Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF REEVES, District Judge. I. Introduction This case involves the constitutionality of limitations placed on statements of candidates for judicial office in this Commonwealth. This matter is currently pending for consideration of the Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary injunction. The judicial canon at the center of this controversy is contained in Rule 4.300 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky (captioned, “Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct”). Together with its commentary, the canon provides as follows: B. Campaign Conduct (1) A judge or candidate for election to judicial office: (c) shall not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; shall not make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court; and shall not misrepresent any candidate’s identity, qualifications, present position, or other facts. COMMENTARY Section 5B(1)(c) prohibits a candidate for judicial office from making statements that appear to commit the candidate regarding cases, controversies or issues likely to come before the court, and prohibits campaigning on issues in a manner designed solely to appeal to public social bias in order to gain a political advantage. As a corollary, a candidate should emphasize in any public statement the candidate’s duty to uphold the law regardless of his or her personal views.... Section 5B(1)(c) does not prohibit a candidate from making pledges or promises respecting improvements in court administration. Nor does this section prohibit an incumbent judge from making private statements to other judges or court personnel in the performance of judicial duties. SCR 4.300, Canon 5B(1)(c). In addition, the Plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of Kentucky’s recusal statute which states that: (2) Any justice or judge of the Court of Justice or master commissioner shall disqualify himself in any proceeding: (e) Where he has knowledge of any other circumstances in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. K.R.S. § 26A.015(2)(e). Canon 3EQ) contains similar language as its statutory counterpart and provides that a judge must disqualify himself when the “judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned ...” Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 4.300, Canon 3E(1). After reviewing the relevant authorities, this Court concludes that the Plaintiffs are not likely to prevail with respect to their challenge to the recusal statute, K.R.S. § 26A.015(2)(e), or Canon 3E(1). In addition, they have not shown that they will suffer irreparable injury if the Court denies the relief requested. Therefore, in-junctive relief is not appropriate with respect to those provisions. However, for reasons which will be discussed more fully below, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to the judicial canon which seeks to regulate and prohibit statements of candidates for judicial office. Instead, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs are likely to prevail with respect to this claim. And when all factors relevant to the question of injunctive relief are considered, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs are entitled to such relief with respect to this issue. Accordingly, their motion will be granted with respect to Canon 5B(1)(c). II. The Parties and Relevant Facts The Family Foundation Trust of Kentucky, Inc. (“Family Foundation”) is a nonprofit corporation organized in 1989. According to its articles of incorporation, Family Foundation exists, inter alia, “to promote and encourage among the general public an understanding of and appreciation for the dignity and worth of human life and the family” and “to educate the general public with respect to the philosophical, sociological, psychological, scientific, theological and legal implications of the various ideas and practices of the family ...” Family Foundation alleges that it is not associated with any political candidate, political party or campaign committee. See Complaint, ¶ 12. The individual Plaintiffs, Leonard Lester and Steven Toadvine, M.D., are Kentucky citizens residing in Knox County. Both are registered voters who wish to “receive information” from Family Foundation regarding “the views of judicial candidates for whom they are eligible to vote in November 2004 and in subsequent elections in order to make an informed voting decision.” Complaint, ¶ 15. The Defendants are various individuals sued in their official capacities. They include members of the Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission, the Kentucky Inquiry Commission, and various counsel for the Kentucky Bar Association. In July 2004, Family Foundation attempted to obtain responses to a number of questions from judicial candidates so that this information could be announced or otherwise published to Kentucky voters, including Lester and Toadvine. Family Foundation sought to obtain the information through a “2004 Kentucky Candidate Information Survey” which was mailed to all judicial candidates on July 27, 2004 by Project Coordinator Sarah Foster. A copy of the form letter accompanying the survey is attached as Exhibit E-l to the Plaintiffs’ memorandum in support of their motion for a preliminary injunction. [Record No. 3] The survey follows the form letter and is attached as Exhibit E-2 through E-3. In relevant part, the form letter from Ms. Foster states: Enclosed is a media survey for judicial candidates running for seats in the Fall’s election. The Kentucky Candidate Information Survey has been produced for more than 10 years for legislative candidates but this is the first year it has sought judicial candidates — following the Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002) U.S. Supreme Court decision. The survey covers a range of important current judicial issues. Admittedly, some of the questions are tough — helping to differentiate among the candidates. Through there are no “right” or “wrong” answers, please give careful consideration because you will be “speaking” to thousands. Because of publication and local newspaper deadlines, please return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed envelope by Friday, August 6. Your answers and those of your opponent will be reliably quoted and given to newspapers and interested citizens in your contested district. In addition to newspapers, we also print our own publication (the 2002 edition from one of the Congressional Districts is enclosed for your review) and post answers on our website. In the Fall 2002 election, over 300,000 homes received our information in these ways— that’s 600,000 voters! This year we expect even more. In addition to the form letter, the accompanying survey provided further comments regarding the propriety of providing the requested information. Its introductory paragraphs state: In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a canon of judicial ethics that prohibited candidates for elective office from “announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues” was unconstitutional. The canon violated the First Amendment because it prohibited speech on the basis of content and because it burdened the free speech of candidates for public office — a category of speech at the core of First Amendment freedoms. Clearly, candidates for elective judicial office may now express their views on legal and political issues without fear of being sanctioned by judicial or legal ethics authorities. The Kentucky Candidate Information Survey (KCIS) certainly recognizes that judicial candidates should maintain actual and apparent impartiality as judges. It recognizes that judicial candidates should not pledge, promise, or commit themselves to any particular result in any particular case in a manner that violates judicial canons or requires judicial recusal. At the same time, voters need to know the views of judicial candidates in order to make intelligent and conscientious decisions regarding candidates’ values and views on the law. Thus, this survey is intended to elicit candidates’ views on issues of vital interest to citizens without requiring judicial candidates to violate ethical standards or compromising judicial impartiality. KCIS recognizes that all of your responses are subject to the judicial obligations to follow binding precedents of higher courts and applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, to honor stare decisis, and to decide any future case based on the law and facts of that case. YOUR RESPONSES INDICATE YOUR CURRENT VIEW ON THE LEGAL ISSUES AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE ANY PLEDGE, PROMISE, OR COMMITMENT TO RULE IN ANY PARTICULAR WAY IF THE LEGAL ISSUE INVOLVED COMES BEFORE YOU FOR DECISION. The survey lists seven questions for response, followed by a request that the judicial candidate identify his or her membership in a number of organizations as well as the person’s church affiliation. The initial seven questions request the following information: 1. Which of the following former U.S. Presidents best represents your political philosophy? John F. Kennedy/Jimmy Carter/Ronald Reagan/George Bush (former) (circle one) 2. Which of the current Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court most reflects your judicial philosophy? RehnquistlStevens/O’Conñor/Sca-lialKennedy/Thom-as/Souter/Ginsburg/Breyer (circle one) 3. Rate your judicial philosophy on a scale of 1-10 with strict constructionist being a 10 and a living document approach being a 1: Please answer the following survey by checking whether you agree with, disagree with, are undecided about, or decline to respond to the proceeding numbered propositions. MARRIAGE 4.In Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 744 A.2d 864 (1999), the Vermont Supreme Court held that the Vermont Constitution required that same-sex couples be permitted to enter into civil unions that encompass state rights that attach to legal marriage. I believe that the Kentucky Constitution does not require that same-sex couples be permitted to enter into civil unions that encompass those state rights that attach to legal marriage. _Agree_Dis-agree_Undecid-ed_Decline to Respond BIOETHICS 5. Some have suggested that destructive human embryo research and human cloning are constitutionally protected forms of scientific activities in themselves or as incidents of human reproduction. I believe that the Kentucky Constitution does not recognize any right to destructive human embryo research or human cloning. _Agree_Dis-agree_Undecid-ed_Decline to Respond RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 6. Several states are attempting to decide if it is lawful to display the Ten Commandments along with other historically significant documents from public buildings. I believe that the Kentucky Constitution does not require the removal of the Ten Commandments displayed with other historically significant documents from public buildings. ___Agree_Dis-agree._.Undecid-ed_Decline to Respond INDECENCY/PORNOGRAPHY 7.Missouri has tried to raise the minimum age for working as a dancer in a strip club from age 18 to age 19 in order to limit the number of high school aged girls from working in these clubs. I believe that neither the U.S. nor the Kentucky Constitution is violated by legislation that raises the age for working as strippers in strip clubs from 18 to 19 years of age in order to limit the number of high school aged girls working as strippers in such clubs. _Agree._Dis-agree_Undecid-ed_Decline to Respond Family Foundation also has attached to its memorandum the responses of several judicial candidates. While several individuals declined to answer any of the questions or identify their association with or memberships in the organizations listed, others provided answers to some of the questions but refused or declined to answer others. For example, Audra Eckerle, a sitting judge of the Jefferson District Court, fell within the first group who declined to provide a response to any of the questions posed. Instead, she responded that Supreme Court Rule 4.300, Canon 5B(1)(e), limited her ability to respond. More specifically, she indicated that: As you may or may not know, the Kentucky Judicial Ethics Committee has issued a Memorandum Opinion that the United States Supreme Court case of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White does not impact Kentucky’s cannon [sic] on judicial campaign statements. * * ❖ * * * Accordingly, I must respectfully decline to answer the questions that you have tendered to me. I believe in good faith that the Cannons [sic] of Judicial Conduct require me to make this decision. [Record No. 3; Exhibit F-l] It is interesting to note that while Judge Eckerle refused to answer the questions presented to her or list any membership or connection with the organizations identified on the last page of the survey, she submitted a resume listing her accomplishments including her affiliation with several other associations. [See Record No. 3; Exhibit F-7] Likewise, Anne Haynie, a candidate for Jefferson District Court, Division 15, indicated in response to the Project Coordinator that, “[although you accurately stated the U.S. Supreme Court decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court has issued a directive that prohibits Judges and Judicial Candidates from expressing an opinion on the issues presented in your survey.” [Record No. 3; Exhibit F-10] Judge Michael L. Henry, a District Judge for Pulaski and Rockcastle Counties, submitted a response similar to Judge Eckerle’s response. However, he noted an additional, unrelated reason for his refusal to respond to the survey. The best information I have been able to gather indicates that by responding to the survey, judicial candidates would run the risk of violating Canon 5A(2) and 5B(1)(c) of the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct. The most recent letter I have been able to obtain from Judge James Bowling, Chairman of the Judicial Ethics Committee, a copy of which is enclosed, informed Kentucky judges that the Canon remains effective as promulgated after Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, which you cited in your letter. I have spoken with the Executive Secretary of the Committee and was advised that until further ruling the cited Canons remain effective. Another matter that concerned me somewhat is that the deadline for response to the Survey, August 6, 2004, precedes the candidate filing deadline for the office I am seeking, which is August 10, 2004. Any candidates filing after the Survey deadline will apparently be precluded from participation anyway, which doesn’t seem quite fair. [Record No. 3; Exhibit F-ll] The letter referenced in Judge Henry’s response and forwarded to Family Foundation is dated October 10, 2002, and addressed to Justices, Judges and Judicial Candidates. It is on the letterhead of the Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary and signed by James L. Bowling, Circuit Judge and Chair of the Committee. This letter/memorandum provides what appears to be the Committee’s most recent formal pronouncement regarding the viability of Canon 5B(1)(c) following Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002). The Kentucky Judicial Ethics Committee issues this memorandum adopting the position of the Judicial Conduct Commission issued August 5, 2002. Like the Judicial Conduct Commission, the Judicial Ethics Committee agrees that the recent United States Supreme Court case Republican Party of Minnesota v. White does not impact Kentucky’s canon on Judicial campaign statements. The announce clause struck down as unconstitutional was repealed by the Kentucky Supreme Court in the ease of J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., Ky., 803 S.W.2d 953 (1991). Therefore, Canon 5(B)(1)(c) of the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct is not affected by the ruling on the Minnesota canon, and remains effective as promulgated by the Supreme Court of Kentucky. [Record No. 3; Exhibit F-12] Jeffrey Lawless, a Somerset attorney running for judicial office, also responded to the Project Coordinator but declined to provide any responses to the questionnaire. He stated, in part, that: Please be advised that the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “A judge or candidate for election to judicial office ... shall not make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court,” and “shall maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office.” In abiding by the Code, I am promoting my qualifications for this office, but I do not feel it appropriate for me or any other candidate for judicial office, to comment with respect to the various judicial issues posed in your survey. [Exhibit F — 15] A number of other candidates and sitting judges either stood behind their interpretation of the subject canon, Judge Bowling’s 2002 memorandum, or more recent comments by Judge Bowling in refusing to respond to some or all of the issues presented in the questionnaire. For example, Judge A.C. McKay Chauvin of the Jefferson Circuit Court indicated that she could not respond as a sitting judge because, “the Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission has directed that the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White does not affect Kentucky’s cannon [sic] on judicial campaign statements as promulgated by the Supreme Court of Kentucky.” [Exhibit F-16] However, Judge Roderick Messer of the Laurel and Knox Circuit Courts indicated that, “[u]pon receipt of your letter, I contacted Circuit Judge James Bowling, who is the Chairman of the Kentucky Judicial Ethics Committee. I was advised by Judge Bowling that the Judicial Commission had issued an order saying White did not apply to Kentucky and that the Judicial Ethics Committee had adopted that position." [Exhibit F-17] (Italics added.) Conversely, J. Ross Steinetorf claims to have relied upon his own reading of the rules in concluding that he was “prohibited from answering [the] questionnaire.” [Exhibit F — 21] It is equally noteworthy that two candidates for Justice of the Supreme Court of Kentucky also received copies of the questionnaire but offered differing opinions regarding their ability to respond to the issues raised. For example, former Circuit Judge Will T. Scott of Pikeville returned a partially-completed survey responding to questions 1, 2, 3 and 7. In addition, he identified membership in one of the organizations listed as well as his church affiliation. He declined to respond to questions 4, 5 and 6 and, with respect to question 4, he explained that “under Cannon [sic] 5 of the Ky. Sup.Ct. rules (4.300) I cannot answer these questions although I would like to — I would note that the Ky. Const, does not have the ‘common benefits’ clause under which the Vt. Case was decided.” [Exhibit F — 19, 20] Conversely, Janet Stumbo, a sitting Justice of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, reviewed the questionnaire but declined to answer any of the questions posed. In explaining her position, Justice Stumbo stated that, I have received and have reviewed the Survey forwarded to me by your organization. I regret that I- am unable to participate in this educational endeavor. Canon 5(B)(1)(c) of the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge “shall not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office [and]; shall not make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court....” The Ethics Committed of the Kentucky Judiciary and the Judicial Conduct Committee have both issued memoran-da stating that the United States Supreme Court decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White does not impact the Kentucky Canon on judicial campaign statements and that our canon remains effective. I enclose for your information a copy of the Ethics Committee memorandum, dated October 10, 2002. • [Exhibit F — 22] In summary, it appears that no identified' candidate for any judicial office has fully responded to the questionnaire presented by the Family Foundation. However, the reasons for individual refusals vary from reliance upon the 2002 memorandum from the Chairman of the Ethics Committee (and discussions with the Chairman) to the individual’s own interpretation of the limitations imposed by the canon. And other than Judge Messer, it does not appear that any judicial candidate has requested a formal or informal opinion concerning whether he or she may respond to any of the specific questions posed by the questionnaire. III. Procedural History The Plaintiffs filed this action on September 23, 2004, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. At the time the Complaint was filed, the Plaintiffs also filed a motion seeking to have the hearing on their request for injunctive relief consolidated with a trial on the merits. [Record No. 5] In addition, the Plaintiffs sought to have final resolution of this matter expedited. [Record No. 4] A scheduling hearing was held on September 28, 2004, in order to establish briefing deadlines and set a time for hearing on the Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. Although earlier dates were offered, the Plaintiffs’ attorneys chose to have their request for injunctive relief heard on October 15, 2004. The Defendants generally objected to a hearing being scheduled on the request for injunctive relief at any time in the near term, claiming they needed substantial time to prepare for such a hearing. On October 12, 2004, the Court denied the Plaintiffs’ request for consolidation of the hearing on their request for injunctive relief with the trial on the merits, relying, in part on the Supreme Court’s holding in University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981) (“it is generally inappropriate for a federal court at the preliminary injunction stage to give a final judgment on the merits”). [Record No. 19] And on October 15, 2004, the parties presented arguments regarding their respective positions concerning the Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. During the September 28th and October 15th hearings, the parties discussed and debated preliminary issues of standing, ripeness, mootness and other related issues which are addressed below. In addition, based on the concerns expressed by the Court on September 28th, the Plaintiffs also tendered the affidavit of Ken Ostrander, Executive Director of Family Foundation. This affidavit cites Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit authorities supporting their position that standing requirements have been met in this action. [Record No. 16] As indicated during the October 15th hearing, the Court will consider this affidavit as supplemental legal authority in support of the Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. IY. Standing The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs lack standing because the relevant ethical rules do not apply to them and because they have not suffered a direct, concrete, and particularized injury. They assert that, at best, these Plaintiffs suffer a generalized grievance, which they share with every other eligible voter in Kentucky. The Plaintiffs disagree and assert that they have met all standing concerns in this case. In addressing this argument, it must be noted initially that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Further, two types of standing must be met for a federal court to exercise jurisdiction: prudential standing, which is a judicially-imposed limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, and constitutional standing, which embodies the constitutional “case or controversies” requirement. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, — U.S. -, — -, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2308, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004). The Supreme Court sought to clarify the principle of “prudential standing” in Elk Grove, noting that “[although we have not exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of the standing doctrine, we have explained that prudential standing encompasses ‘the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” ’ Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). It has also held that [w]ithin the context of the First Amendment, the Court has enunciated other concerns that justify a lessening of prudential limitations on standing. Even where a First Amendment challenge could be brought by one actually engaged in protected activity, there is a possibility that, rather than risk punishment for his conduct in challenging the statute, he will refrain from engaging further in the protected activity. Society as a whole then would be the loser. Thus, when there is a danger of chilling free speech, the concern that constitutional adjudication be avoided whenever possible may be outweighed by society’s interest in having the statute challenged. Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956-957, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984) (quotation omitted); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 n. 5, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (“in First Amendment cases we have relaxed our rules of standing without regard to the relationship between the litigant and those whose rights he seeks to assert precisely because application of those rules would have an intolerable, inhibitory effect on freedom of speech”). As the Court found, “[fjacial challenges to overly broad statutes are allowed not primarily for the benefit of the litigant, but for the benefit of society — to prevent the statute from chilling the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court.” Id. at 958, 104 S.Ct. 2839. In the present action, the Plaintiffs satisfy the prudential concern of stating a claim which falls within the zone of interests implicated by the First Amendment because the right to freedom of speech is designed to protect all citizens’ rights to listen and to express opinions. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”); accord Neinast v. Bd of Trustees of the Columbus Metro. Library, 346 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir.2003); Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 83 (2d Cir.2003) (“it is well-established that the First Amendment protects not only the right to engage in protected speech, but also the right to receive such speech”). The second prudential standing concern is not present here. The Plaintiffs in this case have a right to receive political information that is independent of the judicial candidates’ right to express their opinion because the Plaintiffs claim they were denied their right to receive information — a right protected by the First Amendment. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564, 89 S.Ct. 1243; Neinast, 346 F.3d at 591; Spargo, 351 F.3d at 83; see also Akins, 524 U.S. at 21, 118 S.Ct. 1777. In Spargo, the plaintiffs challenged New York rules on judicial conduct, including a prohibition against “engaging in partisan political activities that are unrelated to their own campaign.” Spargo, 351 F.3d at 67. One of the plaintiffs was a judicial candidate, while the other two were merely supporters of the judge. The Second Circuit noted that the two supporters had their own First Amendment right to receive information that was independent of the judge’s right to speak. Id. at 83-84. With respect to constitutional concerns, Article Three, Section Two of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to the resolution of cases and controversies. The doctrine of standing helps federal courts identify which matters are properly considered cases and controversies for purposes of jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wild life, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Indeed, “the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The Supreme Court has elucidated the standing doctrine by setting forth three requirements: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered a concrete and particularized “injury in fact” that is actual or imminent, (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiffs case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof....” Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations omitted). In Lujan, the Supreme Court discussed the different standing analysis employed depending on whether the plaintiff is the direct subject of government regulation or, alternatively, if the plaintiff is only injured as a third-party: [w]hen the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be averred ... in order to establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it. When, however, as in this case, a plaintiffs asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed. In that circumstance, causation and re-dressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction — and perhaps on the response of others as well. The existence of one or more of the essential elements of standing depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict, and it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury. Thus, when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily “substantially more difficult” to establish. Id. at 561-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Therefore, while it is “substantially more difficult” for a plaintiff to have standing when the government is regulating someone else’s speech, Joseph H. Munson Co. and Baird instruct that this analysis is relaxed when examining a First Amendment claim. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998). The plaintiffs in the case were a group of voters who sought to challenge a decision of the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) which held that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (“AI-PAC”) was not a “political committee,” as defined by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”), and thus was not required to make disclosures regarding its membership contributions and expenditures. The plaintiffs filed a complaint with the FEC, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1), challenging its decision. When the FEC ruled against them, the plaintiffs filed suit in federal court, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A). The FEC argued that the plaintiffs lacked both prudential and constitutional standing. The Court first noted that the FECA specifically authorized the type of suit initiated by the plaintiffs, thus satisfying much of the prudential standing concerns. Akins, 524 U.S. at 20, 118 S.Ct. 1777. The Court next addressed the issue of constitutional standing, turning first to the requirement of injury in fact: [t]he “injury in fact” that respondents have suffered consists of their inability to obtain information — lists of AIPAC donors ... and campaign-related contributions and expenditures — that, on respondents’ view of the law, the statute requires that AIPAC make public. There is no reason to doubt their claim that the information would help them (and others to whom they would communicate it) to evaluate candidates for public office, especially candidates who received assistance from AIPAC, and to evaluate the role that AIPAC’s financial assistance might play in a specific election. Respondents’ injury consequently seems concrete and particular. Id. at 21, 118 S.Ct. 1777. Having concluded that the inability of voters to obtain information relevant to their vote constituted a concrete and particular injury in fact, the Court turned to the most troubling aspect of the plaintiffs’ standing: the fear that their claim represented only a “generalized grievance,” which could invalidate both prudential and constitutional standing. It pointed out that “[wjhether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit on standing, the Court has sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance.” Id. at 23, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (citations omitted). The Court further explained that in most cases in which the harm is widely shared and “generalized,” the harm to a plaintiff is abstract and if a Article Three court ruled on such claims, it would be issuing an impermissible advisory opinion. Id. at 24, 118 S.Ct. 1777. This association between harm that is both widely shared and abstract, however, “is not invariable, and where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found ‘injury in fact.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). It concluded that “the informational injury at issue here, directly related to voting, the most basic of political rights, is sufficiently concrete and specific such that the fact that it is widely shared does not deprive Congress of constitutional power to authorize its vindication in the federal courts.” Id. at 24-25, 118 S.Ct. 1777. The plaintiffs in this case similarly challenge an informational injury relating to voting, “the most basic of political rights.” In Akins, the plaintiffs sued pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A). Here, the plaintiffs’ suit is authorized by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, by virtue of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiffs claim they were denied their right to receive information, which is protected by the First Amendment. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564, 89 S.Ct. 1243; Neinast, 346 F.3d at 591; Spargo, 351 F.3d at 83; see also Akins, 524 U.S. at 21, 118 S.Ct. 1777. Congress created a private cause of action in Section 1983, which “provides for civil liability on the part of any person who, under color of state law, subjects any U.S. citizen ... to a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,” which includes, of course, First Amendment protections. Cullinan v. Abramson, 128 F.3d 301, 306-307 (6th Cir.1997). Thus, as in Akins, Congress has created a cause of action for the plaintiffs and their injury is sufficiently concrete and particularized to satisfy the prudential standing requirements and the constitutional “injury in fact” requirement. The second prong of constitutional standing, causation, also presents a difficult issue for resolution. The Plaintiffs claim that they are injured because judicial candidates will not answer their survey on judicial issues due to the restrictions found in Canon 5B(1)(c) and the Kentucky Supreme Court’s application of that Canon. As they point out, numerous judicial candidates refused to answer the surveys, stating that they believed that Canon 5B(1)(c) prevented them from answering the questions. (Pfs.’ Memo in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Ex. F) Of course, the candidates may be using the canon as a pretense to avoid answering difficult and divisive political questions. In that case, it would not be the canon which chilled political speech, but rather, the candidates’ own legitimate choices on what speech to engage in. The questionnaires provided by the Plaintiffs, however, explicitly state that the candidates refuse to answer due to their belief that answering the questionnaire might violate Canon 5B(1)(c). Assuming, arguendo, that the answers were merely a pretext to avoid answering difficult questions, standing in such a First Amendment case may exist simply from a “judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. at 956-57, 104 S.Ct. 2839 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). Moreover, in the more relaxed context of a First Amendment claim, the letters from the candidates satisfy the Lujan causation requirement. At this stage of the controversy, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the judicial candidates were only using the canon as an excuse not to answer the survey. Finally, a preliminary injunction would redress the Plaintiffs’ injury by removing the alleged barrier to free speech, ie., Canons 5B(1)(c). While it would certainly not compel a candidate to answer the questionnaire, it would remove the candidates’ stated reason for declining to answer the questions. It would thus remove any government-imposed barriers to their right to receive candidate information. Y. Ripeness In addition to questions of standing, this case also presents serious questions of ripeness. While standing focuses on who may bring suit, ripeness focuses on whether the facts are sufficiently developed to permit adjudication. Amelkin v. McClure, No. 94-6161, 1996 WL 8112, *4, 1996 U.S.App. LEXIS 1414, at * 13 (6th Cir. Jan. 9, 1996); Hallandale Prof'l Fire Fighters Local 2238 v. City of Hallandale, 922 F.2d 756, 760 n. 3 (11th Cir.1991). “The basic rationale of the ripeness doctrine is to prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” Adult Video Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 71 F.3d 563, 567 (6th Cir.1995) (quotation omitted). “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 301, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (quotations omitted). In a pre-enforcement challenge, ripeness typically exists “only if the probability of the future event occurring is substantial and of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Nat’l Riftle Ass’n of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 284 (6th Cir.1997). Three factors are relevant to this review: (1) the likelihood that the harm alleged by the plaintiffs will ever come to pass; (2) whether the factual record is sufficiently developed to produce a fair adjudication of the merits of the parties’ respective claims; and (3) the hardship to the parties if judicial relief is denied at this stage in the proceedings. Adult Video Ass’n, 71 F.3d at 568. Finally, “[rjipeness analysis is relaxed for First Amendment cases involving a facial challenge to a regulation because courts see a need to prevent the chilling of expressive activity.” Currence v. City of Cincinnati, 28 Fed.Appx. 438, 441-42 (6th Cir.2002); New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir.1995). In this case, the Plaintiffs’ alleged harm has come to pass because they are being denied the right to receive crucial voting information, purportedly because of Canon 5B(1)(e). While it is true that the state may choose not to enforce the canon against judicial candidates who answer the survey, the claimed injury currently exists because of the chill caused by the very existence of the canon (and its interpretation, discussed infra). The independent right to receive candidate information is jeopardized by the canons. Second, the factual record is sufficiently developed: the Plaintiffs have submitted their survey and responses to the survey. Unlike obscenity cases where “determinations often require analysis of the particular factual contexts in which the [pornographic material] is created, promoted, and disseminated,” Adult Video Ass’n, 71 F.3d at 568, this political speech case does not require an extensive factual inquiry into the particular circumstances of the survey’s creation and dissemination. In addition, Kentucky courts have had several opportunities to interpret the canons, thus adding to the factual record of this case. See Texas, 523 U.S. at 301, 118 S.Ct. 1257 (noting that state had yet to interpret statute in question, thus reducing the case’s “fitness for adjudication”). Finally, the Plaintiffs could suffer irreparable harm if their case is not heard because their interest in learning information from the candidates is time-sensitive and becomes nearly useless after the November 2nd general election. Thus, in this First Amendment case alleging a chilling of free speech relating to voting, “the most basic of political rights,” the Plaintiffs’ injury relating to Canon 5B(1)(c) appears to be sufficiently “ripe” to merit adjudication. VI. Abstention The Defendants also argue that the Court should abstain from hearing this action. In raising this argument, the Defendants acknowledge that there are various circumstances under which abstention is proper. Specifically, the Defendants note that abstention by a federal court may be necessary in the following situations: (1) where a case presents a federal constitutional issue which could be mooted or presented in a different posture by a determination of state law, also known as the Colorado River or Burford-type abstention; (2) where a case presents a difficult question of state law and bears upon policy issues of substantial importance which transcend the case at bar, also called Thibodaux-tjpe abstention; (3) where there is a parallel state proceeding at the time the federal action is instituted, also known as Younger-type abstention. There are three distinguishable line of cases, which set forth the various abstention doctrines as set forth above. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 79 S.Ct. 1070, 3 L.Ed.2d 1058 (1959); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). The Defendants contend that the facts of this case indicate that Younger-type abstention is most applicable in this case. However, they acknowledge that the Younger abstention doctrine is not available due to the fact that there is no parallel state proceeding. Without citing which of these abstention doctrines is, in fact, applicable in this case, the Defendants simply assert that “the general principles of comity recognized in the Younger abstention eases are also applicable under other abstention doctrines.” [Record No. 20, p. 16] As a general rule, district courts have an obligation and a duty to decide cases properly before them, and' “[ajbstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813, 96 S.Ct. 1236 (1976). In the present case, the requirements for the abstention doctrines raised by the Defendants have not been met. In addition to the fact that there is no parallel state court proceeding, this action involves federal constitutional issues; namely, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. And while this action involves the constitutionality of two state judicial canons and a state statute, the outcome of this litigation turns on an interpretation of federal constitutional law, not state law. These are certainly matters which may be resolved by this Court. VII. The Standard for Injunctive Relief In In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir.1985), the Sixth Circuit set forth the relevant considerations for examining a motion for a preliminary injunction. The four factors are: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the injunction will save the plaintiff from irreparable injury; (3) whether the injunction would harm others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the injunction. Id. at 1228. As the Sixth Circuit has noted most recently in Chabad of Southern Ohio & Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati, 363 F.3d 427, 432 (6th Cir.2004), when ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court must consider and balance these four factors. “Accordingly, the degree of likelihood of success required may depend on the strength of the other factors.” DeLorean, 755 F.2d at 1229. The Defendants claim that injunctive relief is not available to the Plaintiffs under Section 1983, noting that in actions taken against judicial officers in their judicial capacity, “injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Assuming that the Defendants are “judicial officers,” this argument fails because declaratory relief is unavailable at this time since the Plaintiffs are merely seeking emergency relief. A declaratory judgment has the same “force and effect” as a final judgment and thus is inappropriate in a preliminary hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2201. In fact, the Defendants opposed the Plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate the preliminary hearing with a hearing on the merits. Therefore, the only remedy available to the Plaintiffs, prior to a full trial on the merits, is a preliminary injunction. Section 1983 does not preclude injunctive relief because declaratory relief is unavailable for the Plaintiffs at this time. VIII. Canon 5B(1)(c) A. History Section 121 of the Kentucky Constitution confers the authority to regulate the conduct of the judiciary upon the Kentucky Supreme Court. In carrying out this task, the Kentucky Supreme Court has promulgated the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct (“Code”), codified in Rule 4.300 of the Rules of the Kentucky Supreme Court. The Code is interpreted by both the state courts and the Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary (“Ethics Committee”). Its enforcement is carried out by the Judicial Conduct Commission (“Commission”). Canon 5 deals with “inappropriate political conduct” by judges and those seeking judicial office. Canon 5B(1)(c) contains both a “pledges or promises” clause (“promises clause”) and a “commit clause,” both of which are challenged in this action. It provides that a judge or candidate to judicial office: shall not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; shall not make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court; and shall not misrepresent any candidate’s identity, qualifications, present position, or other facts. Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 4.300, Canon 5B(1)(c). This canon replaced the repealed Canon 7B(1) which provided that a judge or candidate for judicial office “should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; (or) announce his views on disputed legal or political issues.” Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 4.300, Canon 7B(1)(c) (1991). This provision thus contained a promises clause and an “announce clause.” In J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky.1991) a panel of special justices for the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that Canon 7B(1)(c) violated the First Amendment. In striking it down, the court noted that the existing Canon strictly prohibits dialogue on virtually every issue that would be of interest to the voting public. Inasmuch as the purpose of an election is to give the electorate the opportunity to become informed on a judicial candidate’s qualifications for the position, which would include, among other things, knowledge of the law, and personal views and beliefs, the Canon fails in this respect. Instead, we are encouraging the public to judge candidates for our judiciary by not much more than their personal appearances. We believe a well informed electorate is essential to the democratic election process guaranteed by the Kentucky Constitution. The rights of the voting public to hear what a candidate has to say is a compelling one. We further believe candidates for judicial office can announce their views on legal and political issues without jeopardizing the integrity and independence of the legal system or undermining the impartiality of the judiciary. Id. at 956. The court agreed with the respondent that “pledges of specific judicial conduct on pending cases” and “promises or predispositions of cases or issues that are likely to come before the courts that might reflect a judge’s impartiality” cannot be tolerated. Id. However, the court felt that the canon could be written more narrowly to “outlaw discussion of pending or future litigation.” Id. Following this opinion, the Rules of the Kentucky Supreme Court regarding judicial campaigns were re-written in their present form. As discussed supra, the new canon dropped the announce clause, added the commits clause and left the promises clause in place. Shortly after the J.C.J.D. opinion, a federal district court heard a case challenging the newly-amended canon. Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Retirement and Removal Comm’n, 776 F.Supp. 309 (W.D.Ky.1991). Ackerson was a candidate for the Kentucky Court of Appeals. He sought to “make pledges, promises and statements which would commit or appear to commit him with respect to administrative matters in the Kentucky Court of Appeals.” Id. at 311. Concluding that “strict scrutiny” analysis was appropriate, the court determined that the state had a compelling interest in an impartial judiciary, noting that “[a]n evenhanded, unbiased and impartial judiciary is one of the pillars upon which our system of government rests.” Id. at 313. The court next considered whether Canon 5B(1)(c) (which was then known as Canon 7B(1)(c)) was narrowly tailored to the state’s compelling interest. It concluded that commenting on administrative matters, as opposed to adjudicatory matters, was not related to the state’s interest in having an impartial judiciary. Id. at 314. Although the court held that the canon violated Ackerson’s First Amendment rights as applied to commenting on administrative matters, it determined that the canon was facially valid. Thus, the court enjoined the defendant from enforcing the canon with respect to comments on administrative matters only. Three years later, the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled on its first challenge to the judicial campaigning canon since it struck down the previous version in the J.C.J.D. case. Deters v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Comm’n, 873 S.W.2d 200 (Ky.1994). Deters ran unsuccessfully for the remainder of a district court judgeship in Kenton County. He took out advertisements in The Messenger and The Kentucky Post which stated that “Jed Deters is a Pro-Life Candidate.” Id. at 201. A complaint was filed against him following the election. The Commission reviewed the matter and concluded that Deters had publicly announced his view on the abortion issue for the admitted purpose of obtaining support from voters interested in that issue. In doing so, he attemptéd to obtain an unwarranted and illegal advantage in the election over his opponents. In so acting, he violated Canon 7B(l)(c) by making statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate to a position with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court. Id. at 202. Deters appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, as provided for in Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 4.310. In his appeal, he alleged, inter alia, that Canon 7B(1)(c) violated his First Amendment rights. However, the supreme court disagreed. Citing Ackerson, the court concluded that the state had a compelling interest in limiting a judicial candidate’s speech “because the making of campaign commitments on issues likely to come before the court tends to undermine the fundamental fairness and impartiality of the legal system.” Id. at 205. The Supreme Court of Kentucky most recently dealt with the First Amendment implications of Canon 5B(1)(c) in Summe v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Comm’n, 947 S.W.2d 42 (Ky.1997). Judge Summe successfully ran for Circuit Judge in Kenton County in November 1994. During the campaign, she distributed a letter written by her cousin which described a child abuse case handled by her opponent, Judge Trusty. The letter noted that while the prosecutor argued for a ten-year sentence for the abuser, the judge imposed only a five year sentence and then probated the sentence, causing the defendant to spend only 153 days behind bars. The letter stated that “it is time to judge our judges” and “to stop the abuse instead of treating it.” Id. at 46. “Please join me,” the letter concluded, “in stopping the abuse and vote for a person who will let no one walk away before justice is served. [Summe] has concern for the victim.” Id. First, Judge Summe argued that this letter constituted neither a pledge, promise, nor a commitment. The court disagreed, noting that “[w]hile in isolation, a judge who ‘will let no one walk away before justice is served’ is something to which all should aspire, in the context of the present judicial campaign, it represented appellant’s commitment to prevent the probation of child abusers.” Id. at 47. Judge Summe next argued that Canon 5B(1)(c) violated her First Amendment rights. The court quickly dismissed this argument, citing Deters and Ackerson. It further noted that J.C.J.D. was not useful to Judge Summe because the judicial campaign canon had been amended to remove the announce clause. Id. Five years later, the United States Supreme Court entered the fray in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002). The case dealt with Minnesota’s ethical rules for judicial campaigns. Although the rules contained both a pledges and promises clause as well as an announce clause, the court considered only the constitutionality of the announce clause because the promises clause was not challenged by the petitioners. Id. at 770, 122 S.Ct. 2528. Gregory Warsal, one of the petitioners, ran for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court. During the campaign he criticized several Minnesota Supreme Court decisions on issues including crime, welfare, and abortion. Id. at 768, 122 S.Ct. 2528. Complaints were filed against him for violation of the announce clause, but were later dismissed. He ran again in 1998 and sought an advisory opinion from the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board as to whether the announce clause would be enforced. It refused to answer his request, so he and the Republican Party of Minnesota filed suit in federal district court to enjoin enforcement of the announce clause, arguing that it violated the First Amendment. In delivering the Court’s opinion in White, Justice Scalia recognized that “the announce clause both prohibits speech on the basis of its content and burdens a category of speech that is at the core of our First Amendment freedoms — speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office.” Id. at 774, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (quotation omitted). Thus, strict scrutiny applied, meaning that the state had to prove that the clause was “(1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state interest.” Id. The Court first considered whether a compelling state interest was implicated. It identified three possible compelling state interests protected by the announce clause: (1) preserving the impartiality of the judicial system by removing bias for or against either party in a court proceeding; (2) preserving the impartiality of the judicial system by removing preconceptions in favor of or against a particular legal view; and (3) preserving the impartiality of the judicial system by promoting “open-mindedness” by seeking “to guarantee each litigant not an equal chance to win” a case, “but at least some chance of doing so.” Id. at 775-84, 122 S.Ct. 2528. The Court did not discuss whether “removing preconception in favor of or against a particular legal view” was a compelling interest, instead dismissing this justification on the ground that the announce clause was not necessary to achieve this goal. It noted that the announce clause restricts speech regarding particular issues, not parties, conceding that when a case arises that turns on a legal issue on which the judge (as a candidate) had taken a particular stand, the party taking the opposite stand is likely to lose. But not because of any bias against that party, or favoritism toward the other party. Any party taking that position is just as likely to lose. The judge is applying the law (as he sees it) evenhandedly. Id. at 776-77, 122 S.Ct. 2528. Thus, the court rejected this justification of the announce clause. Next, the Court determined that removing preconceptions in favor of or against a particular legal view is not a compelling state interest. The Court concluded that “[a] judge’s lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice,” for two reasons: (1) “it is virtually impossible to find a judge who does not have preconceptions about the law” and (2) “[pjroof that a Justice’s mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of a lack of qualification, not a lack of bias.” Id. at 777-78, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (quotation omitted). The Court further held that the goal of maintaining the appearance of impartiality was not compelling because “avoiding judicial preconceptions on legal issues is neither possible nor desirable” and thus preserving the “ ‘appearance’ of that type of impartiality can hardly be a compelling state interest either.” Id. at 778, 122 S.Ct. 2528. Finally, the Court turned to the stated interest in preserving judicial open-mindedness. The court did not rule on whether this interest was compelling or whether the announce clause was necessary to protect this interest, because it concluded that the Minnesota Supreme Court did not adopt the announce clause for this purpose. The Court first noted that statements during a judicial campaign constitute an “infinitesimal portion of the public comments to legal positions that judges (or judges-to-be) undertake.” Id. at 779, 122 S.Ct. 2528. Judges and judicial candidates have often committed themselves on issues they must later rule on, the Court noted