Full opinion text
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ROYAL, District Judge. Currently before the Court are the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. The present case has had an unnecessarily prolonged and frustrated history with this Court. Plaintiff 2025 Emery Highway, L.L.C. (herein “Club Exotica”) is a venue that, prior to its closing on September 18, 2004, provided nude and semi-nude entertainment for its patrons. The club first initiated this action in April of 2002 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from this Court. Since then, Club Exotica’s constitutional claims and theories of relief have continued to multiply. Thus, until now, the Court’s attempts to reach any resolution of the shifting theories and morphing claims raised by Club Exotica have been no more successful than an attempt to herd cats. Yet, after a myriad of extensions of time, withdrawn motions, and prolonged delays (by both parties), this Court finally demanded that Club Exotica concisely define its claims and that all claims be brought before the Court for a long-overdue review on the merits. Club Exotica complied and filed its Second Amended Complaint [Doc. 88] in October of 2004 against Defendants Bibb County, Sheriff Jerry M. Modena, and John Doe. Club Exotica’s most recent complaint, however, is still an expansive recitation of allegations. At the core of the Complaint, Club Exotica alleges that' the County, through its government officials and law enforcement actions, has intentionally and repeatedly impinged upon its constitutional rights as guaranteed by the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Following the filing of Club Exotica’s Second Amended Complaint, an additional discovery period was provided. Thereafter, both Club Exotica and the County filed motions for summary judgment [Doc.s 103 & 112]. Timely responses and replies to each motion were filed. These motions are now properly before the Court. Having considered the arguments of the parties, the relevant authorities, and all evidence cited in support of and in opposition to the motions for summary judgment, the Court finds that the County’s motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Club Exotica’s partial motion for summary judgment is due to be DENIED in full. STANDARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT Summary judgment must be granted if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087, 1090 (11th Cir.1996). Only a genuine issue of material fact will defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. See Anderson v. Lib erty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). This means that summary judgment may be granted if there is insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party or, in other words, if reasonable minds could not differ as to the verdict. See id. at 249-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and all justifiable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but the court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. See id. at 254-55, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” and that entitle it to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the moving party discharges this burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and present specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact (i.e., evidence that would support a jury verdict) or that the moving party is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-26, 106 S.Ct. 2548. This evidence must consist of more than mere eonclusory allegations or legal conclusions. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir.1991). Ultimately, summary judgment must be entered where “the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff Club Exotica is a venue in Bibb County, Georgia, which, prior to its closing in September of 2004, provided erotic entertainment for its clientele. The club first opened for business in Bibb County in October of 2001. Because no alcoholic beverages may be sold in Bibb County except under a license issued pursuant to the County’s Alcoholic Beverage Code, see Bibb County, Ga., Code § 3-21, Club Exotica applied to the Bibb County Board of Commissioners for an alcoholic beverage license before it opened. In this February of 2001 application, the applicant, “2025 Emery Highway, LLC, d/b/a Club Exotica,” listed its occupation as a “restaurant/nightclub operation.” (Doc. 104, Deft. Ex. 1). The County initially denied the club’s application for an alcoholic beverage license, citing civil disability provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Code, and litigation ensued. Thereafter, on October 24, 2001, an alcoholic beverage license was issued to Club Exotica, but was done so only pursuant to a settlement agreement in which Club Exotica stipulated that it would not operate as an “adult entertainment establishment.” (Doc. 104, Deft.Ex. 2). Once it opened, Club Exotica began providing erotic, but not nude, dance entertainment. On December 12, 2001, Club Exotica applied to renew its alcoholic beverage license for the 2002 calendar year. In this second application, Club Exotica listed its occupation as “restaurant services” and represented that it had operated as such since it opened in October of 2001. (Deft. Ex. 3). It was recommended that this application for renewal be granted in February of 2002. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, on April 16, 2002, Club Exotica initiated the present action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking a declaration of its rights and liabilities under the County’s Alcoholic Beverage Code and injunctive relief barring the County from infringing on its constitutional rights with respect thereto. As a peripheral matter, the club further sought a declaration as to the constitutionality of the County’s adult entertainment regulations (including provisions of its Adult Entertainment Licensing Code, Adult Entertainment Zoning Code, and Occupational Tax Code). The club included these additional constitutional challenges even though it had not applied to operate and did not claim to operate as an “adult entertainment” venue. Club Exotica pled that all of these codes were unconstitutional both on their face and as-applied to its operations. Primarily, in this first Complaint, Club Exotica stated that it intended to lawfully provide totally nude dance entertainment under Bibb County’s regulatory scheme but anticipated that the County would act arbitrarily and with discriminatory intent to bar the club from providing nude dancing entertainment, in violation of its rights as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Club Exotica explained that it desired to operate as a “mainstream performance house” as permitted by the Alcoholic Beverage Code. This provision would allow the club to both provide nude entertainment and lawfully sell alcohol to its patrons. (See Compl. [Doc. 1]). The Bibb County Alcoholic Beverage Code specifically prohibits certain types of entertainment upon any premises licensed to sell, serve, or dispense alcohol — including “[l]ive entertainment where any person appears unclothed or in such attire, costume or clothing as to expose any portion of his or her specified anatomical areas or where such person performs acts of specified sexual activities or acts which simulate specified sexual activity....” Code § 3-71(c), (c)(2) (emphasis added). Under the Code, “specified anatomical area includes ... [l]ess than completely and opaquely covered human genitals or pubic region; cleft of the buttocks; or any portion of the female breast encompassed within an area falling below the horizontal line one would have to draw to intercept a point about the top of the areola .... ” § 3-71(b)(9). “Specified sexual activities ... includes ... [t]he fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region, buttocks, anus or female breast; ... [s]ex acts ..., actual or simulated, including intercourse, or copulation or sodomy; ... [and] [m]asterbation, actual or simulated_” § 3-71(b)(10). An exception to the prohibition against the display of specified anatomical areas is permitted, however, for any “mainstream performance house ... which derives less than twenty (20) percent of its gross annual income from the sale of alcoholic beverages.” § 3-71(c)(4). It was under this “mainstream performance exception” that Club Exotica sought to offer nude dancing performances and maintain its alcoholic beverage license. Club Exotica then anticipated that it would derive less than 20% of its 2003 revenue from the sale of alcoholic beverages and would thus be eligible to lawfully provide nude entertainment under the exception. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 31-33). Approximately one month after Club Exotica’s first complaint was filed, the Bibb County Board of Commissioners met and amended the Alcoholic Beverage Code. On May 14, 2002, the “mainstream performance exception” was more thoroughly defined so as to provide that: [t]he prohibition against display of “specified anatomical areas” shall not apply to the premises of any traditional or live performance house, museum, theater, concert hall, opera house, educational institution or similar establishment, which regularly features legitimate live performances, including plays, operas, ballets, concerts or other similar performances, and which derives less than 20 percent of its gross annual revenue from the sale of alcoholic beverages. It is the intent of this section to require that any establishment seeking to qualify as a traditional theater must first meet the definition of traditional or live theater (mainstream performance house), as defined in [the Adult Entertainment Code, Bibb County, Ga., Code § 6-72(15) ] and secondly derive less than 20 percent of its gross annual revenue from the sale of alcoholic beverages. If the cost of admission to the establishment, whether by cover charges or tickets, entitles the patrons to free drink(s), then the revenue generated by the ticket sale or cover charge is to be included in the annual revenue from the sale of alcoholic beverages. Code § 3-71(c)(4) (2002) (Doc. 104, Deft. Ex. 6). Thus, the Alcoholic Beverage Code, as amended in 2002, incorporated by reference the definition of a “mainstream performance house” included in the adult entertainment regulations. Bibb County’s ordinances for adult entertainment establishments, particularly the provision referred to as the “Adult Entertainment Licensing Code,” regulate the licensing and operation of venues offering “adult entertainment” — defined as entertainment “characterized by an emphasis on the depiction, display or featuring of ‘specified anatomical areas. ’ ” (See Bibb County, Ga., Code § 6-71, Doc. 104, Deft. Ex. 7). The Adult Entertainment Licensing Code additionally prohibits any license for adult entertainment to be issued “if the premises to be used also holds a license to sell alcoholic beverages” and provides that “[a]ny premise licensed as an adult entertainment establishment shall not be eligible to apply ... for a license to sell alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises.” Code § 6-73(d). The Adult Entertainment Licensing Code and Alcoholic Beverage Code are thus mutually exclusive. A venue may either operate under a license to serve alcohol, as provided by the Alcoholic Beverage Code, or provide adult entertainment, as permitted by the Adult Entertainment Licensing Code; but under the current regulations, a single establishment may not do both in Bibb County. See id. Notably, like the Alcoholic Beverage Code, the Adult Entertainment Code excepts “mainstream performance houses” from its regulatory scheme. See Code § 6-72(2). It defines a “mainstream performance house” as a theater, concert hall, opera house, museum, educational institution or similar establishment, which regularly features live performances, including plays, operas, ballets, concerts or other similar performances, which are not distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on the depiction, display, or description, or the featuring of “specified anatomical areas” or “specified sexual activity” in that such depiction, display, description or featuring is incidental to the primary purpose of any performance. Performances and showings are regularly featured when they comprise 85 percent of all performances or showings. “Distinguished or characterized by an emphasis upon” means the dominant or principal theme of the object referenced. For instance, when the phrase refers to performances, which are “distinguished or characterized by an emphasis upon the exhibition or display of specified anatomical areas,” the performances so described are those whose dominant or principal character or theme is the exhibition or display or “specified anatomical areas” or “specified sexual activities.” § 6-72(15). Thus, under the current regulations, a venue may only serve alcohol while providing totally nude entertainment if it qualifies as a “mainstream performance house.” Shortly after Club Exotica initiated this suit in April of 2002, the parties engaged in discovery in anticipation of a hearing on Club Exotica’s motions for injunctive relief, In a teleconference held with the parties on June 3, 2002, the County represented to the Court that, in light of the present litigation, it would not take any immediate action with respect to Club Exotica and their provision of alcoholic beverages. The County further pledged that it would advise the Court prior to taking any regulatory enforcement action against Club Exotica. Club Exotica thus continued to sell alcohol to its patrons as this lawsuit proceeded. Due to the County’s self-imposed restraining order, this Court likewise took no immediate action on Club Exotica’s pending motion for immediate injunctive relief and focused primarily on the parties’ other motions and discovery disputes. In December of 2002, Club Exotica applied for renewal of its alcoholic beverage license for. the 2003-2004 calendar year. Therein, Club Exotica again represented that its occupation was “restaurant services.” (Doc. 104, Deft.Ex. 5). The County took no action with respect to this application but permitted Club Exotica to continue to sell alcohol to its patrons under its previously issued license without regulatory action being taken. In early 2003, almost one year after this suit was initially filed, Club Exotica sought to amend its original Complaint in this case and renewed its motion for declaratory and injunctive relief. The motion to file an amended Complaint was granted in March of 2003 [Doc. 35]. In its First Amended Complaint [Doc. 36], Club Exotica reiterated its desire to operate under the Alcoholic Beverage Code’s “mainstream performance exception” without interference from County regulators. Club Exotica also added new claims alleging that the County unconstitutionally amended its Alcoholic Beverage Code in May of 2002 for the sole purpose of thwarting nude dance entertainment at its venue. The club averred that both the County’s motivation and procedures in amending the Alcoholic Beverage Code were unconstitutional. The First Amended Complaint likewise stated claims that both the Alcoholic Beverage and Adult Entertainment Licensing Codes were unconstitutional (for various reasons), that the County was disparately applying and enforcing provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Code so as to intentionally discriminate against the club’s establishment, and that the County was unlawfully intimidating Club Exotica’s dancers in an attempt to chill the exercise of their First Amendment rights. (See First Amended Compl. [Doc 36]). Any other claims contained in the original complaint were abandoned. On July 3, 2003, a hearing was held on Club Exotica’s renewed motion for preliminary injunctive relief. (See Minute Entry, July 3, 2003 [Doc. 62]). Although the parties’ preliminary briefs were comprehensive of all the claims contained in the First Amended Complaint, during the hearing, Club Exotic clarified that the sole relief sought at that time was a court order declaring that it may lawfully operate under the “mainstream performance exception” and an injunction barring the County from taking any adverse action against the club, its employees, or its patrons while it operated as such. Upon consideration of the relevant law, this Court determined that Club Exotica’s claim based upon the as-applied vagueness of the mainstream performance exception was not ripe for judicial review. (Order, July 14, 2003 [Doc. 65]). In a written order, this Court found that Club Exotica has apparently made very little, if any, effort to establish a proposed plan of “mainstream” operation or seek an opinion from a County official having sufficient authority to render a decision in this matter. Club Exotica has never been formally advised that it may not operate as a “mainstream performance house” and maintain a license to serve alcoholic beverages. In fact, there is no evidence that Club Exotica has ever even contacted the County to inquire as to its eligibility to operate under the exception.... Moreover, in this case, it is entirely unclear as to how Club Exotica’s new operations will differ from their current, and admittedly non-mainstream, performances. During the preliminary injunction hearing, Club Exotica acknowledged that its past and current performances do not comply with the exception at issue, but assured this Court that its new performances and operations would make it eligible to provide nude entertainment under the “mainstream performance house” exception. Nevertheless, Club Exotica has apparently made no effort to develop either a formal or informal plan describing its vjsion of a “mainstream” operation and appeared before this Court entirely unprepared to present evidence of its proposed “mainstream” entertainment. Thus, apparently Club Exotica not only requests that this Court assume that the County will violate its First Amendment rights when the Code is applied to them, but also expects this Court to speculate as to how Club Exotica may operate once given the opportunity. such actions would not be taken against the owners of Club Exotica or its employees if it attempts to operate as a “mainstream performance house.” Rather, counsel explained that in the event Club Exotica attempted such operations, the County would conduct its own investigation as to whether the requirements of the exception were being met. If, after this investigation, the County concluded that Club Exotica was operating in violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Code, it would provide Club Exotica with reasonable notification that its alcoholic beverage license may be revoked. At that time, a license revocation hearing, “meeting all due process requirements,” would be promptly scheduled and held. Id. at 8-10. This Court additionally concluded that no Court order barring the County from imposing criminal sanctions on the club, its patrons, or its employees was necessary at that time, as the County had again represented that Id. at 11-12. Thus, ultimately, Club Exotica’s motion for preliminary .injunctive relief was denied. On July 18, 2003, after receiving this Court’s written order, Club Exotica began offering entertainment in which its female performers appeared totally nude. The club also continued to sell alcohol to its patrons. Days later, Jerry M. Modena, the Sheriff of Bibb County, issued a letter to both the Bibb County Board of Commissioners and the Tax Commissioner, requesting that Club Exotica’s current alcoholic beverage license be revoked and that its pending renewal application be denied based upon “conduct of the entertainers and other employees of Club Exotica” that had occurred prior to July 3, 2003 — i.e., prior to the club’s official provision of totally nude entertainment. (Doc. 104, Deft.Ex. 13). The Bibb County Sheriffs Office had in fact begun its investigation into the operations of Club Exotica as early as April of 2002. (Doc. 104, Deft.Ex. 9, pp. 22, 29-31). In support of his recommendation, dated July 22, 2003, Sheriff Modena alleged that Club Exotica unlawfully “employed a supervisory manager who is a convicted felon;” “allowed this supervisory manager to possess a firearm on the premises;” and provided entertainment, which “violated public indecency and obscenity laws of the state of Georgia.” (Doc. 104, Deft.Ex. 13). Neither § 3-71(c) of the Alcoholic Beverage Code nor the “mainstream performance exception” were mentioned in the sheriffs letter. See id. Later that same day, in a regularly scheduled public hearing, the Board of Commissioners accepted the Sheriffs recommendation to revoke Club Exotica’s current alcoholic beverage license and further voted to deny Club Exotica’s pending 2003-2004 alcoholic beverage license application. (See Doc. 104, Deft. Ex. 14). The Board further voted to grant Club Exotica a hearing on the proposed revocation of its current alcoholic beverage license. (Id.). Pursuant to § 3-52 of the Alcoholic Beverage Code, Any alcoholic beverage license issued ... may be revoked or suspended by the board of commissioners ... for cause shown, after a hearing of which at least three days’ written notice shall be given to the licensee. Such notice shall specify the time, place and purpose of the hearing, and a statement of the charges upon which such hearing shall be held. At such hearing, the licensee shall have the right to appear in person and by attorney, and both the county and licensee shall have the right to present evidence under oath,- introduce documentary evidence, cross-examine witnesses and generally present evidence of violation of this chapter or absence thereof. Such hearing may be conducted either by the board of commissioners of the county or by one of its committees. If the matter of the hearing is referred to a committee, the committee shall make its recommendations to the full board of commissioners of county which shall act thereon. No action was immediately taken with respect to Club Exotica’s alcoholic beverage license, and within three days of the public hearing, the Board of Commissioners informed Club Exotica of its decisions and of the club’s right to a hearing on “both the denial of the license and the revocation of the current license.” (Doc. 104, Deft.Ex. 14). This July 25, 2003 letter additionally offered to set a mutually agreeable date and time for the hearing and explained that the sole purpose of the hearing would be to discuss the denial and revocation. (Id.). Though the Alcoholic Beverage Code does not require that a neutral hearing officer preside over this type of hearing, the Board also gave Club Exotica the option of having a hearing before a neutral hearing officer or before the Bibb County Board of Commissioners. (Id.). In a subsequent letter, dated July 31, 2003 (Doc. 104, DeftEx. 15), the County further advised Club Exotica of the reasons for the revocation hearing, explaining that the Board had relied on the findings included in the July 22, 2003 letter from Sheriff Modena. The Sheriffs letter was attached and read as follows: [Club Exotica] has allowed and countenanced the inappropriate touching of patrons by Club employees and vice versa. The inappropriate touching has included lap dancing, prostitution, oral sodomy and many other examples of inappropriate sexual contact. To initiate a lap dance, a patron requests that an entertainer come to dance for him personally and tips her per song. The type of dancing includes the entertainer climbing into the lap of the patron and “grinding” her genitals on his groin area. In addition to this, the entertainer will put her breast in the face of the patron and may bend over in front of him, placing her genitals in his face. Lap dancing continues through more than one song if the patron chooses to continue tipping. Therefore, this contact can last from three to six minutes for one song or several more minutes through additional songs. My investigation has revealed that when entertainers are tipped by patrons, patrons are allowed, in various manners, to make physical contact with the genitalia of the entertainers. Patrons may pull the entertainers undergarments to the side and place the dollar bills in the vaginal area, or patrons may place a bill on top of their heads and allow the dancers to squat over their heads, picking up the bills with their vagina. Additionally, the dancers, themselves, will pull their garments to the side, exposing their vagina, so that a patron may place a tip in either their vagina or their garment. In certain private areas of the club, patrons pay dancers for sexual services, including touching and viewing genitalia, oral sodomy and sexual intercourse. These private areas are referred to as either “VIP Area” or “Members Only Rooms.” Patrons pay a fee to enter these rooms and request a certain dancer, that they have seen either on the stage or on the main floor of the bar, to join them. Inside these VIP Area and Members Only Rooms, sexual activities become actual rather than simulated. When entertainers perform on the stage, patrons are permitted to touch the dancers’ genitalia with their faces, as well as view vulgar displays of genitalia and other specified anatomical areas. Finally, the entertainers have performed many other lewd and indecent acts which are expressly prohibited by local and state law. Therefore, I make my recommendation for the denial of the requested license for Club Exotica based on this type of conduct.... (Doc. 104, Deft.Ex. 13). It was Sheriff Modena’s opinion that these activities violated Georgia criminal law and not merely the County’s Alcoholic Beverage Code. Id. In the July 31st letter, the County further provided notice to Club Exotica that the revocation hearing had in fact been set for August 14, 2003 at 10:00 a.m. and that it would take place in the Chairman’s conference room on the fourth floor of the Bibb County Courthouse. (Doc. 104, Deft. Ex. 15). The County also explained that since Club Exotica had not stated a preference, it had selected a hearing officer to conduct the hearing, Senior State Court Judge Taylor Phillips. (Id.). Upon receipt of this notice, Club Exotica responded in a letter dated August 15, 2003, in which it expressed a number of concerns about the nature and justification of the proposed hearing. (Doc. 67, Ex. D). Among these concerns were the Board of Commissioner’s reliance on the Sheriffs letter, without evidence of any actual criminal convictions, and the County’s action in handpicking a state judge as the neutral arbitrator. (Id.). Club Exotica further requested that the hearing be postponed. (Id.). The next day, Saturday, August 16, 2003, approximately 25 to 30 employees of the Bibb County Sheriffs Office raided Club Exotica. Prior to this raid, undercover agents visited Club Exotica, and based on their observations, a decision was made by Sheriff Modena to take action with respect to suspected ongoing criminal conduct at the club. Law enforcement officers taking part in the raid were instructed to look for violations of Georgia law and that mere nudity “would not be reason to make an arrest.” (Doc. 75 at p.62). As a result of the raid, a number employees were arrested; sixteen of the sixteen performers working that evening were charged with “masturbation for hire” and/or “public indecency” under Georgia’s state criminal code. (Id.) No citations for violations of the Alcoholic Beverage Code were made. Likewise, no criminal charges were placed against Club Exotica or any of its operators or managers, and no action was taken to either close Club Exotica that night or to otherwise prevent its continued operation or sale of alcohol. (Pl.’s Response to Deft/s Statement of Material Pact [Doc. 171] at ¶ 53). Ten days after the raid, on August 26, 2003, Club Exotica filed another motion for a temporary restraining order in this Court [Doc. 67]. This time Club Exotica sought an order restraining the County from again disrupting the nude dancing entertainment being offered at its establishment. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion that same day. During the hearing, the County presented the testimony of three witnesses, two Bibb County Sheriffs deputies and Sheriff Modena himself. The two female deputies testified that they were directed to go into Club Exotica before and on the night of the raid to “observe” the conduct therein: Once inside the club, the deputies observed nude dancers spreading their vagina open, playing with their breasts, and using their hands to separate their buttocks. The deputies described, in graphic detail, lap dances that they and other patrons received from the performers. According to this testimony, nude dancers would touch patrons, sit on patrons’ laps, “grind” their genitals on the patrons’ legs, place their vagina in the patron’s face, and even use their vaginal muscles to pick up monetary tips. One of the deputies also described seeing customers fondling the dancers and observed two dancers rubbing one another on stage. The deputy also suspected that dancers were performing oral sex on male patrons. (Transcript, Aug. 26, 2003 [Doc. 75], at 16-59). This testimony was only refuted by Club Exotica’s witness, Michael Hutchinson, a manager on duty that evening. Hutchinson testified that he did not personally see any the activities described by the deputies. (Id. at 80-81). Club Exotica conceded during the hearing, however, that— if the conduct described by the deputies in fact occurred — a reasonable officer could believe that violations of state law had occurred. (Id. at 40). Upon consideration of this testimony, the Court concluded that Club Exotica had not established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits so as to warrant the entry of injunctive relief. (Id. at 103-04). This Court specifically noted that it could not tell a sheriff not to enforce the law and explained that it would be very difficult to craft any order that would both protect Club Exotica and, at the same time, not inhibit the sheriff from enforcing the law. (Id. at 104-05). The Court thus denied Club Exotica’s motion for entry of a temporary restraining order but secured assurances from the County that no action would be taken with respect to the club’s alcoholic beverage license on the basis of any expression possibly protected by the First Amendment — since those issues were still pending before the Court. (Id. at 108). Thereafter, on August 21, 2003, the County responded to Club Exotica’s request for a continuance of the hearing on the status of its alcoholic beverage license and notified the club that the hearing would be postponed until September of 2003. (Doc. 104, Deft.Ex. 16). At that time, the County further advised Club Exotica that alleged activities occurring in the club since July 23, 2003 would also be presented at the hearing (“specifically through and including August 16, 2003”) and that evidence regarding the suspected state law violations and the August 16, 2003 arrests would be produced at the hearing. (Id.). In September, the administrative revocation hearing was conducted before the Board of Commissioners and presiding officer, Judge Taylor Phillips. (See Transcript of Hearing before Bibb County Commissioners, September 10, 2003, Doc. 104, Deft. Ex. 9). Therein the County presented the testimony of four witnesses: Sheriff Modena; Bibb County Sheriffs Deputy, Joseph Whitehead; Bibb County Sheriffs Lieutenant, Billy Johnson; and Senior Vice President of Cornetta Enterprises (the parent company of Club Exotica), Patrick Doggrell. (See id.). By virtue of the testimony provided, the County Commissioners heard evidence that Club Exotica’s entertainers were observed providing “lap dances” for employees from at least May of 2002 through and including the night before the hearing, September 10, 2003. There was testimony that, during these dances, performers would sit on patrons’ laps, gyrate, expose their breasts and genitals, and place their hands in and around their sex organs, so as to simulate masturbation. (Id. at 101-02; 105-07; 135-37). The testimony-showed that the dancers received money for performing these acts with patrons and that Club Exotica managers were in a position to observe this type of conduct occurring but did nothing to stop it. (Id. at 102; 108; 116). The witnesses additionally testified that, on other occasions, there was physical contact between dancers and patrons, apparently intended to stimulate the patron sexually and that prostitution services were even offered to one undercover officer. (Id. at 106-07; 112-13; 119; 137). The County further entered a video tape into evidence, which actually depicted “lap dances” being performed at the club. (Id at 138-141). Club Exotica had the opportunity to cross examine each witness and did so. The club was likewise given the opportunity to present evidence at the hearing but chose not to call any of their own witnesses or to present other evidence. (Id at 143). At the conclusion of the evidence, counsel for the County argued that the Board of Commissioners should revoke the club’s current alcoholic beverage license and deny its pending application for renewal of that license because the activities of Club Exotica’s dancers violated § 3-71 of the Bibb County Code — which bars certain types of conduct upon any premises licensed to sell alcoholic beverages in Bibb County. The County asserted that: (1) Club Exotica provided alcoholic beverages at its premises under a license issued pursuant to the Alcoholic Beverage Code; (2) Club Exotica provided entertainment depicting specified body parts, as prohibited by the Alcoholic Beverage Code; (2) Club Exotica did not fall within the “mainstream performance house” exception as provided by the Code; and that (3) even if Club Exotica did fall within the mainstream exception, it nevertheless provided entertainment depicting “specified sexual activities,” which would be in violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Code — notwithstanding the club’s operation as a mainstream performance house. (Id. at 145-48); Code § 3-71(b)(9);(b)(10); (c)(2);(c)(4). Without articulating its reasoning or justifications, the Board of Commissioners thereafter voted to revoke the alcoholic beverage license under which the club was then operating and to deny the club’s pending application for renewal of that license. (Doc. 104, Deft. Ex. 9 at 162-63). Still, no immediate action was taken to actually prevent the sale of alcoholic beverages at Club Exotica. By agreement of the parties, Club Exotica was permitted to continue operating under its “revoked” alcoholic beverage license (and still provide totally nude entertainment), until the club exhausted its anticipated state litigation regarding the Board’s decision. (See Doc. 86, p. 2:19-25). On September 18, 2003, Club Exotica filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Superior Court of Bibb County. (Doc. 104, DefLEx. 19). In its petition, Club Exotica asserted that the Board’s revocation and denial of the alcoholic beverage license was in violation of its rights as protected by the Constitution of the State of Georgia. (Id). A hearing on the petition was conducted in the Superior Court of Bibb County in March of 2004, and on June 11, 2004, Superior Court Judge Martha Christian entered a written order affirming the decision of the Bibb County Board of Commissioners and denying Club Exotica’s petition for writ of certiorari. (Doc. 104, Deft.Ex. 18). Club Exotica appealed the decision of the Superior Court by application of discretionary appeal; the Georgia Court of Appeals subsequently denied the application for discretionary appeal on August 27, 2004. (Doc. 104, Deft. Ex. 21). On September 14, 2004, shortly after Club Exotica’s state appeal was denied (and approximately one year after their alcoholic beverage license was actually revoked by the Bibb County Board of Commissioners), Club Exotica was officially advised that it was no longer permitted to sell alcoholic beverages on its premises. Bibb County Sheriffs deputies then physically removed the club’s alcoholic beverage license from its wall. Although Club Exotica had, for all practical purposes, abandoned its remaining claims in this Court for more than a year, the club nonetheless returned to this Court [Doc. 78] seeking an emergency temporary restraining order, which would bar the County from taking any action against the club or its dancers if alcoholic beverages were sold on the premises. A hearing on Club Exotica’s motion for temporary restraining order was held on September 15, 2004. (See Transcript of Proceedings, Sept. 15, 2004, Doc. 86). Therein, Club Exotica contended that emergency injunctive relief was necessary because, as a night club, it could not remain economically viable without an alcoholic beverage license. (Id. at 9;12). After hearing the arguments of the parties, this Court found that Club Exotica had failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits and denied the motion. (Id. at 14; 18). The Court agreed, however, to set a date for a hearing on Club Exotica’s anticipated motion for preliminary injunction. (Id. at 18). Following this Court’s ruling, on September 18, 2004, Club Exotica indefinitely closed its doors, finding that operation without an alcoholic beverage license was in fact not economically feasible. (See Letter, June 14, 2005 [Doc. 194]). The club has not attempted to provide either “mainstream performances” or “adult entertainment” since that time. (Id.) On September 22, 2004, before Club Exotica’s anticipated motion for preliminary injunction was filed, the County requested [Doc.79] that, if the Court was to entertain yet another motion for preliminary injunc-tive relief in this case, it be treated as a final hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. In light of the prolonged history and legal nature of this case, this Court agreed that a determination on the merits of Club Exotica’s claims needed to be made [Doc. 80]; a briefing schedule was set, and a hearing on the merits was scheduled for November 22, 2004. Club Exotica thereafter objected to the Court holding a final hearing in this case [Doc. 82] and submitted a motion [Doc. 83] for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint adding new claims against the County — based on conduct taking place more than a year earlier, i.e., constitutional claims arising out of fhe August 16, 2003 raid and subsequent license revocation hearing. The Court granted the club’s motion to file yet another amended complaint but advised Club Exotica that it would be required to review which claims it actually intended to pursue and to state each of these claims concisely so that all issues may be addressed on the merits in the preliminary injunction hearing; the Second Amended Complaint was filed October 14, 2004. Afterwards, teleconferences with the Court were held to discuss the upcoming hearing on Club Exotica’s motion for preliminary injunction. The parties ultimately agreed that Club Exotica would withdraw its motion for preliminary injunction and that an expedited discovery and dispositive motion calendar would be set. After various extensions of discovery, brief filing deadlines, and page limitations, the present motions were filed and are now finally before the Court. DISCUSSION The cross motions for summary judgment currently at bar seek to address the legal merits of each of Club Exotica’s claims. The County, of course, contends that each constitutional claim fails as a matter of law. Club Exotica, on the other hand, counters that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the alleged constitutional infirmities of the County’s relevant regulatory provisions and the alleged constitutionally deficient process in which its alcoholic beverage license was ultimately revoked. The Court will attempt to discuss each of Club Exotica’s claims in turn below. However, as mentioned above, Club Exotica’s claims are quite broad. To the extent that Club Exotica has failed to clearly notify this Court of its intended theories, it has done so at its own peril. This Court has repeatedly directed Club Exotica to identify its claims in a concise and clear manner. Still, on summary judgment, both the County and this Court were forced to make great efforts to discern the relevant issues at bar. Club Exotica appears to have repeated a continuing practice of throwing out sweeping allegations without making the appropriate effort to flesh out arguments related thereto. Many of Club Exotica’s claims lack clear reference to either a recognized legal theory, an applicable legal frame work, or sufficient citation to relevant facts in support. Some grounds stated in the Complaint have been ignored completely. That being said, after thoroughly reviewing Club Exotica’s present and final complaint, it appears that the club essentially complains: (1) that the County’s ordinances regulating nude entertainment and the sale of alcohol are unconstitutional, (2) that it was unconstitutionally targeted by the County for investigation and war-rantless search, and (3) that its alcoholic beverage license was thereafter unconstitutionally revoked. These claims are couched in terms of violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution — including both procedural and substantive due process claims as well as alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause. For the purposes of simplification, this Court will first address the alleged constitutional infirmities in the actual ordinances at issue. The Court will next address the constitutionality of the actions of the County and its sheriff in investigating and raiding Club Exotica. Once those issues are decided, the Court will finally address Club Exotica’s claims that its constitutional rights were violated through and during the procedure in which its alcoholic beverage license was ultimately revoked. I. Constitutional Challenges of the County Ordinances. A. Alcoholic Beverage Code. In its Second Amended Complaint, Club Exotica makes a litany of constitutional challenges to the County’s Alcoholic Beverage Code. The club alleges that the Alcoholic Beverage Code facially violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because it is impermissibly overbroad and acts as an unconstitutional prior restraint on free expression. Club Exotica additionally contends that the Alcoholic Beverage Code is unconstitutionally vague (both facially and “as-applied”) in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. On summary judgment, both parties aver that they are entitled to prevail on these claims as a matter of law. Clearly, laws and ordinances, like the County’s Alcoholic Beverage Code, are subject to facial constitutional attack under a number of different doctrines. Recognized under the First Amendment, the overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible application of the law is substantial when “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’” City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). The First Amendment similarly permits facial overbreadth challenges to be posed where the ordinance creates an impermissible prior restraint on the exercise of free speech. See FW/PBS Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 224, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990). An ordinance may further be deemed unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “even if an enactment does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,” if the ordinance is impermissibly vague—or, in other words, “fails to establish standards for the police and the public that are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests.” Morales, 527 U.S. at 52, 119 S.Ct. 1849. In this case, Club Exotica has chosen to attack the Alcoholic Beverage Code under all of these theories. 1. First Amendment—Overbreadth & Prior Restraint Claims As noted by the County in its motion for summary judgment, Club Exotica’s First Amendment challenges in Count III of the Second Amended Complaint are “a compendium” of allegations “incorporating virtually the entire body of First Amendment Law.” This Court agrees that, from the face of Club Exotica’s Complaint, it appears as though the club attempted to incorporate every possible First Amendment violation that has ever been identified in constitutional caselaw. Significantly, however, a number of these constitutional theories seemed to have vanished on summary judgment. As a consequence, this Court will only address those grounds specifically raised and rebutted on summary judgment; all other grounds for a First Amendment challenge to the Alcoholic Beverage Code are deemed abandoned. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir.1995)(“[T]he onus' is upon the parties to formulate arguments; grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed abandoned.”). Turning to the claims that are at bar, the Court must first acknowledge that the expressive conduct of nude dancing is in fact protected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Fly Fish, Inc. v. City of Cocoa Beach, 337 F.3d 1301, 1314 (11th Cir.2003). Both the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals have recognized that, although nude dancing may only lie at the “outer perimeter of the First Amendment’s protection,” it nevertheless enjoys constitutional protection. Id. On summary judgment, however,, the County contends that not all of Club Exotica’s performances were of the type protected by the First Amendment. Relying on evidence established during the investigation of the club by the Sheriff Modena, the County avers that Club Exotica’s entertainer’s routinely performed “lap dances” wherein they would touch themselves and patrons in an erotic manner and that these performances went beyond that of mere nude dancing. See Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 295 F.3d 471, 484 (5th Cir.2002) (quoting Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248, 1251 (5th Cir.1995) (“Intentional contact between a nude dancer and a patron is conduct beyond the expressive scope of the dancing itself’)). The County now contends that such conduct should be characterized as “obscene” and not deemed protected by the First Amendment. This Court is not so convinced that all touching done during a nude performance is intrinsically obscene—regardless of whether it involves the dancers merely touching themselves or touching a patron. Surely,- some level of touching may be done in a non-obscene manner and may in fact be .central to the expressive nature of the dance itself. See Deja Vu, Inc. v. Spokane County, 46 F.Supp.2d 1083, 1090 (E.D.Wash.1998) (stating that exotic dancers may. conceivably touch themselves or others in. a non-obscene manner). In those instances, so-called “lap dances” and similar conduct performed by totally nude dancers may likely be protected by the First Amendment. In this case, however, the County points to evidence that, during “lap dances,” Club Exotica’s .dancers were actually performing oral sex on patrons, engaging in other physical contact with patrons continuing to the point of ejaculation, opening their vaginas while placing it in close proximity to the. patron’s face, rubbing or slapping their breast on the patron’s face, grinding their genitals or buttocks on the laps of patrons, allowing patrons to use their hands and mouths to place paper money in dancers’ vaginas or buttocks, and even permitting patrons to insert their fingers into dancers’ vaginas. (See Deft. Statement of Material Facts [Doc. 104] ¶¶ 34, 46-47). Surely, if nude dancing itself lies only within the “outer perimeter of the First Amendment’s protections,” this type of conduct falls completely outside the perimeter of the Constitution’s protections all together. The First Amendment’s protections have never been treated as absolute. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). The United States Supreme Court has accordingly developed a three part guideline for determining whether sexual expression is constitutionally protected. Id. at 25, 93 S.Ct. 2607. In Miller, the high Court determined that sexual expression would be deemed obscene and thus outside the protection of the First Amendment if: (1) the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interests, (2) the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by ... applicable state law, and (3) the work, taken as a whole, lack serious literary' artistic, political, or scientific value. Id. “The first and second prongs of the Miller test apply contemporary community standards to questions of fact such as ‘appeal to the prurient interest’ and ‘patent offensiveness.’ Contemporary community standards are not applied in the third prong of the Miller test.” Penthouse Intl., Ltd. v. Mc Auliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1363 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S.Ct. 3031, 65 L.Ed.2d 1131 (1980). This test is also conjunctive; challenged expression must meet all three prongs before it is deemed “obscene.” Id. On summary judgment, Club Exotica contends that the question of whether the acts performed by its dancers were “obscene” is a question of material fact, assumably for a jury to determine. (See Doc. 185 at 29-30). In a sense, the club is correct; this is a question of fact, but it is not one requiring a jury determination. These questions are, of course, normally presented to a jury in the criminal context, see Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 499, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987); however, “a judge may act as a finder of fact in civil proceedings involving obscenity.” Penthouse, 610 F.2d at 1363. In a case like the one at bar, a district court judge is “entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the average person in the community from which he comes for making the necessary determination in a manner similar to the ‘reasonable’ person test found in Other areas of the law.” Id. “The impact of the [expression at issue] is to be judged by its impact on an average person as opposed to a particularly sensitive or insensitive person.” Id. Allegedly obscene material must additionally be evaluated on a case-by-case basis; an exact list of those actions deemed to be obscene would be impossible to draft and the various degrees of tolerance throughout the country would make any such list unresponsive to local needs.. U.S. v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 836 (11th Cir.1982). Upon examination of the evidence presented by the County under the test set forth' in Miller, this Court agrees that the conduct occurring during the “lap dance” performances at Club Exotica exceeded the First Amendment’s protection. A reasonable person in this community would certainly find that Club Exotica’s “lap dances” appealed to the prurient interest. In fact, a reasonable person in this community would find that performances, which include oral copulation of spectators, physical sexual stimulation of spectators to the point of ejaculation, and actual touching of the dancer’s genitals by spectators, are not only aimed at arousing an inordinate, immoderate, or unwholesome sexual desire, see Black’s Law Dictionary 1263 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed, West 2004) (defining prurient interest), but are also “patently offensive” — especially when combined with crude acts such as spectators being allowed to place paper money in the vagina and buttocks of a dancer using only his mouth, to place his finger inside the dancer’s vagina, and to have a dancer physically spread her vagina and place it in close proximity to his face. In fact, much of the conduct described as part of the club’s performances 'is of the type prohibited by Georgia’s public indecency, masturbation for hire, and obscenity statutes. See O.C.G.A. §§ 16-6-8; 16-6-16; 16-12-80. Georgia’s obscenity statute specifically addresses the exhibition or other dissemination of material (“of any description”) that depicts “[a]cts of sexual intercourse, ..., normal or perverted, actual or simulated;” “[a]cts of masturbation;” and “[a]cts involving excretory functions or lewd exhibition of the genitals.” O.C.G.A. § 16-12-80(a), (b) (West 2003). Furthermore, having considered the “lap dance” performances as a whole, this Court cannot find any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in the types of actions performed by the dancers. There may be some slight artistic value to certain parts of the dance performance, i.e., the initial body movements and rhythmic expression conveying a definite erotic message; but taken as a whole, the performances at issue were raw sexual stimulation serving no other purpose other than the sexual stimulation itself and any commercial gain derived therefrom. They had no serious literary, artistic, or political value. See Penthouse Intl., Ltd. v. Webb, 594 F.Supp. 1186, 1198 (N.D.Ga.1984) (finding that while some portions of the magazine may have slight artistic, literary, or political value, the magazine taken as a whole has no serious literary, artistic, or political value); see also Bagnell, 679 F.2d at 836 (suggesting that expression may have no serious value when its sole intended commercial purpose is to cater to the prurient interest in sex). To the extent that Club Exotica seeks to challenge the factual allegations posed by the County, it has failed. Club Exotica did not point this Court to any evidence rebutting the County’s allegations herein. (See Doc. 185 at 29). While such evidence may exist, it is surely not the duty of this Court to scour the record in an attempt to locate evidence which may raise a material question of fact on summary judgment. Club Exotica’s general unsupported denials are clearly insufficient to raise a triable issue. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-26, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Such denials are likewise insufficient for this Court to find that the “lap dance” performances fall within the First Amendment’s protections. Even when this Court purposely looked to whether Club Exotica cited any evidence in opposition to the County’s Statement of Undisputed Facts [Doc. 104], which may assist its case, this Court could only find one meager attempt by the club to rebut the County’s evidence on this issue. Club Exotica merely directed this Court to “see generally” the affidavit of Patrick W. Doggrell [Doc. 169]. A review of this affidavit, however, produces no information which would assist Club Exotica. At most, Doggrell recites the general house rules for the club’s dancers. (Dogg-rell Aff. at ¶¶ 6-7, 10-11). Doggrell does not specifically deny that any of the above discussed conduct nevertheless occurred routinely at Club Exotica, nor does Dogg-rell state that he was present on the nights in question so that he may competently testify as to what activities actually occurred at the club when the officers allegedly viewed this type of widespread conduct. (Id. at ¶ 17). Conversely, when testifying before the .Board of Commissioners, Doggrell himself admitted previously seeing “lap dances,” which included a dancer making actual and vigorous contact with a patron’s genitals, inside Club Exotica. (Doc. 104, Deft. Ex. 9 at 87). For these reasons, the Court must find that Club Exotica has failed to sufficiently refute the evidence on summary judgment that its “lap dance” performances consisted of conduct falling outside the perimeter of the First Amendment’s protections. There is no contention on summary judgment, however, that these “lap dances” were the only dance performances provided by the club. The club apparently also provided stage dances. The County challenges these stage dances on the grounds that the club’s nude and semi-nude dancers would often touch themselves and one another in an erotic manner during the performances. The County points to evidence that, during stage performances the dancers would often spread their legs and rub their nipples, touch their vagina and separate it with their fingers, separate their buttocks while on all fours, and even manipulate their vagi-nas in ways which would create noise. (See Doc. 75; Doc. 104, Deft. Ex.s 9 and 12). The County additionally shows that stage dancers would also sometimes engage in joint dances with other performers wherein they would touch and rub against one another. (Doc. 75 at 54). Again, the club has not pointed to evidence refuting these allegations. Even so, as noted above, this Court is not convinced that such erotic touching during a nude dance necessarily places the performance outside of the First Amendment’s protections. While the evidence at bar makes the dances sound rather crude, this Court, on summary judgment, is unable to find that the dances are completely devoid of any artistic merit— even if such merit is slight. Certainly, not all members of this community would define this type of expression as artistic, and many people may be offended at the sight of these performances. But, that is not sole measure for determining whether expression is protected by the First Amendment. Here, it is undisputed that while engaging in the challenged stage activities, each of Club Exotica’s performers were on stage, moving to rhythm of music, and expressing an erotic and sexual message to their audience. The expression of eroticism and sexuality are protected by the First Amendment. See generally Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991). Thus, so long as the stage dancers were participating in protected expression (and were not engaging in masturbation or intercourse or other actual physical stimulation of the patrons), this Court cannot, on summary judgment, find that such dances were completely devoid of artistic merit. Yet, even to the extent that some “expression” taking place at Club Exotica did fall within the protections of the First Amendment, the County’s Alcoholic Beverage Code is still not unconstitutionally overbroad. On summary judgment, Club Exotica challenges the Alcoholic Beverage Code as being overly broad and asserts that, because the ordinance is directed towards restraining protected expression, it should be analyzed by this Court under a strict scrutiny analysis. Bibb County’s Alcoholic Beverage Code, however, does not completely