Full opinion text
ORDER DENYING, IN PART, AND GRANTING, IN PART, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO ' DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) REA, District Judge. The matter came on for hearing before the Court, the Honorable William J. Rea, Judge, presiding, on January 10, 2005. Having considered the motion, the papers filed in support thereof and in opposition thereto, the oral argument of counsel, and the file in the case, the Court now makes the following decision: the Court hereby DENIES, in part, and GRANTS, in part, Defendant Occidental Petroleum Corp.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). While portions of Plaintiffs’ case are dismissed on other grounds, the Court dismisses the entire case pursuant to the political question doctrine. BACKGROUND I. Factual Allegations The instant case arises from a bombing that occurred in Santo Domingo, Colombia on December 13, 1998. In 1998, Plaintiffs lived in Santo Domingo. The Defendants, Occidental Petroleum Corp. (“Occidental”) and AirScan, Inc., are both American companies; the former is located in Los Ange-les, the latter in Florida. Defendant Occidental operates, as a joint venture with the Colombian government, an oil production facility and pipeline in the area of Santo Domingo. Plaintiffs allege the following relevant facts. Since 1997, Defendant AirScan has provided security for Defendant Occidental’s oil pipeline against attacks from left-wing insurgents. See First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) at ¶ 15. Prior to 1998, Defendants worked with the Colombian military, providing them with financial and other assistance, for the purpose of furthering Defendant Occidental’s commercial interests. See id. at ¶ 16. On several occasions during 1998, Defendant Occidental provided Defendant AirScan and the Colombian military with a room in its facilities to plan the Santo Domingo raid. See id. at ¶ 19. Defendant AirScan and the Colombian Air Force (“CAF”) carried out this raid for the purpose of providing security for Defendant Occidental (i.e., protecting its oil pipeline) and was not acting on behalf of the Colombian government. See id. During the raid, three of Defendant AirScan’s employees, along with a CAF liaison, piloted a plane with CAF markings and that was paid for by Defendant Occidental. See id. From this airplane, Defendant AirScan provided aerial surveillance for the CAF, helping the CAF identify targets and choose places to deploy troops. See id. at ¶ 3. On December 13, 1998, residents of San-to Domingo saw low-flying CAF helicopters overhead and attempted to communicate that they were civilians by lying down on the road and covering their heads with white shirts. See id. at ¶¶ 19-20. Soon thereafter, several witnesses saw an object (or several objects) drop from one of the CAF helicopters. See id. One of the cluster bombs dropped by the CAF exploded directly in the town of Santo Domingo, destroying homes and killing seventeen civilians and wounding twenty-five others. See id. at ¶21. Of the seventeen killed, six were children. See id. During the attack, the CAF helicopters knowingly fired on civilians attempting to escape and on those who were trying to carry the injured to a medical facility. See id. at ¶24. Soon thereafter, other CAF troops entered the town, blocked civilians from leaving, and ransacked their homes. See id. While the purpose of the Santo Domingo raid was to protect Defendant Occidental’s pipeline from attack by left-wing insurgents, no insurgents were killed in the attack. See id. at ¶ 25. These insurgents were located at least one to two kilometers outside of the Santo Domingo. See id. Defendants knew that the insurgents were not in Santo Domingo but carried out the attack nonetheless. See id. Plaintiff Luis Alberto Galvis was approximately 800 to 1000 meters outside of San-to Domingo during the raid. See id. at ¶ 27. After he saw a CAF helicopter and heard an explosion, he attempted to return to Santo Domingo. See id. Before he could enter, a CAF helicopter fired upon him and prevented him from returning. See id. The next day, Plaintiff Luis Alberto Galvis learned that his mother, Teresa Mujica Hernandez, his sister, Edilma Leal Pacheco, and his cousin, Johanny Hernandez Becerra, had been killed during the raid. See id. at ¶¶ 22, 28. Plaintiff Mario Galvis, Luis Alberto Gal-vis’ father, was also in Santo Domingo at the time of the bombing and was injured during the raid. See id. at ¶ 23. Bomb shrapnel tore through his chest, breaking both of his collar bones. See id. He was subsequently hospitalized and continues to suffer chronic pain from these injuries. See id. During the raid, he also saw his wife, Teresa Mujica Hernandez, and daughter, Edilma Leal Pacheco, killed as a result of Defendants’ actions. See id. Plaintiff John Mario Galvis, Luis Alberto Galvis’ younger brother and Mario Galvis’ son, was in Santo Domingo at the time of the bombing. See id. During the raid, he saw his mother, Teresa Mujica Hernandez, and sister, Edilma Leal Pacheco, killed as a result of Defendants’ actions. See id. Plaintiffs have made other allegations regarding the events that took place after the bombing. The Court will refer to those allegations as necessary in the course of its opinion. II. Procedural History On April 24, 2008, Plaintiff Luis Alberto Galvis Mujica filed a Complaint, on behalf of himself and Teresa Mujica Hernandez, Edilma Leal Pacheco, and Johanny Hernandez Becerra. On October 6, 2003, Plaintiffs filed their FAC, adding Plaintiffs Mario Galvis Gelvez and John Mario Galvis Mujica. In their FAC, Plaintiffs have brought federal claims under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 Note, as well as state law claims of wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200. On January 20, 2004, the Court GRANTED Defendant Occidental’s Motion requesting that the Court solicit the views of the United States Department of State regarding potential foreign policy implications raised by this action. On April 2, 2004, the Department of State filed a Statement of Interest indicating that it did not yet have a position on the foreign policy implications of this case. On July 22, 2004, the parties stipulated to an extended briefing schedule regarding Defendant Occidental’s motions to dismiss. This briefing schedule was extended so that the parties could incorporate the Supreme Court’s June 29, 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004). The parties completed their briefing on December 20, 2004. On December 30, 2004, the State Department filed a Supplemental Statement of Interest indicating that it now opposes the pursuit of the instant litigation since it would severely impact this country’s diplomatic relationship with Colombia. As part of that Supplemental Statement of Interest, the State Department attached a letter from the Colombian government indicating that it also opposed this litigation. On January 20, 2004, the Court heard oral argument on Defendant’s motions. During that oral argument, the parties requested the opportunity to file additional briefs addressing the Supplemental Statement of Interest. That supplemental briefing was completed on February 16, 2005. Since February, the parties have continued to file supplemental declarations and supplemental authority with the Court. DISCUSSION I. Legal standards Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a party may bring a motion to dismiss a plaintiffs claims on the ground that the allegations “fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Generally, “[a] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Dismissal is proper if there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “take as true” all material facts in the complaint. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of the Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.Ct. 1848, 48 L.Ed.2d 338 (1976). The “complaint is to be liberally construed in favor of plaintiff.” Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969). The court may consider any material that is properly attached to the complaint as part of the pleadings to be reviewed. See Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 429-30 (9th Cir.1978). Lastly, a court should grant leave to amend even if the plaintiff does not request it, unless the court “determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir.1995). A. Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 Note Section Two of the TVPA establishes liability for: (a) Any individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation- (1) subjects an individual to torture ...; or (2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing .... Section 2(b) of the TVPA requires plaintiffs to exhaust “adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.” Section 3(a) of the TVPA defines extrajudicial killing: ... the term “extrajudicial killing” means a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation. Section 3(b) of the TVPA defines torture: (1) the term “torture” means any act, directed against an individual in the offender’s custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering ..., whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual ... B. Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 This statute provides, in its entirety, that: The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. C. Foreign affairs doctrine The foreign affairs doctrine provides that state laws may not intrude “into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress.” Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432, 88 S.Ct. 664, 19 L.Ed.2d 683 (1968). The doctrine holds that “even in the absence of a treaty”, state laws must yield where “a State’s policy may disturb foreign relations.” Id. at 441, 88 S.Ct. 664. “[T]he Supreme Court has long viewed the foreign affairs powers specified in the text of the Constitution as reflections of a generally applicable constitutional principle that power over foreign affairs is reserved to the federal government.” Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 317 F.3d 1005, 1020 (9th Cir.2003). D. Act of state doctrine “The act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964). “The text of the Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of state.” Id. at 423, 84 S.Ct. 923. “The act of state doctrine is not a jurisdictional limit on courts, but rather ‘a prudential doctrine designed to avoid judicial action in sensitive areas.’ ” Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1431 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir.1981)). E.Political question doctrine “The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). “Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the case to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.” Id. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691. II. Application to the Instant Case A. Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims fail on several grounds: (1) Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust available remedies, see Motion at 3; (2) the TVPA does not recognize aiding and abetting liability, see id. at 4; (3) Defendant did not act under “color of law”, see id. at 4-5; (4) corporations are not “individuals” liable under the TVPA, see id. at 5-6; (5) Plaintiffs did not adequately plead claims of “torture” or “extrajudicial killing”, see id. at 6-9. 1. The TVPA does not recognize aiding and abetting liability Relying on Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994), Defendant argues that the TVPA should not be “construed to authorize aiding and abetting liability.” See Motion at 4. Plaintiffs argue that they have not alleged that Defendants are hable because they aided or abetted but because they were joint tortfeasors. See Opposition at 2-3. a. Plaintiffs have not pled an aiding and abetting liability theory of recovery The Court holds that Plaintiffs are not asserting that Defendant Occidental was aiding or abetting the actions of the Colombian military. At numerous points in their FAC, they allege that the Colombian Air Force (“CAF”) was working in concert with Occidental. “The CAF receives direct funding from Defendant Occidental Petroleum Corporation (“Occidental”) in return for protecting Occidental’s pipeline in Cano Limón and was acting in the furtherance of the private interests of Occidental in carrying out this bombing.” FAC at ¶ 2. “Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendants Occidental and AirScan because these Defendants were involved in a conspiracy with the CAF to carry out these unlawful attacks and because these Defendants provided practical support and encouragement to the CAF in carrying out this massacre.” Id. at ¶ 4 (emphasis added). “At all relevant times, Occidental, AirScan and the CAF were joint venturers and co-conspirators and were working in concert with each other and acting within the course and scope of such joint venture and conspiracy.” Id. at ¶ 39 (emphasis added). “Specifically, as is alleged above, Defendants, operating under color or law, conspired and acted jointly with the CAF officers to carry out a bombing raid upon the town of Santo Domingo .... ” Id. at ¶ 44 (emphasis added). While Defendant clearly believes that Plaintiffs have not yet supplied enough facts to support this theory, see Reply at 4, the Court is not prepared to hold that Plaintiffs cannot prove any set of facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99. Evaluating whether Plaintiffs’ have supplied enough facts to succeed on their claims is more appropriate in a motion for summary judgment. b. Whether the TVPA provides for aiding and abetting liability Even if Plaintiffs had pled aiding and abetting liability, the Court holds that Central Bank does not indicate that aiding and abetting liability is unavailable under the TVPA. Initially, the Court notes that Central Bank can be distinguished since the cause of action considered in that ease was an implied right of action. See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, 291 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir.2002) (commenting that “the courts were already inferring an intent by Congress to create a private civil cause of action with section 10(b), and they would have been stacking another inference on top of that one in extending liability to aiders and abettors”). Here, the TVPA provides an express right of action. Central Bank stands for the proposition that “when Congress enacts a statute under which a person may sue and recover damages from a private defendant for the defendant’s violation of some statutory norm, there is no general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue for aiders and abettors.” 511 U.S. at 182, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (emphasis added). However, this proposition is different than a rule which precludes aiding and abetting liability unless expressly provided for via the language of the statute. In Central Bank, the question before the Court was whether section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 extends civil liability to those who “aid and abet” the violation. Id. at 167, 114 S.Ct. 1439. The Court’s analysis began with the text of the statute. Id. at 173, 114 S.Ct. 1439. After recognizing that the language of the statute did not include the words “aid” or “abet”, the Court held that the words “directly or indirectly” in section 10(b) circumscribe the liability of the statute to preclude aiding or abetting liability. Id. at 175-76, 114 S.Ct. 1439. In other words, since the statute described liability as extending to those who “directly or indirectly” committed securities fraud, aiding and abetting (as liability that does not require even indirect action) was not prohibited by the statute. Like section 10(b), the TVPA does not contain the words “aid” or “abet”. However, unlike section 10(b), the TVPA states that an individual shall be held liable if that person “subjects” an individual to torture or extrajudicial killing. See § 1350 Note § 2(a). To “subject” is defined as “to cause to undergo or experience some action or treatment.” Webster’s New World Dictionary 1334 (3d ed.1988). Because an aider or abettor can be a “cause” of torture or extrajudicial killing by creating the conditions necessary for those unlawful acts to occur, this definition of “subjects” does not clearly answer whether an individual may be held liable as an aider or abettor. Thus, unlike the statute discussed in Central Bank, the plain language is rather inconclusive. After looking at the language of section 10(b), the Central Bank Court next examined other private causes of action created by the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 and whether they provided for aiding and abetting liability. Id. at 178-80, 114 S.Ct. 1439. The Supreme Court found that none of the other express causes of action provided for aiding and abetting liability, thus indicating that there was no similar liability under § 10(b). Id. at 179-80, 114 S.Ct. 1439. The closest analogue to the TVPA is the ATS. Cf. Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir.2002) (finding that the statutes are sufficiently analogous so that the ATCA “borrows” the ten-year statute of limitations of the TVPA). The ATS provides for aiding and abetting liability. See Doe I, 395 F.3d at 947 n. 20 (noting that the ATCA provides for aiding and abetting liability). Thus, unlike section 10(b), the most analogous private causes of action suggest that the TVPA provides for aiding and abetting liability. In the next step of its analysis, the Supreme Court attempted to discern the intent of Congress with respect to the scope of liability. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 181-85, 114 S.Ct. 1439. With respect to that statute, the Court found that “nothing in the text or history of § 10(b) even implies that aiding or abetting was covered” by the statute. Id. at 183, 114 S.Ct. 1439. Unlike § 10(b), the legislative history of the TVPA rather unequivocally states that the statute encompasses aiding and abetting theories of liability. Under “Scope of liability”, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report states that the “legislation is limited to lawsuits against persons who ordered, abetted, or assisted in the torture.” S.Rep. No. 102-249 at 8 (emphasis added). Thus, the legislative history with respect to the TVPA indicates that the statute provides for aiding and abetting liability. For the above reasons, the Court holds that the TVPA does provide for aiding and abetting liability. Thus, the Court holds that Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims should not be dismissed on this ground. 2. Defendant did not act under “color of law” Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have insufficiently pled that “either of the private Defendants controlled [the] government action to the point where it could be deemed a ‘state actor’ in the sense contemplated by § 2(a).” See Motion at 4. Plaintiffs argue that they have sufficiently pled that Defendant controlled the CAF. See Opposition at 5. “By its plain language, the Torture Victim [Protection] Act renders liable only those individuals who have committed torture or extrajudicial killing ‘under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.’ ” Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir.1995). “In construing the terms ‘actual or apparent authority’ and ‘color of law,’ courts are instructed to look to principles of agency law and to jurisprudence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, respectively.” Id. (citing legislative history). “A private individual acts under color of law within the meaning of section 1983 when he acts together with state officials or with significant state aid.” Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982)). See also Sable Com munications of California Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 890 F.2d 184, 189 (9th Cir.1989) (discussing, for purposes of section 1983, that there is state action where there has been joint participation). Cf. Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F.Supp.2d 14, 21-22 (D.D.C.2000) (commenting that the state action requirement of the ATS is met where there has been substantial cooperation between private corporations and the government). The FAC alleges that the CAF was working closely with Defendant Occidental: in exchange for financial assistance, the CAF provided security. “Both AirScan and the military made the[ ] plans [to raid Santo Domingo] in the course of their security work for Defendant Occidental and were acting as agents of Defendant Occidental at the time.” FAC at ¶ 18. “The CAF, in carrying out this raid, was acting in its role of providing security for Occidental and was not implementing official policy of the Colombian government.” Id. at ¶ 19. “During all times relevant herein, Occidental has directly paid Air-Scan for its security services, or has channeled payment to AirScan through the Colombian Defense Ministry.” Id. at ¶ 15. These allegations are sufficient to satisfy the “color of law” requirement of the TVPA. Defendant’s argument largely seeks to impose a higher factual sufficiency standard than is required by Rule 12(b)(6). See Reply at 7 (“Plaintiffs appear to suggest that the FAC does in fact allege the requisite control ... but the suggestion does not withstand scrutiny.”). In a motion to dismiss, the Court only examines whether any set of facts in support of the claim could be proven. 3. Corporations are not “individuals” liable under the TVPA Defendant argues that the term “individual”, as used in the TVPA, “does not encompass corporations.” See Motion at 5. Plaintiffs argue that courts have previously interpreted the term, as used in this statute, to include corporations. See Opposition at 5-6. A case cited by both parties, Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 118 S.Ct. 2091, 141 L.Ed.2d 393 (1998), does not resolve this issue. For the purposes of the Line Item Veto Act, the Supreme Court held that the term “individuals” was to be construed as “synonymous” with the term “person.” Id. at 428, 118 S.Ct. 2091. In making this holding, the Court observed that “in ordinary usage”, both “individual” and “person” refer to “an individual human being”. Id. at 428 n. 13, 118 S.Ct. 2091. The Court also observed that the term “person” “often has a broader meaning in the law.” Id. (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1). Thus, even though Clinton did not so hold with respect to that specific statute, in general, “persons” includes corporations while “individuals” does not. However, it is more practical for the Court to focus on cases that have examined the TVPA’s use of the term “individual.” In Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 F.Supp.2d 132, 141 (E.D.N.Y.2004), the court held that since “UBS AG is not an individual, but a corporation”, it could not “be sued under the TVPA.” See Reply at 8-9. In Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F.Supp. 362, 382 (E.D.La.1997), the court held that “because Freeport as a corporation is not an ‘individual’ for purposes of the TVPA, Freeport cannot be held liable under the TVPA.” See Motion at 6. However, both Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., Inc., 256 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1266-67 (N.D.Ala.2003), and Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1358-59 (S.D.Fla.2003), held that corporations are “individuals” for the purpose of the TVPA. See Opposition at 6. The Court holds that corporations are not “individuals” under the TVPA based on its reading of the plain language of the statute. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377, 382, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004) (stating that statutory interpretation “begins with the language of the statute”). The statute describes liability in terms of “an individual” who subjects another “individual” to torture or extrajudicial killing. See § 1350 Note § 2(a). The statute also defines torture as “any act, directed against an individual in the offender’s custody or physical control” upon whom pain and suffering is inflicted. See § 3(b) (emphasis added). The Court does not believe it would be possible for corporations to be tortured or killed. The Court also does not believe it would be possible for corporations to feel pain and suffering. See Leocal, 125 S.Ct. at 382 (“When interpreting a statute, we must give words their ‘ordinary or natural’ meaning.”). Thus, the only manner in which the statute does not reach an “absurd result”, see Clinton, 524 U.S. at 429, 118 S.Ct. 2091, is by excluding corporations from the scope of the statute’s liability- During oral argument, Plaintiffs argued that the term “individual” does not have to be interpreted uniformly throughout the statute. This is incorrect. It is well-accepted that terms should be construed consistently throughout the statute. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (“Absent some congressional indication to the contrary, we decline to give the same term in the same Act a different meaning depending on whether the rights of the plaintiff or the defendant are at issue.”); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433, 52 S.Ct. 607, 76 L.Ed. 1204 (1932) (“Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”). Thus, the Court holds that the term “individual”, for the purposes of this statute, does not include corporations. See In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F.Supp.2d 7, 55-56 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (“In re Agent Orange”) (reaching the same conclusion after a similar analysis). Since Defendant is a corporation, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims. B. Alien Tort Statute (ATS) In addition to their TVPA claims, Plaintiffs have brought claims under the ATS for extra-judicial killing, torture, crimes against humanity, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and war crimes. 1. Interpreting Sosa Before examining Plaintiffs’ ATS claims, the Court wishes to explain its understanding of the Sosa decision. The impact of the Supreme Court’s recent decision is disputed by the parties. See Opposition at 10-14; Reply at 13-15. In Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2754, the Supreme Court addressed whether the ATS “does no more than vest federal courts with jurisdiction.” The Court’s answer was: Although we agree the statute is in terms only jurisdictional, we think that at the time of enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at common law. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court seems to have been persuaded by an ami-cus curiae brief filed by professors of federal jurisdiction and legal history. Id. at 2755. Those professors argued that “torts in violation of the law of nations would have been recognized within the common law of the time.” Id. The Court believed that “history and practice give the edge” to that position. Id. “The sparse contemporaneous cases and legal materials referring to the ATS tend to confirm both inferences, that some, but few, torts in violation of the law of nations were understood to be within the common law.” Id. at 2759. However, the Court did not restrict the causes of action provided by the ATS to those solely envisioned by the First Congress which enacted the statute. The Court found nothing in the “development in the two centuries from the enactment of § 1350 to the birth of the modern line of cases beginning with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (C.A.2 1980), has categorically precluded the federal courts from recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an element of common law ....” Id. at 2761. But the Court also indicated that federal courts should exercise caution in considering such causes of action. Id. Thus, as this Court interprets Sosa, the following guideline limits the range of possible ATS claims: Whatever the ultimate criteria for accepting a cause of action subject to jurisdiction under § 1350, we are persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations that the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted. Id. at 2765. Further, “the determination whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal courts.” Id. at 2766. This Court also notes that other language in the Sosa opinion contemplates, but does not definitively impose, other limitations on ATS claims. In footnote 21 of the opinion, the Supreme Court considered an exhaustion requirement similar to the TVPA and indicated that it “would certainly consider this requirement in an appropriate case.” Id. at 2766 n. 21. The Court also considered “a policy of case-specific deference to the political branches.” Id. While the Court merely referred to this as a “possible limitation”, the Court remarked that, where the U.S. State Department has weighed in, “there is a strong argument that federal courts should give serious weight to the Executive Branch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign policy.” Id. From this understanding of Sosa, the Court now turns to Plaintiffs’ claims. 2. Whether Plaintiffs’ claims are “for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted” Defendant first argues that the international law norms claimed by Plaintiffs are insufficiently supported by treaties that are not self-executing. See Motion at 12-13. Plaintiffs seem to agree to some extent. See Opposition at 15 n. 16. The Court holds that treaties that fail to “impose obligations” because they are “not self-executing” do not “themselves establish the relevant and applicable rule of international law.” Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2767. However, like the respondent in Sosa, Plaintiffs may show that the norms that are the basis of the ATS claim have “attained the status of binding customary international law.” See id. See also In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation (“Estate I”), 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir.1992) (stating that “for a court to determine whether a plaintiff has a claim for a tort committed in violation of international law, it must decide whether there is an applicable norm of international law, whether it is recognized by the United States, and whether it is violated in the particular case”). Plaintiffs’ FAC lists five different bases for their ATS claims: (1) extrajudicial killing and violation of the laws of wars, FAC at ¶¶ 43^18; (2) torture, id. at ¶¶ 49-56; (3) crimes against humanity, id. at ¶¶ 57-61; (4) cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, id. at ¶¶ 62-67; and (5) war crimes, id. at ¶¶ 68-72. a. Extrajudicial killing The United States, through the TVPA, has recognized that extrajudicial killing, no matter where it takes place, should be prohibited. “Statutes of the United States, based on treaties or other forms of international law, provide a particularly useful source of international law for United States courts.” In re Agent Orange, at 110. “They instance situations where the legislative and executive branches of government agree on what that international law is and agree that we are bound by it.” Id.See also Saravia, 348 F.Supp.2d at 1154 (“Congress’ enactment of the TVPA, singling out torture and extrajudicial killing, confirms that extrajudicial killing provides a cause of action under federal law.”). Cf. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) (observing that it is “the duty of the common-law court to perceive the impact of major legislative innovations and to interweave the new legislative policies with the inherited body of common-law principles”). Thus, the Court holds that there is a binding customary international law norm against extrajudicial killing. See Saravia, 348 F.Supp.2d at 1153-54. See also Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir.2002) (recognizing murder as a jus cogens violation and thus, as a violation of the law of nations); In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir.1994) Estate II”) (describing the “prohibition against summary execution” as a “similarly universal, definable, and obligatory” norm); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 184 (D.Mass.1995) (finding summary execution to be a violation of international law). b. Torture As with Plaintiffs’ claims for extrajudicial killings, the Court holds that the existence of the TVPA is strong evidence that the prohibition against torture is a binding customary international law norm. See In re Agent Orange, at 110; Saravia, 348 F.Supp.2d at 1154. Thus, the Court holds that there is a customary international law norm against torture. See also Doe I, 395 F.3d at 945 (recognizing torture as a jus cogens violation and thus, as a violation of the law of nations); Estate II, 25 F.3d at 1475 (recognizing the right to be free from torture as a specific, universal, and obligatory international law norm); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir.1992) (stating that “[t]here is no doubt that the prohibition against official torture is a norm of customary international law”); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir.1980) (concluding that “official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations”). c. Crimes against humanity On this claim, Plaintiffs’ best evidence is the Nuremberg Charter’s prohibitions against crimes against humanity. See Ar-riaza Decl. at ¶ 31. The charter was ratified by the World War II Allied Forces in 1945 and served as the basis for prosecutions that occurred after the end of the war. Id. at ¶ 32. The international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda also recognize crimes against humanity. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35, 37. Numerous federal courts have previously recognized that customary international law prohibits crimes against humanity. Id. at ¶ 40. See Sarei, 221 F.Suppüd at 1150 (“It is well-settled that a party who commits a crime against humanity violates international law and may be held liable under the ATCA.”). The Court believes that it can rely on the Nuremberg trials and the more recent international criminal tribunals as sources of customary international law. But see In re Apartheid, 346 F.Supp.2d at 549-50 (finding that these tribunals are not binding sources of international law). In Sosa, the Supreme Court held that the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights did not establish the existence of binding customary international law because the Declaration did “not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international law.” 124 S.Ct. at 2767. The Sosa Court also held that the U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was not a source of binding international law because, even though it was ratified, it was done so “on the express understanding that it was not self-executing” and did not create any enforceable obligations. Id.See also Flores, 343 F.3d at 162 (holding that “[t]reaties, which are entitled ‘conventions’ or ‘covenants,’ are proper evidence of customary international law because, and insofar as, they create legal obligations ”) (emphasis in original). The Nuremberg trials imposed enforceable obligations. See Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 559-60 (9th Cir.2005) (“Following World War II, the Executive Branch exercised its authority in a number of ways, including through the Nuremberg trials, which included prosecution for ... crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes against peace.”). The Charter for the Nuremberg trials authorized prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Of the twenty-two defendants prosecuted in the “Major War Criminals” trial, twelve were sentenced to death, seven received prison sentences, and three were acquitted. See Steven Fogelson, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S. Cal. L.Rev. 833, 858 (March 1990). War crimes and crimes against humanity were two of the charges brought against these defendants. Id. at 852. This type of severe punishment would suggest that the Nuremberg Charter did not merely express an “aspiration”. See Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2769. The more recently established international criminal tribunals have continued to enforce norms against crimes against humanity and war crimes. The international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has also been enforcing prohibitions against war crimes and crimes against humanity. Several of the defendants have received prison sentences. See “Overview of ICTY Cases”, at http://www.un.org/ icty/ cases/fact sheets/listindex-e .htm. Likewise, the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda has brought several cases charging crimes against humanity and has imposed prison sentences. See “Completed Cases”, at http://www.ictr.org/ ENGLISH/cases/ completed.htm. Given that these tribunals have prosecuted and punished individuals for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Court finds both of these claims to be binding international law norms. See also Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2783 (Breyer, J., concurring) (commenting that “universal jurisdiction” exists to prosecute claims of torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes). These past and ongoing proceedings demonstrate that these are “enforceable obligations”. Thus, the Court holds that there is a customary international law norm against crimes against humanity. See also Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 150 n. 18 (2d Cir.2003) (“Customary international law rules proscribing crimes against humanity, including genocide, and war crimes, have been enforceable against individuals since World War II”). d. Cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment The international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda recognize claims for cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Id. at ¶ 62. Numerous federal courts have recognized that customary international law prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Id. at ¶ 66. Due to their enforcement in the international criminal tribunals, the Court holds that there is a customary international law norm against cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. See Liu Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d at 1325 (recognizing a claim of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment based on alleged sexual abuse); Jama, 343 F.Supp.2d at 361 (“The law of nations as evidenced in the various conventions, treaties, declarations and other sources cited by the Jama plaintiffs can be said to have reached a consensus that the inhumane treatment of a huge number of persons accused of no crime and held in confinement is a violation of the law of nations.”). But see Sarei, 221 F.Supp.2d at 1162 n. 190 (concluding that “plaintiffs have not demonstrated that prohibitions against cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (other than torture) and gross violations of human rights constitute established norms of customary international law”); Xuncax, 886 F.Supp. at 186 (finding that “it is evident that the prohibition against [cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment] poses more complex problems of definition than are presented by norms forbidding torture, summary execution, disappearance or arbitrary detention”); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F.Supp. 707, 711-12 (N.D.Cal.1988) (holding that there is no cognizable claim for cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment due to the lack of a precise definition). e. War crimes “After the Second World War, the law of war was codified in the four Geneva Conventions, which have been ratified by more than 180 nations, including the United States.” Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242 (citation omitted). See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28, 63 S.Ct. 1, 87 L.Ed. 3 (1942) (“From the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals.”). In 1996, Congress enacted the War Crimes Act, which defined “war crime” in reference to the Geneva Conventions as well as other international agreements. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c). The War Crimes Act provides severe penalties for commission of war crimes, including the death penalty. See § 2441(a). Based on the Geneva Conventions and their incorporation into the War Crimes Act of 1996, the Court holds that there is a customary international law norm against attacks against civilians as war crimes. See In re Agent Orange, at 112-13. See also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43 (recognizing an ATCA claim for war crimes); Sarei, 221 F.Supp.2d at 1139-40 (“Courts have held that a violation of the law of war may serve as a basis for a claim under the ATCA.”). 3. Practical consequences of making these causes of action available to litigants in the federal courts Defendant argues that practical consequences should weigh against finding that these norms are sufficiently definite. See Motion at 14-15, 16-17. Plaintiffs have not addressed this point due to their incorrect interpretation of Sosa. In Sosa, the Court considered respondent’s claim and observed that the implications of recognizing a cause of action for arbitrary detention “would be breathtaking.” 124 S.Ct. at 2768. On this point, the Court stated that: [Respondent’s] rule would support a cause of action in federal court for any arrest, anywhere in the world, unauthorized by the law of the jurisdiction in which it took place, and would create a cause of action for any seizure of an alien in violation of the Fourth Amendment, supplanting the actions under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), that now provide damages remedies for such violations. Id. This portion of Sosa exhibits two distinct concerns: (1) the extent to which recognizing an ATS claim would allow foreign plaintiffs to pursue claims in U.S. courts; and (2) the extent to which recognizing an ATS claim would unnecessarily duplicate remedies provided through other federal laws. In Sosa, the plaintiffs ATS theory was both too broad and duplicative. However, in this case, not all of Plaintiffs’ claims suffer from the same defects as the arbitrary detention claim brought by the plaintiff in Rosa. For the purpose of this analysis, “it is useful to examine [the plaintiffs] complaint in greater detail.” Id. at 2767. a. Claims of extrajudicial killing and torture In a previous step of its analysis, the existence of the TVPA convinced the Court that there are binding norms of international law for extrajudicial killing and torture. The existence of these statutes would indicate that these claims are not impermissibly broad because Congress has adopted statutes that define these concepts and assess liability for these actions. Legislative approval of punishment for these actions would suggest that the courts may — subject to other doctrines such as forum non conveniens — entertain these suits. On the other hand, the existence of these statutes would also tend to indicate that recognizing these ATS claims unnecessarily duplicates existing federal causes of action. With respect to claims for extrajudicial killing and torture, this duplication should not lead to the conclusion that the practical consequences should bar Plaintiffs’ claims. As discussed in footnote 13, the TVPA was intended to complement the ATS by allowing U.S. citizens, as well as aliens, to bring claims for extrajudicial killing and torture committed abroad. Given this legislative consideration, the Court does not believe that it should find ATS claims for extrajudicial killing and torture to be duplicative where Congress has concluded otherwise. Thus, the Court does not dismiss Plaintiffs’ ATS claims for extrajudicial killing and torture due to practical consequences. b.Claims of crimes against humanity Plaintiffs’ claims of crimes against humanity allege that the attack on Santo Domingo was part of “widespread and systematic” violence intended to result in the “forced displacement of civilians.” See FAC at ¶ 58. In other cases, courts have restricted claims of crimes against humanity to more limited circumstances. See Sarei, 221 F.Supp.2d at 1150 (considering “crimes against humanity” as actions that “target a particular group of people for political, racial, or religious reasons”). Plaintiffs have not alleged that Defendant targeted them due to their membership in a particular group but “in furtherance of the organizational policy of securing Defendant Occidental’s pipeline.” See FAC at ¶ 58. Unlike Sosa, the Court finds that this type of claim is not impermissibly broad. The Court imagines, perhaps optimistically, that the violent displacement of persons does not occur as often as “arbitrary detention.” In addition, the Court is unaware of any other causes of action that this type of claim would supplant. Since there are no practical consequences that should limit the availability of this claim under the ATS, the Court does not dismiss Plaintiffs’ ATS claims for crimes against humanity. c.Claims of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment Plaintiffs’ claims of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment allege that Defendant’s acts resulted in gross humiliation, fear, and anguish. See FAC at ¶ 63. These actions caused Plaintiffs to fear for their lives and forced them to flee their homes. Id. at ¶ 64. It would be impractical to recognize these allegations as constituting an ATS claim because it would allow foreign plaintiffs to litigate claims in U.S. courts that bear a strong resemblance to intentional infliction of emotional distress. While the Court has held that there is an international norm against cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, the broad swaths of conduct that could result in extreme fear and anguish counsel against recognizing such a claim. However, this should be taken to indicate that claims of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment should not be recognized when they arise out of more severe situations such as those involving sexual abuse, see Liu Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d at 1325. Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ ATS claims for cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. d.Claims of war crimes Plaintiffs’ claims of war crimes allege that “Colombia has been in a state of war” and that Defendant targeted civilians as a part of military operations. See FAC at ¶¶ 69-70. The Court does not find that these claims are too broad. These war crimes claims are sufficiently severe that they should be recognized by the federal courts. The existing federal cause of action for war crimes does not render an ATS claims for war crimes impermissibly duplicative. The War Crimes Act is a criminal statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441; In re Agent Orange, at 112. Since recognizing an ATS claim for war crimes would only provide for civil liability, there is no duplication that would make it impracticable for such a cause of action to exist. 3. Summary In summary, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the claims for cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment but DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ other ATS claims. C. Plaintiffs’ state law claims In addition to their federal claims, Plaintiffs have alleged state law claims of wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200. FAC at ¶¶ 73-94. 1. Statute of limitations Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ state law claims should be dismissed because they are time-barred. See Reply at 24 n. 24. Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on April 24, 2003. A claim cannot be dismissed as time-barred “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.” Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.1995). “In a federal question action where the federal court is exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, the federal court applies the choice-of-law rules of the forum state — in this case, California.” Paracor Finance, Inc. v. General Electric Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1164 (9th Cir.1996). “Where the conflict [of laws] concerns a statute of limitations, the governmental interest approach generally leads to California courts to apply California law ... and especially so where California’s statute would bar a claim.” See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 716-17 (9th Cir.2003) (citations omitted). Since the Court is exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims, the Court turns to California state law regarding statutes of limitation. a. Accrual of the cause of action “An action ordinarily accrues on the date of injury.” Ward v. Westinghouse Canada, Inc., 32 F.3d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir.1994) (citing Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal.3d 1103, 245 Cal.Rptr. 658, 751 P.2d 923 (Cal.1988)). However, “under the delayed discovery rule, the statute begins to run when a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position is on ‘inquiry notice’ of ‘potential wrongdoing.’ ” Id. “Under California law, knowledge of an injury and its cause does not necessarily imply that any wrongdoing has occurred or that anyone is to blame.” Id. Further, “ignorance of the identity of the defendant does not affect the statute of limitations.” Jolly, 44 Cal.3d at 1114, 245 Cal.Rptr. 658, 751 P.2d 923. Whether a plaintiff is on “inquiry notice” of “potential wrongdoing” is a question of fact. 32 F.3d at 1408. See also Clark v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 83 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1057, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 223 (Cal.Ct.App.2000) (interpreting Jolly as holding that “the plaintiff must be aware of her injury, its factual cause, and sufficient facts to put her on inquiry notice of a negligent cause”). In the instant case, Plaintiffs have brought claims “as a result of their hometown of Santo Domingo and the resulting violent deaths of their family members.” FAC at ¶ 1. That bombing allegedly occurred on December 13, 1998. Id. at ¶ 2. See also ¶¶ 19-24, 27-29 (describing the bombing, and events taking place shortly thereafter, in more detail). Thus, from the FAC, it appears that Plaintiffs’ injuries occurred on December 13, 1998 or shortly thereafter. According to the complaint, around December 14th, Plaintiff Luis Alberto Galvis “joined a human rights organization, the Joel Sierra Organization, and began to publicly denounce the massacre at Santo Domingo.” FAC at ¶ 28. The Court believes that this allegation indicates that Plaintiff Luis Alberto Galvis had “inquiry notice” of “wrongdoing” at this time. That Plaintiff Luis Alberto Galvis may not have not known that Defendant was involved is immaterial, see Jolly, 44 Cal.3d at 1114, 245 Cal.Rptr. 658, 751 P.2d 923; he knew that there was some “wrongdoing” on December 14,1998. While one would imagine that an unprovoked bombing of one’s home would immediately conjure up beliefs about “wrongdoing,” the FAC does not allege facts relating the other Plaintiffs’ reactions, public or otherwise, regarding the bombing in Santo Domingo. Even though it is difficult to conclude that any “reasonable person” would have had such a belief, the Court cannot conclude that these Plaintiffs could prove no set of facts showing that they were not placed on “inquiry notice” of wrongdoing. Thus, with respect to Plaintiffs Mario Galvis Galvez and John Mario Galvis, the Court is unable to make a finding as to when their tort claims accrued. b. Applicable statutes of limitations In 1998, Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340(3) provided a one-year statute of limitations for personal injury and wrongful death actions. See 3 Witkin, Cal. Proc. 4th, Actions § 517, 649-50 (1996); see also Ward, 32 F.3d at 1407. In 2002, this provision was amended by Cal. Civ. Proc. § 335.1 so that there is now a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury and wrongful death actions. With the exception of 9/11 terrorism victims, the extended statute of limitations only applies prospectively. See Krupnick v. Duke Energy Morro Bay, L.L.C., 115 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1028-29, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 767 (2004). Thus, the previous one-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiff Luis Alberto Galvis’ claims. Since his claim accrued, at the latest, sometime towards the end of 1998, the statute of limitations on his wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims expired at the end of 1999. Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff Luis Alberto Galvis’ tort claims as time-barred. The statute of limitations for § 17200 claims is four years. See Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17208. The statute of limitations on these claims expired in December 2002. Thus, the Court dismisses all of Plaintiffs’ § 17200 claims as time-barred. Taking Defendant’s statute of limitations arguments into account, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Mario Galvis Galvez and John Mario Galvis’ tort claims should not be dismissed. Thus, the Court must address whether the foreign affairs doctrine bars these claims. 2. Foreign affairs doctrine Defendant cites American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 123 S.Ct. 2374, 156 L.Ed.2d 376 (2003), as support for the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state law claims pursuant to the foreign affairs doctrine. See Motion at 20-22. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant misinterprets that opinion. See Opposition at 23. a. The Garamendi and Zschernig opinions In Garamendi, the Supreme Court held that California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (“HVIRA”) was preempted because it interfered with the federal government’s exercise of its foreign relations power. 539 U.S. at 401, 123 S.Ct. 2374. The challenged state statute required any insurer doing business in the state of California to disclose the details of any and all insurance policies issued in Europe between 1920 and 1945. Id. at 409-10, 123 S.Ct. 2374. The details of the policies would then be made available to the public through a central registry. Id. at 410, 123 S.Ct. 2374. While California enacted this legislation (along with other related statutes), the federal government was taking its own approach to Holocaust-related claims. Around this time, President Clinton was negotiating directly with the German government on a coordinated approach to these claims and, in 2000, signed the German Foundation Agreement. Id. at 405, 123 S.Ct. 2374. The Foundation procedure, funded by the German government and various German companies, would attempt to provide compensation to all individuals that had suffered under the Nazi regime in Germany. Id. In exchange for establishing this compensation fund, the President agreed to attempt to shield Germany from further lawsuits by filing Statements of Interest in the courts, encouraging them to defer to the Foundation procedure. Id. at 405-06, 123 S.Ct. 2374. In addition, the Foundation, when addressing insurance claims, would also work with the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (“ICHEIC”). Id. at 406-07, 123 S.Ct. 2374. The ICHEIC negotiated with European insurers to provide information about World War II era insurance policies and established procedures for handling claims. Id. at 407, 123 S.Ct. 2374. Notably, the Foundation Agreement did not expressly preempt any state laws. Id. at 416-17,123 S.Ct. 2374. Since there was no express preemption, the Court then had to examine whether the California state statute was “preempted” under the foreign affairs doctrine. The petitioners challenging the California law relied on Zschemig, a case examining the foreign relations implications of an Oregon probate statute. Id. at 417, 123 S.Ct. 2374. See also Deutsch, 317 F.3d at 1021 (describing Zschemig as the only prior-case in which the Supreme Court has struck down a state statute under the foreign affairs doctrine). The Oregon statute examined by Zschemig “prohibited inheritance by a nonresident alien, absent showings that the foreign heir would take the property ‘without confiscation’ by his home country and that American citizens would enjoy reciprocal rights of inheritance there.” 539 U.S. at 417, 123 S.Ct. 2374. In practice, the Oregon probate proceedings under this statute provided state judges with an outlet to “disparage” foreign governments and express, in many instances, their anti-communist views. Id. In Zschemig, a majority of the Supreme Court struck down the statute due to these disparaging statements made by Oregon state judges. While recognizing that states “traditionally regulated the descent and distribution of estates”, the majority believed that in practice, the Oregon probate statute “impair[ed] the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy.” 389 U.S. at 440, 88 S.Ct. 664. In the majority’s view, the statute had “a direct impact upon foreign relations” and had a potential to “adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with those problems.” Id. at 441, 88 S.Ct. 664. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Harlan (reacting to another concurring opinion filed by Justice Stewart) described earlier cases as establishing that “in the absence of a conflicting federal policy or violation of the express mandates of the Constitution the States may legislate in areas of their trad