Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION PAYNE, District Judge. At the time of his death Steven R. Stevenson (“Stevenson”) was an inmate serving a sentence in the City Jail for the City of Richmond, Virginia (the “Jail”) for failure to pay child support. The Plaintiff, Delorise Brown (“Brown”), Stevenson’s mother, in her capacity as the administra-trix of her son’s estate, filed an action in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond, Virginia against the City of Richmond, Virginia (the “City”), Richmond City Sheriff Michelle Mitchell (“Mitchell” or the “Sheriff’), Chief Physician of the Jail Dr. Jack Freund (“Dr. Freund”), and John Does 1-10, unidentified deputy guards employed at the Jail, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Virginia law. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the Defendants removed the action to federal court. The Court, therefore, has federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, over the claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and it has supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), over the state law claims. All of the Defendants, save John Does 1-10, have filed motions pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56 seeking summary judgment respecting the claims pending against them. For the reasons stated below, these motions will be granted in part and denied in part. STATEMENT OF FACTS Consistent with the constraints of Fed. R.Civ.P. 56, the facts recited here are based on deposition testimony, affidavits, documentary evidence in the record, and the parties’ various statements of material facts, to the extent that such statements of facts are undisputed. Power v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 87 F.Supp.2d 545, 547 n. 2 (E.D.Va.2000). Where there is a dispute, the differing versions are identified. Of course, in considering the motions for summary judgment, Brown, as the nonmoving party, is entitled to have her version of all that is disputed accepted and to have the benefit of all favorable inferences. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). I. The Circumstances of Stevenson’s Incarceration and Death Beginning on July 23, 2001, Stevenson was incarcerated in the Jail for failure to pay child support. As part of Stevenson’s commitment to the Jail, the Jail staff completed a medical history and screening. At that time, Stevenson reported good health. He did, however, inform his jailors that he had suffered a gunshot wound in 1997, as a result of which Stevenson lost his spleen. Stevenson apparently informed the Jail staff that, because of his condition, he had been placed apart from the general population in previous incarcerations. On the occasion of this confinement, however, Jail staff assigned Stevenson to Tier G-3, a general population unit in the Jail. By August 7, 2001, approximately two weeks after entering the Jail, Stevenson began to suffer from severe headaches. Stevenson complained of these headaches to his fellow inmates, the on-duty nurse, as well as to several deputy guards. On the afternoon of August 7, 2001, deputy guards allowed Stevenson to visit the Jail’s medical clinic where medical personnel provided him with nonprescription cold medicine. Stevenson’s condition, however, did not respond to this medication, and he continued to suffer from increasingly severe headaches. By August 8, Stevenson had become too weak to carry his food tray in the mess hall. A fellow inmate, therefore, needed to assist Stevenson in obtaining and carrying his meal. Affidavit of Walker, at 4 ¶ 24. During the course of this meal, and within plain view of the deputies who were patrolling the mess hall, Stevenson vomited. Upon witnessing Stevenson’s vomiting, the deputy guards thereafter excused him to return to his cell. Affidavit of Miles, at 6 ¶ 38. That evening, after returning to his cell, Stevenson continued to complain about severe pain in his head and stomach; he had also, by that time, begun to sweat heavily and constantly. Affidavit of Peete, at 5 ¶ 30. By August 9, 2001, Stevenson was so sick that he stopped attending meals altogether. Affidavit of Walker, at 5 ¶ 31. In fact, Stevenson did not leave Tier G-3 at all that day. Instead, Stevenson remained in his bunk dressed only in his underwear, complaining of chills, inability to eat, and persistent heavy sweating. His fellow inmates, in an attempt to cool Stevenson down, repeatedly applied wet towels to Stevenson’s head and body and attempted to provide him with liquids. Id. at 5 ¶ 32. The deputies patrolling Tier G-3 witnessed the inmates’ provision of rudimentary medical assistance; nonetheless, these guards did nothing to assist Stevenson. Stevenson’s only outing from his cell on August 9 was when several inmates helped carry him to the canteen so that he could purchase several personal items. Affidavit of Walker, at 5 ¶ 36. The numerous deputies who were stationed on Tier G-3 and at the canteen witnessed this event, and thus were aware of Stevenson’s inability to walk under his own power. These guards, however, did not in any way assist Stevenson and his fellow inmates. Moreover, throughout the day on August 9, Stevenson’s fellow inmates repeatedly informed deputies of Stevenson’s increasingly deteriorating condition and requested that Stevenson receive medical attention. Affidavit of Walker, at 5 ¶ 38. All told, Stevenson’s fellow inmates requested assistance from deputies approximately twenty times that day. Affidavit of Peete, at 6 ¶ 41. The deputies, however, ignored these requests. Id. at 6 ¶ 42. Moreover, notwithstanding that, during the “count” on August 9, Stevenson was so debilitated that his fellow inmates needed to carry him to the front of his cell, the deputies conducting the count did nothing to address Stevenson’s condition. Affidavit of Miles, at 8 ¶ 55. In fact, the deputies conducting the count ignored Stevenson’s personal pleas for medical assistance. Affidavit of Walker, at 6 ¶ 43. Thereafter, throughout the evening of August 9, Stevenson continued to suffer and to vomit on a fairly regular basis. By the next day, August 10, 2001, Stevenson was more-or-less unresponsive to exterior stimuli, was sweating profusely, and — despite having missed meals for almost two days — -was throwing up on a near-constant basis. Affidavit of Walker, at 6 ¶ 45. Stevenson was so nauseated that he was unable to eat the food and drink that his fellow inmates had procured from the canteen. Affidavit of Peete, at 6 ¶ 45. Because they recognized Stevenson’s symptoms as serious, his fellow inmates repeatedly appealed to the deputy guards for assistance. For most of the day, however, these appeals went ignored. Affidavit of Walker, at 6 ¶ 50. The deputies patrolling the tier looked at Stevenson, heard the other inmates’ pleas, and then left without taking any action in spite of the fact that Stevenson was obviously quite ill. Finally, however, that afternoon, after many pleas from Stevenson’s fellow inmates, the guards allowed Stevenson to see a nurse who, after a brief evaluation, referred Stevenson for an examination by a doctor. Upon referral from the nurse, the Chief Physician of the Jail, Dr. Freund, examined Stevenson. Dr. Freund gauged Stevenson’s temperature at 101.2 degrees. Second Suppl. Decl. of Freund, at 2 ¶ 13. Dr. Freund says that Stevenson had a moderately dry tongue, greater than normal bowel sounds, and enlarged nodes in the left axillar region. In the course of his examination of the demonstrably ill, weak patient, Dr. Freund checked Stevenson’s abdomen, throat, lungs, and neck in an effort to determine whether Stevenson had localizing signs of bacterial infection; in particular, Dr. Freund performed a nu-chal rigidity test. These examinations, according to Dr. Freund, returned negative indications for bacterial infection. It is undisputed, however, that Dr. Freund did not engage in any further testing aimed at ascertaining the existence of a bacterial infection. Upon completion of the examination, Dr. Freund, according to his sworn testimony, diagnosed Stevenson’s condition as a viral infection with dehydration. Dr. Freund thereafter prescribed a fever reducer and a medicine to quell Stevenson’s nausea. Dr. Freund also ordered that Jail staff monitor Stevenson’s temperature daily, place Stevenson on a liquid diet, and administer the prescribed nausea medication. Second Suppl. Decl. of Freund, at 3 ¶ 18. He further ordered Jail personnel to return Stevenson to the clinic on August 14. He then ordered Stevenson to return to the general population unit of the Jail. Thus, in accord with Dr. Freund’s orders, Stevenson returned to the Jail on the evening of August 10. Throughout that night, his fellow inmates continued to apply damp cloths to Stevenson’s head and body and to provide him with liquids. Affidavit of Miles, at 9 ¶ 69. They also assisted Stevenson with vomiting and in removing his vomit from the cell. Throughout these endeavors, the inmates asked repeatedly for assistance from the deputy guards. At some point that night, Stevenson began to throw up a green, mucus-like substance. Thereafter, Stevenson’s fellow inmates were unable to elicit a response from him. Affidavit of Peete, at 8 ¶ 55. The inmates, having had limited success in gaining the guards’ attention through normal channels, began to make loud noises, banging on the bars of the cell and yelling. Finally, a deputy responded to these efforts, and, upon seeing Stevenson and hearing the inmates’ concerns, instructed the inmates that Stevenson’s cell was too hot and that they should attempt to get him out of bed so that he could get some air. Affidavit of Walker, at 9 ¶ 74. The deputy then left Stevenson and the inmates to their own devices. Shortly thereafter, the inmates again summoned the deputy in order to tell him that their attempts to revive Stevenson had proved fruitless. The deputy responded, entered the cell, and attempted unsuccessfully to communicate verbally with Stevenson. Affidavit of Walker, at 9 ¶ 75. The deputy then began to shake Stevenson and to slap his face. When these attempts at revival failed to achieve the desired result, the deputy summoned the on-duty nurse. Id. at 9 ¶ 76. 'Sometime during the early morning hours of August 11, a nurse arrived at Stevenson’s cell and proceeded to slap him about his face, ultimately holding something in front of his nose that caused his body to go into convulsions. Affidavit of Peete, at 8 ¶ 65. When these measures failed to revive Stevenson, the nurse ordered that he be taken to the emergency room at the Virginia Commonwealth University-Medical College of Virginia Hospital (the ‘VCU-MCV Hospital”). Stevenson arrived at the VCU-MCV Hospital at approximately 2:10 AM that morning, at which point he was completely unresponsive and suffering from acute liver, renal, and cardiac failure as the result of overwhelming sepsis. Less than forty-eight hours later, at 7:55 AM on August 13, 2001, Stevenson died of bacterial meningitis at the VCU-MCV Hospital. II. Background Respecting the Richmond City Jail Brown alleges that, at the time of Stevenson’s death, the Jail was overcrowded, poorly ventilated, and unsanitary and that these conditions caused, or contributed to cause, Stevenson’s death. It is necessary, therefore, to consider somewhat the Jail itself and its history. Built in 1964, the Jail was originally designed to house approximately 630 inmates. Mitchell Depo., Feb. 19, 2004, at 20; see generally A Community-Based Corrections Plan, Prepared for the City of Richmond by Powell Consulting Services, May 31, 2001 (hereinafter the “2001 CBCP”). The Jail, which the City owns in fee simple, is a three story structure; the aggregate floor space in the Jail is approximately 195,096 square feet. 2001 CBCP, at 10. At the time of Stevenson’s incarceration and death, the Jail was operating at more than double its design capacity, averaging a population of between 1,400 and 1,500 inmates per day. Mitchell • Depo., Feb. 19, 2004, at 22. Moreover, Brown offers evidence showing that overpopulation and sanitation have been persistent, and worsening, problems at the Jail for about two decades. Brown has proffered a large volume of evidence on that score, including numerous letters to and from various City officials, such as a 1975 letter from then-Richmond City Sheriff Andrew Winston (“Winston”) to former City Manager William Leidinger in which Winston complains of dangerous overcrowding and sanitation problems at the Jail, and a 1987 letter from Winston to former City Manager Robert Bobb (“Bobb”) reiterating those problems. Brown’s evidence also includes the fact that, in 1988, Winston filed in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond a Bill of Complaint against Edward W. Murray (“Murray”), who was then the Director of the Department of Corrections for the Commonwealth of Virginia (the “Department of Corrections”). The City, as well as the State Board of Corrections for the Commonwealth of Virginia (the “Board of Corrections”), were also defendants in that case. Winston’s Bill of Complaint alleged, inter alia, that the dilapidated, unsanitary, and overcrowded conditions in the Jail represented health and safety dangers to the inmates. Ultimately, in a letter opinion dated January 31, 1989, Virginia Circuit Court Judge James Wilkinson, after reviewing evidence and testimony, set forth a full set of findings of facts and conclusions of law. Judge Wilkinson concluded that the maximum number of inmates that could be safely housed at the Jail was 700 and that the Jail, at that time (1989), was grossly overcrowded. Thereafter, Winston agreed to settle the suit upon securing the City’s commitment to build a new facility in which to house female inmates, as well as Murray’s promise to remove from the Jail on a timely basis state prisoners being housed there temporarily. Judge Wilkinson dismissed the settled suit by entering a consent order on March 9,1989. Brown has offered evidence that, although the 1989 settlement of Winston’s suit alleviated the overcrowding and sanitation problems for a while, the problems of overcrowding and sanitation at the Jail gradually thereafter worsened. For example, Mitchell has testified that, notwithstanding the addition of the female annex', many of the Jail conditions described in Winston’s Bill of Complaint once again existed in the late 1990s and that, in fact, some problems — such as overcrowding— became considerably worse in the years subsequent to the settlement of Winston’s suit. Mitchell Depo., Feb. 19, 2004, at 36. Mitchell served as a deputy under Winston; thus, at the time she assumed her current office, she was fully aware of the abysmal conditions at the Jail. In 1994, during the first budget cycle of her tenure as Sheriff, Mitchell spoke with then-City Manager Bobb in an effort to apprise him and the City of the need for a new or expanded jail facility. Mitchell Depo., Feb. 19, 2004, at 62. Thereafter, the City commissioned, through the City Manager’s Office, a study to ascertain the City’s jail-related needs and to provide information respecting whether the City needed to construct a new facility, or at least an addition to the current facility, and, if so, what its configuration should be. To that end, the City retained a consulting group, the Correctional Services Group, Incorporated, which, in October 1994, submitted to the City a “Community Based Corrections Plan” (the “1994 CBCP”). This document analyzed trends in the City’s jail population, assessed the Jail’s incarceration capacity at the time, and estimated what the City’s inmate population likely would be in the future. As a result of the 1994 CBCP, which found the City’s existing facilities to be lacking in several key respects, including their ability to house the number of inmates incarcerated by the City, the City proposed to construct a 300 bed addition to the Jail. To this end, Cary Gill, an architect employed by the City, rendered various architectural plans and designs. By late 1996, the City, through the City Manager’s Office, was considering various plans for an addition to the Jail. Indeed, it appears that, by then, the City Council had gone so far as to earmark specific funds for the project. At some point in 1997, however, the planned addition to the Jail— for reasons not apparent on this record— was cancelled, the City having reallocated the moneys that it had designated for that project to other endeavors. Thereafter, on several occasions in the late 1990s, Mitchell asked City officials to build a new facility or, in the alternative, to make capital improvements to the existing Jail. During the late 1990s, Mitchell had several conversations with City Manager Dr. Calvin D. Jamison (“Dr. Jamison”) during which she informed him that the City needed to begin seriously to address the issues at the Jail, “because something [bad was going] to happen and [she did not] want to ... be responsible for it.” Mitchell Depo., Feb. 19, 2004, at 90. According to Mitchell and indeed as corroborated by Dr. Jamison, these conversations centered on whether or not the Richmond City Council possessed the “political will or the muster to really champion the cause of people who were behind bars.” Id. From these conversations, Mitchell apparently came to the conclusion that, if any improvements were to occur at the Jail, she would need to initiate them herself. With this understanding, by 2000, Mitchell had retained outside legal counsel in an effort to ascertain whether Virginia law provided legal mechanisms that could be used to force the City to make improvements at the Jail. According to Mitchell, she and her counsel undertook a review of Virginia law, “readfing] the Code of Virginia,” in an attempt to find devices that might be available to correct what Mitchell regarded as the serious problems at the Jail. Mitchell Depo., Feb. 19, 2004, at 91. In addition, throughout the late 1990s and into 2000, Mitchell maintained at least a tenuous line of communication with the City Manager’s Office, largely through William Johnson (“Johnson”), Deputy City Manager under Dr. Jamison. Moreover, at some point in early 2000, Mitchell opened a dialogue with Joyce Davis (“Davis”), who, at that time, was a city planner working for the City. Davis, who, at the time, also was communicating with Dr. Jamison respecting the Jail, set up a meeting at Richmond City Hall. This meeting, which occurred in spring 2000, was attended by Davis, Mitchell, Ed Powell, individuals from the City Manager’s Office, and various other City administrators. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the City’s need for a new or expanded jail facility. The record permits the inference (if, indeed, it does not establish) that, at this meeting, all parties agreed that the Jail was seriously overcrowded and that there were various structural problems at the facility. Thereafter, the City, once again, requested the preparation of a community based corrections plan for ascertaining its incarceration needs. Jamison Depo., Feb. 19, 2004, at 32; see also Va.Code Ann. § 53.1-82.1. Thereafter, Powell Consulting Services completed, on May 31, 2001, the 2001 CBCP. Among other things, the 2001 CBCP concluded that the Jail had been functioning significantly above its operating capacity for several decades, and that, as of 2001, the Jail was “severely overcrowded.” 2001 CBCP, at 79. After engaging in an analysis of the more aggressive policing methods adopted by the Commonwealth and the City in the 1990s, as well as the resultant increases in the levels of arrests, convictions, and incarcerations in Richmond, the 2001 CBCP concluded that the City would soon require a facility capable of housing approximately 3,000 inmates. And, because the City’s facilities (i.e., the Jail, the Lock-Up, and Richmond’s share of the Peumansend Creek structure) had, in 2001 (and indeed continue in 2004 to have), a total rated capacity of under 900 beds, the 2001 CBCP concluded that the City needed to secure a new or expanded facility capable of housing a far greater number of inmates than the existing facilities allowed. As was true respecting the 1994 CBCP and the 1996 addendum thereto, the City elected not to follow the recommendation of the penal facility experts that it had hired to ascertain the need for corrective action. Indeed, as admitted by Dr. Jami-son, notwithstanding the findings of the 2001 CBCP, the City had in 2001 (and in fact continues to have as of February 2004) no plans to build a new facility, or to expand or improve the existing Jail. Jami-son Depo., Feb. 19, 2004, at 17. Mitchell testified respecting the 2001 CBCP: The document was produced. We received a copy of it, and that was the end of it. There has been no movement, as far as I am aware of, to do anything with that document.... After we got the plan and after a couple of months or maybe even longer, I had a conversation I think with Joyce [Davis], asking about the plan .... And, basically she said that she wasn’t aware what was going on with it, and that was the end of it. Mitchell Depo., Feb. 19, 2004, at 107-8. On September 10, 2001, less than one month after Stevenson’s death, Mitchell, in her official capacity as Sheriff, filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond. In her Petition, Mitchell avers that the Jail is in ill repair and is simply inadequate to house the number of inmates committed to the Jail by the City or to meet the needs of those confined at the Jail. In addition to alleging that the Jail is too small for its current population, is in general disrepair, and is otherwise outdated, Mitchell’s Petition alleges that the Jail suffers from poor heating and cooling systems and lacks an adequate number of showers and toilets. More importantly for this action, the Petition alleges that, because of severe overcrowding, the Jail presents an unacceptably high risk of contagious disease spreading throughout the inmate population. Finally, the Petition alleges that, although Mitchell, over time, has brought these concerns to the attention of the City and its administrators, the City has failed to take any corrective action. Mitchell’s Petition is currently pending in the state court. III. Counts Remaining after the Opinion on Motions Made Under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) On March 9, 2004, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion (hereinafter the “March 9 Opinion”) granting in part and denying in part the Defendants’ motions for dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). First, the Court, relying on Virginia’s law of sovereign immunity, dismissed a state-law tort claim that Brown had instituted against the City. Brown, 308 F.Supp.2d at 691 (citing, inter alia, Taylor v. City of Charlottesville, 240 Va. 367, 397 S.E.2d 832, 834 (1990); Franklin v. Richlands, 161 Va. 156, 170 S.E. 718, 721 (1933)). It further dismissed the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allegation pending against the City insofar as Brown had sought punitive damages. 308 F.Supp.2d at 695 n. 14 (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981)). Respecting Mitchell, the Court, after undertaking an examination of the Code of Virginia, cabined the purported Jail conditions for which Mitchell could, as a matter of law, be responsible. 308 F.Supp.2d at 699. Finally, the Court dismissed, for failure to state a claim, the Section 1983 claim pending against Dr. Freund. Id. at 708. The Court, however, allowed Brown to file an amended complaint in order to afford her an opportunity to remedy several perceived technical deficiencies present in the original Complaint, particularly Brown’s Section 1983 claim against Dr. Freund. Id. at 708-9. After the March 9 Opinion and the filing of Brown’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), the following claims against the following parties remain: • Count I relies on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, charging that Mitchell and the City, pursuant to an official policy or custom, maintained a crowded, poorly ventilated, and unsanitary jail, which reflected a deliberate indifference to Stevenson’s rights, as secured by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and that this policy or custom caused, or contributed to cause, Stevenson’s death. • Count II also relies on Section 1983, charging that Mitchell failed to train her staff to respond adequately to inmates’ medical problems, thereby demonstrating a deliberate indifference to Stevenson’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and that this failure to train caused, or contributed to cause, Stevenson’s death. • Count III proceeds under Section 1983, charging that John Does 1-10, unidentified guards employed by the Jail, were deliberately indifferent to Stevenson’s serious medical condition and thereby violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. • Count IV relies on Section 1983, charging that Dr. Freund was deliberately indifferent to Stevenson’s serious medical needs in violation of Stevenson’s Eighth Amendment rights and that, through his indifference, Dr. Freund caused, or contributed to cause, Stevenson’s death. • Count V alleges a state law wrongful death action against Mitchell, claiming that the grossly negligent policies and practices of the Sheriff were a cause of Stevenson’s death. Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-50. • Count VI alleges a state-law wrongful death action against John Does 1-10. • Finally, both Count VII and VIII allege state law actions against Dr. Freund, alleging wrongful death, Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-50, and medical malpractice, Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-581.1 et seq., respectively. After the close of discovery, the City, Mitchell, and Dr. Freund moved for summary judgment as to the respective, remaining counts pending against them. For the reasons explained below, those motions will be granted in part and denied in part. DISCUSSION I. The Standard for Assessing Motions for Summary Judgment The standards applicable to summary judgment motions are well-established. Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, designed to secure the just and expeditious resolution of every civil matter. Graham v. PACTTV Benefits Comm., 301 F.Supp.2d 483, 491-492 (E.D.Va.2004). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the facts, and any inferences drawn from these facts, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. A fact is material when proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is genuine if a reasonable jury might return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party on the basis of such issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The nonmoving party is entitled to have its version of all that is disputed accepted, to have all reasonable inferences construed in its favor, to have all factual conflicts resolved in its favor, and to have the benefit of all favorable legal theories invoked by the evidence. Kohl’s Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Target Stores, Inc., 290 F.Supp.2d 674, 678 (E.D.Va.2003). The party who bears the burden of proof on an issue at trial, however, cannot survive summary judgment without sufficient evidence to sustain his burden of proof on that point. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548. These precepts and standards govern the resolution of the Defendants’ motions. II. The City Of Richmond Count I, the only count remaining against the City after the Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) stage, is a Section 1983 claim alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In pertinent part, that statute provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights; rather, it provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. Westmoreland v. Brown, 883 F.Supp. 67, 71 (E.D.Va.1995). To establish liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant, acting under color of law, violated the plaintiffs federal constitutional or federal statutory rights, and thereby caused the complained of injury. Coppage v. Mann, 906 F.Supp. 1025, 1035 (E.D.Va.1995). The gravamen of Count I is that the City subjected Stevenson to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to state and municipal actors by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Although cities are “person[s]” amenable to suit under Section 1983, municipal liability may not be predicated upon a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Rather, under Monell, municipal liability under Section 1983 arises only where the municipality, qua municipality, has undertaken an official policy or custom which causes a deprivation of the plaintiffs constitutional or statutory rights. Id,.; see also Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1385 (4th Cir.1987); Donaggio v. Arlington County, 880 F.Supp. 446, 461 (E.D.Va.1996). Thus, in order to survive the City’s motion for summary judgment as to Count I, Brown must set forth a sufficient factual basis to support a finding that: (1) the City had a policy or custom of deliberate indifference to the deprivation of the constitutional right alleged to have been violated; and (2) this policy or custom caused, or contributed to cause, the complained of injury. Westmoreland, 883 F.Supp. at 76 (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985)); see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). These two elements are now addressed in turn. (A) Custom or Policy Respecting the official custom or policy requirement of Monell, Brown alleges that the City has an official policy or custom of maintaining an overcrowded, unsanitary, and poorly ventilated local jail. FAC, at 15 ¶ 74. Although it is perhaps conceptually awkward to argue that the City has an official policy or custom of maintaining the Jail in the alleged state, it is fair to read the FAC as, at least, alleging knowing and deliberate inaction on behalf of the City, the consequence of which was a deliberate choice to maintain the Jail in an overcrowded, structurally infirm, and poorly ventilated state that offended the Eighth Amendment. And, as recognized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, municipal inaction may, in certain circumstances, qualify as an official policy or custom for purposes of Monell. Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229-31 (4th Cir.1984). Thus, in order to survive summary judgment respecting the official policy or custom requirement as to Count I, Brown must show that the City had knowledge of unconstitutional conditions at the Jail and yet took no action in response, thereby evincing a custom or policy of deliberate indifference. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir.1991). To establish the existence of a triable issue of fact respecting such a custom or policy of deliberate indifference on the part of the City, Brown relies, in large part, on the deposition testimony of the City Manager. To begin, Brown points out that Dr. Jamison has admitted that the Jail is overcrowded, and that it has been so since at least the inception of his tenure as City Manager in 1998. Jamison Depo., Feb. 19, 2004, at 26. Dr. Jamison testified that, although he has long understood that there is a need to reduce the overcrowding at the Jail and remedy the facility’s structural defects, the City is unwilling to fund any capital projects to achieve such results. Id. at 13. Instead, Dr. Jamison explained that his office has been, since at least the beginning of his tenure, exploring the feasibility of certain “alternatives” to the construction of a new jail or the expansion of the existing facility. Read as a whole, the clear import of Dr. Jamison’s deposition testimony is that, notwithstanding a long-standing recognition of the Jail’s serious overcrowding and structural problems, the City has not had the “political will” to institute any solutions. During deposition, Brown’s lawyer asked Dr. Jamison why the City has long refused to remedy the problems at the Jail: A: At the end of the day, the bottom line is that you have to have the resources to do it.... Then you have to say, am I willing to come forward and say to each and every taxpayer in the City of Richmond, we are going to increase your taxes.... Q: So we can build a jail? A: Right. Q: Is there political will in the City of Richmond to do that? A: I believe you can answer that yourself. Jamison Depo., Feb. 19, 2004, at 51-52. Throughout his deposition, however, Dr. Jamison displayed an understanding of the fact that the City has a duty, imposed by both the Federal Constitution and Virginia statutes, to provide inmates with a jail facility that is adequately ventilated and that is not severely overcrowded. Indeed, the City has offered no evidence that, in August 2001 (or, for that matter, anytime since 1988) the Jail was not severely overcrowded, poorly ventilated, and otherwise inadequate. Nor could the City offer such evidence given the three expert reports it commissioned in 1994, 1996, and 2001; reports that the City has simply ignored. As noted, however, by the Supreme Court of the United States: [Wjhen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well being.... The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs — e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety — it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998, 108 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). Thus, under the relevant decisional law, when the conditions at a jail deprive inmates of one or more basic human needs, the Eighth Amendment is violated. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991); Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1382 (4th Cir.1993); Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir.1991). Of course, a “basic human need” that must be provided is the need for “reasonable safety.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993); DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200, 109 S.Ct. 998. And, under the decisional law, this basic human need for “reasonable safety” prohibits the housing of inmates in situations patently likely to lead to the spread of illness, sickness, and communicable disease. Helling, 509 U.S. at 33, 113 S.Ct. 2475; see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (stating that it is “cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions”); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978). In addition, the basic human needs mandated by the Eighth Amendment include inmates’ need for a reasonable amount of space and their need for reasonable temperatures. Williams, 952 F.2d at 826. Here, a reasonable jury could, on the basis of the record established herein, conclude that the overcrowded, poorly ventilated, and dilapidated conditions at the Jail deprived inmates of one or more of those basic human needs. In particular, the jury reasonably could conclude that Stevenson was deprived of the need to be free from conditions likely to result in the spread of infectious disease. Moreover, under the Eighth Amendment, once the responsible officials become “aware of a problem with [jail] conditions, they cannot simply ignore the problem, but should take corrective action.” Williams, 952 F.2d at 826; see also Scarborough v. Austin, No. 91-6754, 1992 WL 163916, *3-4 (4th Cir. July 16, 1992) (per curiam). In sum, on this record, a reasonable jury could find a pattern or practice for purposes of Monell by finding that the City Manager’s Office, in its long-standing failure to act in the face of the known conditions at the Jail, acted with deliberate indifference to a known constitutional deprivation. (1) The Policymaker Issue Of course, not every action or failure to act by every municipal official will subject a municipality to Section 1983 liability. Stated simply, not every individual on a municipality’s payroll is capable of creating a custom or policy under Monell. Rather, municipal liability attaches only where the particular municipal actor possesses the final authority to establish official policy with respect to the topic at issue. Knight v. Vernon, 214 F.3d 544, 552 (4th Cir.2000). In order to hold the City liable under Section 1983 for the City Manager’s actions or inactions, the Plaintiff must show that the City Manager possessed and exercised “final policymaking authority” respecting the City’s authority to remedy the conditions of overcrowding, structural infirmities, and poor ventilation at the Jail. Riddick v. Sch. Bd. of the City of Portsmouth, 238 F.3d 518, 523 (4th Cir.2000); Dotson v. Chester, 937 F.2d 920, 924 (4th Cir.1991). Identification of the person or entity who possesses final policymaking authority is a question of law rather than fact and thus should be resolved by the Court before trial. Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 729 (4th Cir.1999). Moreover, resolution of the final policymaking authority issue is a question of state law. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (plurality opinion); Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist. No. 2, 31 F.3d 183, 196 (4th Cir.1994). Thus, in determining which local official possesses final policymaking authority for the allegedly unconstitutional action in question, it is necessary to look to the relevant state and local legal materials, including state and local positive law, as well as state or local “ ‘custom or usage having the force of law.’” Riddick, 238 F.3d at 523 (quoting Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989)). To qualify as a final policymaking official, an official must have the responsibility and authority to “implement the final municipal policy with respect to a particular course of action.” Riddick, 238 F.3d at 523 (emphasis in original). This is also true in a case such as this involving inaction or acquiescence. Id. Here, the City Manager simply does not possess the relevant final policymaking authority. As discussed at length in the March 9 Opinion, the construction, renovation, and the structural maintenance of local jails in Virginia are, under the Code of Virginia, the responsibilities of local governments— in this case, the City. Brown, 308 F.Supp.2d at 698-701. The Code of Virginia, however, does not further define what individuals within the various local governments are to exercise final decisionmaking policy respecting local jails. Local positive law, however, specifically Section 4-02 of the Richmond City Charter (the “City Charter”), states that all powers vested generally in the City, unless otherwise specified, shall be exercised by the City Council, Richmond’s local legislative body. Further, under Section 6-19 of the City Charter, the final authority to adopt a budget for any capital improvements, including the building of a new jail or structural improvements to an existing jail facility, also resides with the City Council. The decisional law, of course, is that final policymaking authority, depending on the controlling state or local law, can be shared between several individuals or entities; similarly, final policymaking authority can be delegated from the actual policy-making authority to a lower-level entity or individual. Riddick, 238 F.3d at 523. Here, the City Charter establishes that the City Manager has the responsibility for drafting, annually, a list of proposed capital improvement projects for the ensuing fiscal year and an attendant budget, along “with his/her recommendations as to the means of financing the improvements proposed.” City Charter, § 6-19. In other words, Section 6-19 dictates that the City Manager is to advise the City Council on the City’s financial matters and to prepare a draft budget in which he or she is to account for any needed capital projects. Moreover, the City Charter states that the City Manager is to bring any perceived problems or issues facing the City to the City Council. Notably, the paradigm set forth in the City Charter is reflected in the deposition testimony from this case. During deposition, Dr. Jamison and Brown’s counsel had the following exchange: Q: What would be the procedures, as far as you know to get a new jail approved? Who would be a final decision maker on behalf of the City to approve a new jail? A: At the end of the day, the vote would have to come from City Council. Q: [But] who makes the recommendations to City Council for such things as say a new jail? A: That would come from the City Manager. Jamison Depo., Feb. 19, 2004, at 19. Later in the deposition, Brown’s counsel returned to the topic: Q: And policy issues, where would that fall, policy issues for the Richmond City Jail? A: Policy issues at the end of the day are going to be Council issues .... Q: But you’re the designee though for matters that come before the Council; is that not right? A: Correct. Id. at 81. Pointing to the fact that, under the City Charter, impetus for any capital improvements or budgetary projects, such as those that might have remedied the Jail’s allegedly unconstitutional infirmities, stem originally from the City Manager’s Office, Brown argues that the City Manager constitutes the final decisionmaking authority as to the authority here at issue. That argument, however, is not correct. In the time leading up to Stevenson’s death, the City Manager, under the City Charter, certainly possessed the ability to include a proposal for a new jail or for capital improvements to the existing facility in his budget recommendations. Similarly, the City Manager had the duty to advise the City Council on the financial needs of the City and to make any other recommendations that he saw fit, see City Charter, § 5-05, and, in this capacity, arguably possessed a responsibility to advise the City Council to remedy the situation at the Jail. The discretion inherent in the City Manager’s job, however, does not equate to final decisionmaking authority. Riddick, 238 F.3d at 523. Rather, at least as respects capital improvements and the municipality’s budget, the City Manager’s role is one of advisor and recommender. Stated another way, although Dr. Jamison certainly influences greatly the topics that come before the City Council, the ability to adopt final decisions on topics relevant to this suit does not reside in his office. Pursuant to Section 6-10 of the City Charter, after the City Manager submits a draft budget, the City Council may increase, decrease, or strike out items of expenditure in the proposed budget. And, perhaps more importantly for the present discussion, the City Council may insert completely new items of expenditure that did not appear in the City Manager’s draft submission. City Charter, § 6-10. In other words, the City Council is not bound by the draft budget submitted by the City Manager’s office; rather, the local legislative body has the power and responsibility to alter the proposal as it sees fit. Thus, if the City Manager had recommended capital improvements to the Jail or the building of a new facility, the City Council would have been in no way bound to adopt any such recommendation. And, on a related piece, considering that the City Council itself possesses the ability and the duty to insert any needed expenditures into the City’s budget completely apart from the City Manager’s recommendations, the fact that the City Manager failed to make any such recommendation does not absolve the City of potential fault. Likewise, if the City Manager had, in his capacity as advisor to the City Council, see City Charter, § 5-05, recommended a course of action respecting the physical structure and capacity of the Jail, the City Council would not have been obligated to accept or act upon such advice. And, although the City Charter requires the City Manager to lodge with the City Council “such recommendations as may seem to him ... desirable”, id., the City Charter in no way suggests that the local legislature’s only source of ideas or impetus is the City Manager. In sum, therefore, at least as respects capital improvements and the Jail, as a matter of local law, although the City Manager certainly has the duty to advise and to make recommendations, Dr. Jamison’s office is not the repository of final policy-making authority. Riddick, 238 F.3d at 523-24. Rather, the City Charter vests that role in the City Council. As a matter of law, the Court holds that, as respects Brown’s Section 1983 suit against the City, the City Council constitutes the final poli-cymaking entity. That holding, however, is not fatal to Brown’s Section 1983 case against the City because the record contains substantial evidence that, when construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, would permit the jury to conclude that the City Council itself had knowledge of the conditions at the Jail and engaged in an official policy or custom of inaction towards the Jail in the period leading up to Stevenson’s death. Pis. Reply Mem. Regarding Final Policymaker, May 26, 2004, at 3. And, because the City Council constitutes the final policymaking authority respecting the Jail, this evidence is sufficient for purposes of summary judgment and the Monell “custom or policy” requirement. For example, Dr. Jamison testified that, throughout his tenure as City Manager, he repeatedly discussed the problems at the Jail and several proposed solutions with the en bane City Council. Jamison Depo., Feb. 19, 2004, at 47. In fact, under the City Charter, it was his duty to pass along Mitchell’s points respecting the Jail to the City Council and otherwise to bring the problems at the Jail to the City Council’s attention. It cannot be presumed that the City Manager did not perform his duty to do those things. And, to its credit, the City does not argue otherwise. Further, Deputy City Manager Johnson testified respecting several meetings he has had with individual members of the City Council regarding the need to correct conditions at the Jail. Johnson Depo., March 17, 2004, at 44. In other words, Johnson testified that, throughout his tenure as deputy, he has discussed the Jail’s problems and several possible solutions with City Council members. Mitchell too has offered testimony relevant to this topic. She stated: [Djuring budget time, we prepare a budget document. And, this is something that my office will compile. And, it’s basically a book. It outlines our major issues, what our challenges are and what we feel would remedy those challenges. And we present that during our budget time. And, I’ve also ensured that during budget time, we also make those documents available to the members of City Council. Mitchell Depo., Feb. 19, 2004, at 58 (emphasis added). Among the topics that Mitchell addressed in the budget process was the need for a new, or expanded, jail to alleviate severe overcrowding, as well as the need to remedy the temperature problems at the Jail. Mitchell also discussed these needs with Dr. Jamison and Johnson for the purpose of getting them before the City Council. And, from the testimony of Dr. Jamison and Johnson, it is obvious that these topics were presented to the City Counsel en banc and to its members individually. Also, the City Council authorized, and funded, the 1994 CBCP study, and the 1996 addendum thereto, as well as the study that led to the 2001 CBCP. Further, to implement part of the 1994 CBCP and the 1996 addendum thereto, the City Council actually earmarked funds for corrective work at the Jail but then, in 1997, designated those same funds for other uses. One cannot presume that the City Council made the original allocation of funds without being aware of the conditions sought to be remedied by the allocation. Nor can it be presumed that the City Council was unmindful of its purpose for making the original allocation when it redesignated the use of those funds in 1997. Brown also is entitled to the inference that the members of the City Council have noted these CBCP reports and understood their content. As mentioned, the several CBCP reports documented that the Jail suffered from overcrowding, was in general disrepair, and was incapable of housing properly the City’s inmate population. Finally, by the late 1990s, the conditions at the Jail appear to have been a matter of public knowledge. During her deposition, Mitchell noted that two local papers, the Richmond Times-Dispatch (the “Times-Dispatch”) and the Richmond Free Press (the “Free Press”), had, throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, run various stories respecting the conditions at the Jail, particularly the gross overpopulation and the problems associated therewith. For instance, Mitchell recounted that the Times-Dispatch produced several articles respecting the 1999 staphylococci infection at the Jail. Mitchell Depo., Feb. 19, 2004, at 108. Mitchell also testified respecting a 2000 article in the Free Press headlined “Sheriff Lobbies to Eliminate Jail Overcrowding,” in which the paper recounted the Jail’s structural and population problems. Id. at 115. A reasonable jury could conclude that members of City Council were aware of the conditions at the Jail as prominently reported in these two local newspapers. Indeed, it is compelling that the City does not even argue that the City Council was not fully aware of the deplorable conditions at the Jail. Taken as a whole, the record would permit a reasonable jury to find that the City Council, and hence the City, was aware of the long history of overcrowding, poor ventilation, and structural defects at the Jail and the risks that those conditions posed, including the risk of spreading infectious disease. Moreover, a jury could conclude that the Jail’s conditions violated established federal constitutional rights. And, the record clearly would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the well-established custom and policy of the City was to be deliberately indifferent to the rights allegedly violated. (B) Causation Offering sufficient proof to support a finding of an official policy or custom, however, is not the only hurdle that Brown faces in surviving summary judgment respecting Count I. In addition to meeting the policy or custom requirement of Monell, a Section 1983 plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability also must show a causal nexus between the municipality’s custom or policy and the complained of injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Gordon v. Kidd, 971 F.2d 1087, 1097 (4th Cir.1992). Specifically, at the summary judgment stage, a Section 1988 plaintiff must offer sufficient evidence to support a finding that an “affirmative causal link” exists between the alleged custom or policy and the complained of injury. Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir.1999). Here, the City maintains that Brown has failed to raise a triable issue of fact respecting a causal connection between the conditions at the Jail and Stevenson’s contraction of, and subsequent death from, bacterial meningitis. The City’s argument is predicated principally on the undisputed facts that an individual may be colonized with bacterial meningitis for several years before succumbing to illness and that the acute onset of meningitis illness can occur spontaneously without regard to external factors. The City, referencing these facts, argues that Stevenson could have been colonized with bacterial meningitis either before or after he was incarcerated and could have succumbed to actual illness spontaneously and without regard to the Jail’s conditions. Specifically, the City notes that the Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Barry Farr (“Dr. Farr”), himself admitted at deposition that an individual may be colonized with bacterial meningitis for several years before becoming ill. Moreover, Dr. Farr has conceded that an individual can progress from mere colonization with meningitis bacteria to acute illness spontaneously, that is, without regard to any external or other factors (e.g., excessive heat, overcrowded conditions, or a preceding illness such as influenza). Pointing to these statements of Dr. Farr, the City posits that it is impossible to say within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Stevenson became colonized while in custody or that the onset of his illness was caused by the conditions at the Jail. The City’s argument, however, ignores the true import of Dr. Farr’s opinions. Although he admits that, due to the pathology of bacterial meningitis, one cannot be absolutely sure that Stevenson was not colonized with the fatal bacteria prior to his incarceration, Dr. Farr has testified, relying on published and peer-reviewed studies and data, that the great majority of individuals who manifest illness as a result of colonization with bacterial meningitis do so shortly after exposure to the bacteria. Farr Depo., March 16, 2004, at 17, 34. Indeed, Dr. Farr has opined, based on his review of published studies and data, that the majority of individuals who become ill as a result of bacterial meningitis colonization do so within ten to fourteen days after colonization. And, taking into account Stevenson’s condition at the time of incarceration and thereafter and considering that Stevenson had been incarcerated in excess of two weeks at the point that he began to manifest symptoms of the illness, Dr. Farr concludes, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Stevenson was exposed to the infecting strain of bacteria subsequent to his entering into the Jail. Likewise, Dr. Farr has opined, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the conditions at the Jail — in particular the gross overcrowding and poor ventilation present there — were major contributing factors in Stevenson’s contraction of bacterial meningitis and his subsequent manifestation of the illness that caused his death. Farr Depo., March 16, 2004, at 30, 53. To this end, referencing various published studies and texts, Dr. Farr notes that overcrowded and poorly ventilated situations are common areas in which bacterial meningitis can easily spread. He further notes that external conditions such as overcrowding and insufficient ventilation are classic textbook examples of factors likely to cause a person colonized with bacterial meningitis to succumb to illness. Thus, Dr. Farr opines, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the overcrowded and poorly ventilated conditions at the Jail caused or contributed to cause Stevenson’s contraction of bacterial meningitis and the subsequent onset of the acute illness. Through the testimony of Dr. Farr and the record respecting conditions at the Jail, the Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact respecting whether the asserted official custom or policy of the City of ignoring the grossly overcrowded and poorly ventilated conditions at the Jail caused or contributed to cause Stevenson’s illness and death. Thus, Brown has offered sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on the requisite causal element of her Section 1983 case against the City. Carter, 164 F.3d at 221. In sum, therefore, Brown has raised triable issues of fact respecting whether the City had an official policy or custom of deliberate indifference towards the known problems at the Jail and whether this custom or policy caused or contributed to cause Stevenson’s death. The City’s motion for summary judgment respecting Count I, therefore, will be denied. III. Sheriff Mitchell Brown’s FAC asserts three claims against Mitchell, two under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I and II) and one under Virginia state law (Count V). Mitchell appears to have moved for summary judgment on all three counts. Mitchell’s motion for summary judgment, however, is a model of generalized assertion, unsupported by legal citation. For that reason, and because of the stream of consciousness style employed in the memorandum supporting the motion, it is difficult to identify Mitchell’s contentions or to analyze them. Indeed, the motion for summary judgment is structured without reference to any specific count, instead purporting to seek summary judgment on general topics. This unorthodox approach perhaps would warrant summary denial of the motion for summary judgment because it is not the responsibility of the Court to ferret out, from a brief, the legal contentions of the moving party and then to find legal and evidentiary support for them. Likewise, it is not the responsibility of the nonmoving party to engage in a similar exercise in rebutting a motion for summary judgment. Rather, as is elementary in summary judgment jurisprudence, that is the responsibility of the moving party, here Mitchell. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). For instance, in her papers, Mitchell argues that the record contains an insufficient factual basis for certain of Brown’s claims. Although a party obviously may base its request for summary judgment on a lack of proof in the record as to a particular claim, the moving party must first demonstrate an absence of proof on that claim. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Moreover, it is settled beyond peradventure that the moving party must demonstrate, by citing legal authority, that the law supports its request for summary judgment. Mitchell’s motion for summary judgment violates these fundamental precepts. Upon close and generous examination, however, the Court finds that Mitchell’s papers permit the identification of issues as outlined below. Thus, notwithstanding Mitchell’s unorthodox and unacceptable style and the difficulty that it has presented, the Court is obligated to undertake a reasonable and fair construction of her contentions as best that they can be grasped. (A) The Motion for Summary Judgment, as Mitchell Puts it, for “Claims Based on Maintenance and Cleaning” at the Jail As mentioned, in moving for summary judgment, Mitchell has not, to any real extent, engaged in an individualized analysis of the three separate claims pending against her. Rather, she has sought summary judgment on broad topics and areas. Thus, under the heading “No Claim Based on Maintenance and Cleaning,” Mitchell makes the following assertion— and only the following assertion — as the basis for summary judgment