Full opinion text
Order RE: Claim Construction KLAUSNER, District Judge. I. Background Verizon California Inc. (“Verizon”) initiated the instant litigation seeking a declaratory judgment of patent non-infringement and invalidity as to certain patents owned by Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing, L.P. (“Katz”). Katz has filed counterclaims for patent infringement against Verizon. The sixteen patents at issue in this litigation are: U.S. Patent Nos. 5,128,-984 (“the ’984 patent”); 5,351,285 (“the ’285 patent”); 5,561,707 (“the ’707 patent”); 5,684,863 (“the ’863 patent”); 5,787,156 (“the ’156 patent”); 5,815,551 (“the ’551 patent”); 5,828,734 (“the ’734 patent”); 5,898,762 (“the ’762 patent”); 5,917,893 (“the ’893 patent”); 5,974,120 (“the ’120 patent”); 6,044,135 (“the ’135 patent”); 6,148,065 (“the ’065 patent”); 6,292,547 (“the ’547 patent”); 6,335,965 (“the ’965 patent”); 6,349,134 (“the ’134 patent”); and 6,434,223 (“the ’223 patent”). Due to the large number of patents and claims at issue, on September 25, 2002, the Court ordered Katz to identify no more than three representative claims per patent for its infringement case and no more than twenty claims for a claim construction hearing. Katz identified twenty representative claims from eleven of the sixteen patents at issue. Pursuant to the Court’s order of February 14, 2003, the number of representative claims for consideration by this Court at the Markman hearing, however, has been reduced to sixteen claims from ten of the patents at issue. The remaining representative claims are: claims 81 and 94 of the ’734 patent; claim 107 of the ’223 patent; claims 58, 66 and 67 of the ’120 patent; claims 3 and 68 of the ’285 patent; claim 66 of the ’893 patent; claims 31 and 44 of the ’863 patent; claim 21 of the ’551 patent; claim 69 of the ’762 patent; claims 1 and 13 of the ’065 patent; and claim 5 of the ’134 patent. A claims construction hearing was conducted on May 19, 2003. By this order the Court construes the disputed claim language. Each disputed term or phrase is set forth below followed by the Court’s claim construction analysis of the disputed terms or phrases. As there are many issues of interpretation for the Court to decide, this order sets forth the Court’s interpretation of just the disputed claim language. Except as provided in this Order, the Court adopts the parties’ interpretations of the undisputed claim language detailed in the Joint Claims Construction and Prehearing Statement. II. Patent Claim Construction Standard Interpretation of patent claims is a question of law allocated to the Court. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 1396, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). “In the exercise of that duty, the trial judge has an independent obligation to determine the meaning of the claims, notwithstanding the views asserted by the adversary parties.” Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1555 (Fed.Cir.1995). In construing claims, the analytical focus must begin and remain centered on the language of the claims themselves, for it is that language that the patentee chose to use to “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the patentee regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2001). “It is well-settled that, in interpreting an asserted claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification, and, if in evidence, the prosecution history.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996). The District Court may also look to “extrinsic” evidence, such as expert testimony, to educate itself about the technology at issue. Generally, expert testimony should only be considered “an aid to the court in coming to a correct conclusion as to the true meaning of the language employed in the patent,” Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 n.3 (Fed.Cir.1998), and should not be used to add to, detract from, or vary the scope of the claims. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. The Federal Circuit recognizes a “heavy presumption” that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning, as determined from the standpoint of one of ordinary skill in the relevant art. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed.Cir.2002); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed.Cir.2002); Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed.Cir.1999). If the claim language is clear on its face, the court must nevertheless review the remaining intrinsic evidence to determine whether deviating from the ordinary meaning of a claim term is appropriate. Interactive Gift Express, 256 F.3d at 1331. If, however, the claim language is ambiguous, the Federal Circuit instructs that the remaining intrinsic evidence may be consulted to possibly resolve the ambiguity. Id. Means-Plus-Function Limitations An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. In other words, section 112, ¶ 6 operates to restrict claim limitations drafted in purely functional language to those structures disclosed in the specification, and their structural equivalents, that perform the recited function. See Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. Int'l Trade Com’n, 161 F.3d 696, 703 (Fed.Cir.1998). In determining whether to apply the limiting effects of section 112, ¶ 6, the presence of the word “means” in the claim triggers a presumption that the inventor used the term to invoke the statutory strictures of section 112, ¶ 6, York Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor, 99 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed.Cir.1996), while the absence of “means” creates a presumption that section 112, paragraph 6 does not apply, see Mas-Hamilton Group v. La-Gard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1213 (Fed.Cir. 1998). These presumptions, however, may be rebutted if the evidence intrinsic to the patent and any relevant extrinsic evidence warrant such a conclusion. Id.; see also Envirco Corp. v. Clestra Cleanroom, Inc., 209 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2000) (“baffle means” connotes sufficient structure to avoid application of § 112, ¶ 6). In deciding whether either presumption has been rebutted, the analysis focuses on whether the claim, as properly construed, recites sufficiently definite structure for performing the recited function to avoid application of section 112, ¶ 6. Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 704; Mas-Hamilton, 156 F.3d at 1213; see also Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed.Cir.1999); Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 1364 (Fed.Cir.2003). In construing means-plus-function claim limitations, a court must first define the particular function claimed. Thereafter, the court must identify “the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification.” Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 250 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2001). In construing a means-plus-function element, “a court may not import functional limitations that are not recited in the claim, or structural limitations from the written description that are unnecessary to perform the claimed function.” Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. Coating Machinery Systems, Inc., 239 F.3d 1225, 1233 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citing Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed.Cir.1999)). In addition, the specification must be read as a whole to determine the structure capable of performing the claimed function. Harley-Davidson, 250 F.3d at 1379. However, “structure disclosed in the specification is ‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed.Cir.1997). Claim Preambles “[A] claim preamble has the import that the claim as a whole suggests for it.” Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed.Cir.1995). A claim preamble may limit the scope of the claimed invention, where it recites a structural limitation rather than a statement of purpose or intended use. Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478-79 (Fed.Cir.1997); Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed.Cir.1989). However, “[w]here a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention, the preamble is not a claim limitation.” Rowe, 112 F.3d at 478 (citing Vitalink, 55 F.3d at 620-21). Cf. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479 (Fed.Cir.1994) (“[T]erms appearing in a preamble may be deemed limitations of a claim when they ‘give meaning to the claim and properly define the invention.’ ”) (citations omitted). The determination of whether a claim preamble recites a structural limitation or merely a statement of purpose or intended use requires “review of the entirety of the patent to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass by the claim.” Corning Glass Works, 868 F.2d at 1257; see also Rowe, 112 F.3d at 478 (inquiry requires examination of “entire patent record to determine what invention the patentee intended to define and protect.”); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1479 (stating that court must determine whether inventors intended the preamble to represent additional structural limitations or “mere introductory language”); Bell Communications, 55 F.3d at 621 (holding that definition of “packet” in preamble constituted claim limitation when packet incorporated by reference in claim body). See also E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F.Supp. 680, 702 (D.Del.1995) (examining prosecution history to determine effect of preamble); see also Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 866 (Fed.Cir.1985) (examining claims, specification and prosecution history), overruled on other grounds by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed.Cir.1998). III. Effect of the At & T Order Katz urges the Court to adopt the construction of certain disputed claims terms set forth in Katz v. AT & T Corp., 63 F.Supp.2d 583 (E.D.Pa.1999) (“the AT & T Order”). Both parties recognize that the AT & T Order does not enjoy issue-preclusive effect at least as asserted against Verizon, a non-participant in that litigation. See Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1396 (“But whereas issue preclusion could not be asserted against new and independent infringement defendants even within a given jurisdiction, treating interpretive issues as purely legal will promote (though it will not guarantee) intrajurisdictdonal certainty through the application of stare decisis on those questions not yet subject to interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority of the single appeals court.”). Furthermore, the AT & T Order has limited stare decisis effect, given that it emanates from a Federal District Court in a separate jurisdiction. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Linear Technologies Corp., 182 F.Supp.2d 580, 589 (E.D.Tex.2002). However, to the extent that the AT & T Order addresses identical or similar issues of claims construction, it can be viewed as persuasive and highly relevant, rather than binding, authority. See id. at 589-90. Granting such an effect to the AT & T Order balances Markman’s recognition of the importance of “uniformity in the treatment of a given patent,” 116 S.Ct. at 1396, with fairness to Verizon. IV. Construction of Representative Claims The remaining representative claims in the present case fall into three categories: 1) the Dual Call Mode and Cue Suppression Patents, including claims 81 and 94 of the ’734 patent, claim 107 of the ’223 patent, and claims 58, 66 and 67 of the ’120 patent; 2) the Conditional Interface Patents, including claims 3 and 68 of the ’285 patent, and claim 66 of the ’893 patent; and 3) the Format Qualification Patents, including claims 31 and 44 of the ’863 patent; claim 21 of the ’551 patent; claim 69 of the ’762 patent; claims 1 and 13 of the ’065 patent; and claim 5 of the ’134 patent. The patents in each category share the same written description and drawings. Accordingly, references and analysis as to one patent in a given category apply equally to the other patents in that category. A. Dual Call Mode and Cue Suppression Patent Claims The Dual Call Mode and Cue Suppression Patents generally involve interactive voice response systems that provide communication between callers using telephones and computer systems including audio response units. The term “Dual Call Mode” refers to the ability of the interactive voice response system disclosed in these patents to handle a variety of call modes, such as toll-free calls, charge calls, and area code calls. As the “Background” section of the patents describe, it is often desirable to treat callers differently depending on the call mode they use. For example, it may be desirable to limit “800” callers to a given number of accesses, while at the same time permitting an unlimited number of accesses to “900” (ie., charged) callers. The patents refer to this initial screening process as “qualification,” the meaning of which the parties vigorously contest. The term “Cue Suppression” refers to the ability of the Katz system to handle repeat callers and avoid asking any questions that were previously provided to them. In general terms, the Katz system stores the numbers associated with the callers and identifiers for questions previously posed to them. If a caller returns, the Katz system selects a question and then accesses the stored data to determine whether the question was previously provided to the caller. If the question was not previously posed to the caller, the Katz system releases the question and stores the question identifier in association with the caller’s telephone number. The representative Dual Call Mode and Cue Suppression Patent Claims are claims 81 and 94 of the ’734 patent, claim 107 of the ’223 patent, and claims 58, 66 and 67 of the ’120 patent. A.l. U.S. Patent No. 5,828,734 A.l.a. Whether Terms in the Preamble are Claim Limitations Verizon alleges that the term “plurality of interactive operating process formats” constitutes a claim limitation as the body of claim 81 specifically incorporates this limitation by reference. The term “plurality of interactive operating process formats” appears to be a claim limitation, as the body of claim 81 incorporates it by reference. See Bell Communications, 55 F.3d at 621. Specifically, the digital signals associated with a call “identify one of said plurality of interactive operating process formats.” ’734 patent, Col. 18:10-11 (emphasis added). However, the Court notes that the preamble does not qualify the term “interactive operating process format” or “plurality of interactive operating process format” any further than the body of the claim. A.l.b. “format” and “interactive operating process format” Katz’s and Verizon’s asserted interpretations of “interactive operating process format” are almost identical. Verizon contends, however, that “format” requires a single computer program operative to interact with callers, while Katz alleges that “format” may include a plurality of linked computer programs. The term “interactive operating process format” means a call process flow implemented by at least one computer program that sets forth the content and sequence of steps to gather information from and convey information to callers through prerecorded prompts and messages. The call process flow, according to the Court’s interpretation, may be implemented by several linked or independently-executable computer programs. Webster’s defines “format,” in relevant part, as “a general plan of organization or arrangement (as of a television show).” See Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 485 (9th ed.1991). “Format” or “interactive operating process format,” in the context the ’734 patent provides, appears to refer to an interactive process implemented in computer program code, while a “plurality of interactive operating process formats” refers to multiple interactive processes, each implemented in computer program code. Specifically, the Court’s review of the ’734 patent specification suggests that a format refers to the call process flow itself, regardless of whether the call process flow is embodied in one or several computer programs. See ’734 patent, Col. 3:20-23 (“calls are selectively accepted and interfaced so as to accomplish a desired operating format, for example, a contest or a game.”); Col. 5:34-36 (“assume that the system CS is programmed to accommodate a relatively simple game format, that is, a sponsored contest for the promotion of a product.”). In addition, that the processing of calls is distributed among different components in the system disclosed in the ’734 patent also suggests that a “format” can be implemented by more than one computer program. Lastly, the language and structure of claim 81 of the ’734 patent does not suggest a contrary interpretation. Verizon’s asserted interpretation is unnecessary to resolve the alleged ambiguity resulting from Katz’ interpretation of “format.” A.l.c. “digital signals including DNIS” Verizon alleges that “digital signals including DNIS” should be interpreted to mean “signals or data that indicates the number called.” Verizon Brief at 17. Katz disagrees with the term “indicate” in Verizon’s interpretation, preferring use of “identify.” The term “digital signals including DNIS” means digital signals or data that identify the number called. DNIS appears to be a commonly understood acronym in the art for Dialed Number Identification Service, a service that identifies a dialed number. See Hopenfeld 1/31/03 Decl. Ex. B. The passages in the specification cited by Verizon do not compel adoption of its asserted interpretation. Moreover, the description in the ’734 patent of both DNIS and ANI technologies as “indicating” a dialed and calling number, respectively, suggests that Katz used the term “indicate” in a manner synonymously with “identify.” See ’734 patent, Col. 57-62 (“For example, the so-called ‘ANF telephone equipment provides digital signals indicating a caller’s telephone number. Equipment designated ‘DNIS’ is similarly available to indicate the called number. Thus, digital signals may be provided tele-phonically to a system associated with individual calling terminals as for identification or other use.”) (emphasis added). A.l.d. “first/second response unit means” Despite the use of “means” language, the parties appear to agree that the term “response unit means” connotes sufficiently definite structure to avoid the in-terpretational mandates of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. In addition, both parties agree that “response unit means” is an audio response unit. See Verizon Brief at 18:8-10; Katz Brief at 26:26-27. Verizon asserts, however, that the first and second response unit means must be embodied in physically separate structures. See Verizon Brief at 18. While the claim language requires two functionally distinct response units, the claim language does not appear to require that the first and second response unit means reside in physically separate structures. See Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2001) (refusing to interpret “portion” as requiring separate structures, where disclosed embodiments featured physically separate parts, but plain meaning of “portion” encompassed both separate and integral parts). The specification of the ’734 patent appears to be consistent with this interpretation. See ’734 patent, Col. 4:3-13 (“three separate audio response units are illustrated ... Alternatively, a single composite unit might be utilized.”). Verizon points to nothing in the specification or prosecution history of the ’734 patent that requires deviating from the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms to require that the first and second response unit means be embodied in physically separate structures. A.l.e. “voice generator means” Katz identifies an apparent dispute between the parties as to the proper interpretation of voice generator means in claim 81 of the ’734 patent. Verizon, however, does not appear to address Katz’s contention. In any event, the Court adopts the construction of voice generator means set forth in the Joint Claims Construction and Prehearing Statement. See Moore 1/14/03 Decl. Ex. 13 at 1. A.l.f. “qualification means” and “qualifying” The parties agree that “qualification means” in claim 81 of the ’734 patent is a means-plus-function element. They disagree, however, as to the meaning of the term “qualifying” and the structure corresponding to the qualification means disclosed in the specification. Part of the recited function of the qualification means is “qualifying ... calls ... received by said first response unit to provide qualified calls.” ’734 patent, Col. 18:15-19. Claim 81 further requires “means for processing qualified calls ... and calls received by said second response unit.” Specifically, Verizon contends that “qualifying,” as used in the qualification means element, means “determining whether a caller is allowed to proceed or the call is aborted.” Verizon Brief at 20. Katz, on the other hand, alleges that “qualifying” means “assessing or determining whether a caller is entitled to access or use one or more operations of a format.” Katz Brief at 29. The term “qualifying” means “determining or assessing whether a call meets one or more conditions or requirements.” Thus, “qualified calls” are “calls that meet the condition(s) or requirement(s) imposed by the qualification means.” None of the parties’ claims construction briefs proffers a dictionary or plain meaning for “qualifying” or “qualified.” See Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed.Cir.2002) (“Dictionaries are always available to the court to aid in the task of determining meanings that would have been attributed by those of skill in the relevant art to any disputed terms used by the inventor in the claims.”). Webster’s defines “qualified” as 1 b: having complied with the specific requirements or precedent conditions (as for an office or employment): ELIGIBLE See Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary at 963. In addition, Webster’s defines “qualify,” in relevant part, as “to declare competent or adequate: CERTIFY.” Id.; see also Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1203 (must consult intrinsic record to determine “which of the different possible dictionary meanings of the claim terms in issue is most consistent with the use of the words by the inventor.”). Here, claim 81 and the specification of the ’734 patent appear to use the term “qualifying” and “qualified” in a manner consistent with the definitions set forth above. See, e.g., ’734 patent, Col. 4:61-63 (“the unit 18 in cooperation with the memory 32 operates with the control unit 28 to qualify acceptable calls in the ‘800’ mode.”); Col. 7:29-31 (“If the control unit 28 validates the qualification number ‘34726313’, it is recorded in the free-call memory 32 for future checking against repeat use.”). In addition, part of the function of the “qualification means” is “to provide qualified calls” but does not state or require that non-qualified calls are aborted. Neither the specification nor any portions of the prosecution history cited by Verizon suggests a contrary meaning for “qualifying” or “qualified.” The interpretations asserted by both parties appear to import limitations from the specification into the disputed claim language. Verizon’s asserted requirement that the qualification means must either accept or abort a call impermissibly injects the features of the preferred embodiment into the claim language. The plain meaning of the functional claim language, however, does not suggest or require any consequence that attaches to qualified or non-qualified calls. Verizon’s reliance on Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258 (Fed.Cir.2001), is inapposite, as “qualifying” is not sufficiently broad or amorphous that the scope of the claim language can be reconciled only with recourse to the written description. 262 F.3d at 1269 - 1270. Furthermore, the treatment of “qualifying” and “qualified” in the ’734 patent specification does not necessarily require that non-qualifying calls be aborted. Cf. id. at 1270 (“mode,” by implication, did not encompass line rate, since specification consistently referred to mode and line rate as separate and distinct concepts). Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 199 F.3d 1295 (Fed.Cir.1999), is also distinguishable since the ’734 patent specification contains no “clear statements of scope” as to the terms “qualify” and “qualified.” See Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1326 -1327 (distinguishing Toro). Moreover, the ’734 patent does not appear to state that aborting non-qualified callers was important to the invention. Rather, the ’734 patent states that it is merely “important to regulate the use of the “800” calling mode” and to “control and limit” the potentially large number of calls in a free area code dialing mode. See ’734 patent, Col. 2:18-34. Furthermore, nothing in the specification or the prosecution history, cited by the parties, expresses an intent to disclaim a broader meaning for the terms qualified or qualifying. See Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2003) (distinguishing Wang Labs., Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377 (Fed.Cir.1999)). Similarly, Katz’ asserted interpretation similarly crosses the line as the claim language defining the function of the qualification means does not necessarily involve any decision-making relating to access to any given format or operation associated with a format. Rather, the qualification means merely “qualifies calls” to “provide qualified calls.” As to structure corresponding to the qualification means, the ’734 patent clearly links response unit 18, control unit 28, free call memory 32, and required software as performing the claimed function. As to Katz contentions, while it appears that the alternative structures identified by Katz could perform the function associated with the qualification means, the ’734 patent fails to clearly link these structures to the function of qualifying calls in a toll free call mode. For example, coincidence detector 42 functions to qualify questions based on calling number, not the calls themselves. Similarly, coincidence detector and storage unit 34 operates in connection with audio control unit 20 to qualify calls in the area code calling mode. As to Verizon’s contentions, the ’734 patent does not clearly link the lines between the components identified above as being necessary to the function performed by the qualification means. Indeed, it appears that one skilled in the art would understand these lines as indicating the flow of data between functional components, rather than physical transmission lines. A.l.g. “means for processing qualified calls” The parties agree that the “means for processing” element is a means-plus-function element, but disagree as to the meaning of the functional language associated with the element, as well as the structure that corresponds to it. A.l.g.l. “processing qualified calls” According to Verizon, the claim language requires that the calls received by the first response unit are qualified before the common processing operations. Katz contends that the plain meaning of the functional language expresses no such requirement. The functional language “processing-qualified calls” requires that the calls be qualified prior to execution of common processing operations. This interpretation is consistent with the claim language, as the qualification means provides “qualified calls,” while the “means for processing” processes “qualified” calls. This is also consistent with the specification of the ’734 patent which teaches a preliminary qualification phase and a common interface format phase, where qualified calls are coupled to the interface processor. See, e.g., ’734 patent, Col. 4:21-25 (“Accordingly, with overall supervision by the control unit 28, the audio response units 18, 20 and 22 answer and preliminarily qualify callers from the terminals Tl-TN for connection through the coupler 24 to the interface processor 26.”); Col. 4:66-67 (“The audio response unit 22' accepts calls without initial qualification.”); Col. 8:27-29 (“With the entry of a call into the common phase, the line carrying the call is connected through the coupler 24 (FIG.l) to the interface processor 26.”). Moreover, Katz, during prosecution, appears to have distinguished the claimed invention on this basis. See Rooklidge 1/31/03 Decl. Ex. 1 (“Applicant’s claims are distinct from Gordon because Gordon does not show receiving calls by one response unit and coupling those calls after qualification %oith calls received by another response unit”) (emphasis in original). A.l.g.2. “said calls received by said second response unit” Verizon alleges that “said calls received by second response unit” means all calls received by the second response unit. Verizon Brief at 24. Katz does not appear to dispute this interpretation. The Court adopts Verizon’s asserted interpretation as it appears to be correct. A.l.g.3. “concurrent processing” Verizon alleges that “concurrent processing” means “processing at the same time.” Verizon Brief at 24. “Concurrent processing,” according to Katz, means “processing two or more calls in parallel.” Based on the parties’ comments, at the Claims Construction Hearing, concerning their asserted interpretations of “concurrent processing,” the parties appear to agree on the substance or essential meaning of “concurrent processing,” just not the words that should be used to further de-fíne it. The term “concurrent processing” means processing two or more calls at the same time or in parallel (simultaneously). The Court’s interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of the term. See Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary at 273 (defining concurrent as “operating or occurring at the same time ... running parallel”). The specification does not suggest a contrary interpretation. In fact, the written description of the ’734 patent uses the term only twice in unrelated contexts, but in a manner consistent with its ordinary meaning. See ’734 patent, Col. 8:61-64 (“In the disclosed embodiment, concurrently with the operation of further informing the caller, the interface processor 26 actuates the random number generator 40 to provide a random address for the question memory 38.”); Col. 9:37— 40 (“Note that in the interests of human perception, a printed record may be developed concurrently with the qualification of lottery participants.”). The Court’s interpretation is not intended to suggest that processing of calls associated with different formats must begin and end at the same time. See ’734 patent, Col. 8:27-38 (“With the entry of a call into the common phase, the line carrying the call is connected through the coupler 24 (FIG.l) to the interface processor 26. That is, depending on the call mode, the call is passed through one of the audio response units 18, 20 or 22 and the coupler 24 to the interface processor 26. Note that as indicated above, each of the audio response units 18, 20 and 22 is capable of accommodating a large number of asynchronous calls. Similarly, the coupler 24 is capable of connecting lines from the audio response units 18, 20 and 22 (LB1, LB 2 and LB3 respectively) to the interface processor on an individual basis through lines 37 and 39.”); Col. 8:39-41 (“The interface processor 26 may comprise a relatively substantial computing capability for processing many individual calls with programmed variations.”). A.l.g.4. “processing” Katz sets forth an interpretation for “processing” that Verizon does not appear to contest. Accordingly, the Court adopts the asserted interpretation that “processing” means “manipulation of data which performs some operation or sequence of operations on the data.” See AT & T Order at 611. A.l.g.5. “common processing” Katz also proffers a definition for “common processing” as meaning “processing in which the logic underlying certain of the content and/or sequence of steps of the formats are the same or shared.” Katz Brief at 36. Verizon does not offer a competing interpretation. The Court adopts Katz’s asserted interpretation to the extent it is consistent with the construction of the same limitation in the Joint Claim Construction and Prehear-ing Statement. See Moore 1/14/03 Decl. Ex. 13 at 3. A.l.g.6. Corresponding Structure As to the structure that corresponds to the “means for processing,” the parties’ dispute distills down to whether the corresponding structure includes the transmission lines that connect the structures that process calls. More specifically, according to Katz, the structure disclosed in the specification for “processing ... calls” includes “the control unit 28, interface processor 26, or coupler 24 in conjunction with any associated software.” Katz Brief at 37. Verizon contends, on the other hand, that the corresponding structure further comprises “the transmission lines connecting these structures.” Verizon Brief at 24. Katz responds that the lines set forth in the ’734 patent merely show flow of data and are not intended to describe or require any structural limitation. When the structure corresponding to a means-plus-function element encompasses two separate structural components connected by a communication line, the corresponding structure also includes the communication line. See Asyst Technologies, Inc. v. Empak, Inc., 268 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed.Cir.2001). Asyst Technologies is quite instructive as to this issue. In Asyst, the District Court held that the structure corresponding to a “second microcomputer means” limitation included a local control processor and a communication line extending to a second structure. 268 F.3d at 1370. The Federal Circuit reversed that determination, holding that the structure corresponding to the “second microcomputer means” did not extend to the communication line. The Federal Circuit reasoned that, although the communication line enabled the local control processor to function, the specification did not describe the communication line as performing any aspect of the recited function. Id. at 1370-71. In contrast, the Federal Circuit turned to another means-plus-function element-namely, a “fourth means,”that recited two functions corresponding to two separate components connected by the communication line. Id. at 1372. Notably, the Federal Circuit held that “[because the ‘fourth means’ encompasses both the local process controller 20 and the communication means 50, it also necessarily encompasses structure that connects the two, i.e., communication line 51.” Id. Asyst appears to control the instant situation. The parties agree, and the specification discloses, that the structure that performs the “means for processing” functions recited in claim 81 comprises control unit 28, interface processor 26, and coupler 24 in conjunction with associated software. The specification of the ’734 patent also implicates transmission lines 39 in the “means for processing” functions. See ’734 patent, Col. 4:50-53 (“Under control of the control unit 28, the coupler 24 connects individual lines 37 of the sets LB1, LB2 and LB3 to the processor 26 through lines 39.”); see also ’734 patent, Col. 8:28-39. As to other lines depicted in Figure 1 of the ’734 patent, the specification does not clearly link these lines to the recited function, as they are never specifically mentioned. Furthermore, it appears that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand such lines to illustrate the flow of data between functional components, rather than communication lines. Accordingly, the structure corresponding to the “means for processing” includes the control unit 28, interface processor 26, or coupler 24 in conjunction with any associated software, and the lines 39 between the coupler 24 and the interface processor 26. A.l.h. “audio control unit coupled to said voice generator means” Katz and Verizon agree that the “audio control unit” is a means-plus-function element. The parties disagree, however, as to the meaning of the claimed function and the scope of the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification. A.l.h.1. “providing a preliminary automated voice prompt to cue callers to interactively enter data under control of said digital signals (DNIS) to callers calling said one other of said plurality of distinct called numbers” The functional language set forth above, according to Verizon, requires that the audio control unit “provide prompts to callers that dialed the second distinct called number that ask the caller to enter a touch tone response based on the number dialed.” Verizon Brief at 25-26. Katz contends, however, that the functional language should not be limited to touch tone responses. Katz Brief at 39. The language set forth above requires that the audio control unit provide a voice prompt to callers that dialed the second distinct called number to provide a response based on the number dialed. The instant issue distills down to the proper interpretation of “to interactively enter data.” The plain and ordinary meaning of the term does not appear to be limited to touch tone responses. Verizon does not appear to allege otherwise, or that the plain meaning of the term renders the claim sufficiently ambiguous or amorphous to justify resort to the specification to define the term. Furthermore, although the specification of the ’734 patent discloses only a single mode for callers to enter data-ie., digital responses using push buttons-, the ’734 patent does not define the term “enter” either expressly or by implication. Moreover, the functional language appears to merely require providing prompts that cue callers to enter data, as opposed to receiving data entered by callers. A.l.h.2. “coupled” Verizon asserts that the term “coupled” means “separate from but oper-atively connected for electrical communication.” Verizon Brief at 25. According to Katz, no special construction of “coupled” is necessary. Katz, however, also provides a definition: “two things are coupled if they are associated in such a way that power or signal information may be transferred from one to another.” Katz Brief at 40. “Coupled” means associated in such a way that power or signal information may be transferred from one to another. It appears that one of ordinary skill in the art understands the term “coupled” to connote a broad range of associations between two things. The plain meaning of coupled, as understood by someone ordinarily skilled in the art, does not require that the “coupled” components be necessarily physically separate from one another. See Lu-cantoni 1/15/03 Decl. ¶¶ 6-8, & Exs. 2, 3; see also Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary at 298 (“couple” means “to join together for combined effect”). Verizon points to nothing in the specification or prosecution history of the ’734 patent that justifies deviating from the broad meaning of “coupled” as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. At the Claims Construction Hearing, Verizon alleged that two elements must have an interface between them to be “coupled” within the proper meaning of the term. Verizon’s contention, however, begs the question as to whether this interface must be physically defined or defined purely by software. A.l.h.3. “prior to execution of said common processing operations of said one and said another of said interactive process formats” Verizon alleges that the above-identified limitation requires that “the caller receives [the] preliminary automated voice prompts before any of the common processing operations for both formats.” Verizon Brief at 26. Katz contends, on the other hand, that the limitation merely requires that the prompt occurs prior to the “certain common processing operations” identified in connection with the “means for processing” element. Katz Brief at 41. The above-identified limitation appears to require only that the audio control unit provide the voice prompt prior to execution of the “certain common processing operations” identified in the “means for processing” element of claim 81. Specifically, the functional language corresponding to the “means for processing” element requires, by the language “at least certain common processing operations,” only a subset of common processing operations. “Said common processing operations” in the “audio control unit” element appears to refer to the “at least certain common processing operations” and, therefore, does not require that the voice prompt occur prior to any or all common processing operations. A.l.h.4. Corresponding Structure The structure corresponding to function performed by the audio control unit, Verizon contends, comprises “audio control [sic] unit 18, the control unit 28, the interface processor 26, the coupler 24, free call memory 32, the transmission lines connecting the identified structures and the software for performing the claimed function.” Verizon Brief at 26. Katz contends that the corresponding structure “includes any of the following structures and their equivalents: control unit 28, interface processor 26, coupler 24 and any associated software.” Katz Brief at 41. At the claims construction hearing, the parties appeared to agree that the corresponding structure comprises audio response unit 18 and control unit 28. In light of the Court’s interpretation of the functional language set forth above, the structure corresponding to the “audio control unit” must provide a preliminary voice prompt that cues callers, calling in a toll free mode, to enter data prior to execution of certain common processing operations. The specification clearly links the audio response unit 18 and control unit 28 as the structure necessary to perform the recited function. Specifically, audio response unit 18 and control unit 28, in connection with the voice generator, provides voice prompts. See ’734 patent, Col. 7:15-17 (“the audio response unit actuates an internal voice generator prompting the caller to key in his assigned number, ’34726313’.”); Col. 4:56-58 (“Each of the units 18, 20 and 22 incorporate a voice generator along with some basic programmable logic capability.”); Col. 4:22-25 (“with overall supervision by the control unit 28, the audio response units 18, 20 and 22 answer and preliminarily qualify callers from the terminals Tl-TN for connection through the coupler 24 to the interface processor 26.”). The remaining components identified by the parties in their respective briefs do not appear to be implicated in the function of providing preliminary voice prompts. For example, the coupler 24 couples qualified calls to interface processor 26. See ’734 patent, Col. 4:22-25 (“with overall supervision by the control unit 28, the audio response units 18, 20 and 22 answer and preliminarily qualify callers from the terminals Tl-TN for connection through the coupler 24 to the interface processor 26.”). Katz identifies a number of alternative structures that, according to it, can perform the recited function associated with the audio control unit. See Katz Brief at 42. However, the specification fails to clearly link these structures to the function of providing preliminary voice prompts. See Abbott Laboratories, 124 F.3d at 1424. As to Verizon’s asserted interpretation in its Brief, it identifies structures that are unnecessary to perform the recited function of providing preliminary voice prompts. Wenger Mfg., 239 F.3d at 1233; Asyst Technologies, 268 F.3d at 1370-72. Lastly, Verizon’s contention that the transmission lines between the control unit 28 and the audio response unit 18 fails as the specification of the ’734 patent does not clearly identify transmission lines between the audio response unit 18 and the control unit 28 and, therefore, fails to clearly link additional structure, such as transmission lines, as performing or being necessary to the claimed function. A.l.i. “control means” — Claim 94 The parties agree that the “control means” of claim 94 is a means-plus-function element. Verizon contends, however, that the language defining the control means is indefinite and, therefore, renders claim 94 invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112. The ’734 patent also fails, according to Verizon, to identify any structure corresponding to the function of the control means. Verizon, however, does not appear to identify claim terms requiring construction by this Court. The corresponding structure associated with “control means” includes several alternative structures. For example, the corresponding structure can include control unit 28, and, alternatively, the combination of control unit 28 and coincidence detector 34. See Col. 4: 49-52 (“Under control of the control unit 28, the coupler 24 connects individual lines 37 of the sets LB1, LB2 and LB3 to the processor 26 through lines 39”); Col. 7:21-22 (“Within the control unit 28, logic is provided for verifying the identification number as proper.”); Col. 4:22-25 (“with overall supervision by the control unit 28, the audio response units 18, 20 and 22 answer and preliminarily qualify callers from the terminals Tl-TN for connection through the coupler 24 to the interface processor 26.”); Col 4:59-65 (“The audio response unit 18 is coupled to a free-call memory 32. Generally, the unit 18 in cooperation with the memory 32 operates with the control unit 28 to qualify acceptable calls in the “800” mode. The audio response unit 20 is connected to a select-number coincidence detector 34. These structures along with the control unit 28 test area-code mode calls.”). In addition, another alternative, corresponding structure comprises control unit 28, audio response unit 18 and free call memory 32. See Col. 7:31-35 (“each call in the “800” mode also involves a check or test from the audio response unit 18 to the memory 32 to determine whether or not the assigned qualification number has been previously used.”). A.2. U.S. Patent No. 5,974,120 A.2.a. “establishing telephone communications between the callers and the system” Verizon alleges that the above-identified limitation should be interpreted to mean “creating a telephone communication from the caller to the system for prompting caller cues.” Verizon Brief at 29. Katz does not appear to dispute this asserted interpretation. Verizon appears to imply that “a system for prompting callers with caller cues” in the preamble limits the scope of claim 56. The Court agrees that the claim as a whole suggests that “a system for prompting callers with caller cues” is a limitation of claim 56. Specifically, “the system” referred to in the “establishing” step of claim 56 incorporates by reference the “system for prompting callers with caller cues” in the preamble. Bell Communications, 55 F.3d at 621. A.2.b. “the system having a receiving-unit for receiving digital signals including dialed-number identification signals provided automatically from the telephone-communication facility” Verizon contends that the above-identified limitation requires that “the system for prompting the callers with caller cues includes a receiving unit for receiving digital signals from the callers.” Verizon Brief at 29. The Court finds that, beyond the term “dialed-number identification signals provided automatically from the telephone-communication facility,” the above-identified language requires no special construction as its meaning is clear. Furthermore, Verizon, by its inclusion of the phrase “from the callers,” appears to inject a limitation not necessarily required by the plain meaning of the cited language. A.2.c. “dialed-number identification signals provided automatically from the telephone-communication facility” The term “dialed-number identification signals provided automatically from the telephone-communication facility” means digital signals or data, automatically provided by the telephone communication facility, that identify the number called. The meaning of the term is apparent from the claim language itself. The specification of the ’120 patent does not appear to suggest a contrary interpretation. Verizon does not identify any aspect of the prosecution history associated with the ’120 patent that supports its asserted interpretation. See also Section IV.A.1.C., supra. A.2.d. “telephone-communication facility” In its asserted interpretation of “dialed-number identification signals” and “identification signals” in the representative claims of the T20 patent, Verizon appears to define the term “telephone-communication facility” as a public switched telephone network. Verizon Brief at 29, 32, 33. Katz, relying on the AT & T Order, asserts that “telephone-communication facility” means “that part of a telephone network that enables a caller to connect to the Katz system.” Katz Brief at 52; see also AT & T Order at 598. The term “telephone-communication facility” means a telephone network that connects remote terminals and other devices having telephonic capabilities, such as the audio response units, for communication. It is not clear to the Court, whether the parties consider the term “telephone-communication facility” to have a plain meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art. However, Webster’s defines “facility” as “something ... that is built, installed, or established to serve a particular purpose,” see Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary at 445, suggesting that the term “telephone-communication facility” means something dedicated to the purpose of telephone communications. See Altiris, 318 F.3d at 1372 (“simply because a phrase as a whole lacks a common meaning does not compel a court to abandon its quest for a common meaning and disregard the established meanings of the individual words.”). The specification also sheds light on the meaning of “telephone-communication facility” as “accommodating” the remote terminals and connecting the remote terminals to the central station CS. See ’120 patent, Col. 3: 36-37; see also Col. 3:31-35 (“The indicated terminals Tl-TN represent the multitude of telephone terminals existing in association with a communication facility CO which may comprise a comprehensive public telephone network.”); Col. 4:12-15 (“Essentially, as a result of telephonic dialing at one of the terminals Tl-TN, the communication facility CO couples the select terminal to an audio response unit.”); Col. 7:1-5 (“the caller [actuates] the buttons 14 as for example to input: “1 900 5558945”. As a result, signals are provided to the communication facility CO resulting in a connection from the remote terminal T1 to the audio response unit 22.”); Col. 7:31-34 (“the caller dials a number ..., actuating the terminal T1 and the communication facility CO to provide a connection with the audio response unit 18.”). With due deference to the AT & T court, Katz’ proposed construction does not appear to be warranted, as the ’120 patent specification does not define “telephone-communication facility” as only “that part” of a telephone network that enables callers to connect to the Katz system. That being said, however, communication facility, as construed by this Court, does not exclude the possibility that the communication facility is part of a larger telephone network or the public switched telephone network itself. In addition, the Court’s construction is not meant to exclude the possibility that the Katz system is an integral part of (operating within) the communication facility. As to Verizon’s asserted interpretation, limiting the term “telephone-communication facility” to a public switched telephone network would import limitations of a preferred embodiment into the claim. The ’120 patent specification appears to indicate that the communication facility may be other types of networks. See Col. 3:33-35 (“communication facility CO ... may comprise a comprehensive public telephone network.”) (emphasis added). A.2.e. “utilizing the dialed-number identification signals to identify one from a plurality of numbers dialed by the callers” Verizon’s asserted interpretation appears to rehash its contention, rejected by the Court, that dialed-number identification signals “indicate” the dialed number. See Verizon Brief at 30. The language of the claim is clear, requiring no construction by the Court. See Section IV.A.2.C., supra. A.2.f. “also receiving at the receiving unit identification signals relating to the callers” Verizon alleges that the “also receiving” element requires that the receiving unit that receives the “identification signals relating to the callers” be the same receiving unit that receives the dialed-number identification signals. Verizon Brief at 30. Katz does not appear to dispute this interpretation. The Court adopts Verizon’s asserted interpretation, as it appears to be required by the plain meaning of the claim language. A.2.g. “testing said identification signals relating to the callers to determine whether to qualify the callers for access to at least a portion of operations of the system” Similar to its contention regarding qualifying calls in the ’734 patent, Verizon alleges that the language of the “testing” element means “using the identification signals relating to the calls to determine whether to allow callers to access part of the system or abort the call.” Verizon Brief at 31. According to Katz, the plain meaning of the language in the “testing” element does not require that the system aborts non-qualified callers. The language of the “testing” step set forth above requires using the identification signals relating to callers to determine whether to allow access to part of the system. The claim language does not require that the claimed method abort non-qualified callers. Neither the plain meaning of “testing” nor the plain meaning of “qualify,” supra, requires terminating calls associated with callers who do not qualify for access. Indeed, the remaining language in the testing step suggests that non-qualified callers are merely denied access to some operations of the system. While the embodiments disclosed in the specification of the T20 patent terminate calls of non-qualified callers, this alone is not sufficient to overcome the “heavy presumption” that the ordinary and plain meaning of the claim language controls. CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366. See also Section IV.A.l.f., above. A.2.h. “utilizing, for qualified callers, the identification signals relating to the callers, to avoid prompting certain callers with a certain previously provided cue or cues” The “utilizing” element, according to Verizon, should be construed to mean that “if the caller is allowed to proceed, using the identification signals relating to the caller to prevent the caller from receiving any voice prompts that the caller received during a previous call.” Verizon Brief at 31-32. Katz objects to this interpretation, reasoning that Verizon’s asserted interpretation does not give proper effect to the term “certain” and results in a unworkable system. See Katz Reply Brief at 15-16. The term “qualified callers” means the callers qualified in the “testing” step. The element “utilizing ... the identification signals relating to the callers, to avoid prompting certain callers with a certain previously provided cue or cues” means using the identification signals relating to the callers to prevent the callers from receiving one or more specific prompts that the callers received during previous calls. The specific prompts may be all or a subset of the prompts previously provided to a given caller. Verizon’s construction appears to ignore the term “certain” modifying “previously provided cue or cues.” See Exxon, 64 F.3d at 1557 (all words in a claim must be given meaning). A.2.i. “providing to the qualified callers at least one other caller cue”— Claim 56 and 67 Verizon alleges that the “providing” element should be interpreted to mean “providing an additional voice prompt to callers allowed to proceed.” Verizon Brief at 32. The element “providing to the qualified callers at least one other caller cue” means providing, to qualified callers, at least one prompt other than the “certain previously provided cue or cues” identified in the “utilizing” step. The Court’s interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of the language and the context in which it appears in the claims. The specification does not suggest a contrary interpretation. A.2.j. “wherein the process further implements a test with respect to a limit on a period of time”—Claim 58 Verizon alleges that the limitation set forth in dependent claim 58 of the ’120 patent requires a second test, in addition to the testing specified in claim 56, based on a period of time. This limitation, according to Katz, merely specifies how the testing in the testing element is performed and need not be a second test. Katz Brief at 52-53. The limitation in claim 58 requires a second test based on a limit on a period of time. The Court’s interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of the term “further” and the context provided by claim 56. The testing element of claim 56 involves testing identification signals to qualify users, while the test required in claim 58 is temporal. The Court’s interpretation, however, is not meant to exclude the possibility that this second test also involve identification signals. In addition, dependent claims 59 and 60, for example, provide an illustrative backdrop. See ’120 patent, Col. 16:55-61 (“wherein during the testing step, the process further tests ... ”). In contrast, claim 58 states that the process “further implements a test with respect to a limit on a period of time.” Col. 16:53-54 (emphasis added). The term “further implements a test” suggests an additional test. A.2.k. “testing, to determine whether to qualify the callers for voice-digital communication with the system, the identification signals that indicate the telephone numbers”—Claim 67 Similar to above, the “testing” step in claim 67 of the ’120 patent, according to Verizon, requires a determination of whether to allow callers to proceed or to abort the calls. The language of the “testing” step of claim 67 means using the telephone numbers indicated by the identification signals to determine whether the callers are eligible to access the system. Verizon’s asserted interpretation has some appeal, as the language in the “testing” step of claim 67 does not contain the “at least a portion” limitation of claim 56 of the ’120 patent. Nevertheless, the plain meaning of the claim language, discussed above, merely requires testing the telephone numbers expressed in the identification signals to determine whether callers are eligible. The claim language is silent as to the treatment of callers who do not qualify for “voice-digital communication with the system.” Verizon’s asserted interpretation would appear to exclude the possibility of transferring non-qualified callers to a live operator or some alternative means of qualifying for access to the system. Lastly, as discussed above, merely because the preferred embodiments disclose terminating calls associated with non-qualified callers does not appear to justify importing such a limitation into the plain meaning of the claim language. See Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1204