Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER VRATIL, District Judge. Xiangyuan Zhu pro se brings suit against the Federal Housing Finance Board (“Finance Board”), the Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka (“FHLB-Topeka”), and individual directors, officers and employees of FHLB-Topeka. Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986; Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq.; (“Title II”); the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (“FHA”); the First, Fifth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; 18 U.S.C. § 1514A of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961— 1964 (“RICO”); the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”); the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611 et seq. (“FMLA”); the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”); the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (“EPA”);Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”); and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”). This matter comes before the Court on Topeka Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint In Part For Want Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Doc. # 86) filed February 15, 2005, Topeka Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint For Failure To State A Claim (Doc. # 88) filed February 15, 2005, and the Motion Of Federal Housing Finance Board To Dismiss (Doc. # 93) filed March 9, 2005. The so-called “Topeka defendants” include FHLB-Tope-ka; its directors, Ronald K. Went, Richard C. Berg, Duane L. Fager, David W. Her-linger, Bruce R. Lauritzen, Gilbert Lund-strom, James C. Orbison, B. Stephen Parker, Gregory Stine and Louis F. Trost; and FHLB-Topeka officers and employees, Andy Jetter, Executive Vice President, Mark Yardley, First Senior Vice President, Frank Tiernan, Sr. Vice President, Richard Schaplowsky, First Vice President and General Counsel, Dina Cox, Vice President and Director of Human Resources, Sherri Workman, Human Resources Generalist, Mark McLelland, Vice President and Director of Risk Management, Tommy Millburn, Vice President and Director of Internal Audit, Cindy Williams, User Support Analyst, and Chris Shumaker, Risk Analyst. Also before the Court are the Supplement To Plaintiffs Opposition To Topeka Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint In Part For Want of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Doc. # 117) filed May 25, 2005, the Supplement To Plaintiffs Opposition To Topeka Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint For Failure To State A Claim (Doc. # 118) filed May 25, 2005 and the Supplement To Plaintiffs Opposition To Topeka Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint In Part For Want Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction — The Attachment Of Plaintiffs Outline Of Her Second Amended Complaint, (Doc. # 120) filed June 6, 2005, each of which the Court construes as a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. The -final motion before the Court is the Motion To Strike (Doc. # 121) which the Topeka Defendants filfed June 8, 2005, asking the Court to strike each of plaintiffs foregoing supplements. As to the motion to file a second amended complaint, plaintiff has not complied with local rules regarding amendment of pleadings. Under D. Kan. Rule 15.1(a), “a motion to amend shall set forth a concise statement of amendment sought to be allowed, with the signed original, and one copy of the proposed amended pleading, attached.” Plaintiff has not attached a copy of a proposed amended complaint. The Court is therefore in no position to evaluate the sufficiency of her claims and overrules her motions to file a second amended complaint (as contained in Document ## 117, 118 and 120) and further overrules as moot defendants’ motion to strike (Doc. # 121). Facts Plaintiffs amended complaint alleges the following facts: Zhu, a female member of a racial minority, was born on September 27, 1953. In December of 1997, FHLB-Topeka hired Zhu as a financial analyst. During the first six months of her employment she was promoted as Senior Risk Analyst and served in that capacity for about three years, through July 26, 2001. Zhu conducted balance sheet analysis and audited modeling results for the Risk Management Department. She made detailed suggestions so that the model results would match the market values calculated in Accounting. Zhu also served on the Interest Rate Risk Committee. FHLB-Topeka is a district bank of the Federal Home Loan Bank system for Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska and Oklahoma. It is incorporated under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-49 and has its principal place of business in Topeka, Kansas. The Fair Housing Finance Board (“Finance Board”) The Finance Board is an independent executive agency which was created as part of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1421 et seq., as a successor to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. The Finance Board consists of five directors, four of whom are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The fifth director is the Secretary for Housing and Urban Development. See 12 U.S.C. § 1422a(b)(l)(A & B). The primary duty of the Finance Board is to ensure that the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks operate in a financially safe and sound manner. See 12 U.S.C. § 1422a(a)(3)(A). The Federal Home Loan Banks are government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) as defined by 2 U.S.C. § 622(8), and they help assure an adequate supply of mortgage funds by making loans, to creditworthy financial institutions which then lend the funds to individual home buyers. See 12 U.S.C. § 1430. Each Federal Home Loan Bank has individual financial institution “members” which share in the bank’s ownership and management functions. All federally chartered savings and loan associations automatically become members of a Federal Home Loan Bank. Other financial institutions may become members if they meet eligibility requirements. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(f), 1424(a). Federal Home Loan Banks also provide other services for their members, including check clearing, letters of credits and trustee functions. See 12 U.S.C. § 1431. Federal Home Loan Banks are federally-chartered corporations whose stock is held by their member financial institutions, and Federal Home Loan Banks do not receive operating funds from the federal government. Federal Home Loan Banks are subject to the Government Corporation Control Act, 31 U.S.C. § 9101 et seq., which requires the Federal Home Loan Banks to submit annual management reports to Congress and subjects them to periodic government audits. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 9105, 9106. The capital stock of each Federal Home Loan Bank is issued in its own name and is owned entirely by its member institutions, which are required to purchase and maintain minimum levels of Federal Home Loan Bank stock. See 12 U.S.C. § 1426(c). The banks distribute dividends to their shareholders, subject to Finance Board regulations. Id. § 1426(h); 12 C.F.R. § 917.9 (2002). The Federal Home Loan Banks obtain funds for advances and operating expenses through fees to member institutions for various services and by selling consolidated obligations in the capital and money markets. These bonds, which are backed by secured advances and government insured or guaranteed mortgages, are not obligations and are not guaranteed by the United States government. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1431(b), 1435. A board of directors manages each Federal Home Loan Bank. The Board is comprised of 14 members, eight of whom are elected by member institutions. See 12 U.S.C. § 1427(a). The Finance Board appoints the other six members of the board and also designates the chairman and vice-chairman. Id. The Board then selects a president and other officers for the bank, subject to approval by the Finance Board. See 12 U.S.C. § 1432(a). The Finance Board has the power to remove any director, officer, employee or agent of any Federal Home Loan Bank. See 12 U.S.C. § 1422b(a)(2). Each Federal Home Loan Bank submits a budget for approval by the Finance Board. Federal Home Loan Banks may only acquire or dispose of securities or other property with prior approval of the Finance Board or in accordance with stated agency policy. See 12 U.S.C. § 1432(a); 12 C.F.R. § 956.2. Other Federal Home Loan Bank functions, such as the taking of demand and time deposits, are carried out only upon terms and conditions the Finance Board may prescribe. See 12 U.S.C. § 1431(e)(1). Federal Home Loan Bank employees are not employees of the federal government. See 12 U.S.C. § 1422b(a)(2). Federal Home Loan Bank employees participate in a private employer retirement plan (the Financial Institutions Retirement Fund) which is not open to federal employees. Each Federal Home Loan Bank has the authority to hire and fire its employees at will, without recourse to any civil service remedy. See 12 U.S.C. § 1432(a). Background of Legal Proceedings Involving Zhu and Marc Bunting In June of 1998, Zhu informed her real estate agent, Marc Bunting of Countrywide Realty, Inc., that she did not want to buy a house at 2918 SW Gainsboro Road. Although it is not clear from the complaint, Zhu apparently was already living in the house. Bunting called Zhu at work and threatened to sue her if she did not buy the house. Bunting then went to FHLB-Topeka and threatened to sue Zhu because of her race. Zhu purchased the home based on Bunting’s promise to make repairs and Bunting kept a key to the home on the pretext of repairing the house. From November 23, 1998 through June 13, 1999, Bunting went into Zhu’s home and demanded sexual favors. He threatened that if Zhu refused, he would destroy her. When Zhu went to the Countrywide office to ask for home repairs, Bunting’s secretary, Candace Thomas, yelled at her, “You are a Chinese, you should not come here, you should go find a Chinese man in the town.” Zhu also went to Countrywide to ask for her key. Bunting then called Zhu at FHLB-Topeka and threatened her with a restraining order. He asserted that he would have her employer fire her, that he would sue her and have police arrest her “but for” her race. On June 30, 1999, Bunting went into Zhu’s home and sexually assaulted her “but for” her race. On July 1, 1999, Zhu took a written complaint to the Countrywide office and asked for the promised repairs. Robert Thomas, a Countrywide employee, approached her in a threatening manner. Thomas yelled at Zhu that if she ever came to Countrywide again he would have the police arrest her and have her employer fire her “but for” her race. On May 12, 2000, Thomas G. Lemon, an attorney for Bunting, sent Zhu a certified letter which asserted that she had stalked and harassed Bunting for two years and had criminally trespassed on his property. The letter threatened Zhu with criminal proceedings “but for” her race. On May 19, 2000, Bunting’s attorney filed a petition in the Third Judicial District Court of Kansas alleging that Zhu had violated Kansas trespass law and seeking a permanent restraining order. After a two-day bench trial on November 1 and November 3, 2000, Judge Franklin R. Theis entered an order which permanently restrained Zhu “from being within 500 feet of [Bunting] wherever he may be found, except as any litigation or alternative dispute resolution proceedings require their joint attendance.” At some unspecified time, Tiernan (Senior Vice President of FHLB-Topeka) called Zhu into his office, told her that she had better accept the permanent restraining order, and threatened that she should not “go after the white male Mr. Lemon and the law firm.” Amended Complaint (Doc. # 72) ¶ 16. Tiernan “unlawfully intimidated Ms. Zhu that the daily affront and humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the general public caused by the permanent restraining order” was the precondition for her employment at FHLB-Topeka. On June 29, 2000, Zhu filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, Zhu v. Countrywide Realty, et al., Case No. 00-2290. Zhu alleged that Bunting and others made negligent and/or fraudulent representations during the residential real estate transaction and discriminated against her on the basis of sex and race in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1983. On August 2, 2001, about one month before the scheduled trial date, the undersigned judge ordered the parties to mediate with U.S. Magistrate Judge James P. O’Hara. At the end of the mediation session on August 13, 2001, Zhu stated that she would not accept the settlement to which she had previously agreed, because it deprived her of her rights as a homeowner under the FHA. On December 18, 2001, however, the Court ordered the parties to execute certain settlement documents and advised Zhu that if she did not do so, the Court would dismiss her case with prejudice. Zhu did not sign the settlement documents, so the Court dismissed the case. It later overruled Zhu’s motions to reconsider. On June 18, 2003, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. See Zhu v. Countrywide Realty Co., 66 Fed.Appx. 840 (10th Cir. June 18, 2003). Defendants’ Actions Related To Zhu’s HUD Complaint On April 12, 2000, Tiernan called plaintiff into his office and yelled that she should not have bought a house in Topeka, that she was nothing but a non-white Chinese, non-exempt employee, that she should not have filed a housing discrimination complaint with HUD, that she should have accepted Bunting’s permanent restraining order against her and that she should not have taken two hours of sick leave that morning. The following day, Tiernan issued plaintiff a counseling document because she had refused to accept the restraining order. Tiernan wrote that Zhu had violated the use of bank facility policy, even though he had never read the policy. Plaintiff mailed Tiernan the policy and asserted that she had not violated it because she had notified her supervisor as soon as practical after she accessed the office after working hours. On April 28, 2000, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) acknowledged receipt of an FHA complaint in which Zhu alleged that Bunting had engaged in discriminatory housing practices. The HUD complaint listed Zhu and her minor child, Ye Zhu, as aggrieved persons. Plaintiff asked Tiernan, McLel-land and Workman, who was Human Resources Generalist, to write a statement for HUD. On September 20, 2000, McLel-land and Workman, knowing that Zhu had engaged in activities protected by the FHA, conspired with Frank Lowman, who was President and CEO of FHLB-Topeka, to issue her an employment counseling document. On May 4, 2001, Schaplowsky, First Vice President and General Counsel, knowing that Zhu had engaged in lawfully protected activities under the FHA, conspired with Bunting to intimidate, threaten or coerce Zhu to interfere with her rights under the FHA. Schaplowsky e-mailed Zhu that because of a subpoena from Bunting, she was not to delete any records from her computer and that any action in contravention of his e-mail could result in her termination. Zhu went to his office and complained that Bunting had engaged in housing discrimination against her. Schaplowsky yelled at her, “You have no choice or option unless I advised you!” and asked her to leave. On May 18, 2001, Zhu told Schaplowsky that she intended to seek a protective order and asked FHLB-Topeka not to produce the working documents on her computer. After that, she was afraid to work on her computer at FHLB-Topeka because she feared that if she accidentally deleted a file, she might be fired. On May 18, 2001, an attorney for Scha-plowsky informed Zhu that FHLB-Topeka had reviewed all files on her computer. The fax acknowledged that some files might be confidential and privileged, including Zhu’s e-mail to her attorney which stated that she had submitted Title VII charge questionnaires to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on April 21, 2001. On July 26, 2001, Tiernan conspired with officials and employees of FHLB-Topeka, including McLelland, Workman, Ma and Cox, to fire Zhu “on the spot” when she was going to attend a pretrial conference in federal court in Case No. 00-2290. Cox handed Zhu a letter which stated that her employment was terminated and that her health insurance would terminate on July 31, 2001. On August 12, 2001, Zhu sent Workman a letter alleging that FHLB-Topeka had discriminated and retaliated against her on the basis of race. On September 4, 2001, Zhu sent certified letters to Lowman, President and CEO, and Andy Jetter, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, requesting a grievance review. FHLB-Topeka has not responded to either letter. Lowman, Jetter and Workman conspired with officers of FHLB-Topeka to conceal discrimination and retaliation from the Kansas Human Rights Commission, the EEOC and the judiciary. On October 10, 2001, Zhu sent a certified letter to Wente, Chairman of the Board of FHLB-Topeka. The board of directors conspired with officers of the FHLB-Topeka to conceal discrimination and retaliation from the Kansas Human Rights Commission, the EEOC and the judiciary. FHLB-Topeka Financial Operations/ Irregularities Yardley, First Senior Vice President, and then Millburn, Vice President and Director of Internal Audit, gave Zhu the summary of investments which she used to perform the balance sheet analysis and audit the Pinehurst model, a model developed by an FHLB employee. Zhu occasionally found inaccuracies in the modeling results. Furthermore, from time to time, Zhu found accounting discrepancies in the millions of dollars in the spreadsheets which Millburn and Martin provided. She reported each discrepancy to McLelland. For the bank’s approximately $30 billion dollar balance sheet, the discrepancy limit was $1,000. From the beginning of plaintiffs time at FHLB-Topeka, McLelland told Zhu to alter numbers to show a balanced spreadsheet. On September 6, 2000, after Zhu began to document an accounting discrepancy in her balance sheet analysis, the Internal Audit Report for FHLB-Topeka’s stated: “The spreadsheet used to prepare this balance indicated that an out-of-balance situation existed. Amount on the spreadsheet was incorrectly changed to force the spreadsheet to balance.” On September 20, 2000, Workman and McLelland issued a counseling document to plaintiff. The counseling document stated that an audit of the risk department noted that “Zhu had altered accounting numbers to make the duration spreadsheet balance because Zhu could not find the errors Zhu had made in transcribing numbers.” The document also stated that in October of 1998, McLelland had asked Zhu to “work much harder to find and correct this kind of simple transcription error in order to minimize just this kind of problem.” Workman and McLelland made this statement to affect plaintiffs employment status, injure her professional reputation and cover up accounting discrepancy problems. Zhu responded that she had never altered accounting numbers to make any spreadsheets balance and that only at McLel-land’s suggestion or direction would she place a corrected figure on the balance sheet. After receiving the counseling document Zhu insisted that McLelland provide written instructions to adjust any accounting discrepancy. In December of 2000, Cox told Zhu that FHLB-Topeka had re-classified her position from exempt to non-exempt employee. She told Zhu that her job and responsibilities would not change, but that she would receive overtime if she worked more than 40 hours per week. This representation was false because Zhu has received no overtime. All employees with duties similar to Zhu’s remained exempt. Zhu alleges that “the employment status of the classification of exempt entitled them not responsible for their mistake or errors including the accounting discrepancy problems.” Amended Complaint (Doc. # 72) ¶ 105. On January 4, 2001, within one month of the change in Zhu’s job classification, FHLB-Topeka posted a job vacancy for an exempt Risk Analyst. FHLB-Topeka hired Heather Gering, who was under 40 and had no related experience. On February 26, 2001, Workman and Ma conspired to target Zhu for reporting accounting discrepancy problems which she had found in her balance sheet analysis. At Workman’s direction, Ma “fraudulently” stated that Zhu needed to put more effort into balancing duration measurements on her balance sheet analysis. He stated that Zhu should define any problem before bringing it to others for help. At several Interest Rate Management (“IRM”) meetings, McLelland, Tiernan and Yardley discussed the fact that income forecast analyses made by Cindy Williams and Chris Shumaker were not accurate because they were 50 per cent higher than the monthly income for FHLB-Topeka. McLelland, Tiernan and Yardley did not record these discussions in written minutes because those minutes were reported to the board of directors of FHLB-Tope-ka. At one of the IRM meetings, Yardley instructed McLelland to omit from the minutes a $200 million material change in the bank’s financial condition. In July of 2001, Zhu asked for McLelland’s direction concerning a $10 million discrepancy for June of 2001. He responded that he would ask for Tiernan’s instruction. On July 25, 2001, Zhu again asked McLelland how to reconcile the $10 million discrepancy. The next day, July 26, 2001, FHLB-Topeka terminated plaintiffs employment. Shortly after Labor Day of 2001, David Mansfield, the information systems auditor for FHLB-Topeka Internal Audit, called Zhu. Mansfield told her that FHLB-Tope-ka had fired him because he had sent a formal e-mail complaint against Millburn, director of Internal Audit, for refusing to examine two months of work the day before. RICO From 1998 to 2001, Williams, Schumer, McLelland, Tiernan and Yardley executed a scheme to defraud the member financial institutions of FHLB-Topeka by falsely estimating its income. Specifically, to obtain monies and property of member institutions, they used a series of income forecasts that they knew were 50 per cent higher than actual income. Workman, Ma, McLelland, Cox and Tiernan intentionally deceived member financial institutions and public investors as to accounting discrepancies. Yardley and McLelland •willfully omitted from meeting minutes a $200 million income discrepancy. Yardley, Tier-nan, Cox, McLelland and others sold member financial institutions a “New Product” from a newly-formed private company that was not subject to accounting and financial restrictions and disclosures which were intended to protect investors. Tiernan did not disclose to member financial institutions his own interest in selling “New Product.” Zhu informed Jetter of her belief that “New Product” sales were improper and that the lending practice of adding larger margins to its small borrower member financial institutions was improper. At the meeting on July 24, 2001, she also stated that if FHLB-Topeka increased its revenue ten per cent per year and paid its private owners seven to eight per cent per year, it was hard for employees to settle for a three to four per cent salary increase every year. Zhu witnessed defendants’ bank fraud and Tiernan, McLelland, Cox and Workman conspired to terminate her employment after she expressed concern about what she considered to be unlawful business practices. FMLA Since July 15, 1999, Zhu has regularly seen Dr. Jonathan M. Farrell-Higgins for treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) which disrupted her sleep. On September 1, 1999, Zhu was injured in a car accident and told McLelland that she would use her sick leave, lunch time and vacation time for medical appointments. McLelland, who was plaintiffs immediate supervisor at the time, told her that she could work a flexible schedule. When Ma became plaintiffs supervisor, he allowed her to continue to work a flexible schedule. On October 24, 2000 Zhu used sick leave for surgery. In December of 2000, McLel-land warned Zhu that she had used all of her sick leave and vacation time for 2000. On April 12, 2001, Zhu took two hours of sick leave. The next day, Tiernan gave her a counseling document for taking sick leave and accused her of setting her hours arbitrarily to suit her needs. Other employees took sick leave and did not receive counseling documents. In May of 2001, McLelland and Ma told Zhu that she must work a fixed schedule from 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Zhu requested a modified schedule, but FHLB-Topeka denied her request. FHLB-Topeka allowed Williams, a white female, to work a modified schedule to attend full-time college classes for four years. It also allowed female employees in wire transfer to work modified schedules for four days per week. On July 24, 2001, McLelland physically threatened Zhu and yelled at her for reporting to the workplace after 7:30 a.m. Two days later, on July 26, 2001, FHLB-Topeka terminated plaintiffs employment. Race, Sex And National Origin Discrimination On several occasions beginning in December of 1997, Zhu answered incoming 800 calls from Debby (no last name) who asked to speak with Tiernan. Zhu understood that Debby was Tiernan’s friend and that Debby called him several times per day. One day Tiernan announced loudly in front of 30 to 40 employees, “I have seen no one but Debby.” Between February and May of 1998, Tiernan pursued Zhu for a personal relationship. He told her that he wanted to take her out to eat, and on several occasions asked her to call him after work. Once, he put a few hundred dollar bills in a clear shirt pocket and spoke loudly or punched the desk next to hers to get her attention. Zhu did not want to have a personal relationship with Tiernan. He responded to her rejection by physically intimidating her. Once, he stood by the door next to plaintiffs desk and yelled at her, in front of other employees, “What I suppose to do if I am frustrated and feel lonely!” Zhu was afraid of working in such an environment. On October 23, 1998, at Tiernan’s request, McLelland told Zhu that her salary was too high and gave her a memo which stated that the bank expected a high level of performance because she had a Ph.D. On October 31, 1998, Zhu confronted McLelland with a long list of her accomplishments. She asked why the bank had withdrawn a small increase in her pay and stated that she intended to participate in a “statutory proceeding.” In July, 2000, Williams became a risk analyst in charge of the FHLB-Topeka income estimation. As her predecessor had done, Williams forecasted income unreasonably higher than actual income. Williams sat next to Tiernan at every Rate Risk Management Committee meeting. She held his hand on one occasion. At another meeting, Tiernan watched Williams very closely while she was eating a piece of cake. Amended Complaint (Doc. # 72) ¶ 229. Tiernan gave Williams favorable treatment in her employment, allowing her to set her own hours and attend a professional conference out of town. On September 15, 2000, Williams yelled at Zhu because she had a Chinese accent and did not understand the American custom of “baby shower” gift-giving. Williams told Zhu that she should “speak like us because you are living here.” Id. ¶ 168. Zhu reported this to McLelland, who said that Williams owed her an apology. Zhu sent Williams an e-mail which noted the bank’s Mutual Respect Policy Statement. On September 20, 2000, Workman and McLelland issued Zhu a counseling document for sending the email. The counseling document stated that by the end of the year, Zhu was to attend a class or undertake some other formal process to improve her written and spoken communication skills. Zhu attached employee remarks that Washburn University offered an intensive English course, but that she could not enroll until January when the next semester started. Zhu also noted that she had passed such a course at the University of Kansas more than ten years earlier. She stated that she had completed advanced degrees in English and that she had defended her thesis in English before a panel of six professors. Zhu also noted her concern that she did not know a measurable standard for “noticeable improvement.” On August 9, 2000, Zhu had worked all night. She was sitting at her computer at approximately 6:30 a.m. when Lowman, who was president and CEO of FHLB-Topeka, stepped into her office. Zhu told him that Bunting had sexually assaulted her in her home, that she had filed a HUD complaint, that Bunting had filed a petition for a permanent restraining order and subjected her to criminal proceedings under Kansas trespass law, and that she was writing a pleading in that case. Lowman told her that he would arrange for her to speak with Cox and the general counsel for FHLB-Topeka. Zhu felt that she had to fight for her right to drive on the highway to go to work and shop for food, and told Cox that she was afraid that she would be arrested for stalking Bunting when in truth Bunting was following her. Cox e-mailed Zhu some attorney names, and McLelland told Zhu that Cox had told him to let her visit attorneys during the work day. On September 20, 2000, McLelland issued Zhu the counseling document, described supra, fore-mailing Williams. That document stated that “Mr. Lowman notices that you seem to be doing mostly legal work, the matter has to be addressed.” Id. ¶ 256. In October of 2000, Zhu told Lowman that Williams had yelled at her for speaking English with a Chinese accent, and that McLelland had given Zhu a counseling document about plaintiffs e-mail to Williams concerning the incident. Low-man told Zhu that he would “get rid of’ McLelland and Williams. At about 6:30 a.m. on January 6, 2001, Zhu was working at her computer when Lowman stepped into her office without clothing. Zhu was shocked and fearful. On February 8, 2001, Millburn e-mailed Zhu a summary of investments and asked her to let him know if she needed more information. This had been a routine procedure since the beginning of September of 2000. Since that time, Zhu had contacted Millburn several times a month because she needed information. On one occasion when she did so, Millburn asked Zhu to watch a movie after work because he was lonely. She refused. On two occasions in early 2001, McLelland yelled at her loudly, “Sue, don’t bothering [Millburn].” Id. ¶¶ 237-38. On February 13, 2001, Zhu complained to Tiernan about McLelland’s conduct. Tiernan told her that Millburn had complained that she had bothered him. Zhu then complained to Cox. FHLB-Tope-ka did not investigate her complaints. On February 26, 2001, FHLB-Topeka gave plaintiff an “adverse” annual evaluation which criticized her communication skills and suggested that “reading nontechnical material (e. g., articles in Time or Newsweek) would help expand your understanding of written communication and your grasp of those cultural elements that play such a vital role in everyday conversation.” Id. ¶ 175. Plaintiff understood this suggestion as a hostile racial comment because her supervisors knew that they had no communication problem with her and because Williams did not receive a similar requirement. On March 9, 2001, FHLB-Topeka held a process meeting. Williams stated that Zhu had not completed tasks as needed and had not renamed files as required. McLelland yelled that Zhu had better admit what Williams alleged, and physically threatened Zhu. After that meeting, McLelland yelled at Zhu more frequently. On March 28, 2001, Zhu complained to supervisor Brian Dreher, as well as to Yardley and Tiernan, about McLelland’s conduct. Tiernan handled the complaint but did not take any action. On April 12, 2001, after Zhu had taken two hours of sick leave, Tiernan called her into his office and told her that Lowman had seen her walking into the bank at 11:00 a.m. and told him to give her a counseling document. The following day, Tiernan called Zhu a “non-white Chinese” and gave her a counseling document which accused her of setting her own hours. Amended Complaint, (Doc. # 72) ¶ 75. Zhu told Cox of the counseling document and accused Tiernan of discrimination and harassment. Cox did not investigate or take remedial action. On April 20, 2001, Zhu received a memorandum from Cox about her investigation of the incidents leading to the counseling document of April 13, 2001. On April 21, 2001, Zhu submitted a charge questionnaire to the EEOC, alleging that FHLB-Topeka had discriminated against her on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin and disability. On May 1, 2001, Zhu replied to Cox’s memorandum of April 20 and stated that she believed that FHLB-Topeka had discriminated against her because of race, color, sex, national origin and disability. On June 21, 2001, Zhu told McLelland and Cox that to comply with the counseling document of September 20, 2000, she proposed to attend Concord University Law School through distance learning. Zhu asked the bank to pay tuition, as promised in the counseling document, but she has never received it. At a meeting on July 24, 2001, Cox stated that Jetter based his criteria for promoting women on “who bring him the most home baked cookies.” Zhu then stated that although half of the 120 employees at FHLB-Topeka were women, 22 managers were male and only 11 were female. Zhu told Jetter that she believed that she and other women employees were treated unfairly. Age Discrimination Shortly after FHLB-Topeka promoted Jetter to executive vice president and chief operating officer, Jetter stated that he would like to see some new young faces as employees. Soon thereafter, a publication of FHLB-Topeka stated that 24 per cent of the employees were “new and young people.” Amended Complaint (Doc. # 72) ¶ 277. When a young employee made a mistake one day, Ma attributed the mistake to computer delay and proposed that the bank buy the younger employee a faster computer. Further, the bank allowed Williams, who was outside the protected age group, to work a modified schedule to attend college as a full-time student for four years. It also allowed Williams to change her position frequently to suit her needs. The bank denied plaintiffs request for a modified schedule which she requested due to medical problems. On June 7, 2001, Zhu requested that FHLB-Topeka consider her for opportunities to attend conferences, as every other employee in her department had attended conferences. When FHLB-Topeka terminated her employment on July 26, 2001, Zhu was 47 years old. FHLB-Topeka retained other employees outside the protected age group even though their income estimates were never accurate. Administrative Remedies On January 18, 2002, Zhu submitted to the Kansas Human Rights Commission (“KHRC”) an informal Complaint Information Sheet. See Memorandum In Support Of Topeka Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint In Part For Want Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Doc. # 87) filed February 15, 2005, Ex. C. The information sheet mentioned possible claims for race, age and disability discrimination. Zhu does not allege that this sheet was verified or that defendants received notice that she had submitted it to the KHRC. Four days later, on January 22, 2002, Zhu filed a charge of sex and national origin discrimination with the KHRC. The complaint was dual filed with the EEOC. See id., Ex. A. On January 28, 2002, Zhu submitted to the EEOC an informal pre-charge questionnaire. See id., Ex. D. This questionnaire mentioned possible claims for race, age and disability discrimination. Zhu does not allege (and the record does not reflect) that this questionnaire was verified or that defendants received notice that Zhu had submitted it to the EEOC. On February 6, 2002, the EEOC notified Zhu that it would not investigate the claims in her pre-charge questionnaire of January 28, 2002 because the KHRC was investigating the case. On September 30, 2002, in response to Zhu’s charge of January 22, the EEOC issued Zhu a notice of right to sue. Zhu does not allege that after she received the letter of February 6, 2002, she communicated with the KHRC or the EEOC about the claims which she had raised in her questionnaire of January 28. Plaintiffs Claims Liberally construed, plaintiffs amended complaint asserts the following claims against the various defendants: (1)Defendants discriminated on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count 1(a)) and 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (Count 1(b)) when they insisted that plaintiff accept the state court restraining order as a condition of her employment and terminated her employment to punish her for attempting to exercise rights under numerous civil rights statutes; (2) defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Count 11(a)) and 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (Count 11(b)) when they conspired to conceal the existence of race discrimination and segregation imposed by the state court restraining order; (3) because of her race, defendants conspired to deprive plaintiff of access to public accommodations when they encouraged her to abide by the state court restraining order in violation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (Count 3); (4) defendants conspired to interfere with plaintiffs housing rights by encouraging her to comply with the restraining order, which denied her access to public facilities, in violation of the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. (Count 4); (5) defendants violated plaintiffs First Amendment right to free speech by discouraging her from — and ultimately terminating her for discussing matters that cast the Federal Home Loan Bank system in a negative light (Count 5); (6) defendants made plaintiffs acceptance of the state court restraining order a condition of her employment, in violation of her rights to equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count 6(a)); (7) defendants violated plaintiffs rights under the Thirteenth Amendment when they required her to comply with the state court restraining order (Count 6(b)); (8) defendants terminated plaintiffs employment in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1514 A of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act because she gave her supervisors information concerning a $10 million accounting discrepancy at FHLB-Topeka (Count 7); (9) defendants violated RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1512-13, when they engaged in unspecified acts of racketeering which caused plaintiffs termination, damaged her professional reputation and interfered with her conduct of the Bunting case (Count 8); (10) defendants refused plaintiffs request for the reasonable accommodation of a modified schedule and terminated her employment for refusing to comply with a 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. work schedule, in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (Count 9a); (11) defendants terminated plaintiffs employment for refusing to follow a 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. work schedule in violation of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611 et seq. (Count 9(b)); (12) defendants violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. when they demoted plaintiff from exempt to non-exempt status but did not pay her overtime (Count 10(a)); (13) defendants willfully violated the EPA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), when they paid plaintiff less than males with Ph.D. degrees (Count 10(b)); (14) defendants terminated plaintiffs employment in retaliation for engaging in activity protected under the EPA, i.e. for complaining that FHLB-Topeka hired women for lower-paying jobs than men, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (Count 10(c)); (15) defendants maintained a sexually hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Count 10(d)); (16) because of her sex, defendants terminated plaintiffs employment in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Count 10(e)); (17) because of her race, defendants discriminated against plaintiff in the terms and conditions of her employment, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Count 10(f)); (18) because of her national origin, defendants discriminated against plaintiff in the terms and conditions of her employment, including giving her a written reprimand on April 12, 2001, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Count 10(g)); (19) defendants maintained a hostile work environment hostile based on plaintiffs national origin, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Count 10(h)); (20) defendants retaliated against plaintiff for engaging in activity protected by Title VII by terminating her employment after plaintiff complained of race, sex and national origin discrimination, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Count 10(i)); (21) defendants violated the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., by allowing employees outside the protected age group to use modified work schedules to attend college while not allowing plaintiff to do so, and terminating plaintiffs employment while retaining non-proteeted employees in similar positions (Count 10(j)). Legal Standards Rule 12(b)(1) Subject Matter Jurisdiction Courts may only exercise jurisdiction when specifically authorized to do so, see Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir.1994), and must “dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceeding in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Scheideman v. Shawnee County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 895 F.Supp. 279, 280 (D.Kan.1995) (citing Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir.1974)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the law imposes a presumption against their jurisdiction. Marcus v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue, 170 F.3d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir.1999). Plaintiff sustains the burden of showing that jurisdiction is proper, see id., and she must demonstrate that the case should not be dismissed. See Jensen v. Johnson County Youth Baseball League, 838 F.Supp. 1437, 1439-40 (D.Kan.1993). “Mere conclusory allegations of jurisdiction are not enough.” Id. The standards that apply to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) are well settled. Such motions generally take the form of facial attacks on the complaint or factual attacks on the accuracy of its allegations. Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002-03 (10th Cir.1995) (citing Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir.1990)). When a party makes a facial attack, the Court must presume the factual accuracy of the complaint. As to these arguments the Court may not consider evidence outside the complaint. By contrast, if a party attacks the factual accuracy of the complaint, the Tenth Circuit has set out the following standard: [A] party may go beyond allegations contained in the complaint and challenge the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends. When reviewing a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, a district court may not presume the truthfulness of the complaint’s factual allegations. A court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1). In such instances, a court’s reference to evidence outside the pleadings does not convert the motion to a Rule 56 motion. Holt, 46 F.3d at 1003 (citations omitted). No matter how a jurisdictional issue is raised, “whenever it appears by the suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.” Basso, 495 F.2d at 910 (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(h)). Rule 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss A Rule 12(b)(6) motion should not be granted unless “it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir.1997) (further quotations omitted). The Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of plaintiff. See Shaw v. Valdez, 819 F.2d 965, 968 (10th Cir.1987). In reviewing the sufficiency of plaintiffs complaint, the issue is not whether plaintiff will prevail, but whether plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support her claims. Although plaintiff need not precisely state each element of her claims, she must plead minimal factual allegations on those material elements that must be proved. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). The Court affords a pro se plaintiff some leniency and must liberally construe the complaint. See Oltremari v. Kan. Soc. & Rehab. Serv., 871 F.Supp. 1331, 1333 (D.Kan.1994). While pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers, pro se litigants must follow the same procedural rules as other litigants. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980); Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir.1992). The Court may not assume the role of advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. I. Topeka Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint In Part For Want Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Doc. # 86) As set out in more detail below, the Topeka defendants assert that the Court should dismiss portions of plaintiffs complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over most of plaintiffs claims. Defendants assert that the Court only has jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims of sex and national original discrimination against FHLB-Topeka. Specifically, defendants assert that (1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 because the statute was not in effect when plaintiffs claims arose and plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies under that statute; (2) under Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all claims which allege that defendants in some way improperly influenced the outcome in a series of state court actions to which plaintiff was a party, including all of plaintiffs claims under the FHA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985 and 1986, and portions of her claims under Title VII, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADEA, the FMLA and RICO; (3) plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to establish standing to sue under the FHA, RICO, the ADA and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985 and 1986, because she does not allege that she suffered concrete injury that fairly can be traced to the alleged actions of any defendant or that any defendant’s actions invaded an interest of plaintiffs protected by these statutes; (4) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs Title VII claims for race discrimination and retaliation, and plaintiffs ADEA and ADA claims, because she had not exhausted administrative remedies with respect to these claims; and (5) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all claims against the individual defendants under Title VII, the ADEA, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA because plaintiff did not name them as respondents in the administrative charge which she filed with the EEOC and the KHRC and the individual defendants are not “employers” under these statutes. As noted, Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction generally take two forms: facial attacks on the complaint and factual attacks on the accuracy of the allegations in the complaint. See Holt, 46 F.3d at 1002-03. Defendants assert that their motion falls within both categories. Defendants correctly characterize as facial attacks their arguments with respect to Sarbanes-Ox-ley, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Article III standing. As to these arguments the Court may not consider evidence outside the complaint. Defendants assert that their remaining arguments — that the Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs race, age, disability and retaliation claims, and discrimination claims against the individual defendants — are factual attacks on the accuracy of the complaint. Defendants state that in challenging jurisdiction over plaintiffs race, age disability and retaliation claims over such claims, they rely on evidence outside the complaint, ie. the KHRC charge, the KHRC complaint information sheet, the EEOC questionnaire and the right-to-sue letter. These documents are incorporated by reference in the amended complaint, however, and the Court therefore deems these challenges to be facial attacks on the complaint. A. Sarbanes-Oxley Plaintiff attempts to state a cause of action under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Although plaintiff does not cite any particular section of this statute, the only section which creates a cause of action for an employee of a regulated entity is the civil whistle-blower provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. This provision prohibits a company from discriminating against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the employee: to provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in an investigation which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of ... any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal Law relating to fraud against shareholders, when the information or assistance is provided to or the investigation is conducted by— (A)a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency; (B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or (C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(l). Before an employee can assert a cause of action in federal court under the Sar-banes-Oxley Act, he or she must file a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) and afford OSHA the opportunity to resolve the allegations administratively. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(l)(A). The administrative complaint must be filed “[wjithin 90 days after an alleged violation of the Act” and include “a full statement of the acts and omissions, with pertinent dates, which are believed to constitute the violations.” Id., § 1514A(b)(2)(D); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103(b, d). If the employee meets these requirements for a particular violation, and a final administrative decision has not issued within 180 days of the filing, the employee can proceed with an action in federal court based on that violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(l)(B). See Willis v. Vie Fin. Group, Inc., 2004 WL 1774575, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Aug.6, 2004). Defendants assert that plaintiff cannot state a claim under Sarbanes-Oxley for two reasons. First, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act became effective July 30, 2002, and plaintiff bases her Sarbanes-Oxley claim on facts which occurred on or before July 26, 2001. The statute does not include a retroactive provision, and defendants argue that the Court should not apply it retroactively. See In re ADC Telecom., Inc. Sec. Litig., 409 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir.2005) (refusing to retroactively apply 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act to revive stale securities claims); Enter. Mortgage Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig. v. Enter. Mortgage Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401, 409-10 (2d Cir.2004) (same); see also Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 352, 119 S.Ct. 1998, 144 L.Ed.2d 347 (1999) (statutes generally presumed non-retroactive). This Court has found no case law specifically addressing whether 18 U.S.C. § 1514A is retroactive. Because of the 90-day exhaustion requirement, however, the Act could only provide relief for conduct which occurred ninety days (or less) before the statute was enacted. In any event, plaintiff does not allege that she exhausted her administrative remedies under Sarbanes-Oxley. This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction over her claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. See Willis, 2004 WL 1774575 at *3. B. Rooker-Feldman Defendants next assert that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all claims which are based on plaintiffs assertion that the Third Judicial District Court of Kansas wrongfully issued a restraining order against her in Bunting v. Zhu, Case No. 00C579 (“Bunting ”). Under two related theories, plaintiff claims that defendants in this case, who were not parties to Bunting, violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985 and 1986, Title II, the FHA, and the ADA in relation to the Bunting case. First, plaintiff alleges that the Topeka defendants conspired with Bunting and his attorneys to interfere with her efforts to defend herself pro se against Bunting’s trespass claim, thereby causing the state court to issue a restraining order which violated her federal rights. See Amended Complaint (Doc # 72) ¶¶ 67, 71-75, 77-78, 81, 121, 123, 256. Second, plaintiff alleges that although the Topeka defendants knew that the state court order was illegal, they coerced her to comply with it. Finally, plaintiff alleges that the Topeka defendants terminated her employment because she did not agree that the restraining order was legal. 1. Interference With Plaintiffs Pro Se Defense Of Bunting Case Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot recover for interference with her pro se efforts to defend the Bunting trespass case unless this Court finds that the state court wrongly entered the restraining order against her, and that Rooker-Feldman deprives this Court of jurisdiction to make such a finding. Defendants also argue that Rooker-Feldman bars any claim that the state court entered an erroneous judgment because the parties there committed fraud on the court or conspired to deny plaintiff fair access to that court. See, e.g., Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir.1986); Weaver v. Boyles, 172 F.Supp.2d 1333, 1336 (D.Kan.2001) aff'd, 26 Fed.Appx. 908 (10th Cir. Feb.13, 2002); see also Crestview Vill. Apts. v. U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., 383 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir.2004); Johnson v. City of Shorewood, 360 F.3d 810, 818-19 (8th Cir.2004). Defendants point to Bisbee v. McCarty, 3 Fed.Appx. 819, 822-823 (10th Cir. Feb.2, 2001), in which the Tenth Circuit explained the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as follows: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal courts, other than the United States Supreme Court, lack jurisdiction to adjudicate claims seeking review of state court judgments. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149. The losing party in a state court proceeding is generally “barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state court judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’ federal rights.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994). Review of the state court judgment must proceed to the state’s highest court and then to the United States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir.1991). Rooker-Feldman bars not only cases seeking direct review of state court judgments; it also bars cases that are “inextricably intertwined” with a prior state court judgment. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303. If adjudication of a claim in federal court would require the court to determine that a state court judgment was erroneously entered or was void, the claim is inextricably intertwined with the merits of the state court judgment. See Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir.1997). “[T]he fundamental and appropriate question to ask is whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment.” Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir.1996). Id. After the Topeka defendants filed then-motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court addressed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, stating that it “has sometimes been construed to extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases, overriding Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. — U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). The Supreme Court therefore confined the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id. at 1521-22. In other words, precisely the circumstances involved in this case. Because Rooker-Feldman deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over claims that plaintiff sustained injuries on account of the state court restraining order, this Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims under Title II, the FHA and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1985 and 1986-claims which entirely depend on plaintiffs assertion that she sustained injury because some aspect of Bunting was wrongly decided. 2. Coercion To Comply With Illegal Restraining Order Defendants assert that Rooker-Feldman bars any Title VII, ADA or ADEA claim that defendants discriminated against plaintiff when they encouraged her to comply with the state court restraining order or made it a condition of her employment. Plaintiff actually brings such claims under the FHA and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1985 and 1986. Plaintiffs claims under Title VII, the ADA and the ADEA do not mention the restraining order and are based on other allegations of discrimination, as set out infra at 23-24. Accordingly, the Court need not address this aspect of defendants’ motion. 3. Termination Of Plaintiff’s Employment Because She Did Not Agree That The Restraining Order Was Legal As to Section 1981, plaintiff alleges that defendants terminated her employment on the basis of race because she did not agree that the state court restraining order was legal. Termination of her employment constitutes an injury which is distinct from the state court order itself. Thus Rooker-Feldman does not bar plaintiffs Section 1981 claim. C. Standing To Sue Under The FHA, RICO, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985 and 1986 Defendants assert that plaintiff lacks standing to sue under Title II, the FHA, RICO and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985 and 1986. The Court has already found that Rooker-Feldman bars plaintiffs claims under Title II, the FHA, Sections 1982, 1985 and 1986. The Court therefore will address defendants’ standing arguments only as to plaintiffs claims under Section 1981 and RICO. Article III of the Constitution limits access to the federal courts to those who have standing to sue, which requires (1) an injury in fact to an interest protected by federal law; (2) a causal relationship between the injury and defendants’ challenged conduct; and (3) the likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. See Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Props., 98 F.3d 590, 593 (10th Cir.1996) (FHA case); Cache Valley Elec. Co. v. State of Utah Dep’t of Transp., 149 F.3d 1119, 1122 (10th Cir.1998). Defendants assert that plaintiff has not alleged any of the three standing requirements as to her claims under RICO or Section 1981. 1. Standing Under RICO Under RICO, plaintiff alleges that the Topeka defendants injured her by (1) causing the termination of her employment, (2) damaging her professional reputation in the process of terminating her employment and (3) interfering with her defense of the Bunting case, leading to an unjust result. Defendants argue that plaintiffs RICO claim fails because her three alleged RICO injuries are not “injuries in fact” under