Full opinion text
RULING ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 34] AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 12] HALL, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION Members of the Yale Law School faculty (hereinafter the “Faculty”) together with pro se plaintiff YLS Professor Jed Rubenfeld (“Rubenfeld”), have brought this action against Donald H. Rumsfeld, in his official capacity as the United States Secretary of Defense (“DoD” or the “Government”). This action arises out of DoD’s application of the Solomon Amendment against Yale University as a result of a YLS non-discrimination policy. The Faculty, including Professor Rubenfeld, claim that the Law School is not in violation of the Solomon Amendment, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2004), which requires educational institutions to allow military recruiters access to their campuses and their students as a condition of receipt of most federal funds. They argue that YLS’ recruiting programs occur off-campus and are thus beyond the scope of the Solomon Amendment. They also claim that military recruiters have the same opportunity to become eligible for the official recruiting programs, and therefore YLS is neither “effectively preventing” military recruiters from accessing YLS students through the programs, nor treating military recruiters different from non-military recruiters. Alternatively, even if YLS is in violation of the Solomon Amendment, the Faculty argue that the court should declare the Solomon Amendment as applied unconstitutional because it places unconstitutional conditions on hundreds of millions of dollars of government funding granted to Yale University. By compelling them to officially aid the military’s recruiting efforts, the Faculty claim that the Solomon Amendment violates their freedoms of speech and association and violates then-substantive due process right of educational autonomy. Specifically, the Faculty argue that forced inclusion of military recruiters in YLS’ official recruiting process compels them to communicate a significantly different message concerning employment discrimination than they choose to send, and that it forces them to associate with individuals whose publicly acknowledged beliefs are in conflict with those of YLS. Additionally, the Faculty argues that forced inclusion of military recruiters interferes with their substantive due process right to educational autonomy in creating an educational atmosphere at YLS that is free from discrimination and protects all YLS students. Professor Rubenfeld advances a slightly different constitutional claim. He eschews the Faculty’s freedom of association and educational autonomy claims. He presses only a First Amendment compelled speech claim. Unlike the Faculty’s claim that inclusion of military recruiters compels them to change their message, Rubenfeld argues that the Government compels him to aid in the dissemination of the Government’s speech. Rubenfeld argues that compelling him- to help disseminate another’s speech is a violation of his First Amendment rights. DoD opposes the summary judgment motion. It argues first that Yale University, not the Faculty, is the proper party to bring these claims. DoD also claims that, absent final agency action by the proper decision-maker at DoD, the Faculty’s claims are not ripe for judicial review. If the suit is not to be dismissed on standing or ripeness grounds, DoD then argues that YLS is in violation of the Solomon Amendment because YLS has a practice which effectively prevents the military from participating in the YLS’ official recruiting programs. Finally, DoD claims that the Solomon Amendment is a constitutional assertion of Congress’s spending power and violates no constitutional rights. In January 2004, DoD moved to dismiss YLS’ claims for lack of standing and ripeness under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and its constitutional claims for failure to state a 'claim upon which relief could be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On June 9, 2004, the court denied DoD’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Burt v. Rumsfeld, 322 F.Supp.2d 189 (D.Conn.2004). The court held that the Faculty had suffered a constitutionally cognizable injury-in-fact when they, as the governing body of YLS, were forced to suspend its non-discrimination policy under the threat of government withdrawal of hundreds of millions of dollars of funding for sister schools within Yale University, and that the injury implicated legally protected First and Fifth Amendment rights. Additionally, the court held that the plaintiffs’ claims were primarily legal in nature, that the threatened loss of funding constituted concrete and potentially catastrophic harm, and that the years of communications between the parties fleshed out the issue sufficiently for effective judicial review. Refusing to interpret “ripeness” as requiring that YLS live under a perpetual sword of Damocles, the court found the plaintiffs’ claims ripe for review. However, the court reserved decision on DoD’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and will address that aspect of DoD’s Motion to Dismiss in this Ruling. The Faculty has now moved for summary judgment on all of their claims, arguing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Professor Rubenfeld joins in that Motion on the claims pressed by him. DoD counters that, to the extent the court does not dismiss the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims under DoD’s previous Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, the court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs because there are material facts in dispute. Specifically, it asserts a claim pursuant to Federal Rule 56(f) that it will become able to create material issues of fact upon the completion of its requested discovery. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A. Rule 56(a) Summary Judgment Standard The burden is on a party moving for summary judgment to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Crv. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); White v. ABCO Eng’g Corp., 221 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir.2000). When a motion for summary judgment is supported by documentary evidence and sworn affidavits, the nonmoving party must present significant probative evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A court must grant summary judgment “ ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ....”’ Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir.1993) (citation omitted). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine “ ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ” Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). The court resolves “all ambiguities and draw[s] all inferences in favor of the non-moving party in order to determine how a reasonable jury would decide.” Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 523. Thus, “[o]nly when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper.” Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991); see also Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir.1992). A party may not create a genuine issue of material fact by presenting contradictory or unsupported statements, see Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir.1978), nor may he rest on the “mere allegations or denials” contained in his pleadings, Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir.1995); see also Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that a party may not rely on conclusory statements or an argument that the affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment are not credible). Further, a party may not rely “on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir.1986). The Local Rules of this court also address the obligation of the parties with regard to a motion for summary judgment: “All material facts set forth in said Local Rule 56(a) statement will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be filed and served by the opposing party in accordance with Local Rule 56(a)2.” Local Rule 56(a)(l)(D.Conn.) B. DoD’s Discovery Requests Pursuant to Rule 56(f) DoD has asserted repeatedly in its opposition pleadings and at oral argument that DoD requires extensive discovery in order to oppose plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion. DoD requested discovery in the footnotes of its summary judgment opposition brief and in the “Disputed Issues of Material Fact” section of its Local Rule 56(a)(2) filing, in place of the required list of material facts in dispute. See Defs Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at 7-9 [Dkt. No. 42] (“Defs Local Rule 56”). DoD also requested discovery in an additional, twenty-three page filing requested by the court in an attempt to bring specificity to DoD’s previous requests. See Supplemental Declaration of Alan S. Modlinger [Dkt. No. 66] (“Supp. Modlinger Decl.”). However, the court finds that discovery is not warranted. This court is conscious of the principle that the grant of summary judgment prior to discovery is not to be undertaken lightly. See, e.g., Hellstrom v. U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 201 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir.2000) (district court may grant summary judgment without discovery “[o]nly in the rarest of cases”); Trebor Sportswear Co., Inc. v. The Limited Stores, Inc., 865 F.2d 506, 511 (2d Cir.1989); Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 303-04 (2d Cir.2003). However, when a party “fails to produce any specific facts whatsoever to support [their case], a district court may, in its discretion, refuse to permit discovery and grant summary judgment.” Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir.1981) (dismissing plaintiffs conspiracy allegation without discovery). “An opposing party’s mere hopes that further evidence may develop prior to trial is an insufficient basis upon which to justify the denial of [a summary judgment motion],” Id. at 107 (quotation omitted). The object of discovery is not to find out if a party has a claim or defense, but to develop a factual basis for its claim or defense. See Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1138 (2d Cir.1994). Also insufficient to justify a denial of summary judgment under Rule 56(f) are “bare assertion[s] that the evidence supporting a [party’s] allegation is in the hands of the [other party].” Contemporary Mission, 648 F.2d at 107 (quotation omitted); see also Paddington Partners, 34 F.3d at 1138. A party cannot rely upon Rule 56(f) “where the result of a continuance to obtain further information would be wholly speculative.” Contemporary Mission, 648 F.2d at 107. A court may properly deny a discovery request pursuant to Rule 56(f) “if it deems the request to be based on speculation as to what potentially could be discovered.” Paddington Partners, 34 F.3d at 1138. (emphasis added). The Second Circuit has developed a four-part test for district courts to use when ruling on a party’s request for discovery under Rule 56(f). Sage Realty Corp. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 34 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir.1994). Rule 56(f) requires the opponent of a motion for summary judgment' who seeks discovery to file an affidavit explaining: (1) the information sought and how it is to be obtained; (2) how a genuine issue of material fact will be raised by that information; (3) what efforts the affiant has made to obtain the information; and (4) why those efforts were unsuccessful. Id.; see also Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919, 926 (2d Cir.1985). “Additionally, the discovery sought must be material to the opposition of the summary judgment motion.” Sage Realty, 34 F.3d at 128. DoD’s initial attempts at requesting discovery, found in its opposition to the plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion and its Local Rule 56(a)(2) statement, assert no facts at all. See, e.g., Def s Local Rule 56 at 7-9. DoD merely points out the plaintiffs’ factual allegations and requests a broad range of discovery to determine to what extent these allegations are true. See, e.g., Defs Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at Ex. A, ¶¶ 10-14 (“Modlinger Dec!.”); see also Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 21 n. 7. During a teleconference on November 29, 2004, the court asked DoD to file another discovery document in an attempt to allow DoD to address more specifically how the requested information was to be obtained and the relationship between its requests and any material facts. When combined, DoD’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement and the Supplemental Modlinger Declaration fail to pass the four-part discovery test laid out by the Second Circuit in Sage Realty and are insufficient to warrant discovery under Rule 56(f). First, DoD’s Rule 56(f) Statement and discovery requests fail to explain what specific information is sought. Instead, the government either 1) reiterates factual assertions made by the plaintiffs, see, e.g., Modlinger Deck at ¶ 10, and requests discovery apparently aimed at seeing to what extent these claims are true, or 2) lists broad topic areas the government wishes to explore, many of which are not material facts, see, e.g., Supp. Modlinger Decl. at ¶ 5(g)(v). The court finds these requests to be “based on speculation as to what potentially could be discovered.” Paddington Partners, 84 F.3d at 1138 (emphasis added). As the Second Circuit has noted, “[w]hile Rule 56(f) discovery is specifically designed to enable a [party] to fill material evidentiary gaps in its case ... it does not permit a [party] to engage in a ‘fishing expedition’.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted). DoD apparently seeks to embark on just such an expedition. Secondly, DoD never alleges any material facts that its discovery is likely to support. Again, it relies on the vague concept that it requires discovery to negate the material facts supported by competent evidence submitted by the plaintiffs. Even with regard to these vague requests, DoD does not demonstrate “how a genuine issue of material fact will be raised” by the proposed discovery. See Sage Realty, 34 F.3d at 128. For example, in both its original Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement and in its supplemental statement, DoD requests information related to the issue of coercion involved in the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims. Specifically, DoD requests information concerning whether or not YLS was coerced by DoD’s threats into suspending its Non-Discrimination Policy (“NDP”) and allowing military recruiters to use YLS’ Career Development Office (“CDO”). See, e.g., Supp. Modlinger Decl. at ¶ 5(g)(iv) (requesting deposition testimony regarding “the non-discrimination policy at Yale Law School, including its ... suspension ..., [and] the intent underlying its ... suspension .... ”); see also Mod-linger Decl. at ¶ 10 (requesting “appropriate discovery with respect to plaintiffs’ freedom of speech allegations” that “DOD has forced plaintiffs to send a ‘very different message’ ” by “requiring that military recruiters be allowed access to CDO programs”). However, when pressed at oral argument on the need for discovery concerning coercion, counsel for DoD conceded the fact that the YLS involuntarily suspended its NDP because of DoD’s threat to cut off funding to Yale University. Tr. at 124. DoD does not satisfy the first and second prongs of Sage Realty when it seeks discovery unrelated to material facts or requests a fishing expedition in the speculative hope that the facts put forth by the plaintiffs might be shown to be unti-ue. With respect to prongs three and four of the Sage Realty test, it is important to note that while discovery was not stayed by order of the court, the court does not find DoD unreasonably failed to make efforts to obtain discovery. The court’s posture regarding discovery could reasonably have been interpreted as a de facto stay. However, that does not now justify unwarranted discovery or excuse DoD’s failure to come forward with evidence within its own control. Much of what DoD requests through discovery concerns information reasonably within its own control. For example, DoD asks to depose no fewer than 23 witnesses concerning such topics as what facilities, services, and accommodations YLS made available to military recruiters, see Supp. Modlinger Decl. at ¶ 5(g)(Z); how military recruiters were treated differently than non-military recruiters, see id. at ¶ 5(g)(iii); and what contracts the federal government gave to Yale, and how that money was used, see id. at ¶ 5(g)(viii). Presumably military personnel who recruited at YLS know what they were and were not allowed to do, where they were and were not allowed to go, and what services, if any, YLS provided for them. Further, military recruiters know how they were treated when they visited YLS, and know if that treatment differed from what was afforded to other recruiters. Finally, the United States Government, the provider of grants to universities across the nation, knows how much money it provides to Yale University and what programs are funded with that money. Surely, DoD can obtain this information from the other agencies and departments of the federal government, of which it is a part. DoD also failed to come forward with knowledge within its control when it denied the Faculty’s Statement of Material Facts. For example, DoD stated that it “lacked sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny” whether a student hired by the military as an intern in 2003 initiated contact with the military, or whether military recruiters contacted the student. Defs Local Rule 56 at 6, ¶ 49. An employer has access to information concerning how it hired an employee. As a member of the Armed Forces, the recruiter works for DoD, and it is within DoD’s control to ask the recruiter who hired the employee for this information. DoD also claimed that it “lacked sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny” whether, prior to 2002, military recruiters were: denied access to the CDO because they would not sign the NDP, see id. at 3, ¶ 18 and 5, ¶ 38; permitted to appear on the CDO website without signing the NDP, see id. at 3, ¶ 22; or permitted to meet with students or student groups on campus at the invitation of students or student groups, regardless of whether the military recruiters had signed the NDP, see id. at 4, ¶ 27. Additionally, DoD claimed it lacked sufficient knowledge to admit or deny whether, beginning in 2002, military recruiters were permitted to participate in the Fall Interview Program (“FIP”) and Spring Interview Program (“SIP”) because the NDP had been suspended. See id. at 6, ¶ 45. This is all information that military recruiters would have to have, based on their personal experiences with YLS. Even a de facto stay of discovery does not excuse a party from coming forward, in response to a motion for summary judgment, with information within its control. DoD has thus failed to satisfy the Sage Realty test. DoD’s request for discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) is therefore denied. The Government’s refusal to come forward with information within its control or its denial of facts without supporting evidence has consequences under this District’s Local Rule 56. The court will treat as fact for the purposes of this motion for summary judgment the following: 1) any Local Rule 56(a)(1) fact that is admitted or conceded by the defendant; and 2) any Local Rule 56(a)(1) fact offered by the plaintiffs that DoD failed to rebut or claimed insufficient knowledge of, despite information being within its control. III. BACKGROUND A. Yale Law School’s Non-Discrimination Policy Yale Law School enacted a non-discrimination policy in 1972. That policy barred discrimination on the basis of religion, race, sex, and national origin. See Plaintiffs’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement of Material Facts at ¶ 7 (“Pis’ Local Rule 56”); Defendant’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) at ¶ 7 (deem, adm’d). Since 1978, YLS has also prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See Pis’ Local Rule 56 at ¶ 8; Defs Local Rule 56 at ¶ 8 (deem, adm’d). YLS’ NDP, which applies to all aspects of YLS life, provides that YLS is committed to opposing: discrimination on the grounds of age; color; handicap or disability; ethnic or national origin; race; religion; religious creed; gender (including discrimination taking the form of sexual harassment); marital, parental or veteran status; sexual orientation; or the prejudice of clients. See Pis’ Local Rule 56 at ¶ 9; Defs Local Rule 56 at ¶ 9. Prior to the suspension of the NDP in 2002, employers who refused to certify their compliance with it were barred from school-sponsored recruiting services offered through the CDO. See Pis’ Local Rule 56 at ¶ 17; Defs Local Rule 56 at ¶ 17 (deem, adm’d). The CDO is located on-campus. See Bryant Decl. at Ex. A. Prospective employers seeking to participate in YLS’ official recruiting program must register with the CDO. See id. at ¶ 6. Once registered, employers send pertinent information to the CDO, and CDO employees communicate that information to YLS students via the Law School website. See Pis’ Local Rule 56 at ¶¶ 21-22; Defs Local Rule 56 at ¶¶ 21-22 (deem, adm’d). Law students review these communications, sign up for interviews with employers of their choice, and submit resumes online. See Pis’ Local Rule 56 at ¶ 23; Defs Local Rule 56 at ¶ 23 (deem, adm’d). Registered employers can also post job listings online through the CDO and download student resumes from the CDO database. See Pis’ Local Rule 56 at ¶ 24; Defs Local Rule 56 at ¶ 24 (deem, adm’d). (DoD admits that employers can download student resumes). DoD claims that in the last few years, between 79 to 100% of YLS students used the CDO for job searches. See Defs Amendment Mem. at 4. B. The Solomon Amendment According to DoD, “[sjince the Vietnam War ... Congress has confronted ‘disaffection’ with regard to the military among some students and faculty at institutions of higher learning that impairs the ability of the military to recruit.” Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 3. In response, the Congress has passed numerous pieces of legislation over the years “[t]o encourage educational institutions to open their campuses to military recruiters” by prohibiting the “distribution of certain federal funds to institutions of higher learning that barred military recruiters from their campuses.” Id. In 1995, in light of policies like the YLS NDP, and controversies over the presence of ROTC programs on university campuses, Congress enacted the Solomon Amendment, now codified at 10 U.S.C. § 983. Among other things, the Solomon Amendment denies certain categories of federal funding to institutions of higher education that prevent military recruitment on campus. 10 U.S.C. § 983(b). On October 28, 2004, Congress amended the Solomon Amendment. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub.L. No. 108-375, § 552, 118 Stat. 1811 (“NDAA”) (2004). The Amendment currently provides as follows: (b) Denial of funds for preventing military recruiting on campus. — No funds described in subsection (d)(1) may be provided by contract or by grant to an institution of higher education (including any subelement of such institution) if the Secretary of Defense determines that that institution (or any subelement of that institution) has a policy or practice (regardless of when implemented) that either prohibits, or in effect prevents— (1) the Secretary of a military department or Secretary of Homeland Security from gaining access to campuses, or access to students (who are 17 years of age or older) on campuses, for purposes of military recruiting in a manner that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and to students that is provided to any other employer; or (2) access by military recruiters for purposes of military recruiting to the following information pertaining to students (who are 17 years of age or older) enrolled at that institution (or any subelement of that institution): (A) Names, addresses, and telephone listings. (B) Date and place of birth, levels of education, academic majors, degrees received, and the most recent educational institution enrolled in by the student. 10 U.S.C. § 983(b). DoD’s original interpretive regulations limited loss of funding to the particular part of the university (“subelement”) found not to be in compliance. See 61 Fed.Reg. 7739, 7740 (Feb. 29, 1996). In other words, if a subelement of a university, like a law school, denied access to military recruiters, then only that subelement would lose funding, not the entire institution. Further, the Amendment initially implicated only Defense Department funding. See Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 4. Law schools, unlike other subelements of a university, are not typically recipients of large amounts of federal funding. In 1997, Congress extended the rule denying federal funds to apply to grants and contracts provided by the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Transportation, as well as Defense. Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), codified at 10 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1). This extension threatened certain types of student aid, including Perkins Loans and work study funds. However, the applicable regulations continued to cabin the consequences of a subelement’s failure to grant access to military recruiters to that subelement itself, such that non-compliance did not affect the university as a whole. See id. In 1999, Congress also modified the statute’s language to extend its applicability to any “institution of higher education (including any subelement of such institution).” 10 U.S.C. § 983(c)(2), as modified by Pub.L. No. 106-65, § 549(a)(1) (1999). Following this change, DoD adopted interim regulations, effective immediately, that defined an “institution of higher education” to include “all sub-elements of such an institution.” Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Institutions of Higher Education, 65 Fed.Reg. 2056 (Jan. 13, 2000). The effect of this redefinition was that a violation in any part of the university would put federal funding for the entire university in jeopardy. 48 C.F.R. § 252.209-7005. A 2004 amendment to the Solomon Amendment recently added, inter alia, the phrase “in a manner that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and to students that is provided to any other employer” to the end of subsection (b)(1), a phrase that had previously existed only as a safe harbor provision in the regulations. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 216.4(c)(3). This provision makes equal treatment of military recruiters an affirmative duty, instead of a safe harbor, for educational institutions. DoD argued that the 2004 amendment required the plaintiffs to amend their complaint and required the court to allow DoD to file a motion to dismiss this second amended complaint. However, there is no good reason to do so, and DoD offers none. The court requested and received additional briefing on the ramifications of the 2004 amendment. See Dkt. Nos. 63-65. Although the 2004 amendment undercuts some of the plaintiffs’ statutory arguments, the court finds that the issues remain essentially the same. See, e.g., Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 230 n. 10 (3d Cir.2004) (“FAIR”). The issues have been fully briefed. The court will proceed to decide the pending motions. C. Military Recruiting at YLS and the Suspension of the NDP In light of Congress’s policy concerning homosexual conduct in the Armed Forces, popularly known as the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, DoD has refused to certify its compliance with the Law School’s NDP. As a result, under the NDP, DoD has been denied use of the CDO since 1978. Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 6-7; see also Safriet Decl. at ¶ 6. Instead, the Law School has offered military recruiters open access to classrooms and other meeting spaces on campus for informational sessions and other recruiting activities, including interviews, at the invitation of a student organization; and open access to any student or student group to reserve a classroom or other meeting space for such a meeting at any time. See Pis’ Local Rule 56 at ¶ 27; Def s Local Rule 56 at ¶ 27 (deem, adm’d); see also Safriet Decl. at ¶¶ 7-9. Additionally, the Law School makes contact information available to DoD, including students’ names, hometowns and states, academic majors, and degrees received. See Pis’ Local Rule 56 at ¶ 28; Def s Local Rule 56 at ¶ 28. The current conflict between YLS and DoD began in 2001 when a DoD official fired the opening salvo of a several-yearlong series of written exchanges between Yale and various DoD officials regarding the NDP. On December 17, 2001, Colonel Clyde J. Tate, III, U.S. Army, advised Yale University President Richard Levin that, “I understand that military recruiting personnel have been inappropriately limited in their ability to recruit or have been refused student recruiting information at Yale University by a policy or practice of the Yale Law School.” Robinson Decl. at Ex. A. Colonel Tate advised Levin that “current statutes deny the use of certain federal funds” to institutions of higher education with a policy or practice of denying military recruiting personnel entry to campuses, and stated that, “[t]his letter provides you an opportunity to clarify your institution’s policy regarding military recruiting on the campus of Yale University as well as Yale Law School.” Id. Finally, Colonel Tate advised that, “based on this information, Department of Defense officials will make a determination as to your institution’s eligibility to receive funds by grant or contract.” Id. A series of letters and meetings ensued, with military officials repeatedly categorizing the YLS NDP as not in compliance with the Solomon Amendment. On May 29, 2002, Colonel Tate informed President Levin, “Unless we receive new information from you by July 1, 2002, showing that policies and practices of your institution have been modified .to conform with federal requirements ... we will consider forwarding this matter to the Office of the Secretary of Defense with a recommendation of funding denial.” Robinson Decl. at Ex. C;. see also Pis’ Local Rule 56 at ¶ 40; Def s Local Rule 56 at ¶ 40. To avoid this $300 million funding loss to Yale University, the YLS faculty voted in 2002 to approve a “temporary” suspension of the NDP. See Pis’ Local Rule 56 at ¶¶ 42-43; Def s Local Rule 56 at ¶¶ 42-43 (deem, adm’d); see also Burt Decl. at 21 and at Ex. I; Robinson Decl. at Ex. D. Following the Faculty’s suspension of the NDP requirement, YLS permitted military recruiters to use the CDO and participate in the Law School’s formal recruiting programs, the Fall Interview Program (“FIP”) and Spring Interview Program (“SIP”). See Pis’ Local Rule 56 at ¶ 45; Defs Local Rule 56 at ¶ 45. The military gained' access to the CDO website. See Pis’ Local Rule 56 at ¶ 46; =Defs Local Rule 56 at ¶ 46. During the 2002 FIP, one YLS student interviewed with a military recruiter. See Pis’ Local Rule 56 at ¶ 47; Def s Local Rule 56 at ¶ 47. During the 2003 SIP, no students interviewed with a military recruiter. See Pis’ Local Rule 56 at ¶ 48; Def s Local Rule 56 at ¶ 48. One student did secure a summer 2003 Internship with the Army, though not through the FIP or SIP. See Pis’ Local Rule 56 at ¶ 49; Def s Local Rule 56 at ¶ 49. During the FIP and SIP for 2003-2004, a total of five' Law School students interviewed with military recruiters. See Pis’ Local Rule 56 at ¶¶ 51-52; Def s Local Rule 56 at ¶¶ 51-52. To date, none has accepted employment with the military. See id. ’ Conflict between YLS and the military continued, however. In early 2003, the Army referred the controversy to the Department of Defense. On May 29, 2003, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense issued a letter signed by William J. Carr, Acting Deputy Undersecretary for Military Personnel Policy, opining that YLS and, by implication, Yale University, are in violation of the Solomon Amendment. See Pis’ Local Ruie 56 at ¶ 50 (set forth in the Robinson Decl. at Ex. K (hereinafter referred to as the “Carr Letter”)); Defs Local Rule 56 at ¶ 50. In this letter, Acting Deputy Undersecretary Carr specifically declared that the Law School, through its recruiting policy requiring that military recruiters sign the NDP or be excluded from the CDO, “sends the message that employment in the Armed Forces of the United States is less honorable or desirable than employment with the other organizations that [YLS] permits to participate in its CDO programs.” Id. After setting forth the applicable law and regulations and DoD’s interpretation, the Carr Letter explained that YLS was not complying with DoD regulations and was “in effect” preventing military recruiting on campus. Id. Carr further informed Yale that the NDP, despite its temporary suspension, “remains an obstacle to military recruiters and their ability to plan for, schedule, and gain access to Yale Law School students for the purpose of military recruiting.” Id. As such, Carr concluded, ‘Tale’s policy is in violation of federal law,” and advised Levin, “it is my duty under law to recommend to the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness that Yale University be determined ineligible for Department of Defense funding.” Id. Carr gave notice that he would so recommend on June 29, 2003, “unless you advise me before that date of a change in policy sufficient to overcome the deficiencies outlined above.” Id. On October 16, 2003, forty-five YLS faculty members, constituting a voting majority of the YLS faculty, see Pis’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) at ¶ 2; Defs Local Rule 56(a)(2) at ¶ 2 (deem, adm’d), filed the instant suit. On December 23, 2003, the decision-maker for the Department of Defense for purposes of enforcement of the Solomon Amendment, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Charles S. Abell, see Am. Supp. Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 1 [Dkt. No. 54], wrote to President Levin stating that, despite more than two years of correspondence, meetings, and negotiations, he still did not have enough information to make his decision. See Robinson Decl. at Ex. N. Principal Deputy Under Secretary Abell requested detailed answers to a series of questions to allow him to “assess [Yale’s] proposal properly.” Id. President Levin responded in detail by letter on January 16, 2004. See id. at Ex. O. At oral argument on December 9, 2004, the Government reported that Principal Deputy Under Secretary Abell had not yet made his decision concerning Yale’s compliance with the Solomon Amendment. IV. DISCUSSION A. Parties’ Claims The claims brought by the Faculty and those brought by Professor Rubenfeld are not coextensive. Both the Faculty and Professor Rubenfeld assert that YLS is in compliance with the Solomon Amendment, as amended. They argue that because the FIP and SIP occur off-campus, YLS’ refusal to permit military recruiters access to CDO-run programs does not constitute denying military recruiters “access to campus” or “access to students on campus.” Furthermore, the Faculty and Rubenfeld argue that, because the military is subject to the same YLS policy requiring employers to subscribe to the NDP in order to participate in the CDO recruiting program as every other employer, YLS is offering access to military recruiters that is “equal in quality and scope” to that granted to non-military recruiters because the military is welcome to sign the NDP and access the CDO. Even if YLS does violate the Solomon Amendment, the Faculty then argue that the Solomon Amendment places an unconstitutional condition on hundreds of millions of dollars of federal funding given to Yale University. The Faculty argue that, because enforcement of the Solomon Amendment will cut off federal funding not reasonably related to military recruiting, it penalizes them for exercising their First Amendment rights. Such a penalty constitutes an unconstitutional condition on receipt of federal funds. The Faculty claim the Solomon Amendment violates their First Amendment rights in two ways. First, the Faculty argue that, because the Solomon Amendment has compelled them to suspend the NDP and include military recruiters in the CDO recruiting process, they are being prevented from sending their chosen message— that discrimination will not be tolerated— and forced to convey a very different message— that discrimination will be tolerated in certain circumstances. Additionally, the Faculty claim that the Solomon Amendment violates their First Amendment right to freedom of association by interfering with their right to disassociate from an entity, the United States military, whose explicit policies conflict with the institutional beliefs of YLS, as expressed in the NDP. The Faculty also claim that the Solomon Amendment violates their substantive due process right to educational autonomy under the Fifth Amendment. They describe this right as the right “to banish discriminatory conduct from all of the Law School’s activities in order to protect their students and to create the environment necessary to carry out the Faculty Members’ educational mission.” Faculty Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 29 [Dkt. No. 35] (“Mem. Supp.Summ. J.”). The Faculty argue that the easelaw recognizes “a faculty’s autonomous governance of the [university’s] educational environment,” as a right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Id. at 30. Professor Rubenfeld does not press a substantive due process claim and does not press freedom of association as a basis for his First Amendment claim. His compelled speech claim is slightly different from that of the Faculty. Professor Rubenfeld argues that DoD is violating the Faculty’s First Amendment rights not by forcing the Faculty to send a message the Faculty does not want to send, but rather by compelling them to help disseminate DoD’s recruiting message, a message with which Professor Rubenfeld and the rest of the Faculty disagree. DoD opposes all of the plaintiffs’ claims. It continues to argue that Yale University, and not YLS, is the proper party to bring suit and that, therefore, the plaintiffs lack standing to maintain this action. Additionally, DoD again claims that because, after three years, it still has not made a “final” decision concerning Yale’s status, the claims are not ripe. The court has already addressed DoD’s standing and ripeness defenses, see Burt, 322 F.Supp.2d at 196-203, and it will not revisit those issues: it adheres to its prior decision. To the extent the plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable, DoD next argues that YLS is in violation of the Solomon Amendment because the NDP acts as a barrier, keeping military recruiters from receiving access to YLS students equal in quality and scope to that given to other recruiters. DoD further argues that the Solomon Amendment does not impose an unconstitutional condition that violates the plaintiffs’ First and Fifth Amendment rights, but is simply an exercise of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause. See U.S. Const, art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. B. YLS NDP Does Not Comply With the Solomon Amendment The Faculty contend that YLS is in compliance with the terms of the Solomon Amendment, even in the Amendment’s most-recently-amended form. In their Supplemental Memorandum concerning the effect of the October 2004 amendment on YLS’ statutory compliance, the Faculty contend that the access granted to military recruiters is “equal in quality and scope” to that granted to non-military recruiters. See Mem. Further Supp. Summ. J. at 3 [Dkt. No. 64] (“Pis’ Amendment Mem.”). The Faculty argue that, because the military is merely subject to the same YLS policy as every other employer, YLS is offering “equal access.” See Pis’ Amendment Mem. at 3. First the Faculty contend that, “military recruiters are granted ‘equal’ access when nondiscrimination policies are equally applied to military and civilian employers.” Id. (citing Gay and Lesbian Law Students Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs., 236 Conn. 453, 673 A.2d 484 (1996) and Lloyd v. Grella, 83 N.Y.2d 537, 611 N.Y.S.2d 799, 634 N.E.2d 171 (1994)). They further contend that the NDP does not “prohibit, or in effect prevent” the military from gaining access to YLS students, because the system in place prior to the NDP’s suspension, i.e., the status quo ante, provided the military with pertinent student information; access to students via letter, phone, and email; the ability to book rooms at the off-campus recruiting venue; and the ability to meet with students on campus by invitation of any student. See id. at 4. Additionally, Professor Rubenfeld asserts that at no time has YLS instituted a policy or practice that restricts “ ‘military recruiters’ ‘access to campuses’ or ‘access to students on campus.” ’ Rubenfeld Mem. Further Supp. Summ. J. at 2 [Dkt. No. 65] (“Rubenfeld Amendment Mem.”). Recruiting interviews arranged through the CDO are held off campus at a local hotel, and therefore, according to Rubenfeld, YLS’ refusal to permit military recruiters to participate in CDO programs without signing the NDP cannot violate the Solomon Amendment. See Rubenfeld Amendment Mem. at 2. In response, DoD argues that the October 2004 amendment clarifies that YLS must grant military recruiters access to the CDO recruiting programs, or else its policy in effect prevents military recruiters from gaining access to students that is equal in quality and scope to that granted to other recruiters. See Def s Amendment Mem. at 4. DoD further argues that the “equal opportunity” to subscribe to the NDP does not meet the Solomon Amendment’s requirement for equal “access.” See id. Congress meant actual, substantive access, and military recruiters’ inability to sign the NDP “ ‘in effect’ prevents” them from gaining equal access to students. Id. at 4-5. Finally, DoD argues that Congress’s repeated reference to “campuses” is merely meant to specify students who are enrolled at a given institution, not place a geographic boundary on the access afforded to military recruiters. The court finds that YLS is. not in compliance with the Solomon Amendment, as amended, when it. conditions recruiting on subscription to the NDP. In addressing this claim, the court’s analysis is controlled by the plain meaning of the statute. See United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir.2003); see also United States v. Proyect, 989 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir.1993) (“[W]hen the language of the statute is clear, its plain meaning ordinarily controls its construction.”). The Solomon Amendment plainly states that funding may be denied if an institution has a policy that “prohibits, or in effect prevents ... [military recruiters] from gaining access to campuses, or access to students ... on campuses ... in a manner that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and to students that is provided to any other employer .... ” 10 U.S.C. § 983(b). It is undisputed that military recruiters are not allowed access to the CDO if they do not sign the NDP. Nonmilitary recruiters that sign the NDP have access to the CDO. YLS’ policy of requiring subscription to the NDP as a condition of participation in CDO recruiting programs clearly “in effect” prevents military recruiters from accessing students through the CDO. The argument that the military has the opportunity to sign the NDP is unavailing. The statute does not say that military recruiters must have the same opportunity to comply with an institution’s policies as non-military employers, nor does it say that military recruiters must have access to the same procedures as non-military employers in order to gain' access to students. Congress could have easily drafted the Amendment to say either, but it did not. ■ In arguing that YLS has not “prohibited” or “prevented” access as proscribed by the Solomon Amendment, see Pls’ Reply Mem. in Further Supp. Summ. J. at 3-4 [Dkt. No. 52], the Faculty ignore other language in the Solomon Amendment that requires access to students to be “in a manner that is at least equal in quality and scope” to. that given to other recruiters. See FAIR, 390 F.3d at 228 (after September 11, 2001, DoD began a policy of requiring not only access to campuses, but “treatment equal” to other recruiters). The statute clearly states that an institution’s policies cannot prohibit or prevent military recruiters from accessing campuses and students in a manner at least equal to other recruiters. In effect, the NDP does just that. The fact that recruiting interviews take place off-campus does not eliminate the Solomon Amendment violation. The CDO is located on-campus. Prospective employers seeking to participate in YLS’ official recruiting program must register with the CDO. Once registered, employers send pertinent information to the CDO, and CDO employees communicate that information to. YLS students, via the .Law School website. Law students review these communications, sign up for interviews with employers, of their choice, and submit resumes, all online through the CDO. Registered employers can also post job listings online through the CDO and download student resumes from the CDO database. In order to participate in YLS’ official recruiting program, an .employer must have access to. the CDO and its computers, and these are part of the YLS campus. To prevent military recruiters from accessing the CDO and its programs is to deny military recruiters access to a part of Yale’s campus. In sum, YLS may offer military recruiters the same opportunity as non-military recruiters to comply with its policy regarding subscription to the NDP, but that policy “in effect prevents” military recruiters from gaining access to campus and students on campus “at least equal in quality and scope” to that afforded other recruiters. Therefore, under the plain meaning of the Solomon Amendment, YLS is not in compliance with the Solomon Amendment. The plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on its statutory claim is therefore denied. It is the view of this court that both sides have had “a full and fair opportunity to meet the proposition that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried” on the plaintiffs’ statutory claim. Ramsey v. Coughlin, 94 F.3d 71, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1996). Generally with regard to their motion for summary judgment, the Faculty have asserted that there are only five issues of fact material to its claims, and those are not seriously in dispute. See Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 15. The plaintiffs have strenuously pressed that no material issue of fact is in dispute and that summary judgment is appropriate. This court is convinced that all the evidence material to this claim is before the court (certainly that the plaintiffs would submit) and that awaiting a motion for summary judgment by DoD “would not alter the outcome.” Ramsey, 94 F.3d at 74. Based on the analysis above of the statutory claim, the court concludes that DoD is entitled to summary judgment on the statutory claim as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts. Entry of summary judgment for the non-movant DoD is appropriate and expedient. See Ramsey, 94 F.3d at 74; see also Hispanics for Fair & Equitable Reapportionment v. Griffin, 958 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir.1992); Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir.1991). C. Solomon Amendment Is An Unconstitutional Condition The Faculty and Professor Rubenfeld assert that the condition imposed on federal grants to Yale University by the Solomon Amendment is an unconstitutional condition. The essence of the plaintiffs’ claim is that the Solomon Amendment as applied by DoD denies a benefit to Yale University on a basis that infringes their constitutionally protected rights. For more than half a century, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized that, even though a person may not be entitled by right to a valuable benefit and “even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). While having no “right” to do so, see id., Yale University receives $300 million from the federal government. In Perry, the Supreme Court held that the government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests— especially, his interest in freedom of speech.” Id. The basis for this conclusion is that otherwise the government could create indirectly “a result which [it] could not command directly.” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958). “[I]f the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited .... Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.” Perry, 408 U.S. at 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694. DoD argues that the unconditional conditions doctrine is inapplicable because the Solomon Amendment is merely an exercise of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause. See U.S. Const, art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. The Spending Clause does permit conditions to be imposed that are rea*-sonably related to the purpose of the federal program. See So. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 213, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987)(O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S, 173, 196, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991). Here, DoD makes no claim, nor could it the court believes, that the condition imposed by the Solomon Amendment is in any way related, let alone reasonably, to the purposes for which the federal funds have been given to Yale. The condition here is imposed on the recipient, not on “a particular program.” Rust, 500 U.S. at 197, 111 S.Ct. 1759. Under these circumstances the Spending Clause power cannot excuse a violation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as addressed in Perry and its progeny. The Supreme Court has held that an important question to be determined is whether “the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’ ” Dole, 483 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 2793. Put another way, is the government, by imposing conditions on the receipt of funds by Yale University, coercing the plaintiffs. Here, that issue is not in dispute because DoD has conceded the fact of coercion. See Tr. at 124. There.is no question of fact that the Faculty, acting as Yale Law School, voted to suspend its NDP because of the threatened cut-off of $300 million to other parts of Yale University. This court concludes, as a matter of law, that this conceded coercion is well past the point of pressure and is compulsion. There remains only the issue of whether the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights have been violated. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694. That issue is hotly contested by the parties. Therefore, the court must determine whether the coerced NDP suspension caused by the Solomon Amendment has resulted in an unconstitutional violation of the plaintiffs’ rights. 1. First Amendment/Compelled Speech Claim a. introduction. The plaintiffs make two related, but distinct, arguments that DoD is compelling them to speak against their will in violation of their rights under the First Amendment. The Faculty argue that, in being compelled to suspend the NDP and include military recruiters in the CDO recruiting process, they are being prevented from sending their chosen message— that discrimination will not be tolerated— and forced to convey a very different message— that discrimination will be tolerated in certain circumstances. See Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 18-19. Professor Rubenfeld presses a slightly different argument: even if the Faculty Members are not being forced to send any message themselves, DoD is violating the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by compelling them to help disseminate DoD’s recruiting message, a message with which Professor Rubenfeld and the Faculty disagree. DoD replies that it is not materially impeding First Amendment expression. DoD contends that YLS’ message is getting through to its intended audience loud and clear, and that, at most, plaintiffs’ complaint is that suspension of the NDP makes them appear hypocritical. This, DoD asserts, is not a cognizable First Amendment claim. In addition, DoD argues that YLS is not being forced to convey implicit approval of discrimination by allowing military recruiters into the CDO. YLS allows hundreds of recruiters to participate in the CDO program and DoD contends that YLS cannot be perceived as endorsing all the views of each of these potential employers. DoD claims that observers cannot possibly understand YLS to be endorsing the military’s discriminatory policies in light of the school’s 27-year history of preaching nondiscrimination based on sexual orientation. Additionally, DoD argues that the presence of military recruiters at CDO events only twice a year does not force the Faculty Members to “declare a belief,” West Virginia State Bd. Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943), or invade their “freedom of mind,” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). Finally, DoD argues that to the extent that YLS is being compelled to do anything, it is being compelled to aid military recruiters in the act of recruiting, not in speech. Thus, DoD argues, the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment should be examined in light of the Supreme Court’s test for the regulation of expressive conduct formulated in United States v. O’Brien. See 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (holding that a statute forbidding an individual to destroy his draft card did not violate the individual’s First Amendment rights). b. Free Speech Right. As Justice Jackson stated in Barnette, “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” 319 U.S. at 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178. “A system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts.” Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428. In other words, the First Amendment guarantees both “the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” Id.; see also Pac. Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of California, 475 U.S. 1, 11, 106 S.Ct. 903, 89 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality opinion); Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir.1996). These two complementary concepts serve as “components of the broader concept of individual freedom of the mind.” Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428 (quotation omitted). Where the government compels no actual speech from an individual, but “only” compels him to aid a third party in disseminating that third party’s speech, a First Amendment violation occurs. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 15, 106 S.Ct. 903 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (stating that a California utility regulation requiring a utility company to include a third-party’s newsletter in its billing envelopes constituted unconstitutional compelled speech); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 413, 121 S.Ct. 2334, 150 L.Ed.2d 438 (2001) (holding that a mandatory assessment imposed on mushroom producers to support advertising promoting general mushroom sales violated the producer’s First Amendment right against compelled speech). That the governmental action does not restrict an objecting party from communicating its own message does not render that action constitutional. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411, 121 S.Ct. 2334. Nor is a violation of the freedom not to speak, or not to aid others in disseminating their speech, cured by the speaker’s ability to efficiently or effectively disclaim or controvert the speech it has been forced to disseminate. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-58, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974) (a newspaper cannot be forced to print replies to its editorials, despite its clear ability to print a response); see also Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 16-18, 106 S.Ct. 903 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (utility company cannot be forced to include the newsletter of a third party in its envelopes, despite ability to respond). The First Amendment grants a speaker “the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.” Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995). In Wooley v. Maynard, the State of New Hampshire passed a statute requiring every non-commercial vehicle to have a license plate bearing the state motto “Live Free or Die.” 430 U.S. at 707, 97 S.Ct. 1428. The plaintiffs in Wooley were Jehovah’s Witnesses whose religious beliefs conflicted with the state’s motto, and who were repeatedly charged with violating New Hampshire’s statute by covering up the motto on their automobile.. See id. at 707-08, 97 S.Ct. 1428. The Supreme Court held that the state could not “constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and Tor the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public.” Id. at 713, 97 S.Ct. 1428. Even though display of the motto was “a more passive act” than the forced act of saluting the flag found in Barnette, “the difference is essentially one of degree.” Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715, 97 S.Ct. 1428. In Miami Herald, the State of Florida had passed a “right of reply” statute that required any newspaper that assailed the personal character or official record of a candidate for public office to print any reply the candidate might have, free of charge. See 418 U.S. at 244, 94 S.Ct. 2831. The Miami Herald printed several editorials critical of a candidate for a seat in the Florida House of Representatives and refused to publish the candidate’s replies, in violation of the statute. See id. at 243-44, 94 S.Ct. 2831. The candidate argued that the statute was constitutional because it did not “prevent[ ] the Miami Herald from saying anything it wished.” Id. at 256, 94 S.Ct. 2831. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding.that “[e]ven if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors.” Id. at 258, 94 S.Ct. 2831. The Court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the newspaper had already expressed its views in the original editorials, and it could do so again in future editorials in response to the candidate’s replies. Likewise, in Pacific Gas, the Supreme Court said that the state could not force a corporation to “assist in disseminating [a third party’s] message” by including the third party’s newsletter in empty space found in the corporation’s billing envelopes. 475 U.S. at 15, 106 S.Ct. 903 (Powell, J., plura