Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER YOUNG, Chief Judge. This is an action under the Employment Retirement Security Act of 1974, codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (ERISA). The plaintiff, Radford Trust (“Radford”), alleged that the defendant, First Unum Life Insurance Company of America (“First Unum”), had wrongfully denied benefits owed to Radford’s beneficiary, John Doe (“Doe”) (who assigned his claim to Radford), under a group long term disability policy (the “Policy”) that First Unum managed for Doe’s former employer, New York City law firm Hawkins, Delafield & Wood (“Hawkins”). Radford’s action sought damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. First Unum maintained that its denial of benefits was proper, arguing that Doe had failed to establish that he was disabled before his coverage under the Policy was terminated. The company further argued that when Doe released all claims against Hawkins, he also released any claims against First Unum. Because Radford could only recover to the extent of Doe’s rights, First Unum’s arguments would require summary judgment in its favor. Finally, First Unum urged that should the Court hold that First Unum reached its decision incorrectly, the proper course would be remand to First Unum for further proceedings. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and then stipulated that this case might be treated as a case stated. See Pl.’s Stip. [Doc. No. 34]; Def.’s Stip. [Doc. No. 33]. This is a helpful procedure wherein the parties agree that the summary judgment record constitutes the entire case and the Court may draw such inferences therefrom as are reasonable. Where facts are in dispute, the Court notes each party’s contentions, and when necessary makes a determination as would an ordinary factfinder, without presumptively drawing inferences in either party’s favor. See Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank v. Secretary of Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev., 768 F.2d 5, 11-12 (1st Cir.1985). This Court has used the technique to good effect. The Court issued an order and judgment on March 31, 2004, finding facts, declaring the respective rights of the parties in light of these findings, and entering judgment for Radford. The Court further held that Radford was entitled to costs, attorney’s fees, and prejudgment and post-judgment interest. This opinion explains the Court’s reasoning, amends its holding with regard to the date of accrual for prejudgment interest, and addresses Rad-ford’s Motion to Amend Judgment [Doc. No. 39], I. INTRODUCTION A. Factual Background The facts in this case can be found in several documents: (i) First Unum’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts of Record [Doc. No. 14] (“Def.’s 56.1 Stmt.”); (ii) Doe’s response thereto [Doc. No. 19] (“Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt.”); (iii) First Unum’s Response to Doe’s Undisputed Statement of Material Facts [Doc. No. 22] (“Def.’s Resp.”); and (iv) written documents that speak for themselves, as compiled in First Unum’s administrative record [Doc. No. 14] (“R.”). Because Doe, not Radford, is the real party in interest here, the Court does not distinguish between Doe’s contentions and Radford’s, and refers to all contentions made by either as Doe’s contentions. 1. The Policy The Policy provided benefits for “disabled” employees. Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1; R. at FULCL00687-63 (copy of the Policy). The Policy stated: “Disability” and “disabled” mean that because of injury or sickness: 1. the insured cannot perform each of the material duties of his regular occupation; or 2. the insured, while unable to perform all of the material duties of his regular occupation on a full-time basis, is: a. performing at least one of the material duties of his regular occupation or another occupation on a part-time or full-time basis; and b. earning currently at least 20% less per month than his indexed pre-disability earnings due to that same injury or sickness. Note: For attorneys, “regular occupation” means the specialty in the practice of law which the insured was practicing just prior to the date disability started. R. at FULCL00677. With respect to payments made for disability, the Policy provided: When [First Unum] receives proof that an insured is disabled due to sickness or injury and requires the regular attendance of a physician, [First Unum] will pay the insured a monthly benefit after the end of the elimination period. The benefit will be paid for the period of disability if the insured gives to [First Unum] proof of continued: 1. disability; and 2. regular attendance of a physician. Id. at FULCL00675. The “elimination period” was “a period of [180] consecutive days of disability for which no benefit is payable ... and begins on the first day of disability.” Id. at FULCL00681; id. at FULCL00685 (specifying 180 days). “If disability stops during the elimination period for any 14 (or less) days, then the disability will be treated as continuous.” Id. at FULCL00681. “Benefits for disability due to mental illness will not exceed 24 months of monthly benefit payments,” except in circumstances not relevant here. See id. at FULCL00670. “ ‘Mental illness’ means mental, nervous or emotional diseases or disorders of any type.” Id. The Policy provided that an “employee will cease to be insured on the earliest of the following dates” (other possible cessation events are not relevant here): 2. the date the employee is no longer in an eligible class; 5. the date employment terminates. Cessation of active employment will be deemed termination of employment, except: a. the insurance will be continued for a disabled employee during: i. the elimination period; and ii. while benefits are being paid. Id. at FULCL00669. “Active employment” was defined to mean that “the employee must be working ... for the employer on a full-time basis and paid regular earnings (temporary or seasonal employees are excluded) [and] at least [30] hours [per week].” Id. at FULCL00681; id. at FULCL00685 (specifying 30 hours per week). 2. Doe’s Schizophrenia In 1993 and 1994, Doe was under treatment for schizophrenia, and was hospitalized twice for that condition. Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 115. In 1995, after his schizophrenia was no longer acute, he took the Law School Aptitude Test, with accommodations based on his mental illness. See R. at FULCL00354. Doe began working as a full-time associate for Hawkins on September 8,1998, and First -Unum’s coverage of Doe under the Policy became effective on October 1, 1998. Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 117. According to Doe, his symptoms returned over the course of the next year, eventually making him unable to perform his work duties satisfactorily. Both parties acknowledged the content of the progress notes written by Dr. Sarita Singh (whom Doe saw on June 22, 1999), which stated: During the year [Doe] worked, he gradually became increasingly fearful of being sexually assaulted. It got to the point that he feared getting on the elevator to get to his office. His concentration worsened. His sleep became irregular, his appetite worsened to the point that all he could eat was bread. He has auditory hallucinations about lx/wk.... He says he has no contact with his family and has very few friends. R. at FULCL00129. First Unum claimed that the medical records attached to Dr. Singh’s report, which showed that Doe had received no treatment since 1994, demonstrated that Doe “apparently had been treatment free and fully functioning in society since that time.” Def.’s Resp. ¶ 124. On his First Unum claim form, dated October 1, 1999, Doe listed April 20, 1099 as the “[l]ast day [he] worked before [his] disability,” and listed April 21, 1999 as the “date [he] was first unable to work.” PL’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 20. ' 3. Hawkins’s Termination of Doe The parties disagreed as to the nature and significance of the facts surrounding the precise timing and circumstances' of Doe’s termination. According to the Record, Hawkins and Pettina Plevan (“Ple-van”), outside counsel for Hawkins, reported to First Unum on several occasions that Doe’s last day of work was April 26, 1999. See R. at FULCL00047 (Long Term Disability Claim Employer’s Statement); id. at FULCL00277 (First Unum’s log of a call from Plevan to First Unum, which has her stating that. “[Doe] was told on 4/26/99 that his services were no longer required and that he should look for another position”); id. at FULCL00283 (First Unum’s log of a phone call from Plevan to First Unum, which has her reconfirming that April 26, 1999 was Doe’s last day of work). The Record also contained evidence that Doe’s employment continued beyond that date, however. Both parties agreed that Doe continued to receive weekly paychecks until June 30, 1999. See Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 122; Def.’s Resp. ¶ 122. Doe interpreted this as meaning that he was actively employed through June 30, 1999, an understanding he affirmed in a release he signed with Hawkins after settling a disability discrimination suit he brought against the firm. Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 52; R. at FULCL00237. First Unum pointed to statements by Plevan that payment after April 26, 1999 was part of a “severance package.” Def.’s Resp. at 122 (citing R. at FULCL00277 and FULCL00283). Doe noted, however, that Hawkins continued to pay First Unum premiums for long term disability coverage though June 30, 1999, premiums were based on “total covered payroll” (defined as “basic monthly earnings”), Doe received weekly paychecks through June 30, 1999, the pay stubs (except one check for unused vacation) showed Hawkins as deducting SUI/SDI taxes through that date, and New York state law made those taxes deductible “on all wages paid.” PL’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 122 (citing N.Y. Labor Law § 570 (McKinney 2003), and R. at FULCL00258-64, FULCL00283, and FULCL00682). First Unum admitted all this, except that it characterized the weekly pay as “severance pay,” and it “den[ied] that deduction of SUI/SDI taxes equates with active employment as defined in the Policy.” Def.’s Resp. ¶ 122. First Unum argued at the November 3, 2003 summary judgment hearing (although not in any of its filings) that it was “not clear” whether Hawkins had paid premiums for Doe through June 30, 1999, and that if it had, and First Unum had failed to reimburse Hawkins, such failure was due to “inadvertence and neglect,” and thus did not constitute an admission that Doe was an employee through that date. 11/03/03 Hr’g Tr. Doe obviously views Hawkins’s continuing tax and insurance payments as evidence that Hawkins considered him to be an active employee through June 30, 1999, and believes First Unum’s receipt and continued retention of those premium payments constituted an acknowledgment and admission that Doe was actively employed through that date. See id. Doe’s time sheets, provided to First Unum by Hawkins, gave further evidence of his employment beyond April 26, 1999. Both parties acknowledged that Doe’s time sheets for Hawkins recorded him 'as working: 28 hours on “non-billable office matters” and 0.3 billable hours the week beginning April 26, 1999; 35 nonbillable and 0.5 billable hours the week beginning May 3, 1999; 35 nonbillable hours the week beginning May 10,1999; and 27.8 nonbilla-ble and 7.2 billable hours the week beginning May 17, 1999. Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 85 (citing R. at FULCL00362-65); Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 85. There was no evidence in the Record of any work after May 21, 1999. Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 86; Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 86. A December 5, 2000 letter from Plevan to First Unum stated that “it is likely that [Doe] continued to come to the office until early June,” and that it was “ambiguous” when he ceased working. R. at FULCL00326. A July 12, 2001 letter from Plevan to Doe reiterated this, and also conveyed that Hawkins’s earlier statement that April 26, 1999 was Doe’s “last day ‘actually worked’ ... was based on our understanding of the facts, ie., that you stopped doing work before you ceased being an employee.” Id. at FULCL00539. In a June 18, 2001 memorandum, Doe informed Hawkins and First Unum that he did not recall Hawkins giving him a specific date to vacate his office. R. at FULCL00484. A May 28, 1999 memorandum from Samuel Heilman (“Heilman”), a partner at Hawkins, to Doe stated: [I]t is apparent that you have not needed the services of the firm during the past month. Thus, after additional consideration, it is suggested that the firm merely pay you until the end of June and that we forward any personal items still in the office to you at your apartment address or such other location as you request. We will be happy to continue to answer any phone calls directed to you and take messages on your behalf. This will allow you to focus on your job hunting. R. at FULCL00349. In addition, the memo made reference to payments that would be deducted from Doe’s “severance pay,” but it did not specify the nature of that severance pay. Id. at FULCL00349-50. Doe argued that this evidence showed that he had worked at least through May 21, 1999. First Unum, however, characterized the logged hours as “mechanically record[ed],” Def.’s Opp’n [Doc. No. 21] at 11, and as “mostly non-billable time” with “minimal” billable hours, Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 89 (quoting R. at FULCL00389). In First Unum’s view, under the circumstances, the activities recorded in the time sheets did not qualify as “active employment” under the terms of the Policy. The Court found that Doe was actively employed through May 21, 1999. It was undisputed that he was working until at least April 20, 1999, and his time sheets revealed that he was in the office doing work, some of it billable, until May 21, 1999. There could be little doubt that Doe would have been treated as a Hawkins employee had any of the clients for whom he did billable work sued for, say, malpractice. There was no evidence that he was not engaged in work-related activities during that time. Heilman’s May 28, 1999 memorandum is consistent with this finding. It made clear that Hawkins did not want Doe to come into work anymore after it issued, but it suggested that he had been working before then, although perhaps not very productively. The memorandum stated that “after additional consideration, it is suggested that the firm merely pay you until the end of June.” R. at FULCL00349. This suggested a change in policy: ie., it would be better if Doe henceforth ceased active employment. The statement “it is apparent that you have not needed the services of the firm during the past month” may have suggested that the work he was doing was of little importance or of low quality, but it did not deny that he was in fact doing work-related activities in the office. 3. Impact of Doe’s Schizophrenia on His Job As has already been suggested, there was also dispute as to whether, when, and to what extent Doe’s schizophrenia became more acute in the first half of 1999, and whether, under the terms of the Policy, he was “disabled” at a time when the Policy covered him. The parties agreed as to what Doe’s doctors had stated, but disagreed as to the significance and evidentia-ry weight of those statements. On May 21, 1999, Doe met with Dr. Julian Klapowitz (“Dr.Klapowitz”) for the purpose of completing some immunization forms, and he mentioned his schizophrenia to Dr. Klapowitz. Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 123 (citing R. at FULCL00092-93); see Def.’s Resp. ¶ 123 (admitting that Doe mentioned his schizophrenia during the visit, but emphasizing that the visit’s only purpose was “for [Doe] to fill out his immunization records for his admission to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology”). At that time, Dr. Klapowitz wrote in his notes that he would “assist getting [Doe] plugged in to Medicaid psych.” Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt, at 123 (quoting R. at FULCL00093). On June 22, 1999, Doe consulted Dr. Sarita Singh (“Dr.Singh”) about his schizophrenia. Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 118; Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 118; R. at FULCL00129. A year later, Doe would explain his delay in seeking treatment to First Unum’s customer care representative as resulting from a dislike of treatment and a fear of being “branded.” See Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 40 (citing R. at FULCL00056); id. ¶ 41 (citing R. at FULCL00054). Doe’s father also attributed the delay to the debilitation caused by Doe’s schizophrenia and depression. Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 76 (citing R. at FULCL00315). Dr. Singh’s progress notes, quoted at length above, described acute symptoms, so the explanation that Doe and his father gave was more than credible. Dr. Singh prescribed medications and met with Doe again on June 29, and July 12, 1999. PL’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 118; Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 118; R. at FULCL00128-29. Subsequently, on August 30, 1999, Doe saw Dr. David Henderson (“Dr.Henderson”), a psychiatrist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 32. Dr. Henderson made a diagnosis commensurate with that of Dr. Singh, see id. ¶¶ 33-34, and stated that Doe “has a chronic illness that is not responding to treatment. He is unable to work as a lawyer.” Id. ¶ 34 (quoting R. at FULCL00023). Doe claimed that his symptoms had become sufficiently acute by April 1999 that they made him unable to perform his duties satisfactorily, and that his sehizo-phrenia was in fact the reason that Hawkins fired him. The claim for long term disability benefits that Doe filed with First Unum stated that he first began to notice symptoms of concentration difficulty and paranoia on or about March 1, 1999. Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 125; R. at FULCL00045. Doe claimed that his growing difficulties with schizophrenia ultimately led to the termination of his employment with Hawkins. Doe sent a memo to Heilman, dated May 25, 1999, in which he informed Hawkins that he had been “accommodated on the LSAT after producing a diagnosis of schizophrenia” and asked “whether any dissatisfaction” with his job performance “can be traced to such condition.” Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 6; R. at FULCL00355. The closest Hawkins came to answering that question was in Heilman’s May 28, 1999 memo, which stated that “we believe that your abilities may be better used in an area of the law other than public finance.” R. at FULCL00350. Doe notified Hawkins by memorandum addressed to Hellman and dated July 7, 1999 (the “July 7, 1999 Memo”) that he intended to file a disability discrimination lawsuit against Hawkins. Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 8-9; R. at FULCL00341-46. Attached to the July 7, 1999 Memo was a draft EEOC complaint in which Doe stated: “I have been diagnosed with schizophrenia. My employer, Hawkins, Delafield and Wood ended employment either for schizophrenia or manifestations of it.” Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 10 (quoting R. at FULCL00344). On January 18, 2000, Doe settled his claims against Hawkins for $10,000. Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 13; Pi’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 13. In the settlement agreement, Doe “acknowledge[d] and confirm[ed] that [Doe’s] employment with the firm ended effective as of June 30, 1999.” Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14 (quoting R. at FULCL00267); see Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14 (admitting to the release’s text, but emphasizing that under the release both Hawkins and Doe agreed that Doe “acknowledges and confirms” his effective termination date). The release also stated: “This Agreement does not constitute an admission that [Hawkins] has violated any law or committed any wrong whatsoever.” R. at FULCL00266. First Unum’s own file review, dated October 11, 2000, stated that “[Doe] was terminated due to inability to handle the workload, poor attention, poor concentration and diminished social interactions.” Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 120 (quoting R. at FULCL00231) (internal quotation marks omitted); Def.’s Resp. ¶ 120. First Unum consistently maintained both before and during this litigation that Doe could not be regarded as having been disabled before his June 22, 1999 visit to Dr. Singh, and that his coverage had ceased on April 26, 1999, when, according to First Unum, Doe’s active employment ended. Doe argued that the evidence demonstrated that he was disabled before April 26,1999, and therefore covered when he became disabled, and moreover that he had been actively employed until June 30, 1999 (or at least until May 21, 1999), thus making it even clearer that he had been covered at whatever time he became disabled. The Court found that Doe became sufficiently disabled that he could no longer perform his job duties by April 20, 1999. First, the medical diagnoses in the record confirmed that Doe became disabled some time in the first six months of 1999. Dr. Singh’s notes from Doe’s June 22, 1999 visit indicated that he was sufficiently mentally ill that he was unable to “perform each of the material duties of his regular occupation.” That diagnosis was reconfirmed on subsequent visits to Dr. Singh and Dr. Henderson. As early as May 21, 1999, Dr. Klapowitz thought that Doe should be “plugged in to Medicaid psych.” PL’s 56.1 Stmt, at 123. There was no evidence in the Record to controvert these diagnoses. Second, Doe’s work record suggested April 20, 1999 as the actual date of “disability.” Doe consistently maintained before and during this litigation that this was the last day before his disability made him unable to work, and there was no evidence to the contrary. Shortly thereafter, on April 26, 1999, Hawkins told Doe to start looking for another job. First Unum’s own investigation found that Doe was terminated due to “inability to handle the workload, poor attention, poor concentration and diminished social interactions,” a list of failings that bore a striking resemblance to the outward manifestations of schizophrenia. The Court found that Doe’s termination was caused by the onset of his disability, and that he was therefore necessarily disabled before his employment terminated. The Court did not in any way base this finding on the settlement between Hawkins and Doe, nor could it. See Fed.R.Evid. 408; McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 247 (1st Cir.1985). 4. Doe’s Claim for Benefits under the Policy On October 1,1999, several months after Doe’s employment with Hawkins ended, Doe filed his claim for long term disability benefits, and stated that he first began to notice symptoms of concentration difficulty and paranoia on or about March 1, 1999. Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 125; R. at FULCL00045. In his claim statement, Doe reported that the first medical attention he received for his condition was from Dr. Singh, Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 18 (citing R. at FULCL00044), and the only other doctor Doe reported seeing was Dr. Henderson, id.- ¶ 19 (citing R. at FULCL00044). As stated above, Doe noted in the report that his “last day worked before the disability” was “04/20/99.” PL’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 20. Plevan submitted the employer’s statement on Hawkins’s behalf and indicated that Doe’s last day of work was April 26, 1999, at which point he had been “terminated based on job performance.” Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 25 (quoting R. at FULCL00047) (internal quotation marks omitted). Dr. Singh filled out a long term disability claim physician’s statement, dated June 30, 1999 and submitted by Doe, which indicated that Doe was first unable to work on April 20, 1999. Id. ¶ 27 (citing FULCL00013). On June 22, 2000, First Unum’s customer care representative called Doe to discuss his alleged disability. Id. ¶ 40 (citing R. at FULCL00056). As the Court has already noted, when Doe was asked why he failed to seek treatment prior to June 22, 1999, he responded that he “doesn’t like” being treated by doctors, and fears being “branded.” Id. ¶ 41 (quoting R. at FULCL00054). On July 28, 2000, First Unum called Plevan, who again stated that Doe’s last day of work was April 26, 1999. Id. ¶ 42 (citing FULCL00075). But see PL’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 42 (admitting that Plevan made that statement, but pointing out that she later “corrected it to state that time sheets showed he worked for clients through May 21 and that he came to the office through early or mid-June”). On October 11, 2000, Theresa Sullivan (“Sullivan”) conducted-a medical review of Doe’s claim for First Unum. Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 46 (citing R. at FULCL00229-31). Sullivan noted that the medical data did “validate” a diagnosis of schizophrenia and also noted that Doe was undergoing biweekly meetings with Dr. Henderson. Id. ¶¶ 47, 49 (citing R. at FULCL00229 and FULCL00231). She concluded, however, that Doe was “not under care of a physician” between April 21, 1999 and June 22, 1999 and thus that “[i]mpairments [were] not supported” for that time period. Id. ¶ 50 (quoting R. at FULCL00229) (alteration in original). First Unum called Plevan on October 30, 2000 to clarify Doe’s “last day worked.” Id. ¶ 54 (citing R. at FULCL00274). Ple-van responded that Doe “was told on 4/26/99 that his services were no longer needed & that he should look for another position.” Id. ¶ 55 (quoting R. at FULCL00277) (internal quotation marks omitted). She explained that he was paid through June 30, 1999, as part of a “severance package.” Id. (quoting R. at FULCL00277) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, Plevan stated that Doe “may [have] come into the office [after April 26, 1999] for a short period of time but was not working or assigned any work.” Id. ¶ 56 (quoting R. at FULCL00277) (internal quotation marks omitted). Sullivan conducted another medical review on behalf of First Unum on October 31, 2000 that reiterated her initial findings. Id. ¶¶ 58-59 (citing R. at FULCL00280). Glenn Higgins, a clinical neuropsychologist, conducted an additional medical review of Doe’s claim file for First Unum on November 1, 2000, and agreed with Sullivan’s assessment. Id. ¶¶ 61-62. Specifically, he said “[Dr. Singh’s notes] provide the only medical evidence of recent medical status [but] do not offer evidence of work impairing restrictions and limitations on the date of disability (4/27/99).” Id. ¶ 61 (quoting R. at FULCL00281) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). On November 3, 2000, Plevan reiterated that Doe “was terminated [and] not an active employee” as of April 26, 1999. Id. ¶ 62 (quoting R. at FULCL00283) (internal quotation marks omitted). On November 6, 2000, First Unum informed Doe that his claim for disability benefits was being denied. Id. ¶¶ 63-64 (citing R. at FULCL00285-87 and FULCL00296). First, it told him that an “employee will cease to be insured on ... the date employment terminates,” as mandated by the Policy. Id. a ¶ 65 (quoting R. at FULCL00286) (internal quotation marks omitted). First Unum acknowledged that Doe was “diagnosed with schizophrenia,” id. ¶ 66 (quoting R. at FULCL00286) (internal quotation marks omitted), but stated: [W]e do not have any objective medical evidence to suggest that this medical condition restricts or limits you from performing the material duties of your occupation from your last day worked, April 26, 1999, to the date of your June 22, 1999 office visit with Dr. Singh. In addition, since your employment terminated on April 26,1999, which is prior to your treatment, you were no longer in an eligible insurance class, as defined by your Policy. Therefore, it is our conclusion [that] benefits are not payable under your Policy. Id. ¶ 67 (quoting R. at FULCL00286) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Doe appealed First Unum’s denial of benefits and his father, Bernard Doe, also submitted a letter, id. ¶ 74 (citing R. at FULCL00314-16), arguing that “neither did [Doe’s] disability begin on June 22, 1999, nor his employment end on April 26, 1999.” Id. ¶ 75 (quoting R. at FULCL00316) (internal quotation marks omitted). First Unum conducted another review of all pertinent information, including Doe’s billing records, and concluded that Doe was “not in active employment as of April 27, 1999.” Id. ¶ 91 (quoting R. at FULCL00387) (internal quotation marks omitted). First Unum therefore affirmed its denial of benefits. Id. ¶ 93 (citing R. at FULCL00386). Doe went on to make three additional appeals, all of which were denied. Doe’s second appeal was by letter dated April 5, 2000. Id. at 94 (citing R. at FULCL00393). On the same date, Bernard Doe submitted a letter to First Unum, id. at 95 (citing R. at FULCL00397-98), urging that Doe worked more time than the Hawkins time records suggested “because ‘[Doe] billed for a tiny fraction of the time worked. To do otherwise would have been not only unethical, but for some matters pointless,’ due to alleged billing caps.” Id. ¶ 96 (quoting R. at FULCL00397). First Unum noted that “[Doe] did not provide any additional medical records or evidence that he satisfied the definition of disability contained in the Policy as of April 1999.” Id. ¶ 97. By letter dated June 14, 2001, First Unum again affirmed its denial of benefits. Id. ¶ 98 (citing R. at FULCL00477). In that letter, First Unum stated: [Subsequent to April 26, 1999, you were not in active employment as required by the Policy. Further, the medical documentation in the file does not show that you were under the regular attendance of a physician as of April 26, 1999 and the medical evidence does not support restrictions or limitations at that time. Thus, you do not meet the definition of disability as defined by the Policy provisions and you are not entitled to disability benefits. Id. ¶ 101 (quoting R. at FULCL00475) (internal quotation marks omitted). Doe’s third appeal, by memorandum dated June 18, 2001, was denied by letter dated July 13, 2001. Id. ¶¶ 102, 105 (citing R. at FULCL00481-87 and FULCL00534). Doe made a fourth appeal, by memorandum dated July 19, 2001, but in a letter dated the next day, First Unum refused to conduct a fourth appellate review. Id. ¶¶ 105, 108 (citing R. at FULCL00540 and FULCL00548). II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review Courts review a denial of benefits under an ERISA-governed benefits plan de novo, unless the plan “gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan,” in which ease the question is whether the denial was arbitrary and capricious. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114-15, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989); Recupero v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 118 F.3d 820, 826-27 (1st Cir.1997). The Court agrees with the parties that the Policy gives First Unum no such discretionary authority, so a de novo standard applies. Recupero further clarifies the terminology. Under Recupero, even in cases where the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review applies, review of decisions by plan administrators or fiduciaries “is also to be ‘de novo review to assure compliance of the out-of-court decisionmakers with standards of conduct analogous to those applied to trustees under judicially developed law.” 118 F.3d at 827. Thus, Recupero recognizes that there are two elements of judicial review in this context: the depth of the inquiry into the factual and legal bases for the decision under review, and the standard that decision must meet. In all ERISA cases, the inquiry should be searching, that is “de novo,” but in cases where an ERISA-governed plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretion, the question is whether the decision under review was reasonable, whereas in eases where no such discretion is vested, the question is whether the decision was correct. The Court dwells on Recupero in part because it is easy to take statements made in that case out of context. For example, when the Recupero court stated that the phrase “ ‘de novo review,’ as used in the context of judicial review of out-of-court decisions of ERISA-regulated plan administrators or fiduciaries does not mean that a district court has ‘plenary jurisdiction to decide on the merits, anew, a benefits claim,” it was apparently referring to cases where an administrator or fiduciary has discretion. Id. at 827. “Plenary” jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to “disregard completely” the findings of an administrator or fiduciary and to “decide anew all questions of fact bearing on the merits of the benefits claim.” Id. at 828. It appears that the Recupero court was simply clarifying that, even though courts examine the factual and legal bases of an administrator’s or fiduciary’s determination de novo, they are not empowered to overturn an incorrect but reasonable decision in cases where the plan vests the administrator or fiduciary with discretion. See id. at 827-28. B. Summary Judgment and Treatment as a Case Stated Cases challenging denial of benefits under an ERISA-governed plan frequently reach a stage where the parties file cross motions for summary judgment. In many instances, however, resolution of the case rests primarily or exclusively on evaluation of the administrator’s or fiduciary’s decision in light of the record it had before it, a record that is typically already before the court at the summary judgment stage. Should such cases proceed past the summary judgment stage, the “trial” may well consist of nothing more than presentation of the administrative record to the same judge who considered it at the summary judgment stage, because neither party is likely to have a right to a jury trial. See Liston v. Unum Corp. Officer Severance Plan, 330 F.3d 19, 24 & n. 4 (1st Cir.2003). Although the First Circuit has largely reserved questions regarding the availability of jury trials in ERISA cases, it has specifically held that jury trials are unavailable in cases where decision is based entirely on an agreed administrative record and an arbitrary and capricious standard applies. Recupero, 118 F.3d at 831-32. ERISA cases based solely or even primarily on the administrative record are thus uniquely fit for pre-trial resolution. In fact, when an arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies and review is based solely on an agreed administrative record, summary judgment “is merely a mechanism for tendering the issues and no special inferences are to be drawn in favor of a plaintiff resisting in summary judgment.” Liston, 330 F.3d at 24. In cases where a de novo standard of review applies, however, the ordinary summary judgment standard applies. See Hughes v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 264, 268 (1st Cir.1994); see also Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Atallah, 45 F.3d 512, 517 n. 6 (1st Cir.1995) (noting that Hughes applied the summary judgment standard in such a case). Under that standard, the Court would have to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 490, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992). Often a court will encounter a situation where it could resolve the case if acting as a “neutral factfinder,” but cannot resolve the case if it evaluates each of the cross motions for summary judgment under the ordinary standard. There is thus a temptation to “cheat” a little — to apply the summary judgment standard more loosely than is appropriate in order to resolve these cases. Professor Arthur R. Miller has made a persuasive argument that federal courts in general have gotten too aggressive in using summary judgment and dismissal to dispose of cases, at the expense of litigants’ right to their day in court and to a jury trial. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion, ” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 982 (2003). This Court shares Professor Miller’s concerns. Rather than risk creating bad summary judgment precedent that might bleed into other areas of the law, courts should urge the parties in ERISA benefits cases to agree to treat their case as a case stated. See Boston Five Cents, 768 F.2d at 11-12. This permits a court to decide a case based on a stipulated record, without applying the summary judgment standard. The court simply draws such inferences as are reasonable from the facts. Even in this case, where the parties did not agree about the scope of the record, they were able to agree that the summary judgment standard would not apply. C. The Public Responsibility of ERISA Plan Administrators and Fiduciaries, and the Role of the Courts Before delving into the merits, some general comments about ERISA cases are in order. The decisions whether and how to ensure that disability does not lead to poverty are obviously of great societal importance. In this country, although we provide limited disability insurance through Social Security, we rely primarily on private insurance, typically in the form of disability benefits plans administered by insurance companies under contract with employers. A number of current trends suggest that if anything, the role of Social Security may diminish in the coming years, perhaps ultimately ceding the field entirely to private insurance. The benefits of relying on private insurers to carry out this essential public function may be considerable, and Congress has obviously decided that they outweigh the costs. The profit motive may well drive private insurers to tailor plans to beneficiaries’ needs, evaluate risk, and cut waste and inefficiency more effectively than a government bureaucracy would. The government can in many cases accomplish public purposes effectively through reliance on choice and competition. There are also obvious drawbacks to relying on private insurers, however. Although the profit motive drives companies toward efficiency, it creates a substantial risk that they will cut costs by denying valid claims. The market is somewhat inapt to punish insurers for engaging in such practices, particularly if the denials are not too flagrant, because the complexity of the insurance market and the imperfect information available to consumers make it difficult to determine whether an insurer is keeping its costs down through legitimate or illegitimate means. An individual claimant who encounters an insurance company that is disposed to deny valid claims must struggle to vindicate his rights at a time when he is at his most vulnerable. Often a newly disabled person will simultaneously confront increased medical bills and either termination of employment or diminished pay. The judiciary provides a check on these potential abuses; under ERISA, aggrieved claimants can seek redress in the courts of justice. Congress and the courts have made two decisions, however, that limit this cheeking effect. The first is to place limitations on judicial review of plan administrators’ and fiduciaries’ decisions similar to the ones placed on judicial review of governmental agency action, even though, unlike officials in governmental agencies, administrators and fiduciaries are not answerable to the public or to elected officials. Second, and perhaps more troubling, the courts have interpreted ERISA to restrict or eliminate the role of juries in deciding disputes between claimants and insurers. See Liston, 330 F.3d at 24 & n. 4; Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F.Supp. 49, 63 & n. 74 (D.Mass.1997). In the process, they have removed one of the most important guarantees of fairness in the judicial process. It is the jury to which the founders of this nation turned to fill the role of impartial fact finder. Its primacy is guaranteed by the Constitution, and the American jury system is our most vital day-to-day expression of direct democracy. There is no other routine aspect of our civic existence today where citizens themselves are the government. Moreover, beyond involving citizens directly in one of the most fundamental processes of government, the jury system “injects community values into judicial decisions” and “allows equitable resolution of hard cases without setting a legal precedent.” Moreover, jurors’ “very inexperience is an asset because it secures a fresh perception of each trial, avoiding the stereotypes said to infect the judicial eye.” In Massachusetts, Mme. Justice Abrams has summed up the jury’s enormous contribution as follows: [T]he jury system provides the most important means by which laymen can participate in and understand the legal system. “It makes them feel that they owe duties to society, and that they have a share in its government.... The jury system has for some hundreds of years been constantly bringing the rules of latv to the touchstone of contemporary common sense.” Without juries, the pursuit of justice becomes increasingly archaic, with elite professionals talking to others, equally elite, in jargon the eloquence of which is in direct proportion to its unreality. Juries are the great leveling and democratizing element in the law. They give it its authority and generalized acceptance in ways that imposing buildings and sonorous openings cannot hope to match. Every step away from juries is a step which ultimately weakens the judiciary as the third branch of government. Juries take their charge seriously, and strive to apply the law honestly and fairly to the facts of the case before them, infusing practical knowledge of ordinary life and the expectations of ordinary people into the administration of justice. In the federal courts, of course, all judges are lawyers. A judge can thus draw only on that rather more narrow and unrepresentative life experience in determining what is “fair” or “reasonable,” whereas juries can draw on the varied experiences of several people from different walks of life. This multitude of perspectives is much more apt to produce a just result in most cases. Therefore, to the extent that a judge decides an ERISA case differently than would a jury from the community, he may well be producing a factually erroneous result, likely to the detriment both of individual claimants particularly and of the integrity of the private disability insurance system generally. The Court’s observations about disability benefits plans and the legal regime governing them lead to two conclusions. First, administrators and fiduciaries have important public responsibilities. While they have a duty to shareholders to seek profit, they must do so with an awareness of the essential function that they perform in society, and of the comparatively limited oversight they receive from public institutions. They must avoid the temptation to improve their bottom line by denying valid claims. Second, the courts must decide these cases with an awareness of the social policies at stake, the failures in the particular market in question, and the possibility that judges, who lack the ordinary life experience of juries, may systematically err in their evaluations of what is reasonable and fair. With this background understanding in mind, the Court turns to the merits. D. Doe’s Release of Claims against Hawkins Does Not Apply to Claims against First Unum First Unum belatedly filed a Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 30], which it provided to the Court and to Radford at the November 3, 2003 summary judgment hearing. First Unum explained that Doe had entered into an Agreement and General Release with Hawkins, in which he released Hawkins and its agents from future claims, and then argued that First Unum, as an agent of Hawkins, was released as well. See Def.’s Supp. Mot. & Mem. at 1. Because First Unum failed to raise this defense in its Answer, see Answer [Doc. No. 3], it could not raise it at the summary judgment stage. Release is an affirmative defense, enumerated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), and in general, failure to raise an affirmative defense in the original pleadings constitutes a waiver of the defense. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(c); Knapp Shoes, Inc. v. Sylvania Shoe Mfg. Corp., 15 F.3d 1222, 1226 (1st Cir.1994); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ramirez-Rivera, 869 F.2d 624, 626 (1st Cir.1989). None of the exceptions to this general rule applied here. For example, although the First Circuit excuses noncompliance with Rule 8(c) where a defense “has been fully tried under the express or implied consent of the parties, as if it had been raised in the original responsive pleading,” Ramirez-Rivera, 869 F.2d at 626-27, here Radford had insufficient opportunity to “try” the issue at the November 3, 2003 summary judgment hearing, and explicitly objected to First Unum’s belated raising of the defense. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Supp. Mot. [Doc. No. 31] at 2. Similarly, “when there is no prejudice and when fairness dictates, the strictures of [Rule 8(c) ] may be relaxed,” Jakobsen v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 520 F.2d 810, 813 (1st Cir.1975), but here Radford did not receive adequate notice, and was also prejudiced insofar as it had insufficient opportunity to do any necessary factual investigation or to address the defense in oral argument. In any case, First Unum’s argument was utterly without merit. It is hornbook law that “the distinction between the servant or agent relationship and that of independent contractor turn[s] on the absence of authority in the principal to control the physical conduct of the contractor in performance of the contract.” Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 527, 93 S.Ct. 2215, 37 L.Ed.2d 121 (1973); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 & cmt. b (1958). Hawkins had no power to control First Unum’s actions in administering the Plan, so First Unum was not Hawkins’s agent. Like any litigant, First Unum is of course free to defend its conduct with good faith arguments when its actions are challenged in court. This right does not, however, extend to the advancement of frivolous arguments that can only result in added expense and delay, and such conduct is particularly inconsistent with an ERISA plan administrator’s or fiduciary’s public responsibilities. E. Doe’s Coverage under the Policy 1. Application of the Contra Prof-erentum Rule At the outset, the Court notes that the contra proferentum, rule requires that ambiguous terms in the Policy be construed against First Unum. Although First Unum claimed at oral argument that the rule does not apply to ERISA-governed plans, the First Circuit has explicitly held otherwise, at least in cases where the plan does not vest the administrator or fiduciary with discretionary authority. See Hughes, 26 F.3d at 268. The Court merely notes the contra proferentum rule’s applicability for the sake of completeness, however, because nothing in the Court’s analysis or holdings would change if the rule did not apply. 2. Doe’s Eligibility for Benefits under the Policy Under the Policy, “disability” and “disabled” were defined to mean that “the insured cannot perform each of the material duties of his regular occupation.” R. at FULCL00677. Under a separate provision governing payment of benefits: “When [First Unum] receives proof that an insured is disabled due to sickness or injury and requires the regular attendance of a physician, [First Unum] will pay the insured a monthly benefit after the end of the elimination period.” Id. at FULCL00675. Coverage terminated, inter alia, when active employment ended or when the insured ceased to be a member of an insured class, except that if an employee became disabled before one of those things happened, coverage extended through the elimination period and for as long as benefits were paid under the Policy. Id. at FULCL00669. From the date of First Unum’s initial denial of benefits, the company consistently maintained that these provisions, read together, meant that Doe’s failure to submit proof that he had seen a physician before his active employment ended meant that he was ineligible for benefits. See, e.g., Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 67. In other words, First Unum maintained that an insured was not “disabled” under the Policy until he submitted proof of regular attendance of a physician, so failure to submit such proof before being fired meant that coverage terminated before the insured became disabled. This was also the primary position it maintained in filings with the Court. See Def.’s Opp’n at 5-9; Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. & Mem. [Doc. No. 13] at 14-15. At the November 3, 2003 summary judgment hearing, the Court pressed First Unum on this point, noting that under the company’s interpretation, it could easily happen that an employee could be fired for disability before ever having a chance to see a doctor. 11/03/03 Hr’g Tr. First Unum revised its position then, suggesting that the company would be required to pay benefits if proof of attendance by a physician were provided within a “reasonable” period of time after termination. Id. First Unum had also offered this as an alternative reading in its papers, suggesting that even if its interpretation of the Policy were incorrect, it had been justified in treating as probative the fact that Doe “sought absolutely no medical attention for his condition until months after he actually stopped working.” Def.’s Opp’n at 7. The record made plain that the interpretation First Unum proffered at the hearing and as an alternative argument in its filings was not the one it applied to Doe’s claim. First Unum’s original denial of benefits stated that Doe was “not under care of a physician” between April 21,1999 and June 22, 1999 (the date when he visited Dr. Singh), and thus that “[i]mpair-ments [were] not supported” for that time period. Id. ¶ 50 (quoting R. at FULCL00229) (alteration in original). Thus, in First Unum’s view, Doe could not prove disability before the date of his first visit to a physician. If First Unum had merely been treating attendance of a physician as probative of disability, rather than as a prerequisite for finding disability, then it at least would have considered the possibility that Doe was “disabled” as of the date he made his appointment with Dr. Singh, or as of some earlier date. First Unum did not consider that possibility, nor did it even consider Dr. Singh’s evaluation of when Doe’s schizophrenia began to become more acute; all that mattered was the date on which she made her diagnosis. First Unum’s interpretation defied the Policy’s plain language. Regular attend-anee of a physician was in no way built into the definition of “disability” or “disabled.” Even thfe provision relating to proof that regular attendance of a physician was required distinguished between that requirement and proof of disability; it stated that First Unum would provide benefits when it “receives proof that an insured is disabled ... and requires the regular attendance of a physician.” R. at FULCL00675 (emphasis added). It is worth noting that the provision did not even require proof that a physician visit had occurred, but simply a demonstration that the condition was severe enough to “require” such visits. Obviously, a doctor’s diagnosis of schizophrenia would be highly probative that disability began at least on the date of diagnosis, but there was nothing in the Policy to suggest that it was impossible to prove disability before the date of diagnosis, or that unless a visit to a physician occurred before active employment terminated, an employee was ineligible for benefits. The Policy also stated that “[t]he benefit will be paid for the period of disability if the insured gives to the Company proof of continued: 1. disability; and 2. regular attendance of a physician.” R. at FULCL00675. The obvious meaning of this provision was that once a claimant had established disability and eligibility for receipt of benefits, to continue to receive benefits she had to continue to see a doctor and to submit proof of her visits to the Company, in order to show that she remained eligible. First Unum could not rely on this provision to argue that failure to visit a doctor before active employment ended rendered an employee ineligible for benefits. First Unum’s approach was not even coherent. The company alternated between separating and conflating the provisions governing eligibility for benefits and the administrative requirements for receipt of benefits. First Unum did not interpret the provision mandating proof of a disability requiring regular attendance of a physician to mean that if proof were submitted after employment ceased, there would be no coverage. As long as the proof submitted showed that disability began while the claimant was employed, the claimant could receive benefits. In this regard, First Unum was treating the eligibility and receipt provisions as separate. Then, however, First Unum imported the idea of regular attendance of a physician into the definition of “disabled,” thus conflating the two provisions. Moreover, as the Court suggested at oral argument, First Unum’s interpretation would lead to obviously absurd results. Coverage under the Policy terminated when active employment ceased. It is not uncommon for a disability to lead to the cessation of active employment, and unfortunately, it is far from unheard of for a company, in good faith or otherwise, to fire an employee when he becomes disabled. The availability of benefits under the Policy cannot turn on the accident of whether the insured was fortunate enough to get to see a doctor before employment terminated. In many cases, even if an insured sought a doctor’s appointment immediately upon becoming disabled, there is no guarantee that the doctor could schedule him promptly. Moreover, given that employment termination is more likely to occur swiftly after the onset of a major disability than after the onset of a minor one, First Unum’s interpretation would make the most severely disabled the least likely to receive coverage. These are precisely the people whom the Policy was most designed to protect, and often their impairments are the easiest to verify. The more reasonable interpretation closely resembled the one that Radford proposed. See Pl’s Mem. Opp’n at 7-8. To qualify for coverage, an insured had to have become “disabled” in some objectively verifiable way before the date that coverage terminated. A claimant had to submit proof of that disability and that regular attendance of a physician was required in order to begin receiving benefits, and periodically had to submit proof of continuing attendance by a physician to continue receiving benefits. Proof of actual attendance by a physician was a prerequisite for continuing receipt of benefits once a claimant qualified, not for establishing the date when disability began. After interpreting the Policy’s terms, the Court then had to determine when Doe became “disabled,” as the Policy defines that term. It was clear from the record that Doe became disabled before his active employment ceased, and that he was therefore entitled to receive benefits under the Policy (assuming he complied with relevant requirements). More specifically, the record showed that Hawkins fired Doe because his schizophrenia had rendered him unable to “perform each of the material duties of his regular occupation,” so Doe was necessarily “disabled” before Hawkins made its decision to terminate him, and that decision was made no later than April 26, 1999. Doe consistently maintained that April 20, 1999 was the day on which his schizophrenia became sufficiently acute that he could not perform his job, and this was consistent with the termination that followed only days later. As has already been stated, the Court found that Doe was actively employed until May 21, 1999, and that Hawkins’s April 26, 1999 decision to terminate Doe’s employment was based on increasing manifestations of Doe’s schizophrenia. First Unum itself conceded that Doe’s active employment did not end before April 26, 1999. Sée, e.g., Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. & Mem. at 12-13. There could be little doubt that as of April 20, 1999, Doe was unable to perform the “material duties of his regular occupation.” Of the “material duties” of a lawyer’s “regular occupation,” this Court could not imagine a single one that does not require some combination of ability to handle the required workload, attention, concentration, and social interaction. Research, writing, and the other analytical tasks that any lawyer performs involve the first three, and consultation with clients and colleagues involves the last three. Public finance lawyers are no different from other members of the bar in these respects. First Unum conceded that “[Doe] was terminated due to inability to handle the workload, poor attention, poor concentration and diminished social interactions,” PL’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 120 (quoting R. at FULCL00231) (internal quotation marks omitted); Def.’s Resp. ¶ 120, and the record demonstrates that these failures resulted from Doe’s increasingly acute schizophrenia. Thus, Hawkins decided that Doe no longer possessed the qualities that were necessary for him to perform the material aspects of his job. First Unum tried to trap Doe in a Catch-22, arguing that because Doe maintained that he continued to work full time through at least May 21,1999, he could not have been “disabled” during that period. Def.’s Opp’n at 3-4. This was pure sophistry. Of course, if First Unum had accepted the premise that Doe worked full time until May 21, 1999, it would have had to accept that he remained eligible under the Policy until that date, and it would then have had to argue that Doe’s schizophrenia suddenly appeared between that date and June 22, 1999, when Doe visited Dr. Singh. More to the point, First Unum conflated the definitions of “disability” and “active employment.” “Active employment” merely required that the employee work full-time at regular pay, or at least thirty hours per week at Hawkins’s office or any place Hawkins required an employee to travel. The definition in no way required that work done during this time be satisfactory, or that the employee be productive. “Disability,” on the other hand, related to the quality of an employee’s work. Presumably, a “material duty” included a requirement that the relevant tasks be performed satisfactorily. Thus, if Doe spent a full forty-hour week producing a research memorandum that the average associate would be expected to finish in ten hours, he would be “actively employed,” even though he could not perform that material duty. If the speed and quality of Doe’s work in all material areas were low enough, he would be “disabled,” even if he were “actively employed.” Under First Unum’s argument, a schizophrenic employee could not become “disabled” until the moment he stopped working. Of course, if he had not yet seen a doctor regarding his condition, First Unum believed that he would become forever ineligible for benefits the moment he stopped working. This could not possibly be the correct interpretation of the Policy. Thus, the evidence in the record showed that Doe became “disabled” under the terms of the Policy as of April 20, 1999 (certainly no later than April 26,1999), and that he ceased active employment on May 21, 1999 (certainly no earlier than April 26, 1999). The nexus between the end of Doe’s employment and the onset of “disability,” as defined under the Policy, was such that no reasonable interpretation of the record could place Doe’s date of disability after the date his active employment ended. First Unum’s conduct in denying Doe’s claim was entirely inconsistent with the company’s public responsibilities and with its obligations under the Policy. This is not the first time that First Unum has sought to avoid its contractual responsibilities, and an examination of cases involving First Unum and Unum Life Insurance Company of America, which like First Unum is an insuring subsidiary of Unum Provident Corporation, reveals a disturbing pattern of erroneous and arbitrary benefits denials, bad faith contract misinterpretations, and other unscrupulous tactics. These cases suggest that segments that have run in recent years on “60 Minutes” and “Dateline,” alleging that Unum Provident “regularly declines disability claims as a way of boosting profits,” may have been accurate. See Edward D. Murphy, Unum Corp. Retirees Feeling a “Sense of Loss,” Portland Press Herald, Apr. 29, 2003, at 1C. This Court cannot te