Full opinion text
OPINION TSOUCALAS, Senior Judge. Plaintiff, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection of the Department of Homeland Security (“Customs”), seeks collection of a civil penalty and customs duties pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1988) concerning entries of automotive dies made by Ford Motor Company (“Ford”), defendant, in 1989. Customs claims that Ford committed fraud, or was grossly negligent or negligent by making material false statements and/or omissions in connection with the entry of the merchandise at issue and, thereby, violated 19 U.S.C. § 1592. Accordingly, Customs seeks $184,495 for unpaid duties, and civil penalties in the amount of $21,314,111 if Ford’s conduct is found to be fraudulent; $3,497,080 if Ford was grossly negligent; or $1,748,540 if Ford was negligent. See Compl. Ford responds that the merchandise at issue was entered at the value known at the time of entry, thus violating no Customs laws. Ford also counterclaims that it is entitled to recoup any overpayment in duties it has tendered. DISCUSSION In its complaint, Customs alleges that Ford made false statements and/or material omissions in entering automotive tooling dies and equipment into the United States and that such conduct was fraudulent, grossly negligent, or negligent. See Compl. These false statements and/or material omissions include: (1) failing to notify Customs that the prices declared at entry were provisional and subject to upward adjustments; (2) certifying to Customs at entry that the prices declared were true and correct when in fact the invoices failed to include the cost of known engineering changes; and (3) failing to notify Customs “at once” when information was received after importation indicating that the prices declared at entry had increased due to the value of the engineering changes. See Compl. ¶ 6. As a result, Customs claims that the United States was deprived of lawful duty, which it seeks in addition to civil penalties. A bench trial was held on February 28 through March 10, 2005. Parties submitted post-trial briefs on April 15, 2005. Pursuant to USCIT R. 52(a), “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ..., the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon....” USCIT R. 52(a) (2002). At trial, the Court heard testimony from sixteen witnesses. Customs produced three witnesses who testified on various factual matters concerning: how Customs’ investigations were commenced and conducted; Customs’ investigation of Ford (“FN-36 investigation”); and Customs’ factual findings during and resulting from the FN-36 investigation. Customs produced Mr. Michael Turner, former Special Agent in the Detroit Customs Office of Enforcement and primary investigator of Ford; Mr. Robert Neckel, former group supervisor of the Detroit Customs Office of Enforcement; and Mr. Richard Hoglund, former Special Agent in Charge of the Detroit Customs Office of Enforcement. Ford produced three witnesses who testified, inter alia, about their knowledge of Customs’ investigation and the scope of the investigation as it related to Ford: Mr. Harry Gibson, former attorney in Ford’s Office of General Counsel; Mr. Donald Cohen, former manager in Ford’s International Transportation and Customs Office; and Mr. Kenneth Coakley, former Ford purchasing representative of stamps and dies for the FN-36 program. Messrs. Gibson and Cohen also testified about Ford’s customs compliance procedures, compliance record, and Ford’s responses to inquiries made by Customs regarding the FN-36 program. At trial, Customs and Ford introduced documents relating to the FN-36 investigation and the Court admitted such documents into evidence. The Court finds most of this documentary evidence highly probative because it provides contemporaneous accounts of events related to the FN-36 investigation, Ford’s responses to the investigation, and Ford’s compliance procedures. The Court places substantial weight in the veracity of Customs’ Reports of Investigation (“ROI”) written contemporaneously to relevant events concerning the commencement of the FN-36 investigation and fact-finding interviews conducted therein. See PL’s Ex. 2, 33, 93, 94, 99, 112. The Court, however, gives less weight to the ROIs, particularly Ford ROI # 37, which summarize the findings of the FN-36 investigation, because these ROIs were prepared in anticipation of penalty proceedings. See e.g., Pl.’s Ex. 1, 12, 14. The Court finds that the testimony of Messrs. Gibson and Cohen was not highly probative because it was apparent from their testimony and demeanor that they did not independently recall specific events relating to the FN-36 investigation. The Court, however, found the testimony of Mr. Turner highly probative because it was apparent from his testimony and demeanor that he had intimate knowledge of relevant events and was able to independently recollect the FN-36 investigation. Messrs. Neckel and Hoglund corroborated Mr. Turner’s testimony regarding how Customs commenced and conducted investigations during the relevant time period. The Court also heard testimony regarding procedures and practices pertaining to the entry of Ford’s automotive dies in Seattle and Detroit Customs, issuing and responding to Customs’ Requests for Information (“CF 28s”), and general import practices (both Customs’ and Ford’s) from: (1) Mr. Kent Barnes, former Import Specialist in Seattle Customs; (2) Ms. Helen McCarty, former commodities Import Specialist in Detroit Customs; (3) Ms. Dathre-nal Davis, former Field National Import Specialist for the commodity automotive team in Detroit Customs; (4) Ms. Angela Ryan, former Supervisory Import Specialist of the automotive team in Detroit Customs, also the Port Director in Detroit Customs from 2000 until she retired; (5) Ms. Denise Rashke McCandless, former Customs Regulatory Auditor in Detroit Customs; (6) Mr. David LaCharite, former Ford analyst in the International Transportation and Customs Office; (7) Mr. James Brown, former supervisor in Ford’s customs operations unit; and (8) Mr. Frank Ciavarro, former employee in Ford’s customs unit beginning in October, 1989, and currently in Ford’s purchasing unit. Ford and Customs stipulated to the admission of deposition testimony of Mr. Phillip Kruzich, former analyst in Ford’s customs and compliance unit. The Court also heard testimony from Mr. Tom Collins, former administrator in General Motors’s (“GM”) customs office who had knowledge of Mr. Turner’s investigation regarding GM, and Mr. Lowell Blaekb-ourn, former Ogihara America Corporation accounting manager. The Court finds the testimony of Mr. Collins and Mr. Blackb-ourn slightly probative because each witness spoke of their general interaction with Customs during the relevant time frame. Based on their demeanor and given the length of time since the relevant events occurred, the Court finds the testimony of Ms. McCarty, Ms. Davis, Ms. Ryan, Mr. Kruzich, Ms. McCandless, Mr. LaCharite, Mr. Brown, and Mr. Ciavarro slightly probative because each testified to general facts associated with their respective positions. Regarding events relevant to the FN-36 investigation, these witnesses could only attest to events in general terms, even after having their memories refreshed with the exhibits. The Court finds Mr. Barnes’ knowledge of his communications with Ford as probative based on his demeanor and ability to recollect events in addition to the documentary evidence. In accordance with USCIT R. 52(a) and having given due consideration to the testimony of all sixteen witnesses and numerous exhibits presented at trial and admitted by the Court, the Court now enters judgment in favor of plaintiff pursuant to the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. I.Findings of Fact A. Findings of Fact Relevant to Ford’s FN-36 Program and Entry of the FN-36 Merchandise 1. Ford’s program code for the 1990 model year Lincoln Town Car was “FN-36.” See Trial Transcript (“TT”) at 1051; Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 2. 2. Ogihara Iron Works (“OIW”) is the parent company of Ogihara America Corporation (“OAC”), the American subsidiary (referred collectively as “Ogihara”). See TT at 741-42; PX40. 3. The subject merchandise includes tooling and stamping dies, which is large machinery used to make automotive body parts. Tooling included dies, welding fixtures, and checking fixtures (“FN-36 dies”). See TT at 797 & 1051-52; Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 4. Presses are separate from dies. See TT at 800. OIW built the stamping and tooling dies needed for the FN-36 program in Japan. See Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 3. The dies were then shipped to Michigan where OAC did the actual stamping of panels for Ford. See TT at 202; Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 5. All FN-36 payments were made to OAC, who in turn transferred payment to OIW. See TT at 103-04, 156, 1051; Pl.’s Ex. 112. 4. Ford, as importer of record, made eleven entries of FN-36 dies between February 2, 1989, and March 12, 1989, which are the entries in dispute. See Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 11; Pl.’s Ex. 69. The entries were handled by Ford’s customs broker, J.V. Carr & Sons. See TT at 180 & 235; Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 11; Pl.’s Ex. 69. 5. In Detroit, Ford made the following entries: entry number 441-4824795-8 on February 2, 1989; 441-4823061-6 on February 9, 1989. In Los Angeles, Ford entered entry number 989-0021515-7 on February 9, 1989. In Seattle, Ford made the following entries: entry number 441-3103656-6 on February 2, 1989; 441-3103684-8 on February 10, 1989; 441-3103705-1 on February 17, 1989; 441-3103778-8 on February 26, 1989; 441-3103780-4 on February 26, 1989; 441-3103777-0 on February 27, 1989; 441-3103799-4 on March 2, 1989; and 441-3103906-5 on March 12, 1989. See Pl.’s Ex. 40, 75,102. 6. The value of the FN-36 dies declared upon entry was $63,078,426. See Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 10. 7. The value of the FN-36 dies declared on the entry summaries (“CF 7501”) was the invoice price. See TT at 845. The invoice price was the purchase order agreement value. See TT at 845; Pi’s Ex. 71. A tool order is a type of purchase order, but one specifically to purchase a particular die or set of dies. See TT at 742. A purchase order is also considered a contract. See TT at 742. The base tool order is the initial order made by Ford for the dies. See TT at 743. 8. The base tooling order for the FN-36 dies, T510288, was issued on May 27, 1987, in the amount of $42,544,884. See Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 3; PL’s Ex. 24. Subsequently, 17 amendments were made to the base tool order between May 27, 1987, and January 16, 1991, with the amount on the 17th amendment being $66,075,960. See Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶¶ 6 & 12; Pl.’s Ex. 24. Amendment 17 to the base tool order, dated January 16, 1991, is an audit reduction lowering the price of the FN-36 dies. See PL’s Ex. 24. 9. 204 separately numbered purchase orders were also issued between November 29, 1988, and November 16, 1989, for engineering changes and other price adjustments (“engineering purchase orders”). See Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 6; PL’s Ex. 2, 25, 39. 10. To track a program at Ford, purchase order amendments should reference the previous purchase orders issued. This was done by referencing the project number on each purchase order. See TT at 775-76 & 838; PL’s Ex. 47 & 105; Def.’s Ex. C. 11. The base tool order and the seventeen amendments all have the project number “1D90A00” designation on them to identify them as part of the FN-36 program and to track program costs. See TT at 150-51 & 751-54; PL’s Ex. 24. The 204 engineering purchase orders also have the project number “1D90A00” designation on them. See PL’s Ex. 25. Ford employees knew that the project number was a way of tracking purchase orders associated with a particular project. See TT at 751-54, 775-76, 837-38. 12. A legend on the base tool order, amendments, and some of the engineering purchase orders states that “[T]he price set forth in this Purchase Order or Amendment shall be adjusted so as to credit buyer in the amount, if any, by which such price exceeds seller’s actual cost as verified.” followed by the signature of K.J. Coakley and the date signed. See Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 9; PL’s Ex. 24 & 25. 13. To comply with a new seat-belt law in the United States, the FN-36 program had a launch date of August 1, 1989. See TT at 747-49. Engineering changes on the dies were frozen by Ford on October 10, 1988, so that the dies could be transported from Japan to Michigan. See TT at 213-14, 762-63, 801-02; PL’s Ex. 64. The purchase orders, on their face, do not indicate whether they were issued for United States work or foreign source work. See TT at 795; PL’s Ex. 25. 14. Engineering changes to the dies were known and expected by Ford as designs for the FN-36 program evolved, translating into an increase in the price. See TT at 745 & 751; Kruzich at 40-41. Ford knew that the invoice price for the FN-36 dies stated in an entry summary was rarely the final price. See TT at 839-40. 15. Tool order amendments 16 and 17 state that: “[T]he amount shown on this invoice represents the actual incurred costs to manufacture or purchase the tooling described in the referenced tooling order and/or amendment(s), does not exceed the amount authorized, and includes only those acceptable categories of cost described in the tooling guidelines provided by Ford.” Pl.’s Ex. 24; Def.’s Ex. BBBB. 16. Ford’s International Transportation and Customs Office was divided into the customs and traffic units. The customs unit was further divided into compliance and operations units. See TT at 753-54 & 818-19; Kruzich at 5-6. Ford’s customs compliance unit came into existence in the late 1980s/early 1990s. See Kruzich at 15. 17. Ford had an internal policy in place on November 7, 1983, and updated on April 14, 1989, requiring Ford employees in the purchasing department to send copies of each purchase order and amendments to five internal Ford units including the traffic unit. A sixth copy was sent to the supplier. See TT at 163-64, 753, 774-76; Kruzich at 19-24; Pl.’s Ex. 2, 47, 48, 105; Def.’s Ex. C. 18. Ford’s customs unit would not know about an upcoming entry of imported merchandise unless Ford’s purchasing unit had sent them a copy of the purchase order. See TT at 821-25 & 830; Kruzich at 27-36; Pl.’s Ex. 99. Ford did not have a formal policy, however, for what its customs unit was to do with the purchase order upon receiving it. See TT at 823-25; Pl.’s Ex. 99. There were no internal verification procedures in place to ensure that Ford’s customs unit was receiving copies of all the purchase orders issued by purchasing. See TT at 823-25 & 830; Kruzich at 27-36; Pl.’s Ex. 40 at 7. 19. With regard to the FN-36 dies, Ford failed to adhere to its internal policy whereby its purchasing unit notified its customs unit of the engineering changes through the transmittal of purchase orders prior to entry. See Pl.’s Ex. 105; see also TT at 163-73; Pl.’s Ex. 2. 20. Ford did not have a mechanism in place to verify that the information submitted in an entry summary filed by the broker was based on the correct price of the merchandise. See TT at 824-25; Pl.’s Ex. 40 & 99. Ford’s customs unit would learn of changes in the purchase order price, usually after entry, when it received payment information from Ford’s accounting unit. See Kruzich at 30-31. Ford’s customs unit was also aware that it did not receive all the purchase orders because of information later uncovered when answering CF 28s. See TT at 821-32; Kruzich at 42-45. Ford’s customs unit, however, did not advise the purchasing unit supervisors of this issue. See Kruzich at 44-45. 21. A Customs CF 28 is a request for information sent to importers when Import Specialists have questions regarding an entry. See TT at 347 & 825-26. 22. Ford’s customs unit did not consider receipt of a purchase order before entry as important because the entry summary could be amended. The focus at Ford was comparing payments made to vendors against invoices. See TT at 850-51. 23. Ford knew it had a duty to report to Customs any additional purchase orders, including engineering changes, that affected the entered value of imported merchandise. See Kruzich at 40-42. 24. During the late 1980s to early 1990s, Ford was importing billions of dollars each year. See TT at 964. B. Findings of Fact Related to Customs’ Investigation of Ford 25. An investigation could be initiated in different ways. An open investigation could lead into new investigations of either different violations or other importers. See TT at 74, 526, 580-81. Investigations could also begin with referrals from import specialists. See TT at 489-90, 528, 580. When information obtained in an open investigation led to another, notes regarding the new investigation would be contained in the former investigation’s file until a separate file was opened. See TT at 526 & 581-82; Pl.’s Ex. 33. 26. Customs investigations would be documented in ROIs in which agents would summarize interviews and investigative activity. ROIs would often be written contemporaneously to the events reported therein, but would also be written at a later date from notes taken during earlier events. See TT at 76-77, 158-59, 285-87. Material events that would be recounted in an ROI would include: telling an importer it was under investigation, telling an importer the scope of the investigation had expanded, discovery that merchandise was undervalued, and requesting documents to be produced. See TT at 286-88. 27. An investigative agent’s duties included keeping a careful record of the dates relevant information was obtained. See TT at 291-97; Def.’s Ex. A. 28. The term “formal investigation” is not defined in any Customs document submitted to the Court. See Def.’s Ex. A. Among Customs personnel, a “formal investigation” means a file has been opened within Customs’ internal case management system to track cases. The term “formal investigation” has a different meaning when used in Customs’ prior disclosure regulations. The term “formal investigation” is not used interchangeably among the two definitions. See TT at 548 & 553-54. 29. In the late 1980s, Customs conducted a national investigation entitled, “Rebate Adjustment Program,” or “RAP.” Operation RAP investigated allegations that certain United States importers were manipulating freight rates in cooperation with foreign shippers to affect the entered value of merchandise to Customs. OAC was one of the companies being investigated and on November 27, 1989, Customs executed a search warrant on OAC’s Michigan facility seizing numerous documents. See TT at 80-81 & 528-29; Pl.’s Ex. 33; Def.’s Ex. YYY & ZZZ. 30. Mr. Turner took over the Ogihara case in August-September, 1990. See TT at 314-15. Mr. Turner was only investigating OAC, but his attention was drawn to Ford while reviewing the seized OAC documents. He began comparing Ford’s FN-36 invoices submitted to Customs against Ford’s payments made to OAC for the same merchandise. See TT at 82-85 & 268; Pl.’s Ex. 33; Def.’s Ex. YYY & ZZZ. 31. On October 18, 1990, Mr. Turner met with Mr. Gibson and after delivering two summonses in an unrelated matter, discussed presses purchased from Ogihara for the FN-36 program. See TT at 96-99 & 125-26; PL’s Ex. 94. Mr. Turner asked Mr. Gibson to identify an entry number (441-4823061-6). See TT at 333 & 893; Pl.’s Ex. 35. Mr. Turner “advised [Ford] that Customs would ask to review Ford’s records related to payment for and receipt of the presses purchased from OIW and OAC” for the FN-36 program. Pl.’s Ex. 33; see also TT at 98-99 & 339-40; Pl.’s Ex. 94. Mr. Turner did not specifically request records from Ford and did not tell Ford that it was under investigation at this October 18,1990, meeting. See TT at 301-05, 339-10, 893-95; PL’s Ex. 33. 32. On December 19, 1990, Mr. Turner told OAC’s attorneys that the OAC investigation was expanding to include whether the costs of GM-33 and FN-36 dies from OIW were properly reflected in invoices and entry summaries. See TT at 101-02; Pl.’s Ex. 33 & 97. On January 7,1991, Mr. Turner wrote OAC ROI # 8 recording the October 18, 1990, meeting and December 19, 1990, expansion of investigation. See TT at 307-08; Pl.’s Ex. 33. 33. Between October 18, 1990, and March 8, 1991, Mr. Turner requested documents from Ford regarding OAC. See Pl.’s Ex. 35, 37, 97.' On March 8,1991, Mr. Turner had a phone conversation with Mr. Hamell, of Ford, following up on his previous request for documents regarding FN-36 entries of stamping dies and payments to Ogihara. See TT at 109 & 115-19; Pl.’s Ex. 97. Mr. Turner learned that Ford was compiling the requested information and was also conducting an internal audit. See TT at 118 & 894-96; PL’s Ex. 97. The March 8, 1991, phone conversation is memorialized in Mr. Turner’s handwritten notes in the investigatory record, but not included in a ROI. See TT at 115 & 316; PL’s Ex. 97. 34. By March 8, 1991, Mr. Turner had not only expanded the OAC investigation to include Ford as a witness therein, but also was investigating Ford as a separate target concerning its payments to OAC and declarations to Customs regarding the FN-36 program. See TT at 102-03 & 115-19. 35. On April 18, 1991, Detroit Customs Office of Enforcement sent an internal memorandum to Detroit Customs Regulatory Audit requesting an in-depth review of OAC’s records for presses and dies, including a comparison of payments made by Ford against OIW’s invoices. See TT at 119-24; PL’s Ex. 77 & 93. 36. On April 30, 1991, Ford completed its internal audit of the FN-36 tooling and dies, entitled “Ogihara America Corporation Tooling Audit” which includes the 204 purchase orders for engineering changes. See PL’s Ex. 99A; see also TT at 855; PL’s Ex. 97. 37. In a letter dated May 6, 1991, Ford requested a second extension to answer a CF 28 from Seattle Customs. See PL’s Ex. 32. The letter also stated that Ford’s customs unit had been informed on April 22, 1991, that “final audit results and price adjustments will soon be available” from OIW. PL’s Ex. 32; see also TT at 476-77. Ford’s customs unit knew of the engineering purchase orders, but did not disclose them because Ford was unsure whether the work was done in Japan or the United States. See TT at 879-81 & 38. In a letter dated May 23, 1991, Ford updated Seattle Customs on its CF 28 response to a different FN-36 entry than the one discussed in its May 6, 1991, letter. See Def.’s Ex. Y. The letter stated that Ford wanted to confirm that' “the final audit and price adjustments are in agreement” with its CF 28 response. 'Def.’s Ex. Y. 39. On June 7, 1991, Customs issued Ford a summons for all documents relating to “dies, molds, and any other article” of the FN-36 program and OIW. PL’s Ex. 38. The summons requested “all purchase orders and payment records” and “engineering change and modification orders” among other records. PL’s Ex. 38; see also TT at 126-31 & 600-01; Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 19; PL’s Ex. 93 & 112. 40. By June 7, 1991, Ford knew or should have known that it was being investigated by Customs regarding the FN-36 entries. See TT at 540 — 41. 41. In a letter dated July 3, 1991, Ford informed Seattle Customs that any correspondence regarding four FN-36 entries entered at Seattle would now be directed to Detroit Customs. See PL’s Ex. 54. 42. On August 6, 1991, Ford sent Detroit Customs a “supplemental response” to its previous November 20, 1989, response to the March 28, 1989, CF 28. See Pl.’s Ex. 39. Ford reported the 17th amendment to the base tool order and then revealed that there had been an “additional 204 separate Purchase Orders” issued to OAC for dutiable engineering changes that had been “discovered” by Ford’s customs unit in April 1991. See Pl.’s Ex. 39. This disclosure was the first time Customs was informed of the existence of the 204 engineering purchase orders. See TT at 357. The letter estimated $684,417 for unpaid duties owed from an undeclared value of $16.7 million in engineering changes. The unpaid duty owed was determined by applying an allocation method derived from the twelve subject entries. See PL’s Ex. 39 & 74; see also TT at 131-38, 357-61, 627-28; Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶¶ 20 & 21. 43. Customs reviewed Ford’s August 6, 1991, letter and calculated that Ford owed $689,775 for unpaid duties. Customs also accepted the allocation method used by Ford to determine the amount of unpaid duty owed. See TT at 361-62 & 627-28; PL’s Ex. 40. 44. Each engineering purchase order represents a separate engineering change to the FN-36 dies. The engineering changes affected the price of the FN-36 dies, both increasing and decreasing price. See TT at 755-65; Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 7; PL’s Ex. 25, 39, 40, 74. 45. The engineering purchase orders were not cross-referenced as amendments to the base tool order because an internal “implementation of a mechanized purchase order system” would not allow the issuance of an amendment until the previous amendment had been processed. The system would allow independent purchase orders to be issued without regard to sequence. See PL’s Ex. 105, see also TT at 167-68; PL’s Ex. 2 & 99. 46. On August 21, 1991, Mr. Turner opened a separate file record for the FN-36 investigation. Customs was investigating Ford before August 21, 1991, as part of the OAC investigation. The assignment of a separate case number was an internal mechanism at Customs to track documents and investigative findings. See TT at 153-55; PL’s Ex. 112; Def.’s Ex. DD. 47. On August 27, 1991, Mr. Turner sent Customs Regulatory Audit a memorandum requesting a separate audit report of Ford’s FN-36 transactions from the previously requested audit of OAC. See PL’s Ex. 77 & 79; Def.’s Ex. DDDD. 48. On November 8, 1991, Ford submitted additional documents to Customs pursuant to the June 7, 1991, summons including copies of the twelve entry summaries of FN-36 dies filed by Ford in the ports of Detroit, Seattle, and Los Angeles. See TT at 148-49; PL’s Ex. 105. 49. On November 22, 1991, Ford tendered a check to Detroit Customs for $689,775 for unpaid duties owed on the engineering changes in the FN-36 program. See Def.’s Ex. BB. 50. On July 6,1992, Customs Regulatory Audit published its audit report of Ford and the FN-36 program. See PL’s Ex. 40. Ford cooperated with Regulatory Audit by providing requested information during the compilation of the audit report. See TT at 630-31; PL’s Ex. 40. Ford, however, did not submit its internal audit dated April 30, 1991 and it was not included in Customs’ audit. See TT at 641. The audit report states that the dutiable value of the FN-36 program was $79,894,722. See PL’s Ex. 40. On its entry documents, Ford had declared $63,078,426. See Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 10. Thus, Ford had undervalued the FN-36 dies by $16,816,296, which resulted in a loss of revenue in the amount of $689,775. See PL’s Ex. 40. Customs Regulatory Audit used the same allocation formula as Ford had used in its August 6, 1991, letter to determine the amount of unpaid duty owed. See TT at 627-28. 51. The Pre-Penalty Notice was issued on January 10, 1995. See Pl.’s Ex. 41. Customs reappraised the dutiable value of the FN-36 dies upon Ford’s submission of its internal audit, dated April 30, 1991. See TT at 641-46; Pl.’s Ex. 43, 75, 99A. Customs issued a Notice of Penalty reflecting the reappraisal on July 19, 1995. See TT at 641-46; Pl.’s Ex. 43. The final appraised value of the FN-36 dies was $84,393,564; the final undeclared value to Customs was $21,314,111; and the final loss of revenue to the United States was $874,270. See Pl.’s Ex. 43 & 75. After accounting for Ford’s November 1991, payment, the remaining unpaid duty amount owed is $184,495. See Pl.’s Ex. 43. Customs again applied the same allocation method used in its audit and by Ford. See TT at 381; Pl.’s Ex. 75. The $184,495 difference formed the basis of Customs’ complaint. See Compl. ¶ 9. C. Findings of Fact Related to Ford’s Provisional Value Policy and Internal Procedures 52. Ford had a formalized practice of designating certain entries as “provisional” values or prices. See Def.’s Ex. C. Ford’s Customs Compliance Manual states: “[i]n the event that the value is not completely and correctly shown, a ‘provisional’ disclaimer is stated on the invoice, thereby advising customs.” Def.’s Ex. C; see also Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 1. Ford’s Supply Manual states: “[p]rovisional values must be used when actual values are not available and the words ‘Provisional Value’ must be shown on the commercial invoice.” Def.’s Ex. C; see also Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 1. Ford defined a “provisional” entry, invoice, value, or price as merchandise imported through Customs without knowledge of the final price. See TT at 215-16, 868-69, 1022. Ford would notify Customs that merchandise was entered at provisional value either on the invoice or on a separate memorandum to Customs. See TT at 1022-24; Pl.’s Ex. 85 & 86. 53. At the time of the subject entries were made, Ford had an informal procedure with its broker when to advise Customs that the invoice price was not the final price. See TT at 228-30, 332, 839-40, 869-71, 1022-24. Ford would orally instruct its broker to place the words “provisional pricing or value” on an invoice. See TT at 869-71, 992. Ford implemented formal procedures for provisional value with its broker in 1991, after the subject entries. See TT at 247 & 332; PL’s Ex. 107. The formal procedure required that all entries for tooling, dies, molds and machinery be entered with a letter alerting Customs that the value was provisional. See PL’s Ex. 107. 54. Without indicating provisional value on an entry summary, an import specialist would not know that the price listed was incomplete and to withhold liquidation. See TT at 216, 427-28, 493-94. 55. Prior to the FN-36 entries, Ford had used provisional values when entering machinery, tooling, dies, and presses. See TT at 868. 56. Ford had previously entered merchandise without alerting Customs that the entry was provisional. Ford would then later advise Custom in a CF 28 response that the prices declared had been provisional. When provisional values were first relayed to Customs in a CF 28 response, the information was accepted, treated as a prior disclosure and possibly subject to penalties. See TT at 430-31 & 507-08. 57. Between 1988 and 1991, there were no Customs regulations or directives requiring an importer to use the words “provisional value” or pricing on entry documents. See TT at 440, 476, 511, 870. 58. The entry summaries for the FN-36 dies did not indicate that the transaction value was provisional or subject to change. See TT at 229-30; Pl.’s Ex. 26E & 113. 59. There was a lack of communication between Ford’s internal units about Ford’s provisional value policy and when to use it. See TT at 705-06, 779-80 (stating “I have never used [provisional value] in 32 years.”), 827-29; Pl.’s Ex. 2. 60. Ford had submitted internal customs training videos and manuals to Customs for review and suggestions in 1990-91. See Def.’s Ex. D, F, G, H, M. 61. In 2000, Customs published a compliance audit report reviewing Ford’s compliance with Customs laws during the 1996 calender year. Overall, Ford is credited as having met an acceptable level of compliance. Areas where Ford was lacking included internal control procedures especially in verifying the reliability of its broker’s work, maintenance of records, and ensuring that correct values were reported on entries. See Pl.’s Ex. 114. D. Findings of Fact Related to Customs’ CF 28s and Ford’s Responses 62. Customs often sent CF 28s to importers when the imported merchandise was an automotive die because most dies usually had tooling or assists, which could affect dutiable value. See TT at 347, 388, 468-70. The issuance of CF 28s was fairly routine and it was not uncommon for Ford to request additional time to respond to CF 28s. See TT at 478-79 & 832-33. Information submitted as a response to a CF 28 was certified by the importer’s signature to be true and correct. See PL’s Ex. 29, 30, 31,113. 63. Answering CF 28s was not a high priority at Ford. See TT at 826-29 & 851-52. 64. Detroit Customs issued a CF 28 regarding entry 441^4823061-6 on March 28, 1989, to which Ford responded on November 20, 1989, and sent a supplemental response on August 6, 1991. See Def.’s Ex. BBBB; see also Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶¶13, 15, 20; PL’s Ex. 113. Ford’s response dated November 20, 1989, did not mention that Ford was conducting an internal audit. See Def.’s Ex. BBBB. The letter described the different dies imported for the FN-36 program and included copies of the base tooling order and sixteen of the seventeen amendments. See Def.’s Ex. BBBB. 65. Seattle Customs issued a CF 28 regarding entry 441-3103656-6 on March 2, 1989, reissued it on February 28, 1990, to which Ford responded on May 23, 1991, asking for an extension. See Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶¶ 14 & 18; PL’s Ex. 29; Def.’s Ex. Y. 66. Seattle Customs issued a CF 28 regarding entry 441-3103684-8 on March 1,1989, reissued it on December 5,1990, to which Ford responded on January 9, 1991, and May 6, 1991, asking for extensions. See TT at 480-81; Kruzieh at Ex. 5; Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 17; PL’s Ex. 31, 32, 51, 52. Ford’s May 6, 1991, letter also stated that its delay in responding was because final audit results were soon available. PL’s Ex. 32. Seattle Customs met with Ford in late 1990 to finalize Ford’s penalties in an unrelated Fuji dies case, after which this unanswered CF 28 was discussed. See TT at 872-74 & 897; PL’s Ex. 27. 67. Seattle Customs expanded the CF 28 reissued on December 5, 1990, to in-elude entries 441-3103705-1, 441-3103778-8, and 441-3103777-0. See Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 16; Pl.’s Ex. 31 & 54. In Ford’s response, dated July 3, 1991, to these four Seattle entries, Ford only stated that a summons had been issued by Detroit Customs and that all future correspondence would be directed to the Detroit office. See Pl.’s Ex. 54. 68. Seattle Customs also issued a CF 28 for entry 441-3103780-4 on March 16, 1989, to which Ford responded on March 30,1989, asking for a ninety day extension. See Pl.’s Ex. 2 at Ex. 7; PL’s Ex. 30. 69. As a practice, Customs accepted disclosures of values that had changed from the entered value in a CF 28 response. If additional duties were paid with the corrected value, Customs would accept the payment, check the information provided, and possibly refer the information to Customs’ auditors or special agents for further review. See TT at 496-97. 70. Automotive dies were not automatically bypassed by Customs because they often had assists, were not the same type of die in each entry, and were fairly expensive items. See TT at 426-27, 448, 499. Ford’s dies were not on bypass in Seattle or Detroit. See TT at 448 & 499. II. Conclusions of Law The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (2000). In actions brought for the recovery of any monetary penalty claimed under section 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1988), all issues are tried de novo, see 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(6) (2000), including the amount of the penalty. See 19 U.S.C. § 1592(e)(1). The level of culpability has a direct correlation to the maximum amount of penalty that can be assessed. See 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c). Customs has alleged that Ford violated 19 U.S.C. § 1592,. thereby depriving the United States of all or a portion of lawful duty through fraud, or in the alternative, gross negligence or negligence. See Compl. In pertinent part, 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a) states: Without regard to whether the United States is or may be deprived of all or a portion of any lawful duty thereby, no person, by fraud, gross negligence, or negligence- (A) may enter, introduce, or attempt to enter or introduce any merchandise into the commerce of the United States by means of- (i) any document, written or oral statement, or act which is material and false, or (ii) any omission which is material 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a). An act or omission is deemed material if it has the potential to alter the appraisement or liability for duty. See 19 C.F.R. pt. 171, App. B(A) (1988). The issue of materiality is for the Court to determine. See United States v. Hitachi Am., Ltd. (“Hitachi I”), 21 CIT 373, 386, 964 F.Supp. 344, 360 (1997), aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 172 F.3d 1319 (Fed.Cir.1999); see also United States v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 10 CIT 38, 42, 628 F.Supp. 206, 210 (1986) (stating that “the measurement of the materiality of the false statement is its potential impact upon Customs’ determination of the correct duty for the imported merchandise”). A. Customs Failed to Prove that Ford’s Conduct was Fraudulent Fraudulent conduct “results from an act or acts (of commission or omission) deliberately done with intent to defraud” the United States and must be established by clear and convincing evidence. 19 C.F.R. pt. 171, App. B(B)(3); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1592(e)(2) (burden is on Customs). Fraud occurs if an importer “knowingly” enters goods by means of a material false statement or omission. See Hitachi I, 21 CIT at 402, 964 F.Supp. at 371. “Intent is a factual determination particularly within the province of the trier of fact.” Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 839 F.2d 1556, 1567 (Fed.Cir.1988). Based on the evidence and the testimony submitted during trial, the Court finds that Customs has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Ford intentionally violated 19 U.S.C. § 1592 when it entered the subject merchandise. Customs failed to show any intent by Ford to deliberately misrepresent the value of the 204 engineering purchase orders from Customs. Customs also did not show that Ford employees intentionally or knowingly misplaced purchase orders or colluded with other employees to defraud the United States. Rather, the evidence demonstrated that Ford had in place internal compliance procedures. Such procedures illustrate Ford’s attempt to comply with its legal obligations. Whether Ford’s internal procedures ensured that Ford met its statutory obligations is not central to a fraud analysis. Rather, it is significant that Ford had measures in place because they contravene a showing of fraud. Ford, for example, had customs compliance and supply manuals that instructed its employees to circulate copies of purchase orders to other units for upcoming importations for proper and smooth entry of merchandise. See Def.’s Ex. C. Also, Ford’s internal provisional value policy was meant to ensure that Ford was forthright, rather than subversive with Customs. See id. Moreover, Ford responded to Customs’ CF 28s about the subject merchandise rather than ignoring them, albeit often after many months had passed. See e.g., PL’s Ex. 113; Def.’s Ex. BBBB; Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶¶ 13, 15, 20. Ford’s CF 28 responses commonly included tenders for unpaid duties. See e.g., Pl.’s Ex. 39. Such procedures illustrate Ford’s intent to comply with the statute. Without showing that Ford purposefully disregarded its statutory obligations with the intent to defraud the United States, Customs’ allegation of fraud fails. The Court concludes that Customs failed to meet its burden showing that Ford deliberately disregarded its statutory obligations or acted with the requisite intent to defraud the United States. B. Customs Has Established by a Preponderance of the Evidence that Ford’s Conduct was Grossly Negligent. Gross negligence arises “if it results from an act or acts (of commission or omission) done with actual knowledge of or wanton disregard for the relevant facts and with indifference to or disregard for the offender’s obligations under the statute.” 19 C.F.R. pt. 171, App. B(B)(2). “Wanton” is defined as “unreasonably or maliciously risking harm while being utterly indifferent to the consequences.” Black’s Law DICTIONARY 1613 (8th ed.2004). A defendant is liable for a grossly negligent violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1592 “if it behaved willfully, wantonly, or with reckless disregard in its failure to ascertain both the relevant facts and the statutory obligation.” Hitachi I, 21 CIT at 406, 964 F.Supp. at 374 (emphasis retained). A finding of gross- negligence requires the Court to determine that Ford’s omissions of information from entry documents and its failure to comply with its statutory obligations was willful, wanton or reckless or that the evidence before the Court illustrates Ford’s utter lack of care. See Mach. Corp. of Am. v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 473 (Fed.Cir.1985) (citation omitted). Gross negligence -involves a type of intent which is a question of fact and not law. See United States v. Hitachi Am., Ltd. C‘Hitachi II”), 172 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed.Cir.1999); see also Allen, 839 F.2d at 1567. - Customs bears the burden to establish all the elements of the alleged violation. See 19 U.S.C. § 1592(e)(3), Customs must establish such elements by a preponderance of,the evidence, which “is the general burden assigned in civil cases for factual matters.” St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 6 F.3d 763, 769 (Fed.Cir.1993). Preponderance of the evidence'is.“the greater weight of evidence, evidence which is more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it.” Id. (quoting Hale v. FAA, 772 F.2d 882, 885 (Fed.Cir.1985)). Negligence is either failure “to exercise the degree of reasonable care and competence expected from a person in the same circumstances” or “in communicating information, so that it may be understood by the recipient.” 19 C.F.R. pt. 171, App. B(B)(1). Consequently, negligence, does not require the trier of fact to determine intent. Section 1592(e)(4) of Title 19 of the United States Code derogates from common law negligence (i.e., duty, breach, causation, and injury) by shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant to show lack of negligence. See Hitachi I, 21 CIT at 380, 964 F.Supp. at 355. The statute removes the breach element from Customs’ prima facie negligence case. See id. Accordingly, Customs must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the materially false act or omission occurred. See 19 U.S.C. § 1592(e)(3). Once Customs has met its burden, Ford bears the burden to establish that it exercised reasonable care under the circumstances and that the alleged violation was not caused by its negligence. See 19 U.S.C. § 1592(e)(3); 19 C.F.R. pt. 171, App. B; see also Hitachi I, 21 CIT at 381, 964 F.Supp. at 355-56. As a threshold issue, Ford asserts that Customs failed to offer into evidence ten of the eleven entry summaries at issue. See Def.’s Post-Trial Br. at 24-26. Ford argues, that without the entry summaries admitted into evidence, the Court has no means of evaluating Customs’ claims that the entered values were false or that Ford failed to notify Customs that the prices reflected therein were not final. See id. Ford’s argument is flawed because the statutory language contemplates violations where the importer of record has either made material omissions or failed to act. See 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a). An importer may violate the statute by failing to provide Customs with entry documents in the first place. Pursuant to Ford’s argument, the government would be precluded from successfully bringing an action pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1592 in instances where entry documents or specific entry information was never submitted to Customs. This reasoning is untenable and contradicts the plain meaning of the statutory language. The totality of the evidence submitted at trial provides the Court with ample evidence of the values Ford declared on its entry documents. Ford admitted that the invoice price stated in the entry documents was the purchase order price, and all the purchase orders are in evidence. See TT at 845; see also PL’s Ex. 24, 25, 26E, 71. Furthermore, Ford acknowledged that it did not enter the subject merchandise provisionally or disclose the existence of the 204 engineering purchase orders to Customs until its letter, dated August 6, 1991. See TT at 857; PL’s Ex. 39. Accordingly, the Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to evaluate Customs’ claims that the entered values were false or that Ford failed to promptly notify Customs that the prices reflected therein were not final. Based on the evidence submitted, the Court finds that Customs established by a preponderance that Ford’s conduct was grossly negligent. Ford failed to account for the value of the engineering changes when it entered the subject merchandise. On multiple occasions, Ford failed to promptly notify Customs promptly of the value of the engineering purchase orders. This repeated failure constitutes a material omission because the engineering changes had an impact on the dutiable value of the FN-36 dies. Consequently, Ford’s knowledge of and repeated indifference for the value of the engineering changes in its submissions to Customs constitutes a wanton disregard of its obligations. 1. Ford’s Failure to Include or Notify Customs of the Engineering Changes at Entry was a Material Omission in Violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1484 Under 19 U.S.C. § 1484, an importer of record has the duty to present true and correct information at entry enabling Customs to properly assess duties on the merchandise. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1484(a) & 1485 (1988); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a). True and correct information includes, invoices with the purchase price in the currency of the purchase and any other documentation necessary for proper appraisement and classification. See 19 U.S.C. § 1484; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1988); United States v. Thorson Chem. Corp., 16 CIT 441, 448, 795 F.Supp. 1190, 1195 (1992). This duty encompasses an -importer’s obligation" to notify Customs if the values on an entry summary are not final. See Hitachi I, 21 CIT at 387, 964 F.Supp. at 360 (stating that the importer’s omission on entry documents of escalation clauses affecting- price “had a potential impact on the correct duty and thus perpetrated a material omission”). During the relevant time, Ford had mechanisms in place to prepare for the entry of the subject merchandise. For example, Ford’s internal units had procedures that facilitated the notification of upcoming importations so that each unit could do its job correctly. See e.g., Def.’s Ex. C. Ford also had a provisional value policy designed to transmit information within Ford, to its broker, and ultimately to Customs that the value of certain merchandise would increase after entry. See TT at 228-30, 332, 839-40, 869-71, 1022-24; Def.’s Ex. C. Both pre-entry mechanisms failed to occur with the FN-36 entries, resulting in the wanton disregard for the engineering purchase orders. See TT at 229-30; Pl’s Ex. at 24, 25, 26E, 113. Ford argues that the compliance mechanisms it had in place illustrates that it was not wanton. See Def.’s Post-Trial Br. at 18-19. Ford cites the following mechanisms in support: instructions to vendors to put “provisional pricing” on invoices; standing instructions to its broker to indicate provisional prices on entries; and a regular filing of a reconciliation of prices and duties to Customs after prices were finalized. See id. at 2. Of the three mechanisms Ford cites, the evidence established that the first two mechanisms failed to occur with respect to the FN-36 entries. The existence of the third mechanism is not adequately supported by the evidence. Rather, the minimal mechanisms Ford may have implemented represent an institutional indifference to ensuring that Ford captured and reported the full transaction value of entered merchandise. Ford failed to include the value of the engineering changes known at the time of entry. Moreover, Ford knew that the prices declared at entry were not the final dutiable value and failed to notify Customs that such values were subject to change. Ford’s institutional indifference to the existence of the engineering purchase orders constitutes an utter lack of care and therefore, a violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1592. a. Ford Failed to Include the Value of the Engineering Changes When Entering the FN-36 Dies An entry summary is the presentation made by an importer to Customs for entry of merchandise declaring classification numbers, rates of duty, and any supporting documents such as invoices. See TT at 352-53. Ford argues that it complied with 19 U.S.C. § 1484 because the prices listed on the invoices in the entry summaries were the only prices known at the time of entry. See Def.’s Posh-Trial Br. at 11-12. Ford’s argument fails in two ways. First, the initial entry for the FN-36 dies was made on February 2, 1989, yet the initial engineering purchase order was dated November 29,1988. See Pl.’s Ex. 25, 69, 113; Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 11. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Ford knew or should have known at the time of importation that the value of the FN-36 dies was not solely the base tool order and amendments. The entry value of the FN-36 dies should have included any engineering changes dated before February 2, 1989. Ford, however, failed to provide the true and complete value of the merchandise because it did not include the engineering changes known prior to entry. Second, on their face, the purchase orders provide enough information to cross-reference the base tool order and amendments to the 204 engineering purchase orders in three different ways. See PL’s Ex. 24 & 25. First, the 204 engineering purchase orders begin with tool order T524675, which is dated November 29, 1988. See Pl.’s Ex. 25. This tool order unambiguously states that it replaces amendments 8, 9 & 10 to the base tool order, T510288. See id. Second, amendment 11 to the base tool order has a handwritten notation that states it is “reissued on T524675,” which is the initial engineering purchase order. See Pl.’s Ex. 24. Third and most significantly, the project number “1D90A00” was printed on the base tool order, amendments, and most of the engineering purchase orders to track changes and costs made in the FN-36 program. See TT at 775-76; Kruzich at 19-23; Pl.’s Ex. 24, 25, 105. A review of purchase orders by project number should have encompassed the base tool order, seventeen amendments, and 204 engineering purchase orders. Thus, Ford’s customs unit should have been able to account for the engineering changes and convey the correct information to its broker for entry. Ford offered no evidence explaining how its customs unit missed the links between the base tool order and the engineering changes when its accounting unit was able to track all the purchase orders. See Pl.’s Ex. 99A (internal audit dated April 30, 1991, capturing all the engineering changes). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Ford exhibited a lack of care and indifference. Ford ignored the timing and cross-references between all the purchase orders which attributed to the undervaluation of the FN-36 dies. b. Ford Failed to Use or Check Its Provisional Value Policy Regarding the FN-36 Dies Ford contends that it had no legal obligation to enter the dies “provisionally” and did so voluntarily. See Def.’s Post-Trial Br. at 13. Ford also argues that the legend on each purchase order, submitted with Ford’s CF 28 response dated November 20, 1989, placed Customs on notice that the prices declared at entry were not final. See id. at 3. The plain language of the legend, however, indicates that a final price adjustment could occur in crediting the buyer, ie. Ford receiving a credit on money paid, which is different from an increase in price that would affect dutiable value. See Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 9; Pl.’s Ex. 24 & 25. Ford’s provisional value policy was a mechanism implemented by Ford to satisfy its 19 U.S.C. § 1484 legal obligation. Provisional value would be marked somewhere on the entry documents, either on the invoice or on a separate memorandum to Customs, notifying Customs that the value of the merchandise was not final. See TT at 215-16, 228-30, 332, 839^40, 868-71, 1022-24; Pl.’s Ex. 85 & 86; Def.’s Ex. C. When Customs knew that an entry’s value was not final, it would withhold liquidation until the final value was known. See TT at 212-16, 427-28, 493-94. Ford correctly asserts that between 1988 and 1991, there was no Customs regulation or directive requiring an importer to use the words “provisional pricing.” See TT at 440, 476, 511, 870. Ford, however, should have known its legal duty under 19 U.S.C. § 1484 to notify Customs if the value at entry was not the complete and final value. See 19 U.S.C. § 1484. Ford’s duty to be forthright on its entry documents remained regardless if Customs was aware of Ford’s provisional value policy. Ford was a sophisticated importer. See TT at 964. Moreover, Ford had an internal provisional value policy and had marked entries as provisional before. See PL’s Ex. 85 & 86; Def.’s Ex. C. Ford understood that it had an obligation to notify Customs if the price at entry was not complete. See Kruzich at 40-42. Otherwise Ford would not have implemented its provisional value policy. The evidence demonstrated that automotive dies were a type of merchandise that Ford historically marked as provisional because it knew the price would usually change after entry. See e.g., TT at 868, PL’s Ex. 85, 86, 107; Def.’s Ex. C. Ford should have notified Customs that the price stated on the entry summaries was not final because Ford knew that the price of the dies did not include the engineering changes or the price was bound to increase. Ford failed to mark the subject entries as provisional. See TT at 229-30; PL’s Ex. 26E & 113. This was a direct failure and lapse of Ford’s provisional value policy, and a material omission affecting Customs’ ability to assess duties correctly. There was a lack of communication among the Ford units about how and when to apply its provisional value policy. See TT at 705-06, 779-80, 827-29; PL’s Ex. 2. With respect to the 204 engineering purchase orders omitted from the entry documents, there was a failure within Ford’s purchasing unit to transmit copies of these purchase orders to the other Ford units and the broker. See PL’s Ex. 105; see also TT at 163-73; PL’s Ex. 2. No witness explained why the 204 engineering purchase orders were either not received by Ford’s customs unit or not included in dutiable costs. The only explanation given by Ford was that an internal computer system caused all the engineering purchase orders to be separately numbered rather than issued as amendments to the base tool order. See TT at 167-68; PL’s Ex. 2, 99, 105. Ford’s explanation, however, is not reasonable. Ford should have had control mechanisms in place to ensure that its provisional value policy was being implemented or used properly. Without any control mechanisms, Ford’s behavior exhibits an indifference to whether its provisional value policy was being implemented or not defeating its purpose. Ford’s failure to follow its provisional value policy also affected Ford’s communications to its broker. Ford did not formalize its provisional entry policy with its broker until November 1991, well after the subject entries. See TT at 247 & 332; PL’s Ex. 107. In early 1989, when the FN-36 dies were entered, Ford’s policy was to tell its broker to enter certain merchandise provisionally on a case by case basis. See TT at 228-30, 839^10, 869-71. Ford would convey this request through verbal or written communication, but did not have a set practice. See TT at 869-71 & 992. Even if the broker received copies of the engineering purchase orders per Ford’s policies, the broker would not have known to enter any merchandise provisionally unless specifically instructed to do so by Ford. More importantly, Ford did not have post-entry mechanisms in place to verify that the information the broker submitted to Customs was true and correct. See TT at 824-25; PL’s Ex. 40 & 99. Ford’s failure to have a clear policy with its broker on when to use provisional value and its failure to verify information submitted by its broker exhibits Ford’s indifference to satisfying its Customs obligations. Ford did not present evidence that it took any steps to ensure the use of its policy, internally or with its broker. Thus, Ford’s failure to implement or check its provisional value policy demonstrates an indifference amounting to gross negligence. 2. Ford’s Failure to Notify Customs “At Once” of the Engineering Purchase Orders was a Material Omission in Violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1485 Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1485(a), an importer “will produce at once to the appropriate customs officer any invoice, paper, letter, document, or information received showing that any such prices or statements are not true or correct.” 19 U.S.C. § 1485(a)(4) (emphasis added). The statute obligates importers to immediately report to Customs any new information showing that the prices declared at entry were incorrect. See Hitachi I, 21 CIT at 382, 964 F.Supp. at 356. In Hitachi, an escalation clause in the contract gave rise to a possible post-entry increase in the value of the imported merchandise. See id. at 371, 964 F.Supp. at 344. The importers failed to disclose the escalation clause on any of the entry documents, or later when it made payments under the escalation clause. See id. The Court found this failure to be in violation of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1484 and 1485. See id. at 381-82, 964 F.Supp. at 356. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1485, an importer must notify Customs of post-entry payments affecting dutiable value “at once” unless other arrangements have been made. Cf. id. at 390, 964 F.Supp. at 362-63. Ford failed the 19 U.S.C. § 1485 “at once” duty when it 1) failed to fully answer Customs’ CF 28s, and 2) failed to promptly disclose the information contained in its internal audit of the FN-36 program. a. Ford Failed to Fully Answer Customs’ CF 28s The testimonial and documentary evidence established that Ford did not have any procedures in place to compare information filed with Customs against purchase orders or payment records unless a CF 28 was issued by Customs. See TT at 821-32; Kruzich at 42-45; Pl.’s Ex. 40 & 99. A Customs CF 28 was a request for information sent to importers when Import Specialists had questions regarding an entry. TT at 347 & 825-26. Various Ford employees knew a problem existed .between Ford’s customs and purchasing units regarding advance notice of upcoming importations because Ford’s customs unit would “discover” purchase orders when answering CF 28s. See TT at 821-32; Kruzich at 29-45. In some instances, the issuance of a CF 28 was the first time Ford’s customs unit even learned that an entry had been made. See TT at 821-32; Kruzich at 42-45. Ford’s customs unit, however, did not advise the purchasing unit supervisors of this issue, thus nothing was done to remedy the problem. See Kruzich at 44-45. The evidence further demonstrated that the accepted practice at Ford was to wait for Customs to issue a CF 28 as a means of checking whether or not Ford had properly declared all dutiable values at entry. See TT at 823-30 & 850-52; Kruzich at 27-45; Pl.’s Ex. 40 & 99. Ford had numerous opportunities to advise Customs of the 204 engineering purchase orders each time it responded to a CF 28. Testimonial evidence explained that Customs had a practice of accepting prior disclosures in CF 28 responses. See TT at 496-97. While CF 28s are routine, Ford did not take them very seriously, and made minimal efforts to respond. See TT at 826-29 & 851-52. Customs issued CF 28s for seven of the eleven subject entries, to which Ford substantively responded only to two. See Pl.’s Ex. 29, 30, .31, 32; Def.’s Ex. BBBB. The documentary evidence shows that of the two substantive CF 28 responses Ford submit