Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION KRAVITZ, District Judge. This case arises out of a bitter dispute between Plaintiff Justin D. Radolf, M.D., a tenured professor, and his colleagues at the University of Connecticut Health Center (“UCHC”) and the University of Connecticut School of Medicine. It is regrettable that this dispute has required a judicial resolution. All parties involved originally came together in a common effort to direct their time, energy and passion towards the greater public good— conducting research that may one day find a cure for Lyme disease, a debilitating tick-borne illness that affects many people in Connecticut and beyond. Now, it appears that much of the time, energy and passion of the parties has been redirected towards this destructive, accusation-laden battle. Indeed, the relationships among the parties have deteriorated so much that frankly no court is capable of providing a remedy that truly would heal the parties’ wounds and put them all back on track towards realizing their collective goal of improving public health. Yet, the parties remain locked in this bitter fight, and so, a judicial answer appears to be the only one that is available at this time. Dr. Radolfs First Substituted Complaint [doc. # 18] has eight counts (which are a combination of federal and state causes of action), and his Second Substituted Complaint [attached to doc. #34] has two additional counts (both of which are federal causes of action). Dr. Radolf seeks prospective injunctive relief against the Defendants in their official capacities and monetary damages against the Defendants in their individual capacities. Currently pending before the Court are Defendants’ two Motions for Summary Judgment [docs. # 52 & # 55] on all ten of Dr. Ra-dolfs federal and state law claims. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for the Defendants on all of Dr. Radolfs federal claims and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Dr. Radolfs state law claims. I. Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). A genuine issue of fact exists when “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and facts are material to the outcome if the substantive law renders them so. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party carries its burden, the party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon mere allegations or denials,” rather the opposing party must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The Court must draw all ambiguities and inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. II. The basic facts of this case .are not in serious dispute. Dr. Radolf joined the faculty of the UCHC as a tenured professor in April 1999 in order to establish the UCHC Center for Microbial Pathogenesis (the “Center”) and to serve as its Director. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶¶ 11-13; Pl.’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc; # 65], at ¶¶ 11-13. Defendant Peter J. Deckers, M.D., is the Executive Vice President for Health Affairs of the UCHC and Dean of the University of Connecticut School of Medicine. Defendant Richard Berlin, Ph.D., is Associate Dean for Research Planning and Coordination at UCHC. Defendant Stephen Wikel, Ph.D., is a full professor with tenure in the Department of Physiology at UCHC and the Interim Director of the Center for Microbial Pathogenesis. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶¶ 1, 6, 7; ■ Pl.’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶¶ 1, 6, 7. On July 26, 2001, a Special Review Board of the UCHC found that Dr. Radolf had falsified data in two grant proposals submitted to the United States Department of Agriculture and to Connecticut Innovations, Inc. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶ 16; PL’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶ 16. As a result of this finding of academic misconduct, Dr. Radolf was disciplined by the University: a letter of reprimand was placed in his personnel file and he was placed on academic probation for three years. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶¶ 17-18; PL’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶¶ 17-18. By letters dated August 22, 2001 and December 27, 2001, Dr. Deckers informed Dr. Radolf of the procedures by which his grants, contracts, and philanthropic proposals would be thoroughly inspected and reviewed by a committee of faculty members during his academic probation, to ensure compliance with all applicable regulations and the integrity of all research data presented. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶¶ 17, 20; PL’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶¶ 17, 20; see also Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at Affidavit of Peter J. Deckers, Attach. 4 (August 22, 2001 letter from Dr. Deckers to Dr. Radolf) & Attach. 5 (December 27, 2001 letter from Dr. Deckers to Dr. Radolf). Furthermore, in and around October 2001, the Federal Office of Research Integrity (“ORI”), part of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, independently began its own investigation of this incident of academic misconduct. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶ 22; PL’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶ 22. Approximately a year and a half later, on March 10, 2003, Dr. Radolf and ORI entered into a Voluntary Exclusion Agreement, in which Dr. Radolf admitted that he had engaged in scientific misconduct involving research supported by the National Institute of Health (“NIH”). Though neither the UCHC nor the Defendants was a party to the Voluntary Exclusion Agreement or involved in its negotiation, they were subject to its requirements. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶ 159; PL’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶ 159. According to the terms of the Voluntary Exclusion Agreement, Dr. Radolf was placed on academic probation for a period of five years (ie., until March 2008) regarding his participation in certain activities connected to the United States Public Health Service. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶¶ 155, 158; PL’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶¶ 155, 158. As required by ORI, the UCHC submitted to ORI a “Supervisory Plan to Ensure the Scientific Integrity of Dr. Justin Radolfs Research Contribution as Required in the Radolf-ORI Agreement” (the “Supervisory Plan”), which was designed to ensure compliance with all applicable regulations and the integrity of all research data Dr. Radolf presented in grant proposals. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶ 162; PL’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶ 162; see also Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 57], at Affidavit of Peter J. Deckers, Attach. 7 (April 4, 2003 letter from Dr. Deckers to Dr. Radolf, with Supervisory Plan attached). The UCHC’s Supervisory Plan, which was similar to the UCHC procedures already in place at the time, was reviewed and refined by ORI prior to implementation. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶ 163; PL’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶ 163. Dr. Radolf continues to be employed as a full professor with tenure at UCHC and he may still work at the Center for Microbial Pathogenesis, though the parties were unclear about that latter fact at oral argument on January 31, 2005. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶ 8; Pl.’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶ 8. At their core, Dr. Ra-dolfs claims in this lawsuit arise from the actions and decisions of the Defendants in their attempt to navigate the difficult terrain of continuing to employ a tenured professor who was on academic probation imposed by the UCHC and under investigation by the federal government for scientific misconduct, an investigation which eventually resulted in an extended term of academic probation. Additional facts regarding the nature and context of the Defendants’ actions and decisions will be presented as necessary in the Court’s analysis of each of Dr. Radolfs claims. III. The Court turns first to Dr. Radolfs seven federal claims. At the outset, the Court notes from the record before the Court and as confirmed at oral argument, that because of Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity, Dr. Radolf has wisely abandoned any and all federal claims against Defendants University of Connecticut (“UConn” or the “University”) and UCHC, as well as any and all claims for money damages against the Defendants in their official capacities. See also Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Summ. J. [doc. # 70], at 77. Therefore, judgment shall enter for Defendants UConn and UCHC on all Dr. Radolfs federal claims, and for the other Defendants on Dr. Radolfs federal claims insofar as they seek money damages from these Defendants in their official capacities. As a result of Dr. Radolfs concession, the only federal claims that remain are claims against Drs.- Deckers, Berlin and Wikel in their individual capacities. The parties have provided the Court with reams upon reams of paper in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and one need not look far into this mountain of paper to find factual disputes (though the Court notes, to its great dismay, that a good deal of the parties’ submissions and factual disputes involve- the scientific intricacies of tick research). But the presence of a factual dispute does not prevent an award of summary judgment. Rather, only the existence of genuine issues of material fact precludes summary judgment, and in deciding whether a factual dispute is actually material, a court must look at the claim alleged and assess it against existing law. As the Supreme Court observed in Anderson, supra. [b]y its very terms, [the summary judgment] standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original) (quoted in part in Burt Rigid Box, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 302 F.3d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir.2002)). A careful analysis of Dr. Radolfs many federal claims confirms that, even giving Dr. Radolf the benefit of all reasonable inferences, there are no issues of disputed fact regarding his federal claims that are material and thus Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. A. In Count 1 of Dr. Radolfs First Substituted Complaint [doc. # 18], he claims that Drs. Deckers and Berlin violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights by not granting him a pre-decision hearing on reinstating him as Director for the Center of Microbial Pathogenesis — a position Dr. Radolf admits he voluntarily resigned on January 13, 2002. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶ 40; Pl.’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶ 40. At oral argument, Dr. Radolfs counsel conceded that this claim was actually asserted only against Dr. Deckers — the ultimate decision maker on whether Dr. Radolf would be reinstated as Center Director. Accordingly, judgment shall enter for Dr. Berlin on Count 1 of the First Substituted Complaint [doc. # 18]. “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires [a court] to (1) determine whether the claimant has a property interest, then (2) determine whether [he] received adequate process before being deprived of that interest.” Harhay v. Town of Ellington Bd. of Educ., 323 F.3d 206, 212 (2d Cir.2003) (citing Ciambriello v. Cty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir.2002)). “While property interests are constitutionally protected, they are not generally constitutionally established.” Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 85 (2nd Cir.2005) (emphasis in original). Rather, property interests under the Due Process Clause are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. To determine whether a contractual right can be characterized as a constitutionally protected property interest, a court must look to whether the interest involved would be protected under state law and must weigh the importance to the holder of the right. However, not every contractual benefit rises to the level of a constitutionally protected property interest. Harhay, 323 F.3d at 212 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Ezekwo v. NYC Health & Hospitals Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 782, 783 (2d Cir.1991)). “[T]enured public employees have a constitutionally protected property interest in their employment.” Harhay, 323 F.3d at 213 (citing DeMichele v. Greenburgh Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 167 F.3d 784, 789 (2d Cir.1999)). Unfortunately, both parties expend a significant amount of time (and paper) arguing over the contractual nature of the agreement between Dr. Radolf and Dr. Deckers regarding Dr. Radolfs original appointment to the position of Center Director, in an attempt to demonstrate whether Dr. Radolf would or would not have a federally protected property interest in that position. See generally Defs.’ Mem. in Support of Summ. J. [doc. # 53], at 4-10; Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Summ. J. [doc. # 70], at 2-12; 55-63. But that is not the issue before the Court, and therefore, this Court need not, and does not, decide whether the. Due Process Clause would protect Dr. Radolf in any effort by the Defendants to remove him from the Directorship. See, e.g., Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 318 (holding that a municipal employee’s “expectation of continued employment” in a certain position “rises to the level of a constitutionally protected property interest,” joining “a number of other circuits that have concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a property interest in a particular position or rank.”); Ezekwo, 940 F.2d at 783 (“the special nature of the Chief Resident designation” as well as “the ‘policies and practices’ of the institution were such that an entitlement to the position of Chief Resident existed” that implicated the Due Process Clause); Malla v. Univ. of Connecticut, 312 F.Supp.2d 305, 321-22 (D.Conn.2004) (“On these facts, if proved, the Court believes that, under controlling Second Circuit law, [plaintiff] had a federally protected property right in his position as Campus Director for UConn of the Consortium.... While not every contractual benefit rises to the level of a constitutionally protected property interest, UConn’s policies, and practices were such that an entitlement to the position of Campus Director existed.”) (internal quotations, citations, and footnote omitted). But see Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 929, 117 S.Ct. 1807, 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997) (leaving open the question of “whether the protections of the Due Process Clause extend to discipline of tenured public employees short of termination.”). Dr. Radolfs due process claim is not about what process was required before he could be removed from the Directorship of the Center for Microbial Pathogenesis because, as he readily admits, he voluntarily relinquished that title and position in January 2002. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶ 40 (“By letter dated January 13, 2002, plaintiff voluntarily removed himself, from the Director position.”); Pl.’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶ 40 (“Admit that by letter dated January 13, 2002, the plaintiff informed Deckers of his decision ‘to relinquish temporarily [his] position as Director of the Center for Microbial Pathogenesis for personal reasons.’ ”); see also Pl.’s Index of Exs. [doc. #-66], at Exhibit 6 (letter dated January 13, 2002 from Dr. Radolf to Dr. Deckers, in which Dr. Radolf relinquishes the Directorship of the Center for Microbial Pathogenesis). Instead, Dr. Radolfs due process claim is limited to what process the Constitution required when he sought to regain that position after he had relinquished it. Dr. Radolf argues that he has a property interest in regaining the position of Center Director and that the Due Process Clause required Dr. Deckers to give Dr. Radolf a hearing before Dr. Deckers decided not to reappoint Dr. Radolf to that position. The Court disagrees with both premises of Dr. Radolfs argument. First, Dr. Radolf cites no case that has found a property right in getting a job back that one previously relinquished. Once Dr. Radolf removed himself as Center Director, he became no different from any other professor seeking a discretionary appointment to an administrative post, a subject that is governed by the University By-Laws. The applicable section of the University By-Laws on additional duties of UConn’s professional staff states as follows: While members of the professional staff of this University are employed for a variety of duties, as a general rule the University will expect to assign to each full-time member of the professional staff duties which are reasonable and consistent with good and effective teaching practices at both the undergraduate and graduate levels.... Assignment of duties will be made by the appropriate deans, directors, and department heads, subject to review as to general policy by the Provost and Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs or the Executive Vice President for Health Affairs or Vice President and President. In so far as it is possible, consistent with the development of a balanced offering of University services, these assignments should take into account the aptitudes and wishes of individual staff members and their opportunities for long-run professional development. Laws, By-Laws and Rules of UConn, art. XV, § L(l) (revised Aug. 3, 2004), quoted in Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 57], at ¶ 14. The plain language of the University By-Laws cited above demonstrates that the assignment of additional duties, such as the Directorship of the Center, is entirely at the discretion of the deans, directors, and department heads, subject only to general policy review by the upper echelons of the university management structure. Given the governing provisions of the University By-Laws, none of which Dr. Radolf disputes, the Court concludes that Dr. Radolf had no protectable property interest in a discretionary reappointment as Director of the Center for Microbial Pathogenesis. As the Second Circuit held in Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318 (2d Cir.1996), where, as here, “the complained-of conduct concerns matters that are within an official’s discretion, entitlement to that benefit arises only when the discretion is so restricted as to virtually assure conferral of the benefit,” a situation that is not presented in this case. Id. at 323; see, e.g., Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188, 193 (2d Cir.1994) (“Indeed, we previously have stated that, if state law makes the pertinent official action discretionary, one’s interest in a favorable decision does not rise to the level of a property right entitled to procedural due process protection.”) (internal quotations omitted); Petrario v. Cutler, 187 F.Supp.2d 26, 35 (D.Conn.2002) (“[A] property interest does not exist solely because of the importance of the benefit to the recipient. The existence of provisions that retain for the state significant discretionary authority over the bestowal or continuation of a government benefit suggests that the recipients of such benefits have no entitlement to them.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Russo v. City of Hartford, 158 F.Supp.2d 214, 223 (D.Conn.2001) (“A person does not have a property interest in the ... discretionary benefits of their employment”). See also Double I Ltd. P’ship v. Plan & Zoning Comm’n of Glastonbury, 218 Conn. 65, 78, 588 A.2d 624 (1991) (“A statute or ordinance providing procedural guarantees does not create a constitutionally protected property interest unless it sets forth substantive criteria that limit the discretion of the decision-making body.”). Second, even if Dr. Radolf did have a protectable property right in getting back what he had previously voluntarily relinquished, the Constitution would not require Dr. Deckers to conduct a hearing before deciding not to appoint Dr. Radolf to that position. To determine whether the Constitution requires a pre-decision hearing under the circumstances of this case, the Court must balance three factors set forth in the Supreme Court’s well known decision in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976): First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Id. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893 (quoted in Harhay, 323 F.3d at 213; Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 319-20). The relevant private interest is Dr. Ra-dolfs interest in being reappointed to a directorship he voluntarily relinquished. Not only does the Court doubt that this is a legally cognizable property interest, the Court also notes that the parties agree that Dr. Radolf did not experience any reduction in salary or fringe benefits or any monetary harm when he stepped down as Director; nor did he suffer a reduction in lab space or institutional support. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶ 171; PL’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶ 171; but see Radolf Transcript [doc. # 68], at 25 In. 21-25 & 26 In. 1-5 (when asked “Were you separately compensated for the position of directorship?” Dr. Radolf responds that “I believe that the salary I was offered was commensurate with the additional responsibilities of being a center director. And that’s not the only form' of compensation, I might add, because the research resources that were provided to me as part of the package I considered to be compensation, too, and were clearly related to the fact that I was going to be setting up a center.”). Cf. Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 320 (plaintiff “has alleged that, as a result of the demotion, he suffered a demotion in grade and a reduction in salary and benefits, among other things.”). The Directorship undoubtedly may carry intangible benefits in prestige and honor. See, e.g., Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Summ. J. [doc. # 70], at 60 (“I regard [the Directorship] as a tremendous honor”), at 63 (“It is not speculation to assert that there is a special importance in the academic community to being the Director of the Center for Microbial Pathogenesis.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). On the whole, however, the Court is skeptical that such intangible benefits are sufficiently compelling to require a hearing before a decision is made on appointing á professor to the position of Center Director. Furthermore, in the education and employment context, “[c]ourts have held that [] post-deprivation procedures, [such as] providing for a hearing to contest a challenged employment decision, are sufficient to satisfy due process.” Harhay, 323 F.3d at 213 (citing Narumanchi v. Bd. of Trustees, 850 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir.1988)). Here, Dr. Radolf had an array of University-sanctioned post-decision processes available to him if he wished to contest Dr. Deckers’ decision not to reappoint him as Center Director. Specifically, the UCHC has adopted a Faculty Grievance Procedure, set forth in the University By-Laws, which allows a faculty member to present a grievance regarding promotion, tenure and reappointment to a Faculty Review Board made up of elected UCHC peer faculty of senior rank. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶ 15; Pl.’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶ 15; see also Laws, ByLaws and Rules of UConn, art. XV, § T (describing, in detail, the Health Center Faculty Grievance Procedure), found in Defs.’ Reply to Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n [doc. # 92], at Ex. 3. Dr. Radolf could have filed a grievance with the Health Center’s Faculty Review Board, and if he was dissatisfied with the Review Board’s decision, he could also have appealed the decision first to the Health Center’s Appeals Committee, and then ultimately to UConn’s Board of Directors. See id. Yet, by his own admission, Dr. Radolf never filed a grievance pursuant to the Faculty Grievance Procedure and therefore, never availed himself of any of the post-decision processes provided by Defendants. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶ 44; Pl.’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶ 44. Of course, Dr. Radolf was not required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to exhaust state remedies before bringing his federal claims. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982) (“exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983”) (cited in Taylor v. Vermont Dep’t of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 789 (2d Cir.2002)). However, the existence of these post-decision procedural safeguards does bear on whether the Constitution requires Defendants to provide the additional safeguard of a pre-decision hearing. There simply has been no showing that the available post-decision processes are inadequate to prevent erroneous or unfair decisions on whether to reappoint a professor, such as Dr. Radolf, to a discretionary administrative post he had previously relinquished. In short, Dr. Radolf has “fail[ed] to articulate any way in which the [University’s] established procedures failed to provide [him] with adequate procedural protection.” Harhay, 323 F.3d at 213. Finally, as articulated by Dr. Radolfs counsel at oral argument, the pre-decisional “hearing” that Dr. Radolf envisioned was simply having Dr. Deckers meet with Dr. Radolf to explain why he was not being reappointed as Center Director. Dr. Radolf apparently does not seek a formal pre-decision hearing in which he could plead his case. While such a meeting would not represent a significant burden on the University and would certainly have been the courteous thing to do, the question here is whether the Constitution required Dr. Deckers to provide Dr. Radolf with such a meeting. Because, in these circumstances, Dr. Radolfs private interest is not strong and because the probable value of adding the procedural requirement of a meeting is minimal in view of the much more meaningful post-decision processes already available to Dr. Radolf, the Court concludes that Dr. Deckers did not violate Dr. Radolfs constitutional rights by not meeting with Dr. Radolf before deciding not to reappoint him as Director of the Center for Microbial Pathogenesis, a position from which he had previously resigned. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count 1 of the First Substituted Complaint [doc. # 18]. B. In Count 2 of the First Substituted Complaint [doc. # 18], Dr. Radolf alleges that his First Amendment right to academic freedom was violated when Drs. Deckers and Berlin prevented him from participating in the formulation of a grant proposal to the Department of Defense entitled “Anti-vector vaccines to control mosquito and tick transmitted diseases” (the “DOD Grant”), and in subsequent research funded by that grant. See First Substituted Compl. [doc. # 18] at ¶ 229. The Court disagrees. It is important at the outset to emphasize precisely what Dr. Radolf claims was a violation of his First Amendment right to academic freedom. He does not assert that Defendants prevented him from teaching or performing research on any subject matter. Nor does he claim in Count 2 that Defendants retaliated against him for engaging in protected First Amendment activities, by, for example, denying him the opportunity to participate in a grant available to others because of his speech on matters of public concern. See generally Konits v. Valley Stream Cent. High Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir.2005); see also Part III.E, infra (analyzing Count & of the First Substituted Complaint [doc. # 18] — Dr. Radolf s First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants regardirig separate conduct). Rather, Dr. Radolf asserts that he had a constitutional right, derived from and based on the First Amendment right to academic freedom, to participate in research projects for which he was qualified, and Defendants violated that right when they allegedly denied Dr. Radolf the opportunity to participate in the DOD Grant. There are plenty of factual disputes on the nature of the research in the DOD Grant, and on whether and/or why Dr. Radolf was denied participation in this research project. Compare Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc., # 54], at ¶¶ 45-54, 56-80, 82, 88-89, 100, 106-107, 110, 112-13, 115; with Pl.’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶¶ 45-54, 56-80, 82, 88-89,100, 106-107, 110, 112-13, 115. For purposes of summary judgment, the Court draws all ambiguities and inferences in favor of Dr. Radolf, and thus accepts his version of the events surrounding the DOD Grant. Yet, as will be apparent below, the Defendants are still entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because in the circumstances of this case, Dr. Radolf has no First Amendment academic freedom right to participate in writing a particular grant proposal or performing research under a particular grant. The general right to academic freedom is a “First Amendment protection that has long been recognized in the academic arena.” Hayut v. State University of New York, 352 F.3d 733, 745 (2d Cir.2003). Neither “students [nor] teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). And while “courts should accord deference to academic decisions, for decades it has been clearly established that the First Amendment tolerates neither laws nor other means of coercion, persuasion or intimidation ‘that cast a pall of orthodoxy’ over the free exchange of ideas in the classroom.” Dube v. State Univ. of New York, 900 F.2d 587, 598 (2d Cir.1990) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967)). However, courts understandably have been hesitant to define the precise contours of the First Amendment right to academic freedom. See, e.g., Univ. of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 198, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (“Fortunately, we need not define today the precise contours of any academic-freedom right Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir.1982) (“The precise contours of the concept of academic freedom are difficult to define.”)• The right to academic freedom is often formulated as a right of a university or other academic institution to be free from government interference with its curriculum and its decisions on who may or may not teach or be admitted to study. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304 (2003) (“We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”); Univ. of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 197 (characterizing the “so-called academic-freedom cases” as cases where the “government was attempting to control or direct the content of the speech engaged in by the university or those affiliated with it”); Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n. 12, 106 S.Ct. 507, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985) (“Discretion to determine, on academic grounds, who may be admitted to study, has been described as one of ‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university.”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result) (“It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four essential freedoms of a university- — -to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir.2000) (“Our review of the law, however, leads us to conclude that to the extent the Constitution recognizes any right of ‘academic freedom’ above and beyond the First Amendment rights to which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres in the University, not in individual professors.”). In some instances, however, courts have acknowledged that an individual professor or student possessed an individual right to academic freedom. See, e.g., Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460, 467 (2d Cir.2001) (“Dube serves as a caution to governmental administrators not to discipline a college teacher for expressing controversial, even offensive, views lest a pall of orthodoxy inhibit the free exchange of ideas in the classroom.”) (citing Dube, 900 F.2d at 589, 598) (internal quotation omitted); East Hartford Ed. Ass’n v. Bd. of Ed. of East Hartford, 562 F.2d 838, 843 (2d Cir.1977) (“Freedom to teach in the manner of one’s choice is a form of academic freedom that is universally recognized, if not invariably protected, at the college level.”). And some courts have also suggested that the right of academic freedom may extend to research done in a laboratory. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir.1982) (academic freedom “extends as readily to the scholar in the laboratory as to the teacher in the classroom.”) (quoted in McMillan v. Togus Reg’l Office, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 294 F.Supp.2d 305, 317 (E.D.N.Y.2003)). Nonetheless, what is clear from the available case law in this admittedly amorphous area of First Amendment jurisprudence is that no court has ever held that a university professor has a First Amendment right of academic freedom to participate in writing any particular grant proposal or performing research under any particular grant. Indeed, Dr. Radolfs counsel conceded that fact at oral argument. The cases Dr. Radolf cites in support of his argument all concern a public actor (a university or other government entity) either directly forbidding a teacher from teaching a particular subject or preventing a researcher from performing research on a certain subject, or otherwise chilling the teacher’s or researcher’s expressive rights — factual circumstances that are not even alleged here. See, e.g., Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604, 87 S.Ct. 675 (holding that a law seeking to root out Communists from the state teaching ranks was unconstitutional, because “[wjhen one must guess what conduct or utterance may lose him his position, one necessarily will steer far wider of the unlawful zone. For the threat of sanctions may deter almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions. The danger of that chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First Amendment rights must be guarded against by sensitive tools which clearly inform teachers what is being proscribed.”); Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 680 (6th Cir.2001) (addressing the termination of a professor for an allegedly sexist and raeially-derogatory in-class discussion, finding that “a teacher’s in-class speech deserves constitutional protection” and “a professor’s rights to academic freedom and freedom of expression are paramount in the academic setting”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Vega, 273 F.3d at 467 (addressing “the extent to which a college professor could be disciplined for permitting student speech in a classroom to exceed reasonable bounds of discourse”); Rubin v. Ikenberry, 933 F.Supp. 1425, 1433 (C.D.Ill.1996) (“Academic freedom refers to the freedom of university professors and the university administrators to function autonomously, without interference from the government. It also refers to the freedom of individual teachers to not suffer interference by the administrators of the university.”) (citations omitted); Levin v. Harleston, 770 F.Supp. 895, 925 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“Academic tenure, if it is to have any meaning at all, must encompass the right to pursue scholarship wherever it may lead, the freedom to inquire, to study and to evaluate without the deadening limits of orthodoxy or the corrosive atmosphere of suspicion and distrust ... ”), aff'd in part, vacated in part by 966 F.2d 85 (2nd Cir.1992); Cooper v. Ross, 472 F.Supp. 802, 813 (D.C.Ark.1979) (“The present case is particularly difficult because it involves a fundamental tension between the academic freedom of the individual teacher to be free of restraints from the university administration, and the academic freedom of the university to be free of government, including judicial, interference.”). Cf. Dow Chemical, 672 F.2d at 1275 (addressing the question of the extent to which administrative subpoenas seeking enormous amounts of primary data would “threaten substantial intrusion into the enterprise of university research,” stating that “there are several reasons to think they are capable of chilling the exercise of academic freedom”). Dr. Radolf does not allege, and certainly has not submitted any evidence, that Defendants denied Dr. Radolf participation in the DOD Grant to silence or chill his research on the subject matter of the grant proposal. To the contrary, he was free to investigate the subject of the DOD Grant as he chose, and apparently he continues to do so. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶¶ 114, 116 (undisputed facts that Dr. Radolf is conducting similar research as that done in the DOD Grant with colleagues at the University of Rhode Island and Yale University, continues to have access to- and conduct research with ticks); Pl.’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶¶ 114, 116. Furthermore, there is no evidence that either Dr. Radolf s personal financial situation, his academic resources or even his research has suffered at all because he was unable to participate in this particular DOD Grant. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶¶ 171, 172 (undisputed facts that. Dr. Radolf is still a tenured faculty member, has not had his salary or fringe benefits reduced, has not suffered a reduction in lab space or institutional support, and has received pay increases); Pl.’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶¶ 171, 172. In the circumstances, therefore, the Court does not believe that Dr. Radolf had a First Amendment right of academic freedom to participate in the DOD Grant. In any event, even if the Court is wrong and Dr. Radolf did have a First Amendment right to participate in the DOD Grant, Defendants would nonetheless have qualified immunity from his claims in this lawsuit because that supposed constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the events in question — or, for that matter, even today. “[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (citations omitted) (quoted in Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 101 (2d Cir.2003)). Thus, the “qualified immunity doctrine protects government officials from suits seeking to impose personal liability for money damages based on unsettled rights or on conduct that was not objectively unreasonable.” Connell v. Signoracci, 153 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir.1998) (quoted in Sadallah v. City of Utica, 383 F.3d 34, 37 (2d Cir.2004)). According to the Second Circuit, a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity requires the court to engage in a three-step inquiry: (1) Has the plaintiff alleged a violation of a constitutional right?; (2) Was the violated right clearly established at the time of the conduct?; and (3) If the plaintiff had a clearly established constitutional right that was violated, did the plaintiff show that defendant’s actions were not objectively reasonable? Lorusso v. Borer, 359 F.Supp.2d 121, 129-30 (D.Conn.2005) (citing Harhay, 323 F.3d at 211-12). Here, even if the Court erred in concluding that Dr. Radolf did not have a First Amendment right of academic freedom entitling him to participate in the DOD Grant, the Defendants would nonetheless have qualified immunity from any personal liability because this particular alleged variant of the First Amendment right to academic freedom was not clearly established at the time of the Defendants’ conduct. In fact, as previously noted, Dr. Radolfs counsel rightly conceded at oral argument that no court had ever previously recognized such a right. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on .Count 2 of the First Substituted Complaint [doc. # 18]. C. In Count 3 of the First Substituted Complaint [doc. # 18], Dr. Radolf also claims that Drs. Deckers and Berlin infringed his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process when they barred him from participating in the DOD Grant proposal. The Court has already set forth the standards for a procedural due process claim in Part III.A, supra, and need not do so again here. At issue in Count 3 is whether Dr. Radolf has established that he has a property interest in participating in the DOD Grant proposal. See, e.g., Harhay, 323 F.3d at 212. The Court concludes that he does not. Under the undisputed facts of this case, it is clear that participation in the DOD Grant proposal was a discretionary benefit that cannot support a procedural due process claim. To be clear from the outset, Dr. Radolf does not claim he was originally designated as the lead researcher in the DOD Grant proposal or was nominated to receive particular grant funds until Drs. Deckers and Berlin denied him the position of lead researcher or took away the research funds that he was supposed to receive under the DOD Grant. Therefore, whether in those circumstances Dr. Radolf would have an expectation in continued participation in the grant that the Due Process Clause would protect, is not the question before the Court. For Dr. Radolf himself admits that Drs. Deckers and Berlin have not taken any grant funding away from him, nor has Dr. Radolf been removed from the position of Principal Investigator on any funded grant. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶ 108; Pl.’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶ 108. Here, Dr. Radolf simply alleges that Drs. Deckers and Berlin decided not to allow Dr. Radolf to participate in formulating the DOD Grant proposal or in receiving DOD Grant funds. The question before the Court, therefore, is whether Dr. Radolf has a protectable property interest in participating in a grant of his choosing. Dr. Radolf cites no provision of state law and no section of the University ByLaws that establish a tenured professor’s cognizable property interest in participating in research grant proposals of his or her choice. Rather, according to the University By-Laws, Dr. Deckers, as Executive Vice President for Health Affairs and Dean of the Medical School, appears to be the member of the UCHC with the greatest discretion over personnel assignments and the distribution of research funding, and Dr. Radolf does not dispute this fact. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶ 3 (“Per University ByLaws, Article VIII.D [sic ], the Executive Vice President for Health Affairs [“EVP”] is responsible to the President for the coordination and formulation of policies and administration of administrative, business and other support department [sic] at the Health Center. The EVP shall, among other things: appoint those members of the University faculty and staff who report to him, approve the selection and adjustment in service of all personnel under his jurisdiction, be responsible for all monies and funds of the University Health Center regardless of their source and make provision for an accurate accounting of their receipt and expenditure, and direct the assignment of all plant facilities, including buildings, offices, classroom, laboratories, equipment.”); id. at ¶ 4 (“[T]he Dean is the principal administrative office of the School of Medicine and is responsible for, among other things: implementation of the regulations and policies of the University and School of Medicine, preparing annual budget recommendations for the School, making recommendations regarding the appointment, promotion and tenure of members of the faculty, Department Heads, and Associate Deans, and assigning space which is available to the School of Medicine to departments and other units.”); Pl.’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶¶ 3, 4; see also Laws, By-Laws and Rules of UConn, art. VIII, § C (describing, in detail, the responsibilities of the Executive Vice President for Health Affairs), found in Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Motion for Summ. J. [doc. # 76], at Ex. 8. As discussed previously, Dr. Radolf has no cognizable property interest in a discretionary benefit or privilege such as this. See, e.g., Bernheim, 79 F.3d at 323; Gagliardi, 18 F.3d at 193; Petrario, 187 F.Supp.2d at 35; Russo, 158 F.Supp.2d at 223. Furthermore, though the question of whether a tenured professor has a cognizable property interest in the participation in a particular grant seldom arises, two cases help delineate when participation in a particular grant proposal may or may not be protected by the Due Process Clause. In Abbs v. Sullivan, 756 F.Supp. 1172 (W.D.Wis.1990), vacated on other grounds, 963 F.2d 918 (7th Cir.1992), a case concerning a professor merely accused of scientific misconduct, the court discussed a professor’s possible property interest in either receiving future federal funding or in receiving continued funding from an ongoing federal grant, stating: As to future federal funding, plaintiff Abbs has no enforceable right to receive grants or awards, whatever his status as á researcher. Such funding is always discretionary with the funding agency. As to the current grants ... [t]here is no evidence that Abbs would incur any personal financial injury if current funding for his research were suspended or terminated. id. at 1182-83. While not directly on point, the funding agency’s discretion in disbursement of particular funds to particular researchers is analogous to Defendants’ discretion in deciding which professors will participate in which grant proposals. Furthermore, like Professor Abbs, there is also no evidence that Dr. Radolf incurred any personal financial injury or damage to his research capabilities because he was unable to participate in this particular DOD Grant. See Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 54], at ¶¶ 171, 172 (undisputed facts that Dr. Radolf is still a tenured faculty member, has not had his salary or fringe benefits reduced, has not-suffered a reduction in lab space or institutional support, and has received pay increases); Pl.’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶¶ 171, 172. In Hamid v. John Jay Coll. of Criminal Justice, No. 99 CIV 8669 WK, 2000 WL 666344 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2000), Professor Hamid claimed that his supervisors used their power over the administration of a particular research grant to maliciously orchestrate Professor Hamid’s dismissal as lead researcher on the grant. Id. at *1. Though Dr. Radolf heavily relies on Ham-id in support of his arguments, the Court does not find Hamid controlling here for several reasons. First, Hamid involved a denial of a motion to dismiss, not summary judgment. Second, the Hamid court determined that Professor Hamid had sufficiently plead a property interest in continuing as the principal investigator on the research project to survive a motion to dismiss, because, among other things, Professor Hamid had alleged that “as a result of his appointment as [principal investigator] his total income was increased” and he asserted a “ ‘tenure right’ to unimpeded research and this right (if proven) constitutes a substantive rule of entitlement independent of his source of funding.” Id. at *6. Third, Professor Hamid claimed he was being removed as the principal investigator on a research project for discriminatory purposes because of his previous research on politically and racially sensitive topics. Id. at *1. Here, on summary judgment, Dr. Ra-dolf (unlike Professor Hamid) does not claim a property interest in continuing his participation in the DOD Grant. Instead, he claims a constitutionally protectable property interest in being included in grant proposals of his choosing, a claim not asserted in Hamid. Furthermore, Dr. Radolf has failed to present evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude either that his income, tenure or research was intimately connected and dependent on the DOD Grant so as to create a property interest in participation in this grant, or that he had any other right to participation in the DOD research which would create such a property interest. Nor has Dr. Radolf alleged that Drs. Deckers’ and Berlin’s actions were in retaliation for his previous research on sensitive topics. Therefore, Hamid does nothing to counter the simple fact that participating in a particular research grant proposal is a discretionary benefit or privilege that cannot support a due process claim on the facts presented. See, e.g., Bernheim, 79 F.3d at 323; Gagliardi, 18 F.3d at 193; Petrario, 187 F.Supp.2d at 35; Russo, 158 F.Supp.2d at 223. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count 3 of the First Substituted Complaint [doc. # 18]. D. In Count 4 of the First Substituted Complaint [doc. # 18], Dr. Radolf alleges that Drs. Deckers, Berlin, and Wikel violated his rights under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 11 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1). Specifically, Dr. Radolf asserts that in the DOD Grant proposal and subsequent research described in Part III.B, supra, these Defendants falsely attributed his data and findings as their own and that they did the same thing at a press conference held with Representative Nancy Johnson. See First Substituted Compl. [doc. # 18], at ¶¶ 409-24. Dr. Radolf concedes that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 123 S.Ct. 2041, 156 L.Ed.2d 18 (2003), forecloses any claim he may formerly have had under the “origin of work” provision of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Summ. J. [doc. # 70], at 92-93. As Dastar made abundantly clear, in construing the Lanham Act, we have been careful to caution against misuse or over-extension of trademark and related protections into areas traditionally occupied by patent or copyright. The Lan-ham Act ... does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in ■ creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity. Federal trademark law has no necessary relation to invention or discovery, but rather, by preventing competitors from copying a source-idem tifying mark, reduces the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions, and helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34, 123 S.Ct. 2041 (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, the “origin of work” provision of the Lanham Act protects' only “the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not ... the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods,” because copyright and patent laws sufficiently cover inventions, discoveries, ideas and concepts. Id. at 37, 123 S.Ct. 2041. Because Dr. Radolfs claim centers around his contention that he was the “author” or originator of the ideas and concepts that underlie the DOD Grant, his Lanham Act claim necessarily fails in light of Bastar. In the face of Bastar, Dr. Radolf has sought to rescue his Lanham Act claim by re-conceptualizing it as a “false advertisement” claim under § 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Summ. J. [doc. # 70], at 93-95. In that regard, the Court notes that Bastar still allowed “cause[s] of action — not for reverse passing off under the ‘confusion ... as to the origin’ provision of § 43(a)(1)(A), but for misrepresentation under the ‘misrepresents the nature, characteristics [or] qualities’ provision of § 43(a)(1)(B).” Dastar, 539 U.S. at 38, 123 S.Ct. 2041. Dr. Radolf s effort to shoe-horn his claim into this language from Bastar is unavailing. For, at its core, Dr. Radolf s Lanham Act claim remains one in which he asserts that Defendants used research and data that he originated without properly attributing the source of the research and data. In short, Dr. Radolf asserts that Defendants passed off his research as their own. And that type of claim, however styled, is barred by the language arid holding of Bastar. However, even if the Court were to allow Dr. Radolf to transmute his “origin of work” claim under § 43(a)(1)(A) into a quasi-“false advertisement” claim under § 43(a)(1)(B), the Court cannot see how the submission of an academic research proposal to a government funding, agency constitutes “commercial advertising or promotion,” as that phrase is used in § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). According to the Second Circuit, in order to qualify as “commercial advertising or promotion,” the contested representations must be “(1) commercial speech; (2) by a defendant who is in commercial competition with plaintiff; (3) for the purpose of influencing consumers to buy defendant’s goods or services”; and, (4) although representations less formal than those made as part of a classic advertising campaign may suffice, they must be disseminated sufficiently to the relevant purchasing public. Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., 314 F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F.Supp. 1521, 1535-36 (S.D.N.Y.1994)). Under the plain language of Fashion Boutique, the Defendants’ alleged use of Dr. Radolfs data and results in their DOD Grant application or even at the press conference with Representative Johnson was no,t commercial speech. Also, there are no facts in this record that would allow the Court to conclude that Defendants are in commercial competition with Dr. Radolf, that there are consumers seeking to purchase Defendants’ goods or services, or that the representations of which Dr. Ra-dolf complains were made to a relevant purchasing public. As a consequence, Dr. Radolf s creatively re-conceptualized “false advertisement” claim also fails because the research proposal to the DOD was not “commercial advertising or promotion,” as that phrase is used in § 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), and construed by the Second Circuit. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count 4 of the First Substituted Complaint [doc. # 18]. E. In Count 8 of the First Substituted Complaint [doc. # 18], Dr. Radolf asserts that Defendants retaliated against him when he exercised his First Amendment right to voice his opposition to the Defendants’ wrongful’use of funds from two of his NIH grants. Dr. Radolf asserted that these funds were wrongly used to pay the salary of a research associate, Mr. Kenneth Bourell, who works in the Center for Microbial Pathogenesis. Id. at ¶¶ 590-94, 788-89. In Count 8, Dr. Radolf alleges that because he voiced his concerns about the use of the NIH funds to pay Mr. Bourell’s salary, Defendants retaliated against Dr. Radolf by wrongly accusing him of committing fraud in preparing and reporting on the NIH grants, thereby causing UCHC’s Internal Compliance Office to conduct an internal investigation into Dr. Radolf s activities. Id. at ¶¶ 603-04; see also Defs.’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) [doc. # 54] at ¶ 142; PL’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 65], at ¶ 142. As confirmed at oral argument, it is undisputed that the UCHC Internal Compliance Office investigation concluded that there was no basis for a finding that Dr. Radolf had committed fraud or other improper conduct in connection with these two NIH grants. As recently explained by the Second Circuit, [i]n order to establish a First Amendment claim of retaliation as a public employee, [a plaintiff] must show that (l)[his] speech addressed a matter of public concern, (2)[he] suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection existed between the speech and the adverse employment action. Whether speech addresses a matter of public concern is a question of law to be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. Konits, 394 F.3d at 124 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (citing Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir.2004); Johnson v. Ganim, 342 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir.2003); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983)). For the purposes of this case, the Court accepts Dr. Radolfs assertion that complaining about a state university’s possible misuse of federal grant money constitutes speech on a matter of public concern. See, e.g., Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir.2000) (“the proper administration of State facilities” is a matter of public concern); Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir.1999) (“As a general rule, speech on ‘any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community’ is protected by the First Amendment.”) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684); Harman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir.1998) (“[D]iscussion regarding current government policies and activities is perhaps the paradigmatic matter of public concern.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (quoted in Ganim, 342 F.3d at 112); Vasbinder v. Ambach, 926 F.2d 1333, 1340 (2d Cir.1991) (“potential fraud, theft, and misallocation of public funds, were matters of serious public concern”).. F