Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING GOVERNMENT’S MOTION FOR ANONYMOUS JURY (FILED UNDER SEAL) BENNETT, Chief Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I.INTRODUCTION.882 A. The Prosecutions.882 1. The 1993 case.882 2. The 1996 case.883 3. The present case.,.883 B. The Motion For An Anonymous Jury.888 C. Additional Submissions In Support Of The Motion.889 1. 1998 Sentencing transcript. .889 a. Evidence of attempts to obstruct justice.889 i. Testimony of Daniel Cobeen.889 ii. Testimony of Timothy Cutkomp.890 iii. Testimony of Dean Donaldson.891 iv. Testimony of Terry Bregar.892 v.Testimony of Dennis Putzier.892 vi.Testimony of Dana Rasmussen.893 b. Evidence of an attempt to escape.893 i.Further testimony of Terry Bregar.893 ii. Testimony of David Leavitt and Derek Boggs.894 iii. Further testimony of Dennis Putzier.894 iv. Testimony of William Garrison.894 v.Testimony of-Lynette Redden..894 2. Affidavits.895 3. Paper on anonymous juries.895 II. LEGAL ANALYSIS.895 A. Should An “Anonymous” Jury Be Empaneled? ... ■.895 1. Arguments of the parties .895 2. A matter of nomenclature.897 3. The rights at issue.898 4. Applicable standards.899 a. Case law standards .899 i.Need to protect the jury.900 ii.Precautions to minimize prejudice to the defendant.902 b. 18 U.S.C. § 3432.903 i.The statute.903 ii. Judicial interpretations.903 iii. The burden of proof.904 iv. Pertinent criteria for an anonymous jury.905 5. Analysis .906 a. Need to protect the jury.906 i.Present or future capacity to harm jurors.906 ii.Potential sentence.910 iii.Extent of publicity .911 b. Precautions to minimize prejudice to the defendant.913 i.Presumption of innocence.913 ii.Impartial jury .915 iii.Other concerns.917 B. The Proper Degree Of “Anonymity”.918 1. Arguments of the parties .918 2. Analysis .919 a. Degrees of anonymity .919 i. The “innominate” jury.919 ii. Limited anonymity.919 iii. A high degree of anonymity .920 iv. An anonymous and sequestered jury .920 b. The degree of anonymity required here.921 C. Further Prohibitions On Disclosure Of Juror Identity .922 III. CONCLUSION. .924 In this death penalty case, involving the alleged murder of five witnesses to the defendant’s drug-trafficking or other alleged criminal conduct, the government has moved the court to empanel an “anonymous” jury to protect the jury from the alleged threat to their safety posed by the defendant and his associates. The defendant, however, contends that such a step would deprive him of the presumption of innocence and impede his ability to obtain a fair and impartial jury by means of effective voir dire. He also contends that 18 U.S.C. § 3432 demonstrates Congress’s recognition that, even in a capital case, a defendant is entitled to know the identity of the people who will determine his guilt or innocence. The question presented thus requires a delicate balancing of competing interests. The court held a hearing on the motion for an anonymous jury on January 17, 2004, and now enters this written ruling on that motion and related issues. I. INTRODUCTION A. The Prosecutions 1. The 1993 case The pertinent background to the government’s motion for an anonymous jury in this case begins with a survey of the various prosecutions of defendant Dustin Lee Honken in this judicial district. Honken was first prosecuted for drug-trafficking offenses in this district in 1993 in Case No. CR 93-3019 (“the 1993 case”). As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained, In April 1993, a grand jury in the Northern District of Iowa indicted ap-pellee for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. After the disappearance of one or more prospective prosecution witnesses, the government dismissed the indictment. United States v. Honken, 184 F.3d 961, 963 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1056, 120 S.Ct. 602, 145 L.Ed.2d 500 (1999). Thus, the first prosecution of Honken in this district did not lead to a conviction. 2. The 1996 case Honken was again indicted on drug-trafficking charges on April 11, 1996, this time with co-defendant Timothy Cutkomp, in Case No. CR 96-3004-MWB (“the 1996 case”). Count 1 of the Indictment in the 1996 case charged Honken and Cutkomp with conspiracy to distribute, manufacture, and attempt to manufacture 1000 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine and 100 grams or more of pure methamphetamine. Indictment in Case No. CR 96-3004-MWB (N.D.Iowa). Count 2 of the original Indictment in the 1996 case charged Honken with possessing and aiding and abetting the possession of listed chemicals, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(d) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and Count 3 charged possession and aiding and abetting the possession of drug paraphernalia intending to use such paraphernalia to manufacture and attempt to manufacture methamphetamine and listed chemicals, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, respectively. Id., Counts 2 & 3. A superseding indictment filed later in the 1996 case restated the first three charges and added a fourth charge of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine. See Superseding Indictment in Case No. CR 96-3004-MWB (N.D.Iowa). Eventually, in 1997, Honken pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge and the charge of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine, ie., Counts 1 and 4, and the government dismissed Counts 2 and 3. See, e.g., Honken, 184 F.3d at 963. Honken is now serving his sentence on Counts 1 and 4 in the 1996 case. 3. The present case The present prosecution began with the filing of a seventeen-count indictment against Honken on August 30, 2001, which brought a variety of charges arising from Honken’s alleged murder and solicitation of murder of witnesses to his alleged drug-trafficking and other criminal activity, which had, for example, allegedly brought the 1993 prosecution to its abrupt conclusion and had been intended to impede prosecution of the 1996 case. On August 23, 2002, a Superseding Indictment was handed down in this case, amending Counts 8 through 17. See Superseding Indictment (docket no. 46). Because the government relies, in part, on the allegations in the Superseding Indictment as grounds for empaneling an anonymous jury, the court will examine the charges in this case in more detail. Counts 1 through 5 of the Superseding Indictment charge “witness tampering.” More specifically, each count alleges that Honken “did willfully, deliberately, maliciously, and with premeditation and malice aforethought, unlawfully kill” one of five witnesses: Gregory Nicholson, Lori Duncan (Nicholson’s girlfriend), Amber Duncan and Kandi Duncan (Lori Duncan’s daughters, ages 6 and 10), and Terry De-Geus. Count 1 alleges that Gregory Nicholson was murdered 1) with the intent to prevent Gregory Nicholson from attending or providing testimony at an official proceeding in the Northern District of Iowa, Case Nos. 93-20 M and CR 93-3019 [the 1993 case]; 2) with intent to prevent Gregory Nicholson from communicating to a law enforcement officer of the United States, information relating to the commission or possible commission of federal offenses, including: the distribution of methamphetamine, the manufacture of methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute and manufacture methamphetamine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance, in violation of Title 21 United States Code, Sections 841 and 846; and 3) with intent to retaliate against Gregory Nicholson for providing information to law enforcement relating to the commission or possible commission of federal offenses, including: the distribution of methamphetamine, the manufacture of methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute and manufacture methamphetamine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance, in violation of Title 21 United States Code, Sections 841 and 846[;] and 4) with intent to retaliate against Gregory Nicholson for testifying before the Federal Grand Jury investigating the drug trafficking activities of DUSTIN LEE HONKEN and others, which killing is a first degree murder as defined by Title 18, United States Code, Section 1111. This is in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1512(a)(1)(A) & (C); 1513(a)(1)(A) & (B) and 1111. Superseding Indictment, Count 1. Counts 2, 3, and 4 allege that Lori Duncan, Kandi Duncan, and Amber Duncan, respectively, were murdered with the intent to prevent [them] from communicating to a law enforcement officer of the United States, information relating to the commission or possible commission of federal offenses, that is: the tampering with Gregory Nicholson, a federal witness, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1512; and DUSTIN LEE HONKEN’s unlawful contact with Gregory Nicholson, in contempt of court and in violation of DUSTIN LEE HONKEN’s conditions of federal pretrial release in Case Nos. 93-20 M and CR 93-3019 [the 1993 case], in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3148 and 401, which killing of [each witness] is a first degree murder, as defined by Title 18, United States Code, Section 1111. This is in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1512(a)(1)(C), 1512(a)(2)(A), and 1111. Superseding Indictment, Counts 2-4. Count 5 alleges that Terry DeGeus was murdered with intent to prevent Terry DeGeus from communicating to a law enforcement officer of the United States, information relating to the commission or possible commission of federal offenses, that is: the distribution of methamphetamine, manufacture of methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute and manufacture methamphetamine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance, in violation of Title 21 United States Code, Sections 841 and 846, which killing of Terry DeGeus is a first degree murder, as defined by Title 18, United States Code, Section 1111. This is in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1512(a)(1)(C), 1512(a)(2)(A), and 1111. Superseding Indictment, Count 5. The Superseding Indictment includes, in support of Counts 1 through 5, allegations of “Findings under 18 U.S.C. § 3591 and 3592,” which the court finds it unnecessary to repeat here, because the government is not seeking the death penalty against Honken on the “witness tampering” charges. Count 6 charges Honken with soliciting the murder of witnesses, as follows: Between about June 10, 1996, and February 24, 1998, in the Northern District of Iowa and elsewhere, DUSTIN LEE HONKEN did solicit, command, induce, and endeavor to persuade Dean Donaldson and Anthony Altimus to engage in conduct constituting a felony that has as an element, the use, attempted use, and threatened use of physical force against the person of another in violation of the laws of the United States, that is: 1) the murder of Timothy Cutkomp, with the intent to prevent Timothy Cutkomp’s attendance or testimony at a federal drug trial in the Northern District of Iowa, Case No. CR 96-3004 [the 1996 case], in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1512 and 1111; and 2) the murder of Daniel Cobeen with the intent to prevent Daniel Cobeen from attending or testifying at a federal drug trial in the Northern District of Iowa, Case No. CR 96-3004 [the 1996 case], in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1512 and 1111, with the intent that Dean Donaldson and Anthony Altimus engage in such conduct and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent. This is in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 373(a)(1). Superseding Indictment, Count 6. Count 7 charges Honken with conspiracy to tamper with witnesses and to solicit the murder of witnesses, as follows: Between about-July 1, 1993, and continuing thereafter, until about 2000, in the Northern District of Iowa and elsewhere, DUSTIN LEE HONKEN did knowingly and willfully combine, conspire, confederate, and agree with other persons known and unknown to the grand jury, to commit the following offenses against the United States: 1. To kill or attempt to kill another person with the intent to prevent the attendance or testimony of that person at an official proceeding, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1512(a)(l)A); 2. To kill or attempt to kill another person with the intent to prevent communication by a person to a law enforcement officer of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a federal offense or violations of conditions of release pending judicial proceedings, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1512(a)(1)(C); 3. To knowingly use intimidation, physical force, threats, or otherwise corruptly to persuade another person.with the intent to influence, delay, or prevent testimony of a person at an official proceeding, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1512(b)(1); 4. To knowingly use intimidation, physical force, threats, or otherwise corruptly persuade another person with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent communication to a law enforcement officer of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a federal offense or a violation of conditions of release pending judicial proceedings, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1512(b)(3); and 5. To solicit, command, induce, and endeavor to persuade a person to commit a felony that has as an element the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, specifically violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A) & (C) (murder and attempted murder of individuals with intent to prevent them from testifying or communicating information to law enforcement officials) and 1512(b)(1) & (3) (knowingly using, or attempting to use, intimidation, force, threats or corrupt persuasion of an individual with intent to prevent them from testifying or communicating information to law enforcement officials) with the intent that such person engage in such conduct and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 373. Superseding Indictment, Count 7. Count 7 includes fourteen numbered paragraphs of allegations of “Background to Overt Acts” and thirty numbered paragraphs of allegations of “Overt Acts” in furtherance of the conspiracy, which the court will not quote here. Honken is also charged in Counts 8 through 12 of the Superseding Indictment in this case with five counts of murder while engaging in a drug-trafficking conspiracy (“conspiracy murder”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. As they presently stand, each of these Counts charges the “conspiracy murder” of one of five people — Gregory Nicholson, Lori Duncan, Amber Duncan, Kandi Duncan, and Terry DeGeus, respectively — as follows: On or about July 25, 1993 [November 5, 1993, as to DeGeus], in the Northern District of Iowa, DUSTIN LEE HONK-EN, while knowingly engaging in an offense punishable under Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846 and 841(b)(1)(A), that is between 1992 and 1998 DUSTIN LEE HONKEN did knowingly and unlawfully conspired [sic] to: 1) manufacture 100 grams or more of pure methamphetamine and 1000 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine and 2) distribute 100 grams or more of pure methamphetamine and 1000 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, intentionally killed and counseled, commanded, induced, procured, and caused and aided and abetted the intentional killing of [the named individual], and such killing resulted. All in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 848(e)(1)(A) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. Superseding Indictment, Counts 8 through 12. Counts 13 through 17 of the Superseding Indictment in this case charge Honken with the murder of the same five individuals, respectively, while engaging in or working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE murder”), also in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Those charges are as follows: On or about July 25, 1993 [November 5, 1993, as to DeGeus], in the Northern District of Iowa, DUSTIN LEE HONK-EN, while engaging in and working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 848(c), intentionally killed and counseled, commanded, induced, procured, and caused and aided and abetted the intentional killing of [the named individual], and such killing resulted. The continuing criminal enterprise DUSTIN LEE HONKEN engaged in and worked in furtherance of was undertaken by DUSTIN LEE HONKEN in concert with five or more other persons including, but not limited to, Timothy Cutkomp, Gregory Nicholson, Terry De-Geus, Angela Jane Johnson, and Jeffery Honken. In the organization, DUSTIN LEE HONKEN occupied a position of organizer, supervisor or other position of management. The criminal enterprise involved the commission of a continuing series of narcotics violations under Title 21, United States Code, Section 801 et. ¡sic] seq. occurring between 1992 and 2000, specifically: [18 numbered paragraphs omitted]. From this continuing criminal enterprise, DUSTIN HONKEN and others derived substantial income and resources. All in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 848(e)(1)(A) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. Superseding Indictment, Counts 13 through 17. On June 10, 2003, the government filed its Notice Of Intent To Seek The Death Penalty Under 21 U.S.C. § ,848 (docket no. 120), thereby giving notice of the government’s intent to seek the death penalty on the “conspiracy murder” and “CCE murder” offenses in Counts 8 through 17. That Notice included the following allegations of “Future Dangerousness Of The Defendant,” which the government contends are also relevant to its motion to empanel an anonymous jury: The defendant is likely to commit criminal acts of violence in the future which would be a continuing and serious threat to the lives and safety of others. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 2193, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994). In addition to committing the murders charged in this case, the defendant has 1) engaged in a continuing pattern of violent conduct, 2) threatened others with violence, 3) demonstrated low rehabilitative potential, 4) a high custody classification, and 5) demonstrated lack of remorse, and committed one or more of the following: On various occasions, the defendant has threatened to kill Daniel Cobeen, Timothy Cut-komp, agents, investigators, chemists, and prosecutors involved in the prosecution of this case. The defendant has made plans and threatened to kill guards and escape from custody. The defendant has threatened to harm other individuals who cooperate. After the search of his residence in 1996, the defendant developed a plan to obstruct justice and destroy evidence by locating cooperating individuals, purchasing a gun, destroying evidence, locating officers and other public officials in his case and harming them, while using the electronic monitoring device as an alibi. While incarcerated in the Woodbury County Jail, pending trial and sentencing, the defendant attempted to escape and assisted in the planned escape of Dennis Putzier. While incarcerated in the Woodbury County Jail, pending trial and sentencing, the defendant solicited others to bond out of county jail with the purpose of those individuals killing Timothy Cutkomp and Daniel Cobeen, who were cooperating individuals. On February 25, 1998, defendant was sentenced for one count of conspiracy to distribute and manufacture 100 grams or more of methamphetamine or 1,000 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine; and one count of attempt to manufacture 100 grams or more of methamphetamine on February 7,1996. While incarcerated in the United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado, following sentencing the defendant identified cooperating individuals and disseminated information in the form of “snitch packets” in an effort to assist others in identifying and harming cooperating individuals. While incarcerated in the United States Penitentiary Florence, the defendant developed a plan and solicited individuals to join in his plan to escape from custody by overpowering and killing guards, stealing weapons, and amassing cash by committing crimes for the purpose of killing cooperating individuals and law enforcement officials involved in the investigation and prosecution of the defendant and Angela Johnson. The defendant has demonstrated a lack of remorse by boasting about killing his “rats” (cooperating individuals), encouraging others to kill cooperating individuals, and, in one or more conversations, indicating that the killings of the victims did not bother him. The defendant has had a number of disciplinary reports and has been placed in segregation as punishment for misconduct while incarcerated. The defendant’s custody classification within the Bureau of Prisons is high and the defendant is incarcerated in a high-level institution, that is a United States Penitentiary. Notice Of Intent To Seek The Death Penalty at 2-4, 6-8, 10-12, 14-16, and 18-20. This matter is presently set for trial beginning on April 5, 2004, with jury selection to begin on March 15, 2004, although the defendant’s motion to continue the trial is currently pending. B. The Motion For An Anonymous Jury On September 16, 2003, the government filed its Motion For Anonymous Jury (docket no. 150), which is currently before the court. In that motion, the government requests that the court empanel an anonymous jury in this case; submit a proposed jury questionnaire to the jury to assist with jury selection; and obtain criminal histories of members of the jury venire to compare with the criminal histories disclosed by the venire members themselves, in response to the questionnaire, then inform the parties of any criminal history not self-disclosed. Honken resisted the motion in its entirety on September 24, 2003 (docket no. 153). By sealed order dated November 26, 2003 (docket no. 169), the court set an evidentiary hearing on the government’s motion for an anonymous jury and also set oral arguments on other matters for January 15, 2004. In that order, the court also stated its preliminary, sua sponte determination to close to the public the proceedings on whether or not to empanel an anonymous jury. The court also set a briefing schedule for the parties to respond to several issues raised by the court concerning the motion for an anonymous jury, including the following: (1) whether or not the government intended to present evidence via live witnesses; (2) if the government did intend to present evidence, whether or not the defendant would consent to appear at the hearing by videoconferencing or would instead stand on his right to be personally present at the hearing; (3) the degree to which the jury should be “anonymous” or “innominate”; (4) the extent to which prohibitions upon disclosure of the identity of or other information about jurors, or attempts to discover such information, should be imposed upon the parties, their counsel, court and clerks’ office personnel, and the news media; and (5) whether the parties had any objections to closure of the hearing on the government’s motion for an anonymous jury, or had suggestions of any alternatives to closure of the hearing. See Order of November 26, 2003. The parties’ responses regarding the issues identified by the court in its November 26, 2003, order were not as complete as the court might reasonably have hoped. The government filed a response on December 19, 2003, indicating the government’s opposition to closure of the hearing; the government’s intent to rely upon transcripts and affidavits rather than live witnesses at the hearing; the government’s position on the kinds of information about jurors that should be either withheld from or disclosed to the parties and the public; and the measures that the government believed that the court could properly take to maintain confidentiality of the jurors’ identities. However, the defendant filed a response only to the court’s preliminary determination that the hearing should be closed, and that belatedly, in which the defendant stated his concurrence in the court’s preliminary determination to close the hearing. Thus, the defendant failed to file a written response to the other issues raised by the court in its November 26, 2003, order. By order dated January 7, 2004, this court confirmed its order closing the proceedings on whether or not to empanel an anonymous jury. Owing to various conflicts, the hearing on the motion for anonymous jury was rescheduled for January 17, 2004. In response to the government’s notice that it did not intend to present live witnesses at the hearing on the motion for an anonymous jury, Honken waived his right to be personally present and agreed to appear by video-conferencing. See Defendant’s Written Waiver Of Personal Appearance At Hearing Scheduled January 17, 2004 (docket no. 192). While Honken appeared by video-conferencing, his attorneys appeared “live.” They were Alfredo Parrish of Parrish Kruidenier Moss Dunn Boles Gribble & Cook, L.L.P., in Des Moines, Iowa; Leon F. Spies of Mellon & Spies in Iowa City, Iowa; and Charles Rogers, Attorney at Law, in Kansas City, Missouri. The United States was represented by C.J. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and Thomas H. Miller, Assistant Iowa Attorney General and Special Assistant United States Attorney for this case. C. Additional Submissions In Support Of The Motion 1. 1998 Sentencing transcript At the hearing on January 17, 2004, in addition to the Superseding Indictment and Notice Of Intent To Seek The Death Penalty, the government submitted three exhibits in support of its motion for an anonymous jury. The first exhibit is the transcript of Honken’s sentencing, in 1998, on the charges to which he pleaded guilty in the 1996 case. See Government’s Exhibit 1 (five volumes). Indeed, this transcript was the centerpiece of the government’s argument for an anonymous jury in this case. Although Honken’s defense counsel at the sentencing hearing attempted to impeach each of the witnesses concerning the testimony described below, the court finds that the evidence is sufficiently credible that it establishes each of the incidents described by the preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the court will summarize the pertinent evidence from Honken’s 1998 sentencing. a. Evidence of attempts to obstruct justice i. Testimony of Daniel Cobeen. First, Daniel Cobeen, a person Honken had recruited to assist him with manufacturing and distributing methamphetamine in 1993, and who acted as a confidential informant for law enforcement officers in their investigation of Honken, testified that Honken had threatened him directly, for example, by telling Cobeen that if Co-been ever “crossed” him, “he knew somebody that could knock on [Cobeen’s] door and boom,” see Government’s Exhibit 1, Vol. 1, pp. 53-54, 68; that Honken had also alluded to having Gregory Nicholson “disappeared,” id. at pp. 55-56, 66, 68; and that Honken identified a number of people that he felt needed to be killed, including three law enforcement officers. See id. at pp. 68. Although Cobeen admitted that Honken might have made these threats and discussed these things as a “scare tactic,” see id. at 69, Cobeen testified that he “took [Honken] serious ... [bjecause nobody had heard from Nicholson, and nobody had heard from another guy that was involved in it and the whole family, Nicholson’s whole family.” Id. at 71. Indeed, Cobeen was offered $7,000 by law enforcement officers, which he accepted, to relocate himself and his family temporarily, because Cobeen and the officers feared that he might suffer the same fate as Nicholson and his family if Honken discovered his cooperation with investigators. See id. at 46-48. ii. Testimony of Timothy Cutkomp. Another witness at the sentencing, Timothy Cutkomp, the co-defendant in the 1996 case, also testified at length about his discussions with Honken concerning the disappearance of Greg Nicholson and his family, see id. at 223-31, and the disappearance of Terry DeGeus. See id. at 227-31. Cutkomp described a “hypothetical” Honken put to him in late 1993 or early 1994, after Nicholson’s disappearance, describing in chilling detail how one could kidnap a person and one of his family members; force the person to make a videotaped statement exonerating the kidnapper of drug-trafficking activity and recanting statements to the police by threatening to kill their family member; then kill the person and the family member anyway to cover up the kidnapping. See id. at 224-25. Cutkomp testified . that shortly after that discussion, Honken tried to give Cutkomp a videotape, which Honk-en said was a videotape of Nicholson saying Honken wasn’t guilty of anything. Honken wanted Cutkomp to tell authorities that the tape had been given to him by Nicholson, so that it would be “admissible,” but Cutkomp did not take or ever view the videotape. Id. at 225-26. In reference to DeGeus’s disappearance, Cutkomp related Honken’s discussion with him about DeGeus having “disappeared,” during which Honken asked Cutkomp “how far down farm equipment went when they were plowing or disking and stuff,” which Cutkomp interpreted as an indication that Honken was worried that DeGeus was not buried deep enough. Id. at 227-28. Cutkomp also testified that, on several occasions, Honken talked about renting a backhoe, so that he could get rid of “loose ends,” and wondered how to build an incinerator and how hot it needed to get to burn up a body completely. Id. at 229. Cutkomp also testified that Honken asked him how deep something needed to be buried to make sure that frost didn’t pull it back up. Id. At some point in 1994, Cut-komp asked Honken what he thought the likelihood was that any of the witnesses who had disappeared would ever “show up” again, and Honken said “he was 99 percent sure that Greg [Nicholson] would never show back up again, but he was lesser percent sure of Terry [DeGeus],”-which Cutkomp interpreted to mean that Honken “had buried the bodies of ... Greg and his girlfriend and the two kids deep enough that they wouldn’t come back up, and he was worried that he hadn’t buried Terry deep enough.” Id. at 230-31. Cutkomp also confirmed that Honken was interested in having Daniel Cobeen killed. Id. at 250, Yol. 2, 268-69. Cutkomp also described other plans Honken discussed or actions he took to obstruct justice besides killing witnesses. Cutkomp testified to helping Honken melt down a handgun with a blowtorch, then throw it in a ditch along a road, because Honken said it would “look bad” if he were found to have a gun, id. Vol. 1 at 231-32; Honken’s contemplation of a plan to blow up the place where evidence of methamphetamine lab equipment in his case was being tested, in an attempt to get rid of evidence, id. at 250; and Honken’s interest in buying an electronic device or to find other means that would help him “fool” the ankle bracelet that he was wearing while under house arrest, so that he would have an alibi while killing witnesses. Id. at Vol. 2 at 266, 281-82. iii. Testimony of Dean Donaldson. Another witness, Dean Donaldson, testified at the 1998 sentencing hearing that he met Honken in the Woodbury County Jail in 1996. See id. at 390-91. Donaldson testified that, while he and Honken were in jail together, Honken told him that witnesses against him “came up missing.” Id. at 399. Donaldson said Honken told him that one of the witnesses, who owed Honk-en $30,000, had met Honken at an abandoned place in the country, and that Honk-en had shot him repeatedly, because “they don’t die like they do on TV. He kept coming.... ” Id. at 400. Donaldson said Honken then added that “dead people are real heavy.” Id. at 401. Donaldson also recounted Honken’s statements that he and Angela Johnson had strangled other witnesses, “a couple,” with a drop cord, then buried them with a backhoe, but that he was worried about them “surfacing,” which Donaldson took to mean either that they were buried shallow or that Honken was afraid that Angela Johnson would talk. Id. Donaldson also testified that Honken said that, if he had only had another week to “beat” the monitoring band on Ms leg, he would have taken care of all of the witnesses to the 1996 case “again.” Id. at 402. Donaldson said that Honken specifically identified his targets as Daniel Co-been, the United States attorney prosecuting the case, and a chemist from Chicago, and that he would “then come back and kill Angie [Johnson] because she was a witness to all — she was the key to a lot of things” and that she “was the last person he was going to kill because she could link him to the '93 [case],” and he was afraid that “they,” apparently meaning law enforcement officers, would put pressure on her, and he needed to eliminate that threat. Id. at 402-03. Honken also discussed with Donaldson having someone “take out” Timothy Cut-komp. Id. Specifically, Donaldson testified that Honken asked Donaldson “to do it,” and Donaldson “guess[ed] at that time [he] agreed to do it.” Id. Donaldson testified that he and Honken discussed their plan to kill Cutkomp for several days, and that Honken eventually gave him directions “to his [Cutkomp’s] folks’ place,” gave Donaldson a description of Cutkomp, and told him where Cutkomp worked and what kind of car he drove. Id. at 403-04. Donaldson explained that Honken planned to bond Donaldson out of jail, so that Donaldson could murder Cutkomp, by having another associate on the outside, Kathy Ricks, get collateral for Donaldson’s bond. Id. at 404. Donaldson testified that he did, eventually, bond out in August 1996, and that Kathy Ricks had put up the bond for him to get out. Id. Donaldson testified that he and Honken discussed specifically how Donaldson was supposed to kill Cutkomp, including plans to put up a barricade on a road near Cutkomp’s residence, and to shoot Cutkomp when he got out of his vehicle to remove the barricade. Id. at 406. However, their first plan had been for Donaldson simply to go to Cutkomp’s house and to shoot him and his parents there, but Donaldson talked Honken out of that plan. Id. at 407. Honken also explained to Donaldson where he could park his car at an abandoned place near the road before shooting Cutkomp. Id. at 408. Honken also told Donaldson that he had a gun that Donaldson could use to kill Cut-komp, but Donaldson did not want to use that gun, in case it “went back to '93.” Id. at 409. Honken also told Donaldson that on certain days, Cutkomp went to work an hour early, which would be better for the hit, because it would be darker, and gave Donaldson a schedule of times that Cut-komp worked. Id. at 411. Honken also gave Donaldson an address where he could get “a deal” on a high-powered rifle night scope. Id. at 412. Honken also gave Donaldson directions to put Cutkomp’s body in his car, and hide the car at the abandoned house, then toss the rifle he had used to kill him in a muddy pond that Honken identified. Id. at 414. Donaldson also testified that Honken engaged him to send a typed letter from Des Moines to Daniel Cobeen’s parents “advising [them] that it wouldn’t be wise that their son shows up for court, for Dustin Honken’s court.” Id. at 414. Specifically, Honken directed that Donaldson was to buy an old typewriter, so that it couldn’t be traced, id. at 415; dictated to Donaldson what he wanted the letter to say, and had Donaldson write it out, because he didn’t want anything in his own handwriting, id. at 416; and had Donaldson write down the address to which he should send the letter, all with the purpose of trying to get Cobeen’s parents to make Cobeen withdraw his testimony against Honken. Id. In exchange for all of his assistance with eliminating witnesses against Honken, Honken promised Donaldson half of a ten-million dollar drug deal, which Honken believed that he could pull off after getting out of jail. Id. at 417. However, Honken and Donaldson also discussed an alternative plan, which involved Donaldson getting another person that he knew to do “the job” for five or ten thousand dollars. Id. Honken also arranged a code with Donaldson, involving references to the page, paragraph, words, and letters in a certain book, so that Donaldson could communicate with Honken in jail, as well as a list of various people outside of jail whom Donaldson could contact for certain kinds of assistance. Id. at 421. However, Donaldson testified that he never took any action in furtherance of the plans he and Honken had made after he bonded out of the Woodbury County Jail. Id. at 424-25. Donaldson then testified that, when he was sent back to the Wood-bury County Jail in November 1996, he made some attempts to contact Honken, because he had seen him once, and could tell that he was angry, and he was threatened by another inmate who made some reference to Honken. Id. at 427-28. Donaldson also testified that Honken himself made hand gestures like he was shooting Donaldson on one occasion and called him a snitch. Id. at 429. Apparently, these events prompted Donaldson to cooperate with law enforcement officers- in their investigation of Honken. Id. at 429-32. iv. Testimony of Terry Bregar. Another witness who had been an inmate in the Woodbury County Jail with Honken for two weeks in late 1996, Terry Bregar, testified, quite reluctantly, about his contacts with Honken. Specifically, Bregar testified that Honken had told him that if Honken got out, “he could probably beat the whole thing,” by killing the prosecutor and making witnesses “disappear.” Id. at 507. Although Bregar admitted that lots of inmates talk about things like that, Honken was different, because he seemed more “serious” and “stern” about it. Id. at 508. Moreover, Bregar testified that Honken told him that he had “bonded somebody out to take care of some business and some affairs for him,” but that the “guy” had let him down, leaving Honk-en “really irate.” Id. v. Testimony of Dennis Putzier. Dennis Leroy Putzier, another inmate at the Woodbury County Jail with Honken in the fall of 1998, albeit in a different cell block, also testified at the sentencing hearing. Putzier testified that he was first introduced to Honken when Honken slid a note under his door. In that note, Honken identified himself as the person who had bonded Donaldson out of the Woodbury County Jail and asked Putzier if he knew Donaldson and felt that Honken could trust him. Id. at 566-67. However, Putzier testified that he never had face-to-face contact with Honken, because they were in different cell blocks. Id. at 567. Instead, they communicated by notes and by conversations through the fire door between cell blocks. Id. at 567-68. Putzier testified that Honken asked if Putzier’s brother, LaDean Hummel, was capable of killing someone, because Honken was looking for someone to kill “this Tim, his partner, [who] was supposed to be telling on him.” Id. at 568. Honken also expressed concern to Putzier that Donaldson might give “paperwork” and a “map” to law enforcement officers. Id. at 569. Putzier also testified that Honken hoped to beat his 1996 charges by “[h]av[ing] the witness disappear like they did in the one in '93.” Id. at 571. Specifically, Putzier testified that Honken wanted to get rid of “Tim,” presumably meaning Timothy Cutkomp, to beat the 1996 charges. Id. vi. Testimony of Dana Rasmussen. Dana Rasmussen, who was Honken’s cell mate in cell block G of the Woodbury County Jail in the winter of 1996-97, also testified at the sentencing hearing. Rasmussen testified that Honken “solicited from me to do a hit on this guy” who was the primary witness against Honken on the 1996 charges, but Rasmussen declined the request. Id. Yol. 4 at 879. Subsequently, Rasmussen testified, he and Honken discussed a plan to drive by the witness’s parents’ home, and do a drive-by shooting to shoot out the windows of the house. Id. To accomplish this, Rasmussen testified that Honken was going to give Rasmussen money to bond out of the jail, and once the witness had been intimidated into refusing to testify, Honken would fire his attorney and share the refunded retainer with Rasmussen as well as a recipe for methamphetamine. Id. at 879-80. The intimidation scheme was to continue after the drive-by shooting, because Rasmussen was to “call [the witness] at his work and instruct him to get ahold of Dustin’s lawyer, you know, and if he didn’t that I knew where other family members — where his other family lived and that something would happen to them too.” Id. at 881. Rasmussen testified that Honken drew him a map to find the witness’s parents’ house and had Rasmussen recopy it, because Honken didn’t want anything in his own handwriting. Id. at 882. Although he no longer has Honken’s map, Rasmussen gave an account of the detailed instructions that Honken gave him to find the witness’s parents’ home. Id. at 884-85. However, Rasmussen was eventually bonded out by a friend, not Honken, and took no steps to carry out Honken’s plans for witness intimidation. Id. at 882. b. Evidence of an attempt to escape i. Further testimony of Terry Bregar. In addition to the testimony recounted above, concerning attempts to obstruct justice, Terry Bregar also testified regarding Honken’s plans to attempt to escape from jail by knocking a hole through the jail wall, making a rope out of blankets to lower down accomplices, then using that rope to drag up a larger rope from outside to allow the inmates to climb down. See id. at 509-17. Although Bregar testified that he saw evidence of attempts by Honk-en and other inmates to make a hole between the cell blocks, the wall was too hard to penetrate, so Bregar covered the hole with some soap to hide it. Id. at 512. Bregar also saw Honken attempting to pick the lock to the fire door between two cell blocks, because the hole being made in the exterior jail wall was not in the same cellblock where Honken was incarcerated, as well as Honken’s attempts to use materials in the cells to make tools to make the holes in the interior and exterior jail walls. Id. at 513-15. On another occasion, Honk-en came to Bregar’s cell to watch for outside accomplices to arrive in a car to help him escape, but the expected accomplices did not show up, despite Honken’s statements that they had been paid to do so. Id. at 516. ii. Testimony of David Leavitt and Derek Boggs. Another witness, David Leavitt, also an inmate in the Woodbury County Jail with Honken, confirmed some of Bregar’s testimony regarding an escape attempt involving breaking a hole in the jail wall. See id. at 551-54. Specifically, Leavitt testified to seeing inmates patching a hole in the face of the wall of a cell with cardboard and some soap. Id. at 551-52. Leavitt also threaded some rope from a sheet for another inmate, Dennis Putzier, to assist in the escape attempt. Id. at 552-53. Putzier explained that the rope was to help get some tools into the jail to cut reinforcing bars in the wall where the inmates were attempting to make a hole. Id. at 553. However, Leav-itt testified that he did not know who Honken was. Id. at 559. Similarly, Derek Boggs, another inmate, testified that Mr. Putzier was making the hole in his cell in the Woodbury County Jail, although he also testified that he saw Putzier passing notes to Honken. Id. at 562-63. iii. Further testimony of Dennis Put-zier. In addition to his testimony recounted above, Dennis Putzier also testified that he and other inmates in cellblock C were making a hole in the wall of a cell as part of a plan to escape. Id. Putzier testified that, when Honken learned of this escape plan, Honken asked him if he would be interested in making “Tim” disappear after he escaped, in return for which Honken promised to “take care of [Putzier] forever.” Id. at 571-72. Thereafter, Honken discussed with Putzier several ideas about how to complete the hole out of the jail, and Honken provided Putzier with a piece of a step that Honken had broken off, which he hoped would help Putzier to make the hole. Id. at 573-75. Putzier testified that Honken’s involvement in the actual escape was that he would have a ride set up for Putzier, have stuff that they could use to enlarge the hole dropped off by accomplices, and have a place arranged for Putzier to stay after he escaped. Id. at 576. It was only towards the end that Honken became interested in trying to escape himself, and attempted to cut through a wall between the cell blocks or to open the fire door, so that he could escape through Putzier’s hole through the exterior wall. Id. at 577-79. Putzier testified that the escape plan ended when he was moved to another cell block. Id. at 579. iv. Testimony of William Garrison. William Garrison, another inmate in the Woodbury County Jail, also testified to seeing Honken and other inmates attempting to pound a hole through the wall in Honken’s cell. Id., Vol. 3 at 814. He also saw Honken attempt to use a coat hook to open the fire door between cell blocks C and D. Id. at 814-15. v. Testimony of Lynette Redden. The inmate’s testimony concerning an escape attempt was confirmed, at least in part, by the testimony of Lynette Redden, who was the jail administrator for the Woodbury County Jail at the time of Honken’s incarceration there. Ms. Redden confirmed that a hole had been started in cell block C, which, if completed, would have reached the outside. See id. at 788. She also confirmed damage to a cell wall in Honken’s cell in cell block D, and that jail staff had obtained reports from inmates that Honken had been involved in causing that damage. Id. at 788-89. However, she also testified that the Woodbury County Attorney’s Office declined to prosecute Honken for attempted escape. Id. at 792. 2. Affidavits The second of three exhibits submitted by the government at the hearing on its motion for an anonymous jury are affidavits. The first affidavit is by Tobin Michael, Court Security Inspector for the United States Marshal Service, regarding the relative expense .and manpower requirements for a “standard” jury, an “anonymous” jury, and a “sequestered” jury. See Government’s Exhibit 2. The second affidavit is by William Basler, a Special Agent in the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation, recounting information received during interviews with inmates at the United States Penitentiary in Florence Colorado, where Honken was incarcerated prior to his transfer to the United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois. See Government’s Exhibit 2. At the hearing on January 17, 2004, the government was granted leave to submit a post-hearing brief on the question of the sufficiency of the affidavits to meet the standards for empaneling an anonymous jury in this death penalty case. [However, no such brief has ever been submitted.] 3. Paper on anonymous juries Honken also submitted one exhibit at the January 17, 2004, hearing. That exhibit was a copy of a paper prepared by Lara Dolnik of Starr Litigation Services, Inc., in Scottsdale, Arizona, entitled “The Potential Impact Of Juror Anonymity On Juror Decision-Making.” Defendant’s Exhibit A. In that paper, the author discusses studies suggesting that an anonymous jury is more likely to find a defendant guilty and more likely to impose a harsher sentence. II. LEGAL ANALYSIS As indicated in the court’s November 26, 2003, order, the government’s motion for an anonymous jury raises a number of complicated issues. Therefore, the court will consider these issues, and the parties’ pertinent arguments, in turn, beginning with the essential question of whether or not to empanel an “anonymous” jury at all. If the court deems it appropriate to empanel an “anonymous” jury, the court will consider collateral issues, including the extent to which the jury should be “anonymous” or merely “innominate,” and the extent to which prohibitions upon disclosure of the identity of or other information about jurors, or attempts to discover such information, should be imposed upon the parties, their counsel, court and clerks’ office personnel, and the news media. A. Should An “Anonymous” Jury Be Empaneled? 1. Arguments of the parties In its original brief supporting its motion for an anonymous jury, the government argues, first, that an “anonymous” jury is necessary to protect jury members from the threat to their safety posed by the defendant and his associates. This is so, the government contends, because the defendant was involved- with a criminal drug-trafficking organization; he has been indicted for killing witnesses; and he has previously attempted, and has solicited assistance in, the killing of other witnesses and government officials, both before and after he was incarcerated upon his plea of guilty in the 1996 case. The government contends that it can meet the burden of proof on the defendant’s dangerousness, for purposes of empaneling an anonymous jury, on the basis of the indictment itself, without the need for any further evidence, and that, in this case, the indictment, notice of intent to seek the death penalty, and transcript of the defendant’s sentencing on drug-trafficking charges in 1998 adequately support the need for an anonymous jury in this case. However, even supposing that it is necessary to look beyond these sources of information, the government points to the affidavits submitted at the January 17, 2004, hearing, particularly the affidavit of Special Agent Basler, as establishing the potential threat Honk-en poses to members of the jury if they are not kept “anonymous.” The government also asserts that the potential that the defendant could face the death penalty or a very lengthy prison sentence also weighs in favor of protecting the jury, as does the potential for extensive publicity, which might expose the jurors to intimidation or harassment, by the media and others. At the hearing, the government suggested that there were real disadvantages to the government, as well as to the defendant, in empaneling an anonymous jury, such as deprivation of the opportunity to perform any background investigation of the jurors, but that the circumstances were such that the government believed that the jury needed such protection. Consequently, the government asserts that it is not seeking an anonymous jury to obtain any tactical advantage. Also at the hearing, when pressed by the court on the relevance of case law standards for empaneling an anonymous jury in light of a statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3432, expressly applicable to that question in capital cases, the government argued that the case law standards were consistent with the statutory standards, so that they provided guidance in this case. The government also argues that reasonable precautions can be taken to protect the defendant’s rights, even if the jury is anonymous. Specifically, the government argues that the jury should be advised only that their identities are being concealed to protect them from unwanted contact by the parties or members of the press. In this way, the government argues that the defendant’s right to a fair trial will not be implicated by giving the jury the impression that the defendant is dangerous or a threat to the jurors. The government also argues that its proposed questionnaire for the jury provides adequate information for the defendant to voir dire the jurors and to exercise his peremptory challenges, thus protecting his right to an impartial jury. The recurrent theme in Honken’s resistance to the government’s motion for an anonymous jury is that the government has relied entirely on allegations and innuendo, not “facts,” to try to meet its burden to show that an anonymous jury is appropriate. Honken contends that the government must show by the preponderance of the evidence that such a drastic step is appropriate, but has not presented any such evidence. Honken argues, further, that, even in a death penalty case, he has constitutional and statutory rights to a list of the venire members, including their names, addresses, and places of employment, for example, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3432. Because the government cannot meet its burden on the basis of evidence of a threat to the jurors, Honken contends that his right to the presumption of innocence and his right to a fair and impartial jury, which would ordinarily be protected through éffective voir dire, will be unduly prejudiced by empaneling an anonymous jury. He also contends that mere membership in a “drug organization” is not sufficient to warrant an anonymous jury; something more is required. However, Honken argues that there is nothing more. Instead, he points out that the government relies on stale allegations of events from seven to ten years ago, which show no present capacity on his part to harm or threaten to harm anyone. Honken also asserts that the potential for a death penalty should not warrant empaneling an anonymous jury, in light of the fact that 18 U.S.C. § 3432 expressly requires disclosure of jurors’ identities to the defendant in a death penalty case. As to potential publicity, the defendant argues that making the jury anonymous is likely to increase media attention to the case, to his further prejudice. At the hearing, Honken also raised for the first time a contention that an anonymous jury would be prejudicial, because the study he submits as evidence indicates that anonymous juries are more likely to convict and more likely to impose harsher punishment than non-anonymous juries. Honken suggests that empaneling an anonymous jury invites a dangerous “group dynamic” that is different from the dynamic of individual jurors, whose names are public, performing a serious civic responsibility as individuals. Honken dismissed the suggestion that non-anonymous juries might be more likely to convict than anonymous juries to keep a person perceived by the jurors to be dangerous from coming after them, because there was no evidence to support such an hypothesis. Honken argued that the inevitable implication of juror anonymity to the jurors was that the defendant was so dangerous that jurors’ identities had to be hidden, so the defendant must be guilty. Honken also argued that disclosure of a “list” of potential jurors, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3432, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, necessarily contemplated disclosure of jurors’ names. When pressed about what special value a juror’s name would have, if the parties were provided with other identifying information, such as the juror’s age, sex, city of residence, and nature of employment, defense counsel suggested that names indicated valuable information about ethnicity, as well as information from which a party or attorney might recognize that he or she actually knew the juror or had had some prior contact with the juror, and would avoid the dangers of a jury acting out of a “group dynamic” rather than out , of individual judgments regarding the facts. Honken also argues that, under § 3432, the court must find, by the preponderance of the evidence, that it is disclosure of the list of venire members that would jeopardize the life or safety of the jurors, not merely that Honken was, in the past, a dangerous person or involved with a dangerous enterprise. Honken also argues that the government’s proposed procedures are not sufficient to protect him from prejudice to his constitutional and statutory rights. He contends that the government’s proposed questionnaire does not adequately protect his rights, because there is little assurance that the jurors will answer it accurately. He also contends that the government’s proposed procedure precludes him from any independent investigation of the background of the potential jurors. Moreover, he contends that allowing only a government investigator, even one who reports only to the judge, to investigate the jurors presents an appearance of impropriety, if not actual bias. 2. A matter of nomenclature As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, “In the usual case, the parties know the names, addresses, and occupations of potential jurors, as well as those of any spouses, and use this information during voir dire to formulate questions probing for potential biases, prejudices, or any other considerations that might prevent a juror from rendering a fair and impartial decision.” United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 n. 22 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1132, 115 S.Ct. 2558, 132 L.Ed.2d 812 (1995). Jurors about whom some or all of this information is withheld are generally referred to as “anonymous.” However, as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, “[rjeferring to the jury as ‘anonymous’ is misleading.” See United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 723 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1185, 117 S.Ct. 1467, 137 L.Ed.2d 681 (1997). The court explained: Jurors are randomly summoned from the community at large to decide the single case before them and, once done, to “inconspicuously fade back into the community.” United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1023 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 263, 102 L.Ed.2d 251 (1988); see also 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *378. “Anonymous jury” has come to mean something different in recent years, signaling the district court’s decision to withhold certain biographical information about potential jurors from the parties involved. That said, we should be wary of painting with too broad a brush. “Anonymous” juries include those about whom more has been concealed than here. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (11th Cir.1994) (withholding names, addresses, places of employment, and spouses’ names and places of employment), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1132, 115 S.Ct. 2558, 132 L.Ed.2d 812 (1995). The jurors here were not “anonymous” except in the most literal sense. The district court ordered only the jurors’ names and addresses be withheld from the parties. Otherwise, the court provided the defendants with a wealth of information about the venire, including occupations and names of employers. Branch, 91 F.3d at 723. In light of the information disclosed to the defendants, the court described the “anonymity” issue as a question of whether “to withhold biographical information about the jurors from the parties.” Id. It is in the sense of withholding biographical information about jurors that this court also uses “anonymous jury.” If the court decides to empanel an “anonymous” jury, the court will consider below the degree of “anonymity” that is appropriate in this case, i.e., the amount and type of biographical information about jurors that should be withheld or disclosed to the parties. 3. The rights at issue In one of only two cases in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has considered the issue of anonymous juries, the court recognized that empaneling an anonymous jury may interfere with a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. See United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1532 (8th Cir.1995), cert, denied, 517 U.S. 1149, 116 S.Ct. 1449, 134 L.Ed.2d 569 (1996). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently explained the nature of such interference more fully, noting that “the use of an anonymous jury may interfere with defendants’ ability to conduct voir dire and to exercise meaningful peremptory challenges.” United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 971 (9th Cir. 2003); cf. United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 650 (7th Cir.2002) (“Juror anonymity ... deprives the defendant of information that might help him to make appropriate challenges — in particular, peremptory challenges — during jury selection.”), cert, denied sub nom. Cox v. United States, 538 U.S. 967, 123 S.Ct. 1761, 155 L.Ed.2d 522 (200