Full opinion text
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WOODCOCK, District Judge. On September 25, 2002, following a disciplinary hearing, the Student Conduct Code Committee (Hearing Committee) of the University of Maine found that the Plaintiffs, Stefan Gomes and Paris Minor, undergraduates at the University, had sexually assaulted a female student and, thereby, violated the Student Conduct Code. The University suspended them for one year. After the Plaintiffs’ administrative appeals failed, they turned to this Court- for relief, asserting the disciplinary process was substantially flawed. Although the University’s disciplinary process was not ideal and could have been better, this Court concludes it was fundamentally fair and accorded the Plaintiffs the essential elements of due process. This Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. I. THE LAW SUIT The Plaintiffs filed a cause of action against the University of Maine System, the Trustees of the University of Maine System, and six individuals, Peter S. Hoff, Robert Kennedy, Elizabeth J. Allan, David Fiacco, Robert Dana, and Robert Whelan, individually and in their respective official capacities at the University. The University subjected the Plaintiffs to discipline for allegedly committing a sexual assault on June 10, 2002. The Complaint (Docket # 1) contained ten counts, alleging the Defendants committed a number of constitutional, contractual, and tort violations in disciplining the Plaintiffs. On February 23, 2004, this Court granted the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts I, IV and V. Gomes v. Univ. of Maine Sys., 304 F.Supp.2d 117 (D.Me.2004). This Court also granted the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count II to the extent it claimed violations of substantive or procedural due process relating to territorial limitations of University jurisdiction. Id. On all other counts, this Court denied the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Id. The Defendants have now moved for summary judgment on the remaining counts. II. STATEMENT OF FACTS A. The Allegation Following an incident on June 10, 2002, a female University student (Complainant) accused two male University students of sexually assaulting her. Consolidated Statement of Material Facts (SMF) (Docket # 95) ¶¶ 1, 2 The two male students, former members of the University football team, are the Plaintiffs in this case. Am. Compl. (Docket # 42) ¶¶ 1, 2. B. The Student Conduct Code: An Overview The University has adopted a Student Conduct Code (Code), which sets forth the procedures it follows upon notice of a potential violation. Under the Code, the University designates a campus official, denominated the “Officer,” to investigate alleged violations of the Code, to notify the respondent of his conclusions, and, if appropriate, to impose sanctions. Code §§ V.A., B. If the Officer concludes there is doubt whether a violation occurred or what sanction should be imposed, he may refer the matter directly to the Hearing Committee. Id. § V.B.4.C., d. The Hearing Committee consists of three to seven members, at least one must be a student and one a Presidential desig-nee. Id: § V.D.2.a. The President appoints the Chair. Id. The Hearing Committee is charged with holding a hearing to receive evidence, determining whether the respondent violated the Code, and, if so, imposing a sanction. Id. § V.D.4. If the Hearing Committee suspends or dismisses the respondent, the Code provides for two appeals. Id. § V.E. The first appeal is to a new person or group (the Appeal Committee); the second appeal is to the President or designee. Id. § V.E.2. The appeals are limited to a review of the procedures followed and the appropriateness of the sanction. Id. § V.E.l.a., b. C. The Gomes — Minor Investigation and University Procedure: An Overview David Fiacco, as Director of Judicial Affairs, was the designated Officer within the meaning of the Code. The Complainant’s allegations against the Plaintiffs constituted potential violations of Section III of the Code and, by reference, the University of Maine Rape and Sexual Assault Policy and Guidelines. Id. § III.; SMF ¶ 3. On July 16, 2002, pursuant to his request, Mr. Fiacco received information from the Old Town Police Department confirming a complaint of sexual assault had been lodged against the Plaintiffs. SMF ¶¶ 2, 133. On August 17, 2002, the Complainant signed a University incident report, stating a potential violation of the Code. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3. This triggered an investigation by Mr. Fiacco, who referred the case to the Hearing Committee for an administrative hearing. Id. ¶¶ 4, 5. The Hearing Committee, chaired by Dr. Elizabeth Allan,' consisted of five members. Id. ¶ 6. The Hearing Committee held a hearing on September 24, 2002, and by letter dated September 25, 2002, the Chair informed the Plaintiffs that it had concluded they had violated the Code by committing a sexual assault. Id.; Minor Dep. Ex. 8; Gomes Dep. Ex. 5. The Hearing Committee suspended the Plaintiffs from the University through May 31, 2003 and made the suspensions effective immediately. SMF ¶ 7; Minor Dep. Ex. 8; Gomes Dep. Ex. 5. The Hearing Committee ruled the suspensions would not be stayed pending any appeal “for the protection of other persons.” SMF ¶ 6; Minor Dep. Ex. 8; Gomes Dep. Ex. 5. It required the Plaintiffs to petition the University before returning as students and to comply with certain pre-conditions before doing so. SMF ¶ 7; Minor Dep. Ex. 8; Gomes Dep. Ex. 5. The earliest date they could file a reinstatement petition was August 31, 2003, and, if allowed to return to the University, they were to be placed on disciplinary probation for one calendar year from the date of their return. Minor Dep. Ex. 8; Gomes Dep. Ex. 5. Neither Plaintiff has petitioned to re-enroll at the University. SMF ¶ 14. The Plaintiffs appealed the Hearing Committee’s decision to the Appeal Committee. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. The Appeal Committee consisted of three members: Robert Whe-lan, the Chair; Ann Pooler; and Mike Scott. Id. ¶ 9. On October 16, 2002, the Appeal Committee concluded the Hearing Committee did not commit procedural error and found the sanctions appropriate. Id. ¶ 10. The Plaintiffs exercised their right to a second appeal before the President’s designee. Id. ¶ 11. President Hoff named Mark Anderson, the University’s Interim Chief Financial Officer, as his des-ignee for this appeal. Id.; Hoff Dep. at 53-54. Mr. Anderson reviewed the decision of the Appeal Committee and the Hearing Committee to determine whether procedures were followed and the sanctions were appropriate. SMF ¶¶ 11, 12; Costlow Dep. Ex. 60. On November 18, 2002, he concluded that the procedures “were in substantial conformity to the requirements of the code and afforded the Respondents fundamental fairness.” Cost-low Dep. Ex. 60. He also determined that “the sanctions imposed on the Respondents were appropriate given the findings of the committee.” Id. III. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “In this regard, ‘material’ means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the gOvefn-ing law if the dispute over it is resolved favorably to the nonmovant.” Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 93-94 (1st Cir.2001). “By like token, ‘genuine’ means that the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id. at 94 (citing McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995)). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether -this burden is met, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmov-ing party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor. Nicolo v. Philip Morris, Inc., 201 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir.2000). Once the moving party has made a preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the non-movant must “produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to'establish the presence of a trialworthy issue.” Triangle Trading Co. v. Robroy Indios., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1999) (citation and internal punctuation omitted); see also Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e). “As to any essential factual element of its claim on which the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial, its failure to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment to the moving party.” In re Spigel, 260 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). IV. DISCUSSION A. What is and is not Before the Court This case comes before this Court in limited posture. The Plaintiffs’ claims against the Defendants are grounded primarily upon the way the University officials conducted the process leading to its conclusion that the Plaintiffs had violated the Code and to its imposition of sanctions. In essence, the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants failed to accord them a fair and impartial hearing and fair and impartial appeals before imposing and affirming significant sanctions. The Defendants respond that the University disciplinary proceedings were fundamentally fair. This Court’s review is substantially circumscribed; the law does not allow this Court to retry the University’s disciplinary proceeding. This is not a lawsuit between the Complainant and the Plaintiffs. This Court is not asked to make an independent determination about what happened between the Plaintiffs and the Complainant on June 10, 2002. Neither the Plaintiffs nor the Complainant have testified before this Court. This Court draws no opinion, therefore, about whether a sexual assault occurred, whether the acts were consensual, who among the Plaintiffs and the Complainant is credible, and who is not. This decision, which grants summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, is not a judicial finding either in favor or against the Plaintiffs or in favor or against the Complainant on the merits of her claims and their defenses. B. What Remains After the February 23, 2004 Order on the Motion to Dismiss 1. Count I: Due Process (Against All Defendants) Count I, as originally pleaded, attempted to state a direct cause of action for a general denial of rights protected under the United States and Maine Constitutions. Realizing this count did not state a cause of action, the Plaintiffs clarified they were retaining Count I only insofar as its allegations form a factual predicate for the remaining causes of action. Thus limited, the viability of Count I’s allegations depends upon the extent to which they form the factual predicate for other viable causes of action. Count I, therefore, stands or falls depending upon what happens in other counts. 2. Count II: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Against Defendants Allan, Fiac-co, Hoff, Dana and Whelan) Count II alleges a violation of procedural due process. This Court’s February 23, 2004 order dismissed Count II to the extent it was based on an assertion that the University’s jurisdiction was territorially limited. 3. Count III: Breach of Contract (Against Defendants University and Trustees) Count III alleges that the University violated the terms of its contract with the Plaintiffs by conducting a disciplinary proceeding that violated their federal and state constitutional rights and contravened the Code. 4. Count IV: Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Against All Defendants) The February 23, 2004 order dismissed Count IV. 5. Count V: Negligent Hiring and Supervision (Against Defendants University, Trustees, Hoff and Dana) The February 23, 2004 Order dismissed Count V. 6. Count VI: Negligence (Against All Defendants) Count VI alleges that the Defendants had a duty to act with reasonable care in conducting disciplinary hearings against the Plaintiffs, failed to do so, and caused the Plaintiffs harm. 7. Count VII: Defamation (Against All Defendants) Count VII alleges that the Defendants falsely stated that the Plaintiffs committed a sexual offense and the Defendants defamed Plaintiffs in the manner they conducted the hearing and suspended the Plaintiffs. Count VII further alleges the Defendants made public statements regarding the suspensions that defamed the Plaintiffs. 8. Count VIII: Negligent and/or Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Against All Defendants) Count VIII alleges the Defendants, by-acting negligently or intentionally, have caused the Plaintiffs severe emotional distress. 9. Count IX: Negligent Misrepresentation (Against Defendants University Trustees, Fiacco and Dana) Count IX alleges certain Defendants supplied false information to the Plaintiffs for guidance in their transactions as students and student athletes. 10. Count X: Punitive Damages (Against All Defendants) Count X demands punitive damages against all the Defendants on the ground their conduct was so outrageous malice can be implied against the Plaintiffs. C. Count II: 42 U.S.C. § .1983: Procedural Due Process 1. The Plaintiffs’ Claims: An Overview The Plaintiffs contend that Defendants Allan, Fiacco, Hoff, Kennedy, Dana, and Whelan deprived them of their procedural due process rights: [B]y conducting a fundamentally unfair hearing which included depriving the Plaintiffs of critical and potentially exculpatory evidence gathered during the investigation, depriving the Plaintiffs of effective assistance of counsel, preventing the Plaintiffs from effectively cross-examining and confronting adverse witnesses, depriving the Plaintiffs of any effective administrative appeal, depriving the Plaintiffs of an impartial tribunal, and imposing severe punishment ' without'substantial evidence. Am. Compl. ¶ 30. They also allege the investigation, ' hearing, and appeal -Were “conducted in'bad faith and sanctions were imposed in bad faith.” 7&¶31. 2. Applicable Law The First Circuit has held that a student’s interest “in pursuing an education is included within the 'fourteenth amendment’s protection of liberty and propérty.” Gorman v. Univ. of Rhode Island, 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir.1988). 'A student “facing expulsion or suspension from a public educational institution is entitled to' the' protections of due process.” Id. Here, the Plaintiffs were students at a public university 'and potentially subject to expulsión or suspension. They are, therefore, entitled -to the protections óf due process. ’ 'See generally Curtis J. Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to■ Fair Process for the University Student, 99 Colum. L.Rev. 289 (1999). Determining an interest is protected by the due process clause of the Constitution is “only the beginning of the inquiry”; the question remains “what process is due.” Gorman, , 837 F.2d at 12 (citation and internal punctuation omitted). Due process is “not a fixed or rigid conr cept, but, rather,, is a flexible standard which varies depending upon the nature of the interest, affected, and, the circumstances of the deprivation.” Id. At a minimum, students facing .disciplinary action, such as a suspension, must be given “some land of notice and afforded some kind of hearing.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). Judge Gignoux of this Court adopted Professor Wright’s description of the minimum requirements of due process in an academic setting: (1) [T]he student must be advised of the charges against him; (2) he must be informed of the nature of the evidence against him; (3) he must be given an opportunity to be heard in his own defense; and (4) he must not be punished except on the basis of substantial evidence. Keene v. Rodgers, 316 F.Supp. 217, 221 (D.Me.1970)(quoting Charles Alan Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L.Rev. 1027, 1071-72 (1969)). To these factors, Keene added: 1) the student must be permitted the assistance of a lawyer, at least in major disciplinary proceedings; 2) he must be permitted to confront and to cross-examine the witnesses against him; and, 3) he must be afforded the right to an impartial tribunal, which must make written findings. Id. (citations omitted); see also Carey ex rel. Carey v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dish No. 17, 754 F.Supp. 906, 919 (D.Me.1990)(setting forth the seven minimum requirements which must be observed in student disciplinary hearings to assure the requisite balance). The law seeks to counterbalance the tension between two principles. Goss, 419 U.S. at 579, 95 S.Ct. 729 (determining the process that is due requires an “accommodation of the competing interests involved.”); Gorman, 837 F.2d at 13 (same). A university is not a court of law, and it is neither practical nor desirable it be one. Yet, a public university student who is facing serious charges of misconduct that expose him to substantial sanctions should receive a fundamentally fair hearing. In weighing this tension, the law seeks the middle ground. One factor is the seriousness of the charge and the potential consequences— what the Supreme Court described as the “private interest” affected by the official action. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); accord Gorman, 837 F.2d at 13. Here, the private interest is compelling. The Plaintiffs faced charges of sexual assault against a fellow student, charges that could have led to their expulsions and did lead to their suspensions. The potential consequences reach beyond their immediate standing at the University. The Supreme Court has noted that “[wjhere a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,’ the minimal requirements of the Clause must be satisfied.” Goss, 419 U.S. at 574, 95 S.Ct. 729 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971)). The University’s decision could “interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employment.” Id. at 575, 95 S.Ct. 729. The Plaintiffs argue, and this Court accepts, that these charges could “have a major immediate and lifelong impact on [their] personal life, education, employment, and public engagement.” Obj. to Mot. for Summ. J. (Docket # 85) at 4. The Plaintiffs also have an interest in avoiding “an erroneous deprivation” of their private interest through the University’s procedures. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893; Gorman, 837 F.2d at 13. At the same time, a major purpose of the administrative process and hearing is to avoid formalistic and adversarial procedures. Justice White wrote in Goss, “further formalizing the suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process.” Goss, 419 U.S. at 583, 95 S.Ct. 729. In Gorman, the First Circuit advised courts reviewing an educational institution’s administrative process of the following: In fostering and insuring the requirements of due process, however, the courts have not and should not require that a fair hearing is one that necessarily must follow the traditional common law adversarial method. Rather, on judicial review the question presented is whether, in the particular case, the individual has had an opportunity to answer, explain, and defend, and not whether the hearing mirrored a common law criminal trial. [T]he courts ought not to extol form over substance, and impose on educational institutions all the procedural requirements of a common law criminal trial. The question presented is not whether the hearing was ideal, or whether its procedure could have been better. In all cases the inquiry is whether, under the particular circumstances presented, the hearing was fair, and accorded the individual the essential elements of due process. In the words of Justice White, “the Due Process Clause requires, not an ‘elaborate hearing’ before a neutral party, but simply ‘an informal give-and-take between, student and disciplinarian’ which gives the student ‘an opportunity to explain his version of the facts.’ ” Gorman, 837 F.2d at 14, 16 (citations omitted). 3. Specific Issues a. Discovery The Plaintiffs claim the Defendants violated their due process rights by failing to inform them before the hearing of certain evidence: 1) they were not provided with a summary of a statement the Complainant gave to the Old Town Police Department; 2) they were not provided with a witness list before the day of the hearing; and, 3) they were not provided with the Complainant’s medical records until the day of the hearing. i. Old Town Police Department Records Following the June 10, 2002 incident, the Complainant notified the Old Town Police Department, which initiated an investigation. The police officers conducted four interviews of the Complainant: one with Officer Bobbie Pelletier on June 11, 2002; another with Detective Michael Holmes and Officer Debra Holmes on June 11, 2002; a third with Detective Holmes on June 12, 2002; and, a fourth with Officer Holmes on June 13, 2002. SMF 1Í134. The Plaintiffs assert the records of these interviews contain “important prior inconsistent statements” and call the Complainant’s “credibility into serious doubt.” Obj. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 13. They also point out the Complainant’s attorney argued at the close of the hearing that the Complainant should be believed because her story had been entirely consistent. sm:f ¶ 190. Specifically, the Plaintiffs claim the reports of these interviews differ as to the events of the evening of the incident, the Complainant’s consumption of alcohol, who did what to whom, and whether she gave Mr. Minor money after the incident. Obj. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 13-15. The University has admitted that, even though it provided a statement from the Old Town Police Department records to the Complainant’s attorney, it provided nothing in the police report to the Plaintiffs. SMF ¶¶ 33, 176. Further, the police department records were not submitted to the Hearing Committee. The Plaintiffs claim the Hearing Committee was left with the erroneous impression that the Complainant had not drunk alcohol before the incident and that her story had been fully consistent throughout. Finally, the Plaintiffs note that the Complainant selectively used their handwritten statements in the police reports to question them during the hearing; however, the Plaintiffs did not have a copy of their own statements. Id. ¶ 180. The Defendants contend there is no due process requirement in a university disciplinary hearing to provide the responding student with exculpatory or impeachment evidence. The Defendants further state the Plaintiffs themselves failed to act prudently to obtain the records from the District Attorney or request a continuance of the disciplinary hearing. Finally, the Defendants say the Plaintiffs still received a fundamentally fair hearing. The Defendants are correct about discovery in university student disciplinary proceedings. Other than the limited notice provisions set forth in Keene — requiring that the student be advised of the charges and the nature of the evidence— there is no formal right to discovery. See Keene, 316 F.Supp. at 221; see also Palmer ex rel. Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir.1989)(“[M]ore formal procedural safeguards would not sufficiently increase the reliability and fairness of the process to warrant the additional expense and disruption of the educational process.”). It is likely the University could have given neither the Complainant nor the Plaintiffs any police documents at all and survived a due process challenge. The Plaintiffs’ point remains, nevertheless, a potentially significant one. This is because the University gave the statement to one side, namely the Complainant, and denied access to the same document to the other side. In view of the nature of the charge and its circumstances, the Hearing Committee was required to determine who to believe. There were only three people in the Complainant’s room the night of the incident. The Complainant stated she had consensual sex with Mr. Minor, non-consensual sex with Mr.-Gomes, and then non-consensual sex with Mr. Minor; the Plaintiffs agreed they had sexual relations with the Complainant, but said their sexual relations with her were entirely consensual. The credibility of these three individuals ran to the heart of the disciplinary hearing. The Plaintiffs argue the reports contained substantial evidence of inconsistency in the Complainant’s story. They point to the fact that the Complainant made no mention of non-consensual sex with Mr. Minor until the third interview. Further, the police reports reveal the Complainant had consumed some alcohol during the evening leading up to the incident, and the Complainant’s medical records, which were before the Hearing Committee, confirmed her use of prescriptive medication, raising the question of the impact of alcohol on the medication. The Plaintiffs also note the Complainant herself had complained in writing that she had found “numerous errors and gross inaccuracies” in the police report and that this written complaint was placed before the Hearing Committee; however, the Hearing Committee never heard what those errors and inconsistencies were, because the records were never made available to either the Hearing Committee or the Plaintiffs. SMF ¶ 149, 150. These issues, as well as certain other matters, would have at least been appropriate for the Hearing Committee’s consideration; however, none of the information in the police reports was presented to the Hearing Committee. In fact, at the hearing, the Complainant was asked no questions at all: none by members of the Hearing Committee and none by the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs argue the hearing generated the misimpression that the Complainant had been entirely consistent from the date of the incident onward. After her statement before the Hearing Committee, the Complainant called four witnesses, each of whom corroborated her version of events. This allowed the Complainant’s attorney to argue in his closing statement, “You haven’t heard anyone testify to any contradictory statements by [the woman] at all, other than the two Respondents.... There were no inconsistencies in her statements or her testimony or any of the things she stated throughout these proceedings.” Id. ¶ 190. Mr. Fiacco’s refusal to give the Plaintiffs what he had given the Complainant becomes more potentially significant in light of their respective roles in this proceeding. Under the Code, the Complainant and Mr. Fiacco, as the Officer, assume the roles of presenting the case against the Plaintiffs. Code § V.D.4. Mr. Fiacco and the Complainant had a complete copy of the police report, but the Plaintiffs did not, and Mr. Fiacco had failed to turn documents over to the Plaintiffs when requested to do so. The question is whether a university may, consistent with the requirements of due process, make potentially significant documents available to one side and not the other: to the presenting officer and to the complainant, but not to the students facing serious charges. On its face, the University’s actions raise a question as to whether this procedure was fundamentally fair and complied with the basic protections of due process. The analysis cannot, however, end there. Gorman has reminded us not to “impose on educational institutions all the procedural requirements of a common law criminal trial.” Gorman, 837 F.2d at 16. There are a number of factors to consider: 1) what precisely was given to one side that was not given to the other; 2) timing; 3) the reason the University provided unequal access; 4) the University’s role in not supplying the full record; and, 5) the significance of the withheld information. What was given remains unclear. Mr. Fiacco provided “some of the [police reports] to the Complainant.” SMF ¶ 176. This statement of material fact refers to Mr. Fiacco’s deposition in which he states that he “shared a component of the report with the woman,” the component that “summarized her statement of the events.” Id. ¶ 176; Fiacco Dep. at 119. There is no clarification as to what “component” was given to the Complainant. This Court cannot assess the impact of an uneven distribution of material unless the Plaintiffs establish what material was distributed. The timing is constrained. Mr. Fiacco received documents, including the three interview summaries, from the Old Town police records on July 16, 2002. SMF ¶¶ 133, 134. The Complainant orally informed Mr. Fiacco before August 13, 2002 that the police records may contain some inaccuracies. Id. ¶¶ 149, 150; Fiacco Dep. Ex. 12. However, the Complainant did not sign an incident report until August 17, 2002. SMF ¶ 2; Costlow Dep. Ex. 6, 7. Mr. Fiacco undertook a formal investigation and referred the matter to the Hearing Committee on September 9, 2002. SMF ¶¶ 4, 5. That same day, the Complainant gave Mr. Fiacco a written statement of the incident and a note that stated there were “numerous errors and gross inaccuracies” in the Old Town Police Department reports. Id. ¶ 150. The hearing was initially set for September 16, 2002 and was continued to September 24, 2002 at the Plaintiffs’ request. Id. ¶ 73. Between the referral and the hearing, there was a flurry of activity. On September 12, 2002, Mr. Costlow, the Plaintiffs’ lawyer, in a telephone conference with in-house University counsel, Nina La-voie, asked about access through the University to the police reports, and Attorney Lavoie asked Mr. Fiacco to follow up with the Old Town Police Department as to its policy regarding release. Id. ¶¶ 101, 102. On September 13, 2002, and again on September 18, 2002, Mr. Fiacco received written requests from the Plaintiffs to produce the documents. Id. ¶¶ 162, 163. Attorney Lavoie learned on September 13, 2002 that Mr. Fiacco had handed over either to the Complainant or her attorney the copy of the Complainant’s summary statement. Lavoie Dep. at 54-57. On the same day, Attorney Lavoie contacted Deputy District Attorney Mike Roberts and Assistant District Attorney Alice Clifford to determine their office’s position on the release of police reports. Id. at 56-57. She was concerned Mr. ■ Fiacco’s release to the Complainant could have violated a Maine statute. Id. at 58; SMF ¶ 101. She also spoke to the Plaintiffs’ lawyer, who said he wanted the same material that had been provided to the Complainant. Lavoie Dep. at 57. She then asked Mr. Fiacco whether he intended to give to the Hearing Committee the same material he had given the Complainant; he replied, “no.” Id. at 63. When Attorney Lavoie attended the hearing on September 24, 2002, she learned Attorney Costlow had never received a copy of the police report, but the Complainant’s attorney had. Id. at 55. During the period from September 12, 2002 to September 24, 2002, the Complainant’s and the Plaintiffs’ attorneys attempted to obtain a complete copy of the police report through the District Attorney’s Office. On September 13, 2002, Attorney Costlow wrote to ADA Clifford, requesting the complete police report and complaining the Complainant had been provided with a portion of the police records, but his clients had not. SMF ¶ 100; Costlow Dep. Ex. 16. At 3:55 p.m. on September 20, 2002, ADA Clifford faxed to Attorney Hal-lett a complete copy of the police report. SMF ¶ 36; Aff. of Alice Clifford ¶¶ 4, 5. The fax sheet indicates that “Gomes/Mi-nor’s attys are requesting them as well & they will be .sent out to them as well.” Fax Cover Sheet attached to Aff. of Alice Clifford. ADA Clifford has a policy of requiring the attorney to whom she is faxing sexual assault materials be present when she faxes the material. Aff. of Alice Clifford ¶ 6; SMF ¶37. Although the memories of Attorney Costlow and ADA Clifford conflict in some details, the net effect was Attorney Costlow did not receive the materials from the District Attorney’s Office until after the September 24, 2002 hearing. This chronology reflects the tight deadlines attendant to student disciplinary hearings from complaint to resolution. In Nash, for example, the timé between the charge and the hearing was only six days, and the students received a restated notice of charges only one day before the hearing. Nash, 812 F.2d at 657. Although Nash addressed the question of waiver, the Eleventh Circuit concluded the time was “reasonable,” because it allowed the students to retain counsel, to successfully argue for more certain notice and a short delay, and to appear at the hearing with supporting witnesses and documents. Id. at 662. This tight timeframe, a timeframe not uncommon in university disciplinary hearings, makes it less appropriate to impose strict legal document production requirements on the parties. See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 10 (altercations on September 17 and 18; hearing on October 4); Blanton v. State Univ. of New York, 489 F.2d 377, 379-80 (2d Cir.1973)(incidents December 2 — 4; hearing December 18); Donohue v. Baker, 976 F.Supp. 136, 145-46 (N.D.N.Y.1997)(telephonic notice of rape charge three days before hearing; written charges one day before hearing). Often, it is the student who requests the expedited hearing to resolve the disciplinary matter with a minimal impact on his education. See Keene, 316 F.Supp. at 221 (“At plaintiffs own request, the hearing was held at the earliest possible moment.”). Why did the University not turn over the entire police report? The University was confronted with a provision of Maine statutory law that restricts the disclosure of the police reports. See 16 M.R.S.A. § 617 (“Criminal history record information disseminated to a noncriminal justice agency under section 613 shall be used solely for the purpose of which it was disseminated and shall not be disseminated further”)- The police reports constituted “record information” under § 613, and University counsel was concerned that this statute may have prohibited dissemination to any third party, including the Plaintiffs and the Complainant. SMF ¶¶ 101-102. The University, through Attorney Lavoie, made an effort to clarify whether the law prohibited it from releasing material. What was the University’s role? Upon review, the University’s actions were not as significant as the Plaintiffs would have them be. It was on September 9, 2002 that Mr. Fiacco gave the Complainant one unidentified statement from the police report, but it was on September 20, 2002, the Complainant received by fax from ADA Clifford a complete copy of the entire police file. The District Attorney’s Office is not the University of Maine, and its actions are not attributable to the University. ADA Clifford’s uneven distribution of the entire report eclipses the University’s uneven distribution of one statement in the report. The Complainant had the entire report one full week ahead of the hearing and her possession of one statement from the report eleven days earlier has not been shown to have had any impact on the hearing. Because the Complainant later obtained the same statement through other sources, the Plaintiffs’ claim cannot be based on the Complainant’s possession of the statement, but rather must be based solely on their non-possession of this one statement. What was the impact of the University’s actions? This leaves the Plaintiffs’ contention that their non-possession of one unidentified statement constituted a denial of due process. Having failed to -identify which statement they did not receive, it would be speculative to intuit what effect its non-production had on the proceeding. On the state of the record before it, this Court can draw no conclusions. Upon analysis, the Plaintiffs’ claim of a violation of due process based on the University’s failure to distribute a statement in the police report to them before the hearing must fail. Tight time constraints, a general rule against imposing discovery requirements on university disciplinary proceedings, the Complainant’s access to the same material from a non-university source, and the Plaintiffs’ failure to identify the statement itself require this Court to conclude there is no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether the uneven distribution of a statement from the police records constituted a denial of due process. ii. The Witness List Several days before the hearing, the Defendants provided a witness list to the Plaintiffs naming the following witnesses: the Complainant, Jessica Libbey, Jacob Pratt, and Amissa Demons. SMF ¶ 15. The Complainant, Ms. Libbey, and Mr. Pratt testified at the hearing; Ms. Demons did not. Id. ¶ 19. The Complainant called two additional witnesses — Jerod Edes and Kelly LaPierre — over the Plaintiffs’ objections: Id. ¶¶ 15, 20. The Complainant described these witnesses as “rebuttal witnesses” to those witnesses the Plaintiffs listed on their September -23rd letter to Mr. Fiacco. Id. ¶ 21. Although Mr. Costlow objected to Ms. LaPierre’s testimony because she was not on the witness list, he acknowledged whether to allow her to testify was “at the discretion of the chair.” Id. ,¶ 22. Ms. LaPierre and Mr. Edes testified in the presence of the Plaintiffs, and the Plaintiffs had an opportunity to cross-examine , them. Id. ¶ 23. Mr. Costlow was correct in acknowledging the Chair’s discretion. If this hearing had been before a court, the judge would have had the discretion to allow or exclude the testimony of unlisted witnesses. See Alberty-Velez v. Corporacion De Puerto Rico Para La Difusion Publica, 242 F.3d 418, 423 (1st Cir.2001)(an appellate court generally should not interfere with a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence based on its interpretation of its own pretrial order);: Geremia v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 653 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1981)(where memorandum designating nine “contested issues of law and fact,” which had been signed by both sides and filed with the court, was never specifically adopted by the court, any purported preclusion of issues therein could not .be viewed as restricting the court’s considerable discretion in an area). A trial judge’s decision to allow the Government to call a rebuttal witness in a criminal trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 74, 16 S.Ct. 216, 40 L.Ed. 343 (1895); United States v. Jalbert, 504 F.2d 892, 893 (1st Cir.1974). The decision 'to 1 allow the testimony of unlisted'witnesses would have been upheld in a judidial proceeding and was well"within the Chair’s discretion as presiding officer at the disciplinary hearing. Moreover, due procéss in the context of academic discipline does not necessarily require students be given a list of witnesses and exhibits prior to the hearing, provided the students are1 allowed to attend the hearing' itself. ’ Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 662-63 (11th Cir.1987)(“[W]e did not require in Dixon that students facing a hearing on charges of misconduct be given the names of witnesses against them and a summary of their expected testimony, when the opposing witnesses will testify in the presence of the accused.”). Because Ms. LaPierre and Mr. Edes testified in the presence of the Plaintiffs, it was not a due process requirement to give the Plaintiffs their names and a summary of their expected testimony before the hearing. Cf. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930, 82 S.Ct. 368, 7 L.Ed.2d 193 (1961)(because university students were not present to hear the evidence against them, they should be given the names of the accusing witnesses and a report of their testimony to ensure the students’ ability to respond at a later forum). ' • The Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish this case from Nash and Dixon by arguing .that the charge here is much morp serious than in Nash (academic dishonesty) and Dixon (unspecified charges). This Court: does not minimize the seriousness of the charge of sexual assault. But, under a due process analysis, distinguishing between charges of academic dishonesty and sexual assault slices too thin a due process argument. It would require nuanced judgments about gradations of seriousness among differing charges and a perilous attempt to translate tonal levels of gravity to sets of due process rights. Instead of focusing solely on the charge, courts have looked at the potential sanction. Gorman, 837 F.2d at 13 (“[T]he federal courts have uniformly held that fair process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before the expulsion or significant suspension of a student from a public school.”) In Nash, Auburn University imposed a sanction virtually identical to the sanction the Plaintiffs in this case received. The students in Dixon received harsher treatment and were expelled from Alabama State College. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 151 n. 2. Whether the hearing was fair “depends upon the nature of the interest affected and all of the circumstances of the particular case.” Gorman, 837 F.2d at 13. This Court cannot conclude that because the Plaintiffs were charged with sexual assault, the due process clause requires they be supplied in advance with a witness list, when those students are present at the hearing and have the right to listen to the statements and ask questions. Further, it cannot conclude the due process clause mandates that if a witness is not listed, the chair’s discretionary determination to allow that witness to present a statement raises a constitutional concern. iii. The Medical Reports The Plaintiffs object to the Complainant’s introduction at the hearing of medical records not available to them until the morning of the hearing. The medical records were provided to the Hearing Committee and the Plaintiffs the morning of the hearing. SMF ¶ 28. Mr. Fiacco made copies of the records and included them in all hearing binders, including the Plaintiffs’ binder. Id. ¶ 29. Mr. Costlow had the opportunity to review the reports before the start of the hearing. Id. ¶ 30. The Plaintiffs make an argument similar to one the Eleventh Circuit rejected in Nash. Here, the Plaintiffs argue, if they had received prior notice of the medical records, they would have had the opportunity to “discuss them with [a] medical professional.” Obj. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 14. The students in Nash were charged with cheating. At the hearing, they were confronted by their professor and other professors who testified there was such a striking similarity among the student responses, it was likely there had been collusion. Nash, 812 F.2d at 660. The students argued unsuccessfully that if they had known of this analysis in advance, they could have obtained “expert, statistical testimony to rebut the inference that they cheated.” Id. at 662. In rejecting this argument, the Nash court stated that the students were “not constitutionally entitled to advance notice of statements by witnesses who ... were to appear at the hearing.” Id. at 663. Advance notice of exhibits is indistinguishable from advance notice of witnesses. For the same reasons, due process does not require students be given a list of exhibits before the hearing if the students attend the hearing. Because the Plaintiffs attended the hearing, it was not necessary for the Complainant to notify them about the medical records she intended to submit Furthermore, the record demonstrates the Plaintiffs were given an opportunity to review the medical records before the hearing and to question the Complainant about those records during the hearing. SMF ¶ 31. Finally, this Court is doubtful that the incrementally enhanced fairness of the hearing from advanced notice of exhibits would justify opening a rich source of potential controversy. Instead of addressing the main event — whether a violation of the Code occurred — the Hearing Committee would inevitably become enmeshed in charges and countercharges of discovery violations, controversies a university hearing committee is ill-equipped to resolve. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 583, 95 S.Ct. 729. b. Exclusion of Prior Sexual History The Plaintiffs’ due process argument on the Hearing Committee’s handling of prior sexual history is elusive. The Plaintiffs do not challenge the University’s rule excluding reference to the Complainant’s past sexual history. To the contrary, they concede it is “certainly a reasonable rule.” Obj. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 18. They could hardly claim otherwise. See Fed.R.Evid. 412; Me. R. Evid. 412: Instead, they attack the admission of certain testimony and the exclusion of other testimony. In the Hearing Committee’s packet was a written statement from Jerod Edes, which stated in part: “I know for a fact that [the Complainant] would never consent to anything such as what happened to her.... I never believed, and will never believe that [the Complainant] would partake in anything of the sort.” SMF ¶ 194. The Plaintiffs argue that by including this statement in the Hearing Committee’s packet, which discounted the possibility the Complainant would have voluntarily engaged in simultaneous sex with two men, the University turned “this rule from a shield to a sword.” Obj. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 18. They contend they had evidence the Complainant had, in fact, done so in the past. They argue, because Mr. Fiacco was aware of this countervailing evidence, he should not have included the Edes statement in the Hearing Committee packet, knowing it was irrefutable under the rule that precluded prior sexual activity. First, the Plaintiffs knew the Edes statement was included in the Hearing Committee packet and failed to raise any specific objection to the written statement at the hearing. SMF ¶¶ 58, 59. In any event, the Plaintiffs make far too much of Mr. Edes’s written statement. The written statement is a character reference, not a statement of personal knowledge. As a friend of the Complainant, Mr. Edes had a basis for his opinion about her character and what she likely would or would not do, but Mr. Edes could not know what the Complainant actually did or did not do in all her private moments. Moreover, there is no showing this statement in any way influenced the Hearing Committee. Mr. Edes did not repeat his character opinion during his testimony, and the written statement was never expressly mentioned during the hearing. Finally, even if the Hearing Committee considered the statement and gave it some weight, the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a due process violation took place. Second, the Plaintiffs point to the Complainant’s testimony about a prior sexual encounter she had with another football player and the impact it had on her relationship with Mr. Minor. She said one week before the incident she had told Mr. Minor that another football player had ’ sexually assaulted her. Id. ¶ 56, 199. After this conversation, she noticed Mr. Minor’s attitude toward her had “changed drastically.” Id. ¶ 56. When she began to discuss this at the hearing, Mr. Minor objected. Id. The Hearing Committee, however, could not have known what the Complainant’s testimony was going to be and, in the same sense that a court receives evidence de bene, /the Hearing Committee heard the testimony to determine whether it-was proper. Once the Complainant made the statement,. Chair Allan responded;. “[L]et’s try to focus on the events of this evening, any questions in particular because we have already made the announcement that we are not going to consider any past sexual history. Okay.” Id. This interchange is as close a lay chair could be expected to come to ruling the evidence inadmissible and striking it. In these circumstances, it is difficult to ferret out a plausible due process violation. c. Partition The hearing room had three tables: two for the. parties and a long table in front for the Hearing Committee. A screen was placed between the Complainant’s and the Plaintiffs’ tables. Id. ¶ 44. Initially, when seated at their table, the Plaintiffs and their attorney could not see the Complainant or her attorney, and they objected to the arrangement. Id. ¶¶45-46. Mr. Fiacco asked the Plaintiffs if they would waive their due process rights to confront the Complainant,. Id. ¶ 52. When they refused, the arrangement was changed, and the witness chair was placed directly in front of the screen, facing the Committee members. Id. ¶¶ 47, 52. The Complainant’s back and profile were visible from the Plaintiffs’ table. Id. ¶¶ 47, 48. At some point during the Complainant’s testimony, Mr. Costlow moved to a different part of the room to get a better view of the Complainant’s face. Id. ¶ 49. The Plaintiffs assert the physical partition violated due process because they were forced to choose between two fundamental rights: “(1) confronting their accuser, at least through their counsel; and, (2) having counsel beside them to advise them as they heard the witness and cross-examined her.” Obj. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 20. In Cloud v. Trustees of Boston University, 720 F.2d 721 (1st Cir.1983), Boston University presented six witnesses, one of whom was permitted to testify outside of Cloud’s sight because of her professed fear of him. Id. at 724. Cloud asserted this shielded testimony violated the guarantee of “the right to confront and cross examine any witness.” Id. at 725 (citation and internal punctuation omitted). The First Circuit rejected this argument, holding that Cloud was given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness and his attorney and the Judicial Committee were permitted to view the witness. Id. Here, the Plaintiffs were afforded an opportunity to see more of the Complainant than Cloud was. The Hearing Committee required all witnesses to be visible to the Plaintiffs while testifying. SMF ¶ 46. The Plaintiffs admit they could see the Complainant’s profile during her testimony and were given an opportunity to cross-examine the Complainant and her witnesses. Id. ¶¶ 48, 51. Under these circumstances, there is no due process violation. See Cloud, 720 F.2d at 725 (the hearing examiner’s decision to permit the witness to testify out of Cloud’s sight because of her frightened and nervous state did not render the hearing unfair or violate any contractually required procedures). The Plaintiffs also claim they were deprived of their right to counsel, arguing their attorney was forced to choose between seeing the Complainant testify and advising them. This argument assumes the Plaintiffs had a right to counsel at the disciplinary hearing. In Goman, however, the First Circuit noted that the “weight of authority is against representation by counsel at disciplinary hearings, unless the student is also facing criminal charges stemming from the incident in question.” Gorman, 837 F.2d at 16; see also Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th Cir.1993); Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. of Virginia, 719 F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir.1983). On the other hand, in Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir.1978), the First Circuit held a student has a right to counsel in a university disciplinary hearing, when there is a pending criminal charge involving the same incident. Id. at 107. Gabriloivitz limited the attorney’s role to safeguarding the student’s rights at the criminal proceeding, not affecting the outcome of the disciplinary hearing. Id. at 106. Gabrilowitz emphasized this limited right to counsel would be applicable “only for a truly unusual situation.” Id. Here, Mr. Gomes and Mr. Minor were the subjects of a police investigation, but no formal charges had been brought. The District Attorney’s Office, however, had not confirmed it would not bring charges against them. SMF ¶ 165. This Court will assume, without deciding, that Mr. Gomes and Mr. Minor had the limited right to counsel, because of the pending police investigation of the incident that formed the basis of the disciplinary hearing. The Plaintiffs contend Mr. Costlow was presented with an untenable choice: between consulting with his clients and observing the proceedings. His choice, however, was not ■ so stark. The Plaintiffs acknowledge they could see the Complainant’s profile and Mr. Costlow “moved to a different part of the room in order to get a view of the Complainant’s face and demeanor.” Obj. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 20. Mr. Costlow was, therefore, not prevented from seeing the Complainant from counsel table. He simply had a better view elsewhere and decided to take it. SMF ¶ 49. Moreover, the attorneys’ role in the disciplinary hearing, was much more circumscribed than in a court room. The attorneys were allowed to be present, to advise their clients, and to give a final summation. On rare occasions, they were permitted to address objections to the Chair. They were not, however, allowed to question witnesses or otherwise directly participate. The Hearing Committee for the most part allowed questioning of witnesses only through the Chair. The University’s process tracked the process the First Circuit approved in Gabrilowitz. See Gabrilowitz, 582 F.2d at 106-07; see also Nash, 812 F.2d at 664. Finally, there is no showing that the Plaintiffs were affected by their lawyer’s decision to move away from counsel table for a portion of the Complainant’s testimony. To the contrary, Mr. Minor, as noted earlier, objected to the Complainant’s recitation of prior sexual history, and the Plaintiffs have not pointed to any specific question, objection, or evidence they claim was affected by their lawyer’s decision to leave counsel table. By partitioning the room, but allowing the Plaintiffs a limited view of the Complainant, the Hearing Committee fashioned precisely the type of “protective ruling” contemplated by Cloud, balancing the need for the Complainant to be free of intimidation against the Plaintiffs’ right to due process. Allowing the presence, but not the active participation of counsel, the Hearing Committee complied with Gabri-lowitz. There is no due process violation from the partition and location of the Complainant during her testimony. d. Impartial Tribunal The Plaintiffs make two claims of bias against the Hearing Committee: 1) they assert the Chair, Dr. Allan, was biased due to her involvement with rape response and victim advocate programs; and, 2) they claim they were denied the right to voir dire members of the Hearing Committee. Turning to Dr. Allan, they allege she was biased because, at the time of the hearing, she was a board member of the Rape Response Services of Penobscot and Piscataquis Counties, which is a sexual assault victim advocacy organization, had been affiliated with and supported other rape response and victim advocate organizations, and had participated in a number of other organizations such as the Safe Campus Task Force and the Women’s Studies Advisory Committee. Obj. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 9; SMF ¶¶ 83, 209-10. Second, in a letter dated September 17, 2002, Mr. Costlow asked to voir dire the members of the Hearing Committee on the- issue of bias for or against the, football team if the Complainant were allowed voir dire. SMF ¶ 213; Costlow Dep. Ex. 22. In the same letter, Mr. Costlow explained, if the Complaint were allowed voir dire, he would explore “whether any member had personal experience with sexual assault or had worked in a facility or in an advocacy group for sexual assault victims.” Id. Dr. Allan testified she never received or saw the faxed letter until several weeks before her deposition. SMF ¶ 214. By letter dated September 17, 2002 and signed “Elizabeth J. Allan/s,” Mr. Cost-low’s request for voir dire was denied: Questioning of the Committee members is not permitted, although the parties are entitled to know the names of the Committee members. Challenges for bias may be made. Committee ihem-bers have been instructed to tell the Chairperson if they are unable to judge the case fairly and solely on the evidence presented. All parties have the right to-challenge for cause any member of the Committee by submitting to a designated official a written memorandum stating the grounds for. this challenge at least two days prior to the scheduled meeting. Removal of members for cause shall be within the authority and at the discretion of the Chair of the Committee or another member of the Committee if the Chair is unable to exercise that function or is challenged for cause. IoL ¶ 215; Allan Dep. Ex. 3. Although ostensibly signed by Dr. Allan, she neither wrote nor signed it. SMF ¶ 216. Instead, Mr. Fiacco wrote the draft in consultation with legal counsel “in the usual course of action.” Id. Mr. Fiacco’s administrative assistant signed Dr. Allan’s name. Id. ¶ 218. Dr. Allan did not recall seeing Mr. Costlow’s letter, but Mr. Fiacco told her that the letter requested the right to voir dire members of the Hearing Committee, that the same request had been denied to counsel for the Complainant, and that 'the issue had been discussed with University legal counsel. Id. ¶¶ 217, 219. Mr. Fiacco did' not tell Dr. Allan that information about specific types of bias, namely football players and sexual assault, had been requested. Id. ¶ 220. During Dr. Allan’s deposition, she testified it is unlikely her membership on the board of Rape Response Services would have caused her to recuse herself. Id. ¶ 221. The Plaintiffs contend Dr. Allan violated their constitutional right to an impartial tribunal in three respects: First, a reasonable official with Allan’s organizational affiliations would have permitted an inquiry into bias. Allan does not recall seeing Costlow’s letter requesting an inquiry.... Nevertheless, she must be charged with knowledge of its contents and failure to act because a reasonable official with responsibility for addressing bias issues and ensuring an impartial tribunal, upon learning about the letter, would have obtained it, read it and acted on it. Second, due to Allan’s professional involvement with and support of organizations focused on sexual assault victim advocacy and her other extensive involvement in issues directly related to the allegations before the [Hearing Committee], it was a violation of Plaintiffs’ due process rights for her to continue on the [Hearing Committee]. A reasonable official with Allan’s professional involvements would not sit on a committee in judgment of a sexual assault matter without the informed consent of the accused students. Third, Allan made no inquiry about bias regarding the other members of the [Hearing Committee]. In the face of Plaintiffs’ request, she had a duty to ask. She testified that she believed none were biased, but there was no basis for her knowledge.... Again, given that Plaintiffs had made a reasonable inquiry, the only reasonable, response was to ask the others and permit the inquiry to proceed. Obj. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 11. “[A]n impartial and independent adjudicator ‘is a fundamental ingredient of procedural due process.’ ” Gorman, 837 F.2d at 15 (citation omitted); see also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). “Alleged prejudice of university hearing bodies must be based on more than mere speculation and tenuous inferences.” Duke v. N. Texas State Univ., 469 F.2d 829, 834 (5th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932, 93 S.Ct. 2760, 37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973); accord Gorman, 837 F.2d at 15. “Generally, in examining administrative proceedings, the presumption favors the administrators, and the burden is upon the party challenging the action to produce evidence sufficient to rebut this presumption.” Gorman, 837 F.2d at 15; see also Hill v. Bd. of Trs. of Michigan State Univ., 182 F.Supp.2d 621, 628 (W.D.Mich.2001)(“[I]n a university setting, a disciplinary committee is