Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM DuBOIS, District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION.635 II. BACKGROUND.636 A. ENGINEERING REPORT 213.637 B. HARTZELL’S ALLEGED CONCEALMENT FROM THE FAA.640 C. OVERHAUL REQUIREMENTS.642 D. 1989 PROPELLER OVERHAUL.643 III. DISCUSSION. A. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT B. THE GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT OF 1994 (“GARA”). C. GARA § 2(B): KNOWING MISREPRESENTATION, OR CONCEALMENT, OR WITHHOLDING EXCEPTION. .fx 1. Hartzell’s Motions in Limine to Preclude Testimony of Dr. McSwain and Mr. Twa. , rx 2. Evidence of Knowing Misrepresentation. . rx a. High Vibratory Stress. .ix b. Dampers. cn rn cn e. Causally Related. m cn 3. Evidence of Concealment or Withholding From the FAA .. ctt a. on Other Causes . f"n Relaxation of Inspection Requirements . CTt c. Stress Curves. Cn <*Ti CTI § 2(a)(2): NEW PARTS. Oil Oi> Ql E. NEW ENGLAND PROPELLER SEVICE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. CD CD 1. Evidence that an Overhaul was Conducted. CD CD 2. Evidence of Negligent Overhaul. CD CD 3. Motion in Limine to Preclude Testimony of Dr. McSwain CD CD F. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GARA. CD CD IV. CONCLUSION. .669 I. INTRODUCTION This civil action arises out of claims by plaintiffs, Michael and Wendy Robinson, against defendants Hartzell Propeller Inc. (“Hartzell”) and New England Propeller Service, Inc. (“NEPS”) for damages stemming from injuries they suffered in a 1999 plane crash. In the Complaint, plaintiffs allege that the accident occurred when one of the propeller blades on their aircraft failed. Hartzell designed and manufactured the propeller. It is alleged that NEPS performed maintenance on the propeller. Plaintiffs claim, inter alia, that the propeller failure was caused by Hartzell’s negligent design of the propeller. Plaintiffs also contend that Hartzell was aware of the propeller’s defective design and misrepresented the design problems to the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) when the propeller was certified for use and concealed the propeller’s propensity for failure from the FAA after certification. With respect to NEPS, plaintiffs allege negligence in the performance of maintenance on the propeller. Based on these allegations, plaintiffs asserted claims against Hartzell for negligence (Count I), strict liability (Count II), and fraud (Count III) and against NEPS for negligence (Count IV). Presently before the Court are Hart-zell’s Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (“GARA”), Pub.L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (reprinted in notes for 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101), Hartzell’s Motion in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of William Ray Twa, Hartzell’s Motion in Li-mine to Preclude the Testimony of Richard H. McSwain, Ph.D., P.E., Hartzell’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Expert Testimony Relating to the Insufficiency of Hartzell Manuals, NEPS’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and NEPS’s Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Expert Richard H. McSwain From Testifying Regarding Propeller Overhaul. In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Hartzell argues that GARA’s eighteen year statute of repose bars plaintiffs’ claims because the propeller at issue was installed on the aircraft more than eighteen years before the accident. In response, plaintiffs claim that (1) based on Hartzell’s alleged misrepresentations and concealment, their claims are subject to GARA’s “knowing misrepresentation or concealment or withholding” exception and the statute of repose does not apply; or, in the alternative, (2) under GARA’s “new part” provision, the eighteen year period began when Hartzell issued an overhaul manual in 1984 or when the propeller was overhauled in 1989. In its Motion for Summary Judgment, NEPS argues that plaintiffs have produced no evidence that it performed any maintenance on plaintiffs’ aircraft. In the alternative, NEPS contends that, even if it performed maintenance on the aircraft, there is no admissible evidence that the maintenance was performed negligently. Hartzell argues in its Motions in Limine that Mr. Twa and Dr. McSwain should not be permitted to testify about Hartzell’s state of mind or scienter. In the Motion in Limine concerning Hartzell manuals, Hartzell contends that the testimony of Dr. McSwain, Jerry D. Foster, A.J. Fielder, and Donald E. Sommer on the sufficiency of the overhaul manuals and procedures should be excluded because these experts base their conclusions on facts not in evidence. NEPS claims in its in limine motion that Dr. McSwain is not qualified to offer testimony on propeller overhaul. For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum, both Hartzell’s Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to GARA and NEPS’s Motion for Summary Judgment are denied. Hartzell’s motions to preclude the testimony of Mr. Twa and Dr. McSwain are granted with respect to the opinions on the issue of Hartzell’s state of mind or scienter. The motions in limine are denied in all othér respects. Hartzelbs Motion in Limine to preclude testimony on the sufficiency of its manuals is denied without prejudice. NEPS’s motion in li-mine to exclude Dr. McSwain’s testimony is denied. These rulings in limine are without prejudice to defendants’ right to object to testimony and other evidence presented by all such experts at trial. II. BACKGROUND On August 15, 1999, Michael and Wendy Robinson were injured when they were forced to make an emergency crash landing in their Mooney M20E aircraft near Prattsburg, New York. Compl. 13, 14, 16; Hartzell’s Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (“Hartzell’s Mot.”) at 2 & Ex. 1 (National Transportation Safety Board Factual Report Aviation, ID No. NYC99LA 202 (“NTSB Report”)). Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of the crash, Wendy Robinson fractured her spine, breast bone, and left foot; Michael Robinson’s injuries resulted in permanent paraplegia. Compl. 17-20. Plaintiffs aver in the Complaint that a propeller blade fractured during the flight, causing the crash landing. Id. 16. According to an investigation conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board, the fracture occurred in the “mid-blade” region of the propeller. Hartzell’s Mot. at 2 & Ex. 1 (NTSB Report). The plane was equipped with a propeller manufactured by Hartzell, model number HC-C2YK-17666-2, made of 2025-T6 aluminum. Compl. 16, 27, Hartzell’s Mot. at 2. According to Hart-zell, the propeller blade was manufactured on August 8, 1974 and installed on plaintiffs’ aircraft on or about October 17, 1974. Hartzell’s Mot. at 3, Ex. 4 (Aff. of Thomas McCreary, Hartzell’s Safety Investigation Manager) 3, 6. Plaintiffs claim that it was “inspected, repaired, maintained, serviced, overhauled, certified, and returned to service” by NEPS in 1989, prior to the accident. Id. 26. The plane was equipped with a 10-360-A1A engine manufactured by Lycoming. Compl. 24, Hartzell’s Mot. at 2. Plaintiffs state in the Complaint that “[tjhis particular aircraft and engine combination was known to create a harmonic between the blade and the engine, which could and did result in the development of stress corrosion and cracks within the blade.” Compl. 31. On this issue, plaintiffs claim that the “[t]he seriousness and risk of such a harmonic was not made known to the flying public, aircraft owners, or the FAN. In fact, ... Hartzell misled the FAA into believing that any cause of failures were overspeeding or surface generated corrosion pits, rather than as a result of the harmonic between the engine and the propellers.” Id. 33. It is plaintiffs’ position that “high damaging vibration stresses generated by the engine/propeller system caused a fatigue crack in the propeller blade which ultimately resulted in the fracture of the propeller in mid-flight.” Pis.’ Resp. at 2. In addition to the vibration problems associated with the engine/propeller combination, plaintiffs argue that the aluminum used to construct the propeller had a “propensity” for “corrosion pitting and inter-granular corrosion.” With respect to this allegation, plaintiffs claim that the maintenance instructions included in a Hartzell Overhaul Manual dated June 29, 1984 were inadequate to detect corrosion pits or cracks. Pis.’ Resp. at 4. According to plaintiffs, the overhaul manual should have required visual inspection with a magnifying glass. Id. at 4 & Ex. A (McSwain Aff.) at 10(t). Plaintiffs further allege that Hartzell allowed the FAA to relax inspection requirements which required a careful inspection to detect corrosion and stress cracks in order to “cover up” the design defects. Compl. 34-40, 42-43. Finally, plaintiffs allege that Hartzell failed to notify “the FAA of numerous aircraft accidents in which it was either known or suspected that the cause of the accident was a propeller system problem” despite the fact that this “information was required to be disclosed and ... was material and relevant to the performance, maintenance, operation, and continued airworthiness of the accident aircraft.” Compl. 44, 46. The Complaint originally named several defendants in addition to Hartzell and NEPS — Columbia Aircraft Services, Tex-tron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division, Textron, Inc., and Avco Corp. The Complaint against Columbia Aircraft Services was dismissed without prejudice by agreement on February 21, 2002. Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice as to Textron Lycom-ing, Textron, and Avco in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County before the ease was removed to this Court. In addressing the issues raised by Hart-zell’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must examine the facts related to the knowing misrepresentation or concealment or withholding exception to GARA, starting with Engineering Report 213 (“ER 213”). An analysis of Hartzell’s arguments with respect to GARA’s new part provision requires an examination of Hart-zell’s overhaul instructions and the maintenance history of the propeller. The maintenance history is also relevant to NEPS’s Motion for Summary Judgment. A. ENGINEERING REPORT 213 On March 24, 1959, Hartzell began applying for a type certificate for the accident model propeller. In order to certify the use of this propeller with the engine installed on plaintiffs’ aircraft, Hartzell conducted a vibration test with the accident model propeller and engine during the week of July 8, 1963. Hartzell recorded the results of this test in Engineering Report 213, dated August 22, 1963, and submitted the report to the FAA. See Pis.’ Resp. at 8 & Ex. L (ER 213), Ex. M (FAA Statement of Compliance of Aircraft or Aircraft Components with the Civil Air Regulations); Hartzell’s Mot. at 11, Ex. 22 (Sep. 5, 1963 letter from FAA acknowledging receipt of ER 213). During this test, strain gauges were placed on the propeller blades to measure strain at different locations on the blade during different flight conditions. Pis.’ Resp. at 9. These measurements were recorded on four different graphs. These graphs show the stress on the propeller (measured in pounds per square inch (“p.s.i.”)) at different propeller speeds (measured in revolutions per minute (“r.p.m.”)) for four different flight conditions. The graphs also include a line at 4700 p.s.i. labeled “allowable.” Hartzell’s Mot. at Ex. 22 (ER 213); Pis.’ Resp. at Ex. C (William Ray Twa Aff) 6-7. According to plaintiffs, these graphs show that the stresses on the propeller exceeded the allowable limit at three separate points. Mr. Twa, one of plaintiffs’ experts, states: “The test results revealed that vibratory stresses exceeded the allowable limits for the Static Full Throttle, 24" Manifold Pressure Level Flight, and Full Throttle Level Flight Conditions. For the Static Throttle condition at 2250 r.p.m., the stress was 5,000 p.s.i. at blade station 30" where the allowable stress is 4,800 p.s.i. For the 24" Manifold Pressure Level Flight condition at 2300 r.p.m., the stress level was 5,600 p.s.i. with an 10-360 engine, 180 hp and 23" manifold pressure. The allowable stress was 4,800 p.s.i. For the Full Throttle Flight condition at about 2210 r.p.m., the stress level at station 30 was 5,100 p.s.i. with an allowable stress of 4,800 p.s.i..” [Citations omitted.] Pis.’ Resp. at 9 (citing Exhibit L (ER 213) & Exhibit C (Twa Aff.) 7). Hartzell’s written summary of these graphs states: The peak stress at 2230 r.p.m. reached a value of 4800 p.s.i. for the 24 inch manifold setting, which is approximately the allowable value. Since this engine has no dampers which can wear and cause higher stresses, the probability of this value being reached or exceeded in service seems remote. There appears to be no necessity to placard against operation in the 2200-2300 r.p.m. range. Pis.’ Resp. at 9 & Exhibit L (ER 213). Plaintiffs argue that this statement contains three misrepresentations: (1) the peak stress was not approximately equivalent to the allowable value, it exceeded the allowable value; (2) instead of reducing stress on the propeller, the fact that dampers were not installed on this aircraft increased the stresses on the propeller; and (3) despite Hartzell’s statement to the contrary, placards were necessary to limit operation at certain propeller speeds. Id. at 9-10. Plaintiffs point to Mr. Twa’s analysis of the graphs as evidence that Hartzell misrepresented the level of stress reflected by the graphs. For evidence that dampers do not increase the stress on a propeller, plaintiffs provided a letter from Hartzell in which Hartzell suggested installing dampers on an aircraft to reduce stress. Pis.’ Resp. at 10 & Exhibit N (April 13, 1972 letter from David Biermann, Hartzell President, to FAA). As evidence that Hartzell’s statement about placards was a misrepresentation, plaintiffs state that, despite Hartzell’s statement in ER 213 that placards were not necessary, the FAA required warnings to pilots about operating at certain speeds. Tr. of Aug. 25, 2003 Hearing/Oral Argument (“Tr.”) at 110. When the propeller was certified, the propeller’s Type Certificate Data Sheet included a Note requiring owners of Mooney M20E aircraft to mark their tachometers in red between 2000 and 2350 r.p.m. to indicate a restriction on continuous operation in this engine speed range. Pis.’ Resp. Ex. O (Type Certificate Data Sheet) at 51. On May 28, 1965, the FAA issued AD 65-12-13 which changed the red arc on the tachometer to limit operation between 2100 and 2350 r.p.m. and required an addition to the flight manual to explain this operating restriction. Id. Ex. P (AD 65-12-13). In 1977, AD 77-12-06 required the installation of a placard near the tachometer to inform pilots that “continuous operation” should be avoided between 2000 and 2350 r.p.m. or above 2600 r.p.m. in “full throttle level flight.” Id. Ex. J (AD 77-12-06) at 2. Plaintiffs allege that Hartzell had Delegated Option Authority (“DOA”) at the time the propeller was certified. According to plaintiffs, in order for a part to be certified, a manufacturer typically submits an application and supporting material to the FAA and the FAA decides whether to approve the application. However, DOA allows an employee of a manufacturer, called the Designated Engineering Representative (“DER”), to assume the FAA’s role and certify a part. Id. at 7, Ex. K (Dep. of Tim Smyth, engineer for FAA) at 148. After certification, according to Hartzell’s Delegation Option Authorization Manual, “the DOA organization is responsible to ensure that the product design is in accordance with the regulations and has no characteristics which may detract from flight safety. Service difficulties are to be reviewed, reported, and resolved in accordance with section 13.0 of this manual.” Pis.’ Supp. Resp. Ex. C (Hartzell Delegation Option Authorization Manual) at 7. Section 13.0 of the manual mandates that the reporting of failures, malfunctions, and defects be consistent with 14 C.F.R. § 21.3. Id. at 16. According to plaintiffs, “[tjhrough its DOA, Hartzell certified the accident propeller/IO-360-AlA engine combination and intentionally misrepresented to the FAA that the combination was safe.” Pis.’ Resp. at 7. In support of its contention that Hartzell certified the accident propeller/engine combination through its DOA, plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of Mr. Twa, a former DER for Bell Helicopter and FAA employee, in which he states that “Hartzell approved certification of the accident model propeller through its Delegated Option Authority.” Id. at 7, Ex. C (Twa.Aff.) 1-5. Hartzell disputes this evidence and claims it received DOA in 1967, four years after ER 213 was submitted to the FAA. Hartzell’s Combined Reply at 12, n. 7. Plaintiffs argue further that vibration testing for the propeller/engine combination should have been conducted after Hartzell developed new allowable stress limits in the early 1980s. Pis.’ Supp. Resp. at 6. According to plaintiffs, these new limits more accurately represented the stresses on older propellers in combination with damaged or worn engines. Id. The allowable stress curves were altered from the straight lines used in ER 213. The new curves were higher for some operating conditions and lower for others. Pis.’ Supp. Resp. at 6 & Exhibit A (Dep. of Robert Edinger) at 213-14, 219-20. Plaintiffs claim that the FAA “recommended” that Hartzell re-conduct vibration surveys in accordance with these new limits. Id. In the April 6, 1981 letter cited by plaintiffs as evidence of this recommendation, the FAA advised Hartzell that “[v]ibration surveys should be conducted with representative service conditions. That is, high-time engines with poor timing or one misfiring cylinder — particularly if the resultant vibration would not be readily apparent to the pilot.” Id. Ex. D (Apr. 6, 1981 letter from W. Horn, Chief of FAA Engineering & Manufacturing Branch, to W. Hariamert, Hartzell’s Vice President for Engineering). Hartzell claims that it used the new allowable limits from 1981 forward when certifying new propellers. Hartzell’s Combined Rep. at 19, n. 15, Pis.’ Supp. Resp. Ex. A (Edinger Dep.) at 219-20. Plaintiffs argue Hartzell continued to abuse its DOA after certification of the propeller at issue. “Once certification was accomplished, Hartzell could easily deal with the problems in the propeller through its DOA authority and it did so by concealing the vibration problem and leading the FAA to believe that the cause of the frequent propeller failures were other than what Hartzell knew them to be.” Pis.’ Resp. at 10: B. HARTZELL’S ALLEGED CONCEALMENT FROM THE FAA According to plaintiffs, “[w]hile Hartzell concealed the source of the high damaging vibratory stresses which caused failures, many accident model propellers installed on undamped engines were failing.” Id. at 12. Plaintiffs did not specify how many propellers failed, but they submitted a list of propeller failures described as a “Service Difficulty Report” at oral argument. Id. at Ex. Q (Service Difficulty Report); Tr. of Aug. 25, 2003 Hearing/Oral Argument (“Tr.”) at 98. Although plaintiffs did not explain who compiled this list or how it was produced, Tim Smyth, an engineer for the FAA, testified that the FAA uses service difficulty reports to learn of product failures. Hartzell’s Mot. Ex. 3 (Smyth Dep.) at 100. Each page of the report states that the list was “prepared from official FAA records.” Pis.’ Resp. Ex. Q (Service Difficulty Report). An independent review of this exhibit by the Court revealed that the list contains reports of a number of propeller failures involving the same propeller/engine combination as the one at issue in this case and analyzed by ER 213 — a Hartzel HCC2YK1 propeller and a Lycoming 10-360 engine. At oral argument, counsel for Hartzell argued that there were only two reports of “mid-blade” failures involving the accident model propeller. Tr. at 70-71. In making this argument, counsel did not refer to any authority and he did not state that he was relying on the Service Difficulty Report submitted by plaintiffs. Moreover, the Service Difficulty Report does not specify which blade failures occurred at mid-blade and there is no evidence that the reported blade failures at other locations are not relevant. On this issue, the Court notes that neither party presented evidence that precisely defined what is meant by reference to the mid-blade of a propeller. According to Hartzell, “the ‘mid-blade’ area refers to that region of the propeller blade that is between the ‘blade shank’ (also called the ‘blade retention radius’), i.e., the area at one end of the blade that is inserted into the propeller hub, and the ‘blade tip,’ the extreme outer region of the blade.” Hart-zell’s Mot. at 2. This general definition is not disputed and is supported by an illustration provided by Hartzell and Mr. Smyth’s testimony. Id. Ex. 2 (Illustration of Propeller Blade), Ex. 3 (Smyth Dep.) at 17-19. However, neither the illustration nor the Smyth testimony define the length of the “extreme outer area” or the “blade tip.” Plaintiffs’ counsel stated at oral argument that the blade tip is about three inches long, but he offered no evidence to support this definition. Tr. at 116. According to plaintiffs, the FAA relied on Hartzell to investigate the failures identified in the Service Difficulty Report and report the cause of these failures to the FAA because Hartzell had DOA. Tr. at 98. Plaintiffs argue that, instead of reporting-the actual cause of these failures, “Hart-zell’s approach to addressing the defects in the accident model propeller has been to preclude operation of the engine in certain RPM ranges and to put limitations in the flight manual, reduce the manifold pressure or redline the tachometer, blame inaccurate engine tachometers for the failures, and blame pilots for exceeding RPM limitations. However, these measures [did] not address the high vibrations generated from the undamped engine/propeller combination.” Pis.’ Resp. at 11. Plaintiffs presented expert testimony, letters Hartzell sent to the FAA, and Hartzell accident reports in support of their argument that Hartzell blamed other factors instead of disclosing the propeller/engine vibration problem. One of plaintiffs’ experts, Mr. Twa, stated in his affidavit that the measures recommended by Hartzell did “not address the high vibratory stress levels that [caused] the propellers to fail. It is Hartzell’s responsibility to both identify and quantify these high damaging stresses and provide an engineering design change to move these stresses out of the aircraft r.p.m. range, or eliminate them altogether.” Id. Ex. C (Twa Aff.) 11. In a report dated August 17, 1973, Hartzell noted that the aircraft required a placard and stated that “[i]f this placard is ignored by the pilot, the tachometer is incorrect, or the pilot reads the RPM incorrectly due to a parallax, then it would be possible to be operating in a high stressed area. This would accentuate a failure if the leading edge damage is present.” Id. Ex. U (Engineering Report 405) 4. Hartzell also concluded in another report involving the same propeller model that “also present were high vibratory stresses due to operation in objectionable RPM ranges.” Id. Ex. T (Engineering Report 506 dated July 8, 1977) at 1. In a November 10, 1976 letter to the FAA, Hartzell stated that “the cracks found in the 7666A-2 blades are primarily caused by inaccurate tachometers.” Id. Ex. V (Nov. 10, 1976 letter to FAA from R. Grimes, Hartzell President) at 2. Finally, plaintiffs claim the following statement in a Hartzell Service Bulletin blames propeller failures on pilots exceeding the operating limits imposed by the FAA: It has been found that these limits are being exceeded creating excessive stresses on the propeller, engine and even the aircraft structure. Shank failures are occurring which can only be due to higher stresses than tested. Ov-erspeeding is the most serious cause of high stresses because the centrifugal force is increased by the square of the RPM, and in many installations the vibratory stresses increase also. Id. Ex. S (Bulletin No. 118B dated Nov. 28,1977) at 1. C. OVERHAUL REQUIREMENTS Plaintiffs also claim that defendants’ overhaul procedures were inadequate to detect corrosion problems that were aggravated by the high vibrations. It is plaintiffs’ position that a corrosion pit was the “initiation point” for the fatigue fracture that caused the propeller failure at issue and a number of corrosion pits were not detected when the propeller was overhauled in 1989. Pls.’ Resp. at 17, Ex. A (McSwain Aff.) 10(r); Hartzell’s Mot. Ex. 1 (NTSB Report) at la. According to plaintiffs, “the combination of corrosion pits and high vibratory stresses created a condition conducive to blade cracking.” Id. at 15. Specifically, plaintiffs claim Hartzell’s procedures only addressed problems with the blade retention radius or blade shank and not the mid-blade. Id. at 15. Plaintiffs argue in their Supplemental Response that, from 1984 to 2000, Hart-zell’s overhaul manual did not require that any maintenance be performed on the accident propeller. According to plaintiffs, Hartzell Overhaul Manual 133B, issued in 1984, “only directed maintenance action to the ‘hard alloy propeller blades.’ ” Pis.’ Supp. Resp. at 8, Ex. E (TRW Hartzell Propeller Blade Repair Manual 133-B) at 29. Plaintiffs claim the accident propeller was constructed of an aluminum that was “not considered a hard alloy.” Id. at 8, Ex. F (McSwain Aff.) 8-12. Hartzell disputes this contention. First, Hartzell argues that plaintiffs took one page of the 1984 manual out of context and that the same manual also contained inspection requirements for all blades and that these instructions mandated the use of a lOx magnifying glass. Hartzell’s Combined Reply at 22, Ex. C (Hartzell Propeller Blade Repair Manual 133-B) at 62. In addition, Hartzell argues that in 1984 maintenance personnel were required to consult a number of different manuals to properly overhaul a propeller. Id. at 22-23. Plaintiffs also argue that Hartzell was “aware that the propeller material was subject to corrosion pitting.” “Rather than requesting that the FAA issue an AD mandating propeller airfoil blade preventative maintenance, in 1991, Hartzell convinced the FAA to relax the inspection interval for compliance with AD 77-12-06.” Pis.’ Resp. at 15. In this directive, the FAA mandated that the propellers be compression rolled, imposed new RPM restrictions, and changed some inspection requirements. Pis.’ Resp. at 15 & Exhibit J. Compression rolling, or “cold rolling,” involves rolling heavy steel rollers over the propeller blade to increase the strength of the propeller metal. Pis.’ Resp. at 5. In 1991, the FAA changed the interval for compliance with AD 77-12-06 from an inspection after every 2000 hours of time-in-service to an inspection after every 12,000 hours of time-in-service. Pis.’ Resp. at 16, Hartzell’s Mot. at Ex. IS (FAA Airworthiness Directive 77-12-06 Compliance Section). Hartzell disagrees with plaintiffs’ position that it convinced the FAA to relax AD 77-12-06 inspection requirements. In contrast, Hartzell claims that it expressed some concerns about the relaxation of this requirement in a letter to the FAA. “Hart-zell was concerned that the public might mistakenly think that the FAA’s ‘relaxation’ of the blade shank inspection requirement also applied to Hartzell specified overhauls.” Hartzell’s Mot. at 6, Ex. 11 (April 3, 1990 letter from R. Edinger, Hartzell Vice President, to FAA). According to Hartzell, its recommended overhaul period ranged from the lesser of 1000 hours of use or four calendar years in 1969 to the lesser of 2000 hours or 5 calendar years in 1986. Id. at 9, Ex. 17 (Hartzell Service Letter No. 61 dated May 9, 1969), Ex. 10 (Hartzell Service Letter 61R dated Feb. 28, 1992). Hartzell contends that its overhaul procedure was more comprehensive than the maintenance required by AD 77-12-06 because it contained steps for detecting corrosion in all areas of the blade, not just the shank. Id. With respect to this issue, Hartzell points to the fact that it obtained FAA approval to include a note in one of its service letters warning owners that its overhaul periods were not changed by the modification to the AD 77-12-06 maintenance intervals. Id. at 7, Ex. 12, Ex. 13, Ex. 14 (correspondence between FAA and Hartzell regarding notice in Hartzell service letter), Ex. 10 (Hartzell Service Letter 61R) at 3. Hartzell further argues that the propeller was not overhauled as frequently as recommended by Hartzell’s manuals. According to Hartzell, the aircraft’s maintenance records only contain two entriés related to propeller maintenance: (1) small nicks on the blade surface were filed out in 1978; and (2) the propeller was removed for compliance with AD 77-12-06 in 1989. Id. at 13, Ex. 27 (Excerpts from maintenance log). Hartzell claims that “under the applicable service guidelines for this propeller blade five or six overhauls should have been performed since Plaintiffs propeller blade was installed.” Hartzell’s Combined Reply at 2, Ex. A (Dep. of T. McCreary, Hartzell Air Safety Investigation Manager) at 25-26. D. 1989 PROPELLER OVERHAUL Maintenance work performed on the propeller in 1989 is the basis for plaintiffs’ claims against NEPS. In 1989, according to aircraft logs, the propeller was removed from the airplane for maintenance. The parties dispute what maintenance was done and who performed the maintenance. NEPS argues that “plaintiffs cannot prove that NEPS had any involvement whatsoever with the aircraft propeller that is the subject of the lawsuit.” NEPS’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“NEPS’s Mot.”) at 1. According to plaintiffs, the propeller was sent to NEPS in 1989 for both overhaul in accordance with Hartzell’s Overhaul Manual and maintenance required by AD 77-12-06. To substantiate this claim, plaintiffs provide maintenance records from the aircraft and the affidavit of Dr. Richard McSwain. The maintenance records, labeled “Airworthiness Directive Compliance Record” and “Airworthiness Directives,” contain an entry stating that AD-77-12-06 was preformed by “N.E. Propeller” in July of 1989. Pis.’ Mot. in Opp’n to NEPS’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pis.’ Opp’n to NEPS”) Ex. C (Airworthiness Directives), Ex. D (Airworthiness Directive Compliance Record). In addition, the flight log contains the following entry signed by J. Hardy: “removed Hartzell propeller for 77-12-06 AD — Accomplished by N.E. Propeller. See yellow tag back of this book — Reinstalled on A/C.” Id. Ex. E (Flight Log). As further evidence linking NEPS to the accident propeller, Dr. McSwain stated that his chemical analysis of the propeller revealed that both an overhaul and maintenance covered by AD 77-12-06 were performed. That conclusion was based on his finding that polyurethane paint was uniform in composition and appearance over the entire blade surface. Id. at Ex. A, McSwain Aff. 10(m), 10(n) & Ex. A. (Materials Engineering Report) at 5-6. According to Dr. McSwain, AD 77-12-06 only requires repainting the blade in the shank radius area, not the entire blade, leading him to conclude that both AD 77-12-06 maintenance and an overhaul were performed on the accident propeller in 1989. Id. 10(q). In his report, Dr. McSwain stated that “[t]he failure of [NEPS] to completely remove the corrosion pits from the subject Hartzell Y’ shank blade and to apply polyurethane paint over the corrosion pits made subsequent detection of the corrosion pitted condition unlikely.” Pis.’ Resp. at 4, Ex. A (McSwain Aff.) 10(r). He also opined that Hartzell’s inspection procedures were “inadequate to detect the pitting on the blade” because “the pits on surface of the subject Hartzell ‘Y’ shank blade were not detectable visually without magnification” and the Hartzell overhaul procedure did not require an inspection with magnification. Id. Ex. A (McSwain Aff.) 10(u), (McSwain Materials Engineering Report) 4.0(12), 4.0(19). In response, NEPS provided the affidavit and deposition of its President, Arthur D’Onofrio, stating that the company has no records dating back to 1989. NEPS’s Mot. at Ex. C (D’Onofrio Aff.) 5-8 & Ex. E (D’Onofrio Dep.) at 20, 41. NEPS also claims that the maintenance record entries relied upon by plaintiffs were not made by NEPS and the person whose name appears next to the entries, J. Hardy, is deceased and not subject to cross examination. Id. at 3 & Ex. C (D’Onofrio Aff.) 10. Plaintiffs contend that John Hardy, now deceased, a former employee of the Little Brook, Maine airport, was the airplane’s mechanic in 1989. According to plaintiffs, Hardy singed the logbook entries showing that the accident propeller was sent to “N.E. Propeller” for maintenance. Pis.’ Opp’n to NEPS at 9 & Ex. C (Airworthiness Directives Record), Ex. D (Airworthiness Directive Compliance Record), Ex. E (Flight Log). As evidence that this signature was Mr. Hardy’s, plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of Jean Hardy, John Hardy’s widow. Id. at Ex. J (Jean Hardy Aff.) 3. In her affidavit, she identifies the signatures and entries as those of her husband. Id. 3. She also states that her husband “dealt with New England Propeller Service.” Id. 4. III. DISCUSSION A. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT “[I]f the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law[,]” summary judgment should be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Supreme Court describes the summary judgment determination as “the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Therefore, “a motion for summary judgment must be granted unless the party opposing the motion can adduce evidence which, when considered in light of that party’s burden of proof at trial, could be the basis for a jury finding in that party’s favor.” J.E. Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 618 (3d Cir.1987). “[0]n summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ... must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-588, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)). The party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. “If reasonable minds can differ as to the import of proffered evidence that speaks to an issue of material fact, summary judgment should not be granted.” Gelover v. Lockheed Martin, 971 F.Supp. 180, 181 (E.D.Pa.1997). Evidence submitted with a motion for summary judgment must be in a form “as would be admissible at trial and thus must be ‘reducible to admissible evidence.’ ” Williams v. West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 466 (3d Cir.1989) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). “However, the Supreme Court has rejected the view that ‘the nonmoving party must produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.’” Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548). Evidence that is “capable of being admissible at trial” can be considered on a motion for summary judgment. Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 961 (3d Cir.1996). Thus, the Court may consider evidence that is not admissible in the submitted form if the party offering the evidence could satisfy the applicable admissibility requirements at trial. For example, “hearsay evidence produced in an affidavit opposing summary judgment may be considered if the out-of-court declarant could later present that evidence through direct testimony, i.e. ‘in a form that would be admissible at trial’ ” Williams, 891 F.2d at 466 n. 12. B. THE GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT OF 1994 (“GARA”) Hartzell argues that GARA bars plaintiffs’ claims because this suit was initiated more than eighteen years after the propeller was added to the aircraft. GARA provides: (a) In general. — Except as provided in subsection (b), no civil action for damages for death or injury to persons or damage to property arising out of an accident involving a general aviation aircraft may be brought against the manufacturer of the aircraft or the manufacturer of any new component, system, subassembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as manufacturer if the accident occurred— (1) after the applicable limitation period beginning on— (A) the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser or lessee, if delivered directly from the manufacturer; or (B) the date of first delivery of the aircraft to a person engaged in the business of selling or leasing such aircraft; or (2) with respect to any new component, system, subassembly, or other part which replaced another component, system, subassembly, or other part originally in, or which was added to, the aircraft, and which is alleged to have caused such death, injury, or damage, after the applicable limitation period beginning on the date of completion of the replacement or addition. GARA § 2(a). The “applicable limitation period” is eighteen years. GARA § 3(3). GARA is a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations prohibit lawsuits if a period of time has elapsed after an accident occurs or is discovered. Statutes of repose bar suits brought more than a certain period of time after a product is manufactured and delivered to the purchaser. Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 78 Cal.App.4th 681, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 124, 130 (2000). Hartzell asserts that the accident propeller was manufactured and installed on plaintiffs’ aircraft in 1974, and plaintiffs produce no evidence to dispute this contention. Hart-zell’s Mot. at 3-4. The accident occurred in 1999, twenty-five years after this installation. Thus, GARA bars a suit based on the propeller unless an exception to the general provisions applies. Plaintiffs offer two theories to explain why their suit is not barred by GARA. First, plaintiffs argue that Hartzell knowingly misrepresented pertinent information to the FAA and concealed material information from the FAA. GARA § 2(b). Second, plaintiffs present two arguments based on GARA’s “new parts” provision: (1) the eighteen year period began when Hartzell issued an overhaul manual in 1984; or (2) the period began when the propeller was overhauled in 1989. See GARA § 2(a)(2). If any one of these arguments is successful, the eighteen year statute of repose will not bar the plaintiffs’ action and summary judgment will be denied. C. GARA § 2(B): KNOWING MISREPRESENTATION, OR CONCEALMENT, OR WITHHOLDING EXCEPTION Plaintiffs claim that Hartzell’s intentional misrepresentations to the FAA or concealment or withholding of material information from the FAA should prevent Hartzell from seeking the protection of GARA’s statute of repose. GARA lists a number of exceptions to its restrictions on civil actions. Among others, GARA offers no repose if: [T] he claimant pleads with specificity the facts necessary to prove, and proves, that the manufacturer with respect to a type certificate for, or obligations with respect to continuing airworthiness of, an aircraft or a component, system, su-bassembly, or other part of an aircraft[,] knowingly misrepresented to the Federal Aviation Administration, or concealed or withheld from the Federal Aviation Administration, required information that is material and relevant to the performance or the maintenance or operation of such aircraft, or the component, system, subassembly, or other part, that is causally related to the harm which the claimant allegedly suffered[.] GARA § 2(b). To take advantage of what the Court will refer to as GARA’s “knowing misrepresentation or concealment or withholding” exception, plaintiffs must prove: (1) knowing misrepresentation, or concealment, or withholding; (2) of required information that is material and relevant; (3) that is causally related to the harm they suffered. See Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 923 F.Supp. 1453, 1456 (D.Wyo.1996). It is not sufficient for a plaintiff to allege that the aircraft was negligently designed. The plaintiff must offer evidence that the defendant knowingly misrepresented or concealed or withheld this design defect in communications with the FAA. See Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 929 F.Supp. 380, 384-85 (D.Wyo.1996). Plaintiffs produce evidence that they assert establishes knowing misrepresentation or concealment or withholding by Hartzell. First, they claim ER 213, a report submitted to the FAA in 1963, contained a number of misrepresentations. Second, they contend that Hartzell engaged in a decades long effort to conceal the misrepresentations in this report from the FAA, and in the process, either misrepresented or concealed the cause of numerous propeller failures in communications with the FAA. Hartzell objected to some of the evidence submitted in support of these arguments and filed two Motions in Limine to exclude evidence. 1. Hartzell’s Motions in Limine to Preclude Testimony of Dr. McSwain and Mr. Twa Because both of these Motions rely on similar arguments, they will be considered together. According to Hartzell, certain opinions of Dr. McSwain and Mr. Twa should be excluded because “they invade the province of this Court in rendering judgments on matters of law and the jury’s authority to determine the ultimate issue of intent.” Hartzell’s Mot. in Limine to Preclude Testimony of William Ray Twa (“Hartzell’s Twa Mot.”) at 2. “The [knowing misrepresentation or concealment or withholding] exception is factually driven and requires the jury, not an expert, to review and weigh all documents that may support a misrepresentation claim and determine whether Hartzell in fact misrepresented or concealed material to the FAA.” Id. at 3. “Under Rule 702, when ‘faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony ... the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact issue.’ ” ProtoComm Corp. v. Novell Advanced Servs., 171 F.Supp.2d 473, 476 (E.D.Pa.2001) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). “It is now well settled that this gatekeeping function extends beyond scientific testimony to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ knowledge.’ ” Id. (quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)). Although the proposed experts offer technical and specialized testimony, Hart-zell does not question their qualifications or the admissibility of their technical testimony. For example, “Hartzell does not challenge Mr. McSwain’s testing methods with respect to the Y-shank blade.” Hart-zell’s Mot. in Limine to Preclude Testimony of Richard H. McSwain (“Hartzell’s McSwain Mot.”) at 1. Hartzell only challenges the admissibility of opinions concerning its state of mind when it made statements to the FAA. Following the reasoning in In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1203, 2000 WL 876900, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9037 (E.D.Pa. June, 20, 2000), the Court concludes that intent is not a proper subject for expert testimony. As stated by the court in Diet Drugs, “[t]he question of intent is a classic jury question and not one for experts.” Id., 2000 WL 876900, *9, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9037 at *29 (quoting Voilas v. General Motors Corp., 73 F.Supp.2d 452, 464 (D.N.J.1999)). “If the witnesses’ bases for the opinions concerning improper intent come from other evidence such as letters, admissions of AHP officers or employees, or other admissible evidence, that is what the jury should hear and the question of AHP’s intent would flow from such evidence to be determined by the jury.” Id. (quoting City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chem. Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 565 (11th Cir.1998)). Moreover, “[e]ven if such an opinion was relevant, there are serious problems with the reliability of these opinions. The witnesses are qualified in particular scientific disciplines. These disciplines do not include knowledge or even experience in the manner in which corporations and the pharmaceutical marketplace react, behave or think regarding their non-scientific goals of maintaining a profit-making organization.... ” Id. at, 2000 WL 876900, **9-10, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9037, *28-29. Hartzell argues that Mr. Twa should not be able to testify that Hartzell “intentionally misled” the FAA, Hartzell’s Twa Mot. at 1, and that he cannot render an opinion “as to the alleged state of mind of Hartzell.” Id. at 3. For example, Hartzell objects to Mr. Twa’s statement that Hartzell “knew” the vibratory stresses caused by the engine/propeller combination exceeded permissible limits and “intentionally misled” the FAA that this combination was safe. Pis.’ Resp. Ex. C (Twa Aff.) at 8, 15. According to Hartzell, in order to make this judgment, Mr. Twa would need to review every piece of correspondence between Hartzell and the FAA from 1960 to the present and be privy to all phone calls, meetings, and other communication between the parties. Hart-zell’s Twa Mot. at 3. With respect to Dr. McSwain, Hartzell argues that “his belief that the FAA was misled is a factual issue, not one that requires scientific or technical knowledge.” Hartzell’s McSwain Mot. at 4. “Hartzell seeks to preclude Richard McSwain from providing opinion testimony on Hartzell’s alleged misrepresentations for the same reason set forth in its Motion to Preclude William Twa. Mr. McSwain should not be allowed to offer his impressions as to whether Hartzell misled the FAA as said testimony invades the province of this Court in rendering judgments of law and the authority of the jury in determining the ultimate, issues in this case.” Id. at 4. Moreover, Dr. McSwain has “absolutely no experience in providing assessments and evaluations of fraud/misrepresentation claims.” Hartzell’s Reply to Pis.’ Opp’n to Mot. to Preclude Testimony of McSwain at 2. Specifically, Hartzell objects to Dr. McSwain’s conclusion that the combination of, inter alia, the accident blade material and “inadequate inspection procedures” combined to “mislead the FAA concerning the continued airworthiness of the subject blade” and argues that Dr. McSwain “does not explain how this alleged combination of events evidences a misrepresentation to the FAA.” Id. at 4, 6. The Court concludes that the experts’ experience in metallurgy, propeller design, propeller maintenance, and FAA reporting requirements does not qualify them to testify as to the subjective intent of Hartzell employees. However, this does not mean that these experts should be precluded from testifying about such matters as what Hartzell’s vibration tests revealed or what information should have been disclosed to the FAA. Thus, in deciding the pending motions, the Court will not rely on either expert’s statements regarding Hartzell’s state of mind or scienter, but it will consider their opinions about matters that are within their areas of specialized knowledge — for example, whether the results of Engineering Report 213 show that stresses exceeded allowable limits. This ruling is without prejudice to Hartzell’s right to object to questions put to the experts and other evidence offered by the experts at trial. Hartzell also claims that the experts did not rely on all the facts in evidence when forming their opinions. “Determinations regarding the weight to be accorded, and the sufficiency of, the evidence relied upon by the proffered expert are within the sole province of the jury.” Walker v. Gordon, 46 Fed.Appx. 691, 695 (3d Cir.2002). In Walker, the Third Circuit affirmed this Court’s decision not to grant a Daubert hearing to a plaintiff who made an argument similar to Hartzell’s because what the plaintiff was arguing in the Motion — the failure of an expert to rely on all of the evidence in the case — was “a proper subject for cross examination.” Id. Plaintiffs’ experts alleged failure in this case to consider all facts in evidence is not a basis for exclusion of their testimony. 2. Evidence of Knowing Misrepresentation Plaintiffs claim that ER 213, a report Hartzell was required to submit to the FAA to receive a type certificate for the propeller, contains several knowing misrepresentations. See supra § 11(A); Pis.’ Resp. at 8 & Exhibit L (ER 213). “A type certificate is a certificate issued by a government agency to an aircraft or component part manufacturer to reflect the agency’s determination that the aircraft or component part meets applicable regulatory standards.” Bain v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 167 F.Supp.2d 932, 939 (E.D.Tex.2001). It is plaintiffs’ position that the written summary of the graphs attached to ER 213 contains three specific misrepresentations. First, plaintiffs claim that “Hartzell knew that the accident model propeller when used in conjunction with the IO-360-A1A [the accident engine] experienced damaging vibratory stresses which exceeded permissible limits.” Pis.’ Resp. at 9 & Exhibit C (Twa Affidavit) 8. Second, plaintiffs state that Hartzell knew this aircraft needed dampers, and Hart-zell’s statement that a dampened engine could lead to higher stress was a misrepresentation. Id. at 9. Third, plaintiffs contend that Hartzell knew a placard was necessary to warn pilots about operating at certain propeller speeds to avoid exceeding allowable stress levels. Pis.’ Resp. at 10 & Exhibit M (Statement of Compliance of Aircraft or Aircraft Components With the Civil Air Regulations). a. High Vibratory Stresses With respect to the first alleged misrepresentation, which relates to vibratory stresses, Hartzell does not dispute that, according to the graphs appended to ER 213, the vibratory stresses on the propeller exceeded the allowable limits whereas the report summary stated that measured stress was “approximately” the allowable value. At oral argument, Hartzell’s counsel admitted that “in certain conditions measured vibratory stresses ... exceeded the maximum allowable stress limits of the propeller.” Tr. at 60-61. However, Hart-zell argues that the graphs were included with the report, so the FAA would have been able to make this determination itself. Id. Plaintiffs respond by arguing that providing the graphs was inadequate, especially when the engineers at the FAA who reviewed the document were not familiar with propeller engineering. Id. at 131. The Court finds that Hartzell’s statement that the measured stresses were “approximately” the allowable value is not equivalent to a statement that these stresses exceeded the allowable levels. Specifically, the evidence presented raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hartzell’s statement that the peak stresses reached “approximately the allowable value” during the vibration test was a misrepresentation. The inclusion of the graphs and the summary in the report are relevant to the jury’s determination of whether Hartzell made this statement knowingly, but it does not correct the misstatement as a matter of law. b. Dampers Plaintiffs also claim Hartzell falsely represented in ER 213 that “the use of an undamped engine lessened the probability of the existence of a dangerous condition.” Tr. at 130; Pis.’ Resp. at 10. According to plaintiffs, “[Hartzell] knew that vibration dampers were critical to the prevention of failed propeller blades.” Tr. at 130. As evidence of this misrepresentation, plaintiffs provided a letter from Hartzell in which Hartzell suggested installing dampers on a different aircraft to reduce stress. Pis.’ Resp. at 10 & Exhibit N (April 13, 1972 letter from David Bier-mann, Hartzell President, to FAA). In response, Hartzell argues that the recommendation to use dampers, applied to a different aircraft, with a different propeller and a different engine, nine years after the statement in ER 213, without more, is not evidence that Hartzell knew dampers would reduce stresses on the accident aircraft propeller when it submitted ER 213. Hartzell’s Combined Reply at 17. In ER 213, Hartzell states that an engine with dampers that become worn could produce higher stresses, not that dampers increase stress. Pis.’ Resp. at Ex. L (ER 213). A 1977 letter from Hartzell to the FAA discussing three incidents of past propeller failure clarifies Hartzell’s statement in ER 213. According to the letter, “[djamper systems are very intricate and must be maintained like a watch. There isn’t a propeller made that can withstand the punishment of a detuned system.” Pis.’ Resp. at Ex. R (Letter from R.V. Grimes, Hartzell President, to the FAA). There is no evidence that Hartzell’s statement about dampers was a misrepresentation. Specifically, plaintiffs have not produced evidence to refute Hartzell’s statement that worn dampers can produce higher stresses. Thus, plaintiffs have not raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether this statement was a misrepresentation. c. Placards Finally, plaintiffs argue that, despite Hartzell’s statement to the contrary in ER 213, placards were necessary to warn against operation at certain speeds. Plaintiffs contend that operating restrictions imposed by the FAA after certification demonstrate that Hartzell’s statement was a misrepresentation. Tr. at 110. On this issue, as discussed in Section 11(A) of this Memorandum, there is evidence that the FAA required the tachometers of planes equipped with the accident model propeller and engine to be marked in red in order to signify an operating restriction and later required the installation of a placard in addition to this marking. According to Hartzell, the FAA mandated the installation of a placard in response to Hartzell’s Service Bulletin 118A, which contained a requirement for the installation of a similar placard. Hartzell’s Mot. at 11, Ex. 7 (SB 118A) at 2. Hartzell also claims that the FAA’s initial decision to mark the tachometer in red was based on analysis and testing performed by Hart-zell. Hartzell’s Combined Reply at 18, Pis.’ Supp. Resp. Ex. A (Edinger Dep.) at 85. In response, plaintiffs argue that Mooney, not Hartzell, originally recommended marking the tachometer. Tr. at 93. The operating restrictions imposed by the FAA raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hartzell’s statement concerning operating restriction placards in ER 213 was a misrepresentation. Any later efforts Hartzell may have made to correct this misrepresentation by asking the FAA to impose operating limits do not cure the initial misrepresentation as a matter of law. d. Required Information In order to satisfy the second requirement of the GARA “knowing misrepresentation or concealment or withholding” exception, plaintiffs must show that Hartzell was required to submit the documents that allegedly contained misrepresentations to the FAA. To receive a type certificate, Hartzell had to conduct a vibration test and submit this test to the FAA. Civil Air Regulations (“CAR”) § 14.152. Moreover, in order to receive a type certificate, Hart-zell was required to “establish the propeller operating limitations as chosen by the applicant” based on the results of this and other tests. 14 C.F.R. § 14.16 (1963). Thus, Hartzell’s statement as to operating restrictions was also required. Based on this evidence, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have satisfied the “required information” element of the knowing misrepresentation test with respect to the alleged misrepresentations contained in ER 213. Finally, plaintiffs argue that Hartzell was able to mislead the FAA because Hartzell had Delegated Option Authority (“DOA”) at the time the propeller was certified and was able to “stand in the shoes” of the FAA in approving the propeller for certification. Pis.’ Resp. at 6-7. As noted in Section 11(A) of this Memorandum, the parties dispute whether the propeller was certified pursuant to this authority. It is not necessary for the Court to decide whether Hartzell certified the accident propeller pursuant to its DOA. To receive a type certificate, Hartzell was required to submit the vibration test and establish operating limitations, whether it had DOA or not. 14 C.F.R. § 14.152 (1963). Hartzell’s DOA status is, however, relevant to plaintiffs’ concealment claims, and the parties agree that Hartzell had DOA during the time period of the alleged concealment. See infra § 111(C)(3)(d). e. Causally Related To satisfy the third requirement of GARA’s “knowing misrepresentation or concealment or withholding” exception, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the misrepresentations were causally related to the accident. In addressing this requirement, plaintiffs rely on Mr. Twa’s opinion that the graphs incorporated in ER 213 showed that the accident model propeller/engine combination “experienced damaging vibratory stresses ... within the normal engine r.p.m. operating ranges.” Pis.’ Resp. Ex. C (Twa Aff.) 8. These “excessive vibratory stresses that occur within the normal operating range, power range and airspeed limits of aircraft” were the “primary reasons” for propeller blade failures. Id. 11. At oral argument, Hartzell’s attorney argued in response that the high stresses identified in ER 213 are at the tip of the blade and these stresses are not related to stresses in the mid-blade region where, according to the NTSB Report, the propeller failed. On this issue, the graphs demonstrate that stresses measured by the two gauges on the tested propeller that were located on either side of the point of fracture on the failed propeller were less than the allowable limit. Tr. at 62, 69-71, 142-44. The strain gauge that measured stresses above the allowable limit in ER 213 was located at the 30 inch station, seven inches from the end of the blade. Pis.’ Resp. at Exhibit L (ER 213). According to the accident report, plaintiffs’ propeller separated at a point 27 inches from the tip of the blade. Pis.’ Resp. at 2. This part of the blade is between the location of two of the gauges used to measure stress in ER 213 — the 20 inch station, positioned 17 inches from the tip of the blade, and the 0 station, located at the blade shank. The stresses measured at these two locations, as reported in ER 213, were less than the allowable limit during testing. Pis.’ Resp. at Exhibit L (ER 213). Hartzell, however, presented no evidence that stress 7 inches from the tip of the blade (at the 30 inch station) is not related to stress at the point of failure or that the propeller failure at issue was not related to this stress. Mr. Twa opined that the high stresses identified by ER 213 are causally related to the failure of plaintiffs’ propeller and Hartzell presented no evidence to the contrary. Specifically, Hartzell presented no evidence that the propeller failure at issue was not related to stress at the point seven inches from the tip of the blade (at the 30 inch station) on the ER 213 graphs. Thus, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have presented a genuine issue of material fact on this issue. f. Evidence of Scienter Hartzell’s final argument is that plaintiffs have not satisfied the “strict scienter requirement” set forth in GARA’s “knowing misrepresentation” exception. Hart-zell’s Mot. at 19. According to Hartzell, “Plaintiffs Response omits the critical scienter re