Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT OAKLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT’S MOTION TO DISMISS; (2) GRANTING DEFENDANT HON. MARTHA D. ANDERSON’S MOTION TO DISMISS; (3) DENYING DEFENDANT HON. ELIZABETH M. PEZ-ZETTI’S MOTION TO DISMISS; (4) GRANTING DEFENDANT CLINTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT’S MOTION TO DISMISS; (5) DENYING DEFENDANT HON. LISA SULLIVAN’S (VICE HON. MARVIN ROBERTSON) MOTION TO DISMISS; AND (6) DENYING DEFENDANTS JONATHAN AND DONNA CROMWELL’S MOTION TO DISMISS BORMAN, District Judge. INTRODUCTION Before the Court are Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. This case revolves around two minor children, sisters, Lilian-dra Amethest Dawne Holey, birth date August 29, 2001 and Pearl Patrice Holey, birth date August 10, 2002, who both became available for adoption due to tragic events that ensued in their biological family- This case also involves two families, the Tamera and Chaddwic Smith Family of Clinton County (“Smith Plaintiffs”), and the Donna and Jonathan Cromwell Family of Oakland County (“Cromwell Defendants”), both which are seeking to adopt these two children. On March 17, 2003, Clinton County Family Court Judge Marvin Robertson issued orders of adoption of the two children by the Smiths — which orders were subsequently revoked by a combination of two court orders, both of which were issued without notice to the childrens’ then-parents the Smith Plaintiffs. The first order was issued on April 12, 2003 by Oakland County Family Court Judge Elizabeth Pezzetti, the second, on April 17, 2003, by Clinton County Judge Robertson, who had ordered the adoptions one month earlier. There has never been any allegation that the Smiths were unfit parents. The two children presently reside with the Crom-wells in Oakland County. The children have been shuttled around the State of Michigan by state court judges, from one county to another, and from the Smith family to the Cromwell family, without the children receiving any legal representation — no one has been in court to represent the best interests of the children. The Michigan Family Independence Agency (FIA), the State agency charged with representing the best interests of these children, having had notice of critical proceedings in their lives, has been noticeably and purposely absent from significant state court hearings. The children have been in multiple family settings, and have had multiple sets of legal names in the space of a few years. Only recently, has the present court in control of the children, Oakland Circuit, appointed a Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) to represent the children in future court proceedings, proceedings which post-date the issues raised in this case. This case was brought by the Smith family, who legally adopted the two children in March, 2003, and, who, as legal parents, one month later, had their children taken away from them without notice and without an opportunity to participate in the legal proceedings held in two separate Michigan state circuit family courts, Clinton County and Oakland County. The Michigan Adoption Code states in M.C.L.A. § 710.60: (1) After the entry of the order of adoption, the adoptee shall, in case of a change of name, be known and called by the new name. The person or persons adopting the adoptee then stands in the place of a parent or parents to the adop-tee in law in all respects as though the adopted person had been born to the adopting parents and are liable for all the duties and entitled to all the rights of parents. (2) After the entry of the order of adoption there is no distinction between the rights and duties of natural progeny and adopted person... I. Factual Background Regarding the Two Children, and Factual and Procedural History in the State Court System On August 29, 2001, Liliandra Amethest Dawne Holey was born to Patrick and Jennifer Holey. In early April, 2002, Patrick and Jennifer Holey were prosecuted in Ingham County, Michigan for criminal sexual conduct involving a fourteen year-old girl. Shortly thereafter, the FIA instituted a child protective proceeding in Ing-ham County Circuit Court Family Division, and on April 9, 2002, the state took Liliandra into protective custody. Attorney Kenneth Birch represented Liliandra at those proceedings. Liliandra was then placed in foster care with Tamera and Chaddwic Smith (“Smith Plaintiffs”) in Clinton County on April 10, 2002. On April 11, 2002, Liliandra’s parents, Patrick and Jennifer Holey both attempted to commit suicide; Patrick died, but Jennifer survived. The FIA subsequently initiated a neglect case against Jennifer Holey in Ing-ham County Circuit Court, that was assigned to Judge Paula Manderfield. While the neglect case was pending, Jennifer Holey was convicted in the Ingham County Circuit Court of criminal sexual conduct and sentenced to four to fifteen years in prison. Specifically, Ms. Holey pled no contest to Criminal Sexual Conduct, Third Degree. On May 13, 2002, the Cromwell Defendants filed a Petition for Direct Placement Adoption of Liliandra with the Oakland County Family Court’s Adoption Services Department. On May 15, 2002, the Oakland County Family Court’s Adoption Services Department sent a notice of prior court proceedings affecting minor(s) (Liliandra) to the Ingham County Family Court. (Pezzetti Opinion June 12, 2003, P.7) On August 10, 2002, while in prison, Jennifer Holey gave birth to a second child, Pearl Patrice Holey. On August 13, 2002, the FIA placed Pearl in foster care, also with the Smith Plaintiffs’ family in Clinton County. On August 15, 2002, the Cromwell Defendants filed a petition for direct placement adoption as to Pearl with the Oakland County Family Court’s Adoption Services Department. That Court sent a notice of prior court proceedings affecting Liliandra to the Ingham County Family Court. (Pezzetti Opinion June 12, 2003 P. 7). Thus, while the neglect case was pending against Jennifer Holey in Ingham County, the Cromwells (“Cromwell Defendants”), relatives of Jennifer Holey by the sixth degree of consanguinity, filed petitions in Oakland County Circuit Court— Family Division to adopt both Liliandra and Pearl. Mrs. Cromwell is a first cousin to the maternal grandmother of the children. That case was assigned to Oakland County Family Court Judge Elizabeth Pezzetti. Pleadings filed in the Ingham County neglect case by the Cromwell Defendants noted the Oakland County adoption petitions, as does the transcript of the Ingham County hearing. Attached to those Ing-ham County pleadings was a signed consent by Jennifer Holey to the termination of her parental rights for purposes of adoption of both children by the Cromwell Defendants. However, Ingham County Judge Paula Manderfield refused to permit Jennifer Holey to voluntarily terminate her parental rights in favor of the Cromwells, and proceeded with the neglect hearing. On September 6, 2002, Judge Mander-field held a bench trial regarding jurisdiction and guardianship of the two children under the juvenile code. Attorney appearances at the proceeding included Kenneth Birch, counsel for the children, Roderick Porter, counsel for the mother Jennifer Holey, and John F. Mills and James J. Williams as co-counsel for the intervenors Donna and Jonathan Cromwell. Also present was Stuart Shafer, counsel for the foster parents, the Smiths. Transcript, Ingham County Hearing, Sept. 5, 2002, p. 3. Porter, counsel for Jennifer Holey, noted on the record, preference for a direct consent adoption by the Cromwells. Id. at P.12. Mills, counsel for the Cromwells, stated that he had filed motions for the immediate transfer of both children to the Crom-wells based on Jennifer Holey’s consent pursuant to the Adoption Code. Mills challenged as improper, Judge Manderfield’s termination of Jennifer Holey’s consent under the Juvenile Code. Mills stated that the hearing should have been governed by the Adoption Code. Ingham County Hearing, P.15. Williams, co-counsel for the Cromwells stated that the Court should consider the fact that an adoption petition had been filed, in Oakland County where the Crom-wells reside, on May 13, 2002, for Lilian-dra, and more recently, for Pearl. Id. at 18. Jennifer Holey had signed consents on August 14, 2002, on behalf of the Crom-wells adoption of the children. Assistant Prosecutor John Dewane, representing the People of the State of Michigan, noted for the record: I know Mr. Mills and Mr. Williams are preserving their right to appeal, but there has been no proofs otherwise that it’s not in the best interest to terminate the mother’s rights. Id. at 21. Judge Manderfield concluded, for the purpose of that hearing, that the juvenile statutes took priority over guardianship or consent adoption statutes. Id. at 22. Mr. Mills also noted the possibility of an appeal by the Cromwells: Your Honor, on behalf of my client, and certainly without prejudice to any appellate rights they may have, and I’m not sure they have any. Id. at 31. Mills and Williams, co-counsel for the Cromwells, did not appeal Judgfe Manderfield’s ruling. Mills and Schafer, counsel for the Crom-wells and the Smiths, respectively, both noted on the record that their clients had been discussing a solution wherein each family would adopt one of the children. Id. at 31-32. At the same time, Mills noted that the Court was “well aware both sets of competing parents were very adamant in wanting both children.” The FIA, which did take part in this proceeding, through Prosecutor Dewane, stated an objection to splitting up the two children: “I don’t believe that’s in their best interest.” Id. at 32. Judge Manderfield responded: “Well, I’m not splitting them up.” Id. at 32. That hearing marked the first time that the Cromwells had met either child: Mr. Mills: Mr. and Mrs. Cromwell have never had an opportunity to meet either children. May they have the opportunity to visit with the children.... Id. at 32. Judge Manderfield permitted a visit. Id. Judge Manderfield ruled on September 13, 2002, to involuntarily terminate Jennifer Holey’s parental rights, and to commit the two minor children to the jurisdiction of the Michigan Children’s Institute (“MCI”), a division of the FIA, for adoptive planning, supervision, care and placement. Judge Manderfield informed Jennifer Holey of her right to appeal. Id. at 28. Jennifer Holey did not appeal. The Crom-wells did not seek to appeal or otherwise challenge Manderfield’s ruling. It is not clear whether or not they had a right to appeal that ruling. On December 5, 2002, after evaluating the competing requests for the two Holey children by the Smiths and the Cromwells, the MCI, through William J. Johnson its Superintendent, issued a three page single spaced Consent to Adoption Decision in favor of the Smith Plaintiffs. Johnson noted that he “had the opportunity to meet directly with each family to discuss their concerns and their reasons for wanting to adopt the children.” MCI Consent to Adoption Decision, Dec. 5, 2002. P.3. Copies of the MCI decision were provided to the Smiths and the Cromwells, and to Kenneth Birch, the Legal Guardian Ad Litem for the children. On December 11, 2002, the Smith Plaintiffs filed for adoption of the children in the Clinton County Circuit Court — Family Division. On December 13, 2002, Clinton County Circuit Court Family Division Judge Marvin Robertson entered an order placing the children with the Smith Plaintiffs. On January 31, 2003, the Cromwell Defendants filed a motion in Oakland County Circuit Court for a “Section 45” hearing under the Adoption Code, challenging the MCI consent-to-adopt decision that had approved the Smiths’ adoption, and had rejected the Cromwells. On February 6, 2003, the Oakland County Circuit Court, Family Division mailed to the Clerk of the Clinton County Court a “notice of Prior Court of Proceedings Affecting Minors” as to each child, Liliandra and Pearl. Significantly, the notice document stated in the space for listing “name(s) of parents(s)/ plaintiff/defendant:” Jennifer Patricia Holey Patrick Holey Chaddwic and Tamera Smith Thus the Oakland County Circuit Court Family Division notice recognized the Smiths’ importance and/involvement in the legal proceedings regarding the two children, but did not send a copy of the notice to the Smiths, the then foster parents of the two children. The notice stated: A complainVpetition/motion was filed with this court which affects the above named minor(s) who are subject to the continuing jurisdiction of your court. A hearing on the complaint/petition/motion is scheduled for That portion of notice stated: _No Scheduled Date_ DATE (Emphasis added) Thus, the Oakland County Notice recognized that the two children were “subject to the continuing jurisdiction of’ the Clinton County Court, and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the Oakland County Circuit Court. Further, the notice did not set a date for a hearing on the matter. On March 17, 2003, Clinton County Judge Marvin Robertson entered final orders of adoption of both children by the Smith Plaintiffs, thereby making the Smiths their legal parents. The adoption orders legally changed the names of the children to Victoria Lili Smith, and Elizabeth Ann Smith. Accordingly, on March 17, 2003, the Smith family, pursuant to the laws of the State of Michigan, included the two young girls. On April 1, 2003, Judge Pezzetti held a pre-trial conference on the Cromwell’s Section 45 motion. Present were the Cromwells attorneys Ms. Lauren Howard, Director of Oakland County Court Adoption Services, and Musette Michael, Di~ rector of the Bureau of Legal Affairs for the FIA. Michael reiterated the FIA’s position, set forth in her March 21, 2003 correspondence referred to in the Court’s subsequent Opinion of April 15, 2003, that no one would appear at the court hearing to represent the FIA or the MCI. On April 4, 2003, Oakland County Circuit Judge Pezzetti, pursuant to the petition filed by the Cromwells, conducted the aforementioned Section 45 hearing challenging the decision of the MCI Director awarding custody to the Smiths. On this date, the Smiths were the legal parents of the two girls. As noted before, although the FIA was provided notice of the Oakland County Section 45 hearing challenging the decision of its MCI Director as being arbitrary and capricious, the FIA, after phone conversations with counsel for the Cromwells, and possibly other individuals, and after attending the pretrial hearing as a non-attorney representative, chose not to attend the court proceeding, and even more important, informed the Court that it did not support the decision of the MCI Director granting custody of the children to the Smiths. Specifically, the FIA informed the Court and/or the Cromwells that it did not support the MCI Director’s decision. Evidentiary exhibits presented to this Court by the Federal Court Appointed Guardian Ad Litem, John E.S. Scott, includes a February 18, 2003, memorandum from MCI Superintendent Johnson to Musette Michael, Director of Legal Affairs of The Family Independence Agency, regarding the “Adoption of Liliandra and Pearl Holey.” Third Party Plaintiff Exh. 22. In the memorandum, Johnson notes that he had previously forwarded to Michael a copy of a brief filed by Cromwell attorney Sherrie C. Ross in the Oakland County Section 45 motion, along with his request for representation from the Attorney General’s office. Johnson notes that Michael’s response was that the FIA will refuse to request representation from the AG in this matter. In the February 18th memorandum, Johnson requests that Michael’s decision to not request AG representation be reviewed in light of Ross’ most recent brief in this matter, which makes serious allegations about Johnson’s conduct as the FIA’s authorized representative for making adoption decisions. Johnson’s memorandum then lists Ross’ allegations: • Violating state law and FIA policy • Stealing babies • Selling babies • Development of a “black market” for babies • Licensing friends for placement of babies • “Stalling” making of a decision in this matter • Making a decision about adoptive placement prior to termination of parental rights of the children Johnson concluded, that given these “very serious allegations about my conduct in my fulfillment of my duties as the former MCI Superintendent” as he carried out his duties “as the designated representative of FIA to make decisions about adoption of children,” the AG should represent the MCI and him in this matter. On February 19, 2003, Musette Michael responded to him: We requested Attorney General representation, but later withdrew our request .... [W]e decided not to defend the consent decision because Director Bowler does not agree with the decision insofar as it denies consent to the Crom-wells to adopt the children. There is an April 1, 2003 pre-trial conference in front of Judge Elizabeth Pezetti (sic) that I will attend as a non-attorney representative of the FIA. (Third Party Plaintiff Exh. 21) (emphasis added). Thereafter, Director of FIA Legal Affairs Michael sent a letter to Mr. Williams, one of the Cromwell’s attorneys, indicating that she had engaged in discussions with him regarding the Cromwells Section 45 Motion alleging that her colleague/client MCI Superintendent Johnson had “arbitrarily and capriciously withheld” consent to the Cromwells petition to adopt Lilian-dra and Pearl, and that the FIA didn’t oppose the Cromwells request for relief. The letter to Mr. Williams stated in pertinent part: This is to confirm our discussions regarding the “Motion to Determine that the Withholding of Consent to Adopt Liliandra Holey and Pearl Holey was Arbitrary and Capriciously Withheld” filed under M.C.L. 710.45 in Oakland County Circuit Court by Petitioners Donna and Jonathan Cromwell. As I have previously indicated, the Family Independence Agency (FIA) does not oppose the relief ... except insofar as it requests payments of the Petitioners’ attorney fees in paragraph 3. Moreover, the FIA does not intend to defend the December 5, 2002 “Consent to Adoption Decision” issued by the then-Michigan Children’s Institute Superintendent William J. Johnson. Third Party Plaintiffs Exh. 23. Accordingly, not only did no one from the state appear to represent the children, but the state sided with the Cromwells and encouraged the Judge to overturn the MCI decision, apparently because then FIA Director Nanette Bowler disagreed with the Johnson decision. Nothing in the letter states or implies that Bowler found Johnson’s decision to be “arbitrary and capricious,” the legal standard required for overturning such a decision. Failure of the FIA to appear at the hearing was a factor to which Judge Pez-zetti gave significant weight in reaching her decision on April 15, 2004, Page 50-51: [T]he Court would like to highlight a few things to which the Court gave significant weight in making this decision. First, the Court would again mention the fact that no one appeared on behalf of the FIA or Mr. Johnson to defend his decision to deny consent to Petitioners. Not only did no one appear ... but this Court’s file contains a letter ... from Musette Michael, Director, Bureau of Legal Affairs for the FIA, which unambiguously states “the FIA does not oppose the relief requested by Petitioners except ... Petitioners’ attorney fees .... the FIA does not intend to defend the December 5, 2002 ‘Consent to Adoption Decision’ issued by ... Johnson.” Keeping in mind that the MCI is a division of the FIA, this Court gave the FIA’s decision not to oppose the relief requested and not to defend Mr. Johnson’s decision considerable weight in making its decision. No GAL was appointed by Judge Pez-zetti to represent the children at the Rule 45 hearing. The FIA did not appear. No one was present to represent the interests of the Smiths, the then-legal parents of the two minor children. The only party represented at the hearing was the petitioning Cromwells. The only testimony at the hearing came from parties called by the Cromwells. The Cromwells were victorious. After the hearing, Oakland County Circuit Judge Pezzetti, issued an Order on April 15, 2004, finding by clear and convincing evidence, that the MCI Director’s withholding of consent to adopt by the Cromwell Defendants, was arbitrary and capricious. Judge Pezzetti’s Opinion concluded with the following orders: A. That the final order of adoption of Liliandra and Pearl to Mr. and Mrs. Smith entered March 13, 2003 be immediately set aside; B. That this Court takes permanent custody and assumes jurisdiction over Liliandra and Pearl effective immediately; C. That the involvement of LAS [Lutheran Adoption Services] and LSSM [Lutheran Social Services of Michigan] with this case and with Liliandra and Pearl is terminated; D. That Mr. Johnson’s Consent to Adoption Decision is set aside and the jurisdiction of MCI remains terminated; E. That this Court’s Adoption Services Department shall take immediate steps to arrange for the transition of Liliandra and Pearl from Mr. and Mrs. Smith to [the Cromwells]; F. That this Court will sign a final order of adoption of Liliandra and Pearl to [the Cromwells] as soon as one is prepared and presented to this Court by the Adoption Services Department. (April 7, 2003 Opinion and Order). Thus, Judge Pezzetti, an Oakland County Circuit Judge of comparable stature as Clinton County Circuit Judge Robertson, whose Oakland County Adoption Services Agency had acknowledged that the children were under the continuing jurisdiction of Clinton County, ordered that Judge Robertson’s orders of adoption be immediately set aside, assumed “permanent custody” and “jurisdiction” over the children then living in Clinton County, ordered the children transitioned/transferred to Oakland County, and then finally, Judge Pez-zetti committed to, in the future, without even indicating a need to hold a hearing, to sign an order of adoption by the Crom-wells who had not yet even had custody of the two children for one day. Oakland County Judge Pezzetti’s decision was communicated to Clinton County Judge Robertson on April 7, 2003. Evidence of the specific method of communication, and the specific communicator has not been provided to this Court. On April 17, 2003, Clinton County Judge Robertson, without providing notice to the Smiths, whom he had legally made parents of the children one month previous, and without holding a hearing, sua sponte issued an Opinion and Order Setting Aside his Orders of Adoption. The two Smith girls, whom Judge Robertson in legally sanctioning their adoption by the Smiths the previous month, had also legally changed their names to Victoria Lili Smith and Elizabeth Ann Smith, were thus stripped of their parents and their names without any notice/hearing or legal representation. Judge Robertson’s April 17, 2003 Opinion and Order began: This matter comes before us pursuant to the order of the Oakland County Circuit Court dated April 15, 2003, wherein the Honorable Elizabeth Pezetti (sic) ordered that “the final order [adoption] Liliandra and Pearl to Mr. and Mrs. Smith entered on March 13, 2003 be immediately set aside.” Judge Pezetti’s (sic) detailed Opinion and Order are deemed incorporated into this writing, as this court grants comity and effect to the proper exercise of jurisdiction of our Michigan sister courts. Accordingly, the adoptions are set aside. Thus, even though the children were residing in Clinton County with their parents, and even though the Oakland County Notice of its court proceeding recognized that the two children were “subject to the continuing jurisdiction of Judge Robertson’s court”, Judge Robertson’s opinion assumed Oakland County had jurisdiction. Judge Robertson’s order then recited that in granting the March adoptions he had relied on the Final Adoption Supervising Summary filed by Lutheran Adoption Services recommending “the finalization of the adoption of Lili and Pearl by Chadd and Tamera Smith.” Judge Robertson then stated: However, through inadvertence we failed to give due consideration to a prior notice from the Oakland County Circuit Court of a “Section 45 Motion— Adoption Code.” This notice was filed here on February 10, 2003. Again, this Court must note that Oakland County notice had indicated that the Clinton County Court had continuing jurisdiction of the children. Judge Robertson then proceeded to discuss the findings of Oakland County Circuit Judge Pezzetti, and concluded: Consistent with the exercise of jurisdiction by the OaMand County Circuit Court, under the above statutes, and to give effect to the order of that court which directs that the adoption be set aside, IT IS ORDERED that the orders of adoption entered by this court in regard to the above minors are set aside. This Court does not retain jurisdiction, as the Oakland County Circuit Court has taken “permanent custody and assumes jurisdiction over Liliandra and Pearl effective immediately.” One day later, April 18, 2003, Judge Robertson issued a corrected opinion and order which added the following language (underlined) 1. The heading now read Corrected Opinion and Order Setting Aside Orders of Adoption Pursuant to MCR 2.612. 2. Whereas the initial order described Judge Robertson as “Judge of Probate”, the corrected order described him as “Presiding Judge, Family Division. ” 3. On the final page where the word “dated” appears, the initial order stated “April 17, 2003,” the corrected order states “April 18, 2008 nunc pro tunc April 17, 2008.” 4. On the final page, Judge Robertson’s description of his position conforms to # 2 above. Judge Robertson’s Orders setting aside the Orders of Adoption referred to the children by their birth names, not their adoptive names that he had ordered one month previous. On April 21, 2003, Oakland County Judge Elizabeth Pezzetti issued an “Order Placing Child After Consent” as to both children, Liliandra and Pearl, pursuant to a petition for adoption, with the Crom-wells. On May 1, 2003, the Smith Plaintiffs moved for Stay of the Proceedings to Enforce Judgment and Motion for Reconsideration of Judge Robertson’s April 17, 2003 Order(s). On May 6, 2003, Judge Robertson, again without holding a hearing, denied the motion for reconsideration. Essentially, Judge Robertson’s Opinion and Order Denying Motions stated that his April 17, 2003 Order deferred to the jurisdiction of the Oakland County Court, and transferred jurisdiction to that court which had taken permanent custody and assumed jurisdiction over the child on April 15, 2003. His opinion never discussed how Oakland County, which had acknowledged that Clinton County had continuing jurisdiction over the children, could assume jurisdiction over them and take them from their Clinton County parents to Oakland County. Judge Robertson stated that the Smiths were requesting him to determine that the Oakland County Circuit Court had made erroneous findings of fact and conclusions of law, thereby requiring him to act as “a quasi appellate court.” Judge Robertson denied the motions and reaffirmed his order of April 17, 2003. The Smith Plaintiffs filed appeals to the Michigan Court of Appeals, challenging both the Oakland County and Clinton County orders. These challenges were unsuccessful. As to the Smith Plaintiffs May 7, 2003 appeal of Judge Robertson’s order setting aside the order of adoption in the Clinton County proceeding. Michigan Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to the fact that no final order had been entered: The April 17, 2003 order, which vacated an earlier order of adoption and then abdicated jurisdiction to the family division of Oakland Circuit Court, did not determine the ultimate issue of adoption of the two children. Even though Oakland Circuit Court has indicated a future intent regarding adoption, no final order of adoption has actually been entered. The Clinton County circuit court order is akin to an order changing venue, which is not a final order under M.C.R. 7.202(7)(a)(i). (Michigan Court of Appeals May 12, 2003 Order, Defendant Clinton County Motion, Ex. 2). Thus, the Michigan Court of Appeals completely ignored the reality, that Judge Robertson had three weeks before determined “the ultimate issue of adoption of the two children,” sidestepped the legal challenge to Robertson’s subsequent order undoing that adoption, and instead focused on the portion of that order abdicating “jurisdiction to the family division of the Oakland Circuit Court,” and then termed the entire Robertson order as “a,kin to an order changing venue.... ” On May 20, 2003, the Smith Plaintiffs filed a petition for superintending control over Defendant Oakland County Court with the Michigan Court of Appeals. On June 10, 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit in the grounds presented: “The Court orders that the complaint for superintending control is DENIED.” (Michigan Court of Appeals June 10, 2003 Order). Attorney Kenneth Birch, who had previously been appointed Guardian ad Litem (“State GAL”) in the earlier Ingham County Circuit Court matter, filed a motion with the Michigan Court of Appeals seeking leave to file an appearance as GAL on behalf of the children in conjunction with Petitioners’ complaint for superintending control in that Court. On June 10, 2003, the Court of Appeals, in denying the petition for superintending control, granted Birch’s motion. On July 2, 2003, the Smith Plaintiffs filed a delayed application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, challenging the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the petition for superintending control. On July 27, 2003, the application for leave to appeal was denied by the Michigan Supreme Court. The Smith Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration with the Michigan Supreme Court. On October 17, 2003, the motion for reconsideration was denied. In the meantime, the Smith Plaintiffs petitioned for a hearing in the Oakland County Court. On June 12, 2003, after accepting the Smith Plaintiffs’ brief on the issue of standing in their quest for a hearing in an Oakland County Court, Oakland County Judge Pezzetti, without oral argument, issued an opinion and order holding that the Smith Plaintiffs, the legal parents of the two girls on April 4, 2003, the time of the Rule 45 Petition Hearing in her court, were not entitled to notice of the April 4, 2003 hearing as “interested party”. The Court rejected the Smiths’ argument that as legal parents of the children on June 4, 2003, they were entitled to notice and to participate. Judge Pezzetti rejected the Smiths’ claim, finding that Judge Robertson’s orders of adoption “were premature and erroneous.” P.15. Judge Pezzetti found that the Cromwell’s petition for a Section 45 hearing in Oakland County “was a form of ‘appeal’ under the Adoption Code” from the MCI Superintendent’s decision rejecting their consent to adopt the girls. Pezzetti Opinion, June 12 2003, P.17. Judge Pezzetti cited to the Michigan Supreme Court decision in In re JK, 468 Mich. 202, 661 N.W.2d 216 (2003) which had reversed a trial court decision allowing foster parents to adopt the child while the birth parent had appealed to a higher court. Judge Pezzetti’s opinion cited this language from In re JK: Parents whose rights have been terminated by the trial court are entitled to appellate review of this decision without that review being compromised by the specter of appellate courts having to undo an adoption as a concomitant act to the granting of relief for those parents. Such a result is simply contrary to the structure of the justice system established by our constitution and laws. Pezzetti Opinion June 12, 2003, P.16, quoting In re JK at 217. Thus, Judge Pezzetti found that the Cromwells’ Section 45 motion was an appeal from the MCI decision, and that Judge Robertson prematurely finalized the adoption while an appeal was pending, so she “had no choice but to order that Judge Robertson set aside his final orders of adoption entered prematurely on March 13, 2003.” Id. at 17. This Court does not deal with Judge Pezzetti’s decision, but rather with her refusal to provide notice to and a chance to be heard to the then parents, the Smiths. Judge Pezzetti concluded: “Mr. and Mrs. Smith are not ‘interested parties’ as defined by the Adoption Code and pursuant to Michigan case law and finding that they lack standing in this case. Accordingly, the Court will not rule upon and dismisses the following motions filed by Mr. and Mrs. Smith due to lack of standing.” Id. at 21. The Court notes that M.C.L.A. 710.24(a)(1) states that adult parents are interested parties in a petition for adoption. GAL Birch filed a motion to intervene on behalf of the children in the Oakland County proceeding, which Oakland County Circuit Judge Pezzetti denied on June 25, 2003. On June 27, 2003, the Smith Plaintiffs appealed Judge Pezzetti’s order. On July 22, 2003, the Michigan Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of a final order of adoption: The claims of appeal are DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction because the June 12, 2003 order, which denied appellants’ motion to intervene on the ground that appellants lacked standing, is not a final order for the reason that the petitions for adoption are still outstanding. See MCR 7.202(7)(a)(i) and 7.203(A)(1). As a result, appellants may only challenge the order at this time by filing a delayed application for leave to appeal under MCR 7.205. See MCR 7.203(B)(1). (Michigan Court of Appeals July 22, 2003 Order). Thus, the Michigan Court of Appeals order held that the Smiths, the adoptive parents of the two children, who then had their parentage undone and their children removed from their family without a hearing, must wait for another family to adopt their children before they can challenge any court orders imploding their family. On July 9, 2003, State GAL Birch appealed the denial of his motion to intervene by the Oakland County Court to the Michigan Court of Appeals. On August 15, 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of a final order in the Oakland County adoption proceeding: The claims of appeal are DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction because the June 25, 2003 order denying the guardian as litem’s motion to intervene is not a final order for the reason that the petitions for adoption are still outstanding. See MCR 7.202(7)(a)(i) and 7.203(A)(1). As a result, appellant may only challenge the order at this time by filing a delayed application for leave to appeal under MCR 7.205. See MCR 7.203(B)(1). (Michigan Court of Appeals August 15, 2003 Order). The Smith Plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal of Judge Pezzetti’s orders of April 15, 2003, April 21, 2003, June 12, 2003, and July 28, 2003. On November 14, 2003, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied the delayed appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented: The Court orders that the motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED. The Court orders that the delayed application for leave to appeal is DENIED for lack of merit in the grounds presented. The Court orders that the motions to dismiss and for sanctions are DENIED. (Michigan Court of Appeals November 14, 2003 Order). On November 17, 2003, the Smith Plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing in the Court of Appeals, which was denied on December 12, 2003. On January 5, 2004, the Smith Plaintiffs filed an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. On March 26, 2004, the application was denied. Oakland County Circuit Judge Pezzetti has recently appointed a Guardian Ad Li-tem to represent the interests of the two young children in the Oakland County Court proceedings per statements on the record from counsel for Judge Pezzetti. August, 19, 2004, Hearing Transcript, pg. 26. Judge Pezzetti has indicated that she will not finalize adoption proceedings involving the instant two minor children until the conclusion of these federal proceedings. Id at 60. On July 8, 2003, the Smiths filed in Oakland County Circuit Court the following pleadings: • Petitions for Adoption • Motions to Determine whether Denial of Consent to Adopt was Arbitrary and Capricious • Petitions to Determine Custody of Child Temporarily Placed for Adoption On July 21, 2003, the Smiths filed a Motion in Oakland County Circuit Court for Appointment of Attorney-Guardian Ad Litem for the children. These cases were assigned to Oakland County Circuit Family Court Judge Martha D. Anderson. On July 28, 2003, Judge Anderson, without oral argument, dismissed these petitions/motions. Judge Anderson found: 1. That the December 5, 2002 consents to adopt by the MCI in favor of the Smiths had been set aside by Judge Pezetti’s April 15, 2003 Opinion and Order, and thus were invalid. 2. That the motions to determine that Judge Pezzetti’s ruling was arbitrary and capricious were beyond a 56 day time period in MCL 710.115(3), and thus not timely. 3. That the petitions regarding custody of a child temporarily placed for adoption was inapplicable to the instant situation because petitioners relied on MCL 710.23d rather than MCL 710.45(g) which was relevant to the instant situation. Thus, Oakland County Circuit Judge Martha Anderson did not hold a hearing and did not grant the motions. On August 11, 2003, Judge Anderson denied Petitioner Smiths’ Motion for Rehearing filed August I, 2003. II. Procedural History in Federal Court On October 21, 2003, the Smith Plaintiffs filed an “Emergency Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus” in both the United States District Courts for the Eastern District of Michigan (Borman, J.) and Western District of Michigan (McKeague, J.), naming as “Respondents” Oakland County Circuit Judge Elizabeth Pezzetti, Clinton County Circuit Judge Marvin Robertson, Oakland County Circuit Court, Clinton County Circuit Court, Jonathan and Donna Cromwell, and the Attorney General of the state of Michigan (“Attorney General”). On December 12, 2003, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), this Court entered an Order appointing Attorney John E.S. Scott as Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) “to represent the interests of the children in this case.” On December 12, 2003, United States District Judge David McKeague of the Western District of Michigan entered an Order Holding Proceedings in Abeyance. On January 23, 2004, the Smith Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. The Court granted the motion on February 3, 2004. The First Amended Complaint, named as Defendants Clinton County Circuit Court, Oakland County Circuit Court, Jonathan and Donna Cromwell, and the Attorney General of the State of Michigan. On March 15, 2004, the Smith Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. On March 18, 2004, GAL Scott filed a motion to file Third-Party Complaint on behalf of the minor children. On March 29, 2004, the Court entered an Order Dismissing Count IV of the First Amended Complaint (Habeas Corpus) and Dismissing as a Party State-Court appointed GAL Kenneth Birch, having appointed John E.S. Scott as Federal Court GAL. On April 1, 2004, the Court entered an Order Granting GAL Scott’s Motion to File Third-Party Complaint. On April 6, 2004, the Court entered an Order Granting the Smith Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. Given that the Second Amended Complaint superseded the First Amended Complaint, the Court, on April 7, 2004, entered an Order denying as moot the pending motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. The Smith Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, the operative complaint with regard to the instant order, lists as Defendants Oakland County Circuit Court, Hon. Elizabeth M. Pezzetti, in both her Individual and Official Capacity; Hon. Martha D. Anderson, in both her Individual and Official Capacity; Clinton County Circuit Court, Hon. Marvin Robertson, in both his Individual and Official Capacity, and Donna and Jonathan Cromwell. In the Second Amended Complaint, the Smith Plaintiffs request the following relief: A. Entry of a declaratory judgment that Defendant Robertson’s March 17, 2003 Orders of Adoption was [sic] the last valid order [sic], B. Entry of a declaratory judgment that any and all orders subsequent to March 17, 2003, including, but not limited to, Defendant Pezzetti’s April 15, April 21, and June 12, 2003 orders, Defendant Anderson’s July 28, 2003 order, and Defendant Robertson’s April 17 and 18, 2003 orders are void ab initio. C. Entry of a declaratory judgment finding that MCL 710.24 and 710.45 are unconstitutional on their face and/or as applied in whole or in part. D. Entry of a declaratory judgment finding that Plaintiffs and their children were deprived of their constitutional rights of due process and equal protection. E. Entry of a declaratory judgment finding that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ and their children’s constitutional rights of due process and equal protection. F. Entry of an order returning the children to Plaintiffs. G. Entry of an interim order permitting Plaintiffs regular and frequent visitation with their children until further order of this Court. H. Entry of an order allowing GAL Birch access to the children. I. Entry of an order staying all further state court proceedings in this case until further order of this Court. J. Entry of an order awarding Plaintiffs their costs and attorney fees. K. Entry of an order granting such other relief as this Court may deem just and equitable. L. Issuance of a Certificate of Appeala-bility pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2253, if relief is denied. (Second Amended Complaint, pp. 30-31). On May 20, 2004, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), Defendants Clinton County Court and Hon. Lisa Sullivan, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, as did the Cromwell Defendants. On May 24, 2004, Defendants Oakland County Court, Hon. Elizabeth M. Pezzetti, and Hon. Martha D. Anderson filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. On June 14, 2004, the Smith Plaintiffs filed Responses to all motions. On August 19, 2004, the Court heard oral argument. The Smith Plaintiffs “shotgun” 12 requests for relief in their Second Amended Complaint creates a very difficult task for this Court in ruling on the instant motions. At the same time, the Court notes that F.R.Civ.P. 8(a) states: “Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.” In adjudicating a motion to dismiss, the Court must take the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, to wit, the Smiths. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently pointed out in Sil-vernail v. County of Kent, 385 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.2004): In conducting its review [of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)], the Court “must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all of the complaint’s factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Id. at 604, n. 3 (citations omitted). Defendants, collectively, argue that the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed because: A. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; B. The Smith Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the current action; C. Defendants are immune from suit based on the 11th Amendment to the United States Constitution; D. The Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Younger doctrine; E. Defendants are not “persons” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; F. The Second Amended Complaint is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2288; G. The Smith Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts on which they could prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; H. The Court has already ruled that habeas corpus is an inappropriate remedy under the circumstances. ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review This action, as set forth in the Second Amended Complaint, has been brought under Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Section 1983 states, in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1985 states, in pertinent part: If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire ... for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; ... in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators. 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint for an action under these sections was noted in Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 932 F.2d 495, 497 (6th Cir.1991), quoting Jones v. Duncan, 840 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir.1988). [dismissals of complaints under the civil rights statutes are scrutinized with special care. A complaint need not set down in detail all the particularities of a plaintiffs claim against a defendant. Rule 8(a)(2) simply requires ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief...’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). All a complaint need do is afford the defendant ‘fan-notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ [cites omitted]. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) should not be granted ‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief’ [citations omitted], [emphasis added]. B. Standing Standing is the “threshold question in every federal case.” Grendell v. Ohio Supreme Court, 252 F.3d 828, 832 (6th Cir.2001)(quoting Coyne v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir.1999)). In order to satisfy Article Ill’s standing requirements, a plaintiff (1) must have suffered some actual or threatened injury due to the alleged illegal conduct (the “injury in fact element”); (2) the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action (the “causation element”); and (3) there must be a substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress or prevent the plaintiffs injury (the “re-dressability element”). Id. Defendants have argued that the Smith Plaintiffs do not have standing in this case for two reasons: (1) The Cromwell Defendants argue that Judge Pezzetti ruled, after receiving briefing from the Cromwell Defendants and the Smith Plaintiffs, that Smith Plaintiffs had no standing in the Oakland County proceeding, and that this decision precludes, by way of collateral estoppel, the Smith Plaintiffs from having standing in this Court; and (2) Defendants argue that the Smith Plaintiffs have no standing to assert the rights of the children because they were never granted by a court or agency a relationship which would permit them to do so. 1. Effect of Judge Pezzetti’s Rulings The preclusive effect of a state court judgment is determined by that state’s law. Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. City of Berkley, 305 F.3d 386, 394 (6th Cir.2002)(citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984)(“a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.”)). Under Michigan law, issue preclusion forecloses the relitigation of an issue in a subsequent cause of action between the same parties or their privies, where an earlier proceeding resulted in a valid, final judgment and the same issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined. Id. at 396 (citing Ditmore v. Michalik, 244 Mich.App. 569, 625 N.W.2d 462 (2001); People v. Gates, 434 Mich. 146, 452 N.W.2d 627 (1990)). Oakland County Judge Pezzetti issued two rulings in this case. The first ruling was on April 15, 2003, after an April 4, 2003 hearing, attended only by the Cromwell Defendants and their attorneys Sherrie Ross, James J. Williams, and John F. Mills, and not noticed to the Smith Plaintiffs. Judge Pezzetti ruled, inter alia, that: (1) the decision of FIA Director Johnson to withhold consent to adoption by the Cromwells was arbitrary and capricious; (2) Clinton County Judge Robertson’s orders of adoption by the Smiths must be immediately overturned; (3) the children must be transferred to Oakland County forthwith; and (4) that Judge Pezzetti was prepared to enter an order of adoption on behalf of the Cromwells “as soon as one is prepared and presented to this Court by the Adoption Services Department.” Oakland County Judge Pezzetti issued her second ruling in the case on June 12, 2003, holding that the Smith Plaintiffs, whom the order referred to as “the former adoptive foster parents” of the two minors, did not have standing to appear in the case befox-e the Oakland County Court to challenge that Court’s April ruling ordering that their two children be taken away from them and transferred to the Cromwells in Oakland County. The issues litigated by the Smith Plaintiffs in the Michigan Courts do not appear to preempt at least one of the constitutional issues pending before this Court. Without the benefit of the transcript of the Oakland County Rule 45 Motion Hearing, and prior pre hearing proceedings or conferences, if any, the Court can only assume that the only issue litigated in the Oakland County April proceeding was the fate of the children and the only party present was the Cromwell Defendants. The issue involved in the June 12, 2003 Oakland County Court proceeding was whether the Smith Plaintiffs had standing to intervene in the Cromwell’s Oakland County adoption proceeding. One issue before this Court is whether the Smith Plaintiffs were deprived of their Federal constitutional right to due process, an issue before that was not heard by the state courts. Accordingly, the Cromwell Defendants’ argument of complete issue preclusion must fail. 2. The Smith Plaintiffs’ Standing in This Court Standing relates to the position or situation of the plaintiff in relation to the cause of action and the other parties at the time the plaintiff seeks relief from the court. “[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. Ill requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to ‘show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,’ and that the injury ‘fairly can be traced to the challenged action’ and ‘is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982)(quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976)). Also, “the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interest of third parties.” Id. at 474, 102 S.Ct. 752 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). In this case, it is clear that the Smith Plaintiffs, as former parents of the two minor children, have alleged a tangible personal injury to themselves. In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844, n. 51, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977), the Supreme Court noted that adoption “is recognized as the legal equivalent of biological parenthood.” The Smith Plaintiffs’ claims of injury rest on alleged due process violations to themselves as parents of the two children, and in addition, the unconstitutionality of the Michigan statutes applied by the state courts. The Smith Plaintiffs argue that as a result of these constitutional violations, they were precluded from participation in meaningful court proceedings after they had been granted final orders of adoption. Such allegations are more than mere “abstract questions of wide public significance” which amount to “generalized grievances.” Valley Forge Christian College, at 475, 102 S.Ct. 752 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500, 95 S.Ct. 2197). The Smith Plaintiffs’ claims fall within “the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” Id. (quoting Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970)). The Supreme Court has noted that family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974). Further, the Court has noted that family life has been afforded substantive and procedural due process protection. Smith, 431 U.S. at 842, 97 S.Ct. 2094. In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion by Justice O’Connor, noted that the liberty interest at issue — the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children — -is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Court. There, as here, no court found the parent to be an unfit parent. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Smith Plaintiffs have standing to assert their own legal rights in the present case. Indeed, a recent Michigan Supreme Court decision, In re J.K., 468 Mich. 202, 213, 661 N.W.2d 216 (2003), speaks of the fundamental right of a parent and child to maintain the family relationship. Here, the Court concludes that the Smiths, as adoptive parents whose children were removed from them on April 17, 2003 without a hearing, and who were never alleged to be, much less proven to be, unfit parents, have standing to sue to assert their federal constitutional right to due process. On December 15, 2003 this Court, pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 17(c) appointed a GAL, John E.S. Scott, Esq., to represent the rights of the children in this Federal proceeding, because at the time of the filing of the Smith Plaintiffs’ initial federal pleading, state court rulings had deprived them of their status as the adoptive parents of the two children as of April 17, 2003. This Court concludes that given the state court rulings in effect at the time that the Smith Plaintiffs filed the instant case, the Smith Plaintiffs do not have standing to represent the interests of the children in these Federal proceedings. However, given that the Smith Plaintiffs have standing to assert their legal rights, the Court’s analysis must turn to whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case. C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction “The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’ ” United States v. Yeager, 303 F.3d 661, 664 (6th Cir.2002)(quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens For A Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998)). The Court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Defendants argue, however, that, in this case, Eleventh Amendment immunity and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bar this Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction. 1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity Defendants Oakland and Clinton County Circuit Courts, and Defendants Oakland and Clinton County Circuit Court Judges, sued in their official capacities, have argued that they are entitled to immunity from suit in federal court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment as “arms of the state.” Eleventh Amendment immunity bars federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over a claim, where the party asserting immunity establishes that immunity applies. Ernst v. Roberts, 379 F.3d 373, (6th Cir.2004). The Eleventh Amendment states: The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S. Const, am. 11. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state by citizens of another state, and, pursuant to Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890), prohibits citizens from suing their own state. Ernst, 379 F.3d at 378-79 (citing Barton v. Summers, 293 F.3d 944, 948 (6th Cir.2002)). However, “[t]he bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit in Federal courts extends to States and state officials in appropriate circumstances ... but does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 811 (6th Cir.2003)(quoting Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)). Thus, to enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity, Defendants must establish that they are “arms of the state” or “alter egos” of the state. However, as the Sixth Circuit noted in Ernst: Even if the party being sued is a state or an arm of the state, Eleventh Amendment immunity will not apply to a claim, under various circumstances. Immunity may be waived by the state or agency. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 619[, 122 S.Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806] (2002); Lawson v. Shelby County, 211 F.3d 331, 334 (6th Cir.2000); Nelson v. Miller, 170 F.3d 641, 646 (6th Cir.1999). Immunity may be waived by Congress. Nelson v. Miller, 170 F.3d at 646; Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66[, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45] (1989). There tvill be no immunity if the claim challenges the constitutionality of actions against state officials and seeks only prospective, non-monetary damages, such as an injunction. Rossborough Mfg. Co. v. Trimble, 301 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir.2002)(citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) and Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)); Nelson v. Miller, 170 F.3d at 646. Ernst, 379 F.3d at 379 (emphasis added). In the instant case, the Smith Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, read in the light most favorable to the Smith Plaintiffs as the non-moving party, seeks prospective, non-monetary damages, such as an injunction or declaratory relief. In Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802 (6th Cir.2003), the Sixth Circuit considered whether or not a county court of Ohio was an “arm of the state” for Eleventh Amendment purposes. The Sixth Circuit stated: We do not write on a blank slate. Several years ago, we held that an Ohio court of common pleas was an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d 268[264] (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914, 118 S.Ct.