Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER LAGUEUX, Senior District Judge. There are three matters before this Court: l)the objections filed by Defendants, the Palestinian Authority (“PA”), and the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”), to a Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge David L. Martin on March 31, 2004 (“Report and Recommendation”); 2)the PA’s appeal of a separate Order issued by Judge Martin granting Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees as a sanction for the PA’s failure to provide any discovery in the instant case; and 3)Plaintiffs’ motion, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to alter and amend this Court’s April 23, 2004 Decision and Order relating to sovereign immunity. The Estates of Yaron Ungar and Efrat Ungar ex rel Strach-man v. The Palestinian Authority, 315 F.Supp.2d 164 (D.R.I.2004)(hereinafter, Ungar IV). The facts of this case are described at length in this writer’s previous opinions. See Ungar IV, 315 F.Supp.2d at 168-171; Ungar III, 304 F.Supp.2d at 244-47; The Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. The Palestinian Auth., 228 F.Supp.2d 40, 41-43 (D.R.I.2002)(hereinafter, Ungar II); Ungar I, 153 F.Supp.2d at 82-85; and the attached Report and Recommendation. Therefore, there is no need to repeat the tragic events and extensive procedural history underlying this litigation. It suffices to say here that on April 29, 2003, this writer referred Plaintiffs’ three motions for default judgment against the PA and PLO to Magistrate Judge David L. Martin for preliminary review, findings, and recommended disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 32(a). Judge Martin held hearings on the motions last summer and took the matters under advisement. Judge Martin reviewed the submitted memoranda and exhibits, performed independent research, and then issued an extensive Report and Recommendation on March 31, 2004, which is attached hereto. Judge Martin recommended that this Court enter default judgment against the PA in the amount of $116,421,048.00 and against the PLO in the amount of $116,415,468.00. Both recommended amounts include attorneys’ fees. The PA and PLO filed objections to Judge Martin’s Report and Recommendation on April 19, 2004, before the time period for filing objections set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 32 elapsed later that day. The PA and PLO assert the following six grounds for their objections: l)this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the PA and PLO are entitled to sovereign and governmental immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976) (“FSIA”), and the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991, 18 U.S.C. § 2337(2)(1992)(“ATA”), and because the claims asserted against them present non-justieiable political questions; 2)Plaintiffs’ claims are legally insufficient and do not support an entry of default judgment; 3)the Report and Recommendation fails to give effect to the PA’s and PLO’s position that they are entitled to a final determination of their claims to sovereign immunity, including appellate review, before being required to answer the Amended Complaint or participate in discovery; 4)the Report and Recommendation fails to recognize and give effect to the adverse conditions facing the Palestinian government and the PA and PLO, which have made discovery difficult and contrary to Palestinian national interests; 5)this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the PA and PLO; and 6)the law should not require the “disproportionate compensation” recommended by Judge Martin. Objections of Defs. Palestinian Auth. & Palestine Liberation Organization to the Mag. Judge’s Report & Recommendation, (hereinafter, Objections), at 1-3. That same day, the PA appealed Judge Martin’s March 31, 2004 Order that granted Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a sanction for the PA’s failure to provide any discovery in the instant case. The PA’s arguments with respect to this appeal are identical to its objections to the Report and Recommendation. See Notice of Appeal, at 2. Also on April 19, 2004, Plaintiffs filed their own objections to the Report and Recommendation. Plaintiffs later withdrew these objections so as not to impede this Court from entering a final judgment. Notice of Withdrawal of Pis.’ Objections to Portions of the Report & Recommendation Issued on Mar. SI,-2004, at 2. Thereafter, Plaintiffs responded to the PA’s and PLO’s objections and argued that the objections did not present anything new and were “hopelessly vague, frivolous, or irrelevant.” Pis.’ Resp. to Objections of the Palestinian Auth. & Palestine Liberation Organization to the Mag. Judge’s Report & Recommendation, at 1. Plaintiffs requested that this Court make a de novo determination that rejects each of the objections, adopts the Report and Recommendation, and enters a final judgment against the PA and PLO. Id. at 2. On April 27, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to alter and amend this Court’s Decision and Order in Ungar IV regarding sovereign immunity. 315 F.Supp.2d at 164. Plaintiffs request that this Court reconsider and reverse its holding that the PA and PLO did not waive claims to sovereign immunity, and hold instead that “even assuming arguen-do that Defendants were ‘foreign States,’ they have waived any claims to sovereign immunity.” Mem. in Supp. of Pis. ’ Mot. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), at 4. The PA and PLO did not file any objections to Plaintiffs’ motion. The parties briefed and later argued these three matters on June 23, 2004, and they áre now in order for ‘ decision. For the reasons that follow, this Court overrules each of the PA’s and PLO’s objections to Judge Martin’s Report and Recommendation, adopts that Report and Recommendation in toto and attaches it hereto. The PA’s appeal of Judge Martin’s separate Order with respect to Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees and Plaintiffs’ motion to amend this Court’s decision in Ungar IV are denied. Furthermore, this Court directs the Clerk to enter default judgment against the PA and PLO as indicated below. The Objections to the Report and Recommendation The PA and PLO raise six objections to Judge Martin’s recommendation that this Court grant Plaintiffs’ motions to enter default judgment. Since these motions are dispositive of the claims presented in the Amended Complaint, this Court must conduct a de novo review of Judge Martin’s Report and Recommendation. See Harvard Pilgrim Health Care of New England v. Thompson, 318 F.Supp.2d 1, 2-3 (D.R.I.2004)(noting that a dispositive motion is one that extinguishes a party’s claim or defense and is reviewed by a district court de novo where that court may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions). Therefore, although the PA and PLO do not present this Court with any new arguments, this writer will consider each objection in turn. The PA’s and PLO’s first objection is that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Amended Complaint due to the existence of non-justiciable political questions and the sovereign immunity provided in Section 2604 of the FSIA and Section 2337(2) of the ATA. Objections, at para. 1. The PA and PLO raised and this Court rejected the same arguments in Un-gar II and Ungar IV and does so again now. For the reasons set forth in those opinions, this writer reiterates that the Amended Complaint does not present any non-justiciable political questions and neither the PA, the PLO, nor the entity called Palestine is or represents a foreign State and therefore, is not entitled to sovereign immunity. See Ungar IV, 315 F.Supp.2d at 174-187; Ungar II, 228 F.Supp.2d at 44-49. Therefore, the PA’s and PLO’s fust objection to the Report and Recommendation is overruled. The second objection raised by the PA and PLO is that this Court should not enter a default judgement because Plaintiffs’ claims are legally insufficient. Objections, at para. 2. The PA and PLO argue that they “legitimately sought to protect and promote Palestinian interests” and lacked the intent required to engage in acts of international terrorism as defined by the ATA. Id. Furthermore, these Defendants argue that their conduct was not proximately related to Yaron Ungar’s murder. Id. Similar to their claims to sovereign immunity, the above are arguments that should have been raised in an answer to the Amended Complaint or through Defendants’ participation in the present litigation. However, these Defendants decided and instructed their counsel not to answer the Amended Complaint or participate in discovery and therefore, were defaulted. See Report & Recommendation, at 69, n. 46 & at 70. The First Circuit has repeatedly held that when a default is entered, a court must consider that all of the plaintiffs allegations of fact are true and that his or her claims are established as a matter of law. Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d 5, 13 (1st Cir.1985); accord Ramos-Falcon v. Autoridad de Energia Electrica, 301 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.2002)(per curiam)(quoting Quirindongo Pacheco v. Rolon Morales, 953 F.2d 15, 16 (1st Cir.1992) and Brockton, 771 F.2d at 13); In Re The Home Restaurants Inc., 285 F.3d 111, 114 (1st Cir.2002)(citing Franco v. Selective Ins. Co., 184 F.3d 4,9 at n. 3 (1st Cir.1999)); Libertad v. Sanchez, 215 F.3d 206, 208 (1st Cir.2000). This Court previously concluded that Plaintiffs would be entitled to relief if the allegations in the Amended Complaint were true when it denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ungar II, 228 F.Supp.2d at 47. Given the PA’s and PLO’s default and fact that the allegations in the Amended Complaint must now be deemed true, there is no merit in the second objection, which essentially challenges the ATA claims asserted in the Amended Complaint. Therefore, for these and the reasons set forth in Ungar II, the second objection is also overruled. See 228 F.Supp.2d at 47. The PA’s and PLO’s third objection is that the Report and Recommendation fails to give effect to their argument that they are entitled to a final determination of their claim to sovereign immunity before the burdens of litigation are imposed on them. Objections, at para. 3. To support this argument, the Defendants cite In re Papandreou, which dealt with a defendant’s petition for a writ of mandamus to vacate an Order compelling discovery related to a sovereign immunity defense. 139 F.3d 247, 249-50 (D.C.Cir.1998). The Circuit Court found that this discovery should not have been authorized without a showing of need and before the district court considered the alternate, non-merits routes to dismissal of standing, forum non conveniens, personal jurisdiction, and the act of state doctrine that were asserted by the defendants. Id. at 254-56. The Court noted that an assertion of immunity should not increase litigation costs at the expense and neglect of swifter routes to dismissal. See id. at 254. Aside from the fact that Papandreou does not directly support the Defendants’ argument, their continued flawed assertions of sovereign immunity, despite their own admissions that they are not a foreign State as defined by the FSIA, have increased the costs borne by Plaintiffs and prolonged this litigation unnecessarily. Unlike the situation presented in Papan-dreou, the PA and PLO refused to participate in discovery even after this Court heard and rejected the alternate, non-merits routes to dismissal of personal jurisdiction, insufficient service of process, improper venue, and forum non conveniens. Ungar I, 153 F.Supp.2d at 87-100. Moreover, when Judge Martin heard, considered, and ultimately rejected the Defendants’ objection during hearings in July of 2003, this writer had already determined that the PA was not a foreign State or a representative thereof as defined by the FSIA and consequently, was not immune from suit under the ATA. See Report & Recommendation, at 42-43; Ungar II, 228 F.Supp.2d at 49. This Court has since determined that there is no basis whatsoever for the PA or PLO to claim sovereign immunity. Ungar IV, 315 F.Supp.2d at 179, n. 7. Therefore, for all of these reasons and those set forth in the portions of Ungar II and Ungar IV referred to above, the Defendants’ third objection is also overruled. The fourth objection asserts that the Report and Recommendation fails to recognize and give effect to the adverse conditions facing the Palestinian government and the PA and PLO, which made discovery difficult and contrary to Palestinian national interests. Objections, at para. 4. This assertion is disingenuous, especially in light of the fact that such conditions have not prevented the PA and PLO from making the extensive filings reflected throughout the procedural history of this case. See Ungar IV, 315 F.Supp.2d at 169-171. As Judge Martin points out, this objection, although repeatedly raised by the PA and PLO, remains unsupported by affidavit or other admissible evidence. See Report & Recommendation, at 21-22. Furthermore, this Court has granted the PA and PLO numerous indulgences in the form of extensions of time for filing papers and continuances of scheduled hearings. See id. at 25 & 64. Yet, these Defendants made the deliberate choice not participate in this litigation and have not answered a single interrogatory or request for admission or produced a single document sought by Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Defendants’ fourth objection to the Report and Recommendation has no merit and is also overruled. Next, the PA and PLO object to Judge Martin’s conclusion that this Court has personal jurisdiction in the instant case. Objections, at para. 5. This Court dealt with the issue of personal jurisdiction at length and rejected this same argument in Ungar I. 153 F.Supp.2d at 86. This writer sees no need to revisit that decision and overrules the Defendants’ fifth objection based on the authorities and reasoning set forth in that opinion. See Ungar I, 153 F.Supp.2d at 86-91. The final objection raised by the PA and PLO is that the law should not require the “disproportionate compensation” recommended by the Magistrate Judge “for the death of one person in the context of an ongoing conflict in which thousands of innocent civilians on both sides have been killed without any hope of compensation.” Objections, at para. 6. These Defendants argue that the ultimate burden of this compensation will be borne by an impoverished and oppressed Palestinian people who currently suffer from a continuing humanitarian crisis. Id. Defendants are hard pressed to succeed with this argument given the fact that they deliberately stated their intentions not to participate in and thus, waived a hearing on damages. See Report and Recommendation, at 65 (internal citations omitted). Defendants’ arguments are offensive at best, especially given this Court’s adoption of Judge Martin’s extensive recommendations relating to the damages owed by Defendant Hamas for the brutal murders that are the subject of this litigation. See Ungar III, 304 F.Supp.2d at 267-277. Judge Martin applied those same findings in making his recommendations as to the damages to be assessed against the PA and PLO and this writer finds no error in those conclusions. See Report & Recom mendation, at 65-66. The PA and PLO, and not an impoverished and oppressed Palestinian people, are responsible for and must bear the ultimate burden of providing compensation, which this Court fully acknowledges will never return to Plaintiffs the relationships and lives that existed prior to June 9, 1996. This Court hopes that in keeping with the ATA’s purpose to deter acts of international terrorism, its judgment will “interrupt or at least imperil the flow of terrorism’s lifeblood, money,” and thus, prevent the PA and PLO from funding future terrorist acts such as the one that resulted in the Ungars’ horrific deaths. Ungar III, 304 F.Supp.2d at 239(citing Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing on S2465 Before the Subcomm. on Cts. and Admin. Practice of the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., 101st Cong., at 85 (1990)(statement of Joseph Morris)). For all of these reasons, the Defendants’ final objection to the Report and Recommendation is also hereby, overruled. In sum, this Court overrules each of the PA’s and PLO’s objections for the reasons stated above. This Court adopts in toto Judge Martin’s March 31, 2004 Report and Recommendation and publishes it with this Memorandum and Order. Judgment shall be entered against the PA and PLO as directed below. The PA’s Appeal of Judge MaHin’s Order Imposing Sanctions for their Delays and Refusal to Participate in Discovery The PA appeals a separate Order issued by Judge Martin on March 31, 2004, which granted Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Judge Martin ordered the PA to pay attorneys’ fees as a sanction for its delays and ultimate refusal to comply with Plaintiffs’ discovery requests and this Court’s discovery orders. Report & Recommendation, at 67. Judge Martin imposed this sanction separately and independently from his recommendation that this Court award attorneys’ fees pursuant to the ATA and in the event that this writer declined to enter a default judgment in this case. Id. The PA argues that: l)the grant of attorneys’ fees is unauthorized and excessive in amount; 2)their position with respect to discovery was taken in good faith; and 3)the discovery demanded was unreasonable for essentially the same reasons as those offered in its objections to the Report and Recommendation. Notice of Appeal, at 1-2. Once again, this Court does not find any of those arguments persuasive. Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to order the payment of attorneys’ fees as a sanction for failing to obey an order to provide or permit discovery. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(West 2004). A magistrate judge’s determination to award attorneys’ fees as a discovery sanction pursuant to this Rule is a non-dispositive matter, which the district court reviews under the clearly erroneous standard. Thomas E. Hoar Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir.1990) (citations omitted). See also, Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 566 (10th Cir.1997)(noting that discovery orders are non-dispositive and magistrate judges have the authority to order discovery sanctions). A determination is “clearly erroneous” when, although there is evidence to support it, the court, after reviewing all the evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that the magistrate judge made a mistake. Harvard Pilgrim, 318 F.Supp.2d at 2-3(citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). In conducting this review, the district court must refrain from second guessing the magistrate judge’s pre-trial discovery rulings. Id. (citing Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Jenckes Mach. Co., No. 85-0586, 1986 WL 9717, at *1 (D.R.I. Feb.19, 1986)). As defense counsel conceded during oral arguments, this Court’s adoption of Judge Martin’s Report and Recommendation disposes of the present appeal. Given the PA’s history of refusing to comply with this Court’s orders and the rules of procedure governing depositions, interrogatories, and requests for the production of documents and for admissions, this Court finds Judge Martin’s conclusion to sanction the PA for its deliberate actions to delay the completion of this litigation to be clearly correct. Therefore, for these and the reasons previously mentioned with regard to the other objections to the Report and Recommendation, the PA’s appeal of Judge Martin’s Order hereby, is denied. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend this Court’s Decision and Order Regarding Sovereign Immunity The final matter before this Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend this Court’s Decision and Order regarding sovereign immunity. Ungar IV, 315 F.Supp.2d 164. In that decision, this Court noted that the PA and PLO had not waived sovereign immunity, even though it ultimately held that those Defendants were not entitled to such immunity. Id. at 173. Plaintiffs request that this Court amend its judgment to hold instead that even assuming that the defendants were “foreign States,” they have waived any claims to sovereign immunity. Mem. in Supp. of Pis.’ Mot. Pursuant to Fed. R.CÍV.P. 59(e), at 4. Neither the PA nor the PLO have filed any objections to this motion. Rule 59(e) allows a court to alter or amend its judgment if a motion to do so is filed no later than ten days after the original judgment is entered. See Commercial Assocs. v. Tilcon Gammino Inc., 801 F.Supp. 939, 942 (D.R.I.1992); Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)(West 2004). A court has broad discretion in deciding a motion brought pursuant to this Rule. DeSenne v. Jamestown Boat Yard Inc., 781 F.Supp. 866, 869 (D.R.I.1991)(citing United States v. Land at 5 Bell Rock Rd. Freetown, MA, 896 F.2d 605, 611 (1st Cir.1990)). See also Commercial Assocs., 801 F.Supp. at 942 (citing White v. N.H. Dep’t. of Employment. Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450-51, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982)(quoting the Advisory Committee’s notes on the 1946 Amendments to the Federal Rules)). The most common grounds for granting a Rule 59(e) motion are a manifest error of law or fact or newly discovered evidence. DeSenne, 781 F.Supp. at 869 (citing Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 706 F.Supp. 970, 974 (D.Mass.1989)). In order to show a manifest error of law or fact, the moving party must present á substantial reason that the court is in error. Id. Since Plaintiffs have not presented any newly discovered evidence, this Court will confíne its discussion to whether or not its conclusion that the PA and PLO did not waive sovereign immunity was a manifest error of law or fact. This writer made no such error for two reasons. First, the statements of the PA and PLO cited by Plaintiffs are admissions that they do not satisfy the criteria for statehood required by United States’ and international law rather than the explicit waiver of sovereign immunity contemplated by the FSIA exception. Second, this Court’s discussion in Ungar IV regarding the issue of waiver is dictum and ancillary to its holding that the PA arid PLO were not and did not represent a foreign State that is entitled to sovereign immunity. As this Court noted in Ungar IV, the FSIA provides an exception to sovereign immunity when a foreign State waives its immunity either explicitly or by implication. 315 F.Supp.2d at 173(citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(1)). The Supreme Court has directed that explicit waivers of sovereign immunity are narrowly construed in favor of the sovereign. Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318, 106 S.Ct. 2957, 92 L.Ed.2d 250 (1986). An express waiver under the FSIA must give a clear, complete, unambiguous, and unmistakable manifestation of the sovereign’s intent to waive its immunity. World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1162 (D.C.Cir.2002)(citing Aguamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1292 (11th Cir.1999)). In creating the waiver exception to sovereign immunity, Congress anticipated that at a minimum, a waiver would not be found absent a State’s conscious decision to take part in the litigation and failure to raise the sovereign immunity defense despite an opportunity to do so. Haven v. Rzeczpospolita Polska, 215 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir.2000)(citing Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 378 (7th Cir.1985)(per curiam)). A foreign State’s indication that it does not intend to participate in the litigation does not constitute the conscious decision required to explicitly waive a sovereign immunity defense. Id. However, Federal Courts have found an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity where a foreign State is a party to an agreement whose terms include specific language that the parties waive any right to sovereign immunity. See World Wide Minerals, 296 F.3d at 1163; Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 676 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir.1982)(both noting the express provisions of various agreements containing explicit waivers of sovereign immunity). In contrast to an explicit waiver, an admission is an adversary’s position which is contrary to and inconsistent with a contention made later in the litigation. Cox v. Esso Shipping Co., 247 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir.1957); Vockie v. Gen. Motors Corp., 66 F.R.D. 57, 60 (E.D.Pa.1975). See also, Black’s Law Dictionary, 48 (7th ed,1999)(admission is a voluntary acknowledgment of the existence of facts relevant to an adversary’s case). Plaintiffs point to the PA’s and PLO’s statements that their status is “unusual,” “particular,” and “undefined,” as indicating that those Defendants have waived any defense of sovereign immunity. Mem. in Support of Pis.’ Mtn. Pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(e), at 2. These statements are contrary to and inconsistent with the PA’s and PLO’s position that they satisfy the criteria for statehood discussed in Ungar IV. See 315 F.Supp.2d at 177(noting that an entity is a State when it possesses a permanent population, defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other States). Therefore, the statements are, as Plaintiffs point out, express admissions that neither Defendant satisfies the criteria for statehood and thus, each Defendant is not a foreign State that is entitled to immunity under the FSIA. See Mem. in Support of Pls.’ Mtn. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), at 1 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the PA’s and PLO’s decision and instructions to counsel not to participate in the instant litigation until this Court ruled on their sovereign immunity defense did not constitute a complete, unambiguous, and unmistakable manifestation of an intent to waive any purported sovereign immunity defense. See Haven, 215 F.3d at 733. Therefore, this Court sees no manifest error in its conclusion that the PA and PLO did not waive the sovereign immunity defense. Alternatively, this Court’s conclusion that neither the PA, the PLO, nor the entity called Palestine was a foreign State entitled to sovereign immunity disposed of Plaintiffs’ waiver argument and rendered this Court’s discussion of that issue dictum. See McConaghy v. Sequa Corp., 294 F.Supp.2d 151, 160 (D.R.I.2003)(citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 454 (6th ed.1990))(dicta constitutes “[o]pinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the specific case before the court”). As this Court noted in Ungar TV, the waiver issue only arises if and when a court is satisfied that the party claiming sovereign immunity is a foreign State or an agent or instrumentality of a foreign State. 315 F.Supp.2d at 176. See also, Sotheby’s Inc. v. Garcia, 802 F.Supp. 1058, 1062-63 (S.D.N.Y.1992)(noting that it was undisputed that the Philippines was a foreign State as defined in the FSIA and then proceeding to assess whether or not the waiver exception applied). The specific issue before this Court in Ungar TV was whether or not the PA, PLO, or the entity called Palestine were or represented a foreign State that was protected by sovereign immunity. See 315 F.Supp.2d at 173, 175 & 178. This writer answered that question in the negative and' any observations regarding waiver were not part of the determination of the specific issue of sovereign immunity. See id. at 187. Simply put, the PA and PLO never had a valid defense of sovereign immunity to waive. For all of these reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to amend this Court’s decision in Ungar IV, hereby, is denied. As stated above, the Defendants’ objections to Judge Martin’s March 31, 2004 Report and Recommendation are overruled and the PA’s appeal of Judge Martin’s Order with respect to attorneys’ fees is denied. Plaintiffs’ motion to amend this Court’s Decision and Order regarding sovereign immunity is also denied. For the aforementioned reasons, and those set forth in the Report and Recommendation attached hereto, this Court adopts said Report and Recommendation and orders the Clerk to enter final judgment for the specific Plaintiffs listed below against Defendants, the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization, who are jointly and severally liable for the following amounts with respect to each Plaintiff: The Estate of Yaron Ungar $ 2,932,158.00 Dvir Ungar $30,488,482.50 Yisliai Ungar $30,488,482.50 Judith Ungar $15,000,000.00 Meir Ungar $15,000,000.00 Michal Cohen $ 7,500,000.00 Amichai Ungar $ 7,500,000.00 Dafna Ungar $ 7,500,000.00 The Clerk shall also enter judgment for Plaintiffs as a group awarding them attorneys’ fees against the Palestinian Authority in the amount of $11,925.00 and against the Palestine Liberation Organization in the amount of $6,345.00. The total amount of judgment, including attorneys’ fees, shall be $116,421,048.00 against the Palestinian Authority and $116,415,468.00 against the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Clerk shall enter judgment as indicated forthwith. It is so ordered. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION MARTIN, United States Magistrate Judge.- Before the court are three motions: 1) Plaintiffs’ Motion Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) for Judgment by Default against Defendant PA and for Other Relief (“First Motion for Default Judgment” or “First Motion”) (Document # 106); 2) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment by Default against the PA and PLO and for Other Relief for Refusal to Submit to Depositions (“Second Motion for Default Judgment” or “Second Motion”) (Document # 125); and 3) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment by Default Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2) against Defendants the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization (“Third Motion for Default Judgment” or “Third Motion”) (Document # 168) (collectively the “Motions for Default Judgment”). These motions have been referred to me for preliminary review, findings, and recommended disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and D.R.I. Local R. 32(a). Hearings on the motions were held on May 14, 2003, July 14, 2003, and August 22, 2003. After listening to oral argument, reviewing the memoranda and exhibits submitted, and performing independent research, I recommend that the First and Third Motions be granted, that the Second Motion be granted in part and denied in part, and that default judgment be entered against Defendants the Palestinian Authority, also known as the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority (“PA”), in the amount of $116,421,048.00, including attorney’s fees, and against the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) in the amount of $116,415,468.00, including attorneys fees. Index I. Case Statement.30 II. Facts.30 III. Parties.31 IV. Amended Complaint.32 V.Travel .'.34 A. Response to Complaint.. 34 B. Response to Amended Complaint.34 C. Discovery Initiated.35 D. Discovery Stayed.35 E. Default Judgment Against Hamas.36 F. Discovery Stay Terminates.37 G. Motion to Compel Discovery.38 H. Motion for Reconsideration of Discovery Order.39 I. Entry of Default against Palestinian Defendants .40 J. First Motion for Default Judgment.40 K. Second Motion for Default Judgment.41 L. May 14, 2003, Hearing.41 M. Third Motion for Default Judgment.42 N. July 14, 2003, Hearing.43 O. Post July 14, 2003, Filings.44 P. August 22, 2003, Hearing.44 Q. Post August 22, 2003, Filings.45 VI. Jurisdiction.45 A. Introduction.45 B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.46 C. Personal Jurisdiction.47 1. Minimum Contacts.48 2. Defendants’ Arguments Re Minimum Contacts.52 3. Service of Process.55 a. Judge Lagueux’s Findings.55 b. Law of the Case.55 c. Magistrate Judge’s Findings.55 1) PA and PLO are Unincorp. Associations.55 2) Hasan Abdel Rahman is Agent of PA & PLO.56 i. Recently Obtained Evidence.56 ii. Other Evidence.58 3) Marwan Jilani.59 4. Conclusion Re Personal Jurisdiction.59 VII.The Motions for Default Judgment 59 A. First Motion. 59 B. Second Motion. 1. Applicability.. 2. Basis for Second Motion.•. C.' Law Applicable to First and Second Motions. D.' Application of Law to First and Second Motions.. . E. Third Motion.,.. :. F. Law Applicable to Third Motion. G. Application of Law to Third Motion. VIII. Liability.65 IX. Damages. 66 A. “Survivors” and “Heirs”.66 B. Measure of Damages.66 C. Evidence of Damages.66 D. Treble Damages .67 E. Israeli Law Claims.67 F. Interest.67 X. Attorney’s Fees.68 XI. Summary .....69 XII.' Conclusion.69 Appendix...70 A. Letter of 11/21/02.70 B. Letter of 7/22/03 .72 C. Letter of 7/25/03 .74 D. Letter of 7/28/03 .75 E. Letter of 8/4/03.76 F. Letter of 3/23/04 .77 I. Case Statement This lawsuit stems from the June 9, 1996, murder of an American citizen living in Israel, Yaron Ungar, and his Israeli wife, Efrat Ungar, by the terrorist group Hamas — Islamic Resistance Movement (“Hamas”). The action is brought by his legal representative and his heirs pursuant to the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (“ATA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2333, which provides a cause of action for American nationals whose person, property, or business is injured by reason of an act of international terrorism. Defendants PA and PLO are alleged, in general, to have provided Hamas with a base of operations and support for conducting terrorist activities which included the murder of the Ungars. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 29-37. II. Facts The Ungars were attacked on June 9, 1996, near Beit Shemesh, Israel, as they drove home from a wedding. A vehicle driven by Raed Fakhri Abu Hamdiya (“Abu Hamdiya”), and occupied by Abdel Rahman Ismail Abdel Rahman Ghanimat (“Rahman Ghanimat”) and Jamal Abdel Fatah Tzabich AI Hor (“Hor”), overtook the Ungar car, and Rahman Ghanimat and Hor fired Kalishnikov machine guns at it. Yaron and Efrat Ungar were fatally wounded, but the fusillade of bullets missed their ten month old son, Plaintiff Yishai Ungar, who was in the back seat. Another son, Plaintiff Dvir Ungar, then age twenty months, was not in the vehicle at the time of the attack. Subsequent events are detailed in the July 24, 2001, Decision and Order of Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux, see Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 153 F.Supp.2d 76 (D.R.I.2001) (“Ungar I”), relevant portions of which are quoted below: Abu Hamdiya, Rahman Ghanimat, and Hor were arrested following the shooting attack. A fourth man, defendant Iman Mahmud Hassan Fuad Kaf-ishe, was also arrested in connection with the shooting. In addition, a warrant was issued for the arrest of Ibra-him Ghanimat on charges relating to the murders of Yaron and Efrat Ungar. Ibrahim Ghanimat remains at large and is believed to be residing within territory controlled by defendant PA. All five men involved in the shooting are members of Hamas .... A terrorist group dedicated to murdering Israeli and Jewish individuals through bombings, shootings, and other violent acts, Hamas is based in and operates from territories controlled by defendants PA, PLO, and Yasser Arafat. Terrorist attacks are staged by small groups of Hamas members organized as a cell for the purpose of carrying out terrorist activities. Abu Hamdiya, Rahman Gha-nimat, Hor, Kafishe, and Ibrahim Ghani-mat comprised the terrorist cell that murdered the Ungars. On May 3, 1998, Abu Hamdiya was convicted by an Israeli court of membership in Hamas and of abetting the shooting murders of Yaron Ungar and Efrat Ungar. On October 21, 1998, an Israeli court convicted Rahman Ghanimat and Hor of membership in defendant Hamas and of the murders of Yaron Ungar and Efrat Ungar. On November 3, 1998, Kafishe was convicted by an Israeli court of membership in Hamas and of being an accessory to the murders of Yaron and Efrat Ungar. Thereafter, on October 25, 1999, an Israeli court appointed attorney David Strachman (“Strachman”) as administrator of the Estates of Yaron and Efrat Ungar. Strachman was appointed as the administrator of the Ungars’ estates for the express purpose of administering and realizing assets, rights, and causes of action that could be pursued on behalf of the Ungars’ estates within the United States. On March 13, 2000, plaintiffs filed an action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333 et seq. and related torts in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Ungar I, 153 F.Supp.2d at 83-84. III. Parties Originally, the Plaintiffs included the Estate of Efrat Ungar and Rabbi Uri Das-berg and Judith Dasberg in their individual capacities as the parents of Efrat Un-gar. See Complaint ¶¶ 4, 7. However, these claims were dismissed on July 24, 2001, because the Complaint did not allege that Efrat Ungar was a national of the United States. See Ungar I, 153 F.Supp.2d at 97. The remaining Plaintiffs in the action are: the Estate of Yaron Ungar, represented by Strachman; Dvir Ungar and Yishai Ungar, the minor children and heirs-at-law of Yaron Ungar and Efrat Ungar; Professor Meyer Ungar and Judith Ungar, in their individual capacities as the parents of Yaron Ungar and also as the legal guardians of Plaintiffs Dvir and Yishai Ungar; Rabbi Uri Dasberg and Judith Dasberg, as legal guardians of Plaintiffs Dvir and Yishai Ungar; and Am-ichai Ungar, Dafna Ungar, and Michal Cohen, the siblings of Yaron Ungar (collectively the “Remaining Plaintiffs”). The original Defendants included six officials of the PA and the five members of Hamas involved in the murders of Yaron and Efrat Ungar. The individual PA Defendants, Yasser Arafat, Jibril Rajoub, Muhammed Dahlan, Amin Al-Hindi, Taw-fik Tirawi, and Razi Jabali (the “individual PA Defendants”) were dismissed from the action on July 24, 2001, for lack of jurisdiction over the person. See Ungar I, 153 F.Supp.2d at 100. The individual Hamas Defendants, Rahman Ghanimat, Hor, Abu Hamdiya, Ibrahim Ghanimat, and Iman Mahmud Hassan Fuad Kafishe (the “individual.. Hamas Defendants”), were dismissed for the same reason on January 27, 2004. See Estates of Ungar ex rel Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 304 F.Supp.2d 232, 236-37, 240-41 (D.R.I. Jan.27, 2004) (“Ungar III”). The remaining defendants are the PA, the PLO, and Hamas. Default judgment was entered against Hamas on January 27, 2004. See id. at 241-42. IY. The Amended Complaint The Amended Complaint states four causes of action. With the exception of Count I, all claims are brought on behalf of all Plaintiffs against all Defendants. Pertinent to the instant motions, Count I alleges that the PA and PLO (the “Palestinian Defendants”) engaged in acts of international terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331 and 2333 and that then-behavior also constitutes aiding and abetting acts of international terrorism. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 38-48. Counts II, III, and IV are claims pled under Israeli law. See Ungar I, 153 F.Supp.2d at 99 (giving Plaintiffs 30 days to file an amended complaint making allegations against the PA and PLO defendants under Israeli law). Count II of the Amended Complaint alleges negligence. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 49-64. Count III is for breach of statutory obligation. See id. ¶¶ 65-73. Count IV charges Defendants with the “civil wrong” of assault. See id. ¶¶ 74-82. As was the case with the original Complaint, see Ungar I, 153 F.Supp.2d at 84, the factual basis for each claim is essentially the same. Plaintiffs charge that the Palestinian Defendants failed to maintain public order and security in the territories under their control. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 23-25. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the PA and PLO: provided defendant HAMAS with safe haven and a base of operations, by permitting and/or encouraging defendant Hamas to operate freely and conduct activities in the territory under their control or in which they maintained a police presence, and to advocate, encourage, solicit, facilitate, incite for, sponsor, organize, plan and execute acts of violence and terrorism against Jewish civilians in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. Id. ¶ 29. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the PA and PLO: refused requests for the surrender of terrorist suspects, see id. ¶ 31; granted material and financial support to the families of members of Hamas who have been killed or captured while carrying out terrorist violence against Jewish civilians in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank, see id. ¶ 33; assisted Hamas and its members in avoiding apprehension and punishment, see id. ¶ 34; and solicited Ha-mas and the individual Hamas Defendants to commit the attack on the Ungars’ vehicle, see id. ¶¶ 17-18, 36. Plaintiffs also claim that the PA employed several members of Hamas and other terrorist groups suspected of or charged with the murder of U.S. citizens as police officers and/or security officials. See id. ¶ 32. Plaintiffs further aver that the Palestinian Defendants’ actions constitute acts of international terrorism and also aiding and abetting acts of international terrorism because their actions: (1) violate the criminal laws of the United States, see Amended Complaint ¶ 39; (2) “appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,” Amended Complaint ¶ 43 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2331), and “to influence the policy of a government by means of intimidation or coercion,” id. ¶ 43; (3) were dangerous to human life, see id. ¶ 44; and (4) occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, see id. ¶ 45. The Israeli law counts charge all Defendants with violating three specific sections of the Israeli Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New Version) — 1968 (“CWO”). See id. ¶¶ 51, 55, 63, 75. Count II asserts that Defendants committed the “civil wrong of Negligence,” id. ¶ 62, as that tort is defined in CWO § 35, see id. ¶ 56, because “a reasonable person would, under the same circumstances, have foreseen that, in the ordinary course of events, the decedents and plaintiffs were liable to be injured by defendants’ acts and omissions ...,” id. ¶ 61. Count III charges Defendants with “committing the ‘civil wrong’ of Breach of Statutory Obligation CWO § 63,” id. ¶ 71, and cites statutory obligations (and sections) allegedly breached by Defendants. Count IV asserts the “ ‘civil wrong’ of Assault,” id. ¶ 75, as that tort is defined in CWO § 23. Among other allegations contained within Count IV, Plaintiffs allege that the “PA and PLO and their officials, employees and agents solicited and advised defendants HAMAS [and the individual Hamas Defendants] to commit the assault attributed to those defendants herein, and aided, abetted, authorized, ratified and participated in that assault .... ” Amended Complaint ¶ 79. Each of the Israeli law counts also alleges that the Palestinian Defendants are vicariously liable under the CWO for the acts and omissions of their officials, employees, and agents, see id. ¶¶ 64, 80, and for the breaches of statutory obligations by those officials, employees, and agents, see id. ¶ 73. V. Travel A. Response to Complaint Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint (Document # 1) on March 13, 2000. The PA, PLO, and the individual PA Defendants moved to dismiss on June 15, 2000, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient service of process, improper venue, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and inconvenience of the forum. See Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Document # 22). On July 24, 2001, Judge Lagueux denied the motion on all grounds as to the PA and PLO, but granted it as to the individual PA Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Ungar I, 153 F.Supp.2d 76 (D.R.I.2001). He also dismissed all claims based on the death of Efrat Ungar as she was not a citizen of the United States. See id. at 97. B. Response to Amended Complaint Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint (Document # 41) on August 23, 2001, against the PA, PLO, Hamas, and the individual Hamas Defendants. On September 7, 2001, the PA and PLO filed a motion to extend the time to answer the Amended Complaint by sixty days. See Defendants’ Motion to Extend Time to Respond to the Amended Complaint (Document # 42). Plaintiffs objected to the motion to extend time, see Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendants’ Motion to Extend Time to Respond to the Amended Complaint (Document #43), but Judge La-gueux granted the extension on September 19, 2001, see Document # 44 at 3, and set November 13, 2001, as the date by which an answer from the Palestinian Defendants was required, see Docket entry for 9/19/01. On November 13, 2001, the PA and PLO sought an additional enlargement of fourteen days to respond to the Amended Complaint. See Defendants’ Motion for a Further Enlargement of Time (Document #45). Plaintiffs objected to the motion for an additional enlargement and moved for entry of default on November 15, 2001. See Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendants’ Motion for a Further Enlargement of Time and Motion for Entry of Default (Document # 46). The Palestinian Defendants then moved on November 29, 2001, for dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds that it was nonjusticiable and failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and, alternatively, for certification of an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and a stay pending disposition of the application for certification and/or appeal. See Defendants’ Motion for Dismissal and Alternatively for Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal and a Stay (“Motion for Dismissal”) (Document # 47-1). On December 7, 2001, a stipulation was filed and subsequently approved by the court, giving Plaintiffs until December 21, 2001, to respond to the Motion for Dismissal. See Stipulation (Document # 47-2). Plaintiffs’ objection to the Motion for Dismissal was received by the court on December 26, 2001. See Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendants’ Motion for Dismissal of the Amended Complaint and Alternatively for Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal and Stay (Document # 48). C. Discovery Initiated On January 24, 2002, Plaintiffs served the PA with interrogatories, a request for production of documents and a request for admissions. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) for Default Judgment against Defendants PA and for Other Relief (“Plaintiffs’ Mem. First Motion”); see also Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery (Document # 65). The following day, January 25, 2002, Plaintiffs noticed the depositions of Yasser Arafat and six other PA officials to be conducted in mid-March 2002 in Providence, Rhode Island. See Notices of Deposition (Documents # 49-# 55). The Notices of Deposition identified the deponents only in connection with the PA and did not reference the PLO. See id. D. Discovery Stayed On January 30, 2002, the Palestinian Defendants moved for leave to assert defenses in support of their pending Motion for Dismissal. See Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Assert Defenses in Support of their Pending Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint or Alternatively for Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal (“Motion for Leave to Assert Defenses”) (Document # 59). Six days later, on February 5, 2002, the Palestinian Defendants renewed their motion for a stay and moved for leave to seek a protective order regarding the discovery requests which had recently been filed by Plaintiffs. See Defendants’ Renewed Motion for a Stay and Motion for Leave to Seek a Protective Order (“Renewed Motion for Stay”) (Document # 60). Plaintiffs filed on February 20, 2002, an objection to the Renewed Motion for Stay, see Plaintiffs’ Objection to' Defendants’ Renewed Motion for a Stay and Motion for Leave to Seek a Protective Order (“Objection to Renewed Motion for Stay”) (Document # 61), and on February 25, 2002, an objection to the Motion for Leave to Assert Defenses, see Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Assert Defenses in Support of their Pending Motion to Dismiss (Document # 62). On February 26, 2002, the Palestinian Defendants filed a motion for a protective order. See Motion for Protective Order (Document # 63). Plaintiffs filed an objection to this motion on March 8, 2002. See Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order (Document #64). After the PA failed to respond to the request for documents which had been propounded to them on January 24, 2002, failed to respond to the request for admissions, and indicated that it would not produce its employees for depositions scheduled during the latter half of March, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel on March 8, 2002. See Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery (“Motion to Compel Discovery” or “Motion to Compel”) (Document # 65). The Palestinian Defendants objected to the Motion to Compel, see Palestinian Defendants’ Objection to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery (Document # 66), on the same grounds and reasons as set forth in the memoran-da filed in support of their Renewed Motion for Stay and their Motion for Leave to Assert Defenses, see id. On June 20, 2002, this Magistrate Judge granted the Renewed Motion for Stay (Document # 60) and the Motion for Protective Order (Document # 63), staying discovery until Judge Lagueux had ruled upon the Palestinian Defendants’ pending Motion for Dismissal (Document #47-1). See Order Staying Discovery (Document # 70). E. Default Judgment against Hamas Meanwhile, Plaintiffs moved to obtain a default judgment against Hamas and the individual Hamas Defendants (collectively the “Hamas Defendants”). See Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enter Default Judgment against Defendants Hamas and Hamas Operatives (“Motion to Enter Default Judgment against Hamas”) (Document # 38). On June 20, 2002, a hearing on the motion for default judgment was scheduled for July 12, 2002. See Docket Entry for 6/20/02. On the day before the hearing, July 11, 2002, the Palestinian Defendants filed an objection to the entry of default judgment against the Hamas Defendants. See Palestinian Defendants’ Objection to Entry of Default Judgment (Document # 77). At the start of the hearing on July 12, 2002, the court asked the attorney representing the Palestinian Defendants, their local counsel, Mr. Deming Sherman, if he was pressing the objection which had been filed. See Transcript of 7/12/02 hearing (“Tr. of 7/12/02”) at 2. Mr. Sherman responded by asking if he could make “a brief presentation on that?” Id. In the course of the remarks that followed, Mr. Sherman stated that “it is the option of the Palestinian defendants not to participate in the hearing. Accordingly, we do not intend to participate.” Id. at 3. He continued that it was the position of the Palestinian Defendants that the default judgment proceedings being conducted against the Hamas Defendants “should not be in any way binding upon the Palestinian defendants,” id., and that “[njone ... of the findings of fact, the conclusions of law, or orders or judgments ... shall have any impact upon the Palestinian [Defendants],” id. at 3-4. After Mr. Sherman had concluded his presentation, the court again asked him if he was pressing the objection which had been filed. See id. at 4. Upon receiving an affirmative response, the court stated that it would conduct a brief hearing on the objection. See id. at 5. After brief argument, see id. at 8-9, the court overruled the objection, finding that it had been “filed at the 11th hour,” Tr. of 7/12/02 at 9; see also Order dated 8/19/02 (Document #89), and was “untimely,” id. Following the court’s ruling, Mr. Sherman requested and received permission to be excused from the hearing. See id. at 10. Thereafter, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Enter Default Judgment against Hamas (Document # 38), see id. at 25-152, which lasted the entire day and resumed on July 15, 2002, see Tr. of 7/15/02. A further hearing was held on July 19, 2002, for the purpose of having Plaintiffs’ counsel address certain questions posed by the court regarding the issue of personal jurisdiction. The court then took the matter under advisement and subsequently issued a Report and Recommendation which recommended that the motion for default judgment be granted as to Defendant Hamas, but denied as to the individual Hamas defendants and that the claims against them be dismissed from the action. See Report and Recommendation dated 7/3/03 (Document # 183) at 63. F. Discovery Stay Terminates On November 4, 2002, Judge Lagueux issued a Decision and Order (Document # 90), denying Defendants’ Motion for Dismissal. This action terminated the stay of discovery which had been granted by this Magistrate Judge on June 20, 2002. See Order Staying Discovery (Document # 70); see also Plaintiffs’ Mem. First Motion, Ex. B (Letter from Martin, M.J., to Strachman and Schilling of 12/13/02). The Palestinian Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of Judge Lagueux’s decision on November 20, 2002. See Palestinian Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration (“Motion for Reconsideration”) (Document # 91). Plaintiffs objected to the motion on December 12, 2002. See Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration (Document # 94). Judge Lagueux denied the Motion for Reconsideration on April 22, 2003, and also denied the Palestinian Defendants’ request for a stay of proceedings pending appeal. See Document # 135. On April 23, 2003, the Palestinian Defendants appealed the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and Judge Lagueux’s November 4, 2002, Decision and Order to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. See Notice of Appeal of Defendants Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization (Document # 136). That court summarily affirmed Judge Lagueux’s orders on May 27, 2003. See Judgment in Efrat Ungar, et al. v. Palestinian Liberation Organization, et al., No. 03-1544 (1st Cir. May 27, 2003) (Document # 179). G. Motion to Compel Discovery In the meantime, following the termination of the stay of discovery, the court scheduled on November 18, 2002, a hearing for December 12, 2002, on the Motion to Compel Discovery (Document # 65) (and other Plaintiffs’ motions not relevant to the determination of the instant Motions for Default Judgment) which had been filed in March. As a courtesy to the PA’s primary counsel, Mr. Ramsey Clark and Mr. Lawrence W. Schilling, who were from out of state, the court directed the clerk to give the parties at least twenty-one days notice of the hearing. On November 18, 2003, the clerk noticed the hearing on the motion for December 12, 2003. On November 25, 2002, the court received a letter from Mr. Clark, lead counsel for the PA, in which he requested a continuance of the December 12, 2002, hearing because he was scheduled to appear before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in Arusha, Tanzania, on that date and would not be available to appear in Rhode Island until January. See Letter from Clark to Martin, M.J., of 11/21/02 at l. The court treated Mr. Clark’s letter as a request for a continuance and scheduled a telephonic hearing for December 2, 2002, to consider the motion. At the hearing on December 2, 2002, the court denied the request for a continuance. See Order entered 12/12/02 (Document # 96). The court rejected the suggestion of counsel for the Palestinian Defendants that their filing of the Motion for Reconsideration (Document # 94) had revived or reactivated the stay of discovery which had ended on November 4, 2002. Observing that the case had been filed in 2000 and that it was now nearly 2003, the court indicated that it was time for the case to move forward. The court also found that the motions to be heard on December 12th were not so complicated that they could not be handled by counsel other than Mr. Clark. However, as a courtesy, the court indicated that it would allow the attorney representing the Palestinian Defendants on the 12th, presumably Mr. Schilling, to appear via telephone instead of having to travel from New York City. The court granted this dispensation because Mr. Clark indicated that, while he was willing to appear without compensation, to ask another attorney to do so could be somewhat of an imposition. On December 12, 2002, the court conducted a hearing on the Motion to Compel Discovery (Document # 65) and granted it. In granting the motion, the Court purposefully gave the PA an extended period of time (45 days from December 12th) within which to respond to Plaintiffs’ interrogatories, request for production of documents, and request for admissions. See Order of 1/14/03 (Document # 99). The court did so because of the PA’s overseas location and its contention that responding to the requests would be difficult because of conditions existing in the Middle East. For the same reason, the court required that Plaintiffs notice the depositions of PA officers and employees at least 60 days in advance. See id. The PA failed to respond to the discovery requests within 45 days or at any time thereafter. See Plaintiffs’ Mem. First Motion at 2. H. Motion for Reconsideration of Discovery Order An order was issued on January 14, 2003, reflecting the granting of the Motion to Compel (Document # 65). See Order of 1/14/03 (Document # 99). Two weeks later, on January 29, 2003, the Palestinian Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order granting the Motion to Compel. See Palestinian Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration (“Motion for Reconsideration”) (Document # 100). Attached to the Motion for Reconsideration was a letter from Dr. Nasser Al-Kidwa, Ambassador, Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations, addressed to this Magistrate Judge. See id. The letter referenced the intense violence which had been occurring “throughout occupied Palestine for more than two years,” id. (Letter from Al-Kidwa to Martin, M.J. of 1/27/03) at 1, and stated that “[i]t has been impossible under such circumstances to locate people who could seek and find documents, who could gather information and prepare answers to interrogatories and could respond to requests for admissions,” id. Dr. Al-Kidwa opined that “[i]t would seem fair and just to wait until there is a final decision on the issue whether the U.S. Court has jurisdiction over the PNA and PLO for these events before proceeding to these [discovery] requests,” id. at 2, and offered that “[n]othing else is possible for us,” id. Plaintiffs reacted on February 5, 2003, by moving to strike portions of the memorandum and exhibits which the Palestinian Defendants had filed in support of their Motion for Reconsideration (Document # 100) as violative of Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 and 12(f). See Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike (“Second Motion to Strike”) (Document # 104). The Palestinian Defendants objected to the Second Motion to Strike on February 20, 2003. See Palestinian Defendants’ Objection to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike (Document # 109). However, at a hearing held on April 11, 2003, Judge La-gueux overruled their objection and granted the Second Motion to Strike (Document # 104). See Transcript of 4/13/03 hearing (“Tr. of 4/13/03”) at 12-14; Order of 4/22/03 (Document # 135). Meanwhile, Plaintiffs had also filed on February 19, 2003, an objection to the Motion for Reconsideration. See Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration Dated January 27, 2003, (Document # 107). The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration (Document # 100) without a hearing on March 20, 2003, “for the reasons stated in Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition.” See Order of 3/20/03 (Document # 116). Among the reasons expressed therein were that the Palestinian Defendants’ claims of impossibility were unsupported by affidavit or other admissible evidence, see Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Oppos