Full opinion text
OPINION TSOUCALAS, Senior Judge. This consolidated action concerns the claims raised by plaintiffs, Luoyang Bearing Corp. (Group) (“Luoyang”), Zhejiang Machinery Import & Export Corp. (“ZMC”), and China National Machinery Import & Export Corporation (“CMC”), and plaintiff and defendant-intervenors, Wafangdian Bearing Company, Ltd. (“Wafangdian”) and The Timken Company (“Timken”), who move pursuant to USCIT R. 56.2 for judgment upon the agency record challenging the Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration’s (“Commerce”) final determination, entitled Final Results of 1998-1999 Administrative Review, Partial Rescission of Review, and Determination Not To Revoke Order in Part on Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From the People’s Republic of China (“Final Results”), 66 Fed.Reg. 1,953 (Jan. 10, 2001), as amended by Amended Final Residís of 1998-1999 Administrative Review and Determination To Revoke Order in Paid on Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From the People’s Republic of China (“Amended Final Results”), 66 Fed.Reg. 11,562 (Feb. 26, 2001). Specifically, CMC and ZMC contend that Commerce improperly rejected a market economy price of imported steel for the production of People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) tapered roller bearings (“TRBs”) based upon a “reason to believe” or suspect that the price was subsidized. CMC further argues that Commerce erred in: (1) holding an ex parte meeting with counsel for Timken; (2) including employer welfare and provident fund expenses in the selling, general and administrative expenses (“SG & A”) ratio; and (3) adding ocean freight and insurance costs to the export price of Japanese steel to determine the surrogate value. Luoyang, Waf-angdian and ZMC maintain that Commerce erred in: (1) rejecting ZMC’s input value for steel bought from a PRC supplier and paid for with PRC currency; (2) disregarding actual ocean freight charges paid in market economy currency to PRC freight forwarders rather than to the exporter; and (3) using aberrational data in calculating the surrogate value for wooden cases and the steel used to make rollers. Timken contends that: (1) Commerce improperly applied the PRC rate to all Premier Bearing & Equipment Ltd. (“Premier”) United States sales; (2) the administrative record does not support the use of other producers’ factors data to calculate Premier’s normal values; (3) the upward post-sale price adjustments to certain Waf-angdian sales were unlawful; (4) Commerce failed to account for defective parts in calculating normal value for Wafangdi-an; and (5) Commerce acted contrary to law in revoking the order relating to Waf-angdian imports. BACKGROUND This case concerns the antidumping duty order on TRBs and parts thereof, finished and unfinished (“subject merchandise”), from the PRC for the period of review covering June 1, 1998, through May 31, 1999 (“POR”). See Final Results, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1,953. In 1987, Commerce published an antidumping duty order on TRBs from the PRC. See Antidumping Duty Order on Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished or Unfinished, From the People’s Republic of China, 52 Fed.Reg. 22,667 (June 15, 1987). Commerce initiated an administrative review of the subject merchandise on July 23, 1999. See Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews and Request for Revocation in Part, 64 Fed.Reg. 41,075 (July 29,1999). On July 7, 2000, Commerce published the preliminary results of the subject review. See Preliminary Results of 1998-1999 Administrative Review, Partial Re-cission of Review, and Notice of Intent to Revoke Order in Part for Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From the People’s Republic of China (“Preliminary Results”), 65 Fed. Reg. 41,944. Commerce published the Final Results on January 10, 2001. See Final Results, 66 Fed.Reg. 1,953. The Issues and Decision Memo which accompanied the Final Results, is dated January 3, 2001. See Final Results, 66 Fed.Reg. at 1,954. Commerce later published the Amended Final Results on February 26, 2001. See Amended Final Results, 66 Fed.Reg. 11,562. JURISDICTION The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2000). STANDARD OF REVIEW In reviewing a challenge to Commerce’s final determination in an antidumping administrative review, the Court will uphold Commerce’s determination unless it is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law....” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i) (1994). 1. Substantial Evidence Test Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). Substantial evidence “is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Mantime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966) (citations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he court may not substitute its judgment for that of the [agency] when the choice is ‘between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo. ’ ” American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 8 CIT 20, 22, 590 F.Supp. 1273, 1276 (1984) (quoting Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 22-23 (1st Cir.1983) (quoting, in turn, Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. 456)). II. Chevron Two-Step Analysis To determine whether Commerce’s interpretation and application of the antidumping statute is “in accordance with law,” the Court must undertake the two-step analysis prescribed by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Under the first step, the Court reviews Commerce’s construction of a statutory provision to determine whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. “To ascertain whether Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, [the Court] employ[s] the ‘traditional tools of statutory construction.’ ” Timex V.I., Inc. v. United States, 157 F.3d 879, 882 (Fed.Cir.1998) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778). “The first and foremost ‘tool’ to be used is the statute’s text, giving it its plain meaning. Because a statute’s text is Congress’ final expression of its intent, if the text answers the question, that is the end of the matter.” Id. (citations omitted). Beyond the statute’s text, the tools of statutory construction “include the statute’s structure, canons of statutory construction, and legislative history.” Id. (citations omitted); but see Floral Trade Council v. United States, 23 CIT 20, 22 n. 6, 41 F.Supp.2d 319, 323 n. 6 (1999) (noting that “[n]ot all rules of statutory construction rise to the level of a canon, however”) (citation omitted). If, after employing the first prong of Chevron, the Court determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the Court becomes whether Commerce’s construction of the statute is permissible. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Essentially, this is an inquiry into the reasonableness of Commerce’s interpretation. See Fujitsu Gen. Ltd. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1034, 1038 (Fed.Cir.1996). Provided Commerce has acted rationally, the Court may not substitute its judgment for the agency’s. See Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed.Cir.1994) (holding that “a court must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute even if the court might have preferred another”); see also IPSCO, Inc. v. United States, 965 F.2d 1056, 1061 (Fed.Cir.1992). The “[C]ourt will sustain the determination if it is reasonable and supported by the record as a whole, including whatever fairly detracts from the substantiality of the evidence.” Negev Phosphates, Ltd. v. United States, 12 CIT 1074, 1077, 699 F.Supp. 938, 942 (1988) (citations omitted). In determining whether Commerce’s interpretation is reasonable, the Court considers the following non-exclusive list of factors: the express terms of the provisions at issue, the objectives of those provisions and the objectives of the antidumping scheme as a whole. See Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. v. United States, 22 CIT 541, 545, 15 F.Supp.2d 807, 813 (1998). DISCUSSION I. Commerce Properly Selected Surrogate Values for Imported Steel Used to Produce TRBs A. Background 1. Statutory Background Commerce determines the anti-dumping duty margin by taking the difference between the normal value (“NV”) and the United States price of the merchandise. When merchandise is produced in a non-market economy country (“NME”), such as the PRC, there is a presumption that exports are under the control of the state. Section 1677b(c) of Title 19 of the United States Code provides that, “the valuation of the factors of production shall be based on the best available information regarding the values of such factors in a market economy country or countries considered to be appropriate by [Commerce].” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(l) (1994). The statute, however, does not define the phrase “best available information,” it only provides that, “[Commerce], in valuing factors of production ... shall utilize, to the extent possible, the prices or costs of factors of production in one or more market economy countries that are- — (A) at a level of economic development comparable to that of the nonmarket economy country, and (B) significant producers of comparable merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4). Consequently, Commerce is given broad discretion “to determine margins as accurately as possible, and to use the best information available to it in doing so.” Lasko Metal Prods., Inc. v. United States, 43 F.3d 1442, 1443 (Fed.Cir.1994). The antidumping duty statute authorizes, but does not mandate, that Commerce use surrogate countries to estimate the value of the factors of production (“FOP”). In legislative history, Congress provided Commerce with guidance by stating that, “[i]n valuing such [FOP], Commerce shall avoid using any prices which it has reason to believe or suspect may be dumped or subsidized prices.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-576, at 590 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1623 (“House Report”). The House Report further states that, “the conferees do not intend for Commerce to conduct a formal investigation to ensure that such prices are not dumped or subsidized, but rather intend that Commerce base its decision on information generally available to it at that time.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-576, at 590-91, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1623-24. In addition, Commerce has promulgated regulations regarding the valuation of FOP in the NME context. The relevant regulations state that “where a factor is purchased from a market economy supplier and paid for in a market economy currency, [Commerce] normally will use the price paid to the market economy supplier.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1) (1999). 2. Factual Background In the Preliminary Results, Commerce valued the steel used to produce the subject TRBs by using the actual import prices paid by CMC. In particular, Commerce noted: Certain producers in this review purchased steel from market economy suppliers and paid for the steel with market economy currency. Thus, in accordance with [Commerce’s] regulations, [Commerce] valued all appropriate steel inputs using the actual price reported for directly imported inputs from a market economy. For all other steel inputs, we used a surrogate to value that steel. Preliminary Results, 65 Fed.Reg. at 41,948. Commerce later used surrogate values to determine NV upon a determination that there was “reason to believe or suspect” that the market economy prices of imported steel used to produce the subject merchandise sold by CMC and ZMC was dumped or subsidized. See Final Results, 66 Fed.Reg. at 1,955; see also CMC’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Under R. 56.2 J. Agency R. Action Under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(C) (“CMC’s Mem.”) at App. 7. Commerce premised its “reason to believe or suspect,” in part, on the availability and use of general subsidies in the subject industry. See CMC’s Mem. at App. 7. B. Contentions of the Parties 1. CMC’s Contentions CMC argues that Commerce exceeded its statutory discretion by rejecting market economy prices paid for steel inputs in a market-based currency by NME producers to market economy suppliers. See id. at 17-18. According to CMC, “these market-driven prices constitute the ‘best available information.’ ” Id. at 30. Commerce relied on two United States countervailing duty investigations involving steel material inputs not used in the production of cups and cones. See id. at 19. CMC argues, therefore, that Commerce is not entitled to Chevron deference in this determination because “[t]here is no statutory or regulatory provision that requires the rejection of either surrogate or actual prices based on a ‘reason to believe or suspect’ standard that the prices are dumped or subsidized.” Id. Even Commerce’s regulations are silent on this issue and Commerce relied “exclusively on a statement in legislative history — which was neither enacted in the statute nor codified in the regulations — to support its novel position.” See id. at 20. CMC also asserts that the relevant statute does not directly address the issue of a particular methodology that Commerce must employ to value the FOP in an NME. See id. at 21 (citing Shakeproof Assembly Components Div. of III. Tool Works, Inc. v. United States, 23 CIT 479, 481, 59 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1357 (1999)). “[W]hen there is a third country countervailing duty order [‘CVD’] on a different product from the source country[,]” Commerce’s regulations do not address the use of “actual price” to value an input. See id. at 21. “ ‘[T]he Court’s task is to assess the reasonableness of Commerce’s interpretation to allow for valuation based on the actual value of the inputs imported from a market economy.’ ” Id. at 21 (quoting Shakeproof Assembly Components Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. United States, 24 CIT 485, 489, 102 F.Supp.2d 486, 491 (2000)). Since the statute is silent with respect to the issue at bar, CMC argues that Commerce should not be accorded Chevron deference. See id. Instead, the Court should analyze the validity, thoroughness, persuasiveness, formality and consistency of Commerce’s decision in accordance with the test delineated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). See CMC’s Mem. at 22 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001)). CMC further contends that Commerce’s analysis is not persuasive under Skidmore since Commerce expanded its statutory authority by rejecting the actual prices for two reasons. First, the “ ‘reason to believe or suspect’ language applied by [Commerce] is drawn not from the statute or regulations but from the legislative history.” Id. Second, Commerce’s determination is not supported by substantial evidence, but rather depends upon CVD on different products manufactured by different suppliers than those at issue in this review. See id. at 23. CMC also argues that Commerce’s decision to reject actual prices was a change in methodology that was made without sufficient notice to the affected parties or public. See id. Chevron deference, therefore, is not applicable here because Commerce’s “new course was undertaken through informal rulemaking and without public deliberation.” Id. at 24. Furthermore, Commerce’s reliance on the term “subsidies” in the relevant legislative history is misplaced since the meaning of the term is not clearly defined. See id. at 24-25. Commerce’s authority to reject actual prices is limited to situations where specific countervailing subsidies are in place, and not general subsidies on products different than those at issue. See id. CMC also argues that Commerce’s proposed methodology does not promote transparency or predictability and mandates respondents to monitor antidumping and countervailing duty decisions across an entire industry. See id. at 25-26. CMC distinguishes the determination that Commerce depends upon in its analysis to “support the application of the ‘reason to' believe or suspect’ standard to actual market economy import prices.” Id. at 34 (emphasis in original). CMC also cites Tehnoimportexport, UCF Am. Inc. v. United States, 16 CIT 13, 783 F.Supp. 1401 (1992), and China National Arts and Crafts Import and Export Corp. v. United States, 15 CIT 417, 771 F.Supp. 407 (1991), to support its argument that no posh-1998 case on point supports the application of the “reason to believe or suspect” standard to market economy imports. See CMC’s Mem. at 33-34. CMC contends that use of this standard to reject an actual price “is akin to speculation, since the evidence required to ‘suspect’ is very little,” id. at 34, and that Commerce’s assumption that market economy inputs were dumped or subsidized is not based on substantial evidence. See id. at 35. 2. ZMC’s Contentions ZMC supports the arguments made by CMC with respect to Commerce’s rejection of market economy prices paid for steel inputs. See Luoyang’s Mot. at 17-19. Zhejiang adds: The legislative history on which Commerce relied to disregard the direct steel sales to the PRC should have been read in context. As Commerce noted, there was no countervailing duty imposed on imports of the steel by the PRC and there was no evidence that any other country, including the United States, had imposed countervailing duties on the specific steel. Id. at 17. Thus, when Commerce avoids using prices it has a “reason to believe or suspect” may be dumped or subsidized prices, such a decision must be premised on the fact that injury to the domestic injury actually occurred. See id. at 17-18. ZMC argues that Commerce did not provide sufficient evidence to show that there was injury to the specific domestic industry, and that “if the sole evidence is ... the existence of ‘general subsidies’ ... [then this] is a standard Commerce should set forth in the form of rule-making and not a case decision.” Id. at 18. 3. Commerce’s Contentions Commerce argues that Chevron deference is applicable with respect to the statutory provision at issue. See Commerce’s Mem. Opp’n Pis. Mot. J. Upon Agency R. (“Commerce’s Mem.”) at 46 (citing Shakeproof Assembly Components, Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. United States (“Shakeproof III”), 268 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2001)). Commerce responds to CMC and ZMC’s argument regarding notice by stating that Shakeproof III and other cases “recognize[ ] that Commerce routinely announces through administrative determinations different interpretive reasons for accepting or rejecting a particular market-based or surrogate value.” Id. (citing Las ko, 43 F.3d at 1445 (affirming Commerce’s valuation of a factor of production by use of surrogate country and actual cost values)); Baoding Yude Chem. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 25 CIT -, 170 F.Supp.2d 1335 (2001). Commerce contends that it is mandated by statute to base FOP valuation on the “best available information” and to assess antidumping margins accurately. See Commerce’s Mem. at 47 (citing Shakeproof III, 268 F.3d at 1382). Commerce does not agree with CMC’s argument that market-based prices are normally preferred by the agency’s regulations since Commerce’s primary goal is to use the best available information to value FOP. See Commerce’s Mem. at 47-48 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(a) & (c)(1)). In this review, Commerce contends that it had a viable “reason to believe or suspect” that the market economy prices were subsidized and, accordingly, resorted to using surrogate values. See id. at 48. Commerce argues that its decision was in line with Chevron since the agency is accorded wide discretion in the valuation of FOP. See id. at 49. Moreover, Commerce states that its Issues & Decision Mem. sets forth that the obligatory language of the pertinent legislative history most likely refers to surrogate prices as opposed to actual market economy input prices. However, Commerce’s approach in this case is a permissible construction, read in conjunction with the legislative history, that gives effect to the first principle of the statute as set out in Shakeproof [III]. That is, Commerce shall avoid using prices (surrogate or market-based) that may be dumped or subsidized in order to use the best available information to value factors. Id. at 49-50. Commerce argues that it based its “reason to believe or suspect” on substantial evidence as required by this Court’s relevant standard of review and that the agency’s reasoning is set forth in its Market Economy Steel Memorandum. See id. at 50-51. Commerce mentions that the “reason to believe or suspect” requirement merely required “some specific, particularized evidence, taking into account all the circumstances before the administrative decision maker at the time of the decision.” Id. at 50-51. According to Commerce, “[t]his is especially true in light of the congressional statement that Commerce need not investigate to ensure that prices are actually subsidized.” Id. at 51 (emphasis in original). 4. Timken’s Contentions Timken generally agrees with Commerce that its decision to decline market prices was reasonable. See Timken’s Mem. Opp’n Mots. J. Agency R. CMC, Luoyang, Wafangdian & ZMC (“Timken’s Opp’n”) at 21. Timken first argues that Chevron and not Skidmore deference applies in antidumping determinations. See id. at 22. Second, Timken maintains that Commerce’s determination to reject subsidized prices passes the Chevron reasonableness test. See id. at 22-23. Third, Timken contends that CMC’s assertion regarding 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1) is in error because the relevant statute is silent on the issue of using prices of inputs from market sources. See id. at 23. “Therefore, there is no statutory ‘mandate’ precluding Commerce’s action here.” Id. at 23. CMC misreads the regulation’s “direction” since it merely states that “ ‘where a factor is purchased from a market economy supplier and paid for in a market economy currency, [Commerce] normally will use the price paid to the market economy supplier.’ ” 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1). Timken asserts that the word “normally” contemplates exceptions, so that the question becomes whether Commerce, in this particular review, reasonably invoked an exception to the rule. See id. at 23-24. C. Analysis 1. Commerce’s Changes of Policy or Methodology Agency statements provide guidance to regulated industries. While “ ‘an agency does not act rationally when it chooses and implements one policy and decides to consider the merits of a potentially inconsistent policy in the very near future,’ ” Transcom, Inc. v. United States, 24 CIT 1333, 1342, 123 F.Supp.2d 1372, 1381 (2000) (quoting ITT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 725 F.2d 732, 754 (D.C.Cir.1984)), Commerce, in view of the rapidly-changing world of global trade and Commerce’s limited resources, should be able to rely on its “unique expertise and policy-making prerogatives.” Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed.Cir.2000). “ ‘The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created ... program necessarily requires the formulation of policy....’” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974)). An agency decision involving the meaning or reach of a statute that reconciles conflicting policies “ ‘represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, [and a reviewing court] should not disturb [the agency decision] unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.’ ” Id. at 845, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83, 81 S.Ct. 1554, 6 L.Ed.2d 908 (1961)). Furthermore, an agency must be allowed to assess the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis. Under the Chevron regime, agency discretion to reconsider policies is inalienable. See id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Any assumption that Congress intended to freeze an administrative interpretation of a statute would be entirely contrary to the concept of Chevron which assumes and approves the ability of administrative agencies to change their interpretations. See, e.g., Maier, P.E. v. United States EPA, 114 F.3d 1032, 1043 (10th Cir.1997), J.L. v. Social Sec. Admin., 971 F.2d 260, 265 (9th Cir.1992), Saco Defense Sys. Div., Maremont Corp. v. Weinberger, 606 F.Supp. 446, 450-51 (D.Me.1985). In sum, underlying agency interpretative policies “are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Moreover, “ ‘[a]n [agency] announcement stating a change in the method ... is not a general statement of policy.’ ” American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. ICC, 659 F.2d 452, 464 n. 49 (5th Cir.1981) (quoting Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 701 (5th Cir.1979) (internal quotations omitted)). While a policy denotes “the general principles by which a government is guided” by laws, BlaCK’s Law Dictionaey 1178 (7th ed.1999) (emphasis added), methodology refers only to the “mode of organizing, operating or performing something, especially to achieve [the goal of a statute].” Id. at 1005 (defining mode) (emphasis added); accord Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.1983); Interstate Natural Gas Ass’n of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 716 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.1983); Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir.1976). Consequently, the courts are even less in the position to question $n agency action if the action at issue is a choice of methodology, rather than policy. See, e.g., Maier, P.E., 114 F.3d at 1043 (citing Professional Drivers Council v. Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, 706 F.2d 1216, 1221 (D.C.Cir.1983)). Similarly, an agency decision to change its methodology should be examined under the Chevron test and sustained if the new methodology is reasonable. See, e.g., Koyo Seiko Co., v. United States, 24 CIT 364, 374, 110 F.Supp.2d 934, 942 (2000) (stating that the use of different methods of calculation does not mean there is a conflict with the statute). Therefore, Commerce’s rejection of actual market economy prices and use of a surrogate value for bearing quality steel bar was a justifiable change of methodology so long as such change in position was reasonably supported by the record. 2. Commerce’s Determination at Bar The CAFC has reasoned that the purpose of 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(l) and (4) “is to determine antidumping margins ‘as accurately as possible.’ ” Shakeproof III, 268 F.3d at 1382 (quoting Lasko, 43 F.3d at 1446); see also Olympia Indus., Inc. v. United States, 22 CIT 387, 390, 7 F.Supp.2d 997, 1000-01 (1998) (noting that “accuracy is the touchstone of the anti-dumping statute” and citing Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1185, 1191 (Fed.Cir.1990)). Additionally, Commerce’s “task in [an NME] investigation is to calculate what ... [the] costs or prices would be [in the NME] if such prices or costs were determined by market forces.” Tianjin Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 16 CIT 931, 940, 806 F.Supp. 1008, 1018 (1992). The Court recognizes that the House Report concerns the selection of surrogate values to determine NV in the NME context. Neither the statute nor the House Report address the use of market value in the calculation of NV. The Court has established, however, that “nothing in the antidumping duty statute directs Commerce to employ actual prices paid to a market economy supplier by an NME producer in NV calculations.” China Nat’l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 27 CIT -, -, 264 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1236 (2003). Furthermore, in Lasko, the CAFC recognized that the purpose of the statute “is to prevent dumping, an activity defined in terms of the marketplace.” 43 F.3d at 1446. Therefore, the use of suspect prices to calculate NV, even when paid to a market-economy supplier, would be contrary to Congress’ intent. The Court finds that when Commerce has reason to believe or suspect that a market-economy supplier’s prices are subsidized, Commerce may reject market prices paid to the supplier in favor of surrogate prices for its calculation of NV. The Court is unconvinced by CMC’s argument that Commerce’s regulations prefer that Commerce use actual prices paid whenever available. The Court finds that the applicable regulations do not require Commerce to use the market value over a surrogate value. The regulations state that Commerce “normally will value the factor using the price paid to the market economy supplier.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1). The regulation merely advises Commerce to use actual market values to calculate NV for an NME supplier in certain circumstances. As the Court has previously stated, “while Commerce will use market values under normal circumstances, under certain circumstances Commerce may choose not to do so.” China Nat’l, 27 CIT at -, 264 F.Supp.2d at 1237 (noting that the regulation “merely indicates a preference for market prices”); see also Anshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. v. United States, 27 CIT -, -, 2003 WL 22018898, *12, 2003 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 109, at *40 (CIT 2003) (stating that the language “merely suggests a particular methodology, but does not impose upon Commerce the requirement of selecting the market-economy price of a respondent’s purchases to the exclusion of more appropriate values”). While the Court recognizes that surrogate country values are only an estimation of what the product’s NV would have been if the NME were a market-economy country, see Rhodia, Inc. v. United States, 25 CIT -, -, 185 F.Supp.2d 1343, 1351 (2001), Commerce’s decision to use actual prices paid or surrogate values is predicated on which values provide a more accurate NV. See Lasko, 43 F.3d at 1446 (noting that the purpose of the statute is to prevent dumping and that it “sets forth procedures in an effort to determine margins ‘as accurately as possible’ ”) (quoting Rhone Poulenc, 899 F.2d at 1191). When Commerce has substantial evidence that prices paid to a market-economy supplier are not market determined, then the “use of such prices would undermine ‘accuracy, fairness, and predictability,’ in the calculation of margins and contravene the anti-dumping and countervailing duty statute .... ” China Nat’l, 27 CIT at -, 264 F.Supp.2d at 1237 (quoting Lasko, 43 F.3d at 1446). The overarching principle of the statute prevents the Court from concluding “that Congress would condone the use of any value where there is ‘reason to believe or suspect’ that it reflects dumping or subsidies.” China Nat’l, 27 CIT at -, 264 F.Supp.2d at 1238. Section 1677b(c)(l) of Title 19 of the United States Code directs Commerce to use “the best available information” concerning the values for FOP from a market-economy when calculating the NV for a product exported from an NME country, such as the PRC. See China Nat’l, 27 CIT at -, 264 F.Supp.2d at 1234. The CAFC has reasoned that “there is much in the statute [19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) and (4) ] that supports the notion that it is Commerce’s duty to determine margins as accurately as possible, and to use the best information available to it in doing so.” Lasko, 43 F.3d at 1443; see also Shakeproof III, 268 F.3d at 1382. The Court’s role in this case is not to evaluate whether the information Commerce used was the best available, but rather whether Commerce’s choice of information is reasonable. See China Nat’l, 27 CIT at -, 264 F.Supp.2d at 1236. Commerce’s discretion in choosing its information is limited by the statute’s ultimate goal “to construct the product’s normal value as it would have been if the NME country were a market economy country.” Rhodia, 25 CIT at -, 185 F.Supp.2d at 1351. While Commerce enjoys broad discretion in determining what constitutes the best information available to calculate NV, Commerce may not act arbitrarily in reaching its decision. If Commerce’s determination of what constitutes the best available information is reasonable, then the Court must defer to Commerce. The Court must determine whether Commerce had “reason to believe or suspect” that the market economy prices were distorted by subsidies. In China Nat’l, 27 CIT at -, 264 F.Supp.2d at 1239, the Court recognized that the applicable standard has no statutory definition. The Court noted, however, that “in order for reasonable suspicion to exist there must be ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting’ the existence of certain proscribed behavior, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, the whole picture.” Id. (quoting Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 6 CIT 245, 247, 575 F.Supp. 1277, 1280 (1983)). While Commerce must support its determinations with “substantial, specific and objective evidence,” China Nat’l, 27 CIT at -, 264 F.Supp.2d at 1240, the Court recognizes that the antidumping duty statute does not require Commerce to initiate a formal investigation. Congress did not intend for Commerce to undertake an investigation to determine whether prices were in fact subsidized. Rather, the statute and House Report merely require Commerce to have a “reason to believe or suspect” that prices are being subsidized. Consequently, to determine whether there is a “reason to believe or suspect” that prices are subsidized, Commerce may rely on information generally available to it to support its determination. The Court finds that Commerce based its determination to reject the prices CMC and ZMC paid its suppliers on evidence that adequately supports its decision. Commerce’s reason to believe or suspect that the supplier prices were subsidized was explained in the Market Economy Steel Memo where Commerce examined eleven antidumping orders or investigations and three CVD orders. Specifically, Commerce states: The bearing quality steel used by the PRC producers of TRBs is not covered by any of these orders.... Although the most recent findings do not cover the specific products [Commerce] need[s] to value, these findings may have broader implications for [the] steel [at issue].... Based on the information submitted by the PRC producers who import steel from [the subject countries] ... we discovered certain subsidies that are not company specific. For these general subsidies that were used ... we believe it is reasonable to infer that [certain producers] would also use them. CMC’s Mem. at App. 7 (confidential information omitted). In it’s opposition memorandum, Commerce further explains that it considered the evidence and rejected all the [United States antidumping] orders and the oldest CVD order as a basis to believe or suspect that the market economy steel may be unfairly priced because the evidence was either not applicable to the type of steel used by CMC and ZMC or the order was not the most current information. Commerce’s Mem. at 51. Commerce focused on two CVD orders and found that although the market economy suppliers were not covered by the specific CVD orders, general nation-wide subsidies that were not company or product specific were available to any subject steel producer. See id. at 51-52. Such subsidies were significant and “all were calculated using recent information generally contemporaneous with the POR [at issue].” Id. at 52. The Court finds, therefore, that Commerce made a logical inference that CMC and ZMC suppliers may have benefited from the generally available subsidies. Once Commerce presents adequate evidence to support its “reason to believe or suspect” that prices are subsidized, a rebuttable presumption is established that the prices paid are distorted. See Luoyang Bearing Factory v. United States, 27 CIT -, -, 288 F.Supp.2d 1369, 1371 (CIT 2003). The presumption is that the market-economy supplier benefited from subsidies. Based on this presumption, Commerce may choose to discard the prices paid and use surrogate values to calculate NV. The presumption, however, is not conclusive. The presumption shifts the burden to the party challenging Commerce’s determination to present evidence demonstrating that its supplier did not benefit from such subsidies. The Court finds that CMC and ZMC did not present sufficient evidence to rebut this presumption. Both plaintiffs complain that Commerce did not afford the parties the opportunity to submit evidence to rebut this presumption during the review. See Reply Br. Pis. Luoyang, Wafangdian & ZMC at 6-7; CMC’s Mem. at 23-24. However, the parties do not present any new evidence to rebut Commerce’s “reason to believe or suspect” in their briefs, but rather focus on unconvincing arguments regarding what deference Commerce should be afforded. Since no significant financial data or other information indicating that the supplier prices were not subsidized was brought to light, the Court can only conclude that no such evidence exists. If there was conclusive evidence to support the statements that the suppliers at issue did not benefit from subsidies, CMC and ZMC would certainly have placed such evidence on the record. Therefore, the Court affirms Commerce’s determination to deviate from its decision to value the steel used to produce the subject TRBs upon actual import prices articulated in the Preliminary Results, and instead to base its FOP valuation on the “best available information” that Commerce concluded was surrogate values. II. Commerce’s Ex Parte Meeting With Counsel for Timken A. Contentions of the Parties CMC argues that Commerce held an improper ex parte meeting with Timken “after the briefing and formal hearing on the matter and after the record had closed to the submission of information.” CMC’s Mem. at 44 (emphasis in original). CMC complains that this ex parte meeting, held on October 4, 2000, prevented the plaintiffs from participating in the discussion of “methodological issues” pertinent to the Final Results. See id. at 45-46. CMC also argues that 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(g) affords parties an “ ‘opportunity to comment on the information obtained by’ ” Commerce and that the regulations “further restrict the time[ ]frame and manner within which interested parties may submit arguments during the course of an anti-dumping duty proceeding including those for consideration in the final results of an administrative review.” Id. at 47. CMC further complains that only a “truncated recordation” of the meeting was filed and that such action contradicts the agency’s “goal of transparency.” See id. at 47-48. Finally, CMC contends that “Timken’s discussion [fails to] meet the requirements concerning the submission of information to value factors under” 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c) because Timken improperly submitted publicly available information in an untimely fashion. Id. at 48. Commerce argues that CMC improperly relied on Kao Hsing Chang Iron & Steel Corp. v. United States, 25 CIT -, -, 140 F.Supp.2d 1379 (2001), and Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 24 CIT 1158, 118 F.Supp.2d 1366 (2000), rev’d on other grounds, 337 F.3d 1373 (2003), to support the argument that the agency erred in the manner in which the ex parte meeting with Timken was memorialized. Specifically, Commerce contends that the Court in Kao “required Commerce to place on the record affidavits of persons that attended an ex parte meeting with Commerce analysts and supervisors, which meeting had not been otherwise memorialized on the record.” Commerce’s Mem. at 54. Commerce further argues that the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Nippon because the meeting memorandum was placed on the record immediately. “The memorandum [summarizing the meeting] was drafted the same day by a person in attendance and placed on the record.” Id. at 55. Commerce also argues that it is not mandated to place a verbatim transcript on the record, nor is it obligated to initiate a notice and comment period for an ex parte meeting. Timken generally agrees with Commerce and adds that Commerce is only required to maintain an appropriate record of the meeting, which Commerce did. See Timken’s Opp’n at 29-31. B. Analysis Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(A), the administrative record consists of (i) a copy of all information presented to or obtained by the Secretary, the administering authority, or the Commission during the course of the administrative proceeding, including all governmental memoranda pertaining to the case and the record of ex parte meetings required to be kept by section 1677f(a)(3) of this title; and (ii) a copy of the determination, all transcripts or records of conferences or hearings, and all notices published in the Federal Register. The statute also requires Commerce to “maintain a record of any ex parte meetings between — (A) interested parties or other persons providing factual information in connection with a proceeding, and (B) the person charged with making the determination, or any person charged with making a final recommendation to that person, in connection with that proceeding....” 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(a)(3). The record reflects that Commerce properly documented the ex parte meeting with Timken in a timely fashion. The Court agrees with Commerce that the agency followed the letter and spirit of the applicable statute, and that in no way is Commerce required to place a verbatim account of the meeting on the record. The record properly identified the attendees, date, time and place of the meeting and summarized the matters discussed in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(a)(3). Compare Commerce’s Mem. at 54-56, with CMC’s Mem. at 45-46. Commerce argues that all of the issues raised at the ex parte meeting were briefed by Timken. See Commerce’s Mem. at 55. CMC, however, contends that this argument overlooks the inherent problem in that the meeting served as a second hearing on important methodological issues pertaining to the Final Results. CMC’s Reply at 19-20. Nonetheless, Commerce did not act beyond its authority and CMC has not demonstrated that Commerce’s ex parte meeting was improper or that CMC was denied the opportunity to meaningfully participate in this review. III. Commerce Properly Adjusted the Regression-Based Wage Rate To Include Employer Welfare and Provident Fund Expenses A. Background During the POR, Commerce, pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(3), used a regression-based wage rate to value labor costs. See Preliminary Results, 65 Fed.Reg. at 41,948. In the Final Results, 66 Fed.Reg. at 1,953, Commerce valued the PRC labor costs by utilizing the wage rates reported in Chapter 5 of the 1999 Yearbook of Lab-our Statistics (“YLS”). According to Commerce: [The] regulations at section 351.408(c)(3) state that “[Commerce] will use regression-based wage rates reflective of the observed relationship between wages and national income in market economy countries.” These same regulations also require [Commerce] to determine the “wage rate to be applied in nonmarket economy proceedings each year” and make it publicly available. Therefore, to value the labor inputs in this review, [Commerce] applied the PRC regression-based wage rate established by [Commerce] and published by the Import Administration on its website, which was last revised in May 2000. App. Timken’s Mem. Opp’n Pis. J. Agency R. CMC, Luoyang, Wagangdian & ZMC (“Timken’s App.”) at Tab 15 p. 15. B. Contentions of the Parties CMC contends that Commerce erred in adjusting Chapter 5 wage rate data to account for provident funds and welfare expenses. See CMC’s Mem. at 49. Specifically, Commerce added such expenses to the NV calculation of the surrogate SG & A expenses, which CMC argues resulted in a double count of a component of labor. See id. at 49-50. CMC argues that Congress “intended labor to be valued based upon production hours worked, which are appropriately reflected in the application of the unadjusted Chapter 5 wage rate data applied by” Commerce. Id. at 50. According to CMC, Commerce’s past “practice has been to include provident fund and welfare expenses as components of total labor cost and not as part of overhead or SG & A expenses.” Id. at 51 (citing Final Results of Antidumping Duty New Shipper Administrative Review of Pure Magnesium From the People’s Republic of China, 63 Fed.Reg. 3,085, 3,091 (Jan. 21, 1998); Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value on Polyvinyl Alcohol From the People’s Republic of China, 61 Fed.Reg. 14,-057, 14,061 (Mar. 29, 1996)). CMC adds that Timken’s arguments challenging Commerce’s treatment of labor in past reviews have consistently been rejected. See id. (citations omitted). Commerce argues that substantial evidence demonstrates that the surrogate companies incurred all of the labor expenses included in Commerce’s calculation. See Commerce’s Mem. at 56. According to Commerce, the instant review differs from past reviews because current evidence shows that it “is undisputed and clear[ ] ... that the provident fund and welfare expenses are a part of labor expenses incurred by the selected surrogates.” Id. at 57. Commerce points out that the antidumping statute does not direct Commerce to use a particular method to value labor expenses and that in accordance with the evidence submitted by Timken, Commerce properly valued all of its FOP and based this valuation on record evidence. Such evidence, according to Commerce, did not exist in prior reviews. See id. at 58. Accordingly, “Commerce was justified in including these expenses in the SG & A ratio, and, thus, departing from its practice in the previous review.” Id. Commerce further contends that “[t]his change from the previous review is an interpretation of Commerce’s regulation that should be given deference by this Court.” Id. Commerce notes “[t]he expenses for provident fund and welfare incurred by the surrogate companies are different from those listed in Chapter 5 of the YLS.” Id. Timken generally argues that Commerce made the appropriate adjustments with respect to the valuation of labor and explains that the agency relied on annual reports of a certain Indian bearing producer to calculate SG & A expenses. See Timken’s Opp’n at 31-32. Timken maintains that Commerce “specifically identified those labor costs in the Indian annual reports that were above and beyond mere wages ... and added them to” SG & A expenses. Id. at 32. This methodology, according to Timken, was reasonable and logical and CMC’s arguments lack merit. Timken contends that “CMC misstates the issue when it asserts that ‘Commerce erred in adjusting the regression-based wage rate to include employer welfare and provident fund expenses.’ ” Id. at 33. Timken claims that Commerce merely adjusted SG & A expenses, “leaving the regression-based wage rates intact.” Id. Moreover, with regards to the issue raised by CMC that Commerce “double counted” the expenses in question, Timken claims that Commerce “merely re-categorized the expenses to mesh the two sources of data and thereby account for all factor costs.” Id. C. Analysis As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Commerce’s decision to add employer welfare and provident fund expenses to the NV calculation of the surrogate SG & A expenses was a justifiable change of methodology as long as such change in position was reasonably supported by the record. See discussion supra Part I.C.l. The applicable statute provides that, when dealing with imports from an NME such as the PRC, Commerce shall determine the NV of the subject merchandise based on FOP utilized in producing the merchandise and Commerce shall value the reported FOP based on the best available information regarding the values of FOP in an appropriate market economy. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(l). According to 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(3), the FOP utilized in valuing merchandise from an NME include, but are not limited to: “(A) hours of labor required, (B) quantities of raw materials employed, (C) amounts of energy and other utilities consumed, and (D) representative capital cost, including depreciation.” The relevant regulation provides: [f]or labor, [Commerce] will use regression-based wage rates reflective of the observed relationship between wages and national income in market economy countries. [Commerce] will calculate the wage rate to be applied in nonmark-et economy proceedings each year. The calculation will be based on current data, and will be made available to the public. 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(3). In the case at bar, Commerce used the wage rates reported in Chapter 5 of the 1999 YLS, which were made available to the public by means of the Import Administration’s website, to value the PRC labor costs. See Timken’s App. at Tab 15 p. 15 (referring to the Issues & Decision Mem.) The data in Chapter 5 provides the most comprehensive wage rates since such figures include “overtime, bonuses and gratuities, holiday pay, incentive pay, pay for piecework, and cost-of-living allowances.” Id. However, in this particular review, Commerce was also presented with specific and undisputed evidence that demonstrated that additional expenses were incurred by employers in the PRC. See id. at Tab 15 p. 16. Commerce, therefore, added provident and welfare fund expenses to its valuation of labor specifically because these two types of expenses are not expressly included in Chapter 5 data. See id. Commerce added such expenses in order to calculate the costs that the PRC producer would incur if its factory were located in the surrogate country, India as accurately as possible. See id. Tab 4. Since the relevant statute does not direct Commerce to use a specific method in its valuation of labor, see 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(3), and given the evidence provided to Commerce by Timken, the Court upholds Commerce’s valuation of labor. Commerce properly collected new evidence, analyzed it and reasonably determined that the provident and welfare fund expenses must be added to the SG & A ratio in order to accurately value labor. IV. Commerce’s Decision to Add Ocean Freight and Marine Insurance Expenses to Japanese Export Prices to Determine the Surrogate Value for Cups and Cones A. Background The relevant section of the statute provides that Commerce, “in valuing factors of production ... shall utilize, to the extent possible, the prices or costs of factors of production in one or more market economy countries that are — (A) at a level of economic development comparable to that of the nonmarket economy country, and (B) significant producers of comparable merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4). In its determination of values for steel used to produce cups and cones, Commerce chose India as the primary surrogate for China. See Timken’s App. at Tab 15 (citing the Issues & Decision Mem. at 24-25). Commerce then relied on export values of relevant Japanese steel exports to ascertain comparable Indian values, that is to determine an appropriate value of steel in India available to Indian TRB producers. See id. Commerce also adjusted data on Japanese exports to India to include ocean freight and marine insurance costs to determine the surrogate value. See id. Commerce explained that since no Indian producer could produce Indian TRBs with steel located in Japan, ocean freight and insurance costs must be added to determine an accurate value of Indian steel. See id. B. Contentions of the Parties CMC contends that Commerce’s policy “suggests that the adjustment to add a freight and marine insurance expense was erroneous for two reasons. First, this practice is inconsistent with [Commerce’s past] practice ... [and sjecond, ... a containerized freight and insurance value ... does not effectuate the statutory purpose of ‘calculating accurate dumping margins.’ ” CMC’s Mem. at 52-53. CMC also argues that Commerce’s adjustment was arbitrary and should not be sustained. Luoyang argues that Commerce “did not provide parties a meaningful opportunity to comment on the adjustment for ocean freight and marine insurance.” See Mot. Luoyang’s Mem. at 32. Luoyang also contends that in previous reviews, Commerce used Japanese export data as a surrogate for steel, however, Commerce did not make adjustments for additional ocean freight and insurance expenses. See id. at 32-33. Moreover, Luoyang argues that the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that Commerce made any attempt to determine what most closely approximated the distance between Japan and India. See id. at 33-34. Commerce maintains that CMC and Luoyang’s arguments are without merit. Commerce states that it provided a reasonable explanation for its adjustment and that its decision was not inconsistent with Commerce’s practice in the last administrative review. See Commerce’s Mem. at 59. Timken generally agrees that Commerce acted in accordance with law by adding “reasonable” values for ocean freight and insurance to the Japanese steel values. See Timken’s Opp’n. at 37-38. C. Analysis Commerce added ocean freight and insurance expenses from Japan to the United States to the Japanese export values in order to determine usable values for India. See Timken’s App. Tab 15 (referencing Issues & Decision Mem.). Commerce made this adjustment because it lacked information on such costs from Japan to India, and found that the data to the United States was the “best available information.” Id. CMC argues that this adjustment was inconsistent with Commerce’s past practice. However, the record of the eleventh administrative review does not indicate that this precise issue was raised or that there was evidence of freight and insurance costs that Commerce could have used or actually rejected. See Final Results of 1997-1998 Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Final Results of New Shipper Review on Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From the People’s Republic of China, 64 Fed.Reg. 61,-837, 61,839-40. The Court agrees with Commerce. Although CMC complains that the ocean freight and insurance expenses relied upon were not accurate, CMC points to no other information on the record that Commerce could have used or that Commerce rejected. The Court finds that Commerce properly included the cost of freight and insurance to get the steel from Japan to India. Moreover, the Court rejects Luoyang’s argument that the record does not reflect any attempt by Commerce to closely approximate the distance between Japan and India, and draws Luoyang’s attention to the Issues and Decision Memo where Commerce explained that “[o]f the available freight cost data on the record, the PRC to [United States] West coast data most closely approximates the shipping distance between Japan and India.” Timken’s App. at Tab. 15 p. 25. V. Commerce Properly Rejected ZMC’s Input Value for Steel Bought From a PRC Supplier and Paid For With PRC Currency A. Contentions of the Parties ZMC argues that Commerce departed from past practice and used surrogate values for the steel used by ZMC’s factory as opposed to the actual price paid for the steel in United States currency. See Luoyang’s Mot. at 20. According to ZMC, “[t]here is no evidence on the record to show that the prices paid by ZMC’s factory ... were aberrational ... Commerce completely disregarded the possibility that the actual steel price data might in fact constitute the best available information that would lead to the most accurate margin calculation.” Id. at 21. ZMC adds that Commerce’s regulations “do not limit the use of import prices to imports made by the manufacturer only.” Id. at 22. As a result, Commerce is free to use import prices paid by trading companies as surrogate values so long as such prices constitute the “best available information.” Id. at 23. Therefore, the question becomes whether “it is reasonable for Commerce to ignore what is purportedly the best information available when it employs a[n] NME factors of production analysis.” Id. (citation omitted). ZMC maintains that the answer to the question is no. “ ‘Commerce has an obligation to review all data and then determine what constitutes the best information available or, alternatively, to explain why a particular data set is not methodologically reliable.’ ” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). ZMC maintains that although Commerce had adequate data reflecting actual prices paid, Commerce rejected this data and used surrogate value. ZMC contends that this practice was illogical and that “[t]his methodology cannot possibly be characterized as one based on the ‘best available information.’ ” Id. at 24. Commerce argues that this case is distinguishable because it involves a sale in a market that is defined by statute as not reflecting the fair value of merchandise. See Commerce’s Mem. at 63. Commerce further argues that the very “fact that the PRC seller obtained the input in a market economy currency from a market economy producer does not negate the fact that the next transaction, the sale to ZMC’s factory considered by Commerce, occurred wholly within a[n NME].” Id. Timken generally agrees with Commerce and adds that the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency. See Timken’s Opp’n at 53-55. B. Analysis The Court agrees with Commerce that by definition, ZMC’s purchase price of steel from a PRC supplier in PRC currency is unreliable. The Court in Olympia, 22 CIT at 390-92, 7 F.Supp.2d at 1001, held that Commerce’s conclusion that “[p]rices paid by trading companies do not represent prices paid by manufacturers” failed to explain why trading company data is never reliable for the purpose of FOP analysis. In Olympia, the rejected data consisted of market-based prices paid by PRC trading companies to suppliers in market economies. See id. The facts of this review differ in that the price paid by ZMC’s factory, a PRC producer, was in PRC currency and was remitted to another PRC producer. See Luoyang’s Mot. at 7-8 (stating that the steel was purchased and imported by a certain producer and later purchased by ZMC’s factory in PRC currency). Section 1677(18) of Title 19 of the United States Code defines an NME as “any foreign country that [Commerce] determines does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18) (emphasis added). The transaction at issue involves a sale in an NME, and this fact is not negated by ZMC’s argument that the PRC seller obtained the input by using a market economy currency. Commerce explained in ZMC’s verification report its reasons for rejecting this value. Commerce’s Mem. at App. p. 8.; see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1) (stating that “[f]or purposes of valuing the factors of production, ... where a portion of the factor is purchased from a market economy supplier and the remainder for a[n NME] supplier, [Commerce] normally will value the factor using the price paid to the market economy supplier.”) Essentially, the sale occurred in a market that is defined, by statute, as not reflecting the fair value of merchandise. The whole transaction, therefore, was tainted and without evidence showing that the actual prices paid reflected fair market prices, Commerce reasonably disrega