all of the distributor defendants remaining after plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal of five defendants have “ ‘continuous and systematic,’ but limited business operation in New York State which generates substantial revenue” sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on this Court. (Pls.’ Mem., dated Mar. 3, 1998 at 9). Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ numbers, inclusive of indirect sales, are not evidence that defendants purposefully directed their conduct toward New York, and contend that under plaintiffs’ analysis, certain of the distributors should be dismissed in any event because of their minimal contacts with New York. Moreover, defendants claim that they cannot evaluate the calculation of constructive sales in New York as set forth in plaintiffs’ submissions to this Court because they do not have all of the underlying information on which it is based. This Court agrees. Apart from a brief and somewhat vague description of methodology, plaintiffs have merely provided this Court with a series of numbers representing the conclusions of their analysis. Nothing has been presented for this Court or defendants to even begin to verify the accuracy of the