Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SWAIN, District Judge. This is a class action lawsuit brought by mentally disabled tenants and occupants of New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”) public housing who have been subject to eviction proceedings. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and damages, asserting that defendants NYCHA, Tino Hernandez (as Chairman of the NY-CHA) and Stuart G. Laurence (as Hearing Officer for the NYCHA) (collectively, “Defendants”) have violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Rehabilitation Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Plaintiffs also seek declaratory and injunctive relief as to each named Plaintiff in connection with NYCHA tenancy termination or eviction proceedings that were apparently pending as of the time the Amended Class Action Complaint (the “Complaint”) was filed. The Court has jurisdiction of Plaintiffs’ federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Court has reviewed and considered thoroughly the parties’ thousands of pages of evidentiary and argumentative submissions in connection with the instant motions. For the following reasons, the parties’ motions are granted in part and denied in part. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs’ claims in this action arise from NYCHA’s handling of tenants and occupants with mental disabilities, and tenancy problems allegedly arising from such disabilities, both in the context of legal proceedings directed toward termination of tenancies or eviction and in interactions leading up to such proceedings. Plaintiffs argue that NYCHA fails to recognize and accommodate appropriately mental disabilities, including tenancy problems allegedly arising from such disabilities, and that the mentally disabled are denied due process in the context of administrative tenancy termination proceedings arising from lease or public housing rule violations and in court proceedings brought by NYCHA on account of non-payment of rent. Both these claims and the defenses that have been raised focus on NYCHA’s procedures (or alleged lack thereof) for conducting tenancy-related legal proceedings and for dealing with actual or suspected mental disabilities in connection therewith. Accordingly, the following general background section of this opinion will deal primarily with NYCHA’s procedures. The parties’ factual contentions regarding events or proceedings specific to particular named Plaintiffs or class members ■ will principally be addressed in the body of the opinion, in connection with specific legal issues. The following facts are undisputed unless characterized as claims or allegations. Defendant NYCHA is a public benefit corporation established to provide housing to low-income New York City residents. (Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ l.) NY-CHA owns and manages more than 340 housing projects consisting of more than 3,000 buildings containing more than 180,-000 apartments, in which more than 600,-000 individuals reside. (Id. ¶ 2.) As part of its responsibilities in maintaining the public housing units, NYCHA is charged with the duty of terminating the tenancies of residents who violate the terms of their leases or housing rules or regulations. (Id. ¶ 3.) The relevant rules and lease terms include prohibitions on criminal drug use on or near NYCHA’s properties and tenant obligations to act in a manner that will be conducive to maintaining the housing project in “a decent, safe and sanitary condition.” See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (2005) (detailing required lease terms for public housing units). Some of the lease provisions are required by federal law, which also requires strict attention to rent payment and collection issues. Plaintiffs are members and representatives of a class of NYCHA residents with mental disabilities who have been subject to tenancy termination or eviction actions. Judge Denny Chin of this Court certified the plaintiff class in this litigation pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by order dated December 1, 1999, which provides that the class is comprised of: Present, past and future tenants and/or occupants with mental disabilities who reside, resided or seek to reside in housing owned and operated by NYCHA and are, were or may be the subject of administrative grievances and/or tenancy termination proceedings and/or eviction proceedings in housing court or appeals from NYCHA’s administrative determinations in State Supreme Court. In the case of past tenants and occupants with mental disabilities, they are members of the class only if the proceedings against them were pending at some point within the three-year period prior to the filing of this action. Blatch et al. v. Franco et al., No. 97 Civ. 3918(DC), Docket item no. 40 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1999). As will be explained infra in greater detail, Plaintiffs claim in their Complaint that class members’ rights under the Due Process Clause and the above-cited civil rights statutes have been violated in connection with administrative grievance, administrative tenancy termination and/or Housing Court non-payment or eviction proceedings commenced by NY-CHA. A. Tenancy-Related Legal Proceedings The challenged NYCHA legal actions generally follow one of two tracks. In cases of alleged lease or NYCHA tenant conduct rule violations, NYCHA may initiate internal administrative termination of tenancy proceedings, in which lease or rule violation charges are brought and adjudicated within NYCHA’s administrative structure, and through which lease rights may be terminated, prior to seeking a judgment of possession and warrant of eviction in Housing Court. Where the issue is non-payment of rent, NYCHA may commence non-payment proceedings seeking a judgment of possession, and eventual eviction, directly in Housing Court without prior internal administrative proceedings. The two types of proceedings are not mutually exclusive and, depending on the factual circumstances of a particular tenancy, both types of proceedings may be pursued with respect to a given tenant. (Plaintiffs’ Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 4-6.) For instance, internal administrative tenancy termination proceedings may be initiated based on “chronic rent delinquency” where a tenant has repeatedly been late in paying rent. A non-payment proceeding may be commenced based on default on a single rent payment. Similarly, tenants who have allegedly violated lease terms or NYCHA conduct rules may have also defaulted on rent. See Dep. of Ynoemia Cruz, Vol. VI of Plaintiffs’ Exhibits, at 34 (non-payment proceedings); Ex. A to Gra-ziano Decl. (N.Y.CHA Tenancy Termination Procedures) (hereinafter “Termination Procedures”). NYCHA’s procedures in connection with both types of actions include administrative efforts to effect practical resolution of the tenancy or non-payment issues with respect to both disabled and non-disabled tenants. Such efforts consist principally of contact with family members or outside agencies with which the tenant may already be involved (e.g., welfare agencies, social workers, or the Protective Services for Adults (“PSA”) division of New York City’s Human Resources Administration (“HRA”)) in efforts to obtain rent payment coordination or support, or other supportive services that may, with the tenant’s cooperation, obviate rule infraction problems like unsanitary housekeeping. See, e.g., Dep. of May Law Wong (PX VI) at 24 (all tenants with eviction proceedings are referred for social services); Dep. of Frances Buitrón (PX VI) at 65 (Social Services department “cannot mandate a resident to accept services”); Cruz; Dep. (PX VI) at 74 (referral to Social Services department if tenant is “at risk” for any reason; “our intention is not to evict anyone, it is- to solve the problem”). Defendants represent that sixty percent of the administrative tenancy termination proceedings brought during 1998 “were resolved through the efforts of the housing managers working with the tenants and appropriate social services agencies,” and that “[l]ess than five percent ended with an actual eviction.” (Graziano Decl. at ¶ 26.) The principal features of NYCHA’s tenancy-related legal procedures, and those of certain procedures NYCHA has adopted for dealing with tenancy-related problems of mentally disabled persons, can be summarized as follows. 1. Administrative Tenancy Termination Procedures NYCHA’s current procedures for administrative tenancy terminations were first adopted through a consent decree entered in Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970), and were later modified by further consent decrees. Those procedures define a multi-level process. When a problem arises with a tenancy, the first step is for the project’s Housing Manager (or an assistant or other representative working under the manager’s supervision) to interview the tenant in order to discuss the problem that could lead to termination of the tenancy and, when appropriate, assist the tenant by securing outside help, including from social services agencies. (Termination Procedures; DR 56.1 ¶ 8.) If the project manager continues to believe that tenancy termination is warranted, he or she sends the tenant’s file and a written recommendation to NYCHA’s Tenancy Administrator, who, if he or she agrees that termination may be necessary, sends the file to NYCHA’s Law Department to prepare a notice of charges, setting forth the grounds for termination and a hearing date. (DR 56.1 ¶ 8.) The written notice of charges includes notice to the tenant that he or she may be represented at the hearing by counsel or anyone else of his or her choosing and that the hearing is important because it may result in eviction. (Id.) Specifically, the notice states that a recommendation has been made that the individual’s tenancy be terminated for the reasons identified in an attached specification of charges, that a hearing is to be held, and includes additional information, some, of which is printed in capital letters, as follows: At the hearing, you may appear in person-with such witnesses as you may desire, AND BE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL OR OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF YOUR CHOICE. If you desire legal representation and cannot afford a lawyer, it is suggested that you contact one of the agencies which provide free legal services. A copy of the procedures covering these proceedings is enclosed for your information. ■ IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU REALIZE THAT THIS HEARING. WILL BE THE ONLY OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, THAT THE DETERMINATION BASED THEREON MAY RESULT IN YOUR EVICTION, AND THAT SUCH DETERMINATION MAY NOT BE CHALLENGED IN THE LANDLORD-TENANT COURT. ACCORDINGLY, IF YOU DESIRE TO CONTEST THE ABOVE CHARGES, YOU MAY REPLY TO THIS NOTICE AND APPEAR AT THE HEARING. OTHERWISE, YOU WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED YOUR RIGHT TO SUCH A HEARING. (Ex. B to Aff. of Todd Hyman.) The administrative hearing is conducted by an Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”). At the administrative hearing, NYCHA’s position is advocated by a representative of its Law Department; the Law Department proffers portions of the tenant record for consideration by the IHO, witness testimony may be presented and cross-examined, and documentary evidence may be presented. Subpoenas are to be issued if requested by the tenant or tenant’s representative. Before the hearing concludes, the tenant or tenant’s representative is permitted to make a statement in mitigation as to why the tenancy should not be terminated, including matters relating to a family situation or extenuating circumstances. (Termination Procedures §§ 6, 7; NYCHA Management Manual (PX 1/5) at 23.) The IHO considers only the evidence proffered by the parties and does not raise issues that are not contested by the parties or that would call for additional evidence. {See, e.g., Dep. of Stuart G. Laurence (PX VI) at 51, 62-63,125,134.) NYCHA does not provide the IHO with any tenant history or other information in NYCHA’s possession that may indicate that the tenant suffers from a mental disability. {See, e.g. id., at 65, 69, 123, 125, 141,142; Dep. of Eddie Emeric (PX VI) at 27.) The IHO renders a written decision following the hearing, based solely on the testimony, documents and physical evidence presented at the hearing. If the tenant does not appear at the hearing, the IHO makes a written decision based on the record proffered by the NYCHA representative. (Termination Procedures § 8; DR 56.1 ¶ 9.) If the IHO finds that any charge has been proven, the IHO has the power to make dispositions ranging from termination of tenancy, to “probation,” to “[e]ligible [for continued tenancy] with referral to Social Services.” (Termination Procedures § 10.) A copy of the decision and recommendation is sent to the tenant. (DR 56.1 ¶ 11.) The IHO’s decision is binding on NYCHA and can be implemented immediately, but is subject to review by the members of the Board of the Housing Authority (the “Board”). NYCHA policy provides that, in reviewing the IHO’s decision, the Board “shall be limited to whether the decision of the [IHO] is contrary to any applicable ... law or violates ... Authority procedures by reason of any procedural irregularity.” (Termination Procedures § 11.) The Termination Procedures provide that, upon the tenant’s application within a reasonable time after the default, the IHO can reopen the default and set a new hearing date “for good cause shown.” {Id. § 8; Management Manual (PX 1/5) at 24.) Paul Graziano, NYCHA’s General Manager, asserts that the tenant is required to show “a reasonable excuse for failing to appear and a meritorious defense to the charge against his tenancy” in order to have a default vacated. (Graziano Decl. ¶ 18.) IHOs do not advocate for either side and do not have authority to appoint guardians for tenants who are the subject of termination proceedings. (Decl. of Joan Pannell ¶ 6; Laurence Dep. at 90.) They do, however, have authority to adjourn proceedings. (Termination Procedures § 5.) Although a December 1997 policy memorandum instructs IHOs to stop and adjourn hearings if a tenant “appears to be incapable of adequately defending his rights and ... is unrepresented,” IHOs are not trained in recognizing the symptoms of mental illness, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that IHOs have been trained to apply any uniform standards in determining whether a tenant appears to be incapable of defending his or her rights. (See December 1,1997, Memorandum to Impartial Hearing Officers from Ronald J. Segedy (“Segedy Memorandum”), Ex. G. to Expert Rep. of Dr. Robert L. Goldstein; Laurence Dep. at 97-99.) A tenant may challenge NYCHA’s administrative determination by commencing an Article 78 proceeding in state court within four months of NYCHA’s determination. (Management Manual (PX 1/5) at 28.) Following an NYCHA determination that terminates a tenancy, NYCHA may issue a Notice to Vacate and, if the tenant does not vacate in response to the notice, may commence a summary holdover proceeding in Housing Court to evict the tenant. The merits of the underlying administrative proceeding cannot be reliti-gated in the holdover proceeding. (See Management Manual (PX 1/5) at 27-28, 43-51.) 2. Non-Payment Proceedings Where a tenant has failed to pay rent on a timely basis and NYCHA wishes to pursue a judgment for the arrears and for possession of the unit on that basis, neither NYCHA’s administrative tenancy termination procedures nor the Escalera decision requires NYCHA to conduct internal hearings or other proceedings. Rather, NYCHA may initiate a summary “NonPayment of Rent” proceeding in Housing Court, seeking a judgment of possession terminating the tenant’s right to occupy the premises and, upon the tenant’s failure to pay the rent arrears within the time allotted, a warrant of eviction. (DR 56.1 ¶ 16; PR 56.1 ¶¶ 16-19; Management Manual (PX 1/5) at 54-58.) Once a Final Judgment of Possession is entered in Housing Court, NYCHA may seek a warrant for the resident’s eviction. (PR 56.1 ¶ 19.) There is nothing in the record to indicate that NYCHA, which is represented in Housing Court proceedings by its Law Department, provides the tribunal with information in its possession indicating that a tenant against whom it is seeking relief may be mentally disabled, even if the tenant does not appear for the Housing Court proceeding and NYCHA consequently seeks a judgment of possession by default. Nor does it appear that NYCHA has any procedures for requesting that the Housing Court provide a tenant in need of such representation with a guardian ad litem or advocate in connection with the summary proceedings. Under certain circumstances, NYCHA brings the proceeding to the attention of outside social services agencies, such as PSA, which may seek to intervene on the tenant’s behalf or obtain the appointment of a guardian. The warrant of eviction is executed by a City Marshal after a 72-hour notice of eviction is served on the tenant. (Management Manual (PX 1/5) at 64.) NYCHA’s procedures call for it to notify the Marshal that tenants who are elderly, mentally or physically disabled, or mentally or emotionally disturbed, are “at risk” when NY-CHA seeks execution of a warrant of eviction. (Management Manual (PX 1/5) at 62; Ex. H. to Goldstein Rep.) The Marshal’s procedures upon such notification call for an effort to obtain preventive or supportive services for the “at risk” tenant through PSA. (Ex. H to Gold-stein Rep.) PSA sometimes prevents such evictions by paying a tenant’s rent arrears. NYCHA asserts that PSA generally only makes such payments after a warrant of eviction has been issued, and frequently waits until the eve of eviction before taking action on a tenant’s behalf. {See, e.g., PR 56.1 ¶¶ 133,147.) B. NYCHA’s Provisions for Mentally Disabled Residents in Connection with Tenancy Proceedings NYCHA has no specific procedure for offering accommodations or rule modifications to mentally disabled tenants in connection with the conduct of either administrative termination hearings or Housing Court proceedings. However, NYCHA has adopted procedures for soliciting self-identification of disabled persons who are seeking accommodations, and has also adopted special procedures for dealing with lease termination issues involving the mentally disabled. Some of the procedures were adopted after the instant class action litigation was commenced. 1. Self-Identification by Persons Seeking Accommodations On an annual basis, NYCHA solicits self-identification by disabled residents (including identification of disabled household members) and requests for accommodation through a “Disability Status and Notice of Reasonable Accommodation” form that is included in NYCHA’s annual income-verification mailing to tenants. (DR 56.1 ¶ 17; Ex. D to Goldstein Rep.; Graziano Decl. ¶ 18.) Although Plaintiffs contend that the text of the form is insufficient to notify recipients that accommodations for mental disabilities are available (and is thus unlikely to elicit appropriate responses by or on behalf of the mentally disabled), some 15,192 residents had, as of August 23, 2000, used the form to identify one or more members of their household as mentally disabled. (DR 56.1 ¶ 18; Declaration of Saul Mackler ¶ 5.) It is also clear that some persons with mental disabilities, including some of the named Plaintiffs in this action, do not identify themselves as disabled and do not affirmatively request accommodations. Such reluctance to self-identify is often a byproduct of the mental condition itself or a fear of stigma associated with identification as mentally disabled. (Dr. Zonona Expert Report (PX VII) at 4-5; see also, e.g., Declaration of Dr. Philip J. Hauptman (PX VII) at ¶¶ 57, 66, 98, 102.) NYCHA also maintains a Department of Equal Opportunity (“DEO”), which is designed to assist disabled residents in securing housing accommodations as well as in understanding management policies and procedures and other issues related to the residents’ housing needs. (DR 56.1 ¶ 19.) DEO has a designated Section 504 Coordinator, who implements an internal grievance procedure to resolve discrimination complaints and who provides an additional level of review for project-level decisions regarding requests for reasonable accommodation. (Id.; Graziano Decl. ¶¶ 30-31.) NYCHA asserts that there are several safeguards within its tenancy termination and non-payment eviction procedures that protect the constitutional and statutory rights of residents with mental disabilities. These include consultations with project management and case reviews before administrative termination proceedings are commenced, references of tenants to NY-CHA’s Social Services department as liaison to outside agencies for financial or other support, either before or during the course of termination or non-payment proceedings, and a Memorandum of Understanding pursuant to which NYCHA notifies the HRA well in advance of certain “at risk” evictions. 2. 1995 NYCHAJHRA Memorandum of Understanding The 1995 Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between NYCHA and HRA provides that NYCHA is to notify HRA 45 days before its proposed date for eviction, in connection with non-payment proceedings, of any “at risk” tenant who is a recipient of welfare benefits from the Department of Social Services. Pursuant' to the MOU, NYCHA is not to go forward with the eviction if the full rent arrears amount stated in the notice is paid within the 45 day period, but NYCHA reserves the right to take further legal action if the payment does • not cover additional amounts of accrued rent postdating the notice. (MOU (PXII/9) ¶¶ 1-3.) Plaintiffs • assert that the 1995 MOU’s use of welfare benefit recipient status as the eligibility criterion for this procedure skews the protections of this program against the mentally disabled. According to Plaintiffs, most mentally disabled tenants receive federal SSI disability benefits rather than welfare. Indeed, it is undisputed that the named Plaintiffs are on SSI rather than welfare. (See, e.g., Goldstein Rep. at 13 (Alsaa), 17 (Bryer), 19 (Cruz), 22 (Smalls), 27 (Morton), 29 (Mortimer), 35, 39 (Blatch brothers).) The MOU further provides that, in tenancy termination proceedings involving tenants whom NY-CHA deems “mentally incapacitated” (regardless of whether such tenants are welfare recipients), NYCHA must notify PSA after NYCHA’s Department of Resident Review and Counseling (apparently the predecessor to the current Tenancy Administration Division of Operation Services (“OSTA”)) “receives and does an initial evaluation on a case referred to it for termination, but before the tenancy is terminated,” if the tenant has not previously been referred to PSA. The MOU makes no particular provision for action by PSA under such circumstances. (MOU ¶ 4.) NYCHA maintains no policy or procedure, in writing or otherwise, that addresses the subject of competence to advocate on one’s behalf. (Defs’ Resp. to Not. of Dep. on Written Questions at Q. 35 (PX 11/15).) 3. Procedures Instituted After Commencement of This Litigation Since the commencement of the instant litigation, NYCHA has published two memoranda setting forth additional procedures to be followed in tenancy termination cases involving mentally disabled residents: the December 1997 Segedy Memorandum regarding the conduct of proceedings before IHOs; and an April 1999 General Memorandum regarding evaluations and preventive actions in connection with contemplated administrative tenancy terminations. (a) Segedy Memorandum As noted above, the Segedy Memorandum to IHOs directs that if, during the course of the hearing, the tenant “(1) appears to be incapable of adequately defending his rights, and (2) is unrepresented,” the IHO should terminate the session, adjourn the healing, and refer the matter to OSTA for initiation of an evaluation through NYCHA’s Social Services division. The memorandum continues: If the evaluation of Social Services indicates that the tenant does not require referral to PSA, the [IHO] may continue the hearing on the adjourned date. If Social Services evaluates the tenant as requiring referral to PSA, Social Services or OSTA will notify PSA and the hearing office. The [IHO] should not recommence the hearing where a tenant has been referred to PSA until either PSA indicates that (s)he is not eligible under their guidelines or appropriate arrangements have been made for a guardian and/or representative. Segedy Mem. (Ex. B to Graziano Decl.) at 2. Frances Buitrón, the Administrator of NYCHA’s Social Services division, testified that she believes that PSA’s eligibility criteria cover physically or mentally impaired people who do “not have any outside assistance.” (Buitrón Dep. (PX VI) at 9, 15, 43.) The Segedy Memorandum does not offer any instructions as to how the IHO should deal with the conduct of the resumed hearing in the event the OSTA/PSA reference does not result in guardianship or representation and the tenant still “appears incapable of adequately defending- his rights.” Defendant L'aurence, an IHO, testified that in such an event he would continue to adjourn the hearing until instructed by the NYCHA as to how to proceed. (Laurence Dep. (PX VI) at 57, 163.) The record does not contain any indication that NYCHA’s procedures include protocols for IHO determinations as to tenant competency to defend tenancy termination proceedings or provide IHOs with tools other than adjournments and Social Services division referrals to address directly competency issues when they do arise. (b) GM-3630 General Memorandum 3630, entitled “Termination of Tenancy: Mentally'Incapacitated Tenant” (“GM-3630”), establishes a procedure under which a project Housing Manager (or delegate)’who is considering commencing proceedings for termination of a tenancy is to refer a tenant suspected of having a mental disability to NYCHA’s Social Services division for a written evaluation of the individual’s mental capacity and suggested “corrective action” if possible, prior to the institution of termination proceedings. (GM-3630, Apr. 29, 1999 (PX 11/11) at I, II.) GM-3630 provides for such referrals for tenants “who may be mentally incapacitated.” It defines “mentally incapacitated”' by reference to circumstances when, based on information in the tenant’s file or personally known to NYCHA personnel, it appears that because of mental disease or defect the tenant: • may be unable to provide for his/her needs and is likely to suffer -harm or cause harm to others; • is hospitalized for a serious psychiatric or psychological disorder; or • has exhibited seriously confused or disordered thinking that may render him/her incapable of understanding the termination of tenancy hearing process and defending against the charges. (Id. at II.) The Housing Manager is to submit a request to NYCHA’s Social Services division for a written evaluation of the tenant’s mental capacity “as well as a proposal for corrective action, if feasible.” (PX 11/11 at IIIA.) GM-3630 -identifies “arranging for financial management, cleaning and/or housekeeping services, communication with family members or community-based social workers, [and] identification and request for the intervention of community based case management services” as examples of “[r]easonable corrective action.” (Id. at IVA2.) The Social Services division is to determine whether the tenant is mentally incapacitated, utilizing a referral to a Professional Consultant retained by NYCHA for a psychiatric evaluation and determination of mental capacity if necessary. The consultant’s report is required to indicate “whether the appointment of a guardian or other representative is necessary if proceedings to terminate the tenancy would be commenced within the next 180 days.” Social Services is not required to take any further action if the consultant’s report “indicates that the tenant is incompetent and unlikely to benefit from corrective action.” (Id. at IVAl.) If, however, the consultant’s evaluation indicates that the tenant is competent, the Social Services staff worker is to “submit a proposal detailing corrective action that might assist in resolving the tenancy problems.” (Id. at IVA2.) The results of the Social Services evaluation are to be reported back to the Housing Manager. GM-3630 forbids the Housing Manager to forward the case to OSTA for termination processing before a report is received from Social Services; the report is to indicate “whether the tenant appears capable of understanding the termination of tenancy hearing process and responding to the charges, or whether a guardian or other representative is required.” (Id. at IIIA, IVB.) If Social Services has informed the Housing Manager that “corrective action is not feasible,” the Housing Manager can forward the case to OSTA for termination processing. The forwarded file is to include details as to the reasons for initiation of the Social Services referral. (Id. at HID.) GM-3630 further provides that, if Social Services does intervene but the problem persists, the case may be forwarded for termination within a one-year period without requiring any further Social Services evaluation. (Id. at HIE.) OSTA staff are required to “screen cases to determine whether the tenant has been evaluated for mental capacity” and, where the Social Services report recommends the appointment of a law guardian, forward the case to NYCHA’s Law Department “for the purpose of obtaining a guardian.” The case is to be forwarded into termination proceedings only after the Law Department notifies OSTA that a g-uardian has been appointed. (Id. at V.) If OSTA receives a case in which there has been no evaluation and “the tenant appears to be mentally incapacitated,” OSTA is to stop the termination proceeding and refer the case to Social Services for evaluation. (Id.) GM-3630 further provides that if, at the hearing stage, the IHO or NYCHA legal representative “has reason to suspect that the tenant may be mentally incapacitated” and there has been no Social Services evaluation, the hearing is to be stayed, OSTA notified, and a Social Services referral initiated by OSTA. GM-3630 also provides for a Social Services referral in the event an IHO reopens a default if the application is made “on the ground of mental incapacity.” (Mat VI.) Plaintiffs proffer, based on their review of documents produced by NYCHA in this action, that as of the time this motion was briefed, there was no evidence that any corrective action plan had ever been developed or implemented for a mentally disabled tenant. (Sealed Deck of Samuel B. Davol at ¶ 21.) As discussed infra in more detail, Plaintiffs have proffered evidence that, notwithstanding GM-3630 referrals of a number of class members, NYCHA instituted tenancy termination or non-payment proceedings against those class members prior to the completion of any evaluation of their capability to participate in the proceedings. Deposition testimony by members of NY-CHA’s project management and Social Services staff indicates a significant level of confusion regarding the responsibilities of the respective units and the standards applicable to determinations of mental incapacity or incompetency. See n. 14 sivpra and evidence cited therein. Compare Bui-trón Dep. at 74 (PX VI) (Social Services Administrator testifies that it is not role of herself or staff to determine whether a person is mentally incapacitated) with GM-3630 at IVA1 (Social Services staff to “[tjake appropriate steps needed to determine whether or not the tenant is mentally incapacitated”). See also, e.g., Cruz Dep. (PX VI) at 22 (Housing staff refer to Social Services if they think someone “might need help”), 27 (would refer under GM 3630 if, for example, person appeared to be hallucinating or if there is documentation from a psychiatrist or “or something” indicating mental impairment); Buitrón Dep. (PX VI) at 93 (use of “PSA” criteria to determine whether mental incapacity determination should be requested); Emeric Dep. (PX VI) at 38-39 (Housing Assistant testifies that tenant would have to “act crazy” for him to perceive mental disability), 51 (same person has never read or heard of GM-3630); Sevilla Dep. (PX VI) at 63 (Housing Assistant disclaims knowledge of procedure regarding commencement of termination proceedings against person with mental disability), 83 (same person believes that Social Services division determines, after referral, whether GM-3630 should apply). (c) Procedures in Connection with Non-Payment Proceedings GM-3630 does not apply to non-payment proceedings, which are commenced directly in Housing Court. (See GM-3630, § I; PX 11/10 (Defs’ interrogatory responses).) According to the Assistant Director of OSTA, when a tenant is designated as “at risk,” the case is not processed (i.e., pursued in Housing Court) until the tenant has been in arrears for four months. (Reissig-Lazzaro Decl. ¶ 10.) It appears that in such non-payment cases NYCHA obtains relief in Landlord-Tenant Court, up to and including issuance of a warrant of eviction, but then will “notify HRA of the balance owed and grant them an additional 45 days after service of the warrant [of eviction] to permit HRA to assist the tenant in curing the breach.” (Id.) Yvonne Behlin, Assistant Manager of NY-CHA’s Non-Payment Review Unit similarly testified that at-risk referrals are not made until after Housing Court non-payment proceedings have been commenced. (Behlin Dep. (PX VI) at 22, 76-77.) If NYCHA obtains a judgment of possession and a warrant of eviction is issued before the rent arrears are paid “or HRA otherwise intervenes,” NYCHA’s procedure calls for notification of the City Marshal that the matter is an ‘at risk’ eviction when the warrant is forwarded for execution. (Reissig-Lazzaro Decl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs have proffered evidence, however, that in a number of cases in which NYCHA had initiated competency evaluation proceedings or had what Plaintiffs contend was clear evidence of mental disability, warrants of eviction were not flagged as “at-risk” cases. (Sealed Davol Decl. ¶¶ 14, 30.) II. DISCUSSION Cross-motions for summary judgment are now before the Court. Summary judgment is to be granted in favor of a moving party where the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is considered material in this context “if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and an issue of fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir.2001) (internal citation omitted). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court does not engage in fact-finding or weighing of credibility, but determines whether any material questions of fact are in dispute after resolving all ambiguities and drawing all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Carlton v. Mystic Transp. Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir.2000). Where, as here, there are cross-motions for summary judgment, “[e]aeh movant must present sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of proof on all material facts.” Morris v. New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 129 F.Supp.2d 599, 605 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (citing Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 236 (2d Cir.1988)). Conelusory allegations, conjecture and speculation will not, however, suffice to create a genuine issue of fact. Kerzer v. Kingly Manufacturing, 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir.1998). A. Overview of Plaintiffs’ Claims Plaintiffs allege that class members’ rights to due process have been violated in a number of respects in connection with tenancy termination, non-payment and related proceedings. Specifically, they assert that Defendants’ failure to suspend all such proceedings with respect to all class members “pending the appointment of a qualified attorney, a Guardian Ad Litem or some other representative who is experienced in NYCHA tenancy termination proceedings, Housing Court matters and the rights of people with mental disabilities, for the Plaintiff class ... deprived the Plaintiff class of the opportunity to adequately represent themselves and retain their homes in violation of them rights under the Due Process Clause,” the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the FHAA. (First Cause of Action, Compl. ¶ 214.) They further assert that Defendants’ “failure to establish a mechanism for suspending administrative termination of tenancy and grievance hearings, settlement negotiations, Housing Court proceedings and Article 78 proceedings, pending the appointment of a qualified attorney, a guardian ad litem or some other representative who is experienced in NYCHA tenancy termination proceedings, Housing Court matters and the rights of people with mental disabilities, for NYCHA tenants with mental disabilities” violates the Due Process Clause, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the FHAA. (Second Cause of Action, Compl. ¶ 216.) Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants’ alleged “failure to make any reasonable accommodations in its [sic] practice [sic], rules, regulations and procedures for the named Plaintiffs’ and the Plaintiff class’ mental disabilities in lieu of, or when it initiates, prosecutes and conducts, administrative termination of tenancy and grievance hearings (including issuing terms and conditions short of eviction), settlement negotiations, Housing Court proceedings and Article 78 proceedings violates the Due Process Clause,” the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the FHAA. (Third Cause of Action, Compl. ¶ 218.) Plaintiffs further assert that Defendants’ entry into settlements with class members “and termination of their tenancies is arbitrary and capricious, lacks substantial evidence, and violates the Due Process Clause,” the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the FHAA. (Fourth Cause of Action, Compl. ¶ 220.) Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief includes requests that the Court enter a variety of declarations and injunctions nullifying or overturning as arbitrary and capricious and lacking in substantial evidence various state court orders, settlement stipulations and/or administrative orders entered in proceedings involving the named Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs and Defendants, respectively, seek summary judgment as to all of these claims. B. Due Process Claims The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. Violations of the constitutional protection by persons acting under color of state law are actionable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The Supreme Court has identified the factors to be considered in determining what process is due where a protected property interest is in jeopardy: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Id. at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)). 1. Protected Interest The parties do not dispute the tenant-Plaintiffs’ satisfaction of the first element of the Mathezvs test; there is no question that such Plaintiffs have an important private interest in retaining their public housing lease and occupancy rights. Defendants contend, however, that class members who are merely occupants of NYCHA units do not have rights in the public housing that are protected by the due process clause, citing well settled New York state law holding that a relative of a tenant can be removed from premises without being made party to an eviction proceeding brought against the tenant. See Loira v. Anagnastopolous, 204 A.D.2d 608, 612 N.Y.S.2d 189 (2d Dep’t 1994). Plaintiffs fail to proffer relevant authority to the contrary. They rely principally on two bankruptcy court decisions holding that persons with “colorable” rights as “remaining” family members under regulations of the federal Housing and Urban Development Department have rights to grievance hearings to determine their “remaining” family member status prior to eviction. See Fonseca v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 110 B.R. 191 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.1990); Adams v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 94 B.R. 838 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.1989). In both of those eases, the principal tenant had died or moved out of the public housing unit and the debtor claimed to be the remaining adult family member entitled to a grievance process under the regulations. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that the “occupant” members of the Class are in such a factual position. In that the regulation at issue in the bankruptcy court cases characterizes the remaining family members covered by the rule as “tenants” in any event, the Court’s conclusions here with respect to the rights of tenant class members embrace such occupants. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ due process claims will be granted insofar as those claims are asserted on behalf of “occupants” who are not tenants of record. 2. Other Matthews v. Eldridge Factors The strength of the Government’s interest in fair and efficient administration of public housing is not a matter of particular dispute. The parties’ disagreements as to the magnitude of the risk of erroneous deprivations, the incremental value of additional protective measures, and the nature and degree of burden that additional procedural requirements would entail are attributable principally to their different perspectives on the nature of rights to due process. Defendants take a holistic and result-oriented approach to the analysis, arguing that their numerous mechanisms for consultations, evaluations, referrals to outside social services agencies, and the like have, in the cases of most if not all class members, ultimately staved off eviction, thus obviating any due process problem and rendering superfluous any additional. protections sought by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, focusing on the trial-type proceedings that are the basis for determinations negatively affecting class members’ leasehold and occupancy rights, and on stays, reversals or vacaturs of those determinations after third-party intervention in the proceedings, argue a clear showing of risk of erroneous and avoidable deprivations. While NYCHA’s approach emphasizes salutary practices that, if properly and consistently implemented, may preclude the development of due process issues by staving off termination proceedings or be of great assistance to class members in preventing actual eviction, it misperceives the core due process question. The due process inquiry is properly focused on the contested-hearing phase of the various proceedings affecting tenants’ legal rights and thus on the essential due process question identified in Mathews v. Eldridge—whether the affected interest-holder is afforded meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in connection with the termination of protected rights. It is from this latter perspective that the Court will analyze the parties’ contentions in connection with Plaintiffs’ due process claims. 3. First and Second Causes of Action: Due Process Claim Concerning Necessity of Appointed Representation The Court first takes up Plaintiffs’ broadest claims — that NYCHA’s failure to appoint a guardian ad litem or some other expert representative in connection with each tenancy-related proceeding involving a mentally disabled person, and to suspend all such proceedings pending appointment of such guardians or representatives, violates the Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs have failed to proffer evidence from which a rational factfinder could conclude that due process requires absolute entitlements and procedural bars of this sort in every such proceeding. While Plaintiffs have offered evidence (some of which will be discussed in more detail below) of incidents in which named Plaintiffs were, or appeared to be, unable to understand or respond appropriately to charges in the context of hearings, or failed to attend hearings because of emotional or other personal problems, there is no evidence of record from which a factfinder could rationally conclude, without engaging in unwarranted and unseemly stereotyping, that each and every member of this broadly-defined class of persons is so incapable of rational thought and coherent communication as to require the appointment of expert representation in order to enjoy a meaningful opportunity to be heard with regard to tenancy termination. Plaintiffs have therefore failed to frame a genuine issue of material fact as to whether due process requires the appointment of a guardian or other expert representative in every matter involving the tenancy of a mentally-disabled person, and the suspension of all tenancy-related grievance and termination proceedings pending such appointment, in connection with all such proceedings involving members of the class. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is, accordingly, granted as to the due process claims asserted in Plaintiffs’ First and Second Causes of Action. 4. Third Cause of Action — Due Process Claim Concerning Failure to Make Accommodations Plaintiffs point to facts that they contend demonstrate a variety of failures to provide meaningful notice or opportunity to be heard in connection with terminations of tenancies, grievance proceedings affecting tenancies, non-payment proceedings, warrant execution proceedings, and settlements affecting class members’ tenancies. The Court will discuss the parties’ evidence and arguments in the context of the various aspects of the proceedings that have been challenged. (a) Administrative Termination of Tenancy Proceedings As explained earlier, NYCHA maintains a complex internal administrative process, which includes adjudicative proceedings, for terminating tenancy rights for reasons other than non-payment of rent. The decision to take action adverse to a tenant’s rights (whether termination or some sanction short of termination) is made by an IHO, subject to limited review by NYCHA’s Board. The IHO conducts a trial-type hearing and makes his or her determination based on the record developed at the hearing. As NYCHA itself informs tenants in its hearing notices, “THIS HEARING WILL BE THE ONLY OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, ... THE DETERMINATION BASED THEREON MAY RESULT IN ... EVICTION, AND ... SUCH DETERMINATION MAY NOT BE CHALLENGED IN THE LANDLORD-TENANT COURT.” (E.g., PX III/59 (December 11, 1995 Notice to Kenneth/Kelvin Blatch).) The IHO is not an advocate for either side, and does not play a role in developing the record. If the tenant does not appear at the hearing, the IHO makes the determination solely upon the record as presented by NYCHA. Tenants must be afforded proper notice of these hearings in consideration of their circumstances or limitations, as well as a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the hearings. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349, 96 S.Ct. 893. “All that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to ‘the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.’ ” Id. (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970)). The undisputed evidence of record is sufficient to establish that NYCHA’s procedures were, prior to the Segedy Memorandum, and remain, generally insufficient to protect the right of tenant class members to a meaningful opportunity to be heard in opposition to NYCHA’s efforts to terminate or otherwise affect adversely their tenancies through the administrative process. The material undisputed evidence can be summarized as follows. NYCHA does not present to IHOs information, known to NYCHA, that may indicate the presence of a mental disability on the part of the tenant. Furthermore, pri- or to December 1997, NYCHA had no formal procedures in place for evaluating the potential mental disability or competency of a tenant prior to the institution of tenancy termination proceedings, nor did NYCHA have any formal procedures authorizing IHOs to adjourn hearings and direct that referrals be made for such purposes. Defendant IHO Laurence’s practice during that period was to go very slowly if there [was] a perceived mental defect, an effort to adjourn the case, to encourage a relative or legal service to enter the matter, or to encourage the Housing Authority to bring in [PSA], And absent a capital P procedure, to move very slowly and see that individuals are protected as best they can be. My own mandate, at least until told these new capital P procedures [ (referring to the Segedy Memorandum) ], was to protect tenants in public housing. So, if somebody has a vermin harborage or fire hazard, or is causing great danger to his neighbors, that is a concern of mine. Nonetheless, always to move very slowly and protect the respondent, and explain anything to him or her. Laurence Dep. at 29-30. The transcript of a 1996 hearing involving named Plaintiff Kenneth Blatch reflects just such an approach, in a situation in which the unrepresented tenant clearly gave delusional and irrational responses to Laurence’s questions and (although NYCHA did not inform Laurence of the fact) NYCHA had long been aware of major psychiatric problems on the part of Blatch and his brother Kelvin. The Blatch brothers were both named in a notice proposing to terminate their tenancy for Non-Desirability on account of Kenneth’s arrest in the lobby of their NYCHA building with a vial of crack. Kenneth appeared at the hearing, accompanied by his aunt (who is now acting as his Next Friend in the instant litigation), a cousin and a social worker. Kelvin did not appear. The hearing transcript reveals that IHO Laurence did indeed try to speak slowly and clearly and to explain the charges to Kenneth. IHO Laurence even tried to suggest responses to Kenneth that might have provided bases for rejecting the Non-Desirability charge. (See Tr. of March 12, 1996 Hearing, Ex. C to Decl. of Karen Constant (“Blatch Tr.”) at 6-7.) Kenneth instead, testified that he was a lawyer, Jesus Christ, a New York City Police Officer, a “cardinal in the Christian Church,” a medical doctor, and “in personal contact with the President of the United States of America,” and that he was “the only reason why people can walk the streets in New York City.” (Id. at 8-9, 11, 19-20, 25-26.) He also testified that he had “been attending a group called mentally ill crack addicted young adults at the Harlem Out Patient Clinic” and that the social worker in attendance at the hearing was “in charge of the group.” (Id. at 10.) He made a number of statements against his own interest relating to crack smoking, despite IHO Laurence’s admonitions to him that he had “said too much,” that he “should just think before you speak” and that Laurence “only want[ed] to know good things about” Blatch. (Id. at 13, 15.) Blatch rebuffed Laurence’s attempts to persuade him to let one of the accompanying people act as his representative. (Id. at 20-21.) The aunt testified, but was largely unresponsive to Laurence’s attempts to elicit mitigating information from her. Neither the social worker nor the cousin testified. Laurence made no inquiry as to Blatch’s brother Kelvin’s whereabouts even though Kelvin was named as a respondent in the specification of charges. Despite Laurence’s specific queries to Kenneth and his aunt regarding Kenneth’s “apparent schizophrenia” and whether there was any “legitimate medication” he could take, Laurence did not inquire into whether Blatch was competent to represent himself and his brother, and the lawyer representing NYCHA proffered none of the extensive information in NYCHA’s possession regarding the brothers’ psychiatric history, including their extensive history of involvement with PSA and the New York State Department of Mental Health and the appointment of a guardian ad li-tem in connection with an earlier NYCHA attempt to evict them. (See id. at 35-39; Constant Decl. at 3; PR 56.1 ¶¶ 201-209; and NYCHA records referenced in Rep. of Philip Hauptman ¶ 50 (PX VII).) Rather, the NYCHA lawyer responded to Laurence’s observation that “notwithstanding [Blatch’s] very severe problems, ... he really doesn’t bother other people” and query as to whether there is “anything you can do for this man” and his “unfortunate” brother by “insisting]” on tenancy termination on the grounds that Kenneth was “a clear and present danger not only to his fellow tenants and to himself, but to the Project community at large.” (Blatch Tr. 35-36.) Laurence’s written post-hearing decision, which was adopted by NYCHA’s Board, found both Blatches ineligible for continued occupancy on grounds of Non-Desirability and breach of tenant rules and regulations and terminated the tenancy of both Blatches. Laurence’s decision both acknowledged that “Kenneth is seriously mentally ill [and] Kelvin, less so” and found that Kenneth had “waived” his rights to counsel or other representative and to have the charges read. Laurence further found the charges “deemed proven” based upon Kenneth’s testimony. (March 19, 1996 Decision and Disposition of Hearing Officer (PX III/62); April 3, 1996 NYCHA Determination of Status for Continued Occupancy (PX III/63)). NY-CHA thereafter commenced a holdover proceeding against the Blatches in Housing Court. (November 15, 1996 Notice of Petition Holdover Licensee-Squatter (PX III/64).) It was the Blatches’ cousin, not NYCHA’s representative, who informed the Housing Court on the first court date that the Blatches “had mental problems.” The Housing Court adjourned the matter in contemplation of PSA involvement. A guardian ad litem was eventually appointed, and a settlement was entered into after this class action litigation was commenced. (Constant Decl. ¶¶ 11-13; PR 56.1 ¶¶ 220, 222.) The transcript of the Blatches’ tenancy termination hearing makes it plain that Kenneth Blatch was not competent to represent himself, much less his brother, and that the subsequent determination to terminate their tenancy was made in violation of their due process right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard in connection with the deprivation of their tenancy rights. Indeed, Defendants’ expert consultant reached the conclusion upon reading the transcript that Kenneth “was incompetent at the time ... I would say he was incompetent to make any legal decisions at the time” and, after this litigation was commenced, NYCHA’s Deputy General Counsel recommended that the Board rescind the termination of tenancy decision “because the tenant, who attended the hearing without a representative or a guardian, has mental disabilities such that he cannot adequately defend his rights.” (Goldstein Dep. (PX VIII § -2); August 14, 1997 Mem. to Members of the Board (PX III/ 65).) NYCHA conducted a similarly problematic tenancy termination process in 1996 in the case of named Plaintiff Julia Gott-lieb. Gottlieb, who was 71 at the time the motions were briefed, has been diagnosed with Schizoaffective Disorder and possible early dementia. Her conditions affect her thought processes, conduct and speech (PR 56.1 ¶¶ 278-281.) She does not acknowledge her mental disability or have insight into the problems it causes. (Id. ¶ 281.) NYCHA has been aware of Gott-lieb’s disability since 1985 and acknowledged in 1993 and 1994 that her mental condition had led to poor housekeeping problems that created unsafe conditions. (Id. ¶¶ 284-288; Memoranda dated March 28, 1994 and August 16, 1994 (PX PV/86).) It is undisputed that Gottlieb hoarded clothing and garbage in her apartment, creating sanitary and fire hazards, and that she had refused to accept cleaning and counseling services from agencies NY-CHA had contacted on her behalf. NYCHA commenced a termination of tenancy proceeding against Gottlieb by serving notices of tenancy termination charges on Gottlieb in August and November of 1996. The Specification of Charges accused Gottlieb of Non-Desirability and chronic breaches of rules and regulations, all relating to failure to keep her apartment clean and uncluttered. (PX IV/93.) Gottlieb appeared, unrepresented, for a hearing before IHO Laurence on December 20, 1996. She repeatedly informed Laurence that she would like to have a lawyer and would prefer not to represent herself; Laurence instructed her to “stop talking,” and asked her to admit or deny the charges. (Gottlieb Tr. (PX IV/94) at 3-5.) Laurence asked her questions about the housekeeping charges and problems. Her answers were rambling and largely non-responsive and Laurence again instructed her to “stop talking” on numerous occasions. (Gottlieb Tr. at 6-12.) Laurence then invited her to testify, explaining that “the burden is on you to show me how and why you should stay in this apartment.” Her response was to blame her husband' for the clutter, ask for an opportunity to clean, sing a Christian hymn and relate anecdotes about her family members. (Id. at 13ff.) Laurence inquired of the NYCHA representatives whether NY-CHA was willing to clean the apartment or have PSA clean it, but he made no inquiry into Gottlieb’s psychiatric history or competency. NYCHA offered no information concerning Gottlieb’s known psychiatric problems. (Id. at 10 ff.) On December 30, 1996, Laurence issued his written decision as follows: Tenant admits the charges and they are deemed proven. Julia Gottlieb argued that she will, in her own time, clean up her apartment, but offered no testimony or other evidence that could persuade the hearing officer of her bona fides. Tenant is clearly disturbed and unable to manage her own affairs. The hearing officer hopes that she will allow the Authority into her apartment to effect a general cleaning and perhaps forestall her eviction. Nonetheless, on the current record the Housing Authority must have the right immediately to terminate this tenancy as it constitutes both a vermin harborage and fire hazard neither of which can be lawfully tolerated. Laurence specified “termination” as the disposition. (PX IV/95.) NYCHA’s Board adopted Laurence’s decision and ordered the tenancy terminated on January 22, 1997. (Id.) NYCHA commenced a holdover petition against Gottlieb on July 15, 1997, and did not inform the Housing Court of Gottlieb’s psychiatric problems. After Gottlieb obtained legal representation and filed an Article 78 proceeding through counsel, the Housing Court action was marked off the calendar; a guar