Full opinion text
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY MOTION TO STRIKE EXXON’S ANSWERS AND AFFIRMATIVE. DEFENSES TO ‘ CLASS MEMBER CLAIMS, FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT, AND FOR FURTHER SANCTIONS AGAINST EXXON CORPORATION AND ITS ATTORNEYS GOLD, District Judge. Plaintiffs Allapattah Services Inc., et al., pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f), 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and this Court’s inherent power to control the integrity of the judicial process and the conduct of the parties before it, move this Court to enter orders: (1) striking Exxon’s frivolous answers and affirmative defenses filed in the claims administration process which seek to obstruct the timely processing of claims by re-litigating the very issues already resolved by the jury’s verdict and this Court’s post-trial orders which have been affirmed on appeal by the Eleventh Circuit; (2) entering final default judgment against Exxon on each claimant’s claim in the amount determined by the Special Master in accordance with the Order on Procedure; (3) revoking the Court’s discretionary ruling to allow Exxon to assert set-offs in the claims process; (4) requiring Exxon’s counsel to forfeit and disgorge any fees paid in connection with the filing of Exxon’s frivolous pleadings; (5) with respect to claims as to which Exxon has yet to file answers, requiring Exxon to limit the denials and affirmative defenses set forth in its answers to the limited number of objections expressly authorized in the Order on Procedure; and, (6) awarding undersigned counsel the reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred in connection with this motion and related proceedings [D.E. # 1874]. On April 18, 2005, Exxon filed its Response to Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Strike Exxon’s Answers and Affirmative Defenses, for Default Judgment and for Sanctions [D.E. # 1899]. On April 25, 2005, Plaintiffs filed their reply [D.E. # 1912], Oral argument was held on Friday, April 29, 2005. For reasons set forth in this order, I grant Plaintiffs’ motion in part by striking particular affirmative defenses and Exxon’s release set-off. I also award attorney’s fees, costs, and other sanctions. I. BACKGROUND OF FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS. A. Pre-Trial Rulings On Damages, Releases and Prejudgment Interest. Prior to trial, Exxon filed numerous motions challenging Plaintiffs’ stated intention to establish Exxon’s duty, breach and damages on a class-wide basis [D.E. # s, e.g., 7, 239, 270, 296, 298, 388, 409, 412, 415, 673, 744, 746, 976, and 977], Exxon complained particularly about Plaintiffs’ intention to prove damages on an annualized, cents-per-gallon basis that would apply to each member of the Class. I entered a number of orders rejecting Exxon’s arguments and ultimately adopting Plaintiffs’ proposed special jury verdict providing for determination of damages in this manner. See Allapattah Servs. Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F.Supp.2d 1300 (S.D.Fla.1999); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F.Supp.2d 1308 (S.D.Fla.1999); Allapattah Servs. Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F.Supp.2d 1326 (S.D.Fla. 1999); and Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corporation, 188 F.R.D. 667 (S.D.Fla. 1999). In the last referenced order, I specifically stated that I intended to rule on Exxon’s defense related issues pre-trial. 188 F.R.D. at 670 n. 1. I did so with regard to Exxon’s affirmative defense that releases affecting in excess of 5,000 dealer-members preclude Plaintiffs’ action for breach of contract, and its claim that prejudgment interest could not be handled on a class-wide basis. In connection with Exxon’s release defense, I concluded that Exxon’s form releases did not bar the Class Dealers’ claims based on two grounds. First, I held that if the jury determined, through special interrogatories, that Exxon breached its good faith obligations to its dealers under its sales agreements, and that such breach was fraudulently concealed from the class, then the Releases may not, in good faith, be uniformly enforced against an involuntary waiver of those rights. Id. at 681-684. Second, as an alternative ground, I concluded that the plain meaning of the terms “trade accounts” and “reimbursements,” which appear in the vast majority of the releases, unambiguously, and, as a matter of law, except Plaintiffs’ claims from the releases. Id. at 681 n. 24. I also concluded, as a matter of law, that releases executed after certification of the Plaintiff-Class cannot bar those Plaintiffs from participating in the litigation of this action. Id. at 685. The sole exception was for releases executed in Delaware. Even as to those releases, I concluded that they were not enforceable against the dealers that included the “exception” language, see id. at 681 n. 24, but would be enforceable, if at all, against those Delaware dealers whose releases contain no such qualifying language (i.e. the Category-four releases). Id. at 684 n. 26. Accordingly, the issue of releases was finally and unequivocally resolved by my order. Notwithstanding, Exxon again raises the same issue in its affirmative defenses filed during the claims administration process. In connection with prejudgment interest, I surveyed the applicable state laws and concluded, pre-trial, that the Plaintiffs were entitled to prejudgment interest in the event of a jury verdict. See id. at 688 (“[T]he entitlement and accrual periods of prejudgment interest shall be in accordance with the aforementioned conclusions”). Where prejudgment interest is awarded as a matter of right, I further concluded that the Plaintiffs’ breach of contract damages were liquidated. Id. at 685 n. 29. B. Post-Trial Rulings On All Substantive Issues Pertaining to Damages, Prejudgment Interest, Releases and on the Claims Administration Process Including Set-offs. On February 20, 2001, the jury rendered a Special Verdict in favor of the Class Dealers [D.E. # 1395]. Besides finding for Plaintiffs on issues of liability and causation, the jury, in accordance with Fed. R.Civ.P. 49(a), determined class damages in the form of a common guideline or factor (cents-per-gallon on a year-to-year basis during the Class Period). After the verdict, the Dealers filed a motion for entry of an aggregate, lump some verdict for the Class as a whole [D.E. # 1409]. Exxon opposed the motion, arguing that by virtue of the “on average” nature of Exxon’s pricing obligation, Plaintiffs had failed to prove that any dealer had been damaged, that damages would have to be established on a dealer-by-dealer basis in the claims administration process, and that damages were not liquidated, thereby pre-eluding an award of prejudgment interest [D.E. # 1416, pages 15-18]. Exxon also argued that the jury’s finding that Exxon’s contractual duty was owed to all dealers rather than to individual dealers constituted a conflict in the verdict that entitled it to judgment as a matter of law [D.E. # 1440], I denied Exxon’s arguments In a series of interlocking orders and judgments intended to provide for interim, but final, review of Exxon’s liability to every member of the class for an award of compensatory damages in an amount determined by the jury’s verdict, plus prejudgment interest. The orders consist of the Order on Procedure for Determination and Entry of Final Judgment (the “Order on Procedure”) [D.E. # 1464] (also cited as Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 157 F.Supp.2d 1291 (S.D.Fla.2001)), the Judgment on Special Verdict (the “Interim Judgment”) [D.E. # 1465], the Order Denying Exxon’s Rule 50 and 59 Motions (the “Rule 50 Order”) [D.E. # 1463], and the Rule 54(b) Final Judgment on Jury Verdict for Named Plaintiffs (the “Rule 54(b) Final Judgment”) [D.E. # 1507]. 1. Each Class Member’s Entitlement to Compensatory Damages In an Amount Determined by the Jury’s Special Verdict. In my Rule 50 Order and Order on Procedure, I expressly rejected Exxon’s argument that based on the “on average” nature of the Exxon’s obligation to reduce whole sale prices, some class members were damaged to a greater or lesser extent than others. I held that the jury’s verdict established that Exxon had failed to provide any offset to any dealer throughout the damage period, that Plaintiffs had properly established class-wide breach, and that the cents per gallon damage award would determine the amount of every class member’s damage in the administrative claim process. I also rejected Exxon’s argument as to the supposed conflict in the jury verdict concerning the nature of Exxon’s pricing obligations: Although Exxon did its best to confuse the jury as to its obligations to its dealers with the tests used to prove or disprove its performance, ... [i]n the Court’ view, Exxon’s argument regarding conflict in the verdict form is a “smoke-screen” to hide from its own self-created obligation established during the creation and implementation of the DFC Program. [D.E. # 1463, pages 5-6]. Consistent with these rulings, the Interim Judgment on Special Verdict specifically provided that the annual cents per gallon damage factor in the jury verdict “shall apply in all farther proceedings involving the Class Plaintiffs and Exxon Corporation in the Claims Administration Process” [D.E. # 1465]; see also 157 F.Supp.2d at 1328. The Judgment provided: The Special Verdict made certain factual findings and established a damage factor in favor of the Class Plaintiffs in this case. Those findings and the damage factors shall govern and apply in all further proceedings involving the Class Plaintiffs and Exxon Corporation in the Claims Administration Process. Id. at 1328 (emphasis added). In my Order on Procedure for Determination and Entry of Final Judgement, i squarely held that the jury’s applicable factor or guideline will apply to determine the measure of damages of each Class Dealer during the claims administration process. Id. at 1298. I also provided that the same procedure was to be used to calculate the compensatory damages awarded to the named Plaintiffs in the Rule 54(b) Final Judgment. Id. at 1324 n. 32 (“As an alternative means of bring the issues associated with this case to the attention of the Eleventh Circuit as soon as possible, the Court is prepared to enter a Final Judgment for the named Plaintiffs under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).”). I said the same thing in several different ways. In my discussion of issues affecting the claims administration process, I held: “[C]ompensatory damages to each dealer are mathematically derived from multiplying the cents per gallon damage award determined by the jury in the Special Verdict times the total number of gallons of motor fuel purchased by that dealer over the period of March 1, 1983, until August 29, 1994, as established by Exxon’s Dealer Volume Database on a store level basis, less reductions, if any, required based on statute of limitation in Ohio, and Category-four releases in Delaware.” Id., 157 F.Supp.2d at 1308. Furthermore, in discussing Exxon’s argument that there was no basis to determine the amount of damages subject to each state’s prejudgment interest rate, I held that: “[t]he record contains competent, substantial evidence upon which the jury’s determination of a damage factor was based and upon which the jury could reasonably rely.” Id., 157 F.Supp.2d at 1313. I explained that when monetary relief is sought, and when data from each class member is required to assess individual recovery entitlement, it is appropriate for the class representatives to develop and prove common guidelines or formulae that will apply to determine the measure of recovery for each individual proof of claim. I concluded that Plaintiffs’ proof of aggregate monetary damages [based on a finding of cents per gallon] was feasible and appropriate under the unique and highly unusual circumstances. Id. at 1313-1314. I reiterated: “[T]he damage against which to apply each state’s prejudgment interest rate is to be determined by multiplying the amount of the annual cents per gallon factor, as determined by the jury, by the volume of Exxon’s sales to individual dealers in that state who submit verified claims, less any reductions by virtue of statute of limitations in Ohio and Category-4 Releases in Delaware”. Id. at 1314. Accordingly, I clearly rejected Exxon’s argument that each claimant must prove the amount, if any, Exxon actually overcharged the dealer through which the claimant is claiming and the amount the dealer was damaged by that overcharge. 2. Each Class Member’s Entitlement to Prejudgment Interest. Finding that the award of compensatory damages calculated in the manner as to every member of the Class was certain in amount, time, and location, I then ruled that compensatory damages were liquidated and awarded prejudgment interest in accordance with the law of each of the representative. To assure that my ruling was subject to review on appeal, prejudgment interest was computed on the compensatory damages awards in accordance with the relevant state law and included in the Rule 54(b) Final Judgment entered in favor of the named Plaintiffs. If Exxon had any doubt about my intention as expressed in my earlier order, Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 188 F.R.D. 667, I again revisited my rulings in Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 157 F.Supp.2d at 1311-1321. I reaffirmed my prior rulings and held against Exxon on its restated contentions that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of right in any state because: (1) there is no basis to determine the amount of “damages” subject to each state’s prejudgment interest; and (2) the Plaintiffs damages are not liquidated. To express the self-evident, I finally and comprehensively resolved the prejudgment interest issue against Exxon in eleven pages of the Order. Notwithstanding, it now appears as an affirmative defense in Exxon’s answer to each dealers claim in the claims administration process. 3. The Limited Objections Available to Exxon in the Claims Process In my Order on Procedure for Determination and Entry of Final Judgment, I concluded that Exxon had a limited right to participate in the claims administration process and to otherwise file objections. 157 F.Supp.2d at 1324. I stated that: “[Sjuch objections or requests may pertain to: (i) filing set-offs, as addressed above; (ii) challenging whether the class member was a dealer during the Class Period; (iii) challenging the time period the class member as a dealer during the Class Period; (iv) contesting the amount of gallons purchased by the class member during the Class Period on a yearly basis; (v) arguing the proper application of any applicable statute of limitations and release as a result of the Court’s rulings; (vi) requiring a determination of ‘Good Faith’ amounts of claims for subject matter jurisdiction purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, when necessary; and (vii) raising any purported miscalculation of compensatory damages and prejudgment interest for that class dealer.” Id. The express language of item (iv), and the balance of the Order specifying the manner in which the amount of every class member’s compensatory damages and prejudgment interest would be calculated, makes clear that my reference to Exxon’s standing to object to damages and prejudgment interest was strictly limited to ensuring the mathematical correctness of the rate of interest and the mathematical correctness of the specified calculations. It certainly did not envision a procedure, as now advocated by Exxon, that it may challenge individual class member’s recovery of damages as measured by the cents-per-gallon award of the jury verdict. With regard to set-offs, I exercised my discretion to allow set-offs as a matter of supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Id. I did so on a very limited basis as it pertained to “unpaid motor fuel charges, unpaid rent, and the like.” See id. at 1322. I was persuaded by Exxon’s representations as to the limited number and kind of set-offs at issue. At no point did Exxon ever advise that it planned to assert over 5.000 set-offs against claimants for return of consideration paid for releases. I now conclude that Exxon knew, or must have known, about such a significant set-off given my earlier ruling on Releases, and the jury’s verdict on fraudulent concealment. If the issue was raised, I would not have agreed, in my discretion, to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that set-off. The issue of set-offs was discussed at length at a status conference held on July 24, 2001. I posed the following question to Exxon’s counsel: THE COURT: As I understand from reading the papers — and maybe I am reading in between the lines- — -there are two categories of potential set-off claims. One would be, for instance, if a dealer had an outstanding fuel bill that was never paid in full for whatever reason, and then the other I saw alluded to is there are some rental amount that was due. Are there other categories that you anticipate or are they just unknown at this point and you are sort of preserving your position? July 24, 2001 Transcript, page 3. Counsel responded: MR. STEWART: Like a lot of things in this case, Your Honor, there is not a clear yes or no answer to that question. There will be some fuel charges. We also anticipate that there will be some rent charges. Depending upon which dealers make claims, there may be other charges arising out of the relationship. For example, Your Honor heard during the trial that they had other types of business activities going on within the stations, C stores, other types of operations, car washes, things of that nature. There may be some charges associated with those activities, although, as you move further away from fuel, I think that it is fair to say, at least we anticipate that the number of claims, set-offs, will diminish significantly in number. July 24, 2001 Transcript, page 4 (emphasis added). MR. STEWART: Exxon tries, at the conclusion of each dealer’s relationship, to get everything settled up, so we don’t anticipate that there is going to be thousands of set-offs, as the plaintiffs have intimated in their papers, and we anticipate that the number of different types of set-offs are going to be small in number. July 24, 2001 Transcript, page 4 (emphasis added). MR. STEWART: Just one last point on the last point that your Honor made. I have already said this, but I want to underscore it because I don’t want the Court to think that we are dealing from our side, that we are dealing with an enormous number of claims and then for you to be surprised and have any kind of reaction by virtue of that surprise when there are not a huge number of claims by way of set-off. We do not believe that there is going to be a huge number of claims that we can perceive at this point, and I don’t think that is going to change in the future. July 24, 2001 Transcript, pages 17-18 (emphasis added). 4. The District Court’s Certification for Interlocutory Review and Entry of Rule 54(b) Final Judgment for the Named Plaintiffs. On several occasions, I expressed my desire to proceed in a way that would allow the Eleventh Circuit to review the issues in this case as quickly as possible while allowing this Court to enter an appropriate form of judgment. Exxon acknowledged and agreed with this goal in its briefing [D.E. # 1416, page 23 n. 19, D.E. # 1445, pages 8-10]. In lieu of entry of a single, appealable final judgment for the entire Class as sought by Plaintiffs, Exxon proposed an alternative procedure “to present the issues in this ease for immediate review by the Eleventh Circuit” while the claim process was being established and implemented. See Supplemental Memo, on Entry of Judgment at 8 [D.E. # 1445]. First, Exxon proposed entry of a Rule 54(b) final judgment in favor of the named Plaintiffs. Exxon maintained that because the claims of the named Plaintiffs were, by definition, typical of the claims of the entire class, “an appeal from a Rule 54(b) final judgment will present the Eleventh Circuit with all the issues applicable to the class.” [Id. at 9] (emphasis added). Exxon stated: Moreover, an appeal from a judgment pursuant to Rule 51(b) will present the Eleventh Circuit with all of the issues applicable to the class. Thus, throughout this case, plaintiffs have argued, and the Court has agreed that the claims of the named plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the entire class, see Rule 28(a)(3), and that the question of law and fact applicable to the named plaintiffs are the same as the questions of lato and fact applicable to the entire class, see Rule 28(a)(2) and 23(b)(3). [D.E. # 1445, page 9] (emphasis added). Second, Exxon proposed that the Court enter an “interim judgment” on the jury verdict in order that the Court could certify the judgment, and all the issues raised in Exxon’s Rule 50 and 59 motions, for interlocutory review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): Although not a Final Judgment, this Court could utilize the procedure in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to authorize an immediate appeal. If the Court were disposed to enter such an Order, Exxon would file its Rule 50 and 59 motions so that, if denied, those rulings could be incorporated into the § 1292(b) order. [D.E. # 1416, page 23 n. 19]. The parties’ competing positions on the entry of an appealable judgment came before me on July 24, 2001. At the hearing, I clearly explained my intention to enter a ruling that would ensure all pending issues would be resolved with finality upon conclusion of an interim appeal: [M]y purpose is, in this order I am going to enter, to try to address and not punt on as many issues as I can to allow the parties a full right to make their arguments to the Eleventh Circuit, however they may evolve. So, I am trying to be as inclusive here and not just reserve it for another day because the last thing I would like to see is, you know, assuming the procedure goes forward as you have envisioned it, Mr. Stewart, further appeals in the future, based upon the final judgment when these are new questions. So, I would rather address as many issues as I can for both parties on the issue. July 24, 2001 Transcript at 9 (emphasis added). In response to Plaintiffs’ complaints that Exxon’s proposals would result in a “judicial train wreck” in which Exxon could potentially appeal 10,000 separate final judgments to the Eleventh Circuit, Exxon’s counsel assured this Court that this would not be the case, because a final judgment entered in favor of the named Plaintiffs would present all the issues in the case to the Eleventh Circuit, whose ruling would thereby bind the entire class: I want to make clear because this is another one of those boogeyman arguments about these thousands and thousands of final judgments. I think that all of the issues in this case go up if there is a judgment on the main plaintiffs because they have taken the position in the papers that are filed in front of Your Honor on this last round of briefing that no individual plaintiff can prove a case unless they went through all of the proofs that had to be brought before Your Honor. They have made that clear that is their position, that for even one dealer to prove this case, they would have to go through everything that was in front of the Court in this trial. So, that takes up all of the issues that were involved as far as the trial is concerned. [Id. at 33]. In response to this Court’s question as to whether review of the Rule 54(b) final judgment could proceed in tandem with a § 1292(b) certification, Exxon’s counsel stated: Yes, sir, and that is what we would like to see happen so that we have the greatest opportunity to get all these issues up there and the issues resolved as far as the case is concerned. [Id. at 34] (emphasis added). When Plaintiffs’ counsel responded that Exxon had no incentive to expeditiously resolve individual claims in the claims process because its internal rate of return on the monies it took from the dealers was double the state law prejudgment interest rates, Exxon’s counsel responded: Every time we have an argument, we hear we are trying to delay this process .... So I think it is totally unfair to have these delay arguments thrown up as an excuse to overlook, in essence, the law on these points. [Id. at 46]. In order to achieve interlocutory review on all the issues determined by the jury verdict, my Final Order on Procedure, the Rule 50 Order, the Interim Judgment, the Rule 54(b) Final Judgment, and my prior order on releases, I certified all of the rulings for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): An immediate appeal from this Order, together with the judgment on Special Verdict entered in accordance herewith, will materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation by giving direction to the forthcoming claims administration process, thereby avoiding significant lost time and unnecessary expense if the legal conclusions set forth in this Order are ultimately reversed. Finally, while appeal of this order is interlocutory, this Court urges the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to consider all legal issues directed to the Judgment on Special Verdict, which this Court has directed the Clerk of the Court to enter, as part of its pendent appellate jurisdiction. This Court and the parties will greatly benefit from the Eleventh Circuit’s review and early determination of the myriad of legal issues associated with this case before untold additional attorney’s fees and costs are incurred in reaching a Final Judgment for both the named and putative class members. 157 F.Supp.2d at 1327 (emphasis added). Adopting Exxon’s recommendation, I further clarified my intent regarding appellate review so that both the Class Dealers and Exxon would be able to raise any and all issues for resolution by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. I stated: By this Order, the Court has endeavored to decide all issues posed by the parties and also to approve the form of the judgment to be entered on the Special Verdict in accordance with Fed. R.Civ.P. 58. Although not a final judgment, the Court shall utilize the procedures in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to authorize an interlocutory appeal. For this reason, the Court has ordered Exxon to file its Rule 50 and 59 motions so that, if denied, those rulings could be considered as part of the § 1292(b) review. 157 F.Supp.2d at 1296. In addition, the Court, by this Order, shall rule on all remaining outstanding issues affecting the claims administration process and request the Eleventh Circuit to review these matters before such an administration process is implemented. 157 F.Supp.2d at 1308 As an alternative means of bringing the issues associated with this case to the attention of the Eleventh Circuit as soon as possible, the Court is prepared to enter a Final Judgment for the named Plaintiffs under Fed.R.C.P. 54(b). Such a final judgment will not prejudice the claims of the remaining class members and will also allow an immediate full appeal on the merits while the claims administration process for the balance of the class is being established and implemented, and the appellate process is initiated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 157 F.Supp.2d at 1324 n. 32. C. Exxon Appeals the Issues Now Raised in the Claims Process Pursuant to this Court’s certification and consistent with its representations that it would seek review of all issues resolved below, Exxon sought interlocutory review under § 1292(b) and also appealed the Rule 54(b) final judgment. The Eleventh Circuit granted review under § 1292(b), which entitled it to review all issues in the case, Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1365 (11th Cir.1997), and consolidated the interlocutory appeal with Exxon’s appeal of the Rule 54(b) Final Judgment. In its consolidated brief on appeal, Exxon sought review of all issues arising in connection with class certification, pre-trial rulings, the trial, the jury’s special verdict, and the District Court’s related post-trial rulings. Among at least 7 other major points of error advanced, Exxon specifically urged reversal on the following grounds: (1) that the District Court erred in establishing the cent-per-gallon damage award of the jury verdict as the damage factor for the determination of the compensatory damages of the named Plaintiffs and individual class members in the claims process because the jury had not found that the named Plaintiffs or any individual dealer was in fact damaged [Brief at 62 (App.-K, D.E. # 1875 (excerpt)) ]; (2) that the District Court erred in awarding prejudgment interest to the named Plaintiffs and to class members in the claims process based on the damages computed using the cents per gallon jury verdict [Id. at 63]; (3) that the District Court erred in ruling that Exxon’s form release was invalid based upon the jury’s determination that Exxon fraudulently concealed its breach [Id. at 46]. In appealing this ruling, Exxon’s initial brief mistakenly asserted that the District Court had not made the alternative ruling that the release contained an exception for the claims brought in this case. [Id.]. Exxon belatedly sought review of this alternative ground in its reply brief. [Reply Brief at 46-47, App.-L, D.E. # 1875 (excerpt) ]; (4) that the District Court erred in certifying the case and trying damages on a class-wide basis [App.-K at 79-80, D.E. # 1875]. D. The Eleventh Circuit Affirms the District Court on All Issues Raised in Exxon’s Appeal In its preliminary introduction, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the full scope of the issues before it both in terms of the final judgment for the named plaintiffs and the interlocutory appeal. It stated: After entering a final judgment for the class representatives and denying the dealers’ motion for the entry of a class-wide judgment, the district court certified the following two questions for interlocutory appeal: (1) whether it properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over class members whose claims did not meet the jurisdictional minimum amount in controversy requirement; and (2) whether an aggregate compensatory and prejudgment interest award could be entered for the class before the claims administration process. Additionally, the court urged us to consider all of the legal issues raised by both parties relating to the disposition of the case. Thus, we also consider (1) whether Exxon is entitled to participate in the claims administration process; (2) whether Exxon may assert set-off claims against the dealers; (3) whether the district court abused its discretion by certifying the class; (4) whether the court erred when it admitted extrinsic evidence to supplement the Dealer Sales Agreements (dealer agreements); (5) whether the dealers’ claims were barred by the statutes of limitations; and (6) whether the court abused its discretion by allowing the dealers’ expert witness to testify at trial. We find no reversible error and accordingly affirm. Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1251-1252 (11th Cir.2003) (emphasis added). Thus, the Eleventh Circuit’s panel opinion opens with broad language affirming this Court’s prior rulings. The last paragraph ends with similar catch-all language with respect to all issues raised by the parties: “With respect to each of the remaining issues raised by the parties, we find no reversible error. Accordingly, we AFFIRM” [Id. at 1264] (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit, therefore, rejected all of Exxon’s arguments on appeal, and by its opinion affirmed the jury’s Special Verdict, the Order on Procedure, the Rule 50 Order, the Interim Judgment, the Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and the Court’s order regarding releases in them entirety. The balance of the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion confirms this conclusion, giving brief attention to the issues Exxon is now attempting to re-litigate. For example, the Eleventh Circuit relegates Exxon’s arguments challenging the jury’s verdict and the methodology for calculating damages and prejudgment interest as set forth in the Order on Procedure to a short footnote addressing the propriety of the Rule 54(b) Final Judgment in favor of the named Plaintiffs: Exxon also argues that it was inappropriate for the district court to enter individual final judgments for each of the named class representatives, because no reasonable jury could have found that Exxon breached its obligations under the dealer agreements. Exxon’s argument, however, is little more than an attack on all the factual findings made by the jury. As we find that the jury’s verdict was supported by substantial evidence, we find that Exxon’s argument is without merit. [Id. at 1256 n. 8]. The Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance of “all factual findings made by the jury” affirms the jury’s determination of Exxon’s liability to all dealers as well as the quantum of damages, expressed in cents per gallon, suffered by all dealers. Moreover, as Exxon itself advanced to this Court prior to its appeal, because the methodology for the calculation of the named Plaintiffs’ compensatory damages and prejudgment interest awards is, by definition, typical of the Class, this ruling necessarily affirms that methodology, specified in the Order on Procedure, as to all dealers. The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion further emphasizes its affirmance of this Court’s specific rulings concerning the methodology for calculation of individual dealer damages and prejudgment interest in the claims process as specified in the Order on Procedure. It stated: “[W]e agree with the district court that the determination of the amount that each dealer was overcharged during that class period must take place on an individual basis, taking into account the amount of compensatory damages to which each dealer is entitled” and “we further find that the district court did not err in ... devising an appropriate procedure for the administration of each dealer’s claim.” [Id. at 1257, 1264] (emphasis added). While not mentioning prejudgment interest directly in this paragraph, the Eleventh Circuit previously recognized the difficulties of entering an aggregate judgment because of “the difficulty of awarding prejudgment interest on a class-wide basis when the applicable amount of interest varies from state to state.” Id. at 1257. In that Exxon raised the award of prejudgment interest as a ground for error in its main brief, and the Eleventh Circuit found “no reversible error,” it affirmed with respect to this issue as well. With respect to Exxon’s release defense, in yet another footnote, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the argument raised by Exxon in its initial brief and affirmed this Court’s determination that the Releases were voidable by virtue of Exxon’s fraudulent concealment. Id. at 1263 n. 18. The Eleventh Circuit opinion also implicitly affirmed this Court’s alternative ruling by adopting the District Court’s finding that only Category -four Delaware Releases are effective, and ultimately concluding that: “With respect to each of the remaining issues raised by the parties, we find no reversible error.” Id. at 1264. While not discussed by the Eleventh Circuit, this reference necessarily includes Exxon’s claim, in its reply brief, that the alternative ruling that the Releases contained in exception for the claims brought in this case was erroneous and subject to reversal. With respect to Exxon’s right to assert set-offs in the claim process, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed its entitlement, holding that it was “purely discretionary” for the district court to allow such claims. Id. at 1259 n. 14. It stated specifically: “Thus, the district court had discretion to decide whether Exxon should be allowed to assert set-off claims against the dealers.” Id. E. Exxon’s Petitions for Further Review to the Eleventh Circuit En Banc and the United States Supreme Court Recognize that the Panel Opinion Disposed of its Arguments on Damages and Interest In its petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, Exxon did not suggest that the panel opinion had failed to affirm the jury verdict or the District Court’s post-judgment orders and judgments in all respects. To the contrary, Exxon’s petition recited that the panel had improperly affirmed the district court’s orders that “applied the jury verdict on liability to all members of the class, entered final judgment in favor of 10 named plaintiffs on the basis of an ‘on average’ damage figure, prescribed a procedure for resolving damage claims for other class members, and certified multiple questions for appeal.” [Rehearing Petition at 5-6 (App.-N), D.E. # 1875]. Exxon’s rehearing petition also complained that under the panel opinion, “each dealer is now entitled to recover compensatory damages without proof that the prices he paid were too high” [Id. at 2], and that the panel opinion affirmed use of a “single jury verdict form that required ‘all or nothing’ answers applicable to the class ‘as a whole’ ” [Id. at 11]. After its petition for rehearing en banc was denied, Exxon sought certiorari review from the Supreme Court on the issues of class certification and subject matter jurisdiction over the lesser claimants. In connection with the issue of class certification, Exxon continued to complain that this Court and the Eleventh Circuit had improperly allowed Plaintiffs to prove Exxon’s liability and class members’ damages on a class-wide basis. [Certiorari Petition at 23 (App.-O (excerpt)), D.E. # 1875], The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the issue of supplemental jurisdiction, thereby denying review of class certification. Thereafter, the Eleventh Circuit immediately issued its mandate. [App.-P, D.E. # 1875]. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s denial of review of certification issues, Exxon continued to advance arguments concerning those issues in its merits brief, including the argument that the class definition, affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit, had improperly allowed Plaintiffs to compute the amount of damages suffered by individual dealers with aggregated, national data. [Merits Brief at 13, 41-42 (App.-Q), D.E. # 1875]. Exxon’s merits brief to the United States Supreme Court also expressly recited that the Eleventh Circuit’s panel opinion affirmed the District Court’s Order on Procedure. [Id. at 7]. F. The District Court Appoints Special Master Scott and Warns Exxon Not to Assert Frivolous Arguments in the Claims Administration Process After the Supreme Court denied Exxon’s petition for certiorari on the issue of class certification and the Eleventh Circuit issued its mandate [filed June 11, 2003], this Court proceeded to appoint former U.S. District Judge Thomas Scott as Special Master responsible for the determination of individual class member claims in the claim process. The order of appointment directs the Special Master to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Order on Procedure. [D.E. # 1759]. When the lawyers for the parties met to prepare to meet with Special Master Scott for the first time to discuss implementation of the claims administration process, Exxon’s new lawyers indicated that they intended to contest individual class members’ entitlement to prejudgment interest. When Class counsel subsequently advised this Court that it appeared that Exxon intended to re-litigate issues it had already lost on appeal, I issued a stern warning in open court that I would not countenance the assertion of frivolous arguments by Exxon that would delay the claims process: THE COURT: Let me just say I don’t understand yet what the issues are but I am going to closely observe them. If there are issues raised by Exxon that I consider to be frivolous and improper that already have been resolved or committed to by prior statements of the company through their counsel, I frankly will impose § 11 fees. It’s not going to be a free ride on Exxon to do whatever it wishes. I’m not saying that it will, but I want the ground rules to be laid out clearly that I’m going to hold the parties to prior representations and prior rulings and I’m not going to get into the reconsideration of prejudgment interest. That’s been resolved as far as I’m concerned. You may reserve, of course, for any appeal to the Eleventh Circuit of a final judgment, but no way are we going to get into the issues of prejudgment interest as part of the application process. The only question is what very limited issues were reserved for Exxon to dispute and those were crafted carefully, so I’m putting Exxon on notice. There has been some kind of allegations of what’s ahead and I don’t know that they are fair allegations or appropriate allegations, but if I find frivolous activities here on the part of Exxon in this claims process, there’s another ground for fees here and that’s Rule 11 sanctions fees. Hear me clearly. [January 27, 2005 Transcript, pages 10-11 (emphasis added) ]. When Exxon’s counsel complained that Exxon was being maligned for something it had not done, I responded as follows: THE COURT: All right, sir. With regard to that issue, I am not prejudging any matter relating to Exxon’s position which will be filed on March 1st. All of my statements relative to their position are already in orders. I hope that those orders are sufficiently clear and will be followed. I’m just giving a framework for consideration that from what I have seen, I’ve seen some matters being presented here by Exxon that are frivolous matters with respect to some of these filings, I will treat them with great consideration and consider whether appropriate sanctions are there. I’m not trying to chill your efforts but I’m trying to put it in a framework where you understand what’s on the table. I don’t know where you are and what your position is but I am very concerned that we move ahead with a process that has a resolution and not undue or frivolous delay. I think that’s all I want to say about that issue. [Id. at 42-43] (emphasis added). G. Exxon Files with Class Counsel and the Special Master 9,000 Answers and Position Statements on Damages, Prejudgment Interest and Set-Offs. On February 14, 2005, Plaintiffs moved before the Special Master to review Exxon’s answers to claims be served on Class counsel and not yet served on members of the Class [D.E. # 1816]. By this procedure, Class counsel argued that it will allow the Court and Class counsel to ensure that Exxon has asserted only those limited defenses and objections authorized by the Court. By agreed order issued on February 25, 2005, Class counsel’s motion was granted, subject to Class counsel having thirty days from receipt of the answers to review them, and, if necessary, request the Special Master’s intervention before the answers were filed and served on members of the Class [D.E. # 1834], Thereafter, Exxon filed with the Special Master its Notice of Filing Exemplar of Defenses [D.E. # 1892], and, per the direction of the Special Master, also filed position papers and presented argument explaining the positions it has taken and the defenses it has asserted. Its position papers were on the calculation of damages and prejudgment interest [D.E. # 1841], on set-off and release defenses [D.E. # 1843], and on the process for adjudicating claims by Exxon Corporation [D.E. # 1850]. In its Exemplar, Exxon listed fifty-two potential affirmative defenses. It is significant to note that Exxon did not admit in any of the 8,912 answers that it owed one dollar to any claimant, even in those claims as to which it otherwise admits the identity of the claimant as a dealer and the time periods in which the claimant operated an Exxon service station. Leaving aside issues it wished to reserve for further appeal, Exxon defenses ranged from the most trivial of objections (e.g. for misspellings and omitted middle initials) to the assertion, without a stated factual basis, in each answer that every claim “does not invoke a good faith amount in controversy in excess of $50,000.” Exxon asserts in every claim as an affirmative defense that the claim may belong to another person without identifying the alternative owner or the good faith basis for this defense. In connection with its set-off-from-voidable-release claim, Exxon’s answers even reference a demand for costs and statutory attorney’s fees under the laws of the States of Texas, Arizona, and Arkansas regardless of the claimant’s store location. It is apparent to this Court that the form of Exxon’s answer is intentionally structured to confuse, obstruct and delay the expeditious determination of claims. Instead of clearly stating whether Exxon is objecting to the claim and on what grounds, Exxon’s answers are formatted to intentionally create the appearance that Exxon denies the validity of every claim. But, this is not all. In addition, in its position papers, Exxon, through a team of “new” lawyers, purposefully attempted to lead the Special Master, who is new to these proceedings, into error by advocating arguments that it lost at trial and on appeal, asserting: (1) the Eleventh Circuit has not approved the method that the district court used to calculated individual damages and prejudgment interest, and (2) the “on average” price reduction does not allow calculation of individual damages and prejudgment interest. It also advocated a new set-off included in over 5,000 answers that it is entitled to the return of consideration for any release voided by a class member. By way of illustration, while Exxon’s new counsel gives lip service to this Court’s prior rulings, they spend countless pages rearguing reasons why this Court was wrong in its orders and stating that “... implementation of the District Court’s ruling regarding damages and prejudgment interest will result in judgments that must be reversed on appeal for the reasons set forth in Part II of this memorandum” [D.E. # 1841, page 26]. Otherwise stated, Exxon advocates, as if there has never been a trial and final appellate review, that every dealer must individually prove whether it was damaged and how much, that no dealer’s damage claim is liquidated, and that no dealer is entitled to prejudgment interest. Exxon even claims that the Eleventh Circuit failed to review the jury verdict (“Exxon did challenge the jury verdict in the Eleventh Circuit but the Eleventh Circuit did not necessarily review that challenge”), and if it did, its ruling was clearly erroneous [D.E. # 1841, at 22-23 n. 22]. It argues: “[T]hus, even if the Eleventh Circuit’s decision were regarded as necessarily approving the District Court’s rulings regarding calculation of individual damages, entitlement to and calculation of prejudgment interest, that implicit ruling need not be followed because it is clearly erroneous.” Id. at 23 (emphasis added). At a hearing held before the Special Master on March 31, 2005, Exxon engaged in “double speak” by, on one hand, stating that it was not arguing with this Court’s and the Eleventh Circuit’s rulings, while, on the other hand, proceeding to do just that in hope of convincing the Special Master to allow Exxon to proceed in the manner set forth in its position papers: MR. JULIAN: I think that, as he have indicated in the paper, we understand what Judge Gold’s rulings are. We don’t intent to argue with Judge Gold about his rulings, but we don’t agree with the plaintiffs’ counsel on whether the Eleventh Circuit has affirmed many of the rulings, and many of the rulings that he made after the verdict was entered were certified to the Eleventh Circuit pursuant to section 1292(b). The Eleventh Circuit selected some of the issues to rule upon. It chose not to rule upon some of the other issues, and so we don’t have any law of the case with respect to really a variety of very important rulings that Judge Gold made, and that’s why we are continuing to assert affirmative defenses, notwithstanding that there has already been a ruling by the district court as to certain of the defenses and to other issues such as the method of calculation of damages; but I think we can identify those where Judge Gold has ruled, and I think that the — your appropriate role, as we have indicated, is to continue to uphold Judge Gold’s rulings. Although we disagree with his rulings, I don’t think that we have any authority but to implement his orders, although our positions on those rulings, I think, are things that should be taken into consideration here, and I want to emphasize that we think that they very much have merit. Transeript, March 31, 2005, pages 10 and 11. H. Plaintiffs File for Emergency Relief The Plaintiffs’ filed the subject motion referring to Exxon’s stance as “shocking” [D.E. # 187, page 27], by wanting to “start over” and claiming that it is yet to be determined whether any dealer was in fact overcharged. Plaintiffs argue that Exxon’s “blatant effort to delay payment of monies it owes makes a mockery of the judicial process and warrants immediate imposition of sanctions sufficient to overcome Exxon’s bad faith and dilatory conduct” Id., and, that “Exxon’s assertion of legally and factually frivolous denials, defenses and demands for attorney’s fees and costs, and the confusing manner in which the answers are constructed, is intended to chill individual class members participation in the claims administration process by creating the false appearance that their claims are invalid or deficient, and that pursuing the claim will enmesh the claimant in a difficult and protracted legal dispute with the outcome in question.” Id. at 7. In its response, Exxon first argues that this Court should refer the Emergency Motion to the Special Master for a Report and Recommendation, even though it acknowledges that any such report would ultimately have to be addressed by this Court [D.E. # 1899, page 8]. Exxon next argues that it has only raised defenses that it is “entitled” to raise in order to preserve them for appellate review after entry of a “final judgment” for each claimant, and that it has not taken any position that warrants judicial estoppel or revocation of prior orders. It concludes that the request for sanctions is inappropriate. Upon review of Exxon’s arguments, and its positions taken at oral argument, I conclude that Exxon has in bad faith attempted to make a “judicial train wreck” of the claims administration process despite my clear warning. But, equally important, the totality of Exxon’s actions reveals a cynical plan to prolong this litigation which has endured more than thirteen years, by pursuing the very appeals Exxon stipulated that it would not pursue when urging this Court to delay entry of final judgment following the jury’s verdict over four years ago. Exxon pleads with this Court not to impose sanctions that would chill its ability to preserve its appellate rights. Exxon has it wrong. It is not entitled to a “do over.” It is not entitled to further appeals on issues already decided. The sanctions that must be imposed are those that will do precisely that-chill Exxon’s blatant disregard of an orderly judicial process — otherwise Exxon will be rewarded for continuing to successfully delay payment of the money its owes to the Class members. II. THE COURT EXERCISES ITS AUTHORITY TO HEAR PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY MOTION. I complement the Special Master on an excellent job. While the Special Master has been diligent in holding hearings with the parties, and receiving memoranda on legal issues, I conclude that it is necessary for this Court, at this juncture, to assume direct jurisdiction over certain aspects of the claims administration process in order to control the integrity of the judicial process and the conduct of the parties before the Court. By doing so, I shall provide direction and guidance to the Special Master and the parties, and, thereby, avoid long delays through potential objections and appeals which ultimately I have will have to resolve in any event. I emphasize that I am not assuming jurisdiction over all issues; just those which are addressed in this Order. The remaining issues not discussed may be decided by the Special Master in a manner not inconsistent with this Order. III. THE RULINGS OF THE DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED BY THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ARE GOVERNED BY THE MANDATE RULE AND THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE AND MAY NOT BE RE-LITIGATED DURING THE CLAIMS ADMINISTRATION PROCESS. Each of Exxon’s legal arguments on its reargued affirmative defenses runs headlong into the “mandate rule.” The mandate rule requires a district court to strictly comply with the terms of a circuit court’s opinion when a case is remanded. E.g., Pelletier v. Zweifel, 987 F.2d 716, 718 (11th Cir.) (collecting citations), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 918, 114 S.Ct. 311, 126 L.Ed.2d 258 (1993). The district court must implement both the letter and spirit of the mandate, taking into consideration the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion and the circumstances it embraces. United States v. Mesa, 247 F.3d 1165, 1171 (11th Cir.2001). The rule is derived from the law of the case doctrine, which “operates to create efficiency, finality, and obedience within the judicial system.” Litman v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006, 108 S.Ct. 700, 98 L.Ed.2d 652 (1988). A district court may reconsider matters once decided under the following limited exceptions to the mandate rule: (1) new and substantially different evidence is presented in a subsequent trial; (2) there is an intervening change of controlling authority on the issue in question; or (3) the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice. Heathcoat v. Potts, 905 F.2d 367, 370 (11th Cir.1990) (citations omitted). The law of the case is established not only by what the Eleventh Circuit decides expressly, but by what it decides by necessary implication. DeLong Equipment v. Washington Mills Electro Min., 990 F.2d 1186, 1197 (11th Cir.1993) (“[A] decision of the Court of Appeals at an earlier stage of the same case represents the law of the case not only as to matters ‘decided explicitly’ but also as those ‘decided by necessary implication.’ ”) (citations omitted), modified on other grounds, 997 F.2d 1340 (11th Cir.1993). But the law of the case doctrine is not limited only to those matters expressly and necessarily decided. Under the law of the case doctrine, “a legal decision made at one stage of the litigation unchallenged in a subsequent appeal when the opportunity existed, becomes the law of the case for future stages of the same litigation, and the parties are deemed to have waived the right to challenge that decision at a later time.” United States v. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556, 1561 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting Williamsburg Wax Museum v. Historic Figures, 810 F.2d 243, 250 (D.C.Cir.1987)). Thus, if a matter is omitted from one appeal, it may be held foreclosed, under the “two bites of the appellate appeal rule,” on a later appeal to the same court as a matter of law of the case. Id. (citing cases). Accordingly, Exxon cannot now raise matters which it did not previously appeal as grounds for error to the Eleventh Circuit. In its Response to Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion, Exxon argues that the Eleventh Circuit did not explicitly discuss each of the points it raised in its appellate brief. This Court will not presume that the Circuit panel completely disregarded an argument specifically raised on appeal. From the entire context of the opinion, its conclusion that the district court did not commit reversible error, and its affirmance with respect to each of the “remaining issues raised by the parties,” one must presume that the Eleventh Circuit considered Exxon’s unaddressed arguments so lacking in merit as to be unworthy of discussion. The fact of the matter is that there is “no requirement in law that a federal appellate court’s decision be accompanied by a written opinion” at all, let alone one which discusses at length every argument raised, no matter how frivolous. Furman v. United States, 720 F.2d 263, 264 (2d. Cir.1983) (rejecting contention that its prior summary affirmance of petitioner’s conviction which addressed some but not all of petitioner’s claims, gave less than adequate consideration to the claims raised on appeal). As stated in Furman, “[i]n each case, the [appellate] Court’s ruling is issued after due consideration of the merits of the appeal, and the judgment entered determines, either explicitly or implicitly, all issues raised in the appeal.” Id. at 266. Exxon’s position that it has the right to appeal again those issues which were not directly addressed is astounding after taking into consideration the entirety of the opinion and the circumstances its embraces. Exxon’s position is not only contrary to fundamental appellate law, but it is plainly contrary to any clear reading of the panel’s opinion. Exxon, for instance, claims that the Eleventh Circuit did not review the Rule 54(b) Final Judgment at all because the issue was not listed in the first paragraph of the opinion identifying what Exxon says are the “sole” issues the Eleventh Circuit “had agreed to address” [Exxon’s Response at 18-19, D.E. # 1899], Its position ignores that, in the introductory paragraph, the Eleventh Circuit made it clear that it was not oblivious to the Final Judgment when it stated: “[AJfter entering a final judgment for the class representatives and denying the dealer’s motion for the entry of a class-wide judgment, the district court certified the following two issues for interlocutory appeal .... ” 333 F.3d 1248,1251 (emphasis added). Exxon also ignores that the Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected its argument that “it was inappropriate for the district court to enter individual final judgments for each of the named class representatives, because no reasonable jury could have found that Exxon breached its obligations under the dealers agreements.” 333 F.3d at 1256 n. 8 (emphasis added). By necessary implication, the Eleventh Circuit is stating that it was not wrong for the district court to enter individual final judgments for each of the named class representatives based on the same methodology to be applied for the putative class members. The Eleventh Circuit expressly endorsed this Court’s Order on Procedure which established the claims process that would employ the very same methodology for calculating damages and prejudgment interest for every class member. 333 F.3d at 1248. The panel’s express affirmation on this very issue was not lost on Exxon, which sought rehearing or rehearing en banc and Supreme Court review on this ruling complaining: “Each dealer is now entitled to recover compensatory damages without proof that the prices he paid were too high” [App. N to Plaintiffs’ Appendix in Support of Emergency Motion, D.E. # 1875]. In light of Exxon’s express recognition of the panel’s approval of the damages and interest methodology set forth in the Order on Procedure, Exxon simply engages in bad faith in rearguing now that this issue was never addressed and decided. Alternatively, Exxon argues that it is permitted to revisit these issues under the exception to the law of the case doctrine that this Court and the Eleventh Circuit may consider again previously decided issues when the earlier ruling was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice if implemented. The Eleventh Circuit has made it clear that this limited exception must be rarely used and applies only to legal errors when the legal error is beyond the scope of reasonable debate. It stated, in Jenkins Brick Company v. Bremer, 321 F.3d 1366 (11th Cir. 2003): In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988), the Supreme Court described the law-of-the-case doctrine, and the doctrine’s most significant exception, as follows: A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a ru