Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE BENNETT, Chief Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION.787 II. LEGAL ANALYSIS.787 A. SNB’s Motions.787 1. References to insurance.787 a. Arguments of the parties.788 b. Analysis .788 2. References to settlement negotiations.789 a. Arguments of the parties.789 b. Analysis .789 3. Mr. Cain’s “conclusions” or “opinions”.790 a. Arguments of the parties.790 b. Analysis .791 4. Revision of internal policies.793 a. Arguments of the parties.793 b. Analysis .794 i. Rule 407.794 ii. The “feasibility of precautionary measures” exception.794 iii. Applicability of the exception.795 5. Amendment of the probate petition.796 a. Arguments of the parties.796 b. Analysis .797 6. Growth of trust principal.798 a. Arguments of the parties.798 b. Analysis .798 7. The relationship between Doug Palmer and Charles Williams.800 a. Arguments of the parties.800 b. Analysis .801 8. SNB’s corporate relationship to Security National Corporation.801 a. Arguments of the parties.802 b. Analysis .802 9. Stock indices.803 a. Arguments of the parties. 803 b. Analysis .804 10. Expert testimony of Todd Borton.805 a. Arguments of the parties.805 b. Analysis .806 11. Expert testimony of Dominic Campisi.808 a. Arguments of the parties.809 b. Analysis .809 B. The Remainder Beneficiaries ’ Motions.810 1. Offset of sums the income beneficiary could have claimed.810 a. Arguments of the parties.811 b. Analysis .812 2. Offset of trustee fees .815 a. Arguments of the parties.815 b. Analysis .815 III. CONCLUSION.816 I. INTRODUCTION In a Complaint filed May 1, 2003, Remainder Beneficiaries of the so-called DPW Trust, plaintiffs John Franklin Williams, Peter Martin Williams, and James Oliver ' Williams, assert various claims premised on alleged mismanagement of the DPW Trust by defendant Security National Bank (SNB). The Remainder Beneficiaries assert eight claims. Count I is a claim for outright distribution of the DPW Trust to the Remainder Beneficiaries. In this Count, the Remainder Beneficiaries allege that, when Charles Williams, the income beneficiary of the DPW Trust, died on May 7, 2002, the Remainder Beneficiaries became entitled to distribution of the remainder of the Trust. Count II is a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. This claim alleges that SNB breached its fiduciary duty by improperly treating the return of over $1.70 million in capital of Pritchard Investment Company (PICO) as income to the Trust, then distributing that sum to the income beneficiary, Charles Williams. Count III is another claim for breach of fiduciary duty, this time alleging that SNB improperly favored the income beneficiary over the Remainder Beneficiaries. Count IV is a claim for breach of fiduciary duty by self-dealing. This claim alleges that SNB paid estate taxes for Charles Williams’s estate from the DPW Trust, then failed to offset those payments against sums that Charles Williams should have paid back to the DPW Trust for the overdistribution of the PICO receipts. Count V is a claim for breach of fiduciary duty by paying estimated estate taxes on amounts not received by the DPW Trust. Count VI is a claim for breach of fiduciary duty for self-serving, conduct in liquidating the assets of the DPW Trust other than SNB’s own securities to pay estimated estate taxes. Count VII is a claim for breach of SNB’s fiduciary duty to account to the Remainder Beneficiaries and to keep them informed. Finally, Count VIII is a claim for “statutory liability” pursuant to Iowa Code § 633.4605 alleging that SNB committed a “breach of trust” by concealing or disposing of trust property in bad faith. SNB answered the Complaint on July 7, 2003, denying the Remainder Beneficiaries’ claims. Although SNB originally asserted various counterclaims, those counterclaims were dismissed, in their entirety, by order dated November 6, 2003. On January 9, 2004, SNB also filed a third-party complaint against John F. Pritchard, Jr., a co-trustee of the DPW Trust, but SNB voluntarily dismissed its third-party complaint without prejudice on March 11, 2004. On September 15, 2004, SNB filed a Motion For Partial Summary Judgment seeking judgment in its favor on Counts I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII of the Complaint. However, the court summarily denied SNB’s motion for partial summary judgment on February 15, 2005. This matter is set for trial beginning on March 7, 2005. In anticipation of trial, the parties have filed a total of thirteen motions in limine. The court will consider the motions in turn, beginning with SNB’s motions. II. LEGAL ANALYSIS A. .SNB’s Motions 1. References to insurance The first motion now before the court is SNB’s February 1, 2005, Motion In Limine To Preclude Plaintiffs From Introducing, Or Making Any Reference To, Defendant’s Insurance (docket no. 129). The Remainder Beneficiaries filed a “limited” resistance to this motion on February 11, 2005 (docket no. 158). a. Arguments of the parties In support of this motion, SNB contends that knowledge of insurance or the absence of insurance would induce the jury to decide the case on an improper basis. SNB also contends that its insurance coverage is irrelevant to any issues in this case. In their “limited” resistance, the Remainder Beneficiaries agree that evidence of insurance is not admissible to show liability, but they nevertheless contend that a letter from SNB to its insurer is admissible here to show SNB’s efforts to minimize its own liability by attempting to legitimize its erroneous distributions to Charles Williams. The Remainder Beneficiaries explain that, in the letter they intend to offer into evidence, SNB states that its interests are closely associated with the Trust so that defending the Trust would not be adverse to the bank. Because the Remainder Beneficiaries do not intend to proffer this letter for the purpose of showing SNB’s negligence, the Remainder Beneficiaries contend that the letter is admissible. b. Analysis Rule 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides as follows: Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness. Fed. R. Evid. 411. The purpose of the rule is “to avoid the possibility of prejudice to the insured party.” Ouachita Nat’l Bank v. Tosco Corp., 686 F.2d 1291, 1301 (8th Cir.1982). “In this regard, it is generally thought that the jury’s knowledge that a plaintiff is receiving insurance benefits, or that a defendant is carrying liability insurance, might serve to decrease or increase, respectively, the amount of damages awarded by a jury.” Id.; accord Higgins v. Hicks Co., 756 F.2d 681, 685 (8th Cir.1985) (the concern of Rule 411 is that “ ‘knowledge of the presence or absence of liability insurance would induce juries to decide cases on improper grounds’ ”) (quoting Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 411). “However, it is established that the existence of liability insurance may be used for some purposes, such as showing the possible bias of a witness.” Id.; Morrissey v. Welsh Co., 821 F.2d 1294, 1305 (8th Cir.1987) (“[N]ot every reference to insurance constitutes reversible error.”). Thus, where evidence of a defendant’s liability insurance is irrelevant to any issues in the case, the evidence may properly be excluded. Higgins, 756 F.2d at 685. On the other hand, evidence of liability insurance may properly be admitted if it is relevant to an issue in the case or if it is offered to prove bias or prejudice of a witness. Id. at 684-85. In this case, Rule 411 supports SNB’s general request to exclude evidence that it carried liability insurance. Fed. R. Evid. 411. On the other hand, the Remainder Beneficiaries are not offering the letter containing a reference to SNB’s insurance for the purpose of showing that SNB had liability insurance, but for the tangential purpose of showing that SNB minimized its conduct in representations to its insurer. Thus, the concerns of Rule 411 are only marginally implicated by the letter, because the inferential notice that SNB has insurance, which the letter might provide, is not the primary purpose for proffering the letter and, just as importantly, that inferential notice that SNB has insurance is unlikely to induce jurors to find against SNB. See Higgins, 756 F.2d at 685 (the concern of the rule is that knowledge of insurance will induce the jurors to decide cases on improper grounds); Ouachita Nat’l Bank, 686 F.2d at 1301 (the concern of the rule is that knowledge of liability insurance or receipt of insurance benefits may increase or decrease a jury’s damages award). Because the letter is relevant to the issue of SNB’s minimization of its conduct, and there is little danger that the tangential reference to the fact that SNB had insurance coverage will foster a decision by the jury on an improper basis in this context, the letter will not be excluded. Id. (evidence of insurance may properly be admitted if it is relevant to the case); Ouachita Nat’l Bank, 686 F.2d at 1301 (evidence of insurance may be admitted for a purpose other than to imply that damages should be increased or decreased because a party was insured). Any danger that the tangential reference to the fact that SNB had insurance could also be mitigated by a limiting instruction concerning the proper use of the letter that the Remainder Beneficiaries intend to offer into evidence. Therefore, SNB’s February 1, 2005, Motion In Limine To Preclude Plaintiffs From Introducing, Or Making Any Reference To Defendant’s Insurance (docket no. 129) will be denied, where the only evidence of SNB’s insurance that the Remainder Beneficiaries intend to offer is relevant to issues in the case, and that evidence is not offered merely to imply that damages should be increased or decreased because SNB had insurance. SNB may, however, request a limiting instruction on the letter from SNB to its insurer that the Remainder Beneficiaries intend to offer into evidence. 2. References to settlement negotiations SNB’s next motion is its February 1, 2005, Motion In Limine To Preclude Plaintiffs From Introducing, Or Making Any Reference To, Settlement Agreements (docket no. 130). The Remainder Beneficiaries responded to this motion on February 11, 2005 (docket no. 155). a. Arguments of the parties SNB argues that evidence of settlement negotiations is generally inadmissible pursuant to Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Moreover, SNB asserts that the parties agreed that settlement negotiations would be kept confidential. In their response, the Remainder Beneficiaries state that they resist the motion only because no settlement agreements have been reached between the parties in this case, so there is no evidence to preclude. However, the Remainder Beneficiaries also agree that any evidence of settlement negotiations between the parties and any testimony relating to such negotiations is irrelevant and inadmissible, where the parties have agreed that prior settlement negotiations and any future settlement negotiations will remain confidential. b. Analysis In light of the Remainder Beneficiaries’ response, analysis of this over-protective motion in limine can be brief. Rule 408 expressly provides that evidence of furnishing, offering, promising, or accepting a settlement is not admissible to prove the validity of any claim, and that evidence of conduct or statements made in settlement negotiations “is likewise not admissible.” Fed. R. Evid. 408. No party has suggested that any evidence of settlement offers or negotiations is admissible for any other purpose. Id. (noting this exception). Therefore, SNB’s February 1, 2005, Motion In Limine To Preclude Plaintiffs From Introducing, Or Making Any Reference To, Settlement Agreements (docket no. 130) will be granted. 3. Mr. Cain’s “conclusions” or “opinions” SNB’s next motion is its February 1, 2005, Motion In Limine To Preclude Reference To Notes And Observations Of Paul Cain As Opinions Or Conclusions (docket no. 131). The Remainder Beneficiaries resisted this motion on February 11, 2005 (docket no. 163). At issue in this motion are various notes and observations by Paul Cain, an accountant with McGladrey & Pullen, L.L.P. SNB hired McGladrey & Pullen in January 2003 to review account activity in the DPW Trust to determine, among other things, whether Trust tax returns were properly completed. Mr. Cain was primarily responsible for such reviews, but SNB contends that he never completed the task or formed any opinions about any matter. Rather, he provided no more than a “progress report” to SNB. SNB seeks to exclude any references to Mr. Cain’s comments or notes as embodying “opinions” or “conclusions.” a. Arguments of the parties Although SNB may call Mr. Cain as a fact witness, SNB contends that, on cross-examination, the Remainder Beneficiaries should be barred from referring to Mr. Cain’s statements during a conference call with SNB representatives and in various documents that he provided to SNB as “opinions” or “conclusions.” Such a characterization, SNB contends, would be misleading or confusing to the jury, even if Mr. Cain could be qualified as an expert under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, because he provided no “reliable” conclusions, where he has admitted that he lacked sufficient facts on which to base any conclusions. Furthermore, SNB contends that Mr. Cain never reached an expert opinion within the contemplation of Rule 702, so that any suggestion that he did so would be unfairly prejudicial to SNB. Finally, SNB contends that Mr. Cain’s comments do not satisfy Rule 702’s “reliability” requirements, where Mr. Cain stated plainly that he did not have enough information to reach any conclusions. The Remainder Beneficiaries contend that Mr. Cain reviewed and analyzed information he received from SNB and ultimately advised SNB as to the “most reasonable” classification of the disputed receipts from PICO, a family-owned company. The Remainder Beneficiaries contend that Mr. Cain’s advice amounts to an “opinion,” even if it was only preliminary or incomplete. The Remainder Beneficiaries contend, further, that even lay persons may state “opinions” under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. However, the Remainder Beneficiaries contend that the critical issue is not whether or not Mr. Cain was an “expert,” but what Mr. Cain told SNB. The Remainder Beneficiaries explain that they intend to offer evidence that Mr. Cain advised SNB about what would be the “most reasonable” classification of the sums received by the Trust from PICO to show what SNB knew at the time that SNB made allegedly false and misleading disclosures to the Remainder Beneficiaries and to the Iowa Probate Court. In essence, the Remainder Beneficiaries contend that Mr. Cain is not being offered as an “expert” witness at all, but as a “fact” witness concerning what SNB had been told about the “most reasonable” classification of the PICO assets. Even if Mr. Cain is treated as an expert, however, the Remainder Beneficiaries argue that SNB’s complaints about the incompleteness of his opinions or the lack of sufficient information to support them would go to the weight of his “expert” opinions, not their admissibility, where there is some support for those opinions. The Remainder Beneficiaries also contend that SNB cannot be “surprised” by any of Mr. Cain’s comments, where SNB retained Mr. Cain for the very purpose of providing those comments. Under these circumstances, the Remainder Beneficiaries contend that the concerns of Rule 702 are not implicated. b. Analysis Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides as follows: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702. SNB contends that any “expert” opinion by Mr. Cain would fail at least the first and possibly the second requirement of the rule, because Mr. Cain conceded that he did not have sufficient facts or data to reach any reliable “final” conclusion or opinion. However, the court is not convinced that the present evidentia-ry dispute has anything at all to do with Rule 702. Rather, this court concludes that the present evidentiary dispute concerns the admissibility of “fact” testimony from a person who could, perhaps, have been qualified to give “expert” testimony. The court finds that the proper resolution of that dispute is, therefore, controlled by Rule 403 rather than Rule 702. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized the distinction between persons testifying as “experts” and persons with “expert” qualifications who testify as “fact witnesses” in a particular case. For example, in Long v. Cottrell, Inc., 265 F.3d 663 (8th Cir.2001), the plaintiffs asserted that they were entitled to a new trial, because the trial court had allowed the defendant’s vice-chairman to testify despite the defendant’s failure to disclose him as an expert. Long, 265 F.3d at 668. The trial court had denied the plaintiffs’ new trial motion, because the trial court found that the witness had testified as a “fact witness only,” and did not testify as an “expert.” The appellate court agreed, holding that, even if the witness had testified in numerous other products liability cases, his testimony in the case then before the court was not “expert in nature.” Instead, the witness had “testified based on his first-hand experience from working in the industry and his involvement in [the defendant’s] design and testing processes.” To the extent that the witness had purportedly testified on the “state of the art in the industry,” the court also concluded that “his testimony was based on his personal knowledge and was not in the form of expert opinion.” Similarly, his testimony about what other manufacturers in the industry were doing “was expressly limited to his own knowledge and experience.” Id. at 668-69. Thus, even a witness who appears to be an “expert” in a particular field may actually testify only as a “fact witness” in a particular case. In another instructive case, Easley v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 758 F.2d 251 (8th Cir.1985), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the district court had erred by preventing in-house experts from testifying as “fact witnesses,” even though the trial court had properly excluded their “expert” testimony as a sanction for failure to comply with discovery. Easley, 758 F.2d at 258. The appellate court concluded that exclusion of the “fact” testimony of these in-house experts was inappropriate, despite “the difficulty of separating statements about actions taken as in-house experts from what would essentially be expert opinion testimony,” because exclusion of the “fact” testimony had apparently pre-eluded the proffering party “from presenting some admissible evidence.” The appellate court concluded that, at least in a bench trial, the better course “would have been to hear the testimony, and continue to sustain objections [to ‘expert’ testimony] when appropriate.” Id. In the present case, it is clear that Mr. Cain could have been qualified as an “expert,” because as an accountant, he had the sort of specialized knowledge that could assist the trier of fact to understand certain kinds of financial records or evidence, see Fed. R. Evid. 702 (defining expert testimony), but he was not so designated in this case. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the testimony that the Remainder Beneficiaries intend to elicit from Mr. Cain is actually “fact witness” testimony, not testimony that is “expert in nature.” See Long, 265 F.3d at 668-69 (recognizing this distinction in the testimony of a person who could have been qualified as an “expert” and who had testified as an expert in other litigation); Easley, 758 F.2d at 258 (also recognizing that “fact” testimony may be presented by a person precluded from testifying as an “expert”). The testimony that the Remainder Beneficiaries plan to elicit is testimony based on Mr. Cain’s own personal knowledge about what he told SNB about the “most reasonable” classification of the PICO assets. Id. at 668 (testimony from first-hand knowledge and experience was not “expert” testimony). Moreover, exclusion of testimony concerning what Mr. Cain told SNB would be inappropriate, because it would apparently preclude the Remainder Beneficiaries “from presenting some admissible evidence” about what SNB knew or had been advised at certain times in relation to conduct by SNB that the Remainder Beneficiaries contend constituted a breach of fiduciary duty or was otherwise wrongful. See Easley, 758 F.2d at 258 (also finding admissible on this ground “fact” testimony from a witness barred from providing “expert” testimony). To put it another way, Mr. Cain’s evidence is admissible pursuant to Rules 401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, because it is probative of what SNB knew or had been advised about the “proper classification” of the PICO assets at the time that it took certain actions or made certain representations in relation to those assets. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (defining “relevant evidence”); Fed. R. Evid. 402 (providing that relevant evidence is generally admissible). The court concludes, further, that this evidence should not be excluded pursuant to Rule 403, because the probative value of what Mr. Cain told SNB outweighs the potential for prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury about which part of his testimony might be “expert” testimony within the meaning of Rule 702 and what might be “fact” testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (allowing the court to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed, inter alia, by its potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury). As in Easley, the court concludes that the potential difficulties in separating statements about what information Mr. Cain provided to SNB (ie., “fact” testimony) from statements suggesting his “expert” opinion about the proper classification of the PICO assets do not justify excluding Mr. Cain’s testimony. Rather, the Remainder Beneficiaries are entitled to present to the jury Mr. Cain’s testimony about what “opinions” or advice he gave SNB, even if the opinions or advice were only tentative or preliminary, to show what SNB knew or had been advised. See Easley, 758 F.2d at 258 (difficulties in distinguishing between “fact” and “expert” testimony did not warrant excluding all testimony of in-house experts barred from giving “expert” testimony). Although this case involves a jury trial, and Easley involved a bench trial, the court concludes that Mr. Cain’s testimony should be taken subject to timely objections to improper “expert” testimony, because the court can and will, if necessary, instruct the jury on the proper purposes for which any evidence may be considered. Cf. id. (in a bench trial, the court should have taken the in-house experts’ testimony subject to objections concerning improper “expert” opinions). SNB will, in its turn, be entitled to attempt to elicit from Mr. Cain testimony about the “preliminary” or “incomplete” nature of his investigations and opinions and the lack of sufficiency of the information he reviewed to reach a final “expert” opinion, but that evidence will go primarily to the weight that SNB should or should not have given to Mr. Cain’s opinions at the time, whether or not Mr. Cain was ultimately right about the proper classification of the assets in question. Therefore, SNB’s February 1, 2005, Motion In Limine To Preclude Reference To Notes And Observations Of Paul Cain As Opinions Or Conclusions (docket no. 131) will be denied. 4. Revision of internal policies On February 1, 2005, SNB also filed a Motion In Limine To Preclude Plaintiffs From Introducing, Or Making Any Reference To, Defendant’s Subsequent Modifications To Its Internal Policies (docket no. 132). This motion involves SNB’s modification of its internal policies regarding (1) the treatment of incoming monies as income versus principal; and (2) receipt of trust statements by trust remaindermen. The Remainder Beneficiaries resisted this motion on February 11, 2005 (docket no. 159). a. Arguments of the parties SNB contends that the Remainder Beneficiaries should not be allowed to present the evidence that SNB subsequently changed certain pertinent policies in an attempt to prove that. SNB’s actions at issue in this litigation were culpable. SNB contends, first, that evidence of such remedial measures should be excluded pursuant to Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. SNB asserts that there is no dispute that it controlled the trust, no assertion that its previous policies were not feasible, and no “impeachment” purpose to such evidence. SNB also argues that it would be inappropriate to create a disincentive to trustees to take remedial measures. SNB argues, second, that the evidence should be excluded pursuant to Rule 403, because it would be unfairly prejudicial to SNB, confuse the issues, and mislead the jury. Somewhat more specifically, SNB contends that it would be prejudiced by an improper inference from this evidence that it had acted culpably in this case. In their resistance, the Remainder Beneficiaries argue that Rule 407 does not preclude the use of subsequent remedial measures when offered to show the feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, and that the probative value of such evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect under Rule 403. As to admissibility under Rule 407, the Remainder Beneficiaries point out that the rule expressly authorizes the admission of evidence of remedial measures, inter alia, for the purpose of “proving the feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted.” Here, the Remainder Beneficiaries point out that SNB contends only that it has not controverted the feasibility of its previous policies, but has never admitted the feasibility of the remedial measures. Consequently, the Remainder Beneficiaries argue that SNB’s failure to address the feasibility of precautionary measures means that SNB controverts the feasibility of those measures. The Remainder Beneficiaries also assert that they will claim that SNB’s policies at the time were inadequate and that better policies were feasible. Finally, the Remainder ■ Beneficiaries argue that, under the circumstances, the probative value of evidence that SNB subsequently took remedial measures outweighs any potential for prejudice from such evidence. b. Analysis i. Rule 407. Rule 407 of the* Federal Rules of Evidence provides as follows: When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a warning or instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. Fed. R. Evid. 407 (emphasis added). As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, “the rule has two justifications”: (1) “subsequent remedial measures are of limited probative value as an admission of fault”; and (2) “exclusion of remedial measures favors ‘a social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety.’ ” Meller v. Heil Co., 745 F.2d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir.1984) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 407, Advisory Committee Note, 1972 Proposed Rule). Thus, [wjhile Rule 407 recognizes the importance of encouraging safety improvements, it also recognizes that this saluto-ry social policy must be balanced against competing interests. Chief among these other interests is the admission of relevant, probative evidence. Rule 407 strikes a balance by-excluding subsequent remedial measures only when used as evidence of the defendant’s “negligence or culpable conduct.” It permits introduction of such measures to prove other controverted issues, provided that introduction of this evidence meets the remaining admissibility requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Meller, 745 F.2d at 1299-1300 (footnotes omitted). While .SNB asserts that the general rule of exclusion, in the first sentence of the rule, applies here, the Remainder Beneficiaries contend that an exception, stated in the second sentence, applies here. More specifically, the Remainder Beneficiaries contend that the “feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted” exception applies to the remedial measures taken by SNB. Therefore, the court must explore the meaning of this exception. ii. The “feasibility of precautionary measures” exception. “[Exceptions to the rule are to be narrowly read in order to preserve the ‘important policy of encouraging subsequent remedial measures.’ ” Albrecht v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 808 F.2d 329, 332 (4th Cir.1987) (quoting Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 856 (4th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080, 101 S.Ct. 862, 66 L.Ed.2d 804 (1981)). The exception upon which the Remainder Beneficiaries rely has two parts: (1) “feasibility” of the remedial measure and (2) “controversion” of that feasibility. Id.; Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (1st Cir.1991) (“This exception only applies if feasibility is controverted.”) (citing cases). As the Advisory Committee explained at the time that the rule was proposed, “The requirement that the other purpose be controverted calls for automatic exclusion unless a genuine issue be present and allows the opposing party to lay the groundwork for exclusion by making an admission.” Fed. R. Evid. 407, Advisory Committee Notes, 1972 Proposed Rules. Therefore, “[i]t is not for the plaintiff to put feasibility in issue, for feasibility is not in issue unless and until controverted by the defendant.” Albrecht, 808 F.2d at 331. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has defined “feasibility” within the meaning of Rule 407 as follows: Whether something is feasible relates not only to actual possibility of operation, and its cost and convenience, but also to its ultimate utility and success in its intended performance. That is to say, “feasible” means not only “possible,” but also means “capable of being ... utilized, or dealt with successfully.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 831 (unabridged ed.1967); see Black’s Law Dictionary 549 (5th ed.1979) (“reasonable assurance of success”). See also American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 196 (5th Cir.1969) (defendant’s witness had testified that an airplane altimeter in issue was “feasible and safe and that there was no reason to change it”; plaintiff allowed to show that defendant changed altimeter design after crash). Anderson v. Malloy, 700 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir.1983). Thus, an opposing party “controverts” feasibility when that party testifies, in effect, that a device or procedure was not “capable of being utilized or dealt with successfully.” Id. at 1214. iii. Applicability of the exception. SNB has never asserted or presented any evidence that the remedial procedures that it subsequently adopted were not “capable of being utilized or dealt with successfully.” Id. However, the Remainder Beneficiaries contend that the feasibility of the remedial measures must nevertheless be deemed to be “controverted,” where SNB argued only that it did not controvert the feasibility of the previous measures. The Remainder Beneficiaries argue, further, that SNB’s “controversion” can be inferred from SNB’s failure to address the feasibility of subsequent precautionary measures. The court finds that, in SNB’s motion, SNB inexplicably applied the “contr-oversion” requirement to the wrong measures, the previous measures. However, the question under Rule 407 is whether the opposing party controverts or admits the feasibility of the precautionary measures, not whether SNB controverts or admits the feasibility of the measures in place at the time of the allegedly culpable conduct. See FED. R. EVID. 407 (“The rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered ... as proving ... feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted.”) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the court concludes that SNB’s confusion about what must be controverted is simply not a reasonable basis on which to deem SNB to have controverted the feasibility of the precautionary measures. Nor is the court persuaded by the Remainder Beneficiaries’ argument that SNB has controverted feasibility by not responding to the Remainder Beneficiaries’ attempt to put feasibility at issue. This is so, notwithstanding that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Meller v. Heil Co., 745 F.2d 1297 (10th Cir.1984), found that the feasibility of precautionary measures was controverted simply because the opposing party had not made an “unequivocal admission of feasibility.” Meller, 745 F.2d at 1300 n. 7. In Meller, the defendant did not attempt to rebut the plaintiffs proof of the feasibility of precautionary measures. The court noted that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving that the defendant’s product was “unreasonably dangerous” and that the feasibility of alternative designs was a factor essential to the plaintiffs theory of “unreasonable danger.” Id. Because the defendant did not stipulate that the alternative designs were feasible, the court found that the plaintiff was “obligated to prove this element of her case.” Under such circumstances, the court concluded that “the defendant [could not] assert that, because it did not attempt to rebut the plaintiffs proof, the issue was not controverted at trial.” Therefore, the court concluded that “the feasibility of an alternative design is deemed controverted unless the defendant makes an unequivocal admission of feasibility.” Id. (citing in support the Advisory Committee’s note that “[t]he requirement that the other purpose be controverted calls for automatic exclusion unless a genuine issue be present and allows the opposing party to lay the groundwork for exclusion by making an admission”) (emphasis added by the Mel-ler court). This court does not agree that, in the circumstances of this case, SNB was required to make an “unequivocal admission of feasibility” or be deemed to have controverted the feasibility of the precautionary measures at issue. First, this is not a case involving a negligent design or any requirement that the plaintiff prove that the defendant’s conduct or product was “unreasonably dangerous.” Nor are the Remainder Beneficiaries otherwise compelled to prove the feasibility of other procedures in SNB’s handling of trust assets or statements to remaindermen. Finally, the Advisory Committee’s comment that Rule 407 “allows the opposing party to lay the groundwork for exclusion by making an admission,” Fed. R. Evid. 407, Advisory Committee Notes, 1972 Proposed Rule (emphasis added), is in permissive terms, so that it simply does not warrant an inference that a party that does not stipulate to feasibility or attempt to rebut the opposing party’s evidence of feasibility must be deemed to have controverted feasibility. Thus, this case fits within the general rule that “[i]t is not for the plaintiff to put feasibility in issue, for feasibility is not in issue unless and until controverted by the defendant.” See Albrecht, 808 F.2d at 331. Because SNB has not expressly controverted the feasibility of its subsequent remedial measures, and cannot be deemed to have done so, evidence of those remedial measures is not admissible pursuant to Rule 407 unless and until SNB does controvert feasibility. See Raymond, 938 F.2d at 1523 (“This exception only applies if feasibility is controverted.”) (citing cases). Therefore, SNB’s February 1, 2005, Motion In Limine To Preclude Plaintiffs From Introducing, Or Making Any Reference To, Defendant’s Subsequent Modifications To Its Internal Policies (docket no. 132) will be granted. 5. Amendment of the probate petition The fifth motion now before the court is SNB’s February 1, 2005, Motion In Limine To Bar Plaintiffs From Introducing Any Evidence Of Defendant’s First Amended Iowa Probate Court Petition (docket no. 133). The Remainder Beneficiaries resisted this motion on February 11, 2005 (docket no. 161). a. Arguments of the parties SNB anticipates that the Remainder Beneficiaries will attempt to introduce into evidence SNB’s first amended petition in what the parties have called the “Iowa Probate Action” in state court to imply that SNB intentionally provided inaccurate information to that court. However, SNB contends that such evidence should be excluded, because it is irrelevant to this case, the inferences the Remainder Beneficiaries seek to assert are wholly unsupported by the facts in the record, and admission of the evidence of the amended petition would, consequently, be unfairly prejudicial to SNB. SNB professes its entire good faith in amending its state-court petition. The Remainder Beneficiaries, however, assert that admission of the amended petition would be proper; indeed, they contend that failure to do so would be tantamount to precluding them from proving an element of their claim of breach of fiduciary duty. The Remainder Beneficiaries contend that, for over eight years after discovering the overdistribution to Charles Williams of Trust receipts from the PICO liquidation, SNB did nothing to recover the overdistribution and, in fact, continued to represent in probate court proceedings that the overdistribution was only about $500,000, instead of $1.7 million. Moreover, the Remainder Beneficiaries contend that, as late as 2003, SNB represented to the Remainder Beneficiaries that the over-distribution was about $800,000, when SNB had been advised by an outside accounting firm that the improperly classified assets amounted to about $1.7 million. Similarly, the Remainder Beneficiaries point out that SNB filed an amended petition in the probate action on May 12, 2003, still suggesting that the overdistribution to Charles Williams was only about $800,000. The Remainder Beneficiaries contend that, in amending the Iowa Probate Petition, SNB failed to include any disclosure of over $900,000 in additional overdistribu-tions to Charles Williams, any documents or conclusions provided by the outside accounting firm suggesting that the overdis-tribution exceeded $800,000, or any indication that the $800,000 figure needed to be adjusted, even though such information and documentation were known to SNB at the time. From these factual assertions, the Remainder Beneficiaries contend that the amended petition in the Iowa Probate Action is directly relevant to their claims for breach of fiduciary duty and punitive damages. They contend that SNB’s “hidden knowledge” about the amount of the over-distribution at the time that SNB filed its amended petition in the Iowa Probate Action is relevant and material to their claim that SNB ignored its fiduciary duties and otherwise acted without regard to the consequences of its actions. The Remainder Beneficiaries also dispute the supposed prejudice to SNB of admitting the amended petition, arguing that this evidence may be “prejudicial” to SNB, because it hurts SNB’s position, but it is not “unfairly prejudicial” in the context of this case. To the contrary, the Remainder Beneficiaries argue that excluding the amended petition would unfairly deprive them of vital proof for their claim. b. Analysis Contrary to SNB’s contentions, the court finds that the amended petition is probative of SNB’s allegedly culpable conduct, because it suggests that SNB was concealing from the Remainder Beneficiaries and the Iowa Probate Court material information that was known to SNB. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (evidence is “relevant” if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”); Fed. R. Evid. 402 (“relevant” evidence is generally admissible). Also contrary to SNB’s argument, the court finds that, based on the other evidence that the Remainder Beneficiaries have identified, the inferences that the Remainder Beneficiaries wish to draw from the amended petition are not so farfetched that a reasonable juror would find them “wholly unsupported” by the record. Thus, the amended petition does satisfy Rule 401, Rule 402, and the “probative value” side of the balancing test under Rule 403. Fed. R. Evid. 401 (defining relevant evidence), 402 (providing that relevant evidence is admissible), and 403 (the court may balance the “probative value” of evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice). Furthermore, the court finds that there is no danger of unfair prejudice to SNB of admitting the amended petition into evidence in this case. Fed. R. Evid. 403 (the danger of “unfair prejudice” must outweigh the probative value of the evidence for the court to exclude the evidence). SNB contends that evidence of the amended petition would “undoubtedly result in unfair prejudice against SNB, because [the Remainder Beneficiaries’] reference to the Amended Petition would likely cause the jury to falsqly infer that SNB intentionally released inaccurate figures to the court in the Iowa Probate Action.” SNB’s Brief In Support Of Its Motion In Lime To Bar Plaintiffs From Introducing Any Evidence Of Defendant’s First Amended State Court Petition, 4. However, the court finds that the amended petition is, indisputably, SNB’s representation concerning circumstances that are material here. Also, as the court concluded above, the inferences that the Remainder Beneficiaries wish to draw from those representations are not so wholly unsupported by the record as to make the admission of the amended petition “prejudicial.” The likelihood that SNB will have to dispel the inference that it misrepresented material circumstances to the Iowa Probate Court does not constitute “prejudice” where that inference is reasonably supported by the record, and SNB will have the opportunity to demonstrate to the jury why, in its view, the inference is false. Therefore, SNB’s February 1, 2005, Motion In Limine To Bar Plaintiffs From Introducing Any Evidence Of Defendant’s First Amended Iowa Probate Court Petition (docket no. 133) will be denied. 6. Growth of trust principal The sixth motion before the court is SNB’s February 1, 2005, Motion In Limine To Preclude Plaintiffs From Arguing That They Are Entitled To Growth Of The Principal Of The Trust (docket no. 134). The Remainder Beneficiaries resisted this motion on February 11, 2005 (docket no. 156). a. Arguments of the parties Reprising one theme of its unsuccessful motion for summary judgment on Count III of the Complaint, SNB argues in support of this motion in limine that Iowa law only entitles contingent remainder beneficiaries to preservation of trust principal, not growth of trust principal. Developing this theme, SNB argues that, had it acted in the way the Remainder Beneficiaries suggest, it would have breached its duty under the trust agreement and applicable law, for example, by breaching its duty of impartiality and its duty to fulfill the intent of the DPW Trust. SNB contends that there is no Iowa decision finding a breach of fiduciary duty by a trustee where, as here, the principal of the trust purportedly grew during the trustee’s tenure. The Remainder Beneficiaries sing a different tune, however, although their melody also reprises a theme of their resistance to SNB’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, they incorporate by reference their arguments in resistance to summary judgment that SNB’s failure to balance income and growth interests violates applicable law, the terms of the DPW Trust, and SNB’s own admissions about the proper objectives of a trustee. b. Analysis In its summary judgment motion, the arguments reprised here were directed at Count III of the Remainder Beneficiaries’ Complaint, the claim of breach of fiduciary duty by favoring the income beneficiary over the Remainder Beneficiaries. That Count alleges that SNB acted in breach of its fiduciary duty by maintaining a trust portfolio that improperly benefited the income beneficiary, Charles Williams, over the Remainder Beneficiaries by investing the majority of the Trust’s assets in fixed income assets and otherwise failing to diversify the Trust assets, with the result that the Trust principal is now some $10 million less than it would have been, if the Trust portfolio had been properly diversified. See Complaint, Count III, ¶¶ 52-54. SNB is correct that, under Iowa law, “[a] trustee is under a duty to protect and preserve the trust assets.” In re hunt’s Trust, 236 Iowa 28, 17 N.W.2d 803 (1945); see also Restatement (Second) of TRusts § 176. This duty is not, however, to the exclusion of all other duties. For example, the Restatement (Seoond) of Trusts imposes a duty of loyalty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary, Restatement (Seoond) of Trusts § 170; to administer the trust using such care and skill as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his or her own property, id. at § 174; in the absence of trust language directing otherwise, when there are two or more beneficiaries, to deal impartially with them, id. at § 183; and when those beneficiaries have successive interests, to act with due regard to their successive interests, id. at § 232 (although, pursuant to comment b, this provision only requires the trustee to preserve trust property for the beneficiary ultimately entitled to the principal of the trust). Such duties are also implicit in the remedies available to beneficiaries. For example, “[e]ven contingent remaindermen are entitled to guard against damage to their in-teresas].” Cox v. Cox, 357 N.W.2d 304, 306 (Iowa 1984). The Iowa Supreme Court has recognized that the remedies for a trustee’s breach of loyalty to the trust include “any loss to the trust estate”; “any profit made [by the trustee] through the breach”; and “a profit that would have accrued to the trust if there had been no breach.” Coster v. Crookham, 468 N.W.2d 802, 806 (Iowa 1991) (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 205). SNB has identified no provision of the DPW Trust that derogates from these duties. Although the DPW Trust provided for distributions to the life beneficiary, Charles Williams, SNB has not demonstrated beyond dispute that the DPW Trust unambiguously imposed upon SNB a duty to favor his interests over the interests of the Remainder Beneficiaries. See Restatement (Seoond) of Trusts § 232 (duty of impartiality to successive beneficiaries). Furthermore, the Remainder Beneficiaries have pointed to sufficient evidence to generate a genuine issue of material fact that SNB did not properly diversify the assets of the Trust in the manner that a reasonably prudent person would have done. See id. at § 174 (prudent investor rule), and SNB has pointed to no evidence demonstrating that its investment and management choices not to diversify assets were reasonably necessary to serve the purposes of the DPW Trust. In addition, the Remainder Beneficiaries have pointed to sufficient evidence to generate a genuine issue of material fact that SNB did not act impartially in investing and managing trust property to take into account the differing interests of Charles Williams and the Remainder Beneficiaries, where they have pointed to evidence gen-Grating a genuine issue of material fact that SNB can only argue that the Trust principal grew by including PICO assets improperly distributed to Charles Williams that have not yet been recovered. See id. at § 232 (the trustee must take into account the interests of successive beneficiaries, although, pursuant to comment b, this provision only requires,the trustee to preserve trust property for the beneficiary ultimately entitled to the principal of the trust). Thus, there is, at the very least, a genuine issue of material fact as to whether SNB fulfilled its duties to preserve Trust assets, to act as a prudent investor would, for example, by diversifying Trust assets, and to make investment and management decisions impartially as between differing interests of beneficiaries. Under these circumstances, the court will not preclude the Remainder Beneficiaries from, arguing that SNB was under a duty to preserve and grow the principal of the Trust. Therefore, SNB’s February 1, 2005, Motion In Limine To Preclude Plaintiffs From Arguing That They Are Entitled To Growth Of The Principal Of The Trust (docket no. 134) will be denied. 7. The relationship between Doug Palmer and Charles Williams SNB’s next .motion is its February 1, 2005, Motion In Limine To Preclude Plaintiffs From Introducing, Or Making Any Reference To, Doug Palmer’s Relationship To Mr. Charles K. Williams (docket no. 135). The Remainder Beneficiaries resisted this motion on February 11, 2005 (docket no. 160). a. Arguments of the parties In support of this motion, SNB explains that Doug Palmer was a member of SNB’s board of .directors and that, prior to Charles Williams’s marriage to Dorothy Pritchard Williams, Charles Williams was married to a member of Palmer’s family. SNB contends that, after Mr. Williams married Dorothy Pritchard Williams, and until the time of his death, Mr. Williams had no “relationship” whatsoever with the Palmer family, and hence, no legal, social, or professional relationship with Doug Palmer. SNB contends that evidence of any such supposed relationship is irrelevant and highly prejudicial, in that it creates a false appearance of some kind of impropriety. SNB contends that any “relationship” between Charles Williams and Doug Palmer or the Palmer family is too distant and unrelated to have any probative value on any issue in this case and could cause a jury improperly to infer that Mr. Williams had some influence over SNB’s board of directors through Palmer. In' response, the Remainder Beneficiaries point out that Charles Williams was married to, and had four children by, Doug Palmer’s sister. Thus, Doug Palmer is the uncle of four of Charles’s children. Under these circumstances, the Remainder Beneficiaries argue that the Palmer/Williams family relationship bears directly on the issue of whether SNB acted with bias in administering the DPW Trust and, if so, whether its allegedly culpable actions at issue here were negligent or intentional. More specifically, the Remainder Beneficiaries contend that Marilyn Hagberg, who was SNB’s trust officer for the DPW Trust, was provided with a family chart for Charles .Williams showing his relationship to the Palmer family. The Remainder Beneficiaries contend that these facts make it more probable that the trustee acted in favor of Charles Williams and to the detriment of the Remainder Beneficiaries, who had no relationship with the Palmer family. The Remainder Beneficiaries argue, further, that SNB will not be unfairly prejudiced by this evidence of a relationship between Charles Williams and the Palmer family, because in their view, the family relationship is not remote or unrelated to the circumstances at issue, nor is it so emotionally-charged in and of itself as to be prejudicial. b. Analysis Had the Remainder Beneficiaries put forward no evidence that SNB’s trust officers responsible for administering the DPW Trust were actually aware of the relationship between Charles Williams and the family of a member of SNB’s board of directors, the court would probably have concluded that the evidence in question in this motion is irrelevant or that, at best, its slight probative value as background information (e.g., on family relationships of the persons involved in the case) is outweighed by the unfair prejudice of an unwarranted inference of some kind of family favoritism in the actions of SNB. However, the Remainder Beneficiaries have pointed to evidence that at least two of the trust officers successively responsible for managing the DPW Trust were aware of a family tree showing Charles Williams’s relationship to the Palmer family. Thus, there is at least some probative value to the evidence beyond merely clarifying the family relationships for background purposes, because there may be some legitimate inference that the trust officers were affected by their knowledge of Charles Williams’s relationship to the family of a member of SNB’s board. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (evidence is “relevant” if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”). The court recognizes that the Remainder Beneficiaries have not pointed to any record evidence showing that the trust officers acknowledged or denied that their knowledge of the family relationship between Charles Williams and the Palmers had any effect on their management of the Trust, but neither has SNB presented any categorical denial that their knowledge had any such effect. Thus, there is a fact issue — albeit perhaps a tenuous one — as to whether the trust officers’ knowledge of Charles Williams’s relationship to the Palmer family had any effect on the trust officers’ management of the Trust. Nor is the court convinced that the probative value of this evidence, which may be slight, is outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (probative evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice). It may be incumbent upon. SNB to demonstrate that the trust officers’ knowledge of Charles Williams’s family relationship to a member of SNB’s board had no effect on management of the trust, but that burden does not amount to “unfair prejudice.” To put it another way, the court will not pre-try the case on motions in limine, by pre-weighing the evidence on questions that properly belong to a jury, where there is some fair basis for the inference the Remainder Beneficiaries may wish to advocate and no greater showing of prejudice to SNB than SNB has made so far. Therefore, SNB’s February 1, 2005, Motion In Limine To Preclude Plaintiffs From Introducing, Or Making Any Reference To, Doug Palmer’s Relationship To Mr. Charles K. Williams (docket no. 135) will be denied. 8. SNB’s corporate relationship to Security National Corporation SNB’s eighth motion now before the court is its February 1, 2005, Motion In Limine To Preclude Plaintiffs From Introducing, Or Making Any Reference To, Defendant’s Corporate Relationship With Security National Corporation (docket no. 136). The Remainder Beneficiaries resisted this motion .on February 11, 2005 (docket no. 157). a. Arguments of the parties In support of this motion, SNB explains that it expects that the Remainder Beneficiaries may attempt to support their argument for punitive damages by showing that SNB is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Security National Corporation (SNC), as well as other information about the assets, earnings, and other financial records of SNC. SNB argues that any such reference to the existence or the financial resources of a parent company are irrelevant to the question of whether punitive damages should be awarded, and in what amount, against SNB. SNB contends that the Remainder Beneficiaries will be unable to show any sufficient basis for piercing the corporate veil to allow them to reach the assets of SNC, because there is no basis for concluding that SNB is a “dummy” corporation or the “alter ego” of SNC, or that SNC played any role in the matters at issue in this case. Thus, SNB contends that evidence of the finances of a much larger corporation that is unrelated to this litigation would prejudice SNB on the question of punitive damages. The Remainder Beneficiaries describe their resistance to this motion as “limited.” Specifically, they represent that they do not intend to offer evidence relating to the assets, earnings, or other financial information of SNC for purpose of their claim for punitive damages. However, they point out that they have asserted a claim that, when SNB liquidated assets of the Trust to pay estimated estate taxes, it did not liquidate SNC stock held by the Trust, but instead liquidated other assets, thus improperly favoring SNC’s interests. Therefore, they contend that they may properly offer evidence relating to SNC in this limited regard. b. Analysis The Remainder Beneficiaries concede, and the court finds, that there has been no attempt to satisfy the requirements for piercing the corporate veil in this case to show that the assets of SNC are relevant to a determination of punitive damages, if any, to be, awarded against SNB. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ballstaedt, 606 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Iowa 2000) (“The burden is on the party seeking to pierce the corporate veil to show the exceptional circumstances required. C. Mac Chambers [Co. v. Iowa Tae Kwon Do Academy, Inc.], 412 N.W.2d [593,] 598 [ (Iowa 1987) ]. Factors that would support such a finding include (1) the corporation is undercapitalized; (2) it lacks separate books; (3) its finances are not kept separate from individual finances, or individual obligations are paid by the corporation; (4) the corporation is used to promote fraud or illegality; (5) corporate formalities are not followed;' and' (6) the corporation is a there sham. Id. (citing Briggs Transp. Co. [v. Starr Sales Co.], 262 N.W.2d [805,] 810 [(Iowa 1978)]).”). Therefore, the court will grant SNB’s motion to exclude evidence of SNB’s corporate relationship to SNC as to any efforts by the Remainder Beneficiaries to use evidence of that relationship or the financial condition of SNC as a basis for awarding punitive damages against SNB. On the other hand, the court finds that the Remainder Beneficiaries may properly introduce evidence that assets of the Trust included securities of SNC corporation, the parent company of SNB, for the limited purpose of showing how the Trust assets were treated, including attempting to show that SNB improperly liquidated other assets rather than SNC securities to pay estate taxes. To this limited extent, evidence that SNC is the parent company of SNB is probative of issues in this case and that probative value is not outweighed by the danger of any unfair prejudice to SNB. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (permitting the court to exclude relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice). Such limited evidence will be admitted for this limited purpose. Therefore, SNB’s February 1, 2005, Motion In Limine To Preclude Plaintiffs From Introducing, Or Making Any Reference To, Defendant’s Corporate Relationship With Security National Corporation (docket no. 136) will be granted in part and denied in part, as explained above. 9. Stock indices The ninth motion now before the court is SNB’s February 1, 2005, Motion In Limine To Preclude Use Of The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index As A Benchmark For Damages (docket no. 137). The Remainde