Full opinion text
OPINION QUIST, District Judge. Plaintiffs in this case are the O’Donnell family: Patrick, the father, Sandra, the mother, and their six children, John, (17), Ruth, (16), Nathan, (12), Valerie, (9), Alicia, (6), and Rachael, (6 months). Defendants are the City of Lansing (“the City”); the Lansing Police Department (“LPD”); LPD officers Susan Brown, Christopher Baldwin, and Tony Beatti; LPD Chief Mark Alley in his official capacity; and Ingham County Child Protective Services (“CPS”) caseworkers Colin Parks and Colleen Duhm and their supervisor, Joye Sharp. CPS is a part of the state Family Independence Agency (“FIA”). This case arises from the entry into and temporary removal of the O’Donnell children from the family’s home while the parents were out of town on September 16, 2000. Based on these events, Plaintiffs filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting various federal constitutional claims, along with related state constitutional and other state law claims. Now before the Court are three summary judgment motions: one filed by Plaintiffs; a second filed by Defendants the City, the LPD, Brown, Baldwin, Beatti, and Alley (the “City Defendants”); and a third filed by Parks, Duhm, and Sharp (the “CPS Defendants”). For the reasons discussed below, summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part for Plaintiffs; granted in part and denied in part for the City Defendants; and granted in part and denied in part for the CPS Defendants. I. Background On Friday, September 15, 2000, Patrick and Sandra O’Donnell departed for a weekend business trip to North Carolina, with plans to return Sunday night or Monday. They left the two older children, John and Ruth, in charge of the younger children. John had a driver’s license and was trained in CPR, first aid, and life saving. Nathan, the 12 year old, had emergency and scout training. The parents left an envelope containing emergency and other contact information, insurance cards, and cash near the telephone in the living room. On Saturday, September 16, Patrick O’Donnell’s sister, Kathleen Shattuck, spent the day at the O’Donnell home. John, Ruth, and Nathan went to a youth activity that afternoon, and Kathleen left after they returned home. At approximately 8:15 p.m., John and Ruth left to go to the house of their pastor, Glenn Ray, and to take a video to a friend, Rhonda Carpenter. They planned to be gone for two to three hours and left Nathan in charge of the younger children, telling him where they would be and saying they would return in several hours. After John and Ruth left the house, Sandra O’Donnell’s mother, Roseann Hew-son, called the O’Donnell home. Nathan was outside helping a neighbor, so Hewson spoke with Alicia. Hewson then called Sandra’s sister, Pat DeLong. DeLong called 911 to make a child neglect report. LPD officers Baldwin and Beatti were dispatched to the house in order to investigate the report. Nathan let the officers into the house and told him where his parents were. Beatti inspected the house while Baldwin talked to Nathan. Nathan showed the officers the envelope and gave them his parents’ and the other children’s names. Nathan also gave Baldwin Rhonda Carpenter’s number, and Baldwin called her house and left a message with Rhonda for John to call him. Baldwin also gave Nathan a phone number for the police dispatch. When John and Ruth arrived at the Carpenter house, Rhonda told John to call home. John called and spoke with Nathan, who told him that the police had come to the house after receiving an anonymous report of child neglect and that the officers were checking on the children’s welfare. Nathan gave John the police dispatch number, which John called and spoke with Officer Baldwin. Baldwin instructed John to return home immediately and said the police would return to the house with Department of Social Services personnel. John said he would return shortly but not immediately. John and Ruth left for home several minutes after speaking with Officer Baldwin. After talking to John, Baldwin spoke with Sgt. Brown at the precinct, who suggested that he call Child Protective Services. Baldwin called CPS worker Parks. The contents of the conversation between Baldwin and Parks are somewhat disputed. Baldwin returned to the O’Donnell home a second time by himself at approximately 10:30 p.m., by which time John and Ruth were back home. John saw Baldwin arrive and stepped out the front door to meet him in the yard. Baldwin said he was there to gather information for his report and asked for the parents’ names and the children’s ages. John refused to give Baldwin any information other than his own name, age, and birth date. John also refused Baldwin’s request to enter the home, saying he had no warrant and had already seen the children earlier. Baldwin then told John he might be arrested for not cooperating. Meanwhile, a neighbor, Jenny Lamphere, came over and told Baldwin that an aunt had been there during the day, gave him her name and phone number, and offered to sleep on the O’Donnell’s couch overnight until the parents returned. Baldwin then departed and returned to the precinct, where he called Parks again and gave him information about the situation at the O’Donnell home. A second complaint had come in to 911. Parks contacted the source, who said that the children had been left alone in the past. Parks contacted Hewson to make arrangements for the children to be placed with her if necessary. Parks called Margaret Mays, the on-call supervisor at CPS. Mays referred Parks to CPS supervisor Joye Sharp. Plaintiffs claim Sharp told Parks to return to the home to gather more information; Defendants claim Sharp merely concurred with Parks’ decision to do so. Plaintiffs also claim Sharp instructed Parks to contact the on-call family court intake referee, Carol Whitworth, whereas Defendants claim Sharp only concurred in Parks’ decision to do so. Parks also contacted CPS worker Colleen Duhm to assist with the investigation. According to the police, a decision was made to return to remove the children from the home, and Referee Whitworth issued a verbal court order to that effect. Parks and Duhm met Baldwin and Beat-ti at the police station. Baldwin also called Officer Brown, who said she would come to the house. The officers and CPS workers departed the station and arrived at the O’Donnell home. In the meantime, John had hidden the envelope with his parents’ contact information. John refused to let the officers in when they knocked on the door, saying they lacked a warrant. The officers then asked John to step outside, which he did. The police and CPS workers told John they needed to get into the house to check on the welfare of the children. Baldwin told John that he would be arrested if he did not cooperate. John continued to block the door and refused to let the officers and CPS workers in because they lacked a warrant. After about 15-20 minutes of conversation on the front porch, Baldwin arrested John for obstruction, handcuffed him, and took him to a squad car. After John’s arrest, Ruth too refused to let the officers into the home. She called the family’s pastor to tell him what was happening. Officer Beatti spoke with the pastor and continued to speak with Ruth for about 10 minutes. Then the officers decided to enter the home without Ruth’s consent. After following the police in, Parks and Duhm inspected the home. According to Parks, he then reached the decision to remove the children, so he called Sharp and then Referee Whitworth to get verbal authorization for the removal and placement of the children in a relative’s foster care. Meanwhile, the family’s pastor arrived. John, who was sitting in the squad car, informed him where the envelope with the contact and emergency information was located. The police brought John to the precinct station, booked him, and put him in a holding cell. The family’s pastor posted bail, and John was permitted to leave at around 3:00 a.m. Meanwhile, the other children were taken to their grandmother Hewson’s house. Parks made arrangements to set a hearing for Monday, September 18, which the O’Donnell parents attended. At the hearing, FIA concluded that the child neglect complaint was unsubstantiated, the investigation was closed, the case was dismissed, and the children were returned to their parents. Plaintiffs later filed their complaint, which sets forth the following claims: (1) violation of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution; (2) deprivation of liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (3) violation of constitutional rights to familial integrity; (4) false arrest in violation of M.C.L. § 750.479; (5) false imprisonment; and (6) negligence. As relief, Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages; a declaration that Defendants’ actions were unconstitutional; a declaration that the statutes and protocols were unconstitutional as applied by Defendants; a preliminary and permanent injunction against Defendants from engaging in the allegedly unconstitutional actions; and a preliminary and permanent injunction against Defendants from applying and enforcing statutes and protocols in the allegedly unconstitutional manner. II. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56. Material facts are facts which are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return judgment for the non-moving party. Id. A motion for summary judgment is properly supported if the moving party shows that there is no evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party makes its showing, the non-moving party must demonstrate with “concrete evidence” that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id.; Frank v. D’Ambrosi, 4 F.3d 1378, 1384 (6th Cir.1993). The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party when evaluating a summary judgement motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 578-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1352-58, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). It may, however, grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356). III. Discussion A. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiffs ask for summary judgment on their first (i.e., Fourth Amendment) and second (i.e., Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process) claims, reserving the other claims for adjudication at trial. Regarding the first claim, all Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their rights by entering their home without a warrant; Plaintiffs Ruth, Nathan, Valerie, Alicia, and Rachael O’Donnell allege that Defendants violated their rights by seizing and removing them from their home; and Plaintiff John O’Donnell alleges that the police officer Defendants violated his rights by arresting and detaining him for obstructing the entry into the home. Regarding the second, procedural due process claim, all Plaintiffs allege that they were deprived of their constitutional liberty (i.e., family integrity) rights without due process by Defendants’ entry into their home and seizure of their children. As the following discussion explains, the fundamental problem with Defendants’ conduct is that the referee’s verbal order did not comprise valid authority to either enter the home or remove the children. The Fourth Amendment required a written order for these actions, and no exigent circumstances existed to obviate this requirement. Moreover, John’s arrest and detention for obstruction were unlawful because the entry he attempted to prevent was itself unlawful. The Court will therefore enter summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their Fourth Amendment claims. Summary judgment is also appropriate for Plaintiffs on their procedural due process claims because they were deprived of their constitutionally protected liberty interest in familial integrity without adequate process of law. (1) Fourth Amendment (a) Entry into Home The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Government entry into a private home is considered a search implicating the Fourth Amendment. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2797, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1379, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 3134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) (“physical entry into the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed”). Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, except pursuant to few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, such as the exigent circumstances exception discussed later in this opinion. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Defendants assert that Referee Whit-worth’s verbal order authorizing removal of the children constituted valid authority for the police and the CPS social workers to enter the home. In support of this proposition, Defendants point to a Michigan Court Rule then in effect, M.C.R. 5.963(B), which stated: The court may order an officer or other person to immediately take a child into custody when, after presentment to the court of a petition, a judge or referee has reasonable grounds to believe that conditions or surroundings under which the child is found are such as would endanger the health, safety, or welfare of the child. The court shall inquire whether a member of the child’s immediate or extended family is available to take custody of the child pending preliminary hearing and whether there has been a central registry clearance and whether a criminal history check has been initiated.... Also, Defendants contend that their actions were permitted under M.C.L. § 712A.14, which permits police officers, “without the order of the court,” to “immediately take into custody any child ... whose surroundings are such as to endanger his or her health, morals, or welfare.” While the aforementioned court rule and statutory provision may authorize the seizure of a child in the circumstances they describe, they do not give the police or anyone else the authority to enter a home to effect the seizure. State statutes and regulations cannot be construed to displace the protections of the United States Constitution — even when the state acts to protect the welfare of children. Cf. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540-41, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 2414, 150 L.Ed.2d 532 (2001). The entry itself must satisfy the Fourth Amendment, which generally requires a warrant; “the Fourth Amendment applies to [social workers], as it does to all other officers and agents of the state whose requests to enter, however benign or well-intentioned, are met by a closed door. There is ... no social worker exception to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.” Walsh v. Erie County Dep’t of Job & Family Servs., 240 F.Supp.2d 731, 746-47 (N.D.Ohio 2003) (citing Roska v. Peterson, 304 F.3d 982, 989 (10th Cir.2002) (warrantless no-knock entry violated Fourth Amendment absent exigency of imminent danger to child’s welfare)); Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 816 (9th Cir.1999) (“[Wyman] does not hold that a social worker may enter the home despite the absence of consent or exigency.”); Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1547 (11th Cir.1995) (even though social worker’s intrusion was motivated by concern for child’s welfare, “and not as part of any investigation, the search falls within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment”); Franks v. Smith, 717 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir.1983) (“A section 1983 claim can also lie against others, such as social workers, where actions by them were taken in their official capacity as state employees.”); State in Interest of A.R., 937 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (“the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies whenever an investigator, be it a police officer, a DCFS employee, or any other agent of the state, responds to an alleged instance of child abuse, neglect, or dependency.”). Accordingly, even if the referee’s order authorized taking the children into custody, the Court must conduct a separate Fourth Amendment analysis to determine whether that order also constituted a valid search warrant authorizing entry into the home. The Court concludes that it did not because it was merely a verbal order when it should have been in writing. Some states permit the issuance of search warrants by telephone. See White v. State of Mississippi 842 So.2d 565, 569-70 (Miss.2003) (listing states where judicial officials may authorize searches telephoni-cally). State statutes, court rules, and judicial decisions permitting telephonic search warrants have been held not to violate federal or state constitutional guaranties against unreasonable searches and seizures. See 38 A.L.R.4th 1145 § 3 (2004) (listing cases). Michigan does not have a statute permitting search warrants to be issued by telephone. The closest thing under Michigan law is M.C.L. § 780.651, which authorizes the issuance of search warrants by “electronic or electromagnetic communication.” The statute at the time of this incident stated: “A judge may issue a umitten search warrant in person or by an electronic or electromagnetic means of communication.” M.C.L. § 780.651(3) (emphasis added). “The peace officer or department receiving an electronically or eleetromagnetieally issued search warrant shall receive proof that the issuing judge or district court magistrate has signed the warrant before the warrant is executed. Proof that the issuing judge or district court magistrate has signed the warrant may consist of an electronically or electromagnetically transmitted facsimile of the signed warrant.” M.C.L. 780.651(4) (emphasis added). M.C.L. § 780.651 was amended in 2002 to clarify that transmission by means of “electronic or electromagnetic communication” includes transmission “by facsimile or over a computer network,” but these are only additional methods of transmitting a written document. The Michigan statute does not authorize “verbal” search warrants such as the one purportedly issued in this case. In the instant case, Referee Whitworth did not comply with M.C.L. § 780.651 because her purely verbal order never existed in written form. Courts in some states that, like Michigan, do not permit verbal, telephonically conveyed search warrants, have nonetheless upheld such “warrants” in cases where exigent circumstances existed or certain procedural safeguards were observed. See 38 A.L.R.4th 1145 § 4 (2004). As discussed later in this opinion, exigent circumstances did not arise in this case. As for procedural safeguards, none were followed here. The referee did not, for example, make a contemporaneous written record and recording of the telephone conversations. State of Minnesota v. Cook, 498 N.W.2d 17, 21-22 (Minn.1993). The referee did not promptly issue a written confirmatory search warrant and file it. State of New Jersey v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 459 A.2d 1149, 1155 (N.J.1983). In short, Defendants have demonstrated no indicia of compliance with minimal procedural safeguards to support the validity of the oral order. Defendants claim that their entry into the home was further justified because, at the time of the incident at issue in this case, it was the Police Department’s and Child Protective Services’ policy for a referee to verbally authorize police to enter homes in order to take children into custody. If that was the Police Department’s policy, it was constitutionally defective for the reasons already discussed. Moreover, several CPS social workers testified that they knew that a referee’s verbal order only gave authority to remove and place children, and that such an order did not comprise authority to enter the home if that was where the children were located. (Parks Dep. at 212, Pl.’s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 7.) (“[the referee] couldn’t give me authorization to enter a home”); (Duhm Dep. at 29, Id. Ex. 8.) (“I don’t have the authority to enter a home without a court order — actually I don’t know that I have authority to enter the home without the police”); (Sharp Dep. at 19, Id. Ex. 9.) (“The referees give verbal orders, but not to enter homes but to remove children and to place children.”). In addition, the Police Department at least belatedly recognized that verbal orders could not authorize entry into a home. On October 12, 2000, Lansing Police Department Chief Alley issued a memorandum addressed to “LPD Officers” and titled “Taking Custody or Removal of Children in Suspected Abuse or Neglect Cases,” stating: In the past, when F.I.A. workers state they have a “verbal” court order to remove or place children we have assisted them in carrying out this action. This practice was recently reviewed and determined to be inconsistent with applicable statutes and court rules. As Law Enforcement Officers we have the authority to immediately take children into protective custody who are endangered, according to MCL 712A.14. Because court orders vary in language and thus vary in the amount of authority we can use to execute the order, it is important that we have the court order in our possession before enforcing it. In the event that a person is arrested for obstructing or interfering with officers when taking children into protective custody, the person should be advised that a court order exists prior to the arrest, and that information should be included in the Officer’s report. I have advised the F.I.A. that we will no longer be assisting them in executing a verbal court order which was made to the case worker from a Judge or Referee over the phone. When reviewing these orders, it is important that you read and understand what authority the order gives you in removing the children. Absent exigent circumstances, the order should also include the authority to enter a residence if the children are not already in custody of the officer. Please review and retain the attached information regarding taking custody or removal of children. This information will be covered in our updated Procedure Manual. (Pl’s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 19.) Regardless of what CPS’s or LPD’s policies were at the time, the entry required a search warrant and the verbal order did not satisfy that requirement. Therefore, the Court finds that the entry into the O’Donnell home was a presumptively unreasonable warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment. However, a warrantless search may overcome the presumption of unreasonableness for Fourth Amendment purposes if an exception to the warrant requirement applies. Defendants argue that the warrantless entry into the O’Donnell home was lawful under the exigent circumstances exception. “The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is narrowly drawn.” United States v. Ball, 90 F.3d 260, 263 (8th Cir.1996). It is the government’s burden to overcome the presumption that a warrantless entry was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment by establishing the exception. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 371 (6th Cir.1982). When the underlying facts are essentially undisputed and a finder of fact could reach but one conclusion as to the existence of exigent circumstances, the issue may be decided by the trial court as a matter of law. Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 501 (6th Cir.2002). According to the Sixth Circuit, exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry occur within four general categories: 1) hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; 2) imminent destruction of evidence; 3) the need to prevent a suspect’s escape; and 4) a risk of danger to the police or others. United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir.1996). The dispute in this case centers on the fourth category, that is, whether the scenario posed an adequately grave risk of danger to the O’Donnell children. “Exigent circumstances” occur where “real immediate and serious consequences” would “certainly occur were a police officer to postpone action to get a warrant.” O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 997 (6th Cir.1994) (inter-nal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 503 (6th Cir.2003). There must be a “need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury.” O’Brien, 23 F.3d at 997 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)). “[T]he Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392, 98 S.Ct. at 2413. However, the authorities must be presented with a “true immediacy” and a “real danger that serious consequences would certainly occur.” Williams, 354 F.3d at 504. Exigent circumstances do not exist where “no evidence indicates that [plaintiffs’ children were] in immediate threat of death or severe physical harm.” Roska v. Peterson, 304 F.3d 982, 990 (10th Cir.2002), abrogated in part on other grounds, 328 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir.2003). The mere possibility of danger is not enough. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 594 (2d Cir.1999). The Court finds as a matter of law that exigent circumstances did not justify entry into the O’Donnell home because the facts Defendants point to do not indicate imminent or likely harm. First, any perceived danger to the children was merely speculative and insufficiently serious. Referee Whitworth is the only person in this case who even claims to have believed exigent circumstances existed. She says she reached this conclusion because of the facts that three young children, one of whom was a six month old baby, were left for the evening under the supervision of a twelve year old, and that authorities were unable to contact the parents, posed a potential risk to the children’s health and safety. These facts perhaps raise reasons for concern, but they do not reach to the level of exigent circumstances to support a warrantless entry. Defendants have failed to alert the Court to any specifically evident indicia of danger. Second, even if the situation posed a serious risk of danger to the children, there is no indication that any potential harms would imminently come to fruition. The rationale for the exigent circumstances exception is that some situations require immediate action, with no time to get a warrant. See United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1517 (6th Cir.1996) (“the cases finding exigent circumstances uniformly cite the need for prompt action by government personnel, and conclude that delay to secure a warrant would be unacceptable under the circumstances”). In the instant case, Defendants have offered no evidence that there was no time to get a warrant. What is more, the police officers’ own admissions belie the impotence of Defendants’ exigent circumstances argument. These individuals, who were on the scene at the O’Donnell home, acknowledge that they did not believe that the situation was serious enough to be considered exigent. (City Def.’s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 31 (“according to the officers, they did not believe the minor children were in immediate danger and thus exigent circumstances did not exist”)). In addition, when asked if he perceived any actual dangers or risks before entering the home, CPS worker Parks testified that he only saw a “potential for harm” based on the facts that a 12 year old was in charge and the authorities could not contact the parents. (Parks Dep. at 66-67, Pl.’s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 7.) In sum, Defendants speculate about possibilities, but they fail to point out any concrete “reason to believe that the children were at such risk of harm or injury that immediate action was necessary.” Walsh, 240 F.Supp.2d at 749. The truth of the matter is that Defendants failed to get a warrant, not because they had no time and needed to act immediately, but because they believed they did not need one; in their mistaken view, the verbal authorization was enough. Defendants’ exigent circumstances argument merely serves to obscure their misapprehension of the law governing entry into homes. (b) Seizure of Ruth, Nathan, Valerie, Alicia, and Rachael Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on the question of whether the removal of Ruth, Nathan, Valerie, Alicia, and Rachael from the family home violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court has determined that the entry into the O’Donnell home violated the Fourth Amendment as a matter of law because the government officials lacked a warrant and the circumstances were not exigent. Plaintiffs contend that the unlawful entry also automatically makes the seizure (that is, the taking into custody) of the children a Fourth Amendment violation. This position is incorrect, as the entry and the seizure require separate analyses. Even if the entry into the home violated the Fourth Amendment, the seizure of the children may not have. However, an independent analysis of the seizure leads the Court to conclude that it too violated the Fourth Amendment, and thus summary judgment for Plaintiffs on this issue is appropriate. Government officials may take a child into custody under two circumstances. First, seizure is permitted when duly authorized by a court order. See, e.g., Brokaw v. Mercer County, 285 F.3d 1000, 1010 (7th Cir.2000). The Michigan Court Rule in effect when this incident occurred permitted courts to issue an order to take a child into custody if presented with “reasonable grounds to believe that conditions or surroundings under which the child is found are such as would endanger the health, safety, or welfare of the child.” M.C.R. § 5.963(B). Defendants appear to argue that oral orders suffice to permit the removal of children from a family’s home but have provided no authority for this position, and the Court rejects it. For Fourth Amendment purposes, a verbal order to seize a child from his home is defective for the same reason as is a verbal order to enter (i.e., search) a home; both must be written to be valid orders under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the removal of the minor children was not duly authorized by a valid court order. Second, government officials may in some circumstances take custody of a child without a court order. Exigent circumstances of course provide one exception, but the Court has already determined that such circumstances did not exist in this case. However, Defendants argue that removal without a court order may also occur when supported by “probable cause.” M.C.L. § 712A.14 permits any police officer, “without the order of the court, immediately [to] take into custody any child ... whose surroundings are such as to endanger his or her health, morals, or welfare.” Although the Sixth Circuit appears not to have addressed the removal of children without a court order under the Fourth Amendment, Courts outside of the Sixth Circuit have held that seizure of a child is permitted if it “is pursuant to a court order, if it is supported by probable cause, or if it is justified by exigent circumstances, meaning that state officers ‘have reason to believe that life or limb is in immediate jeopardy.’ ” Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 605 (2d Cir.1999)) (emphasis added). Brokaw repeatedly spoke of probable cause and exigent circumstances in the disjunctive, indicating that the two are separate bases for removal. See, e.g., id at 1011 (in the absence of a court order, removal may be “justified by probable cause or exigent circumstances”) (emphasis added). Brokaw analyzed a child removal under both the exigent circumstances and probable cause standards, concluding that neither was satisfied. Id. Other cases also indicate that probable cause comprises a justification for war-rantless removal separate from exigent circumstances. See Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 603-605 (analyzing child’s removal as a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and considering whether a court order, probable cause, or exigent circumstances justified the child’s removal); Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 925-26 (5th Cir.2000) (noting that a warrant, probable cause, or a reasonable belief that a child is in imminent harm is necessary to justify a seizure of a child under the Fourth Amendment); J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 929 (10th Cir.1997) (applying probable cause standard to removal of child); Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir.2000) (“state may not remove children from their parents’ custody without a court order unless there is specific, articulable evidence that provides reasonable cause to believe that a child is in imminent danger of abuse”); Donald v. Polk County, 836 F.2d 376, 384 (7th Cir.1988) (stating that caseworkers may, without court order, remove a child if they make a “finding of probable cause” that the child is “at risk of immediate injury”). The aforementioned authorities, whose holdings the Court does not necessarily adopt, suggest that even in the absence of a valid court order or exigent circumstances, children may be removed based on probable cause, which appears to be a distinct and somewhat (but not much) lower standard than exigent circumstances. What this means is that probable cause may comprise an additional exception to the warrant requirement in the child seizure context. However, the parties have not cited, and the Court cannot find, any Sixth Circuit decision adopting or rejecting the probable cause standard in the child removal setting. In addition, “[t]he Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the temporary removal of children in cases of suspected abuse or neglect is governed by the probable cause standard.” J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 929 (10th Cir.1997). The Court will avoid deciding whether probable cause comprises an exception to the court order requirement in the child removal context because even if it does, Defendants have alleged no facts indicating that probable cause existed here. Probable cause “is a fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts,” and requires reasonableness based upon the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2329, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Defendants contend that there was probable cause to remove the children because the oldest sibling, John, had been arrested and removed from the scene and because the parents were out of town and could not be reached to discuss either a different placement or someone coming into the home. In addition, Defendants allege, an inspection of the house revealed piles of clothes stacked on the floor, absence of a smoke detector, water in the basement, and flammables near a water heater. In this case, the Court concludes that there was no probable cause to support removal of the children without a court order because based on the undisputed facts, the children’s surroundings did not pose any “danger” to their health, morals, or welfare. Even after John was arrested, Ruth, a 16 year old who had received safe sitter training, remained at the home to care for the younger siblings. Defendants’ only real argument is that Ruth was too young to be in charge of the other children. (CPS Defs.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 3 (“Parks did not feel Ruth, who was 16, should be left in charge for the remainder of the weekend.”)). This argument can easily be rejected when one considers that 16 year olds are legally permitted to marry and have children of their own, M.C.L. § 551.103, and that a neighbor and the family’s pastor offered to stay at the home. Thus, even if probable cause could justify removing children, Defendants have failed to meet that burden in this case. Accordingly, the seizure of Ruth, Nathan, Valerie, Alicia, and Rachael violated the Fourth Amendment as a matter of law. (c) Arrest and Detention of John John O’Donnell seeks summary judgment on the issue of whether his arrest and detention violated his Fourth Amendment rights (i.e., the first claim). The police arrested John for refusing to allow them entry to the house pursuant to M.C.L. § 750.479, which at the time of this incident stated in pertinent part: “Any person ... who shall so obstruct, resist, oppose ... any of the above named officers, or any other person or persons authorized by law to maintain and preserve the peace, shall be guilty of a misdemean- or....” John admits that he refused to give Officer Baldwin contact information for his parents; refused to provide information about his parents or the other children; refused to let Baldwin into the house initially; and refused to let the officers into the house when they returned later with the CPS workers. The police contend that these refusals gave them probable cause to arrest John for the misdemeanor of resisting and obstructing the police. A plaintiff bringing a constitutional claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment must show that there was not probable cause for the arrest. Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 871 (6th Cir.1997). It is well established that an arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. Donovan v. Thames, 105 F.3d 291, 297-98 (6th Cir.1997). As the Court has already determined, the police were not permitted in the house in the first place because they had no warrant to enter and no exception to the warrant requirement such as exigent circumstances applied. It necessarily follows that the police had no probable cause to arrest and detain John for impeding their entry when the entry itself was not lawful. Accordingly, the Court will grant John summary judgment on the issue of whether his arrest and detention violated his Fourth Amendment rights. (2) Procedural Due Process Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on their Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim. The constitutional guarantee of procedural due process requires that the government provide “due process” before making a decision to “infringe upon a person’s life, liberty, or property interest.” Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir.1996). Procedural due process “prohibits arbitrary and unfair deprivations of protected life, liberty, or property interests without procedural safeguards.” Id. at 1350. The touchstone of procedural due process is the fundamental requirement that an individual be given the opportunity to be heard “in a meaningful manner.” Id. at 1349. “[T]he right to a hearing prior to the deprivation is of constitutional stature.” Id. Procedural due process applies only to the deprivation of constitutionally protected liberty or property interests. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). To state a cognizable § 1983 claim based on the deprivation of procedural due process, the government’s conduct in depriving a person of a protected liberty interest must go beyond mere negligence and must instead be grossly negligent, deliberately indifferent, or intentional. Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1350 (6th Cir.1996) (citing Howard v. Grinage (Howard I), 6 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir.1993) and Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253, 1262 (6th Cir.1986)). Here, there is no question that removing the children was intentional. Once the deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest has been demonstrated, a court must determine whether a plaintiff was afforded adequate due process protection. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due.”). Plaintiffs argue that the entry into the home and removal of the children deprived them of their protected liberty interest in family integrity, and that these events occurred without required pre-deprivation process. Thus, in order to decide whether Plaintiffs merit summary judgment on their procedural due process claim, the Court must begin by determining whether Plaintiffs suffered a deprivation of the constitutionally protected right to family integrity. The right to family integrity has been recognized as a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (there is “a fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2267, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (stating that parents have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their own children). Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir.2000) (“Parents and children have a well-elaborated constitutional right to live together without governmental interference.”); Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 923 (5th Cir.2000) (“a child’s right to family integrity is concomitant to that of a parent”). Plaintiffs in their third cause of action (substantive due process) have alleged a violation of their protected liberty interest in familial relations. Although the procedural and substantive due process claims in this case implicate the same liberty interest, the substantive claim requires a deprivation of greater severity. In other words, it is not necessary for Plaintiffs to win on their substantive due process claim in order to make the less stringent showing of deprivation required for their procedural due process claim. In any event, Defendants do not even argue that the removal of the children did not implicate family integrity rights for purposes of the procedural due process inquiry. The Court therefore con-eludes that the removal of the children infringed upon the O’Donnell family’s integrity rights in satisfaction of the procedural due process test’s first prong. The second step in the procedural due process analysis requires a determination of whether Defendants provided Plaintiffs constitutionally adequate process before depriving them of their right to familial integrity. The law recognizes the state’s right to interfere with family relationships when necessary, so long as the state complies with procedural due process requirements. See, e.g., Doe v. Staples, 706 F.2d 985, 988-89 (6th Cir.1983); Doe v. State of Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412, 1416-17 (5th Cir.1993); Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486, 1489 (10th Cir.1994). See also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 983, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990) (“[T]he deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property is not itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme Court has indicated that due process cannot be concretely defined. “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by government action.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Three factors guide the determination of what process is due: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Plaintiffs contend that due process required notice and a hearing before the children were removed. “Before a person is deprived of a protected interest, he must be afforded opportunity for some kind of a hearing, ‘except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.’ ” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n. 7, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705 n. 7, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971)). “However, due process does not require a formal and full-blown adversary hearing in every case.” Doe v. Staples, 706 F.2d 985, 990 (6th Cir.1983). The hearing required is only one “appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). “The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.” Boddie, 401 U.S. at 378, 91 S.Ct. at 786. According to Defendants, Plaintiffs were accorded due procedural protections. Defendants state that: an investigation was initiated based on a complaint to the LPD; social services personnel investigated the complaint and concluded that the children were at risk of harm; the on-call referee conducted an ex parte hearing wherein she received information from CPS and decided to authorize removal of the children; Defendants had a compelling government interest in protecting the children until the parents returned home; no less restrictive means was available under the circumstances given the lateness of the night; the parents could not be reached, even after their contact information was provided; no other appropriate caregiver was immediately available; the children were placed with their grandmother in the most family-like setting available at the time; and the children were out of their home for only approximately 36 hours. Defendants further note that a formal hearing was scheduled for the Monday morning after the Saturday night of the incident to review the allegations and determine whether jurisdiction should continue; the parents were given notice of the hearing; the parents appeared at the hearing with representation; a guardian was appointed for the children to represent their interests; and the petition containing the allegations on which the removal was based was filed and presented to the parents prior to the hearing. In reply to Defendants, Plaintiffs argue that they did not receive any process prior to the removal of the children. They contend that the ex parte hearing with Referee Whitworth does not constitute sufficient due process for two reasons: first, the CPS Defendants admit they entered the house and seized the children before Whit-worth verbally issued the removal order (although the police say the order came before the children were taken), and second, Parks allegedly recklessly misrepresented or omitted key facts in his call to Whitworth. See Malik v. Arapahoe County Dep’t ofSoc. Servs., 191 F.3d 1306, 1315 (10th Cir.1999) (“An ex parte hearing based on misrepresentation and omission does not constitute notice and an opportunity to be heard.”). In addition, Plaintiffs contend that the CPS social workers failed to properly investigate the allegations of child neglect. See Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1020 (2000) (absent exigent circumstances, due process requires an investigation). Plaintiffs maintain that the process due in this case should be the same as that required in Doe v. Staples, 706 F.2d 985 (6th Cir.1983). There, the court required the following: (1) notice prior to removing a child, stating the reasons for removal; (2) a full hearing with the opportunity to present witnesses and evidence; (3) legal counsel; (4) a neutral and detached agency official presiding at the hearing; and (5) a written decision stating the reasons for the ruling. Id. at 990. However, Plaintiffs fail to recognize that Staples imposed process requirements based on the particular context of that case, as the law in this field requires. The Court cannot simply import the Staples requirements to the instant case, which differs from Staples in several respects and merits its own appropriately tailored process requirements. Here, the court referee gave verbal authorization to remove the children (although the unwritten order was legally ineffectual and the two groups of Defendants dispute whether the order came before or after the children were removed from the home). Also, notice to the parents on the night of the incident was impossible because the children refused to provide contact information, and a hearing was held the following Monday at which the parents and their attorney were present. Although Staples’ requirements do not necessarily dictate the process required in this case, the Court finds that the process provided to Plaintiffs was constitutionally inadequate. The Sixth Circuit has not expressly ruled on the issue, but law from other circuits suggests that at a minimum, due process requires a written order unless exigent circumstances are present. See Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1020 (7th Cir.2000) (“Minimally, [due process] also means that governmental officials will not remove a child from his home without an investigation and pre-deprivation hearing resulting in a court order of removal, absent exigent circumstances.”). See also Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 739 (10th Cir.1997) (“Removal of children from the custody of their parents requires pre-deprivation notice and a hearing except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justified postponing the hearing until after the event.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Malik, 191 F.3d at 1315 (a parent has a liberty interest in familial association and privacy that, absent extraordinary circumstances, cannot be violated without adequate pre-deprivation procedures). Cf. Lossman v. Pekarske, 707 F.2d 288, 291 (7th Cir.1983) (“When a child’s safety is threatened, that is justification enough for action first and a hearing afterward.”); Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 346 (4th Cir.1994) (“[0]nly where a child’s life is in imminent danger or where there is immediate danger of severe or irremediable injury to the child’s health (and prior judicial authorization is not immediately obtainable) may an official summarily assume custody of a child from his parents.”). The Court has already determined that the circumstances in this case were not exigent, and even if probable cause could support removal, that standard has not been met here either. Further, it is undisputed that the referee’s order was verbal. The fact that the order was unwritten suffices to render the process provided to Plaintiffs inadequate — and this is not to mention the dispute as to whether the verbal order had been issued before the children were seized (if the verbal order was issued after the seizure, then Defendants cannot claim that Plaintiffs received even an ex parte hearing from the referee before the children were removed). The Court next rejects Defendants’ contention that the hearing and court review on the Monday after the incident comprised an adequate post-deprivation remedy sufficient to absolve any earlier due process defects. In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1917, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), the Supreme Court held that post-deprivation remedies that fully compensate a plaintiff for his loss of property are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. The Sixth Circuit has extended the Parratt rule to deprivation of liberty rights. See, e.g., Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 584 (6th Cir.1985); Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir.1990). However, post-deprivation remedies will be adequate only when pre-deprivation remedies were “impossible,” Mertik v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1353, 1364-65 (6th Cir.1993), for example, because of an emergency situation. See Donald v. Polk County, 836 F.2d 376, 380 (7th Cir.1988) (“In an emergency situation, the government may take away property or liberty, so long as postdeprivation notice and a hearing are 'provided.”); Jordan by Jordan, 15 F.3d at 343 (“[I]t is well-settled that the requirements of process may be delayed where emergency action is necessary to avert imminent harm to a child ... provided that adequate post-deprivation process to ratify the emergency action is promptly accorded.”) (internal citations omitted). This case involved no emergency, and it would not have been impossible to get a valid, written court order for the removal of the children. The only thing preventing Defendants from doing so was their mistaken belief that only a verbal order was necessary. Furthermore, courts permit post-deprivation process to make up for lack of pre-deprivation process when government officials commit “random or unauthorized”' acts, but when government officials act according to an “established state procedure that itself violates due process rights,” such as the faulty “verbal” court order in this case, post-deprivation remedies are inadequate. Mertik, 983 F.2d at 1365. For these reasons, the post-deprivation hearing was inadequate and Plaintiffs suffered a procedural due process violation. B. City Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment The City Defendants’ summary judgment motion sets forth the following arguments: (1) Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of Art. I, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution must be dismissed because there are no inferred damage remedies against municipalities and individual government defendants under the Michigan Constitution; (2) the City of Lansing Police Department is not an entity subject to. suit separate from the City of Lansing; (3) Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Defendants Brown, Baldwin, Beatti, and Alley in their official capacities must be dismissed because they are claims against the City of Lansing, which is named as a party in this suit; (4) Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the City of Lansing must be dismissed because Plaintiffs cannot present evidence of a policy or custom or a failure to train which resulted in the alleged violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; (5) Plaintiffs’ state law tort claims against the City of Lansing must be dismissed on the basis of governmental immunity; (6) Plaintiffs’ claims against Chief Alley in his individual capacity must be dismissed because Plaintiffs cannot present evidence that he was in any way involved in this incident; (7) Plaintiff John O’Donnell’s claim for violation of due process under the Fourth Amendment based on his arrest and detention, and the other (minor) children’s claims under the Fourteenth Amendment based on their removal from the home, must be dismissed because such claims must be brought under the more specific Fourth Amendment; (8) Defendants Brown, Baldwin, and Beatti are entitled to summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment (i.e, first cause of action) and false arrest (i.e., fourth cause of action) claims because Plaintiff John O’Donnell admits in the complaint and in deposition testimony that he refused to cooperate and supply requested information to the officers and thus there was probable cause to arrest John O’Donnell for resisting and obstructing; (9) the Fourth Amendment claims by all the Plaintiffs based upon entry into the home and by the minor children for removal from the home do not amount to violations of the Fourth Amendment; (10) Defendants Brown, Baldwin, and Beatti are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs Patrick and Sandra O’Donnell’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims because there were no procedural or substantive due process violations; and (11) in the alternative, the police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. The Court addresses each argument in turn below. (1) Article I, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution Claim The City Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of Art. I, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution, which is set forth in the complaint’s first cause of action (i.e., the § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim). This Michigan constitutional provision comprises the state law analog to the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment. See People v. Levine, 461 Mich. 172, 178, 600 N.W.2d 622, 625-26 (1999). Plaintiffs acknowledge that under the Michigan Constitution, there is no judicially inferred cause of action for damages against municipalities or municipal government employees. See Jones v. Powell, 462 Mich. 329, 335, 612 N.W.2d 423, 426 (2000). However, they contend that Art. I, § 11 constitutes a right previously held under state law, the deprivation of which is actionable under § 1983. Plaintiffs cite Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976), but that case does not support their position. Paul stated that the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due process guarantees are implicated when a state seeks to deny a person rights initially recognized and protected by state law. Id. at 711, 96 S.Ct. at 1165. For example, when a state issues drivers’ licenses, it recognizes its citizens’ right to operate a vehicle, and the state cannot later withdraw this right without giving the citizens due process. Id. (citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971)). A plaintiff in such a situation may maintain a § 1983 action for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. But contrary to what Plaintiffs in this case argue, Paul in no way suggests that a § 1983 action also arises for violation of the substantive state law. The first cause of action, where the Michigan constitutional claim is found, is not a procedural due process claim, but rather a substantive claim for unreasonable search and seizure brought under § 1983. Accordingly, the City Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the Michigan Constitution. (2) Whether City of Lansing Police Department is Subject to Suit Under § 1983 Defendants argue that all claims against the City of Lansing Police Department should be dismissed because the Police Department is not an entity subject to suit separate from the City of Lansing itself. The City of Lansing is also named as a Defendant in this action. The capacity to sue or be sued is determined by the law of the state in which the district court sits or the law of the individual’s domicile. Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b). In this case, the law of Michigan controls. As interpreted by the state courts, Michigan’s governmental immunity statute, M.C.L. 691.1401 et seq., immunizes municipal police departments from suit. See McPherson v. Fitzpatrick, 63 Mich. App. 461, 464, 234 N.W.2d 566, 568 (1975) (“A municipal department, board or commission such as the Detroit Police Department, is unable to raise funds for payment and is not liable in tort.”) (citing O’Leary v. Bd. of Fire & Water Com’rs, 79 Mich. 281, 44 N.W. 608 (1890)). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims against the City of Lansing Police Department are claims against the Ci