Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION HUDSON, District Judge. On September 20, 1999, Petitioner, Robin McKennel Lovitt (“Lovitt”), was convicted in the Circuit Court for Arlington County of both robbery and capital murder. Following a sentencing hearing on March 1, 2000, and in accordance with the jury verdict, Lovitt was sentenced to death. Thereafter, on both direct appeal and in collateral state proceedings, Lovitt unsuccessfully challenged his death sentence. He now petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter is now before the Court on Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition. For the reasons stated below, Respondent’s motion shall be granted. 1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND [I]n the early morning hours of November 18, 1998, Clayton Dicks was stabbed six times in the chest and back while working during the overnight shift at Champion Billiards Hall (the pool hall) in Arlington County. A few months before the killing, Lovitt worked as a cook at the pool hall on an evening shift that ended when Dicks arrived to begin the overnight shift. Amy Hudon, the manager at the pool hall, testified that about two months before Dicks was killed, she had trouble opening a cash register drawer near a pool table and asked Lovitt to help her open the drawer. Lovitt opened it by “wedging” a pair of scissors into the drawer’s latch. About two months before the killing, Lovitt quit working at the pool hall. [On November 18, 1998,] Dicks arrived at the pool hall between 1:30 and 2:00 a.m. The other employees present when Dicks arrived had left the pool hall by 3:00 a.m., leaving Dicks as the sole employee on the premises.... About 3:25 a.m., Jose N. Alvarado and Carlos Clavell entered the pool hall and saw two men arguing behind the bar. Alvarado testified that one man was shorter than the other, and that the shorter man repeatedly shoved the taller man, who was wearing an apron. Alvarado stated that he and Clavell watched as the shorter man stabbed the taller man six or seven times with a silver-colored weapon. Alvarado saw blood on the taller man’s apron and watched as the taller man fell to the floor behind the bar. Clavell testified that he heard the taller man begging the shorter man to stop attacking him. Both Alvarado and Clavell saw the assailant repeatedly kick the man who had fallen to the floor. Alvarado and Clavell immediately ran from the pool hall to a service station, where Alvarado telephoned the “911” emergency response number and reported what they had seen. Although Alvarado could not identify Lovitt as Dicks’ assailant at the preliminary hearing held in this case, Alvarado testified at trial that he was about “80% certain” that Lovitt was the assailant. When police and emergency medical personnel arrived at the pool hall in response to Alvarado’s telephone call, they found Dicks lying on the floor behind the bar in a pool of blood. Dicks was alive but was unable to speak and was taken by helicopter to a nearby hospital. The multiple stab wounds prevented his heart from functioning, and he died while awaiting surgery. Dicks had been stabbed six times, five times in the chest and once in the back. Four of these wounds were lethal. Dicks also suffered two areas of internal hemorrhage on both sides of his head, as well as external abrasions on both shoulders and on his left knee. The police recovered from the pool hall a cash register that was lying on the floor near where Dicks was found. The register was broken into pieces, the cash drawer had been removed from the register and was missing, and a torn piece of a ten-dollar bill was found nearby. A pair of scissors with orange handles that was usually kept in a container on the bar was missing. A police canine unit found an orange-handled pair of scissors bearing blood lying open in the woods about 15 yards behind the pool hall. Warren A. Grant, Lovitt’s cousin, testified that Lovitt arrived at Grant’s home in the early morning hours of November 18, 1998. Grant lived about a quarter of a mile from the pool hall in a residential area located on the “other side” of the woods. Grant stated that Lovitt knocked on his door sometime between 1:30 and 3:00 a.m. Lovitt ... entered the house carrying what looked like a large, square, gray metal box. After Lovitt unsuccessfully tried to opened the locked box, Grant eventually opened it by using a screwdriver to “pop” some of the screws securing the box. Lovitt removed money from the opened cash register drawer and divided the cash between himself and Grant. Lovitt left the cash register drawer with Grant and instructed him to “get rid of [it].” A few days later, Grant began cutting the cash drawer into pieces with tin snips and put them in a bag. On November 20, 1989, Arlington Detective Noel E. Hanrahan obtained pieces of the cash register drawer from Grant. Four days later, Lovitt was arrested and charged with the present offenses .... When Officer Stephen Ferrone collected Lovitt’s clothing at the jail, Ferrone asked a detective whether he needed to seize Lovitt’s jacket. Ferrone testified that, upon hearing this question, Lovitt stated, “I wasn’t wearing it when it happened.” Julian J. Mason, Jr., a forensic scientist employed by the Virginia Division of Forensic Science, qualified as an expert witness on the subject of tool mark identification. He testified that the cash register drawer Grant surrendered to the police had been removed from the broken cash register found on the floor of the pool hall. Mason also stated that the pry marks on the cash register drawer were made by the scissors that were found in the woods behind the pool hall. Carol Palmer, a forensic scientist employed by the Virginia Department of Forensic Science, qualified as an expert witness on DNA testing. Palmer extracted human DNA from two places on the scissors, on a blade near the tip and on a blade near the finger loops. She also extracted blood from three small circular areas on the left front side of Lovitt’s jacket, but the DNA tests were inconclusive and Palmer was unable to determine whether the blood on the jacket was human.... .... The DNA extracted from the tip of the scissors displayed a DNA profile that matched the DNA profile of Dicks. The profile derived from this sample did not match the DNA profiles of either Lovitt or Grant, thus eliminating both as contributors of this DNA. Palmer stated that the chance of someone other than Dicks contributing the DNA sample on the tip of the scissors was 1 in more than 5.5 billion. The DNA extracted from the mid-section of the scissors also matched the DNA profile of Dicks. However, Palmer stated that this DNA evidence, unlike the DNA evidence from the tip of the scissors, did not exclude either Lovitt or Grant and, thus, was inconclusive as to them. After Lovitt’s arrest, he was incarcerated in the Arlington County Jail in the same unit as Casel Lucas. Lovitt and Lucas developed a friendship during the two months that they lived together in this unit. Lovitt first told Lucas that after leaving the bathroom at the pool hall on the night of the murder, Lovitt saw a Hispanic man stabbing Dicks. Lovitt told Lucas that, at that time, Lovitt saw the cash register drawer, grabbed it, and ran from the pool hall. According to Lucas, Lovitt later stated that he knew Dicks and was aware that no one else would be in the pool hall late at night. Lovitt further related that he waited in the bathroom until everyone left the pool hall before coming out of the bathroom to attempt to open the cash register drawer. Dicks confronted Lovitt as he unsuccessfully attempted to open the cash drawer. Lovitt told Lucas that he had to kill Dicks because Dicks had recognized him. According to Lovitt, Dicks asked him, “Why [are] you doing this?” Lovitt admitted to Lucas that he stabbed Dicks several times and took the cash register drawer to his cousin’s house where he and his cousin split the money before leaving to buy some drugs. Lovitt told Lucas that he discarded the murder weapon while en route to or from Grant’s house, and that he changed his clothes at Grant’s house because he had blood on his shirt and pants. During the penalty phase of the trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence of Lovitt’s criminal record. In October 1975, when Lovitt was 11 years old, he was charged with assault and placed in protective supervision. Also as a juvenile, in August 1979, Lovitt was committed to Beaumont Learning Center of the State Department of Corrections (Beaumont) based on adjudication of charges of breaking and entering and larceny. While at Beaumont, Lovitt was disciplined for fighting, assault, and possessing contraband items. After his release from Beaumont in 1980, Lovitt was convicted of grand larceny in 1981 and was sentenced to 12 months in jail. Between 1983 and 1985, Lovitt was convicted of petit larceny, grand larceny, breaking and entering, and distribution of marijuana. In 1986, Lovitt was convicted of attempted robbery and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of from one to three years. After being released on parole in August 1987, Lov-itt’s parole was revoked in August 1988 based, in part, on additional arrests and his failure to pass certain drug tests. Lovitt later was convicted of statutory burglary and grand larceny. While incarcerated on these convictions and the parole violation, Lovitt was disciplined for damaging property and for fighting. In September 1990, Lovitt again was released on parole. In early 1991, Lov-itt was convicted of possession of cocaine, grand larceny, and burglary. While incarcerated on these charges, Lovitt was the subject of ten disciplinary actions for offenses including possession of contraband, disobeying direct orders, assault, possession of intoxicants, and manufacturing “shank handles.” After being released on parole in October 1996, Lovitt was convicted in 1997 of possession of marijuana, petit larceny, unlawful entry, assault and battery, and destruction of property. Lovitt was on parole at the time of the present offenses. In October 1998, Arlington County Police Officer Jerome A. Lee detained Lov-itt in an apartment parking lot in Arlington. Lovitt had parked his car behind the apartments, appeared to be very nervous, and consented to a search of his vehicle. Lee found a long kitchen knife on the floor of the passenger area and a soda can used to smoke crack cocaine in the rear floor area of the vehicle. Lovitt presented testimony from his sister, [Lamanda] Jones, who testified that Lovitt was the oldest of 12 children and that he helped take care of his younger siblings, although not “gladly.” Lovitt also presented testimony from four deputies employed by the Arlington County Sheriffs Office, who stated that Lovitt had not presented any disciplinary problems while being held in jail on the present charges. Lovitt I, 260 Va. at 502-08, 537 S.E.2d at 870-73. In May of 2001, about six months after the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Lovitt’s convictions, the Circuit Court for Arlington County entered an order authorizing the destruction of the exhibits entered into evidence at Lovitt’s trial. Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 229, 585 S.E.2d at 808. Pursuant to that order, all of the exhibits received in evidence at trial, with the exception of one chart, were destroyed. Id. II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND HABEAS STANDARD During the sentencing phase of trial, after the jury concluded that Petitioner poses a future danger to society and that the murder he committed was outrageously and wantonly vile, they fixed Lovitt’s punishment for capital murder at death. As punishment for the robbery, the jury sentenced him to life imprisonment. Lov-itt appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. See Lovitt I, 260 Va. at 520, 537 S.E.2d at 881. On October 1, 2001, the United States Supreme Court denied Lov-itt’s petition for a writ of certiorari from the state court’s final judgment. Lovitt v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 815, 122 S.Ct. 41, 151 L.Ed.2d 14 (2001). Thereafter, Lovitt filed a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging, among other things, that the Supreme Court of Virginia, by ratifying the Commonwealth’s destruction of trial exhibits, prevented him from obtaining an adequate habeas review and, in so doing, violated his right to due process. Second, he alleged that the prosecution willfully and unlawfully suppressed exculpatory evidence, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). And finally, he argued that, at trial, he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After reviewing Lovitt’s petition, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that it raised disputed issues of fact that could not be resolved without a full evidentiary hearing. Thus, the Supreme Court directed the Circuit Court of Arlington County (“the circuit court”) to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding each of Lovitt’s disputed factual claims, pursuant to Virginia Code Section 8.01-654(C). Prior to the hearing, the circuit court granted Lovitt leave to take extensive discovery, including the depositions of the two Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorneys who prosecuted his case and that of a deputy circuit court clerk. Additionally, Lovitt was granted leave to subpoena the social services records of many of his family members from a variety of government agencies. Likewise, he requested and was granted copies of relevant records from the prosecutors’ files. After the discovery period expired, the circuit court conducted a comprehensive, two-day evidentiary hearing (“the habeas hearing” or “the evidentiary hearing”). At the conclusion of that hearing, the circuit court wrote a report describing the court’s extensive findings of fact and its recommended conclusions of law. Upon receipt of those findings and recommendations, the Supreme Court of Virginia ordered the parties to fully brief, and then orally argue, the disputed issues. Although the Supreme Court of Virginia was bound by all of the circuit court’s factual findings that were not either plainly wrong or without evidentiary support, see Hedrick v. Warden, 264 Va. 486, 496, 570 S.E.2d 840 (2002), it reviewed each issue of mixed law and fact de novo. See Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 229, 585 S.E.2d at 808. Following the dismissal of Lovitt’s second state application for post-conviction relief, Lovitt filed a federal writ of habeas corpus with this Court under Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 2254 (“ § 2254”), which has been amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996. Under § 2254(d)(1), this Court may issue a writ of habeas corpus only if Lovitt’s state habeas proceedings resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). The Supreme Court has interpreted an “unreasonable application” of law to mean a state court’s application of established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, in an objectively unreasonable way. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843. This is not to say that a federal court can grant habeas relief “simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Rather, under the “unreasonable application” clause, this Court may grant relief only if the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle but unreasonably applied it to the facts of Lov-itt’s case. Id. at 407-08, 120 S.Ct. 1495. III. PETITIONER’S GROUNDS FOR FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF In support of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Lovitt makes a number of claims. First, he argues that the Supreme Court of Virginia unreasonably determined the relevant facts and unreasonably applied Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, to his claims that the government unlawfully suppressed certain exculpatory evidence that was material to his defense. Second, Lovitt contends that the state court unreasonably erred by failing to consider the misconduct of the Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorneys, each of whom made “intentional misrepresentations” to the jury. Third, he maintains that the Supreme Court of Virginia unreasonably applied Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984), to the facts of his case by finding that the Commonwealth’s post-conviction destruction of certain evidence was neither done in bad faith nor material to the defense. Fourth and finally, Lovitt argues that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), by holding that his attorneys were not ineffective during the penalty phase of trial. In the substantive portion of the opinion that follows, the Court will review each of these allegations in turn. IV. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL BAR As the respondent concedes, each of Lovitt’s pending habeas claims has been “exhausted” within the meaning of Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 2254(b), either because it was presented to the Supreme Court of Virginia on direct appeal or habeas review or because it was never presented to the Supreme Court and now cannot be presented to that court under Virginia Code Section 8.01-654(B)(2), which generally prohibits successive habeas petitions. Any habeas claim that, even though “exhausted” under § 2254(b), has also been procedurally defaulted may not be reviewed on its merits. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996). In this case, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that one of Lovitt’s claims, that relating to the prosecutors’ alleged misconduct, was defaulted under Virginia Code Section 8.01-654(B)(2). Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 244 n. 4, 585 S.E.2d at 817 n. 4. Although Lovitt contests the Supreme Court’s finding of procedural default, he also alleges that sufficient cause and prejudice exist so as to excuse any potential default of such a claim. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). The Court will take up the default issue in due course. See Part XIII, infra. V. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL STANDARDS GOVERNING FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF In its determination of whether habeas relief is warranted, this Court is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d) and (e). Under Section 2254(e), “a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus based on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Supreme Court has emphasized that this standard places an additional hurdle before federal habeas petitioners who must demonstrate not only that the state court’s decision was erroneous or incorrect but also that it was unreasonable. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495. VI.LOVITT’S AFFIDAVIT As a preliminary matter, along with his petition for habeas corpus relief, Petitioner also .filed a six-page affidavit, which he executed on March 5, 2004. Lovitt’s affidavit offers testimony regarding (1) the Commonwealth’s witness Casel Lucas; (2) the failure of trial counsel to adequately investigate Lovitt’s background; and (3) how the Arlington Circuit Court deputy clerk’s destruction of evidence has precluded him from seeking additional DNA testing. After a thorough review of both Lovitt’s affidavit and the complete state court record, this Court is of the opinion that although Lovitt had ample opportunity to develop the factual information contained in his affidavit during the state habeas proceedings, he chose not to do so. Consequently, under § 2254(e)(2), this Court is barred from considering such evidence. VII. PETITIONER’S BRADY CLAIMS In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant’s due process rights are violated when the prosecution suppresses evidence that is material to either guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Evidence is “material” under Brady “only where there exists a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed the result at trial would have been different.” Goins v. Angelone, 52 F.Supp.2d 638, 674 (E.D.Va.1999) (quoting Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5, 116 S.Ct. 7, 133 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995)). In his petition, Lovitt contends that the Supreme Court of Virginia unreasonably denied relief on his claims that the Commonwealth violated Brady by (1) failing to disclose Dr. Pierre-Louis’s opinion regarding the alleged murder weapon; (2) failing to disclose Casel Lucas’s lengthy history as an informant; and (3) by failing to explore how the cumulative impact of these failures prejudiced Lovitt’s defense and undermined confidence in the verdict. A. The Commonwealth’s Suppression of Dr. Pierre-Louis’s Scissors Opinion Lovitt first claims that the Supreme Court of Virginia unreasonably applied Brady when it determined that the Commonwealth was not required to disclose the pre-trial opinion of the medical examiner, Dr. Pierre-Louis, vis-a-vis the two pairs of scissors she examined at autopsy. With respect to this issue, the state court reviewed the record and made the following factual findings: Dr. Marie-Lydie Y. Pierre-Louis was the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Clayton Dicks. Among those present during the autopsy were Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney Margaret E. Lair-Eastman (Eastman), one of the prosecuting attorneys at Lov-itt’s trial, and Detective Stuart Chase of the Arlington County Police Department. During the autopsy, Dr. Pierre-Louis was shown two pairs of scissors recovered from a container next to the cash register near the location where Dicks’ body was found. Dr. Pierre-Louis was not shown the orange-handled pair of scissors found with blood on the blade tip (the bloody scissors), discovered in the woods behind the pool hall and admitted into evidence at Lovitt’s trial. The autopsy report prepared by Dr. Pierre-Louis indicated that each of Dicks’ six stab wounds displayed a blunt and a sharp edge. The wounds ranged in depth between three and eight inches, and three of these wounds were between six and eight inches deep. The autopsy report further indicated that one of the pairs of scissors examined by Dr. Pierre-Louis had a total length of eight-and-one-half inches with blades that were three-and-one-half inches long and one-half inch wide at the base. The other pair of scissors she examined was six-and-one-half inches in length and had blades that were three inches long and one-half inch wide at the base. At the autopsy, Dr. Pierre-Louis told Eastman and Detective Chase that neither of the two pairs of scissors that she examined could have been the murder weapon because the length and width of their blades were not consistent with the nature and dimensions of Dicks’ stab wounds. Dr. Pierre-Louis also told Eastman and Chase that she would have to examine the bloody scissors before she could reach a conclusion whether those scissors were the source of Dicks’ wounds. Dr. Pierre-Louis’ opinion concerning the two pairs of scissors she examined was not included in the autopsy report. Neither Eastman nor anyone else in the prosecutor’s office informed Lovitt’s trial counsel of Dr. Pierre-Louis’ opinion. During Lovitt’s trial, Dr. Pierre-Louis was not asked to give her opinion concerning the two pairs of scissors that she had examined, nor was she asked to opine whether the bloody scissors admitted into evidence were consistent with Dicks’ stab wounds. Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 231-32, 585 S.E.2d at 810. Lovitt assigns error to a number of the state court’s factual and legal conclusions because each, he argues, was based on an unreasonable application of Brady. First, according to Lovitt, the Supreme Court of Virginia unreasonably determined that the scissors Dr. Pierre-Louis examined at autopsy were different in size from the “bloody scissors” the Commonwealth alleged to be the murder weapon. Second, the court unreasonably found that the doctor’s initial opinion was not exculpatory. And third, the Supreme Court of Virginia unreasonably held that Dr. Pierre-Louis’s initial opinion was not material. A Brady violation has three essential elements: (1) the evidence must be favorable to the accused; (2) it must have been suppressed by the government, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the suppression must have been material, i.e., it must have prejudiced the defense at trial. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 299-300 (4th Cir.2003). Under the second prong of Brady, it is clear that the government suppressed Dr. Pierre-Louis’s initial scissors opinion. The real question, under the first prong, is whether that opinion, in and of itself, would have been exculpatory to the defendant. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436-37, 115 S.Ct. 1555. 1. Dr. Pierre-Louis’s Initial Opinion Lovitt first takes issue with the Supreme Court of Virginia’s finding that the medical examiner’s initial opinion was not exculpatory because the scissors she analyzed were “not introduced into evidence, were not the alleged murder weapon, and were not shown to be the same size as the alleged murder weapon.” Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 245, 585 S.E.2d at 818. Instead, Lovitt argues that because one of the pairs of scissors presented to Dr. Pierre-Louis at autopsy “had blades that were identical in size^ — 3]é inches long and 1/2-inch wide — to the ‘missing,’ bloody scissors found behind the pool hall and later introduced at trial as the alleged murder weapon,” her opinion was exculpatory and should.have been disclosed. See Pet. at 6-7. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, a circuit court judge reviewing evidence on this topic heard testimony from three sources: Dr. Pierre-Louis, Detective Chase, and Deputy Commonwealth’s Attorney Barbara Walker. Reevaluating that evidence, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the medical examiner’s statements were not exculpatory: We first consider Dr. Pierre-Louis’ comment made at the autopsy that the two pairs of scissors she was shown were not consistent with Dicks’ wounds. As stated above, both Detective Chase and Barbara Walker testified'that these scissors were not the same size as the bloody scissors, which were the scissors introduced at trial. In addition, after the bloody scissors were subjected to DNA testing, which showed that Dicks’ blood was on the tip of the scissors, ■ Dr. Pierre-Louis told Detective Chase that she had been wrong in her earlier conclusion regarding the pairs of scissors she examined. We conclude that Dr. Pierre-Louis’ opinion concerning the scissors presented at the autopsy was not exculpatory evidence because that opinion related to scissors that were not introduced into evidence, were not the alleged murder weapon, and were not shown to be the .same size as the alleged murder weapon. Her initial opinion also was not exculpatory in light of the circuit court’s factual finding, supported by the testimony of Detective Chase, that Dr. Pierre-Louis changed her opinion before trial. Therefore, we hold that the prosecution was not required to provide the defense information concerning Dr. Pierre-Louis’ initial opinion stated at the autopsy. Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 245, 585 S.E.2d at 818. Although Lovitt questions that finding, arguing that Dr. Pierre-Louis’s initial opinion would have undermined the Commonwealth’s theory of the case, he fails to explain how the Commonwealth’s disclosure of Dr. Pierre-Louis’s opinion would have been favorable to his defense. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. On the contrary, regardless of the size and dimensions of the scissors presented to Dr. Pierre-Louis during the autopsy, it is clear from the record that neither was the pair of “bloody scissors” the police retrieved from the killer’s alleged escape route. In additionj Dr. Pierre-Louis gave no opinion, either during the autopsy or at trial, regarding likelihood that the “bloody scissors” were the murder weapon. Consequently, even had her initial opinion been revealed to the defense, it would only have served to rule out the two pairs of pool hall scissors, both of which were unrelated to the alleged murder weapon. The Court’s analysis of this issue is unhampered by Lovitt’s attempt to cull the record for discrepancies between the trial evidence and the post-conviction hearing testimony, the totality of which he believes demonstrates a due process violation. First and foremost, it bears emphasis that, prior to trial, Lovitt obtained a copy of the autopsy report, access to all of the physical evidence in the ease including the bloody scissors, and the advice of an expert from the Northern Virginia Forensic Laboratory. Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 234-35, 585 S.E.2d at 811. Second, according to Lov-itt’s own expert, a pair of scissors of the same approximate size and dimension as the “bloody” scissors could have caused the wounds suffered by Dicks. Id. And finally, although two separate state courts heard disputed testimony regarding the various sizes and dimensions of the scissors, each independently concluded that the scissors Dr. Pierre-Louis observed at autopsy were different in size and shape from the scissors used to murder the decedent. Moreover, as both the circuit court and the Supreme Court of Virginia found, prior to trial, Lovitt’s attorney, Denman Rucker, had access to Dr. Pierre-Louis and could have asked her to compare the victim’s wounds to the various pairs of scissors. Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 234, 585 S.E.2d at 811. “Where the exculpatory information is not only available to the defendant but also lies in a source where a reasonable defendant would have looked, a defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the Brady doctrine.” United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378, 381 (4th Cir.1990). Consequently, this Court must agree with the Supreme Court of Virginia. “Lovitt cannot show he was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s failure to inform him of Dr. Pierre-Louis’[s] initial opinion, because he was aware of the issues involving scissors of that approximate size and investigated those issues as part of his defense ....” Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 246, 585 S.E.2d at 818. Moreover, it is this Court’s opinion that, under Brady and its progeny, the Supreme Court of Virginia reasonably concluded that even had the Commonwealth disclosed the doctor’s scissors opinion to the defense, it is unlikely that such evidence would have affected the outcome of the trial. Thus, the doctor’s comments were not exculpatory, and the Commonwealth did not violate Lovitt’s due process rights by failing to disclose them. 2. The Doctor’s Pre-Trial “Recantation” of Her Initial Opinion Next, the Court must address whether the Supreme Court of Virginia reasonably determined that Dr. Pierre-Louis’s opinion was not exculpatory because she either amended or abandoned it prior to trial. Specifically, this issue involves circumstances under which, during a post-autopsy telephone conversation with Detective Chase, the doctor learned that police had recovered a third pair of scissors, the “bloody scissors,” which they believed to be the murder weapon. Responding to this information, Dr. Pierre-Louis “made some comment that, I guess I was wrong, or, I made a mistake.” Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 234, 585 S.E.2d at 811. Some time later, also hearing that the newly discovered scissors contained the victim’s blood, the doctor responded by saying “oh well,” which the prosecutors took to mean that she had abandoned “any notion that scissors could not be the murder weapon.” Id. Reviewing the post-conviction hearing record, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Dr. Pierre-Louis’s initial opinion “was not exculpatory in light of the circuit court’s factual finding, supported by the testimony of Detective Chase, that Dr. Pierre-Louis changed her opinion before trial.” Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 245, 585 S.E.2d at 818. To this conclusion, Lovitt advances two assignments of error. First, he argues that the state court failed to apply the test of presumptive materiality required by United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). Second, he contends that, even without the Agurs presumption, it was unreasonable for the Supreme Court of Virginia to conclude from Dr. Pierre-Louis’s remarks that she had changed her opinion. Thus, it was unreasonable for that court to find, under Brady, that such an “alteration” rendered the doctor’s opinion any less favorable to the defense. Of course, this Court reviews such decisions only to determine whether the state court reasonably applied the apposite federal law. In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment .... ” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Addressing Lovitt’s second assignment of error first, it is the opinion of this Court that although both the circuit court and the Supreme Court of Virginia improperly concluded that the doctor changed her initial opinion prior to trial, the state court reasonably applied Brady in determining that the doctor’s opinion itself, in whatever form, was not exculpatory to the defense. Here, Petitioner first argues that, as a factual matter, it was unreasonable for the Supreme Court of Virginia to conclude that Dr. Pierre-Louis’s comments to Detective Chase were intended to retract her initial opinion. To that end, Lovitt contends that, during the doctor’s brief conversation with the detective, Dr. Pierre Louis only learned that police had found “what [they] believe[d] to be the murder weapon” near the crime scene. Pet.- at 10. She was not given the dimensions of the bloody scissors, nor did she ask about them. Moreover, as the Supreme Court of Virginia found, “Dr. Pierre-Louis also told Eastman and Chase that she would have to examine the bloody scissors before she could reach a conclusion whether those scissors were the source of [the victim’s] wounds.” Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 232, 585 S.E.2d at 810. Considering her lack of information. about the third pair of scissors, Lovitt argues, it would be illogical to dub her remarks a “retraction” of her initial opinion. It is not for this Court to second-guess the state court’s factual determinations. Rather, this Court is to review whether those factual determinations were reasonable under the strictures of federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 403-404, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (“Congress intended federal judges to attend with the utmost care to state-court decisions, including all of the reasons supporting their decisions, before concluding that those proceedings were infected by Constitutional error sufficiently serious to warrant the issuance of the writ.”). See also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843. On the other hand, if the circuit court’s factual finding is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it, the reviewing- court need not accept it. See Hedrick, 264 Va. at 496, 570 S.E.2d 840. It is this Court’s opinion that, in performing its Brady analysis on the “retraction” issue, the Supreme Court of Virginia erred in accepting the circuit court’s factual conclusion. Considering the scope and brevity of the discussion between the doctor and Detective Chase, it makes little sense that, having heard only that police had uncovered a third, blood-covered pair of scissors, Dr. Pierre-Louis would decide that her previous opinion — which eliminated two unrelated pairs of scissors as potential murder weapons — was incorrect. Nowhere in the record had the doctor opined that the murder weapon could not have been a pah* of scissors. Rather, she noted that neither of the two pairs she examined, each of which had different blade lengths and widths, could have killed the victim. Even more telling, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that Dr. Pierre-Louis, after learning about the third pair of scissors, told the detective and one prosecutor that “she would have to examine the bloody scissors before she could reach a conclusion” about whether they were, indeed, the murder weapon. Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 232, 585 S.E.2d at 810. In the wake of such a remark, the Court finds it unreasonable to believe that the doctor’s “oh well” and “I guess I was wrong” comments were anything more than offhand, spur of the moment responses to an otherwise uneventful conversation. The Court finds no evidence that Dr. Pierre-Louis changed or retracted her initial opinion concerning the two pairs of pool hall scissors; thus, the state court erred in so finding. This does not, however, change the Court’s analysis with respect to the less-than-exculpatory nature of the doctor’s opinion. Whether or not the doctor changed her opinion, the fact remains that even according to Petitioner’s own pretrial expert, the bloody scissors were of such a size as to have been capable of causing the victim’s death. Nothing in Dr. Pierre-Louis’s original scissors opinion affects that conclusion; thus, nothing in that opinion would have been favorable to the defense under Brady. Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for the state court to discount the exculpatory value of the doctor’s amended opinion. On the contrary, this Court concurs with the state court that Dr. Pierre-Louis’s initial opinion was not exculpatory “because that opinion related to scissors that were not introduced into evidence, were not the alleged murder weapon, and were not shown to be the same size as the alleged murder weapon.” Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 245, 585 S.E.2d at 818. B. The Commonwealth’s Alleged Failure to Disclose the Lengthy Informant History of a Key Prosecution Witness The second facet of Petitioner’s due process challenge involves the testimony of a significant prosecution witness, Casel Lucas (“Lucas”). At trial, Lucas testified that the petitioner, while confined with Lucas at a correctional facility, confessed to first taking the cash register box and then stabbing the decedent in order to avoid being identified. Lovitt I, 260 Va. at 505-06, 537 S.E.2d at 872. On several prior occasions, Lucas had served as an informant or witness for the prosecution in unrelated criminal cases. Id. Although the Commonwealth supplied defense counsel with a computer printout of Lucas’s prior convictions, prosecutors did not disclose his prior history as an informant. Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 235, 585 S.E.2d at 811-12. On habeas, Petitioner contends that the Commonwealth violated his due process rights by failing to disclose Lucas’s prior history of both police and prosecutorial cooperation. More specifically, Petitioner asserts that the Supreme Court of Virginia misapplied the holding in Brady when it determined that Lucas’s record as a jailhouse informant was not material impeachment evidence because such informant history was not favorable to the defense. For its part, the Commonwealth argues that the Supreme Court of Virginia appropriately rejected both arguments on their merits. The Supreme Court of Virginia based its analysis of Petitioner’s due process claim on the following facts, which are taken from that Court’s opinion: Before Lucas testified at trial, Eastman and Walker provided Lovitt’s defense counsel with a report detailing Lucas’s extensive criminal record. However, neither Eastman nor Walker disclosed to defense counsel that Lucas had provided information to various police departments in four previous criminal cases. The circuit court found that before the trial, the prosecutors in Lovitt’s case were “unaware that Casel Lucas had provided information regarding any other case.” The evidence at the habeas hearing showed that in 1998, Lucas testified in Alexandria against Steven Evans, who had been charged with robbery. In exchange for his testimony, Lucas received a total recommended sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment for various pending criminal charges, including robbery, abduction with the intent to defile, and attempted rape. Walker testified that although Lucas told her about his cooperation with the police in the Evans ease, she did not tell either Rucker or Janell Wolfe, Lovitt’s co-counsel at trial, about Lucas’s role in that prosecution. However, Walker stated that Lucas’s sentence in the Evans case was included in his criminal record that the prosecution provided to defense counsel before Lucas testified. When Wolfe interviewed Lucas prior to his testifying, Lucas told her of his involvement in the Evans case. However, Lucas did not inform Wolfe that he had cooperated with the police in any other cases. Wolfe testified that had she received such information, she and Rucker would have used it to impeach Lucas’s credibility at trial. At Lovitt’s trial, Rucker cross-examined Lucas concerning his cooperation with the police in the Evans case. In 1996, Lucas provided information to the police concerning a “jailhouse confession” made by Edward Young, who had been charged with rape in Arlington County. Walker served as the prosecutor during the sentencing in the Young case and Wolfe served as Young’s counsel. However, neither Walker nor Wolfe was aware of Lucas’s involvement in the Young case because the case did not proceed to trial and the defendant’s plea agreement did not mention Lucas. Lucas did not receive any benefit in exchange for the information that he provided in the Young case. In 1997, Lucas provided information to detectives in the District of Columbia concerning the “Starbucks triple homicide” case. One of the detectives sent a letter to the judges of the Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria informing them of Lucas’s cooperation in the Starbucks case. There was no evidence that Lucas received any benefit resulting from his cooperation with the police in that case. Further, prior to Lovitt’s trial, the Arlington prosecutors did not have any information about Lovitt’s cooperation in the Starbucks case. In 1998, Lucas provided Alexandria authorities with a statement detailing a defendant’s “jailhouse confession” in the “Eddie Lee case.” Lucas did not receive any benefit as a result of his cooperation in that case, and the Arlington prosecutors were not aware of Lucas’s involvement in the Lee case prior to Lovitt’s trial. In June 1999, before Lovitt’s trial, Lucas sent a letter to Judge Paul F. Sheridan of the Arlington County Circuit Court requesting reconsideration of one of his sentences. In the letter, Lucas stated that he had cooperated with the police in previous matters but did not mention Lovitt’s case. The letter was sent directly to Judge Sheridan’s chambers and a copy of the letter apparently was not placed in Lucas’s file until after Lovitt’s trial. Lucas’s request for reconsideration was denied. The prosecutors in Lovitt’s case were not aware of Lucas’s letter at the time of Lovitt’s trial. Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 235-36, 585 S.E.2d at 811-12. With the exception of the Evans case, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that Lucas’s record of cooperation with authorities did not constitute impeachment evidence, subject to disclosure, because Lucas had received no benefit for his assistance. Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 247, 585 S.E.2d at 819. Furthermore, with respect to the Evans case, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that Lucas himself revealed his cooperation to Lovitt’s defense, counsel, which defense counsel later used, at trial, to cross-examine Lucas. Id. Finally, the Supreme Court of Virginia, relying on Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), found that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, had prosecutors disclosed this evidence to the defense, the proceeding would have resulted in a different outcome. In Petitioner’s view, each of these conclusions is the result of an unreasonable determination of fact and an unreasonable application of federal law. As this Court stated above, Brady requires the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence if it is both favorable and material to the defense. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), the Supreme Court held that impeachment evidence is clearly within the boundaries of the Brady rule. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 155, 92 S.Ct. 763. The Court, in Giglio, explained that when the government has entered into an agreement or understanding with a key witness regarding his prosecution, the credibility of that witness is at issue, and any failure to disclose details of the deal may deny the accused due process. Id. In Strickler, the Court further elaborated on that proposition by holding that exculpatory evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the proceeding would have resulted in a different outcome. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936. Again, a “reasonable” probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555. In order to establish a Brady violation in the context of Lucas’s cooperation, Petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) there was evidence of an agreement or an understanding; (2) the prosecution suppressed the evidence; (3) the evidence was favorable either because it was exculpatory or impeaching; and (4) the evidence was material to the defense. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Lucas’s history of cooperation consisted of four separate occasions. The prosecution, however, had prior knowledge of only one of those occasions. With respect to the one, known incident of Lucas’s cooperation — the Evans ease — the trial court found that the prosecutors were aware both of Lucas’s testimony against Steven Evans in the City of Alexandria and that Lucas had received a reduced sentence in exchange for his testimony. Regardless, the prosecutors failed to disclose Lucas’s cooperation to Petitioner’s trial counsel. Clearly, such evidence was exculpatory under Brady, and the Commonwealth should have disclosed it. Nonetheless, during a pre-trial interview of Lucas, Petitioner’s trial counsel learned about his cooperation and was able to use that information, during trial, to cross-examine Lucas. Accordingly, when applying the final prong of the Brady test, the Supreme Court of Virginia, relying on Strickler and Kyles, found that the prosecution’s failure to disclose evidence of Lucas’s cooperation in the Evans case “did not place Lovitt’s trial in a posture that would undermine confidence in the verdict.” Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 247, 585 S.E.2d at 819. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that evidence of Lucas’s cooperation was not material to the defense. Given the fact that both of Petitioner’s attorneys were aware of Lucas’s assistance in the Evans case prior to trial, there is no reasonable probability that, had the prosecution disclosed such information sooner, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Accordingly, it is the opinion of this Court that, in rejecting Petitioner’s argument, the Supreme Court of Virginia reasonably applied federal law as declared by the United States Supreme Court. Lucas’s other instances of cooperation stand on a different legal footing. As the trial court concluded, with respect to those three cases, prosecutors were unaware of Lucas’s involvement. Furthermore, in those cases Lucas received no legal benefit in exchange for the information he provided to law enforcement officials. To implicate Brady and Giglio, there must be an explicit promise, or a plea agreement, that the defendant will receive a legal benefit in exchange for his testimony or cooperation. Collier v. Davis, 301 F.3d 843, 848-49 (7th Cir.2002); Knox v. Johnson, 224 F.3d 470, 481-82 (5th Cir.2000). Lucas’s hopeful expectation that he would receive some type of legal benefit for his cooperation is insufficient to support a Brady violation. Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 187-88 (5th Cir.1997). Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s position, the Supreme Court of Virginia properly construed the holdings of Collier and Knox. With respect to the information that Lucas provided to District of Columbia detectives about the 1997 Starbucks triple homicide, the state court found that Lucas received no benefit from his cooperation. Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 236, 585 S.E.2d at 812. In that case, although a District of Columbia detective forwarded a letter to an Alexandria circuit court judge on Lucas’s behalf, the letter itself gave no indication that Lucas and the police department had struck any specific deal or agreement. Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, this Court must presume that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s assessment of that letter’s value is correct. See 18 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner’s argument that the Supreme Court of Virginia misinterpreted and misapplied Brady is based, in large part, on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals case Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286 (4th Cir.2003). In Monroe, upon habeas review of Petitioner’s conviction, the district court found that prosecutors had suppressed information regarding a specific promise they made to a witness, offering her a reduced sentence in exchange for her crucial trial testimony. Monroe, 323 F.3d at 301. There, the district court also found 'that the prosecution had failed to reveal the witness’s history of offering information to authorities in exchange for some legal benefit. Id. The withheld information, according to that court, would have indicated that the witness both had a reputation of trying to barter information and was a “professional snitch.” Id. at 315. The immediate case is distinguishable from Monroe in several respects. First, unlike Monroe, prosecutors in the immediate case were unaware that Lucas had provided information to law enforcement authorities on three prior occasions. To prove a Brady violation, there must be a knowing suppression of exculpatory evidence. It is self-evident that a prosecutor cannot suppress or withhold information that is unknown to him or her. Thus, with respect to the three instances of cooperation by Lucas of which the prosecutors were unaware, it cannot be said that the government knowingly withheld impeachment evidence. Second, Monroe is distinguishable because, in that case, prosecutors were aware of a specific deal in which the government attempted to gain the witness’s testimony in exchange for legal consideration. As discussed above, as to the three instances of cooperation unknown to the prosecutors in the case under review, no such deal existed. Accordingly, Monroe does not convince this Court that the entirety of Lucas’s cooperation is relevant in the context of a Brady analysis. Petitioner counters that the Supreme Court of Virginia misapplied Brady by minimizing the prosecutor’s duty to seek out exculpatory evidence on behalf of the accused. Furthermore, Petitioner contends that a prosecutor’s constitutionally-mandated duty to ascertain information about its witnesses’ previous cooperation is without jurisdictional boundaries. See Pet’s Reply Br. 11-12. In essence, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor has an obligation to contact countless other jurisdictions in order to determine if a prospective witness has testified in that county or city in exchange for some legal benefit. Petitioner bases his extraordinary position on the settled rule that “the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555. To further support this argument, Petitioner cites to Burrows v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 469, 438 S.E.2d 300, 302-04 (1993). The language from Kyles, relied upon by Petitioner here, has historically been interpreted to hold a prosecutor responsible for any and all information possessed by his or her own agents. See Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 505-06 (4th Cir.2002). Logically, such a rule would also embrace information and evidence possessed by state governmental agencies that are directly affiliated with the prosecuting jurisdiction. Beyond that, and with respect to the expanded interpretation of Kyles promoted by Petitioner, this Court can find no supporting authority. Moreover, to require a prosecutor to mine the records of every surrounding jurisdiction in both the Commonwealth of Virginia and the District of Columbia, absent some specific information triggering such an inquiry, would be patently unreasonable. Petitioner’s reliance on Burrows, here, is misplaced. Petitioner is correct that, in Burrows, the Virginia Court of Appeals held a prosecutor responsible for disclosing information concerning a witness’s plea agreement in a neighboring jurisdiction. In that case, however, prior to trial, the prosecutor learned specific information about an informant’s plea agreement in a nearby county but failed to disclose it. The facts of the case at hand are significantly different. After a thorough review of both the relevant law and evidence in this case, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that, aside from Lucas’s cooperation in the Evans case, his unrequited assistance in other cases did not constitute exculpatory, impeachment evidence such that it was subject to disclosure. Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 246-47, 585 S.E.2d at 819. This Court is of the opinion that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s conclusion is consistent with the overwhelming weight of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence and of those federal cases that interpret it. Thus, the state court’s determination that Lucas’s history of cooperation was not exculpatory was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. This Court’s review of this issue, however, does not end here. The Court must also determine whether the Commonwealth’s failure to reveal Lucas’s plea agreement in the Evans case, when coupled with other undisclosed exculpatory evidence, was sufficiently material to deprive Petitioner of a fair trial. That analysis follows. C. Materiality and the Cumulative Impact of the Suppressed Evidence on Petitioner’s Defense The final tier of this Court’s Brady analysis involves an evaluation of whether the evidence Lovitt claims was unconstitutionally suppressed was “material” to his defense. Such an analysis involves an examination of what cumulative impact the undisclosed, exculpatory evidence might have had on Lovitt’s case. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436 n. 10, 115 S.Ct. 1555; Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d at 302; Ellis, 121 F.3d at 916. Here, Petitioner argues that, “[gjiven the absence of physical and eyewitness evidence linking Mr. Lovitt to the crime,” the Commonwealth’s suppression of evidence must have prejudiced his defense. Pet. at 19-20. In order to determine whether a Brady violation is “material,” the Court must consider whether, in the absence of the undisclosed evidence, the defendant received a fair trial, which is a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375. Under settled principles regarding the disclosure of exculpatory evidence, the United States Supreme Court holds that exculpatory evidence is material if, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, there would be a reasonable probability that the proceeding would have resulted in a different outcome. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936; Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 687 (4th Cir.2002). Of course, the operative standard is “reasonable probability.” Here, Petitioner contends that the Supreme Court of Virginia failed to properly assess the cumulative impact of the suppressed evidence and, instead, erroneously opted to conduct an item-by-item evaluation to determine materiality. Admittedly, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that only one item of suppressed evidence was exculpatory. Nonetheless, to determine materiality, it did conduct an analysis of the probable cumulative impact of all of the allegedly undisclosed items. See Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 245-47, 585 S.E.2d at 817-19. In so doing, the state appellate court concluded that the reasonable, probable impact of such evidence on Lovitt’s defense was insufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Id., 266 Va. at 247, 585 S.E.2d at 819. Now, the Commonwealth urges this Court to draw the same conclusion. Petitioner’s impact argument is predicated on the assumption that both the medical examiner’s initial opinion and Lucas’s entire history as a professional informant are exculpatory. Petitioner maintains that “[g]iven the lack of eyewitness or physical evidence linking Lovitt to the crime, Dr. Pierre-Louis’s opinion that 3 h-inch long scissors could not have been the murder weapon and Lucas’s history as a ‘professional’ informant, considered alone or together, ‘could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’ ” Pet. at 22 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 (other citations omitted)). Finding the medical examiner’s statement not to be exculpatory, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that it was not required to consider the issue of its materiality. Still, the court performed such an assessment and found: .... [T]he Commonwealth’s failure to disclose this information could not have prejudiced Lovitt’s defense because Dr. Pierre-Louis conceded at the evidentia-ry hearing in the present case that two of Dick’s fatal wounds, designated on the autopsy report as wounds # 2 and # 3, could have been caused by the bloody scissors. This acknowledgment that the bloody scissors could have been the source of two of Dick’s fatal wounds completely negates Lovitt’s claim that there is a reasonable probability that his trial would have resulted in a different outcome if Dr. Pierre-Louis’ initial opinion had been provided to the defense. In addition, as the circuit court found, the evidence in the present case showed that trial counsel Denman Rucker investigated before trial whether the scissors like those presented at the autopsy could have caused Dicks’ wounds. Upon consultation with a forensic expert, Rucker was told that scissors of that approximate size could have caused Dicks’ wounds. Thus, Lovitt cannot show he was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s failure to inform him of Dr. Pierre-Louis’ initial opinion, because he was aware of the issues involving scissors of that approximate size and investigated those issues as part of his defense in Lovitt’s trial. Lovitt II, 266 Va. at 245-46, 585 S.E.2d at 818. With respect to the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose information about Casel Lucas’s cooperation, as discussed above, only one instance — relating to the Evans case — would have been exculpatory to the defense. None of Lucas’s other attempts at cooperation were known to the prosecution, and none earned him a legal b