Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT HELLERSTEIN, District Judge. The American Civil Liberties Union and other plaintiffs have demanded that the government produce relevant documents concerning the “treatment of Detainees in United States custody,” the “death of Detainees in United States custody,” and the “rendition of Detainees and other individuals” to countries known to employ torture. Plaintiffs’ demands under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, were first made on October 7, 2003. The government, after being inattentive for many months to the obligations imposed on it by FOIA, see Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Def., 339 F.Supp.2d 501 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (“Opinion and Order of September 15, 2004”), has made large, but not complete, production, reviewing and turning over thousands of documents from various of its agencies. The present motions relate to documents claimed to be possessed by, or of concern to, two government agencies, the Department of Defense (“DOD”) and the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”). More than one year ago, on August 16, 2004, in order to facilitate the government’s processing of documents, plaintiffs created a priority list of enumerated documents (the “August 16, 2004 List”). The priority list was a subset of previous demands that plaintiffs most wished to be produced and which, based on public references to such documents, plaintiffs believed the government could readily process. The priority list focused on specifically identified records, such as records “provided by defendant agencies to Congress, members of Congress, or congressional committees,” or “discussed or identified in the media.” My Opinion and Order of September 15, 2004 set out an expedited procedure with respect to the August 16, 2004 List. Specifically, the government was required to produce the documents responsive to the List, or provide a declaration showing that an exemption against production applied, see Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C.Cir.1973), following which there would be motions for partial summary judgment to resolve disputes regarding documents claimed to be exempt. Initially, defendant CIA took the position that it did not have to search its operational files and identify responsive documents, claiming an exemption by statute. See CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431. However, the CIA Information Act itself provides exceptions to the exemptions from FOIA that it affords the CIA, and I held that since the agency had already conducted a search pursuant to an investigation of its Inspector General into allegations of improprieties of CIA operatives in Iraq, the statute by its explicit terms no longer exempted the CIA from its obligations under FOIA to search. I ordered the CIA to search its investigative files for responsive documents, and either to produce them or show them to be exempt. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dept of Def., 351 F.Supp.2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (Opinion and Order of February 2, 2005, modified, April 18, 2005). Against this backdrop, plaintiffs and defendants both moved for summary judgment on issues arising from plaintiffs’ priority list of August 16, 2004. “Summary judgment is the procedural vehicle by which most FOIA actions are resolved.” Jones-Edwards v. Appeal Bd. of the Nat’l Sec. Agency Cent. Sec. Agency, 352 F.Supp.2d 420, 423 (S.D.NY.2005) (citing Miscavige v. IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 369 (11th Cir.1993) (“Generally, FOIA cases should be handled on motions for summary judgment, once the documents in issue are properly identified.”)). This Opinion addresses five categories of issues that are disputed: (1) the DOD’s withholding of reports and documents relating to the International Committee of the Red Cross; (2) documents relating to the DOD’s interrogation activities; (3) the CIA’s refusal to confirm or deny the existence or possession of certain documents; (4) the CIA’s representation, with regard to documents relating to a request by former CIA Director Tenet to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that a certain Iraqi suspect be held at a high-level detention center and not be identified, that there are no meaningful, reasonably segregable portions of the documents that are not exempt from production; and (5) the DOD’s withholding of photographs taken by Joseph Darby at Abu Ghraib prison and provided to the Army’s Criminal Investigative Division. This written decision expands on, and supersedes, the rulings and observations that I made at the public and in camera oral arguments held on May 26, May 31, August 15, and August 30, 2005. The Applicable Legal Principles As the Second Circuit recently observed, “FOIA was enacted in order to ‘promote honest and open government and to assure the existence of an informed citizenry [in order] to hold the governors accountable to the governed.’ ” Nat’l Council of La Raza v. DOJ, 411 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir.2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 478 (2d Cir.1999)). Clearly, however, the policy of open disclosure is not the only policy to consider. FOIA itself recognizes this, and provides nine exemptions against disclosure. It is the burden of the relevant agency to show that an adequate search was made, and that a “specific, enumerated exemption[ ] set forth in” FOIA authorizes it to withhold a document from production. Id.; Carney v. DOJ, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir.1994); see also Tax Analysts v. IRS, 410 F.3d 715, 719-20 (D.C.Cir.2005) (reiterating that the requirement for granting summary judgment to an agency is that the “agency must show, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the requester, that there is no genuine issue of material fact”). The showing must meet an exacting standard, since, “[consistent with FOIA’s purposes, these statutory exemptions are narrowly construed.” Nat’l Council of La Raza, 411 F.3d at 355-56 (citing Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8, 121 S.Ct. 1060, 149 L.Ed.2d 87 (2001)). My inquiry with respect to the documents in issue is particularly acute. Our nation has been at war with terrorists since their September 11, 2001 suicide crashes into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, killing thousands and wounding our nation in ways that we still cannot fully recount — indeed, we were at war with terrorists since well before that event. American soldiers are fighting and dying daily in Afghanistan and Iraq. The morale of our nation is a vital concern and directly affects the welfare of our soldiers. How then to deal with the commands of FOIA and the strong policy it reflects “to promote honest and open government,” “to assure the existence of an informed citizenry,” and “to hold the governors accountable to the governed”? Of course, national security and the safety and integrity of our soldiers, military and intelligence operations are not to be compromised, but is our nation better preserved by trying to squelch relevant documents that otherwise would be produced for fear of retaliation by an enemy that needs no pretext to attack? FOIA places a heavy responsibility on the judge to determine “de novo” if documents withheld by an agency are properly withheld under an exemption and, if necessary, to examine the withheld documents “in camera”: On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action. In addition to any other matters to which a court accords substantial weight, a court shall accord substantial weight to an affidavit of an agency concerning the agency’s determination as to technical feasibility under paragraph (2)(C) and subsection (b) and reproducibility under paragraph (3)(B). 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); see also Al-Fayed v. CIA 254 F.3d 300, 307 (D.C.Cir.2001) (“[I]t is precisely because FOIA’s terms apply government-wide that we generally decline to accord deference to agency interpretations of the statute, as we would otherwise do under Chevron, U.S A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).”). An agency’s burden, although high, is not impractical. It suffices if the agency shows, by “[affidavits or declarations supplying facts,” that the agency has conducted a “thorough search” for responsive documents, and has given “reasonably detailed explanations why any withheld documents fall within an exemption.” Carney, 19 F.3d at 812; see also Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C.Cir.1973) (requiring as justification for claims of exemption “a relatively detailed analysis in manageable segments” and outlining guidelines for indexing). A district judge is required to give “substantial weight to an agency’s affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record.” Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C.Cir.1984). Once the agency has made a reasonable response, the burden on a FOIA plaintiff is high: In order to justify discovery once the agency has satisfied its burden, the plaintiff must make a showing of bad faith on the part of the agency sufficient to impugn the agency’s affidavits or declarations, or provide some tangible evidence that an exemption claimed by the agency should not apply or summary judgment is otherwise inappropriate. Carney, 19 F.3d at 812 (citations omitted). The declarations submitted by the agency in support of its determination are “accorded a presumption of good faith.” Id. My duty as a judge is to apply the legal principles of the statute and cases discussed above. I. International Committee of the Red Cross Documents Plaintiffs demand production of all reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) concerning the treatment of detainees in Iraq (Item 8 of the prioritized August 16, 2004 List); the government’s responses to the ICRC’s concerns (Item 13); a letter from military lawyers over the signature of Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski to the ICRC responding to its concerns about conditions at Abu Ghraib (Item 49); and a complete set of documents reflecting discussions between the ICRC and military officers at Guantanamo Bay (Item 58). Defendant DOD objected to production, arguing that responsive documents are exempted under FOIA Exemption 3, which provides that FOIA disclosure requirements do not apply to matters that are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). The relevant statute, 10 U.S.C. § 130c, authorizes the withholding of “sensitive information” to the extent such withholding is requested by a foreign government or international organization. See 10 U.S.C. § 130c(a). Section 130c provides that if the information was “provided by, otherwise made available by, or produced in cooperation with” the foreign government or international organization, and certain other criteria are satisfied, the information may be exempted from release by the United States government. In particular, the national security official concerned must determine each of the following: (1) That the information was provided by, otherwise made available by, or produced in cooperation with, a foreign government or international organization. (2) That the foreign government or international organization is withholding the information from public disclosure (relying for that determination on the written representation of the foreign government or international organization to that effect). (3) That any of the following conditions are met: (A) The foreign government or international organization requests, in writing, that the information be withheld. (B) The information was provided or made available to the United States Government on the condition that it not be released to the public. (C) The information is an item of information, or is in a category of information, that the national security official concerned has specified in regulations prescribed under subsection [ (g) ] as being information the release of which would have an adverse effect on the ability of the United States Government to obtain the same or similar information in the future. Id. § 130c(b). Under FOIA, “[t]he two threshold criteria needed to obtain exemption 3 exclusion from public disclosure are that (1) the statute invoked qualifies as an exemption 3 withholding statute, and (2) the materials withheld fall within that statute’s scope.” A. Michael’s Piano, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 18 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir.1994) (citing CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985)). Exemption 3, as the Second Circuit explained, “incorporates the policies of other statutes”; a statute that meets the requirements of Exemption 3 “may effectively exclude certain matters from disclosure, namely, as stated in exemption 3, those matters ‘specifically exempted from disclosure by [the subject] statute.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)). There is no dispute, except for one argument discussed below in this paragraph, that 10 U.S.C. § 130c qualifies as a withholding statute and that the ICRC qualifies as an appropriate international organization; the only question is whether the disputed materials fall within the statute’s scope. See id. at 144 (“[W]e follow the approach taken by the Supreme Court in construing withholding statutes, looking to the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, in order to determine legislative purpose.” (citing Sims, 471 U.S. at 168-73,105 S.Ct. 1881)). Plaintiffs’ only argument that the statute does not apply is that no regulations have been promulgated to support the determination of the relevant national security official, the Secretary of Defense, that the release of the information would have “an adverse effect on the ability of the United States Government to obtain the same or similar information in the future.” See 10 U.S.C. § 130c(b)(3)(C), (g), (h)(1)(A). However, the text of the relevant portion of the statute is in the disjunctive; the statute does not provide that the promulgation of regulations is a necessary precondition to the statute’s effectiveness. Furthermore, a directive of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld requires confidential treatment of all ICRC communications. See Deck of Charles A. Allen, Deputy Gen. Counsel (Internat’l Affairs), Office of Gen. Counsel, DOD, dated Mar. 25, 2005, ¶ 13 & Ex. B (describing and attaching Memo, Sec’y of Def., July 14, 2004). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ argument is without merit. I hold that 10 U.S.C. § 130c constitutes a withholding statute for the purposes of FOIA Exemption 3. I therefore turn to examine if the documents responsive to Items 8, 13, 49, and 58 fall within the scope of 10 U.S.C. § 130c. Item 8 requests the reports delivered by the ICRC to DOD. Such reports clearly fall within the scope of 10 U.S.C. § 130c and accordingly, they are covered by FOIA Exemption 3. At oral argument, plaintiffs conceded that the ICRC reports were properly exempted under the statute, and I so ruled. Tr. of May 31, 2005, at 12. The government argues that Items 13, 49, and 58 reflect a dialogue between DOD and the ICRC, and thus were produced “in cooperation with” the ICRC, and are properly exempted under 10 U.S.C. § 130c(b)(l). Plaintiffs disagree with this characterization and argue, in addition, that with respect to at least some documents, extensive discussions in the press constitute a waiver of confidentiality. The ICRC represented that it maintained, and requested that the United States government likewise maintain, confidentiality with respect to the disputed information, see Letter from Finn Ruda, Deputy Head of ICRC’s Delegation for United States and Canada to Stewart F. Aly, Assoc. Deputy Gen. Counsel, DOD, confirming “that all records of communications from the ICRC or its representatives regarding detainees in Guantánamo and Iraq have been provided by the ICRC to the DOD on condition that the documents not be released to the public.” Second Decl. of Stewart F. Aly, dated Mar. 23, 2005, Ex. D (attaching letter) [hereinafter Second Aly Deck]. The Finn letter also states that “the ICRC itself is withholding such documents from public disclosure.” Id. The requirements of § 130c(b)(2) and (b)(3) are thus satisfied. As to the government’s first argument, that the contested information was “provided by, otherwise made available by, or produced in cooperation with” the ICRC, see 10 U.S.C. § 130c(b)(l), I examined a sample of the documents ex parte and in camera. The government provided a binder of samples — tabs A, B, C, and D, pertaining, respectively, to Items 8, 13, 49, and 58. Tab B provided a sample of four out of twenty-two responsive documents; Tab C contained the one responsive document identified by DOD; and Tab D provided a sample of three of thirty-eight documents. The documents sampled essentially contained responses by DOD to the observations reported by the ICRC, thereby exposing the information “provided by” the ICRC. Just as an attorney’s responses to a client’s requests for advice are privileged — see, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C.Cir.1980) (noting that “[w]hile its purpose is to protect a client’s disclosures to an attorney, the federal courts extend the privilege also to an attorney’s written communications to a client”); In the Matter of Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir.1977) (“Ordinarily the compelled disclosure of an attorney’s communications or advice to the client will effectively reveal the substance of the client’s confidential communication to the attorney. To prevent this result, the privilege normally extends both to the substance of the client’s communication as well as the attorney’s advice in response thereto.”); see also 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2320 at 628-29 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (describing that one reason for privileging an attorney’s communications to a client is that disclosure could “lead[] to inferences of the tenor of the client’s communications”); 1 McCormick on Evidence § 89 at 326 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (“[I]t is generally held that the privilege will protect at least those attorney to client communications which would have a tendency to reveal the confidences of the client.”) — so the DOD’s responses to the ICRC are exempt, for otherwise the ICRC’s request for confidentiality would be compromised. Specifically, I ruled as follows, after in camera inspection of the sample of documents provided by the government: with respect to Tab B documents, responses to concerns raised by the ICRC regarding the treatment of detainees (Item 13), I ruled that the documents, if produced, would disclose information reported by the ICRC to DOD, and were therefore exempt and that no segregable portion could meaningfully be produced following redaction. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). With respect to Item 49, a letter from military lawyers over the signature of Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski to the ICRC responding to its concerns about conditions at Abu Ghraib, I ruled that the single document could be redacted, and thus the portions not covered by 10 U.S.C. § 130c must be disclosed. With respect to Item 58, a complete set of documents reflecting discussions between the ICRC and military officers at Guantánamo Bay, the documents had already been produced in redacted form. I ruled that the redactions had been made appropriately, and thus that the government had satisfied its burden. I accepted over plaintiffs’ challenge the government’s representation that the samples it provided were fairly representative, and I ruled that the principles reflected in my rulings be applied by the government to all other documents in these categories that were responsive to plaintiffs’ requests. II. DOD Interrogation Activities Plaintiffs seek summary judgment to obtain DOD’s responses to requests for: an interim policy put into effect by Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez based on the Guantánamo Bay policy set forth in Gen. Miller’s report (Item 4); documents showing that Lt. Gen. Sanchez approved the use of high-pressure interrogation techniques by senior officials at Abu Ghraib without requiring them to obtain prior approval from outside the prison (Item 37); a memorandum from the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF-7) regarding the applicability of Army Field Manual 34-52 and sensory deprivation (Item 39); a document regarding “Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy” listing interrogation tactics approved by CJTF-7 (Item 40); a directive of Lt. Gen. Sanchez entitled “Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy” (Item 41); and a memorandum from CJTF-7 on interrogations (Item 42). Defendant DOD represented that it possessed only two responsive documents, both of which had been declassified, and that the two had already been turned over to plaintiffs. Defs.’ Br., at 8 (citing Second Aly Decl., ¶¶ 23-26 & Exs. E, F). In response to plaintiffs’ challenge, DOD identified drafts of the two disclosed mem-oranda, Third Decl. of Stewart F. Aly, dated May 19, 2005, ¶¶ 3-9, and, although offering to process the drafts, advised that they probably would be withheld under FOIA Exemption 5, since they constituted the agency’s deliberative processes. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (providing exemption for “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency”). I ruled that the government’s representation as to the completeness of its production had to be accepted, and that the government should complete its processing of the drafts by June 21, 2005, with leave to plaintiffs to raise objections to exemptions claimed by the government. III. CIA’s Glomar Responses The third dispute concerns a response by the CIA, neither confirming nor denying that it possesses documents responsive to three of plaintiffs’ requests. Plaintiffs’ first request is for a memoran-duna from the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to the CIA interpreting the Convention Against Torture (Item 1). Plaintiffs, referring to leaks about the document in the press, comment that the documents may have expressed opinions on certain interrogation techniques, such as “sleep deprivation,” the “use of phobias,” and the “deployment of ‘stress factors,’ ” distinguishing such techniques from those “causing severe physical or mental pain.” Plaintiffs’ second request is for a DOJ memorandum specifying interrogation methods that the CIA may use against top Al-Qaeda members (Item 29), which, according to plaintiffs, may permit a technique known as “water-boarding” whereby a detainee believes he is drowning. Plaintiffs’ third request is for a directive signed by President Bush granting the CIA the authority to set up detention facilities outside the United States and/or outlining interrogation methods that may be used against detainees (Item 61). The CIA, responding to these three categories of requests, gave a “Glomar response,” neither admitting nor denying the existence of these documents in its possession, and claiming that the very fact of the existence or non-existence of the documents must be withheld. The CIA represents that it cannot admit or deny that it possesses documents relating to these categories without revealing “intelligence activities” or “methods,” and that it must therefore give a Glomar response. (a) The Dorn Declarations The CIA Information Review Officer, Marilyn A. Dorn, states in her declaration: CIA confirmation of the existence of the records requested in item nos. 1, 29, and 61 would confirm a CIA interest in or use of specific intelligence methods and activities. Similarly, a CIA response that it had no records responsive to those items would suggest that the CIA was not authorized to use or was not interested in using these intelligence methods and activities. Either response would provide foreign intelligence agencies and other groups hostile to the United States with information about CIA’s intelligence activities and methods. See Fourth Deck of Marilyn A. Dorn, dated Mar. 30, 2005, ¶ 13 [hereinafter Fourth Dorn Deck]. Ms. Dorn claims that records responsive to the three items requested cannot be identified as either existing, or not existing, without compromising national security. If the CIA were to state that the documents existed, the CIA would be admitting that it “had engaged in clandestine intelligence activities or had an interest in pursuing clandestine intelligence activities upon which DOJ allegedly advised or which were allegedly included in the ‘Presidential Directive,’ ” and would also “acknowledge a CIA capability to pursue such intelligence activities and employ such methods,” because the “CIA would not request legal memoranda from DOJ or authorizations from the President for intelligence activities in which it had no interest.” Id. ¶¶ 10-11. If, on the other hand, it were to deny the existence of the documents, its denial “would acknowledge a lack of CIA interest or capability.” Id. ¶ 11. Hence, it can neither admit nor deny. Ms. Dorn states that the “mere confirmation or denial of the existence or nonexistence of [such] documents ... reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security,” id. ¶ 16, because it would “interfere with the United States Government’s collection of intelligence in the war on terrorism,” id. ¶ 12, and be of “material assistance” to those who would disrupt our intelligence operations, id. ¶ 14. Ms. Dorn states also that confirmation or denial of the existence of the requested documents could bear on the foreign relations of the United States, since countries that cooperate with us “may be less willing to cooperate if the U.S. Government were to officially acknowledge CIA current or past clandestine intelligence activities and methods, or intelligence interests.” Id. ¶ 15. Following oral argument in May, the CIA submitted a Fifth Declaration of Marilyn A. Dorn, dated July 15, 2005 [hereinafter Fifth Dorn Deck], a classified document, which supplements the agency’s justifications for its Glomar responses. I have reviewed the Fifth Dorn Declaration in camera and ex parte. This Opinion discloses no fact or argument that is not part of the public record. The CIA justifies its Glomar response, neither admitting nor denying the existence of three categories of documents responsive to plaintiffs’ demands, on the basis of Exemptions 1 and 3 to FOIA. I discuss each of these exemptions in turn. (b) Exemption 1 Exemption 1 exempts matters that are “(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). Executive Order 12958, effective as amended March 25, 2003, provides for classification of national security information. Exec. Order No. 12958, reprinted as amended by E.O. 13292 in 50 U.S.C. § 435 [hereinafter E.O. 12958]; see also Exec. Order No. 13292, 68 Fed.Reg. 15315 (Mar. 28, 2003). Pursuant to E.O. 12958, an agency may classify information within specified categories if the appropriate classification authority “determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security”: Sec. 1.1. Classification Standards, (a) Information may be originally classified under the terms of this order only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) an original classification authority is classifying the information; (2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government; (3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed in section 1.4 of this order; and (4) the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized dis- . closure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage. E.O. 12958 § 1.1(a). Permissible categories of information that may be classified include information concerning: (a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations; (b) foreign government information; (c) intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology; and (d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources. Id. § 1.4. Information may not be classified to “conceal violations of law,” to “prevent embarrassment,” or to prevent or delay release of information “that does not require protection”: Sec. 1.7. Classification Prohibitions and Limitations. (a) In no case shall information be classified in order to: (1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; (2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; (3) restrain competition; or (4) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of the national security. Id. § 1.7(a). The Executive Order also provides for a Glomar response; in response to a FOIA request, “[a]n agency may refuse to confirm or deny the existence or nonexistence of requested records whenever the fact of their existence or nonexistence is. itself classified under this order or its predecessors.” Id. § 3.6(a). (c) Exemption 3 The CIA also justifies its Glomar responses under Exemption 3, which exempts matters “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute ... (A) requiring] that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion ..., or (B) establishing] particular criteria for withholding or referring] to particular types of matters- to be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). The framework for analyzing agency withholdings under Exemption 3 was outlined earlier in connection with the ICR.C documents. See A. Michael’s Piano, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 18 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir.1994) (requiring the government to show that “(1) the statute invoked qualifies as an exemption 3 withholding statute, and (2) the materials withheld fall within that statute’s scope”). The qualifying statute here is Section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-3(c)(7) (West 2003), which commands the Director of Central Intelligence (“DCI”) to “protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.” See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167-68, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985); Assassination Archives and Research Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55, 58 (D.C.Cir.2003). The CIA contends that a substantive answer to plaintiffs’ requests can “reasonably be expected to lead to unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods.” Wolf v. CIA 357 F.Supp.2d 112, 117 (D.D.C.2004) (quoting Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C.Cir.1982)). The Supreme Court in Sims, analyzing the “intelligence sources and methods” language of the statute, held that its “broad sweep” “comport[ed] with the nature of the Agency’s unique responsibilities.” 471 U.S. at 169, 105 S.Ct. 1881 (construing an earlier version of the statute authorizing the DCI to protect “intelligence sources and methods”). The Supreme Court ruled that “the plain meaning of the statutory language, as well as the legislative history of the National Security Act ... indicates that Congress vested in the Director of Central Intelligence very broad authority to protect all sources of intelligence information from disclosure,” and that the DCI, not the judiciary, has the responsibility to weigh the factors and decide if disclosure “may lead to an unacceptable risk of compromising the Agency’s intelligence-gathering process.” Id. at 168-69, 180, 105 S.Ct. 1881; see also Fitzgibbon v. CIA 911 F.2d 755, 766 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“The assessment of harm to intelligence sources, methods and operations is entrusted to the Director of Central Intelligence, not to the courts.” (citing Sims)). (d) Analysis The Glomar response, by which the agency neither admits nor denies that it possesses a requested document, traces its roots to Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C.Cir.1976) [hereinafter Phillippi /]. That case involved the Glomar Explorer, a large ship ostensibly designed for oceanic research. The ship was recorded as owned by the Summa Corporation, a corporation owned or controlled by Howard Hughes. However, according to accounts appearing in the media, the real owner and operator was the CIA. A controversy arose concerning whether the CIA — before the news stories appeared — had attempted to persuade the media not to publish these accounts. The plaintiff, Phillippi, a journalist, filed suit under FOIA to uncover such contacts between the CIA and the news media, demanding production of: all records relating to the Director’s or any other agency personnel’s attempts to persuade any media personnel not to broadcast, write, publish, or in any other way make public the events relating to the activities of the Glomar Explorer, including, but not limited to, files, documents, letters, [etc.]. Id. at 1011 n. 1. The CIA, asserting that the “existence or nonexistence of the requested records was itself a classified fact exempt from disclosure under Sections (b)(1) and (3) of FOIA,” id. at 1012, determined that “in the interest of national security, involvement by the U.S. Government in the activities which are the subject matter of [Phillippi’s] request can neither be confirmed nor denied.” Id. The CIA was concerned that admission or denial of contacts with the press would amount to admission or denial of its involvement with the Glomar Explorer project and would thereby compromise “intelligence sources and methods” in violation of section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1970), and “severely damage the foreign relations and the national defense of the United States.” Id. at 1011, 1013-14 (Aff. of Brent Scow-croft, Ass’t to Pres, for Nat’l Sec. Affairs). As the Court of Appeals described the issue: In effect, the situation is as if appellant had requested and been refused permission to see a document which says either “Yes, we have records related to contacts with the media concerning the Glo-mar Explorer” or “No, we do not have any such records.” Id. at 1012. The Court of Appeals remanded to require the CIA to “submit a public justification, which is as detailed as is possible, for refusing to confirm or deny the existence of the requested records.” Id. at 1015 n. 12. The Court of Appeals held that the district court should discharge its de novo review obligation by first creating “as complete a public record as is possible,” and only then, if necessary, by “examin[ing] classified affidavits in camera and without participation by plaintiffs counsel.” Id. at 1013. Later cases, relying on Phillippi I, have approved Glomar responses where substantive responses, either admitting or denying that particular documents existed, “would remove any ‘lingering doubts’ that a foreign intelligence service might have on the subject, and [where] the perpetuation of such doubts may be an important means of protecting national security.” Frugone v. CIA 169 F.3d 772, 774-75 (D.C.Cir.1999) (citing Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 745 (D.C.Cir.1981)); see also Hunt v. CIA 981 F.2d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir.1992). The danger of Glomar responses is that they encourage an unfortunate tendency of government officials to over-classify information, frequently keeping secret that which the public already knows, or that which is more embarrassing than revelatory of intelligence sources or methods. That over-classification was evident in Phillippi, after administrations changed and “the government acknowledged both that the CIA was responsible for the [Glo-mar Explorer] project” and that “CIA officials had tried to dissuade members of the press from publishing stories about it.” Phillippi v. CIA 655 F.2d 1325, 1328 (D.C.Cir.1981) [hereinafter Phillippi II]. Yet, even then, the CIA was allowed to redact records to withhold descriptions of conversations between the CIA and the press. The district court rejected plaintiffs arguments that since the world already knew, possibly from the CIA’s own disclosures, that the real purpose of the Glomar Explorer apparently extended beyond oceanic research to raising a lost Russian submarine from the ocean floor, there could be no remaining statutory purpose to withhold descriptions of contacts with the press. The Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s deference to the CIA, holding that courts lacked competence to decide such delicate questions affecting national security and should defer to “well-documented and specific affidavits of the CIA.” Id. at 1330. In sum, the line between what may be revealed and what must be concealed is itself capable of conveying information to foreign intelligence agencies. For this reason, this court cannot simply assume, over the well-documented and specific affidavits of the CIA to the contrary, that revelation of seemingly innocent information which might nonetheless jeopardize a fallback cover story is required under the FOIA, either because the information in question has already been made public, or even, as in the present case, because it was disseminated for confidential purposes by the CIA itself. Without the ability to engineer controlled leaks of disinformation, the CIA would be deprived of the ability to disseminate a fallback cover while simultaneously protecting it. Id. The Court of Appeals also accepted that there was a national interest in keeping foreign analysts in the dark, and leaving them unsure if that which was publicly disclosed was all that was secretly known. As the Court of Appeals put it: FOIA does not require the CIA to lighten the task of our adversaries around the world by providing them with documentary assistance from which to piece together the truth. Id. at 1332. And, further, even if the only question was whether to recognize officially that which was informally or unofficially believed to exist, the niceties of international diplomacy sometimes make it important not to embarrass a foreign country or its leaders, and exemptions from FOIA protect that concern as well. Id. at 1332-33. Historians will evaluate, and legislators debate, how wise it is for a society to give such regard to secrecy. The practice of secrecy, to compartmentalize knowledge to those having a clear need to know, makes it difficult to hold executives accountable and compromises the basics of a free and open democratic society. It also creates a dangerous tendency to withhold information from those outside the insular group, for fear of compromising the sources and integrity of intelligence. The consequences can be dire for, as noted in the 9/11 Commission Report, the strict need-to-know, proprietary approach to intelligence that has been employed by government agencies prevents the effective use of our vast storehouse of information. 9/11 Comm’n Rep. (2004), § 13.3, at 416-17 (“The biggest impediment to all-source analysis — to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots — is the human or systemic resistance to sharing information.”). Identities of terrorists may be locked in the files of one agency and not given to another, or reported, if at all, only at the very top of chains of command, denying real-time need to know by those at operating points. The insularity of information tends to cause a multiplicity of intelligence-gathering agencies, each zealously protecting its own private sources in competition with other agencies. See, e.g., Judith Miller, A New York Cop in Israel, Stepping a Bit on F.B.I. Toes, N.Y. Times, May 15, 2005, § 1, at 37 (discussing tensions between the New York Police Department and the FBI arising from their separate intelligence-gathering endeavors abroad, in turn resulting from the NYPD’s desire to have quick access, on an equal footing with federal agencies, to key counter-terrorism information). There was no more cogent critic of the penchant by government officials to over-classify information than the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and few with his competence and experience. Senator Moynihan, reflecting on his experiences as Chairman of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, among many other relevant positions, commented at the conclusion of his book, Secrecy: [A] huge proportion of the government’s effort at classifying is futile anyway. Let [George F.] Kennan have the last word. In a letter of March 1997 he writes: “It is my conviction, based on some 70 years of experience, first as a government official and then in the past 45 years as an historian, that the need by our government for secret intelligence about affairs elsewhere in the world has been vastly overrated.”... A case can be made ... that secrecy is for losers. For people who don’t know how important information really is. The Soviet Union realized this too late. Openness is now a singular, and singularly American, advantage. We put it in peril by poking along in the mode of an age now past. It is time to dismantle government secrecy, this most pervasive of Cold War-era regulations. It is time to begin building the supports for the era of openness that is already upon us. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy, 226-27 Yale Univ. Press 1998); see generally Rep. of the Comm’n on Protecting and Reducing Gov’t Secrecy (1997). This is not to say that there is no room for secrets, or that the courts have the competence or the expertise of national security experts. Indeed, the courts generally respect the CIA’s right to make a Glomar response. See Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 244, 246 (7th Cir.2004) (“Every appellate court to address the issue has held that the FOIA permits the CIA to make a ‘Glomar response’ when it fears that inferences from Vaughn indexes or selective disclosure could reveal classified sources or methods of obtaining foreign intelligence.”)- Most such cases involve requests by persons who claim to have had employment or other personal connections to the agency, or who seek such information about others who may have had such relationships. By giving a Glomar response, the CIA is able to avoid identifying its employees, or targets, and their activities. See, e.g., id. at 245 (Glomar response necessary to avoid “reveal[ing] details about intelligence-gathering methods”); Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 774 (D.C.Cir.1999) (Glomar response necessary to avoid acknowledgment of employment); Minier v. CIA 88 F.3d 796, 801-02 (9th Cir.1996) (Glomar response necessary to avoid revealing if person was a CIA agent); Hunt v. CIA 981 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir.1992) (“[Disclosure of the existence or non-existence of records pertaining to Eslaminia,” an Iranian national allegedly murdered by Hunt, “is tantamount to a disclosure whether or not he was a CIA source or intelligence target.”). Other cases defer to the CIA’s unwillingness to describe its intelligence-gathering activities. See, e.g., Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 774 (D.C.Cir.1984) (upholding Glomar response to request for “information concerning alleged efforts by the United States and other countries to infíl-trate intelligence agents and potential guerrillas into Albania during the period 1945-53”); Gardels v. CIA 689 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (D.C.Cir.1982) (upholding Glomar response to request by a student at the University of California for “documents revealing covert CIA connections with or interest in the University”); Wolf v. CIA 357 F.Supp.2d 112, 114 (D.D.C.2004) (upholding Glomar response to request by a researcher for records concerning Jorge Elicier Gaitan, a former Colombian presidential candidate who was assassinated in 1948); Earth Pledge Found. v. CIA 988 F.Supp. 623, 625 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (upholding Glomar response to request for communications between the CIA station in the Dominican Republic and CIA headquarters “pertaining to contacts with dissident elements, hostile to the regime of Rafael Trujillo”). In the present case, the CIA justifies its Glomar responses, in its publicly filed documents, by referencing the same types of concerns as those found in the cases. Ms. Dorn states that the “CIA would not request legal memoranda from DOJ or authorizations from the President for intelligence activities in which it had no interest”; that “[mjerely acknowledging that the CIA sought legal opinions or authorizations addressing specific interrogation and detention activities is itself classified because the answer provides information about the types of intelligence methods and activities that are available to the CIA or may be of interest to the CIA”; and that “[rjevealing that information reasonably could be expected to interfere with the United States Government’s collection of intelligence in the war on terrorism.” Fourth Dorn Decl. ¶¶ 11-12. Further, Ms. Dorn states that our foreign relations could be compromised because hitherto cooperating countries “may be less willing to cooperate if the U.S. Government were to officially acknowledge CIA current or past clandestine intelligence activities and methods, or intelligence interests.” Id. ¶ 15. In the Fifth Dorn Declaration, a classified document submitted to me in camera, Ms. Dorn provides further elaboration and describes particularized harms to justify the agency’s Glomar responses. In Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773 (D.C.Cir.1984), the Court of Appeals upheld a Glomar response under Exemptions 1 and 3 upon descriptions of specific probable harms that might flow from substantive admissions or denials. The request in Miller was for: All information on attempts by the U.S., U.K., and other western countries to infiltrate intelligence agents and potential guerrillas into Albania during the period between the end of World War II and the death of Stalin in 1953, including but not limited to those operations apparently betrayed to the Russians by Kim Philby. Id. at 774. In response, the Information Review Officer for the Directorate of Operations of the CIA (the same position held by Ms. Dorn), described why national security and the United States’ foreign relations would be compromised by a substantive disclosure: 1) disclosure now might prevent foreign countries from participating in future covert missions, 2) disclosure might hamper future relations with Albania, 3) a pattern of denials or affirmances would permit hostile nations to piece together a “catalog” of U.S. covert missions, 4) denial or affirmance would enable the Soviet Union to ascertain the reliability of its double agent, Kim Philby, 5) acknowledgement could jeopardize sources and sympathizers still within Albania, 6) acknowledgement could hamper future recruitment of sources, and 7) acknowledgement would reveal the particular intelligence method — infiltration of agents — allegedly used in the mission. Id. at 775-76. The Information Review Officer showed also how acknowledging the existence of the Albanian program would reveal “intelligence sources or methods” in three possible ways, thereby compromising them: “by providing the critical confirmation which would allow Albanian leaders to identify participants in the covert action; by damaging future CIA efforts to recruit sources; and by revealing how, where and when the CIA has deployed its resources.” Id. at 777-78. Upon these particularized justifications, the Court of Appeals upheld the CIA’s Glomar response under Exemptions 1 and 3 to FOIA. Courts interpret FOIA to afford agency affidavits “a presumption of good faith” and award agencies “summary judgment on the basis of affidavits” that are “adequate on their face.” Carney v. DOJ, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir.1994); see also Miller, 730 F.2d at 776 (“[T]he district court must accord substantial weight to an agency’s affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record.” (quotations omitted)). Clearly, the need for such deference is particularly acute in the area of national security. The statutory text of FOIA, however, requires the court to “determine the matter de novo, ” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), for “[i]n no case” is classification to conceal “violations of law” or “inefficiency, or administrative error,” or to mask “embarrassment.” See E.O. 12958 § 1.7; see also Phillippi I, 546 F.2d at 1013-15 & n. 12. Largely, the courts fail to grapple with this tension, ruling instead that the administrative assertions of secrecy should be accepted without much, if any, de novo review. In the case before me, Item 29, a DOJ memorandum specifying interrogation methods that the CIA may use against top Al-Qaeda members, and Item 61, a directive signed by President Bush granting the CIA the authority to set up detention facilities outside the United States and/or outlining interrogation methods that may be used against detainees, specifically refer to “interrogation methods” alleged to be considered, and perhaps used, by the CIA in connection with detainees in United States’ custody. The discussions of these documents in the public press, undoubtedly arising from numerous leaks of the documents, raise concern, however, that the purpose of the CIA’s Glomar responses is less to protect intelligence activities, sources or methods than to conceal possible “violations of law” in the treatment of prisoners, or “inefficiency” or “embarrassment” of the CIA. Compare 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-3(c)(7) (West 2003) (protecting intelligence sources and methods), and E.O. 12958 § 1.4 (same; permissible subjects of classification), with E.O. 12958 § 1.7 (criteria that forbid classification). The Dorn Declarations amply discuss the need to protect “intelligence sources and methods.” But they do not describe the intelligence sources or methods themselves, or reflect any discussion within the administration whether the particular methods might constitute a “violation[ ] of law,” or an “embarrassment,” or administrative “inefficiency” or “error,” when debate on these points within the administration probably occurred, as suggested by the discussions in the press. See E.O. 12958 § 1.7. And since the existence of the documents that plaintiffs request, which give rise to all this controversy, is neither admitted nor denied, there is nothing to show the court that might allow me to arrive at my own conclusions. In short, I am not given enough relevant information to make the de novo determinations that FOIA would seem to require. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). Nevertheless, under the cases and notwithstanding FOIA’s clear statutory command, there is small scope for judicial evaluation in this area. See, e.g., Phillippi II, 655 F.2d 1325. The Fifth Dorn Declaration sets out that which the cases require. See Miller, 730 F.2d 773. The agency’s arguments that it should not be required officially to acknowledge the precise “intelligence activities” or “methods” it employs or considers — for example, whether it has any role whatsoever in the interrogation of detainees — are given deference by the courts, for the CIA, not the courts, is deemed to have the competence to “weigh the variety of complex and subtle factors in determining whether disclosure of information may lead to an unacceptable risk of compromising the Agency’s intelligence-gathering process.” Sims, 471 U.S. at 180, 105 S.Ct. 1881; see also Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 766 (D.C.Cir.1990) (disapproving the district court’s performance of “its own calculus as to whether or not harm to the national security or to intelligence sources and methods would result from disclosure”). On the basis of the Fourth and, in particular, the Fifth Dorn Declarations, I accept the CIA’s Glomar response with respect to Items 29 and 61 of the August 16, 2004 List. Item 1, however, a “[mjemorandum from DOJ to CIA interpreting the Convention Against Torture,” does not, by its terms, implicate “intelligence sources or methods.” The CIA’s Glomar response to that item focuses, not on plaintiffs’ demand, but on plaintiffs’ effort to explain to the government why, because of frequent references in the public press, it should not be difficult for the government to process its response. Thus, plaintiffs referred to news reports of interrogation techniques that may have been justified in the memorandum, such as “sleep deprivation,” the “use of phobias,” and the “deployment of ‘stress factors,’ ” distinguishing. such practices from those that cause “severe physical or mental pain” characteristic of torture. The CIA justifies its Glomar response not on the text of the demand, but on all those references, as if they were part of the demand itself. See Fourth Dorn Deck, at 5 n. 4. In effect, the agency seeks to use plaintiffs’ attempt to provide assistance to the government in identifying the memorandum as a basis for withholding information about the item requested. But plaintiffs’ speculation as to the possible contents of the memorandum is not controlling; rather, it is the unem-bellished request set forth in the August 16, 2004 List (set out in the “Description of Record” column) that controls. The List was created for the benefit of defendant agencies, and they must be bound by it. See Miller, 730 F.2d at 777 (The “agency [i]s bound to read [the request] as drafted, not as either agency officials or [the requester] might wish it was drafted.”). I rule, therefore, that acknowledging whether or not the memorandum requested by plaintiffs exists reveals nothing about the agency’s practices or concerns or its “intelligence sources or methods.” Available exemptions can be proved if necessary to avoid compromise, if any, to the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Since the government has failed in its burden to justify its Glomar response, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir.1999); Carney v. DOJ, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir.1994), the government shall produce the documents relating to Item 1, or prove that the same are exempt from production. IV. CIA Request to DOD to Detain an Iraqi Suspect Without Identifying the Suspect The fourth set of issues involves seventy-one documents responsive to Item 43 of the August 16, 2004 List, a request by former CIA Director Tenet to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld that the DOD hold an Iraqi suspect at a high-level detention center, but that he not be listed on the prison rolls, and an order by Secretary Rumsfeld implementing the request. The CIA, responding on behalf of the government, withheld the documents under Exemptions I, 2, 3, 5 and 7(A). In particular, with respect to Exemption 1, the CIA relied upon Executive Order 12958, which governs the classification of national security information. With respect to Exemption 3, the CIA relied upon the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-3(c)(7) (West 2003), and Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. § 403g (West Supp.2003), as the statutes furnishing the requisite authority to withhold. The CIA supported its position by providing a Vaughn index of 126 pages, describing each document by its length and general subject matter, but not as to its specific content. See Fourth Dorn Deck, Ex. A. At the end of each description, Ms. Dorn represented that “There is no meaningful, reasonably segregable portion of the document that can be released.” Plaintiffs challenge whether, indeed, there are no “meaningful, reasonably seg-regable” portions of the documents. If there are, those portions must be produced. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (“Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection.”). Plaintiffs asked the court to review in camera each of the seventy-one responsive documents. Plaintiffs do not press their challenge to Ms. Dorn’s showing that the documents overall are exempt from production. An agency seeking to withhold material may satisfy its burden under FOIA by affidavits evincing a thorough search and providing reasonably detailed explanations for the withholding. Carney v. DOJ, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir.1994). Cases generally disfavor in camera inspections by district court judges as the primary method for resolving FOIA disputes. See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire and Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 224, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (“The in camera review provision is discretionary by its terms, and is designed to be invoked when the issue before the District Court could not be otherwise resolved; it thus does not mandate that the documents be individually examined in every case.”); Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir.1999) (“When a government agent can attest in a sworn affidavit that the redactions are necessary, and elaborate on the reasons for the redactions with sufficient specificity, the district court should be able to rule on the appropriateness of the redactions without conducting an in camera review of the redacted materials.”); PHE, Inc. v. DOJ, 983 F.2d 248, 253 (D.C.Cir.1993) (noting that in FOIA cases “in camera review is generally disfavored”). However, when a court is not able to resolve to its own satisfaction an agency’s determination to withhold documents, it may require a further showing by the agency and, if necessary, it may conduct an in camera review. See Halpern, 181 F.3d at 295 (ruling that, on remand, “the district court may, in its discretion, order in camera review of the unredacted documents themselves,” and remarking that “[i]n camera review is considered the exception, not the rule, and the propriety of such review is a matter entrusted to the district court’s discretion” (quoting Local 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 1177, 1180 (2d Cir.1988))). Ms. Dorn’s Fourth Declaration describes the nature of each of the seventy-one documents, and the procedures by which she determined non-segregability with respect to each document. Fourth Dorn Decl. ¶ 22. Ms. Dorn’s statement that a “line-by-line review was conducted for all the documents, individually and as [a] whole” is undocumented, and her statement that “there are no meaningful, reasonably seg-regable, non-exempt portions” of the seventy-one documents is conclusory, for she does not describe the individual documents paragraph by paragraph and line by line. Id. FOIA provides that the district judge has the responsibility, ultimately, to make the determination, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), and I determined that there was no feasible way for me to evaluate the conclusory determination of lack of segregability at the end of each of Ms. Dorn’s document descriptions without viewing at least a sample of the documents in camera. I ordered the plaintiffs to select a sample size of fifteen documents, that is, about 20% of the total set of seventy-one responsive documents,