Full opinion text
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW GEORGE C. SMITH, District Judge. Plaintiff class asserts claims under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Defendants’ use of district-wide at-large elections to elect state judges results in the denial or abridgment of minorities’ right to vote. The Court conducted a bench trial in this case on February 10-13, 18-20, and 24-26, 1997. For the reasons that follow the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act for any of the challenged courts, and that Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor on all counts of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. I. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Plaintiffs challenge the at-large election of state appellate and trial court judges in Ohio’s eight most populous counties. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that the at-large election of the judges of certain of Ohio’s Courts of Appeals, Courts of Common Pleas, Municipal Courts, and one County Court impermissibly dilutes the voting strength of African-Americans in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, § 2 of the' Ohio Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 27-31. 2. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenge the following judicial districts: (1) Courts of Appeals: First District (Hamilton County); Second District (Champaign, Clarke, Darke, Greene, Miami, and Montgomery Counties); Sixth District (Erie, Fulton, Huron, Lucas, Ottawa, Sandusky, Williams, and Wood Counties); Eighth District (Cuyahoga County); and Tenth District (Franklin County); (2) Common Pleas Courts: Hamilton County Common Pleas; Montgomery County Common Pleas; Franklin County Common Pleas; Mahoning County Common Pleas; Stark County Common Pleas; Summit County Common Pleas; Lucas County Common Pleas; and Cuyahoga County Common Pleas; and (3) Municipal and County Courts: Dayton Municipal Court (Montgomery County); Montgomery County Court # 1 (Montgomery County); Toledo Municipal Court (Lucas County); Bedford Municipal Court (Cuyahoga County); Franklin County Municipal Court (Franklin County); Youngstown Municipal Court (Mahoning County); and Akron Municipal Court (Summit County). Complaint at ¶ 41 (collectively, “challenged courts”). 3. Defendants’ Exhibits (“Def.Ex.”) 6 and 7 display the courts subject to challenge, the territorial jurisdiction of each court, the number of judges for each court, the total population of each judicial district, and the black population of each judicial district. Def.Ex. C at 3. Plaintiffs have stipulated that the numbers contained in Def.Ex. 7 are accurate. Transcript (“Tr.”) at 197-98. The Court hereby accepts this stipulation. 4. Def.Ex. 8 is a compilation of pertinent portions of 1990 Census of Population: General Population Characteristics, Ohio, CP-1-37, providing total and black populations for areas comprising the judicial districts. The Court has admitted Def.Ex. 8 into evidence, Tr. at 1670, and hereby takes judicial notice of the census data contained therein, as well as all other pertinent census data. See Grills v. Branigin, 284 F.Supp. 176, 180 (S.D.Ind.), aff'd, 391 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 1666, 20 L.Ed.2d 641 (1968). 5. According to the 1990 Census, the total population of Ohio is 10,847,115 of whom 1,154,826, or 10.65%, are black. 1990 Census of Population: General Population Characteristics, Ohio, CP-1-37 at 21. See also Def.Ex. 17 at 1, No. 3. 6. Plaintiffs have submitted Plaintiffs’ Exhibit (“Pl.Ex.”) 45, which is a series of county maps indicating the boundaries of the challenged courts within Ohio’s eight most populous counties and purporting to show the concentration of minority population within each county. Tr. at 799-801, 1524-25. These maps, in and of themselves, however, contain insufficient information to enable the Court to determine whether Plaintiffs have established the first Gingles precondition, i.e., whether African-Americans can constitute a majority in a geographically compact hypothetical single-member district. Tr. at 978-79, 1435-36, 1524-25, 1531, 1625-26. Although these maps indicate the approximate African-American population in each census tract depicted, they do not indicate the number of Caucasians within those tracts or contain the boundaries for political subdivisions within each county. Tr. at 978-79,1524-25,1625-26. 7. The named Plaintiffs are twelve (12) African-Americans who reside throughout the State of Ohio (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), Def.Ex. 17 at 1, No. 1, five of whom are current or former Democratic state legislators, ie., William Mallory, Jeffrey D. Johnson, Casey C. Jones, C.J. Prentiss and Vernon Sykes. Complaint at ¶¶ 6, 12-14, 16. 8. On March 14, 1996, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ request for certification of this case as a class action. The certified class is the voting age population of African-Americans entitled to vote and elect judges in each of the twenty challenged courts. Docket Entry (“D.”) 45 & 46. 9. Defendants are Governor George V. Voinovieh, Secretary of State Robert Taft, and the State of Ohio (collectively, “Defendants”). Complaint at ¶¶ 18-20. 10. Before trial, the Court entered summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims of intentional discrimination under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, § 2 of the Ohio Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court also entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ claims under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act with regard to the Sixth District Court of Appeals and the Court of Common Pleas for Stark County. D. 83. Plaintiffs have voluntarily withdrawn all of the claims upon which this Court entered summary judgment. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment; Tr. at 857, 928. 11. Def.Ex. 16 is a compilation of judicial election results in the challenged courts from 1975 through 1996. Def.Ex. 15 is a distillation of those results listing only the races involving at least one African-American candidate. Plaintiffs have stipulated that, except where corrected during the trial, the information contained in these exhibits is true and correct. Tr. at 197-98. The Court hereby accepts this stipulation. Structure and Organization of Ohio Courts 12. The Ohio Constitution and Ohio Revised Code governs the structure, organization; and territorial jurisdiction of Ohio’s state court system. See Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, R.C. Chapter 2501 (Courts of Appeals), R.C. Chapter 2301 (Courts of Common Pleas), R.C. Chapter 2101 (Courts of Common Pleas, Probate Division), R.C. Chapter 2153 (Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division), R.C. Chapter 1901 (Municipal Courts), and R.C. Chapter 1907 (County Courts). 13. Under Article IV, § 1 of the Ohio Constitution, “[tjhe judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas and divisions thereof, and such other courts inferior to the supreme court as may from time to time be established by law.” The Ohio Supreme Court, the highest court in the State, consists of seven justices: a chief justice and six justices elected statewide. Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 2(A) Def.Ex. Cat 2. 14. Article IV, § 3(A), and R.C. 2501.01, divide the state into twelve compact appellate districts comprised of one or more whole counties, each of which districts has at least three judges. Def.Ex. C at 3. Defendants’ Exhibit 5 is a map displaying the territorial jurisdiction of the appellate districts. The First, Eighth, and Tenth Districts are each comprised of a single county — Hamilton, Cuyahoga, and Franklin Counties, respectively. R.C. 2501.01(A), (H), & (J); Def.Ex. C at 3; Def.Ex. 7 at 1. The remaining districts are constructed by combining whole counties— no county is split between appellate districts. Def.Ex. C at 3; Tr. at 953-54. The Second District Court of Appeals is made up of Champaign, Clark, Darke, Greene, Miami, and Montgomery Counties. R.C. 2501.01(B); Def.Ex. 7 at 1. 15. Under Article IV, § 3(A), the General Assembly may increase the number of judges in any appellate district based on the volume of business within the district. Def.Ex. C at 3. Under this provision, the General Assembly has increased the number of judges in the First District to six, R.C. 2501.013(A), in the Second District to five, R.C. 2501.013(B), in the Eighth District to twelve, R.C. 2501.012(A), and in the Tenth District to eight, R.C. 2501.12(C). Def.Ex. 7 at 1. 16. Under Article IV, § 4(A) of the Ohio Constitution, “[tjhere shall be a court of common pleas and such divisions thereof as may be established by law serving each county of the state.” Def.Ex. C at 3. The Ohio Constitution gives the General Assembly the authority to combine one or more whole counties into a common pleas court district, Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 4(A), but the General Assembly has declined to do so. R.C. 2301.01; Def.Ex C at 3. The Ohio Constitution does not give the General Assembly the authority to divide counties into separate common pleas courts. 17. Each county court of common pleas must have at least one resident judge. Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 4(A); Def.Ex. C at 3. 18. The courts of common pleas include a probate division and such other divisions as may be provided by law. Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 4(C); Def.Ex. C at 3.. The General Assembly has established probate, domestic relations, juvenile, and drug court divisions within specified courts of common pleas. Def.Ex. C at 3. “Judges are elected specifically to such probate division and to such other divisions.” Id. 19. The Ohio Revised Code establishes the total number of judges for each court of common pleas and the various divisions thereof. Def.Ex. C at 3. The Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County contains a General Division with 34 judges, R.C. 2301.02(C), a Domestic Relations Division with 5 judges, R.C. 2301.03(L)(1), a Juvenile Division with 6 judges, R.C. 2153.02, and a Probate Division with 2 judges, R.C. 2101.02 and 2101.021. Def. Ex. 7 at 2; Tr. at 1603. 20. The Court of Common Pleas for Franklin County contains a General Division with 16 judges, R.C. 2301.02(C), a Domestic Relations and Juvenile Division with 5 judges, R.C. 2301.03(A), and a Probate Division with 1 judge, R.C. 2101.02. Def.Ex. 7 at 2; Tr. at 1605. 21. The Court of Common Pleas for Hamilton County contains a General Division with 15 judges, R.C. 2301.02(C), a Domestic Relations Division with 3 judges, R.C. 2301.03(B)(2), a Juvenile Division with 2 judges, R.C. 2301.03(B)(1), a drug court division with 1 judge, R.C. 2301.03(B)(3), and a Probate Division with 1 judge, R.C. 2101.02. Def.Ex. 7 at 3; Tr. at 1527-28,1604-05. 22. The Court of Common Pleas for Lucas County contains a General Division with 10 judges, R.C. 2301.02(C), a Domestic Relations Division with 2 judges, R.C. 2301.03(D)(1), a Juvenile Division with 2 judges, R.C. 2301.03(D)(2), and a Probate Division with 1 judge, R.C. 2101.02. Def. Ex. 7 at 3. 23. The Court of Common Pleas for Mahoning County contains a General Division with 5 judges, R.C. 2301.02(C), a Domestic Relations Division with 1 judge, R.C. 2301.03(E)(1), a Juvenile Division with 1 judge, R.C. 2301.03(E)(2), and a Probate Division with T judge, R.C. 2101.02. Def.Ex. 7 at 4. 24. The Court of Common Pleas for Montgomery County contains a General Division with 11 judges, R.C. 2301.02(C), a Domestic Relations Division with 2 judges, R.C. 2301.03(F)(1), a Juvenile Division with 2 judges, R.C. 2301.03(F)(2), and a Probate Division with 1 judge, R.C. 2101.02. Def.Ex. 7 at 4; Tr. at 1605. 25. The Court of Common Pleas for Summit County contains a General Division with 8 judges, R.C. 2301.02(C), a Domestic Relations Division with 2 judges, R.C. 2301.03(I)(1), a Juvenile Division with 1 judge, R.C. 2301.03(I)(2), and a Probate Division with 1 judge, R.C. 2101.02. Def. Ex. 7 at 5. 26. Under its authority to create inferi- or courts, see Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 1, the General Assembly has, by statute, created municipal courts, including the six (6) municipal courts challenged in this case, ie., the Akron, Bedford, Dayton, Franklin County, Toledo, and Youngstown Municipal Courts. R.C. 1901.01; Def.Ex. C at 3. 27. R.C. 1901.02 establishes the territorial jurisdiction of each of Ohio’s municipal courts.' Def.Ex. C at 3. R.C. 1901.08 establishes the number of judges for each municipal court. 28. The Akron Municipal Court has jurisdiction within the Cities of Akron and Fairlawn, the Villages of Lakemore and Mogadore (the portion in Summit County), and Bath, Richfield, and Springield Townships in Summit County. R.C. 1901.02(A) & (B); Def.Ex. 7 at 7. The Akron Municipal Court has six judges. R.C. 1901.08; Def.Ex. 7 at 7. 29. The Bedford Municipal Court has jurisdiction within the Cities of Bedford, Bedford Heights, Solon, and Warrensville Heights, the Villages of Bentleyville, Chagrin Falls, Glenwillow, Moreland Hills, North Randall, Oakwood, Orange, and Woodmere, and Warrensville and Chagrin Falls Townships in Cuyahoga County. R.C. 1901.02(A) & (B); Def.Ex. 7 at 6. The Bedford Municipal Court has two judges. R.C. 1901.08; Def.Ex. 7 at 6. 30. The Dayton Municipal Court has jurisdiction within the City of Dayton. R.C.1901.02(A). Def.Ex. 7 at 6. The Dayton Municipal Court has five judges. R.C. 1901.08; Def.Ex. 7 at 6. 31. The Franklin County Municipal Court has jurisdiction within Franklin County. R.C.1901.02(A), (A)(5), & (B); Def.Ex. 7 at 6. The Franklin County Municipal Court has fourteen judges. R.C. 1901.08. One of the judges of the Franklin County Municipal Court is assigned to that court’s Environmental Division. R.C. 1901.011, 1901.031, & 1901.051(C). Def. Ex. 7 at 6. 32. The Toledo Municipal Court has jurisdiction within the City of Toledo, the Village of Ottawa Hills, and Washington Township in Lucas County. R.C. 1901.02(A) & (B); Def.Ex. 7 at 6. The Toledo Municipal Court has seven judges. R.C.1901.08; Def.Ex. 7 at 6. One of the judges of the Toledo Municipal Court is assigned to that court’s Housing Division. R.C.1901.011, 1901.031, & 1901.051(B); Def.Ex. 7 at 6. 33. The Youngstown Municipal Court has jurisdiction within the City of Youngstown. R.C.1901.02(A); Def.Ex. 7 at 7. The Youngstown Municipal Court has three judges. R.C.1901.08; Def.Ex. 7 at 7. 34. Pursuant to R.C.1907.01, county courts are created in each county in which the territorial jurisdiction of a municipal court or courts is not coextensive with the geographical boundaries of the county. Def.Ex. C at 3-4. These county courts have jurisdiction throughout those parts of the county which are not subject to the territorial jurisdiction of any municipal court. Def.Ex. C at 4. 35. The Dayton, Kettering, Miamis-burg, Oakwood, and Vandalia Municipal Courts are within Montgomery County, but their combined territorial jurisdiction is not coextensive with the geographical boundaries of that county. R.C.1901.01 & 1901.02(B). Because portions of Montgomery County are not within the territorial jurisdiction of any of the municipal courts within that county, Montgomery County has a county court. R.C.1907.01 36. R.C.1907.11 establishes the number of judges for each county court. Def.Ex. C at 3. The Montgomery County Court has five part-time judges. R.C.1907.11(A). 37. Under R.C.1907.15(A)(1), the Court of Common Pleas in a county with a county court having more than one judge may divide the county court into separate districts and assign a specific judge or judges to each district so created. The Court of Common Pleas for Montgomery County has so divided the Montgomery County Court into two districts and has assigned three judges to District # 1, the court challenged by the Plaintiffs herein. See In re Montgomery County Court (Montgomery C.P. April 26, 1994); Def.Ex. 3; Def. Ex. 7 at 8. Under the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas’ order, the territorial jurisdiction of Montgomery County Court District # 1 includes the City of Trotwood, the Villages of Brookville, Farmersville, New Lebanon, Phillipsburg, and Verona (the portion in Montgomery County), and Clay, Jackson, Jefferson, Madison, and Perry Townships in Montgomery County. Id. 38. The basic structure of Ohio’s state court system, under which territorial jurisdiction is based solely on geography, dates to the 1850’s when race was not an issue in the structure of state government in Ohio. Tr. at 1075, 1502-03, 1606-07. The territorial jurisdictions of the Ohio courts are race-neutral, ie., they are based solely on geography and not on population or the racial composition of the population within the respective jurisdictions. Def.Ex. B at 3; Def.Ex. C at 5; Tr. at 964-65, 1075, 1502-03. Ohio’s Judicial Electoral Scheme 39. Under Article IV, § 6(A), of the Ohio Constitution, the electoral districts of all state courts are “linked” to the territorial jurisdictions of the courts. Tr. at 955-56, 1503-04; Def .Ex. B at 3-4; Def.Ex. C at 4-5. Specifically, the judges of the Ohio Supreme Court are elected by the electors of the state in at-large elections, judges of the courts of appeals are elected by electors of their respective appellate districts in at-large elections, and judges of the courts of common pleas, and the divisions thereof, are elected by the electors of the counties. Def.Ex. C at 4; Tr. at 955-56. Various statutes provide for the election of municipal court and county court judges by electors within the courts’ respective territorial jurisdictions. R.C. 1901.07(B), 1901.08, 1907.11, & 1907 .13. Def.Ex. C at 4. 40. Like the territorial jurisdiction of Ohio’s courts, the electoral districts of Ohio’s courts are race-neutral, i.e., they are based solely on geography and not on population or the racial composition of the population within the respective jurisdictions. Def.Ex. B at 3-4; Def.Ex. C at 5; Tr. at 965,1075,1502-03,1505. 41. Candidates for the courts of common pleas, municipal courts, and county courts must reside in the district of the court to which they seek election. Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 6(B); R.C. 2301.01, 1901.06 and 1907.13. Def.Ex. C at 4. A county court judge must reside within the jurisdiction of the county court, but in counties divided by the common pleas court into areas of separate jurisdiction pursuant to R.C.1907.15(A)(1), the judge need not reside in the area of separate jurisdiction to which he or she is assigned. R.C.1907.13 42. Candidates for the courts of appeals, courts of common pleas, and municipal courts must be admitted to practice law in the state and must have been engaged in the practice of law for a minimum of six years. R.C. 2501.02, 2301.01, and 1901.06. Def.Ex. C at 4; Tr. at 163-64, 957-58. Candidates for county court must be admitted to practice law in the state and must have been engaged in the practice of law for two years. R.C.1907.13; Def.Ex. C at 4. Under Article IV, § 6(C) of the Ohio Constitution, no judicial candidate may serve if that candidate attains the age of 70 years on or before the date the candidate takes office. Def.Ex. C at 4; Tr. at 957. 43. The qualifications for judicial candidates- — age, residency, admission to practice law and years of practice — are all race-neutral. Def.Ex. B at 4; Def.Ex. C at 5; Tr. at 965-66,1505. 44. With a few minor exceptions, judicial candidates in Ohio run for “numbered posts,” ie., they are candidates for specific judicial seats. Tr. at 1018-19. This practice of not pitting incumbent judges against one another promotes collegiality among judges and avoids voter confusion. Tr. at 1017-19. 45. Judicial candidates in Ohio run in the general election on a “nonpartisan” ballot, ie., judicial candidates’ party affiliation does not appear on the general election ballot. R.C. 3505.04 & 1901.07(A), Def.Ex. C at 4; Tr. at 953, 956-57. Judicial elections are, nonetheless, intensely partisan. Tr. at 953, 970,1510. 46. Candidates for Supreme Court justice, court of appeals judge, and common pleas judge run in partisan primary elections. Def.Ex. C at 7; Tr. at 957. 47. Candidates for municipal court judge may be nominated either by nominating petition or by primary election subject to charter provisions. Def.Ex. C at 4; Tr. at 957. Certain municipal judicial candidates must be nominated by petition signed by a specified number of electors, including Toledo (1000 electors), R.C. 1901.07(C)(2), Akron (250 electors), R.C. 1901.07(C)(3), and Franklin County (1000 electors), R.C.1901.07(C)(5). Def.Ex. C at 4; Tr. at 844, 957,1113. 48. County court judicial candidates must be nominated by petition of 1% of the electors of the jurisdiction voting in the most recent gubernatorial election. R.C. 1907.13. Def.Ex. Cat4. 49. The Democrat and Republican parties, and the judicial candidates themselves, actively communicate the candidates’ party affiliations to the voters. This information is communicated to the voters via party sample ballots or slate cards, as well as other campaign literature and media. Def.Ex. C at 7; Tr. at 336, 970-71, 1217,1266,1510-11. 50. The nominating processes for judicial candidates — either by primary or nominating petition — are race-neutral. Def. Ex. B at 4; Def .Ex. C at 5; Tr. at 966, 1505, 1608. Plaintiffs acknowledge that there are no racially discriminatory barriers imposed by the nominating process itself. See Def.Ex. 22 at 3-5, Nos. 5 and 8; Tr. at 1505. 51. The Governor appoints judges to fill vacancies in any judicial position. Ohio Const. Art. IV, § 13; Def.Ex. C at 5, Tr. at 960, 969. See also Newman v. Voinovich, 789 F.Supp. 1410, 1412 (S.D.Ohio 1992), aff'd, 986 F.2d 159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 924, 113 S.Ct. 3041, 125 L.Ed.2d 727 (1993). Governors of both political parties typically fill such vacancies with members of the Governor’s political party, regardless of the partisan leanings of the judicial district in which the appointee will be serving. Def.Ex. C at 6; Tr. at 969; Newman, 789 F.Supp. at 1412. Gubernatorial appointees hold office until the next general election, at which time they must seek election to fill any remainder of an unexpired term. Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 13. Both the current Ohio Governor, Defendants Voinovieh, a Republican, and his predecessor, Governor Richard F. Celeste, a Democrat, actively sought to appoint qualified African-Americans to judicial vacancies. See Newman, 789 F.Supp. at 1416; Tr. at 418, 636-37. 52. There are significant differences between judicial and legislative or executive branch elections in Ohio. Def.Ex. C at 5; Tr. at 152, 334r-35, 966, 1504. Candidates for judicial office are governed by the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct. Def. Ex. 4; Def.Ex. C at 5; Tr. at 152, 1508. Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ witnesses agree that, pursuant to Canon 7, judicial candidates are precluded from running on issue-oriented platforms or from making pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office. Def.Ex. B at 4; Def.Ex. C at 5; Tr. at 51-52, 152-53, 334-35, 677, 817, 873, 958, 1506-07. Canon 7 is widely seen as protecting the integrity and perceived fairness that is so important to the judiciary. Def.Ex. C at 5. Candidates can and do often run on “law and order” or “tough but fair” judicial campaign themes. Tr. at 493,1229,1267,1513,1611. 53. Judges are not “representatives” in the sense that they will represent the will of the electors. Tr. at 335, 958-60, 966, 1506. Judges cannot and should not cater to a particular “constituency.” Tr. at 335, 959, 966, 1013-14, 1334, 1506, 1573-74, 1609. Factors Generally Influencing the Outcome of Judicial Elections in Ohio 54. Judicial elections in Ohio are typically described as “down-ticket” races. Tr. at 248, 1139, 1216-17. As “down-ticket” races, the voters generally have relatively little information concerning the candidates for judicial office, Tr. at 248, 1139, 1216-17, 1510-11, 1517, and because of the restrictions of Canon 7, the ability of judicial candidates to campaign on issues and communicate positions on issues to the voters is severely limited. Tr. at 51, 152-53. Accordingly, a number of other factors generally play a significant role in the outcome of judicial elections in Ohio. 55. Political Affiliation. Through a variety of “partisan cues,” the political affiliation of judicial candidates becomes known to voters and clearly plays a significant, Tr. at 139, 182, 191, 415, 631-32, 662, 1157, 1314, if not predominant, role in the election of judges. Def.Ex. B at 5; Def.Ex. C at 7; Tr. at 970-71, 1509-10, 1542. These “partisan cues” include party endorsements, distribution of political party sample ballots, and the like. Def.Ex. C at 7; Tr. at 970-71, 1217, 1266, 1510-11. As a result, judicial elections are, in reality, highly partisan affairs in which each political party attempts to elect its own candidates. Tr. at 953, 972, 1510. Generally, a Republican judicial candidate running for election in a Republican leaning county, such as Franklin or Hamilton Counties, enjoys an advantage over a Democratic candidate in the same election, regardless of the race of the candidate or voters. Def.Ex. A at 17; Tr. at 971-72, 993. A Democratic candidate running in a Democratic leaning county, such as Cuyahoga County, enjoys a similar advantage. Def. Ex. A at 17; Def.Ex. C at 7; Tr. at 106, 971-72, 1547. Further, because many of the geographical districts from which judges are elected are heavily Republican or heavily Democratic, it is not surprising that there are frequently uncontested elections or elections in which there is no meaningful competition for a judicial seat. Tr. at 109, 972. 56. Incumbency. Typically in judicial elections in Ohio, an elected or appointed incumbent enjoys an advantage. Def.Ex. B at 5; Def.Ex. C at 6; Tr. at 139, 182, 191, 415-16, 629, 640, 662, 968, 1111, 1215-16, 1237, 1314-15. As evidenced by Def. Ex. 16, most incumbent judges in Ohio, black and white, easily win reelection. This exhibit is consistent with the history of the high rate of reelection for incumbent judges in Ohio. See L. Baum, The Electoral Fates of Incumbent Judges in the Ohio CouH of Common Pleas, 66 Judicature 420 (1983). Elected incumbents have the highest probability of winning reelection. Def. Ex. C at 6. Elected incumbents tend to have a higher name recognition than a challenger, a very important advantage in judicial elections where less information is available to voters concerning the candidates. Def.Ex. C at 6; Tr. at 629, 968-70, 1514. Elected incumbents also have an advantage in campaign organization, fund-raising, and experience in campaigning. Def.Ex. C at 6; Tr. at 968-69. Appointed incumbents also enjoy a significant advantage over challengers, but do not have the same degree of advantage as elected incumbents. Def.Ex. C at 6. Non-incumbent challengers typically face the greatest barriers to election. Def.Ex. C at 6. Non-incumbent challengers typically are less known and less experienced candidates. Def.Ex. C at 6. Where there is an open seat judicial contest in which no incumbent is running, the partisan makeup of the judicial district is the most important determinant in the outcome in these races. Def.Ex. C at 6. 57.Judicial Experience/Qualifications. A typical pattern in judicial elections is for a candidate to run for lesser judicial office and then to seek election to a higher judicial office as the candidate gains name recognition, experience and electoral success. Def.Ex. B at 5; Def.Ex. C at 7; Tr. at 972,1514. Jurists who have served on a lower court are typically more-well known than those individuals who have not served on the bench, Tr. at 968, 1514, and those jurists who perform well are more likely to receive newspaper endorsements and bar recommendations. Def.Ex. C at 7. Canon 7 does permit a judicial candidate to communicate the candidate’s judicial experience and qualifications to the voters, and in these relatively low-information races, such experience and qualifications takes on added importance. Tr. at 873,1513. 58. Endorsements. Endorsements by newspapers, bar associations, and community groups also provide the voter with key information in a contest that is typically characterized by a low level of information. Def.Ex. C at 7; Tr. at 191, 662, 1111, 1157-58, 1215, 1261-63, 1314. Judicial candidates often feature such endorsements in their campaign advertising. Tr. at 989. 59. Name Recognition/Familiarity. Name recognition is often an important factor in the less publicized judicial contests. Def.Ex. B at 5; Def.Ex. C at 4; Tr. at 50,121,181, 923, 1111, 1157, 1315, 1509-10. Name recognition can arise from a number of sources including previous experience in politics and elections, active involvement in civic and social activities or simply the good fortune of a well-recognized family name. Def.Ex. C at 7; Tr. at 115-16, 420, 495-97, 1215-16, 1509-10. Both whites and African-Americans are hesitant to run against candidates who have “strong judicial names.” Pl.Ex. 37 at 8-9; Tr. at 138. 60. Quality of Campaign Waged. While partisanship, incumbency, and name recognition are critical factors in determining the outcome of judicial elections, a challenger without these resources may still be successful with a good campaign. Def.Ex. B at 10; Def.Ex. C at 7; Tr. at 181-82, 191, 416, 662, 1111-12, 1157, 1315, 1515, 1517. In the evidence presented, there are many examples of non-incumbent challengers or members of the minority party winning an election because the candidate ran an effective campaign. Tr. at 765, 973-74, 987-90, 994-95, 1164-65, 1225-27. Although not always, the quality of campaign waged depends in large part upon the resources and financing available to the candidate. Tr. at 50, 416, 1157, 1216,1509-10. 61. Party RecruitmenVSlating. In Ohio judicial elections, political party organizations have played a positive role in actively recruiting and supporting black candidates for election to judicial office. Def.Ex. B at 5; Def.Ex. C at 7; Tr. at 399-404, 974, 1112-13, 1315-16, 1325-26. Both major political parties have actively recruited minority judicial candidates, Tr. at 399, 1112-13, 1133, 1136, 1158, although, because most African-Americans identify themselves as Democrats, Tr. at 1133, 1149-50, 1539-40, the Republican party has generally had a more difficult time in attracting African-American candidates. Tr. at 1134-34, 1279-80. One difficulty in recruitment, however, is the relatively small pool of qualified black judicial candidates. Tr. at 400, 974. See Findings of Fact at ¶¶ 109, 144, 167, 192, 215, 236, 262, 285. The Ohio Supreme Court’s Commission on Racial Fairness has determined that of the approximately 31,000 registered attorneys in Ohio, only 1,100, or approximately 3.5%, are “attorneys of color.” Tr. at 129-30. Because “attorneys of color” include African-Americans, Latinos, Asian/Pacific Islanders, and Native Americans, the number of African-American attorneys is actually less than 1,100 or 3.5%. Tr. at 130. 62. Voter Turnout/Roll-Off. Turnout in elections varies with each election year and can be a factor in judicial contests. Def.Ex. B at 5; Def.Ex. C at 8; Tr. at 975. Another factor is “roll-off,” which occurs when more votes are cast at the top of the ticket than in lower level judicial races. Def.Ex. B at 5; Def.Ex. C at 8; Tr. at 975-76,1517. 63. Controversies/scandals. In certain elections, a judicial candidate may be disadvantaged because of unfavorable publicity concerning the candidate or his or her candidacy. Tr. at 629, 1158, 1515-16. Controversies or scandals surrounding a candidate, including some incumbent judges, may enable a challenger to defeat a more well-known and better financed candidate. Tr. at 1515-16. 64. Gender. Although evidence of the precise effect of the candidate’s sex was not presented, several witnesses testified that, sometime beginning in the 1980’s, female judicial candidates enjoyed a measurable advantage over their male counterparts. Tr. at 424, 509,1114-15,1171, 1227. 65. Race. The race of the a judicial candidate and voters plays a role in determining the outcome of judicial elections in Ohio, Tr. at 1432, 155, 976, 1030, 1051, 1517-18, 1613, but in most judicial elections, does not play a predominant or significant role. Tr. at 1181, 1241,1261, 1267, 1271,1325,1389-90,1518-21,1613. Analysis of Racial Bloc Voting in General 66. The “secret ballot” precludes the compilation of official statistics as to why voters vote as they do in any particular election. Def.Ex. A at 8; Tr. at 1364. To determine the degree of racially polarized voting, one must conduct a statistical or other empirical analyses of the election results for each election at issue. Tr. at 949-50, 982,1481. 67. “Racially polarized voting” is essentially the degree to which black and white voters, as groups, vote differently. Tr. at 1359. The analysis of racial bloc voting addresses the final two Gingles preconditions, i.e., the “political cohesion” of the minority group and the degree of white bloc voting. “Political cohesion” is generally when the members of a protected minority group tend to vote the same way for elected office most of the time, Tr. at 1355,1444,1535-36, i.e., when the minority group consistently or regularly has a “clear candidate of choice.” 68. “Candidate of choice” is the candidate preferred by African-American voters, be the candidate white or black, Democrat or Republican. Tr. at 436, 1399, 1538. There is no consensus as to the candidate of choice of African-American voters, Tr. at 1087-88, 1356, even among the class representatives in this ease. Plaintiffs Jeffrey Johnson, Charles Cross, and William Mallory testified that their preferred candidate is a Democrat. Def. Ex. 23(A) at 32; Def.Ex. 23(F) at 31; Def. Ex. 23(H) at 36; Tr. at 224. Plaintiffs Gooding, Johnson, and Jones testified that their preferred candidate, all other things being equal, is an African-American. Def. Ex. 23(D) at 12; Def.Ex. 23(E) at 47; Tr. at 392-93, 435. Most of the class representatives testified that their primary determinant was the qualifications of the individual, with political affiliation and race being secondary factors. Def.Ex. 23(B) at 27; Def.Ex. 23(C) at 13, 41; Def.Ex. 23(D) at 13-14; Def.Ex. 23(G) at 19-20; Def.Ex. 23(1) at 25; Tr. at 330, 658, 703-04. 69. The Plaintiffs in this case have offered no statistical evidence of racial bloc voting. Tr. at 659, 949, 982, 1361, 1412, 1500, 1521, 1627-28. Plaintiffs’ witnesses generally testified as to their belief that “blacks tend to vote for blacks and whites tend to vote for whites.” Tr. at 141, 154-55, 167-68, 324, 392, 492, 509, 566, 687, 728-29, 731, 914-15. The only “statistical” evidence offered by Plaintiffs is entitled “An Analysis of Judicial Contests for the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Involving at Least One African American Candidate from 1974-1996” complied by Ronald B. Adrine, Judge of the Cleveland Municipal Court. Pl.Ex. 37 (“Ad-rine Report”) As discussed in detail below, the Adrine Report is limited to Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County, Tr. at 95, and, in any event, does not constitute valid statistical evidence upon which this Court could find the existence of legally significant racial bloc voting. 70. Defendants’ expert, Dr. Gary King, has conducted exhaustive statistical analy-ses of all the districts subject to challenge and all elections within the twenty challenged courts from 1985 to 1995. Def.Ex. A; Tr. at 1371-72. Dr. King chose the time period of 1985 to 1995 because this time period is probative of recent judicial elections and the election results can be correlated with the 1990 Census data. Tr. at 1372. Election results outside of the this time period were not used bécause of the great difficulty in matching census data to electoral data prior to 1985. Def. Ex. A at 12; Tr. at 1372. 71. Dr. King obtained precinct level data for all judicial elections between 1985 and 1995. Def.Ex. A at 12; Tr. at 1371-73. The precinct level data was then organized, tabulated, processed, sorted, and keypunched. Def.Ex. A at 12; Tr. at 1372. The electronic data were then matched to 1990 demographic data from the 1990 Census. Def.Ex. A at 12; Tr. at 1374. The data were then subject to statistical analysis to estimate the degree of racially polarized voting in each election. Def.Ex. A at 12; Tr. at 1374. 72. Dr. King is currently a Professor of Government at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Def.Ex. A at 2; Tr. at 1344, 1346, and serves as the Director of the Harvard/MIT Data Center. Def .Ex. A at 2; Tr. at 1346. Dr. King is the world’s foremost expert in the statistical analysis of racial bloc voting. Tr. at 1600. Dr. King has verified his methodology and analysis using known individual level data, Def.Ex. A at 10-13, Tr. at 1369-71. His methodology and analysis has been used and relied upon by, inter alia, the United States Department of Justice, Tr. at 1353, and has been independently verified by Dr. King’s colleague at Harvard University and researchers at Washington University in St. Louis, the University of Wisconsin, the University of California at Berkeley, Stanford University, the University of Michigan, and the University of Essex in England. Tr. at 1468. 73. Dr. King’s method is described in his Report, Def.Ex. A at 8-12, and in his trial testimony. Tr. at 1364-82. Dr. King’s method is a type of “regression analysis” that involves a combination of a number of scientifically and legally accepted methods, including bivariate ecological regression and homogeneous precinct analysis. Tr. at 1468-70. Dr. King’s methodology constitutes an improvement upon the “Goodman’s regression” method of analysis that was used by the experts in Gingles and ultimately relied upon by the United States Supreme Court. Def.Ex. A at 10-11; Tr. at 1367-68, 1382. Dr. King’s methodology does not yield statistically impossible results as does “Goodman’s regression.” Def.Ex. A at 10; Tr. at 1368, and is the best method currently available to measure racial bloc voting. Tr. at 1449, 1470. 74. The statistical results are reflected in Tables 3 and 4 of Dr. King’s Report. Def.Ex. A; Tr. at 1375. Table 3 provides an analysis of every general election in the challenged courts over the previously described time frames. The Table lists the judicial elections, the candidates, the party affiliation of the candidates and the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote. Def.Ex. A at 15; Tr. at 1376-77. The last two columns provide the percentage of blacks voting Democratic and the percentage of whites voting Democratic. Tr. at 1377-79. This information is estimated by statistical technique with a standard of error of 1%. Tr. at 1378. Table 4 provides compilations of the data presented in Table 3. Tr. at 1388,1400. 75. The “degree of racial bloc voting” is the difference between the percentage of blacks who voted for the Democratic candidate and the percentage of whites who voted for the Democratic candidate, ie., the final two columns in Table 3 of Dr. King’s Report. Tr. at 1039-40, 1379, 1461. See also Clarke v. City of Cincinnati 40 F.3d 807, 816-17 (6th Cir.1994) (Boggs, J., concurring), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1109, 115 S.Ct. 1960, 131 L.Ed.2d 851 (1995). 76. Based upon this data and his statistical analysis, Dr. King concluded that there does not appear to be a consensus as to African-Americans’ “candidate of choice.” Def.Ex. A at 7; Tr. at 1357. See also Tr. at 980-81, 1537-38. There are occasions when African-American voters support white Democrats, black Democrats, white Republicans, and black Republicans, and consequently, Dr. King was unable to conclude that the “candidate of choice” is always a Democrat, always a Republican, always white, or always black. Def.Ex. A at 7; Tr. at 1357-58. See also Tr. at 981. 77. Based upon this data and his statistical analysis, Dr. King concluded that there is a degree of racial bloc voting in virtually every judicial election in the eight most populous counties. Def.Ex. A at 16; Tr. at 1359, 1461. See also Tr. at 1541. There is generally a degree of racial bloc voting in every election, Tr. at 1360, because, by definition, the only elections in which there is not a degree of racial bloc voting are those elections in which white and black voters, as groups, vote exactly the same. Tr. at 1066-67. 78. Dr. King further concluded that the degree of racial bloc voting varies widely, from county to county, court to court, and election to election. Def.Ex. A at 16, 18; Tr. at 1360, 1362, 1379. See also Tr. at 977, 983-84, 1040, 1543. Black candidates routinely receive a significant portion, and sometimes a majority, of the votes cast by white voters, or so-called “white cross-over votes.” Def.Ex. A at 18; Tr. at 984. The data does not support the testimony of Plaintiffs’ witnesses that blacks usually vote for blacks and whites usually vote for whites in judicial elections. Tr. at 1001, 1049-50, 1379-80,1521. 79. Dr. King also calculated an “average degree of racial bloc voting” for each of the counties at issue herein. The “average degree of racial bloc voting” is the difference between the average percentage of African-Americans who vote for the Democratic candidate over all of the elections analyzed by Dr. King and the percentage of whites who voted for the Democratic candidate over the same elections. Tr. at 1403-04. These “average degrees of racial bloc voting” are reported in Table 4 of Dr. King’s Report and are discussed below. 80. Dr. King also concluded that when African-American judicial candidates run as the candidates of the majority party in a particular county or judicial district, they are generally successful. Def.Ex. A at 17; Tr. at 1390. For example, black Democrats running in heavily Democratic Cuyahoga County and black Republicans running in heavily Republican Franklin County are generally successful in both primary and general elections. Def.Ex. A at 17; Tr. at 1390, 1406-07, 1547. 81. Dr. King testified that to determine whether a degree of racial bloc voting is “legally significant,” one must determine the extent or size of the racial bloc voting over time, see Findings of Fact ¶ 82, and whether the minority group’s preferred candidate is consistently defeated. Tr. at 1360, 1362. See also Tr. at 1540-42. “Legally significant racial bloc voting” must be determined over a number of elections, and there is no level at which the degree of racial bloc voting becomes “legally significant” in a single election. Tr. at 1461-63, 1544. 82. Dr. King concluded that there is no legally significant racially polarized voting, that is a white bloc vote which will usually or normally defeat the combined strength of minority support plus “white crossover votes,” in any of the challenged districts. Def.Ex. A at 16-18; Tr. at 1388-89, 1391-92, 1413. See also Tr. at 1540, 1599-1600. King further testified that race was not the predominant factor affecting the outcome of judicial elections in Ohio Tr. at 1389-90. See also Tr. at 981-83. The candidate preferred by African-American voters is sometimes elected and sometimes not elected. Tr. at 1389-90. See also Tr. 981-83, 1600. If race were the predominant factor in Ohio judicial elections, Dr. King’s results would look very different. Tr. at 1389-90. See also Tr. at 1523-24, 1543-44. The “clear partisan patterns” reflected in Dr. King’s Report suggests that party affiliation is a, if not the, predominant factor in Ohio judicial elections. Tr. at 977,1389,1416. 83. Dr. Asher testified that black candidates running unopposed is indicative of the absence of racial bloc voting, because if, in fact, legally significant racial bloc voting existed in a particular district, ambitious white candidates would eagerly run against black candidates. Tr. at 1001, 1083-86. 84. Dr. King and Defendants’ other experts testified that his statistical analysis is not the only method of assessing the existence and degree of racial bloc voting. Tr. at 1363-64, 1583. All three agreed, however, that Dr. King’s method is the most accurate method of estimating racial bloc voting from aggregate data, ie., precinct level election returns and census data. Tr. at 1032-34, 1449, 1470, 1585. 85. One such alternative method suggested by Plaintiffs involves surveys or polling. Tr. at 1030-32, 1420, 1500, 1584-85. Dr. Herbert Asher, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at The Ohio State University, Def.Ex. C at 1; Tr. at 939, and a nationally recognized expert on American and Ohio Politics, Def.Ex. C at 1 and Exhibit 1, Tr. at 944-47, and Dr. Alfred John Tuchfarber, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati, Director of the University of Cincinnati’s Institute for Policy Research, Tr. at 1478, and a nationally recognized expert in political surveys and survey techniques, Tr. at 1482, concurred with Dr. King’s conclusion that surveys are not a particularly reliable method of assessing racial bloc voting. Tr. at 1030-32, 1363-64, 1420-21, 1425-26, 1428, 1585. For whatever reason, a significant number of respondents in political polls or surveys do not give accurate responses to questions in such surveys, Tr. at 1428, 1585, particularly when such polls or surveys involve race or racial issues. Tr. at 1425-26. 86. Even though Plaintiffs suggested that surveys or polls might be an alternative method of assessing racial bloc voting, they did not present any evidence that they conducted any such surveys or polls with regard to any of the issues in this case. Tr. at 1500. “Chilling Effect” 87. At trial, a number of Plaintiffs’ witnesses testified generally that potential African-American judicial candidates are “chilled” or discouraged from seeking judicial office due to the perception that black candidates cannot overcome white bloc voting and be elected. Tr. at 71, 137, 161, 324, 377-78, 388, 741-42, 835-36. Plaintiffs offered no statistical or empirical evidence supporting this testimony. 88. Because candidates who do not run cannot be elected, it is impossible to statistically measure this so-called “chilling effect.” Tr. at 1363,1457-58,1647-48. Rather, a valid statistical analysis must be based upon the results of actual election contests. Tr. at 1363. 89. This so-called “chilling effect” is not supported by the actual election results. Tr. at 1019-20, 1071-74, 1578-80, 1645. As discussed below, African-American judicial candidates have won 80 of 123, or 72.3%, of the judicial primary elections involving at least one African-American candidate in the twenty challenged courts. Def.Ex. 15 at 51; Tr. at 1413-14, 1566. African-American judicial candidates have won 66 of 115, or 57.4%, of the general elections involving at least one African-American candidate in the twenty challenged courts. Def.Ex. 15 at 51; Tr. at 1414, 1567. See Findings of Fact ¶ 110. Accordingly, African-American attorneys are actually statistically more likely to be elected to judicial office than their white counterparts. Tr. at 1578-81,1663. Totality of Circumstances Factors in General 90. As discussed below, the Supreme Court in Gingles directed courts to assess a number of factors in determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, members of a minority group have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect their candidates of choice. Those factors are listed in the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act and include: (1) the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; (2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized; (3) the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting; (4) the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; (5) the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; (6) the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; (7) the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction; (8) the extent to which the elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group; and (9) whether the policy underlying the State’s or the political subdivision’s use of the contested practice or structure is tenuous. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44-45, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2763-64, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). History of Voting-Related Discrimination in Ohio 91. The Plaintiffs have not asserted that there is any recent history of voting-related discrimination in Ohio. See Def.Ex. 22 at 3-4, No. 5. Drs. Asher and Tuchfar-ber testified that there was, in fact, no such recent history of voting-related discrimination. Def.Ex. B at 10; Def.Ex. C at 11; Tr. at 1011-13, 1568-69, 1606-07, 1648. Judge Adrine testified that he was unaware of any such discrimination. Tr. at 121-22. 92. In Mallory v. Eyrich, 717 F.Supp. 540 (S.D.Ohio 1989) appeal dismissed, 898 F.2d 154 (6th Cir.1990), the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, approved the sub-districting of the Hamilton County Municipal Court following the state’s and county’s confession of judgment on the claim under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Def.Ex. 14; Tr. at 205-07, 227-31,1489-92. 93. In Armour v. Ohio, 775 F.Supp. 1044 (N.D.Ohio 1991), a three-judge United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio concluded that the 1981 Ohio House of Representatives districts in Mahoning County violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article XI of the Ohio Constitution. The state did not appeal the district court’s ruling. See Def.Ex. 13; Tr. at 260-64, 285-96, 301-04,1493-95. 94. In Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 122 L.Ed.2d 500 (1993), the United States Supreme Court found no legally significant racial bloc voting in Ohio legislative elections and, therefore, no Voting Rights Act violation in the reapportionment of Ohio’s legislative districts following the 1990 census. See Def. Ex. 12; Tr. at 237-38,1497. 95. In Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, 40 F.3d 807 (6th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1109, 115 S.Ct. 1960, 131 L.Ed.2d 851 (1995), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio’s determination that the at-large election of Cincinnati City Council members did not violate § 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Tr. at 253-54,1492-93. 96. In State, ex rel. Rogers v. Taft, 64 Ohio St.3d 193, 594 N.E.2d 576 (1992), the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a Voting Rights Act and Fifteenth Amendment challenge to the at-large election judges and county commissioners in Mahoning County. Def.Ex. 26; Tr. at 296-97, 304-06. Extent of Racially Polarized Voting in Ohio 97. The Court has previously discussed the extent of racial bloc voting in Ohio judicial elections. The Court further discusses below the extent of racial bloc voting in each of the counties at issue herein. Use of Voting Practices or Procedures that Enhance the Opportunity for Discrimination 98. The only voting practice or procedure which Plaintiffs assert enhances the opportunity for discrimination against African-Americans is the use of at-large judicial election districts linking the territorial jurisdiction of the courts at issue herein. Def.Ex. 22 at 4-5, No. 7; Def.Ex. B at 10; Tr. at 1569-70,1650. Candidate Slating/Recruitment Process 99. There is no evidence that minorities have been excluded from the candidate slating processes of the major political parties. Def.Ex. B at 11; Tr. at 122-23, 1012-13, 1315-16,, 1325-26, 1570, 1608-09, 1650. 100. Indeed, both political parties in Ohio have actively recruited African-American judicial candidates. Def.Ex. B at 11; Tr. at 1306, 1650. The individual efforts of the county political parties are discussed below. Effects of Past Discrimination in Education, Employment, and Health 101. Numerous witnesses testified that African-Americans have suffered a history of discrimination in housing, education, employment, and health in Ohio. Tr. at 319-20, 323-24, 373-74, 528-36, 552-54, 580-84, 724-26, 768-75, 803-09, 859-60, 863-68. 102. Plaintiffs’ expert witness Dr. Robert L. Green, Professor of Social Work at Case Western Reserve University, Tr. at 881, generally outlined the history of discrimination against African-Americans in the United States, and with little specificity, in Ohio. Tr. at 804-922. Discrimination against African-Americans in housing, education, employment, and health has occurred in each of Ohio’s eight most populous counties. 103. Plaintiffs have directed this Court’s attention to numerous reported judicial decisions containing official findings of discrimination against African-Americans in each of Ohio’s eight most populous counties. Pl.Exs. 3-9,11-14, 16-17; Tr. at 47-48, 319-20, 321-24, 373-74, 480-83, 519-21, 553-54, 560-61, 580-81, 722-23. 104. Ohio’s history of discrimination against its African-American citizens is not the subject of serious dispute among the parties. Defendants’ witnesses acknowledged that African-Americans in Ohio have suffered discrimination in the areas of housing, education, employment, and health. Def.Ex. B at 11; Tr. at 1012, 1028-29, 1256-57, 1570-71, 1591-95. Nor is there any serious dispute that disparities remain among whites and African-Americans in several socio-economic categories as a result of such discrimination. 105. Most de jure forms of discrimination against African-Americans were repealed in the early part of this century. Def.Ex. B at 11; Tr. at 1595,1651. 106. Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence which establishes that the effects of past discrimination deny African-Americans equal access to the political process or actually hamper the ability of African-Americans to participate in the political process. Def.Ex. B at 10. Dr. King testified that if housing and other forms of discrimination were a predominant or overwhelming factor in voting in judicial elections, then one would observe a degree of nearly 100% racial bloc voting, but that degree of racial bloc voting does not exist anywhere in Ohio. Tr. at 1456. Overt or Subtle Racial Appeals in Campaigns 107. Before trial, Plaintiffs did not contend that any Ohio judicial elections were subject to overt or subtle racial appeals. Def.Ex. 22 at 8, No. 10; Tr. at 1511. At trial, Plaintiffs provided very few examples of judicial campaigns marked by overt or subtle racial appeals. Tr. at 62-63, 156, 242. Plaintiffs’ witnesses further testified that most of these racial appeals “backfired,” resulting in the election of the African-American candidate. Tr. at 113, 242-43, 631. 108. Drs. Asher and Tuchfarber found that there is little or no evidence of overt or subtle racial appeals having been used in Ohio judicial campaigns. Def.Ex. B at 11; Tr. at 1011-12,1060-61,1572, 1651-53. Accordingly, the Court finds that, in general, judicial campaigns have not been marked by overt or subtle racial appeals. Extent to Which Minorities have been Elected to Public Office 109. The Ohio Supreme Court’s Commission on Racial Fairness reported in 1995 that 31 of the state’s 677 state court judges, or approximately 4.6%, were African-American. Tr. at 131. At the same time, the Commission reported that only 1,100 of the state’s 31,000 registered attorneys, or 3.5%, were “attorneys of color.” Tr. at 129-30. Plaintiffs’ witnesses Judge Ronald B. Adrine, Judge Carl J. Character, and Jesse Gooding serve on the Commission. Tr. at 64,172, 689-90. 110. As reflected in Def.Ex. 15, as corrected during trial, African-American judicial candidates have won 80 of 123, or 72.3%, of the judicial primary elections involving at least one African-American candidate in the twenty challenged courts. Def.Ex. 15 at 51; Tr. at 1413-14, 1566-67. African-American judicial candidates have won 66 of 115, or 57.4%, of the general elections involving at least one African-American candidate in the twenty challenged coui’ts. Def.Ex. 15 at 51; Tr. at 1414, 1567. These figures do not reflect all of the judicial elections in the each of the eight most populous counties, but are limited to the elections for the twenty challenged courts originally at issue herein. For example, these totals do not include elections for the Cleveland Municipal, East Cleveland Municipal, or the University Heights Municipal Courts in Cuyahoga County, all of which have elected one or more African-American judges. Tr. at 1601-03. 111. In addition, African-Americans have been routinely elected to the Ohio General Assembly from majority white legislative districts with significant white cross-over votes, including some of the Plaintiff class representatives in this case. Def.Ex. 11; Tr. at 223-24, 245-46, 314, 316-17, 334, 395-96, 617-18, 656, 1013, 1572. This fact led the United States Supreme Court to conclude in 1993 that there was no legally significant racial bloc voting-in Ohio legislative elections. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. at 158, 113 S.Ct. 1149. 112. Kenneth Blackwell, an African-American Republican, has been elected Ohio Treasurer in a state-wide election. Tr. at 1213,1572. Responsiveness of Elected Officials to the Particularized Needs of the Minority Group 113. Until trial, Plaintiffs made no allegation that judges of any of the challenged courts are not responsive to the particularized needs of the African-American community. Def.Ex. 22 at 8-9, No. 11; Def. Ex. B at 11. 114. As noted above, the only “responsiveness” judges are to show towards both black and white citizens is to be both fair and impartial. Judges and judicial candidates are forbidden from catering to any particular constituency. Tr. at 335, 959. 115. At trial, Plaintiffs’ witnesses generally asserted that the lack of a number of African-American judges in proportion to the African-American population in the judicial districts undermined the African-Americans’ perception of the fairness and impartiality of the judiciary. Tr. at 48-49, 72-74, 376, 542, 568-69, 571, 696-97, 746, 757, 832-33, 839-40. Plaintiffs’ witnesses also generally testified that it is important to have African-American judges because those judges are more familiar with African-Americans’ experiences, lifestyles, attitudes, demeanors, mindsets, and customs, Tr. at 48, 71, 165-67, 324-25, 376, 541-43, 561, 569-70, 645, 650-51, 695-96, 742, 836-38, and can impart that familiarity and knowledge to other members of the judiciary. Tr. at 48-49, 72-73, 165-66, 326-27, 841-42. Plaintiffs’ witnesses further testified that, in their opinions, having more African-American judges would enhance the perception of the fairness of the court system within the African-American community. Tr. at 74, 393, 541, 570-72, 651, 697, 730, 747, 840, 842. Other than a few isolated instances, however, Plaintiffs’ witnesses did not testify that the judiciary, or any of its Caucasian judges, were other than fair and impartial towards African-American litigants. Tr. at 171-72, 545. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ witnesses readily conceded that white judges can be, and are, fair and impartial to African-American litigants. Tr. at 335, 676, 744. Defendants’ witnesses also testified that the judiciary is fair and impartial to litigants of all races and soc