Full opinion text
RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HALL, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION This litigation involves three federal civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the plaintiff, Hartford Police Detective Nicholas Russo, against Hartford police officers and supervisors, the Hartford Police Union and Union officers, and the City of Hartford. Russo alleges various federal constitutional and state law violations arising out of events preceding and surrounding his arrest on December 16, 1997, and his subsequent suspension from his police duties. Russo filed three related lawsuits, Russo v. City of Hartford, et al., 3:97cv2380 (JCH); Russo v. Bailey, et al., 3:00cv1794 (JCH); and Russo v. Marquis, et al., 3:00cv2382 (JCH), which have been consolidated for pre-trial purposes. Pending before the court are motions for summary judgment filed by all defendants in each of the actions. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Russo has been employed as a police officer for the City of Hartford Police Department(“HPD”) since 1981. For more than six years, Russo served as a Detective with the Crimes Against Persons(CAPers”) division of the Hartford Police Department. In June 1995¡ Russo was also assigned to the Federal Violent Crimes Unit in Hartford. He served as a detective in both capacities until his arrest on December 16, 1997. As a result of that arrest, on November 3, 2003, Russo was ultimately convicted of six felony counts. On January 7, 1997, Russo did not report to work and failed to report for the following two days. During this three day period, Russo left voicemails for Sargent Daryl Roberts and the two also had multiple phone conversations. In a voicemail from the morning of January 7, in which Russo indicated that he was sick and would not be at work, Roberts observed that Russo’s speech was slurred and disorganized. During a phone conversation with Russo shortly thereafter, Roberts made similar observations about Russo’s voice. Russo left another voicemail later that morning, in which Roberts observed that Russo’s voice had become sluggish and jittery. Roberts made recordings of the voicemails and provided them to David Kenary, a lieutenant assigned to the CAPers division. On January 10, 1997, Lieutenant Kenary ordered Russo to bring a doctor’s note to explain his absence from work. Russo brought a note from his physician stating that he had been absent from work for three days because he was being treated for influenza. Thereafter, Lieutenant Kenary and Charles Lilley, a sergeant assigned to the CAPers division, contacted Russo’s physician to confirm the authenticity of the note. The physician stated that he had not seen Russo in weeks. In a later conversation, the physician told Lieutenant Kenary that he had given Russo drug samples, but had not recorded the transactions because they were unofficial. On January 9, Chief Croughwell listened to the recorded voicemails and read memo-randa prepared by Sergeant Roberts and Sergeant Lilley which documented the information and their observations of Russo. Croughwell then asked Russo to submit to a drug test. In the spring of 1997, the locks to the CAPers office were changed, and Russo was not given a key. Russo requested a key from Daryl Roberts, a sergeant in the CAPers division. Sergeant Roberts did not give him a key. The CAPers office was typically opened and unlocked from 7:00 AM until 11:00 or 11:30 PM. Sergeant Roberts, Lieutenant Kenary, and Sergeant Lilley ordered Russo to report to them each morning with his itinerary for the day. On several occasions, they also ordered him to report at the end of the day with a signed memo from the United States Attorney’s office detailing what Russo had done that day. Additionally, the contents of Russo’s desk in the CAPers office were removed and the desk was moved. On June 15,1997, a murder took place in the City of Hartford. Both the HPD and the Federal Violent Crimes Unit investigated the murder. Russo investigated the murder as a member of the Federal Violent Crimes Unit and helped effectuate the arrest of a suspect. The HPD had arrested a different suspect. In the news media, Russo criticized the HPD’s arrest of its suspect. Russo’s affiliation with the federal authorities and, specifically his involvement in their arrest of the murder suspect, caused tension within the CAPers division of the HPD. In the fall of 1997, Lieutenant Kenary contacted the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) to initiate a criminal investigation of Russo’s physician. The State’s Attorney also initiated a criminal investigation of Russo’s physician in September 1997, for which purpose he formed a joint investigation team including, among others, Chief Croughwell, Captain Flaherty, and Lieutenant Kenary. In October 1997, Russo began working with the United States Attorney’s Office on a probe investigating corruption in the HPD. On or about October 13,1997, Russo told Stephen Kumnick, an Inspector in the Attorney General’s office, about the corruption probe. On or about October 30, 1997, Inspector Kumnick told James Rov-ella, one of Russo’s fellow detectives in the CAPers division, about the probe and Russo’s involvement in it. In turn, Detective Rovella notified two potential targets of the probe, Sergeant Christopher Lyons and Detective Robert Lawlor. Sergeant Lyons and Detective Lawlor then spoke with Chief Croughwell about the probe and threatened to physically harm Russo. In their presence, Chief Croughwell called Russo at home and conveyed the threats. During that conversation, Russo heard Sergeant Lyons and Detective Lawlor also personally threaten him. The Attorney General notified Chief Croughwell of the probe in an October 31, 1997 memorandum detailing Russo’s conversation with Inspector Kumnick. During October and November, in the course of investigating Russo’s physician and at the direction of Inspector Skinner, Lieutenant Kenary obtained Russo’s prescription records from Russo’s physician as well as numerous area pharmacies. On November 4, 1997, Captain Flaherty and two police sergeants confronted Russo at the United States Attorney’s Office in New Haven, Connecticut. Captain Flaherty told Russo that Chief Croughwell had ordered that Russo immediately submit to a drug test. Captain Flaherty relieved Russo of his firearm, escorted Russo to the back seat of an unmarked police vehicle, and brought him to a drug testing facility. While at the testing facility, Captain Flah-erty also interrogated Russo. During the return trip to Hartford, Captain Flaherty told Russo that Chief Croughwell had ordered him that Russo’s firearm not be returned to him and that Russo be placed on sick leave until Chief Croughwell received the results of the drug test. During the trip, Russo was not advised of his Miranda rights. Subsequently, Captain Flaherty told Russo that Chief Croughwell had changed his mind and wanted Russo either to report to work in a limited capacity (no gun or field duty) or voluntarily use his sick leave. In addition, Captain Flaherty stated that Chief Croughwell had ordered Russo not to drive a car home and not to drive a car to work the next day. On Chief Croughwell’s orders, a police sergeant drove Russo home. On or about November 5, 1997, before the results of the drug test had returned from the lab, news of the test was disseminated generally to members of the HPD. In turn, that information about the drug test was given to a newspaper reporter who contacted Russo about the matter and indicated that she intended to print a story about Russo. On December 15, 1997, after meeting with other members of the joint investigation team, the Attorney General’s office drafted an arrest warrant for Russo. On December 16, 1997, a member of the state police and a member of the HPD (neither of whom are named as defendants) searched Russo’s home. He was arrested and charged with four counts each of Forgery in the Second Degree and Illegally Obtaining a Controlled Substance by Fraud. Chief Croughwell suspended Russo without pay pending the outcome of the criminal matter. On September 14, 2000, the Connecticut Superior Court granted Russo’s motion to suppress the prescriptions obtained from the pharmacies. The following day, all charges against Russo were dismissed. The State appealed that ruling. Rudewicz informed the Union that Russo would be reinstated effective October 29, 2000. The reinstatement was conditioned on Russo documenting his fitness for duty and meeting POST certification requirements. On December 4, 2000, Bruce Marquis became Chief of Police and adopted Rudewicz’ position concerning Russo’s reinstatement. Russo has not been reinstated since, and he has not received any pay or benefits since January 2001. On February 19, 2002, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court, and the criminal charges were reinstated. On November 3, 2003, Russo was convicted on six felony counts. He is currently suspended without pay. The Hartford Police Union prematurely challenged Russo’s suspension in August of 2000. After the dismissal of criminal charges in September 2000, the Union pressed the grievance for Russo’s reinstatement. Russo alleges that the Union failed to act and did so in furtherance of an implicit agreement between the HPD defendants and the Union defendants. From December 16, 1997 to December 31, 1998, Lawrence Reynolds was the president of the Hartford Police Union. From January 1, 1999 to the present, Michael Wood has been the president of the Union. During all times relevant to this action, Thomas Hardwick was the vice-president of the Hartford Police Union. Additional facts, undisputed or construed in a light most favorable to Russo, will be discussed as to individual claims. III. DISCUSSION A. Standard The several defendants in these cases have filed motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In a motion for summary judgement, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgement as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); White v. ABCO Engineering Corp., 221 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir.2000). The burden of showing that no genuine factual dispute exists rests upon the moving party. Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir.1994)). Once the moving party has met its burden, in order to defeat the motion the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and present such evidence as would allow a jury to find in his favor. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.2000). In assessing the record, the trial court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgement is sought. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Graham, 230 F.3d at 38. “This remedy that precludes a trial is properly granted only when no rational finder of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party.” Carlton, 202 F.3d at 134. “When reasonable persons, applying the proper legal standards, could differ in their responses to the question” raised on the basis of the evidence presented, the question must be left to the jury. Sologub v. City of New York, 202 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir.2000). B. Russo v. City of Hartford, et al., 3:97-cv-2380 (JCH) [Dkt. Nos. 453 (Police Defendants) and 459 (City) ] In this action, Russo alleges that Chief Croughwell and Captain Flaherty (the “Police Defendants”), and the City of Hartford (“City”) deprived him of constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and his rights under Connecticut common law. All three defendants have moved for summary judgment. 1. Police Defendants Russo brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Police Defendants as well as the City. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an individual may bring a claim for damages against another who, acting under the color of state law, deprived him of a federal right. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 403, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997). Thus, “to prevail on a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that the challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person acting under color of state law, and that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Dept., 176 F.3d 125, 136-37 (2d Cir.1999) (citing Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir.1983)). Russo alleges deprivation of his rights under the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. a. Retaliation under the First Amendment Russo contends that, in retaliation for his cooperation with federal investigators, probing corruption in the HPD, Russo was subjected to an illegal drug test in November 1997, the results of which were illegally leaked to the media, and targeted in a criminal investigation that resulted in his suspension and arrest. The Police Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the ground that the alleged conduct was not protected under the First Amendment, and that there is no causal connection between the drug test and Russo’s speech. The Supreme Court has recognized that the state has an interest as an employer in regulating speech by employees so as to promote the efficiency of public services performed by its employees. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). However, “a public employee does not relinquish First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public interest by virtue of government employment.” Id. Acknowledging the wide variety of fact situations where critical statements by a public employee may be thought to furnish grounds for dismissal, the Supreme Court has declined to “lay down a general standard against which all such statements may be judged.” Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Instead, to assess the extent to which a state may regulate the speech of its employees, courts must balance “the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Id. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731. Before this balancing test is reached, a plaintiff making a First Amendment retaliation claim under section 1983 must initially demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) his speech was constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision; and (3) a causal connection exists between his speech and the adverse employment determination against him, so that it can be said that his speech was a motivating factor in the determination. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-87, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). If a plaintiff establishes these three factors, the defendant may, nevertheless, avoid liability by making either of two showings: One way the government may prevail is by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same adverse action in the absence of the protected speech. Alternatively, the government may show that plaintiffs speech was likely to disrupt the government’s activities, and the likely disruption was sufficient to outweigh the First Amendment value of plaintiffs speech. If the government relies on the latter rationale and the balance of interests indeed weighs in the government’s favor, plaintiff may still succeed by proving that the adverse action was in fact motivated by retaliation rather than by fear of disruption. Mandell v. The County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 384 (2d Cir.2003). Defendants rest their argument that there was no First Amendment violation almost entirely on their contention that Russo did not engage in protected speech when speaking with federal agents because he was required to do so incident to his job. Defendants do not address the remaining factors of the Mount Healthy test. Nevertheless, finding that there is a material fact at issue as to whether the speech satisfies the public concern inquiry, the court addresses the remaining prongs. i. Protected Speech. The First Amendment protects only speech which may “be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684. “Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Id. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684. The Second Circuit has interpreted Connick as directing courts to “look behind pretextual ‘public concern’ rationale proffered by the disciplined employee in order to discern whether [his] conduct, taken as a whole, was actually meant to address matters of public concern, or was simply a vehicle for furthering her private interests.” Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 153 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684). In other words, “the court should focus on the motive of the speaker and attempt to determine whether the speech was calculated to redress personal grievances or whether it had a broader public purpose.” Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 163-64 (2d Cir.1999). “Speech on a purely private matter, such as an employee’s dissatisfaction with the conditions of his employment, does not pertain to a matter of public concern.” Id. at 164 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684). There can be no doubt that Russo’s communication with the federal investigators, insofar as it concerned alleged unlawful and corrupt practices of the Hartford Police Department, constitutes “speech on a matter of public concern.” In fact, “ ‘discussion regarding current government policies and activities is perhaps the paradigmatic matter of public concern.’” Johnson v. Ganim, 342 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Harman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir.1998)). The Police Defendants attempt to seize upon the Second Circuit’s directive that courts examine the speaker’s motive and argue that Russo’s motivation for speaking, notwithstanding the content of his speech, was entirely personal and, thus, not entitled to First Amendment protection. Indeed, the Second Circuit has noted that the fact “that an employee’s speech touches on matters of public concern will not render that speech protected where the employee’s motive for the speech is private and personal.” Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1012 (2d. Cir.1994) (affirming denial of motion for preliminary injunction). Defendants contend that Russo’s cooperation with a federal investigation was not voluntary but rather compelled by the duties of his job. Since his motivation was only to do his job, they argue, Russo’s speech was not motivated by a broader public purpose as is required for it to fall within the ambit of First Amendment protection. Police Defs.’ Suppl. Memo, at 6. Russo appears to concede that, if his motivation for speaking was, in fact, his desire to do his job — that is, if he only spoke because he was ordered to do so — then he would not benefit from First Amendment protection. He argues, rather, that the record reveals that he was not compelled to give information to the federal investigators, but did so voluntarily because he believed that corruption was wrong. In support of their competing assertions, both parties point to a passage in Russo’s deposition in which he initially states that he was not ordered to cooperate with the investigators and moments later states that he was ordered. Specifically, defendants note that Russo testified: “The truth is I was asked about corruption. And being a sworn police officer in the State of Connecticut I was required to give information if I knew of any crimes being broken or if I had any knowledge.” Russo Vol. IV at 97. To the question, “Is it your position that you were required to provide information?,” he answered, “That’s my position.” Id. The Police Defendants argue that, if not motivated by something additional to Russo’s desire to perform his job, the speech does not fall within the scope of the First Amendment. The existence of one motive does not preclude the existence of another. Rather, as the Second Circuit has noted, “ ‘[mjixed motivations are involved in most actions we perform every day; we will not hold [plaintiffs] to herculean standards of purity of thought and speech.’ ” Johnson, 342 F.3d at 114 (quoting Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 371-72 (5th Cir.1989)). Indeed, moments before saying that he was ordered to answer questions, Russo stated that he “voluntarily gave information” regarding corruption. Russo Vol. IV at 96. Notwithstanding any inconsistencies in his testimony, a reasonable fact finder could infer that Russo was motivated, at least in part, by a public concern regarding corruption within the HPD. On the current record, defendants have simply failed to establish the absence of all but personal motive. Further, the court finds no support for the proposition that merely because an individual is compelled to speak as a job-related duty, that such speech is never afforded First Amendment protection. See Dangler v. New York City Off Track Betting Corp., 193 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir.1999). In Dangler, the Second Circuit found that a public employee’s accusation of improper and corrupt behavior by his co-workers “implicated particularly strong First Amendment issues.” Id. Significantly, for purposes of the instant case, the Dangler court noted that the employer’s own written policy made such reporting mandatory. Id.; see also Piesco v. City of New York, Dep’t of Personnel, 933 F.2d 1149, 1152 (2d Cir.1991) (noting, in dicta, that compelled testimony under oath could receive First Amendment protection). In Johnson v. Ganim, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment in defendant’s favor on a First Amendment retaliation claim. 342 F.3d at 114. Johnson, an employee of the City of Bridgeport and Union member,' had sent a series of letters to the City Administration complaining about the Administration’s policies and practices. The City Director of Labor Relations conducted a hearing and, upon determining that the language used in the letters violated City workplace rules, terminated the plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment, reasoning that, in addition to constituting a threat, the nature of the plaintiffs complaints— insofar as they were directed at the administration’s policies regarding the Union with which plaintiff was heavily involved— was personal and, thus, unprotected. The Second Circuit did not agree and expressly rejected the district court’s rationale that the plaintiffs personal interest in the subject matter prevented his speech from implicating matters of public concern: There is no question that [plaintiff] took a personal interest in the matters about which he wrote. He was heavily involved in Union activities, and its members, assuming the truth of his allegations, suffer from the administration’s improper activities. The thrust of the speech, however, is aimed at the alleged system-wide epidemic that affected not only the Union, but the administration itself and the voting public as a whole. Indeed, if the letter is viewed as requesting that action be taken, the benefit of such action would inure more to the group than to him specifically. Therefore, the “predominant content” of the letter addressed matters of public concern. 342 F.3d at 114. The Second Circuit considered the content of the speech and expressly rejected “the proposition that a matter is not of public concern if it personally and directly affected the speaker.” Id. To hold otherwise would have the impermissible effect of allowing “only those persons with the least amount of first hand knowledge about the subject matter [to] utter speech without fear of government reprisal.” Id. Similarly, in the case at bar, the court can credit Russo’s personal job-related interest in answering the questions of the federal investigators and, yet, based on the “predominant content” of the speech, determine that it, satisfies the public concern inquiry. As such, the Police Defendants have failed to establish- that the speech was not of public concern simply by establishing that Russo had a personal motivation for engaging in such speech. ii. Adverse Employment Action. The Second Circuit has held that “only retaliatory conduct that would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights constitutes an adverse action.” Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir.2001). Adverse employment actions include discharge, refusal to hire, refusal to promote, demotion, reduction in pay, and reprimand. See Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir.1995) (citing Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 75, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990)). Even lesser actions may be considered adverse employment actions. Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 324-26 (2d Cir.1996) (adverse employment actions may. include negative evaluation letters, express accusations of lying, assignment of lunchroom duty, reduction of class preparation periods, failure to process teacher’s insurance forms, transfer from library to classroom teaching as an alleged demotion, and assignment to classroom on fifth floor which aggravated teacher’s physical disabilities). The Police Defendants fail to argue, or even assert, that the actions in question did not constitute adverse employment actions. The court finds that the question of whether the drug testing and investigation constitute adverse employment actions creates an issue of material fact to be resolved by a jury. The Second Circuit has found that “the threat of disciplinary proceedings” and the suspension that would accompany initiation of such proceedings “could have a deterrent effect on officers who wished to” exercise their First Amendment rights. Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 320 (2d Cir.2004) (reversing district court finding that threat of disciplinary proceedings and suspension could not, as a matter of law, constitute an adverse employment action). Drug testing and investigation share that potential deterrent effect. Accordingly, Croughwell and Flaherty have not established that their actions do not constitute adverse employment actions as a matter of law. iii. Causation. The causal connection must be sufficient to warrant the inference that the protected speech was a substantial motivating factor in the adverse employment action, that is to say, the adverse employment action would not have been taken absent the employee’s protected speech. See Mount Healthy City, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. 568. The Police Defendants argue that the cause of the testing and suspension and other alleged adverse employment actions was not Russo’s alleged speech, but rather his drug abuse. The court finds that there is a question of fact as to the cause of the employment actions. Causation can be established either indirectly by means of circumstantial evidence, for example, by showing that the protected activity was followed by adverse treatment in emplojhnent. See Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir.1990) (discussing the causation prong of the retaliation test in the Title VII context). A plaintiff need not establish causation through temporal proximity, however, if instead he can offer evidence of retaliatory animus. Mandell, 316 F.3d at 384. In Mandell, the Second Circuit found that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence of retaliatory animus to create a triable question of fact where, inter alia, plaintiffs superiors told him to learn to keep his mouth shut and, further, that his testimony might adversely affect his career. Id. at 383. In the case at bar, the court finds there is evidence of retaliatory animus sufficient to raise an issue of fact. The court finds such animus evidenced in Croughwell’s telephone call to Russo informing him that, because of his cooperation with the federal investigators, two of his subordinates wanted to physically hurt him. Further, the court finds such animus evidenced in Flaherty’s alleged threat to “get” Russo. See Pl.’s Joint Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement ¶ 29. iv. Balancing Test. As noted earlier, a finding in Russo’s favor on the three prong test for First Amendment retaliation then leads to a further analysis. If Croughwell and Flaherty demonstrate either that: (1) the defendants would have taken the same adverse action in the absence of the protected speech; or (2) that disruption caused by the plaintiffs speech is sufficient to outweigh the First Amendment interest in plaintiffs speech, there is no First Amendment retaliation. See Mandell, 316 F.3d at 382-83. The second prong is not implicated here. With regard to the first prong, the Second Circuit has held that summary judgment is precluded where questions regarding an employer’s motive predominate in the inquiry regarding how important a role the protected speech played in the adverse employment decision. See Piesco, 933 F.2d at 1155. Such is the case here, and accordingly, the court declines to grant summary judgment on this claim. b. Séarch and Seizure under the Fourth Amendment Russo contends that the Police Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by transporting him in the back of a police car to the drug testing facility, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25(A), 35, and by requiring him to submit to drug tests without reasonable cause or suspicion. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 35(C). As to the compulsory drug test, the Police Defendants argue that they had a reasonable suspicion that Russo was using drugs, thereby justifying the drug tests. As to the alleged detention which was incident to the administration of the drug tests, they argue that Russo was not in custody and,' even if he was, it was not unreasonable. Russo responded by arguing that Roberts was not properly trained and Russo was not given a copy of the “just cause drug test,” all in violation of the drug policy. Pl.’s Memo, in Opp’n at 10. The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” “[CJompulsory urinalysis ,of public employees qualifies as a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Coppinger v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 861 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir.1988). However, public employees working in safety sensitive jobs may be subject to compulsory drug testing based upon a reasonable suspicion standard as opposed to the probable cause standard applied to other warrantless searches. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 622-23, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); see also Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (holding that drug testing of Customs Service employees seeking “promotion to positions having a direct involvement in drug interdiction or requiring the incumbent to carry firearms” need only meet standard of reasonableness in order to meet requirements of the Fourth Amendment). “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). The reasonable suspicion standard requires consideration of several factors: “(1) the nature of the tip or information; (2) the reliability of the informant; (3) the degree of corroboration; and (4) other facts contributing to suspicion or lack thereof.” Security & Law Enforcement Employees, Dist. Council 82 v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 205 (2d Cir.1984) (reasonable suspicion to conduct strip search); see also Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir.1987) (holding reasonable suspicion existed when information regarding an employee’s drug use was provided by a fellow employee and a known drug dealer). Reasonable suspicion “must be based on an analysis of all the circumstances as they appeared to the official making the judgment at the time.” Nocera v. Rivera, 921 F.Supp. 192, 199 (S.D.N.Y.1996). In the case at bar, prior to ordering the initial drug test on January 9,1997, Chief Croughwell had many objective facts from which he could have reasonably drawn the inference that Russo was abusing drugs. Although Chief Croughwell had not been aware of any current drug use by Russo, he did know that Russo had been arrested in 1988 for illegally obtaining prescription drugs, for which Russo was suspended without pay for 18 months. Additionally, he had personally listened to the recorded telephone message of Russo calling in sick, in which voicemail Russo’s speech was slurred and his thought pattern was disorganized. He met with Russo’s supervisors to discuss their concerns about Russo’s work performance and their suspicions of his drug use. He reviewed memoranda prepared by Sergeant Roberts and Sergeant Lilley that detailed a recent pattern of erratic work attendance and suspicious episodes when Russo did report to work. Based on this knowledge, which Russo does not dispute, Chief Croughwell had more than ample cause to order the January drug test based on a reasonable suspicion that Russo was using drugs. Russo argues that the “just cause memo” was based only on telephone calls and thus Roberts “could not identify any physical signs of intoxication.” Pl.’s Memo. Opp’n at 9. However, various portions of Sergeant Roberts’ memorandum report in-person contact with Russo in January 1997. Defs’ App. B at Ex. 8. On January 6, Russo was at the Department and “talking a lot and speaking very very fast.” Id. at p. 3. Further, on January 7, although by telephone, Roberts notes “physical signs”: speech slurred, repeating himself frequently, disorganized speech pattern. Id. In addition, Sergeant Lilley’s memorandum supported the decision to have Russo drug tested. Sergeant Lilley reported that, for about a month, Russo exhibited “a wide range of mood and personality swings.” Id., Lilley Memo, at 3. Russo’s argument rests on an assumption that Roberts did not receive training to identify intoxication, as required by the Policy. See Pl.’s Memo, in Opp’n at ¶¶ 9-10. However, his proffered Rule 56(c)(2) Statement at paragraph 123 is not supportive of this assumption nor is it supported. In fact, Roberts testified that, in addition to knowledge in this regard that he obtained as a narcotics officer, he was trained as a supervisor before January 1997. Pl.’s Joint Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement, Depo. Transcripts, Roberts Depo. at 124. Prior to ordering the second drug test on November 4, 1997, Croughwell had acquired additional information which bolstered his reasonable suspicion that Russo was using drugs. Namely, he had received information that, during the previous ten months, Russo had obtained more than 5,400 doses of Tylenol 3 (with codeine), which is a controlled substance. Contrary to Department Policy, Russo never told his supervisor that he was taking Tylenol 3 (with codeine). Chief Croughwell contacted a doctor at the EAP and inquired about the effect of taking such an amount of Tylenol 3 over that time period. The doctor indicated that the effect could be adverse and recommended a drug test. Accordingly, the court finds that Chief Croughwell, again in November 1997, had more than ample reasonable suspicion that Russo was using drugs. Therefore, summary judgment as to the Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim in Count One against Chief Crough-well and Captain Flaherty is granted. c. Interrogation in Violation of Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination Russo contends that the Police Defendants violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by “by taking him into custody; and then using the drug test against him.” Pl.’s Memo. Opp’n at 12. The court first notes that no section 1983 action will lie for a Miranda violation. See Neighbour v. Covert, 68 F.3d 1508, 1510 (2d Cir.1995) (per curiam). Moreover, the Tenth Circuit has held, and this court agrees, that “urine samples used for drug testing constitute non-testimonial evidence and therefore do not implicate Plaintiffs Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.” Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347, 1350 (10th Cir.1994); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (holding that facts disclosed by a blood sample tested for alcohol content are not “testimonial” and therefore do not implicate the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination). Accordingly, Russo cannot maintain a section 1983 claim based on the alleged violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as alleged in his complaint or pressed in opposition. d. Procedural Due Process Violation under the Fourteenth Amendment Russo contends in this Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 126) that the Police Defendants violated his right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to his property rights in his job. These defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that Russo did not avail himself of the process contractually guaranteed to him by the City. Russo’s counsel stated at oral argument that he does not press this claim. Thus, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. e. Qualified Immunity Police Defendants have moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The court considers that ground with respect to the only remaining federal claim against the Police Defendants in this ease, the First Amendment retaliation claim. When exercising discretionary authority, a state official whose conduct deprives another of a right secured by federal constitutional or statutory law may avoid liability for damages under section 1983 under the doctrine of qualified immunity. That doctrine does not apply, however, where at the time and under the circumstances of the challenged conduct all reasonable officials would have realized that it was proscribed by the federal law on which the suit is founded. See, e.g., Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir.2002). “When considering the issue of qualified immunity we must first determine whether — viewed in the light most favorable to the injured party — the facts alleged demonstrate that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. If so, we must determine whether that right was clearly established.” Id. (internal citation omitted). The requirement that the right was clearly established is, in part, a function of the issue of notice: “[p]ublic officials sued in their individual capacity are entitled to qualified immunity from suit unless ‘the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’ ” Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 129 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). That is not to say that the specific conduct alleged must have previously explicitly been held unlawful, but rather that immunity is unavailable “if ‘in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [is] apparent.’ ” Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002)). The defendants cannot be held liable for official acts so long as their “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). To determine the validity of the claim of qualified immunity, a two-step analysis applies. This court “must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290, 119 S.Ct. 1292, 143 L.Ed.2d 399 (1999); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). The second prong of the test, determining whether the right was “clearly established,” considers whether the unlawful nature of an officer’s activity could have been known by the officer at the time of commission. “If a reasonable officer could have believed that the challenged conduct was lawful at the time of the violation, then qualified immunity bars the claim.” Sira v. Morton, et al., 380 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir.2004). As indicated earlier, see section III. B.l(a), supra., the court finds that, when the record is construed in a light most favorable to Russo, an issue of fact exists regarding a violation of Russo’s constitutional right to free speech. Therefore, the court must consider “whether that right was clearly established.” Caldarola, 298 F.3d at 160. On this score, the Second Circuit has recently noted that “[i]t has ‘long been established’ that a government employee’s right to speak on issues of public concern is protected from retaliation if the speech does not disrupt the administration of the government,” Catletti v. Rampe, 334 F.3d 225, 231 (2003) (quoting Dobosz v. Walsh, 892 F.2d 1135, 1141 (2d Cir.1989)). The record before the court does not suggest that Russo’s exercise disrupted the administration of the government. Thus, “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). No reasonable officer could believe that retaliating against Russo on the basis of Russo’s statements would not have violated Russo’s First Amendment rights. The second prong of the test is normally objective. It considers the actions of the “reasonable officer,” not those of the particular defendant in question. The constitutional violation alleged by Russo, however, incorporates a subjective element. Whether Croughwell and Flaherty violated Russo’s rights hinges on their motivation for their actions. As described above at section III.B.l(a), there is a triable issue of fact regarding Croughwell and Flaherty’s liability on the claim of First Amendment retaliation. The Second Circuit has found that “[tjhough the qualified immunity inquiry is generally an objective one, a defendant’s subjective intent is indeed relevant in motive-based constitutional torts.” Johnson v. Ganim, 342 F.3d 105, 117 (2003). Further, “[w]here a factual issue exists on the issue of motive or intent, a defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity must fail.” Id. To find otherwise would be to allow defendants accused of motive and inténtion-based constitutional violations to be entitled to immunity in any case where they could point to some arguably legitimate grounds for their actions. Id. (citing Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 169 (2d Cir.2001)). Therefore, in this case, because “specific intent of a defendant is an element of plaintiffs claim under clearly established law, and Russo has adduced sufficient evidence of that intent to defeat summary judgment, summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is inappropriate.” Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368 (2d Cir.2003). f. False Imprisonment In Count Four, Russo claims that Flaherty, Croughwell, and the City of Hartford are liable for subjecting him to false imprisonment. “False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another.” Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 820, 614 A.2d 414 (1992). In order to create a triable issue of fact with respect to false imprisonment, Russo must allege and provide evidentiary support that “ ‘his physical liberty has been restrained by the defendants] and that the restraint was against his will, that is, that he did not consent to the restraint or acquiesce in it willingly.’ ” Id. at 820, 614 A.2d 414, (quoting LoSacco v. Young, 20 Conn.App. 6, 19, 564 A.2d 610, cert. denied, 213 Conn. 808, 568 A.2d 793 (1989)). The restraint must be accomplished “through the exercise of force.” Id. In addition, liability attaches only if the “act is done for the purpose of imposing a confinement, or with knowledge that such confinement will, to a substantial certainty, result from it.” Green v. Donroe, 186 Conn. 265, 268, 440 A.2d 973, 974 (1982) (quoting 32 Am.Jur.2d, False Imprisonment § 9; Restatement (Second), Torts § 35). Russo claims that on November 4, 1997, Flaherty, on Croughwell’s command, removed Russo from a meeting at the U.S. Attorney’s Office, demanded that he get in a car with Flaherty, Hajdasz and Huertas, and required Russo to take a drug test. According to Russo, he was intimidated and threatened by Flaherty, who also took Russo’s gun from him. Russo claims that he did not speak due to a fear that he would be pushed from the car. In addition, upon reaching Hartford, Russo asked that he be able to use the bathroom and Flaherty refused. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is clear that Flaherty and Croughwell acted intentionally. They acted with “the purpose of imposing a confinement.” Id. That is, Flaherty, on Croughwell’s command, confronted Russo in New Haven with the full intention that he would be transported to a drug testing facility. Russo claims that he had a reasonable fear that force would be used against him. The Connecticut Supreme Court has found that evidence that defendants “displayed a revolver”; “used abusive and threatening language toward the plaintiff’; “took the plaintiff by the arm and escorted him to [the defendant’s] car,” and that the plaintiff “did not feel free to leave while he was in [defendant’s] car” sufficed to create a triable issue of fact regarding the use of force as a necessary element of proving false imprisonment. Berry, 223 Conn. at 821, 614 A.2d 414. Further, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that the presence of the gun did not constitute the sole basis for plaintiffs claim that the defendants used force. Id. The plaintiffs evidence, primarily his own testimony, that force was used sufficed to create a question for the jury. Id. Russo need only submit minimal evidence to support his contention that the defendants used force to impose confinement. The presence of three armed police officers, after Russo had been disarmed, suffices to create a question of fact. Russo must also prove, however, that “ ‘he did not consent to the restraint or acquiesce in it willingly.’ ” Id. at 820, 614 A.2d 414 (quoting LoSacco v. Young, 20 Conn.App. 6, 19, 564 A.2d 610, cert. denied, 213 Conn. 808, 568 A.2d 793 (1989)). Russo consented to be subject to mandatory, random, and reasonable cause drug testing as a condition of his employment with the Hartford Police Department and to be transported in connection with such testing. Pl.’s Joint Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement, Ex. D at § III.A.1. Chief Crough-well, upon “a belief based on objective and articulable facts sufficient to lead a reasonably prudent supervisor to suspect that an employee is under the influence of drugs so that the employee’s ability to perform the functions of the job is impaired,” ordered a drug test. Id. at § III.C.l; see supra, at section III.B.l(a)(iv) regarding reasonable suspicion basis. Chief Crough-well then designated Flaherty to instruct Russo “to submit to reasonable suspicion urinalysis drug testing” and to provide Russo’s “transportation to the designated testing agency.” Pl.’s Joint Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement, Ex. D at § III.C.2(b); see also Police Defs.’ Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶¶ 16-17. An employee can refuse to submit to a drug test but is then subject to certain consequences. An employee who refuses to submit to a drug test is sent home or suspended with pay and subject to a departmental disciplinary hearing. Pl.’s Joint Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement, Ex. D at § III.C.2(c). Russo was aware of the drug testing policy, including his right to refuse. Police Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement, ¶¶ 14, 16 and 17. Russo provides no facts to prove that Flaherty and Croughwell prevented Russo from refusing to take the test. He claims he was in fear while being transported. However, he was first advised that he was to be taken for a drug test while in a meeting at the U.S. Attorney’s Office with, inter alia, a senior Assistant U.S. Attorney. Russo voluntarily left that room with the HPD personnel, knowing where and why he was going. Had this not been his voluntary act, surely he could have safely refused in the presence of federal law enforcement. Because Russo, as a condition of his employment, consented to the reasonable suspicion drug test and, at the time he was instructed to submit to the test, did not refuse to submit to testing, the confinement imposed by Flaherty at Croughwell’s direction did not constitute false imprisonment as a matter of law. 2. Municipal Liability Russo contends that the City is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of the Police Defendants. Am. Compl. Count Two (Dkt. No. 126). In light of the court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Chief Croughwell and Captain Flaherty as to all section 1983 claims except the First Amendment retaliation claim, that is the only claim with respect to which the court needs to consider the possibility of municipal liability. The City argues that Russo cannot, as a matter of law, establish that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of its policy or custom. Russo argues that the City is liable because: (1) Croughwell was responsible for establishing final government policy; (2) the HPD had a deliberate policy of failing to train or supervise its officers in the investigation of other officers; and (3) the HPD had such a history of interfering with officers like Russo as to imply constructive acquiescence by the policy makers. The court finds that there are no issues of material fact and, as a matter of law, the City is not liable for the conduct of the individual defendants. While a municipality can be held liable for a constitutional violation asserted in a claim under section 1983, liability cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior. Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 56-57 (2d Cir.2000) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). In fact, avoiding results that are indistinguishable from re-spondeat superior appears to be a primary concern of Supreme Court jurisprudence on municipal liability. See, e.g., St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (plurality opinion) (“If the mere exercise of discretion by an employee could give rise to a constitutional violation, the result would be indistinguishable from respondeat superior liability.”). For a municipality to be hable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the act that caused the violation of rights must have been committed pursuant to an official policy or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-94, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Further, “[t]he official policy must be the ‘moving force of the constitutional violation.’ ” Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill, 973 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018). Where the act did not result from official municipal policy, the municipality may still be held liable where the injury is caused by one of its lawmakers or “ ‘by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.’ ” Jeffes, 208 F.3d at 57 (2000) (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 121-22, 108 S.Ct. 915). “Where the contention is not that the actions complained of were taken pursuant to a local policy that was formally adopted or ratified, but rather that they were taken or caused by an official whose actions represent official policy, the court must determine whether that official had final policy-making authority in the particular area involved.” Id. A plaintiff may also establish municipal liability by showing that a municipal policy or custom existed as a result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference to the violation of constitutional rights, either by inadequate training or supervision. Vann, 72 F.3d at 1049. “In order to establish the liability of a municipality in an action under § 1983 for unconstitutional acts by a municipal employee below the policymaking level, a plaintiff must establish that the violation of his constitutional rights resulted from a municipal custom or policy.” Vann v. The City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1049 (2d Cir.1995). a. Final policymakers As an initial matter, the court must consider whether Chief Croughwell or Captain Flaherty were final policymakers so as to render the City liable for their actions or inactions. Whether an official in question possessed final policy making authority in a particular area is a legal question to be determined by reference to state law, local law, and custom and usage having the force of law. Jeffes, 208 F.3d at 57-58. The Supreme Court has provided some general principles to guide the court in its consideration: When an official’s discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not of that official’s making, those policies, rather than the subordinate’s departures from them, are the act of the municipality. Similarly, when a subordinate’s decision is subject to review by the municipality’s authorized policymakers, they have retained the authority to measure the official’s conduct for conformance with their policies. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127, 108 S.Ct. 915. This court’s review of Connecticut law, in light of these principles, reveals that Chief Croughwell cannot be considered a policymaker for purposes of section 1983 liability as alleged here nor can the actual policymakers be considered to have either ratified the alleged conduct or expressed deliberate indifference to it. This case is distinguishable from Jeffes and Mandell, cases in which the Second Circuit found that an elected sheriff and a county police commissioner, respectively, possessed sufficient policy-making authority to support an allegation of municipal liability under Monell. See Jeffes, 208 F.3d at 61; Mandell, 316 F.3d at 385. In Jeffes, the Second Circuit found that state and county law did not provide for supervision or control of an elected sheriffs policymaking “with respect to the existence or enforcement of a code of silence.” Jeffes, 208 F.3d at 61. The sheriffs ability to make personnel decisions was circumscribed by county employment policy. The sheriffs elected status and his general authority under New York State law to attend to the county jail and its inmates, however, allowed the court to find that with respect to an alleged code of silence perpetrated by prison guards, the sheriff was the final policymaking authority. Id. In Mandell, the court found that the defendant police commissioner did have “authority to set department-wide personnel policies.” Mandell, 316 F.3d at 385. The instant case is distinguishable. Croughwell did not have the authority to set personnel policies. Nor does Russo allege that Croughwell oversaw some sort of unofficial department policy, like the code of silence alleged in Jeffes, for which he did not have to answer to any more senior policy or policymaker. Croughwell remained accountable to department and city policy in all of the activities Russo alleged violated his constitutional rights. The record reveals that Chief Crough-well did, in fact, exercise discretionary authority in his decision to assign Russo to the CAPers division, to initiate an investigation of Russo (including the attendant interrogation, detention, and drug tests), and, ultimately, to suspend Russo. However, the exercise of this discretion does not necessarily compel the conclusion that Chief Croughwell was a policymaker for the purpose of establishing municipal liability with respect to the duties and obligations of his staff and himself to other staff differ. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 484 n. 12, 106 S.Ct. 1292. Rather, here it is uncontroverted that the City Charter vests policymaking authority in the City Council and the City Manager. The court also notes that, to the extent Russo characterizes Chief Croughwell’s exercise of his discretion as a de facto policy of the municipality, Croughwell’s discretion was necessarily kept in check by a formal review mechanism. City’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement ¶¶32, 34, 36, 40-42. As such, the policymakers “retained the authority to measure the official’s conduct for conformance with their policies.” See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127, 108 S.Ct. 915. Accordingly, the court cannot hold the municipality liable for the actions of Chief Croughwell as alleged in this action under the theory that he was a municipal policymaker. b. Inadequate Training/Supervision Russo also argues that the City is liable as a result of “inadequate training and supervision in deliberate indifference to [his] constitutional rights.” Memo. Opp’n at 12. To establish a claim concerning inadequate training, Russo must show: (1) that “a policymaker of the municipality knows to a moral certainty that its employees will confront a given situation”; (2) that “the situation either presents the employee with a difficult choice of the sort that training or supervision will make less difficult or that there is a history of employees mishandling .the situation”; and (3) that “the wrong choice by the employee will frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Young v. County of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 903-04 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297-98 (2d Cir.1992) (internal alterations omitted)). While the parties disagree on exactly how to characterize the situation that requires training or supervision, the court views it as training regarding the treatment of fellow officers who are investigating corruption in the HPD and/or working with the federal government. Pl.’s Memo. Opp’n at 13-14. The City argues that training aimed at eradicating such behavior would be superfluous insofar as it should be obvious to all officers, in the absence of formal training, that they should not pursue vendettas against fellow officers for the latter’s involvement in corruption investigations. City’s Memo, at 31-32. Indeed, it has been recognized that, where a situation arises in the course of one’s duties as a police officer and the proper response to that situation “is obvious to. all without training or supervision, then the failure to train or supervise is generally not ‘so likely’ to produce a wrong decision as to support an inference of deliberate indifference by city policymakers to the need to train or supervise.” Walker, 974 F.2d at 299-300. The court finds that, as a matter of law, Russo cannot establish the inadequacy of training and supervision. The City cannot be liable if the need for such training was not obvious. Vann, 72 F.3d at 1049 (“To prove such deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that the need for more or better supervision to protect against constitutional violations was obvious.”). Here, Russo has come forward with no evidence. from which a finder of fact could reasonably infer that the City