Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER JENKINS, Senior District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. THE ISSUES ON REMAND.902 II. PRÉCIS.902 III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY.903 IV. THE CLAIMS OF THE PART II PLAINTIFFS (O o co A. Ms. Donna Singer. CO o <r> B. Mr. Fred Riggs. CO t — to C. Mr. Allison Dickson. ÍO h- oj D. The Nature of Plaintiffs’ Claims. íO 1 — 1 -a E. Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Pleading. 0 J — 1 V. THE NAVAJO COURT ORDERS. A. The December 28,1999 Order. 1. Findings re: Mr. Riggs. 2. Findings re: Ms. Singer. 3. Findings re: Mr. Dickson. 4. Preliminary Relief Under the December 28,1999 Order .... B. The March 1, 2000 Order. C. The March 6, 2000 Order. VI. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF NAVAJO SOVEREIGNTY.... A. Inherent Navajo Tribal Sovereignty. 1. “Domestic Dependent Nations”. 2. Inherent Tribal Powers. 3. Tribal Sovereignty & Federal Indian Policy. B. Oliphant, Montana & Implied Divestiture of Tribal Sovereignty 1. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. 2. Montana v. United States & its Exceptions. 3. Civil Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians Reaffirmed. C. Navajo Sovereignty & Self-Government. 1. The Navajo Treaty of 1868 . 2. Subsequent Legislation Enlarging the Navajo Reservation . 3. A Tale of Two Treaties: Montana & the 1933 Act. 4. The Navajo Nation Government . D. Navajo Sovereignty & the Navajo Courts. 1. Creation of the Navajo Court System. 2. Jurisdiction of the Navajo Courts . 3. Navajo Court Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Defendants ... 4. Montana & the NPEA in the Navajo Courts: the Manygoats Case E. The Navajo Preference in Employment Act (NPEA). 1. “Ab-Will” Employment vs. “Just Cause” Tenure. 2. NPEA Protection for Non-Navajo Spouses. 3. Administrative Enforcement of the NPEA . 4. Singer, et al. v. San Juan County, et al. and the NPEA’s Exhaustion Requirement. CD 00 F. Navajo Tort Law. CD OO E>0 VII. ENFORCEMENT OF THE NAVAJO COURT ORDERS IN THIS FORUM. ID 00 Oi A. Theories re: the Navajo Court’s Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in Singer, et al. v. San Juan County, etal.. CD 00 o 1. Navajo Court Jurisdiction as a Federal Question. CD 00 o 2. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over the County and Health District Defendants Under the Montana Exceptions. 00 o (i )Plaintiffs’ Theory re: Jurisdiction. 00 o (ii )San Juan County’s Theory re: Jurisdiction. 05 o (in )The Health District’s Theory re: Jurisdiction. 05 o B. Analysis & Conclusions re: the Navajo Court’s Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in Singer, et al. v. San Juan County, etal.. .993 1. Montana & the Plaintiffs’ “Congressional Presumption” .. .993 2. The Defendants’ Reading of Montana. .996 3. The Navajo Court’s Findings of Jurisdictional Facts. .998 (i )Fred Riggs. 1001 (ii )Allison Dickson. 1001 (Hi )Donna Singer. 1001 (iv )San Juan County. 1004 (v )San Juan County Commissioners. 1005 (vi )San Juan County Attorney Craig Halls. 1005 (vii )County Administrator Richard “Rick” Bailey. 1006 1006 (viii )Summary re: the County Defendants. 1007 (■ix )San Juan Health Services District. 1012 (x )Health District Board Members. 1012 (xi )Roger Atcitty. 1013 (xii )Lauren “Laurie” Schafer. 1014 (xiii )Reid Wood. 1015 (aró) Summary. 1015 Navajo Court Judgments in the Federal Courts . o 1015 1. Comity vs. Full Faith and Credit. 2. Full Faith and Credit, Comity & the Problem of Non-Final Judgments. CO <M O tH 3. Final Judgments Under Navajo Law. LQ <M O tH 1026 4. Preliminary Injunctive & other Equitable Relief in the Singer, et al. v. San Juan County, et al. Navajo Court Orders .... 1029 Attorney’s Fees Awards Under Navajo Law. 1030 Plaintiffs’ Standing re: Navajo Patients. 1033 Governmental Immunity & The Health District Defendants ... 1033 1. The October 30, 2000 Decision & Law of the Case. 1035 2. State Sovereign Immunity & Tribal Courts. 1037 3. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 1040 4. Counterclaims & the Waiver of State Immunity. 1041 5. The Health District’s Counterclaim. 1042 6. Sovereign Immunity & Reciprocity. 1045 7. Plaintiffs’ Claims & the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 1045 (i )Contractual Claims. 1046 (ii )Intentional Tort Claims. 1048 (in )Civil Rights Claims. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION. .1052 The original complaint filed in this action asserted claims by fifteen plaintiffs, including Donna Singer, Fred Riggs, and Allison Dickson. (See Complaint (Verified), filed July 25, 2000 (dkt. no 1).) These three plaintiffs’ claims were addressed early in this litigation by Judge Kimball, the district judge then assigned to this case, who entered orders dismissing their claims against San Juan County, the San Juan Health Services District and various individual defendants on the grounds that neither the County nor the Health District had waived their sovereign immunity from suit in tribal court, and that individual employee defendants likewise remained immune from suit under Utah law absent allegations of fraud or malice. The court dismissed their claims against Truck Insurance and R. Dennis Ickes on the ground that the tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. (See Memorandum Decision and Order, filed October 30, 2000 (dkt. no. 81); Memorandum Decision and Order, filed December 13, 2000 (dkt. no. 115).) Those rulings became the subject of a Rule 54(b) certification and an appeal. (See Notice of Appeal, filed January 4, 2001 (dkt. no. 126); Order, filed March 6, 2001 (dkt. no. 168).) On October 7, 2002, The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Truck Insurance and Ickes on jurisdictional grounds, but vacated the dismissal of the County and Health District defendants and remanded the matter for further proceedings. See MacArthur v. San Juan County, 309 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir.2002). By that time, the case had already been reassigned to this court. One month later, in November of 2002, the plaintiffs sought leave to file an amended complaint that, among other things, would clarify the claims of Singer, Riggs and Dickson in light of the appellate court opinion. Leave to amend having since been granted, the claims of these three plaintiffs are now set forth in Part II of the Amended Complaint. (See Amended Complaint, filed June 14, 2005 nunc pro tunc to November 14, 2002 (dkt. no. 744) (“Amended Complaint”), at 98-120.) I. THE ISSUES ON REMAND The Tenth Circuit vacated the court’s dismissal of Singer, Riggs and Dickson’s claims against County and Health District defendants, and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion that “the district court should have performed a Montana analysis before reaching the sovereign immunity question,” referring to Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981). MacArthur v. San Juan County, 309 F.3d at 1227, 1228. The threshold question in our review of the Navajo court judgment is whether the Navajo Nation’s decision to exercise adjudicative power over County and Health District defendants passes muster under Montana. If, and only if, appellants overcome the heavy presumption Montana establishes against the existence of tribal jurisdiction will a federal court have occasion to address the sovereign immunity issue at all. Id. at 1226. On remand, then, this court must first determine whether the Navajo Nation District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the parties and claims in Donna Singer, et al. v. San Juan County, et al., Case No. SR-CV-162-99-CV (Navajo Nation Dist. Ct., filed April 12,1999), the proceeding in which the orders now at issue were originally entered. To make that determination, this court has examined (1) the nature and scope of Navajo sovereignty; (2) the tribal forum’s relationship to the parties and the subject matter of the claims, including the nature of the interests and injuries asserted by these plaintiffs, and whether the scope of the protection of Navajo law extends to embrace those interests and injuries; and (3) the extent of the jurisdiction of the Navajo courts to adjudicate plaintiffs’ pleaded claims against the County and Health District defendants and grant the relief reflected in the three orders now at issue. Should plaintiffs’ claims fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Navajo court, this court must decide whether the Navajo court’s adjudication of those claims was barred by sovereign immunity — as asserted by the County and Health District defendants and previously held by this court — or whether the plaintiffs are entitled to enforcement of the Navajo court orders through further proceedings in this court, applying either principles of comity or full faith and credit. II. PRÉCIS For reasons explained in some detail below, this court holds that the Navajo Nation District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction of plaintiffs Riggs and Dickson’s claims against the San Juan Health Services District, and Riggs’ defamation claim against one individual defendant, Reid Wood, arising from Riggs and Dickson’s employment at the Montezuma Creek Clinic, a facility located on state-owned land within the boundaries of the Navajo Reservation: both Riggs and Dickson are Navajo tribal members living on the Navajo Reservation, and (1) their employment by the District was a “consensual relationship with the tribe or its members” entered into “through ... contracts, ... or other arrangements,” and (2) employer conduct in such employment relationships “has some direct effect on ... the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe,” all within the meaning of Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-566, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981), the controlling Supreme Court precedent vindicating the exercise of Navajo civil jurisdiction over non-Indians under either of those circumstances. The Navajo court also had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction of the claims of Riggs, Dickson and Singer against defendant Roger Atcitty, a Navajo tribal member residing on the reservation who had served as a member of the Health District’s governing board, under Navajo Nation Code, tit. 7, § 253(B). This court holds that the Navajo court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction of Riggs and Dickson’s claims against San Juan County and the named non-Indian individual defendants (other than defendants Wood and Atcitty) under Montana or the Navajo Nation Code. Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, the Navajo court also did not have subject-matter jurisdiction of the claims of plaintiff Singer, a non-Indian living outside of the Navajo Reservation who is married to a Navajo tribal member, as against San Juan County, the Health District, or the non-Indian individual defendants arising from her employment as manager of the same clinic. Excepting Riggs’ defamation claim pleaded against Wood individually, adjudication in the Navajo court of Riggs and Dickson’s cognizable claims against the San Juan Health Services District, Atcitty and Wood (and Singer’s claim against At-citty) is barred by the District’s sovereign immunity under the limited-waiver, exclusive-remedy and exclusive-forum provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The Act’s limited waiver of immunity does not give the State of Utah’s consent to suit against its political subdivisions in Indian tribal courts. Sovereign immunity aside, the plaintiffs have asked this court to enforce three interlocutory orders “as issued” by the Navajo court granting preliminary injunc-tive and other equitable relief against the Health District and defendant Wood as a matter of full faith and credit, or under principles of comity. Yet much of that injunctive relief was rendered moot even before this action was filed in July of 2000; the portion of the equitable relief prescribed by those orders that is not moot still remains interlocutory and unliquidat-ed as to sums ordered to be paid. For these reasons, the three Navajo court orders at issue need not be recognized or enforced in this forum at this time. III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Following receipt of the Tenth Circuit’s mandate in this case on November 20, 2002 (dkt. no. 460), this court set a schedule for consideration of the issues on remand. (See Minute Entry, dated January 7, 2003 (dkt. no. 480).) Those issues were briefed by counsel for the parties. (See “Plaintiffs’ Briefing on Montana,” filed February 13, 2003 (dkt. no. 492); San Juan Health District Defendants’ Memorandum Regarding Subject Matter Jurisdiction and in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, filed February 20, 2008 (dkt. no. 497); San Juan County Defendants’ Memorandum Regarding Tribal Court Jurisdiction, filed February 20, 2003 (dkt. no. 499); Adoption of San Juan Health District Defendants and San Juan County Defendants’ Memoranda Regarding Subject Matter Jurisdiction, filed February 21, 2003 (dkt. no. 501); “Federalism and Article III Court Limitations in Defining Navajo Tribal Court Jurisdiction” [unsigned original document submitted by plaintiffs’ counsel], filed February 24, 2003 (dkt. no. 502).) The issues on remand were set for hearing on February 24, 2003. At that time, the court heard and considered the arguments of counsel and the matter was taken under advisement. (See Minute Entry, dated February 24, 2003 (dkt. no. 503); Transcript of Hearing, dated February 24, 2003 (“Tr.2/24/03”), passim.) Following the hearing, counsel submitted additional written materials, including plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment for Enforcement of the Navajo Court Orders under Full Faith and Credit or Comity and Response of the District and County’s Briefs and Motions for Summary Judgment [& Memorandum in Support], filed February 28, 2003 (dkt. no. 504) (“Pltfs’ Summ. Judg. Mem. (504)”). The court revisited the issues on remand at a December 19, 2003 hearing on pending motions: THE COURT: ... Now people have filed a great deal of material couched under some fairly interesting labels, but they relate really to the question of the subject matter of the mandate, namely the jurisdictional powers of the Navajo Court. And the defendants have filed a memorandum which I think is their effort to deal with the jurisdiction issue on remand and plaintiffs have filed a motion but it relates to the jurisdictional question on remand and it seems to me we have got three questions. We have got the jurisdiction of the Navajo Court, which is the subject matter of the mandate. We have got the question then of the jurisdiction of this court and then we have got the question as to .whether immunity is available. But the first thing we have to decide, it seems to me, is the power of the Navajo Court to do what it did and the effort on the part of the plaintiffs here to enforce the order that was received from the Navajo Court. (Tr. 12/19/03, at 7:2-18 (the Court).) The court inquired “if anybody wants to add anything in writing, in dealing with the jurisdictional question?” (Id. at 7:19-20.) Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated that she wished to submit further written materials. (Id. at 8:3-13 (Ms. Rose).) The court then asked if anyone wanted to add anything “in the way of oral argument at this point” as to the issues on remand, and plaintiffs’ counsel indicated that she did. (Id. at 8:14-9:10 (Ms. Rose).) Counsel presented argument at some length concerning the jurisdictional question, (see id. at 9:18-65:13), and the court once again took the matter under advisement. (Id. at 66:20-22; see Minute Entry, dated December 19, 2003 (dkt. no. 582).) The filing of motions and memoranda continued. Counsel also submitted several citations to supplemental authority as allowed by DUCivR 7 — 1(b)(4). In May of 2004, plaintiffs’ counsel requested that this case be referred to mediation or a settlement conference. Though the defendants initially opposed a referral to mediation, by the time of the July 6, 2004 hearing on the subject, they had joined in the request, and this court referred the matter for a judicial settlement conference pursuant to the court’s Local Rule, DUCivR 16 — 3(b), deferring further consideration of the matter pending the outcome of the settlement conference. (See Minute Entry, dated July 6, 2004 (dkt. no. 657).) The court set the matter for a status conference on September 28, 2004. (See Notice of Hearing, filed September 7, 2004 (dkt. no. 660).) At that time, counsel reported that the settlement conference had failed, and court and counsel discussed the issues then remaining for decision. (See Minute Entry, dated September 28, 2004 (dkt. no. 663); Transcript of Hearing, dated September 28, 2004, passim.) More recently, the court granted the plaintiffs’ “Rule 15 Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint to Conform to the Evidence & The 10th Cir. Court 10-7-02 Opinion,” filed November 6, 2002 (dkt. no. 438), which inter alia, cast the pleadings of the Part II Plaintiffs (Singer, Riggs and Dickson) in their current form, purportedly clarifying the Part II Plaintiffs’ claims in light of the court of appeals’ October 7, 2002 opinion. (See Amended Complaint, filed June 14, 2005 (nunc pro tunc to November 14, 2002) (dkt. no. 744), at 98-120.) That amendment to the pleadings, however, did not significantly alter the analytical framework for consideration of the issues on remand' — a framework that was examined in detail at both the February 24 and December 19, 2003 hearings, was reviewed briefly at the September 28, 2004 status conference, and now guides this court’s consideration and resolution of the issues on remand. IV. THE CLAIMS OF THE PART II PLAINTIFFS At the outset, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Navajo court must be examined in the context of the pleadings that originally invoked that jurisdiction, the parties over whom the Navajo court sought to exercise its adjudicative authority, and the remedies that it prescribed in an effort to resolve the disputes brought before it. According to Part II of the Amended Complaint, plaintiffs Singer, Riggs and Dickson (the “Part II Plaintiffs”) seek an order of this court enforcing four orders previously entered by the Navajo District Court against several of the named defendants, including San Juan County, the San Juan Health Services District, Rick Bailey (County administrator and CEO of the District); Reid Wood (District CEO); Laurie Schafer (District Patient Care Director); San Juan County Attorney Craig Halls; County Commissioners Bill Redd and J. Tyron Lewis (both as commissioners and Health District Board members); and Health District Board members Roger Atcitty, John Lewis, Karen Adams, and Patsy Shumway. (Amended Complaint at 105-106.) A. Ms. Donna Singer Donna Singer is the “non-Indian spouse of a Navajo Tribal Member who lives outside but near the reservation, and who worked at Montezuma Creek Clinic,” a facility operated by the San Juan Health Services District at the time of the events of which she complains. (Amended Complaint at 104.) She was employed as the manager of the Montezuma Creek Clinic from 1995 until the termination of her employment by the SJHSD in December 1998. She is currently employed at the clinic by Utah Navajo Health Systems, Inc., a Native American non-profit organization that has operated the Montezuma Creek Clinic under a Pub.L. 93-638 (Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act) contract with the Navajo Nation since January 1, 2000. According to her Navajo court pleadings, Ms. Singer “over the years had made numerous minor time card mistakes,” as had “[m]any people throughout the San Juan Health Services District system.” Complaint for Damages, filed April 12, 1999, in Donna Singer, et. al. v. San Juan County, et al., Case No. SR-CV-162-99CV (Navajo Nation District Court, Shiprock District (“Navajo Ct. Cmplt.”), at 7 ¶¶ 43-44; available in “Pertinent Parts of the Navajo Court Record As Attachment to the Amended Complaint,” received November 8, 2002 (dkt. no. 438 note).) Yet she “received no official letter or notice with warning language concerning time card mistakes or errors in nearly 18 years” of working for the County and the SJHSD. (Id. at 7 ¶ 47 & Exhs. 25, 27, 28.) As an “exempt” managerial employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000), Ms. Singer asserted that she “was not allowed to have overtime” compensation, (id. at 8 ¶¶ 51-52 ), yet was required to keep time cards, allegedly “in violation of SJHSD board policies.” (Id. at 8 ¶ 53 & Exh. 38.) Ms. Singer alleged that she “was asking questions about ambiguous budget expense items put onto Montezuma Creek Health Clinic’s budget at a public meeting of the Administrative Control Board of the San Juan Health Services District regular monthly scheduled meeting as a participating member of the audience,” apparently in June of 1998, (id. at 8-9 ¶ 60 & Exh. 64, at [l]-[2]), and that she had been both “privately” and “publicly” supportive “of a private hospital coming into Blanding.” (Id. at 9 ¶¶ 61-62.) She further alleged that on or about November 13, 1998, a mistake was made on her time card: “Mrs. Singer was in Blanding when an unknown person at the Montezuma Creek Health Clinic clocked in on her card.” (Id. at 7 ¶¶ 45-46 & Exh. 30.) The resulting error came to the attention of District administrators, and on or about November 25, Ms. Singer provided a written explanation of the error. (Id. at Exh.32.) Ms. Singer was then given a December 1 memorandum from Reid Wood, Chief Executive Officer of the Health District, referring to allegations of “time card fraud,” and she was placed on paid administrative leave. (Id. at Exh. 34.) A second memorandum from Wood, dated December 2, advised Ms. Singer that “it has been alleged that you have engaged in employment related misconduct,” specifically that she had “[s]ubmitted false information regarding your hours worked on your time card for the period ending November 22, 1998 by reporting that you worked 80 regular hours when you only worked 68 regular hours,” and scheduled a “pre-disciplinary hearing” for December 4, 1998. (Id. at Exh. 35.) Following his meeting with Ms. Singer on December 4, Wood prepared a “Notice of Decision” memorandum, dated December 7, advising Ms. Singer that the allegations that her “[t]ime card for the period ending November 22, 1998 was improperly reported,” and that she “also approved another employee’s time card that was incorrect” were “supported by the substantial evidence,” and that “it is my decision to terminate your employment as of 5:00 p.m. December 4, 1998.” (Id. at Exh. 36.) As we discussed, as a supervisor you are held to a higher standard of conduct. Your personnel file also indicates that this is not the first time this problem has occurred.... Please be advised that you have a right to appeal this decision by submitting a written notice to appeal with San Juan Health Care Services within ten days of receipt of this notice. If an appeal is filed, your appeal will be submitted to the appeals board. If you fail to file an appeal' you waive any right to contest this decision at a later date. (Id.) Her pleadings did not detail the sequence of events following December 7, 1998 (e.g., her pursuit of an appeal, see id. at Exh. 44), but Ms. Singer did allege that at a subsequent grievance hearing on February 12, 1999, “Mr. Wood admitted that ‘time cards’ were not the problem or cause of Mrs. Singer’s discharge from her employment,” (id. at 7 ¶ 39 & Exh. 39), that Wood and Mary Nielson, the Health District financial officer, had made derogatory verbal remarks about her, casting doubt on her honesty and integrity, and that these remarks were published to others. (Id. at 7 ¶¶ 40-41, 12 ¶¶ 100-103.) From the materials submitted by the plaintiffs, it appears that in or about April of 1999, Ms. Singer filed .complaints with both the Office of Navajo. Labor Relations (ONLR) and the Navajo Nation District Court in Shiprock, New Mexico, together with applications for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctive relief. (See id.; Pertinent Parts Navajo Ct. R. (“Docket,” & “ONLR App for TRO & P.I.” Tabs).) In both forums, Ms. Singer sought “[rjeinstatement ... to her merit position of employment as manager of the Montezuma Creek Health Clinic,” with back pay, benefits and seniority status, as well as compensatory and punitive • damages, attorney’s fees, the retraction and expungement of all derogatory remarks and records, and a public apology. (Navajo Ct. Cmplt. at 39 — 41.) Ms. Singer also sought affirmative relief requiring the County and the District to implement a merit system for employees, an employee bill of rights, and the Navajo Preference in Employment Act, as well as “[pjroportionate representation on the SJHSD for An-eth and Red Mesa chapters commensurate with the population of Navajos living in the San Juan County boundaries,” presumably referring to representation on the Health District board. (Id. at 40-41.) She requested appointment of a special master “to protect the employment rights of the Montezuma Creek Clinic employees and possibly the Monument Valley Clinic (also serving the Navajo Nation)” and the imposition of an unspecified “fine or sanction” against the defendants “for SJHSD’s callous disregard for the poverty stricken, down trodden, condition of health care within the Navajo Nation, an independent sovereign and federally recognized reservation, due primarily to the historical subjugation of the United States that has precipitated such long standing problems as recognized in federal law.” (Id. at 42, 43.) She also asked the Navajo court “for exclusion of the defendants Mr. Wood, Mrs. Nielsen and Mrs. Schafer, for all time from coming within the Navajo Nation’s territorial boundaries ... for endangerment of the public safety and callous disregard for the health and welfare of the Navajo Nation,” and for “such further sanctions, fines, penalties as the Court feels is necessary and just to protect the health, safety and welfare of the tribal members in the areas of the Navajo Nation.” (Id. at 43.) B. Mr. Fred Riggs Fred Riggs is an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation who resides within the boundaries of the Navajo Reservation in New Mexico, and has worked for many years as a Physician’s Assistant at the Montezuma Creek Clinic. Like Ms. Singer, Mr. Riggs is currently employed by Utah Navajo Health Systems, Inc., the tribal contractor that has operated the Montezuma Creek Clinic since January 1, 2000. Like Ms. Singer, Mr. Riggs also had problems with his SJHSD “time card” in November of 1998. According to his Navajo court pleadings, by a letter dated November 2, 1998, SJHSD patient care director Laurie Schafer offered Riggs “the position of a Mid-Level Provider for San Juan Health Care Services,” with full-time work at the Montezuma Creek Clinic at a rate of pay of $ 60,000 per year “with full benefits and $ 1000 allowance for CME’s.” (Navajo Ct. Cmplt. at 9 ¶ 66 & Exh. 46.) The letter advised that “[y]ou will be required to use a time clock while you are working,” and that “[t]his position may require additional duties as necessary.” The District abruptly terminated his employment at the Montezuma Creek Clinic on or about November 4, 1998 as a “reduction in force,” then rehired him almost immediately, upon Riggs’ signature accepting Schafer’s offer. (See id. at Exh. 46.) Riggs thus continued to work at the Montezuma Creek Clinic, but in a lesser position at a significantly reduced rate of pay — purportedly $10,000 less per year than he had been receiving up to that time. (Navajo Ct. Cmplt. at 9 ¶ 66 & Exh.45, at ¶¶ 8-11 (Fred Riggs Affidavit).) And for the first time in his career, Riggs was required to keep “time cards.” (Id. at Exh. 45, at ¶ 18.) Riggs recounted an incident on or about November 11, 1998, in which he had agreed to take an emergency call in Bland-ing later that day, outside his existing job description. He averred that when he “asked administration personnel how, and how much he was to be paid, Reid Wood threatened his job acting as if [Riggs] was lazy, uncooperative, and insubordinate and greedy.” (Id. at 9 ¶ 70 & Exh. 45, at ¶¶ 4-V.) According to Riggs, his very first time card in November of 1998 reported “a day and a half of leave as 8.4 hours instead of 12 hours,” an error of which he insists he was unaware. (Id. at Exh. 45, at ¶ 25.) Like Singer, Wood advised Riggs in writing on December 1, 1998 that he faced allegations of “time card fraud” and placed him on administrative leave with pay (Id. at 10 ¶¶ 72-78 & Exh. 45, at ¶¶12, 25, Exh. 48.) Remarkably, the “specific conduct” alleged against Riggs was identical to the allegation made against Singer that same day, namely that Riggs had “[s]ub-mitted false information regarding your hours worked on your time card for the period ending November 22, 1998 by reporting that you worked 80 regular hours when you only worked 68 regular hours.” (Id. at Exh. 49.) Wood advised Riggs that he had scheduled a “pre-disciplinary hearing” for December 4,1998. Following the December 4th “hearing,” Wood advised Riggs in writing that he had determined that the allegation that Riggs’ time card “for the period ending November 22, 1998 was improperly reported” was “supported by the substantial evidence,” and that “it is my decision to place you on 30 days probation,” meaning that Riggs’ “time card will be audited for sufficiency for that period of time.” (Id. at Exh. 50.) As he had done with Singer, Wood advised Riggs that he could appeal Wood’s determination within ten days of receipt of his memorandum. (Id. at Exh. 50.) Riggs subsequently returned to work on thirty days’ probation. (Id. at 10 ¶ 74 & Exh. 50.) According to Riggs, he was kept on probation for longer than thirty days, (id. at 10 ¶ 75), and was given a verbal warning for placing “the time for President’s [D]ay in the wrong place on the time card.” (Id. at Exh. 45, at ¶ 33.) Mr. Riggs gave written notice of his grievance concerning Wood’s disciplinary action on or about December 15, 1998, (see id. at Exh. 60), and a “grievance hearing” was held on February 12, 1999. (Id. at Exh. 45, at ¶¶ 27, 28.) Riggs asserts that the February 12th hearing panel was “tainted” by Wood’s influence (Wood had recently been appointed CEO of the Health District), and was “constituted in such a way that impartiality can not be achieved.” (Id. at Exh. 45, at ¶¶ 35-40.) Following that hearing, Riggs averred that the “SJHSD is refusing to take charge of the time card fraud out of [his] records though it is wholly fallacious and without foundation, and instead wish[ed] to place a letter in the file saying it was not proven and that [Riggs] had requested the charge be removed.” (Id. at Exh. 45, at ¶29.) Riggs complained that his “reduction in force” and resulting reduction in pay did not comply with the Navajo Preference in Employment Act, “did not comply with a merit system,” and was discriminatory. (Id. at 9 ¶¶ 67, 68.) He alleged that the SJHSD had failed to implement .a merit system as required by Utah law, and that Mr. Wood had treated him and other Montezuma Creek Clinic employees “differently than managers and other employees in the SJHSD system who had numerous similar time card errors on their cards, including the payroll department.” (Id. at Exh. 45, at ¶30 (Fred Riggs Affidavit).) He complains that he requested training and orientation on time cards “and was met with Reid Wood’s anger and impatience .... ” (Id. at Exh. 45, at ¶ 34.) “SJHSD has not disciplined Mr. Riggs with common sense or respect for him as a person.” (Id. at 32 ¶ 286.) In both the Navajo court and ONLR proceedings, Riggs sought reinstatement to his position and rate of pay prior to the November 1998 “reduction in force,” with back pay, benefits and seniority status. Like Ms. Singer, Riggs requested a public apology, expungement of disciplinary action from his file, a “published retraction of all derogatory allegations and comments made” against him, and an award of both compensatory and punitive damages ($ 3,000,000 each). (Id. at 39-40.) Like Ms. Singer, Riggs also sought sweeping affirmative relief requiring the Health District to implement a merit system, an employee bill of rights, the Navajo Preference in Employment Act, as well as proportionate representation of the Aneth and Red Mesa chapters; he requested the exclusion of Wood, Nielson and Shafer from the reservation “for all time,” and the appointment of a special master to protect his employment rights and those of his fellow Montezuma Creek Clinic employees. (Id. at 40-43.) C. Mr. Allison Dickson Allison Dickson is an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation, living in Utah within the boundaries of the Navajo Reservation. Like plaintiffs Singer and Riggs, he is currently employed at the Montezuma Creek Clinic by Utah Navajo Health Systems, Inc., the tribal contractor that has operated the clinic since January of 2000. Mr. Dickson was initially hired by the Health District in March of 1998 for six months as a full-time temporary office clerk, handling medical records and billing at the Montezuma Creek Clinic and filling in for another employee who was away on maternity leave. Dickson continued working at the Clinic after the absent employee returned to work. He applied for full-time permanent employment in November or December of 1998, but his request was rejected by the District. Dickson complained that this denial of permanent full-time employment violated an established Health District policy that “mandates that a person ‘will’ become a ‘regular’ employee after 520 hours” of employment by the District. (Id. at 11 ¶ 88 & Exh. 55.) The excerpt from the District personnel policies and procedures relied upon by Dickson reads as follows: Introductory Period. Each new, transferred, or promoted full-time and part-time employee will be subject to an initial introductory period. The length of the introductory period is generally 520 working hours (the equivalent of three months of full-time work), those who are in a supervisor or exempt profession position will have a 6 month introductory period. During this time period the new employee must demonstrate the ability and willingness to perform the job. During this period, the employee’s work will be continuously evaluated by the supervisor. At the end of the period, performance will ususally [sic] be reviewed by the supervisor to determine if employment should be continued. Successful completion of the introductory period will ususally [sic] be documented in writing as designated in the Employee Evaluation section. An employee may either resign or be terminated during the introductory period, with neither the employee nor San Juan Health Care Services required to give the other prior written notification or explanation. Upon successful completion of the introductory period, the new employee will become a regular employee, unless hired specifically for a short-term job. Employment as a regular employee is still “at will”, and regular employees may be terminated at any time, with or without notice, and with or without cause. (Id. at Exh. 55 (emphasis added).) Dickson alleges that he “has worked over 520 hours, in addition to the six month temporary position,” but had still been refused “regular” permanent full-time employment. (Id. at 11 ¶¶ 87, 90-91, 96 (emphasis added).) Dickson also alleges that at Wood’s instance, he was denied a hearing on his grievance at about the same time that Singer and Riggs’ appeals were to be considered in February 1999. (Id. at 11 ¶¶ 93-94; see id. at Exhs. 51, 56.) Mr. Dickson’s principal claim before the Navajo court thus depended on the construction and application of the Health District’s own personnel policies and procedures' — in particular the language quoted and italicized above. That claim thus becomes a question of the terms of his contractual employment relationship with the District; if District policy is construed to create a “property” interest in his continuing or prospective employment, it becomes a question of due process as well. Dickson also complained about “racially insensitive and derogatory remarks and policies by Mr. Wood and Mrs. Nielsen,” (id. at 11 ¶ 95), remarks allegedly made at a January 5, 1999 staff meeting with Montezuma Creek Clinic “P.A.R.” (patient accounts receivable?) personnel at which they discussed “the Certifícate of Indian Blood in which patients need to have on file before receiving their medical care.” (Id. 11 ¶ 95 & Exh. 57.) Apparently, Wood asked if Certificates of Indian Blood “were like dog tags,” (id. at 27 ¶ 249 & Exh. 57), while at some point, District financial officer Mary Nielson publicly labeled the Montezuma Creek Clinic billing clerks” as “rebellious” and “insubordinate.” (Id. at 28 ¶¶ 257, 259 & Exh. 45, at ¶ 26 (Affidavit of Allison Dickson).) Plaintiffs alleged that when Dickson pressed his claim for full-time permanent employment, “Mrs. Nielsen told Mr. Dickson to cut his hours back to 32 and reminded him his position probably ‘wasn’t that necessary.’ ” (Id. at 12 ¶ 104.) The relief originally sought by Dickson largely parallels that requested by Singer and Riggs: he would be made “a full time employee with all benefits”; all “non hiring action” would be expunged from his file; he would receive a public apology, a formal retraction of any derogatory remarks made about him by SJHSD administrators, and an award of $ 3,000,000 in compensatory damages and $ 3,000,000 in punitive damages. (Id. at 39-41 (Prayer for Relief).) Dickson also joined Singer and Riggs in seeking affirmative relief as to Health District personnel practices, including the implementation of a merit system and an employee bill of rights, compliance with the Navajo Preference in Employment Act, as well as the appointment of a special master, proportionate representation of two Navajo chapters in SJHSD governance, and the other equitable relief summarized above. D. The Nature of Plaintiffs’ Claims The plaintiffs’ original Navajo court complaint alleged that “all the captioned plaintiffs have standing to sue herein due to the intentional injurious acts the have been perpetrated upon them by the defendants,” and that “all of the events herein complained of giving rise to these proceedings occurred at or near the Montezuma Creek Health Clinic and/or in the course of the plaintiffs[’] employment with the Montezuma Creek Health Clinic which is physically located within the exterior boundaries of the Navajo Nation.” (Id. at 4 ¶ 21 (emphasis added).) They alleged that the Navajo court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter pursuant to 7 NNC 253 and 7 NNC 254, and the Navajo Nation’s independent and inherent sovereignty that is encouraged by federal Statute at 25 U.S.C. 450a., and is undiminished by the Treaty of 1868, and Utah Code sections 9-9-208 and 9-9-209 among others, and the United States Supreme Court “exception” in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 at 565, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 to 566 (1981). See likewise the attached MemoRAndum of Law, attached hereto as Attachment C. (Id. at 5-6 ¶ 29 (font variations in original).) Plaintiffs’ pleaded causes of action included civil rights claims alleging the denial of freedom of speech, (id. at 17-18 ¶¶ 170-183); freedom to assemble, (id. at 19 ¶¶ 184-190); due process, (id. at 19-22 ¶¶ 191-214); and equal protection, (id. at 26-31 ¶¶ 243-280) — “as protected by the Navajo Nation, the United Nations and the United States,” as well as tort claims of “wrongful hiring,” (id. at 22-23 ¶¶215-220); defamation, (id. at 23-24 ¶¶221-229); “tortious interference with future contractual relations,” (id.); intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, (id. at 32-33 ¶¶ 281-296); “theft,” (id. at 24-26 ¶¶ 230-242); “violation of fiduciary duties,” (id. at 33 ¶¶ 297-300); “misfeasance,” (id. at 33-34 ¶¶ 301-309); and “malfeasance in office,” (id. at 35-39 ¶¶ 310-348). Most of these causes of action were footed upon factual allegations arising from the events involving plaintiffs’ employment at the Montezuma Creek Clinic by the Health District, as summarized above. The rest, it turns out, were surplusage. Absent from the Complaint was any claim of breach of contract. As originally pleaded, then, the plaintiffs’ claims before the Navajo Nation District Court were employment-related claims. They arose out of each plaintiffs individual employment relationship with the Health District, and the plaintiffs sought compensatory legal and affirmative equitable relief that would resolve their existing employment disputes. Indeed, the plaintiffs asserted that “all Labor Commission and Office of Navajo Labor Relations claims of the Plaintiffs will not be prohibited from being heard in this Court, after such time as the plaintiffs employment claims have gone through their respective administrative process,” (id. at 5 ¶ 28), clearly indicating that Singer, Riggs and Dickson also had employment claims then pending before the Navajo labor agencies — claims as to which they had not yet exhausted their administrative remedies at the time they commenced the Navajo court action in April of 1999. (See infra, at 979-82.) E. Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Pleading A month after entry of the Navajo court’s December 28, 1999 Order, (see infra at 921-25), plaintiffs Singer, Riggs and Dickson filed “Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Pleadings to the Original Pleadings,” dated January 28, 2000, in Donna Singer, et al. v. San Juan County, et al., Case No. SR-CV-162-99-CV (Navajo Nation District Court, Shiprock District) (a copy of which is annexed to the Amended Complaint (dkt. no. 744)) (“Navajo Ct. Supp. Pldg.”), with the Navajo Nation District Court. The Supplemental Pleadings purported to add claims of “Obstruction of Justice,” “Misuse of Judicial Process,” “Defamation, per se,” and “[t]he endangerment of Navajo patients at Montezuma Creek Clinic.” (Navajo Ct. Supp. Pldg. At 2 ¶ 3.) The plaintiffs’ new claims were said to be “based upon the Court’s Findings of Fact in the Court’s Preliminary Injunction Order issued on the 28th day of December, 1999,” including “factual findings therein pertaining to the defendant’s counsel” and the conduct of the Navajo court litigation, and the “intentional and malicious disruption of operations and services of the Montezuma Creek Health Clinic.” (Id. at 2 ¶¶ 4, 5.) The Supplemental Pleading made no additional factual allegations in support of the plaintiffs’ new claims, but augmented their prayer for relief to demand that “each of the defendants, both jointly and severely [sic], be ordered to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the amount of $18,000,000 USD (Eighteen Million Dollars);” and that each of the defendants, both jointly and severely [sic], be ordered to pay additional damages to the plaintiffs pursuant to 7 NCC 701 in the amount of $6,000,000 USD (Six Million Dollars) to be paid directly to Montezuma Creek Clinic to be used as the management of Montezuma Creek Clinic sees fit in the best interest of the Native American People, and not to be used for employment compensation or to take the place of the insurance payments made in behalf of the Native American patients, without express authority of this Court; (Navajo Ct. Supp. Pldg. at 3 ¶ 7(b) (emphasis added).) It appears that the Navajo court granted plaintiffs leave to file their Supplemental Pleading on February 22, 2000. (See Order for Leave to Supplement the Pleadings, signed February 23, 2000 (a copy of which is annexed to the Amended Complaint (dkt. no. 744)).) V. THE NAVAJO COURT ORDERS The Part II Plaintiffs sought enforcement of four written orders entered by the Navajo Nation District Court for the Shi-prock, New Mexico Judicial District: (1) the “Findings, Opinion and Judgment at Preliminary Injunction,” dated December 28, 1999, in Donna Singer, et. al. v. San Juan County, et al., Case No. SR.-CV-162-99-CV (Navajo Nation District Court, Shiprock District) (the “December 28,1999 Order”); (2) the “Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dissolve or Modify the Preliminary Injunction Order,” entered March 1, 2000 (the “March 1, 2000 Order”); (3) the “Special Order in Aid to Satisfaction of Preliminary Injunction,” signed March 6, 2000 (the “March 6, 2000 Order”); and (4) the “Order Mandating that All Defendants’ to be Bound by the Preliminary Injunction Order,” entered March 15, 2000 (the “March 15, 2000 Order”). (See Amended Complaint at 99, and the copies of three of the orders annexed thereto.) As noted above, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the Part II Plaintiffs’ claims as against defendants Truck Insurance and R. Dennis Ickes because of the Navajo court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over those defendants under Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981). MacArthur v. San Juan County, 309 F.3d at 1222-1225. Therefore, the question of enforcement of the Navajo court’s March 15, 2000 Order — which purported to bind Truck Insurance and Ickes to that court’s prior orders — is no longer before this court. A. The December 28, 1999 Order The Navajo Nation District Court’s December 28, 1999 “Findings, Opinion and Judgment at Preliminary Injunction” serves as the centerpiece of the Part II Plaintiffs’ claims in this proceeding. Styled and written as a preliminary injunction, the December 28, 1999 Order made preliminary fact findings, (see December 28, 1999 Order at [3]-[ll]), discussed the factors bearing upon the issuance of a preliminary injunction, (id. at [ll]-[20]), and prescribed sweeping equitable relief in favor of Singer, Riggs and Dickson as to their specific employment disputes with the Health District, and in favor of Navajo health care recipients generally as to a litany of concerns involving the District’s administration of health care services at the Montezuma Creek Clinic. (Id. at [20]-[22].) The Order also anticipated that “[t]he proceedings in chief herein be and are hereby scheduled for initial pretrial conference by this court, unless these proceedings are not earlier settled and compromised by the parties by stipulation on the limited factual; legal; and damage issues remaining.” (Id. at [22].) On a preliminary basis, at least, the Navajo court made findings as to many of the transactional facts alleged by Singer, Riggs and Dickson, as summarized above. (See supra, at 909-17.) 1. Findings re: Mr. Riggs As to Mr. Riggs, the Navajo court found, inter alia, that on or about November 11, 1998, Riggs had been terminated as a “RIF and rehired with a $10,000 pay cut; was made to start using a time card; and lost three years of raises,” (December 28, 1999 Order at [3]); that “Mr. Riggs accidentally represented 8.4 hours as a day and a half, or 12 hours,” and that “as a result of this time card mistake Mr. Riggs was disciplined,” even though he “never received any warning letters; any time card instruction; nor any time to correct any alleged deficiencies, either prior to this November RIF, or the aforestated discipline,” and even though “as a bona fide professional, [he] is exempt from time card keeping requirements,” (id. at [4]); that Riggs was offered “a promotion to fill the position made vacant by Ms. Singer[’]s termination, as manager of the Montezuma Creek Clinic,” but that Wood “immediately withdrew the offered promotion because Mr. Riggs had accused him of discrimination” in pursuing a formal grievance as to the disciplinary action, (id.); that after Riggs’ grievance hearing, “he was placed on an additional 30 days[’] probation without justification,” (id.); and that evidence showed “similar and multiple errors on time cards throughout the” District, and in November 1998, “just one week prior to Mr. Riggs being disciplined, Reid Wood[’]s time card had ink; cross-outs; and write ins, errors for which others, notably the plaintiffs were disciplined,” but Wood “was not similarly disciplined for his time cards errors.” (Id. at [5].) The Navajo court also found similar errors on time cards kept by Mary Nielson, District financial officer, (id.); that another “Caucasian physician assistant” had “time cards showing he was not required to punch in or out, either for or after the November, 1998, RIF;” (id.); that the November 1998 “RIF was not done in compliance with the Navajo Preference in Employment Act (NPEA) in as much as there was no written justification as to just cause for the RIF; nor was a warning of the RIF made to Mr. Rigg; nor was Mr. Riggs RIF last, as a Navajo Physician Assistant;” (id. at [3]); and that The defendants offered absolutely no credible evidence of the San Juan Health Services District affording any evidence of Mr. Riggs receiving any due process; evidence of any degree of equal protection of the policies and procedures, as well as the law applicable to his employment; no evidence of any consideration of the Navajo Preference in Employment Act in its actions toward Mr. Riggs; and no evidence that the San Juan Health Services District had not intentionally used the reputation of Mr. Riggs without his permission essentially to stop the time card problems throughout the San Juan Health Services District; .... (Id. at [5].) The court found that the defendants had not refuted the allegation that they had used Riggs’ case to make “an example of what happens to people who take grievance of decisions of’ the Health District and “who make allegations of racial or other discrimination[.]” (Id.) 2. Findings re: Ms. Singer Concerning Ms. Singer, the Navajo court found, inter alia, that “on the 13th day of November, 1998, Ms. Singer was unaware of another person[’]s clocking in on her Montezuma Creek Clinic time card when she was in Blanding, Utah;” “[t]hat Ms. Singer told the Chief Financial Officer of her whereabouts on the date in question;” and “[t]hat the purported time card error involved only four hours of work for which Ms. Singer was never paid, and Ms. Singer admitted to having made the time card error[.]” (Id. at [6].) Nonetheless, the court found that Singer had been “charged with fraud; placed on administrative leave; told not to communicate with anyone at the clinic; and then terminated;” (id.) that District administrator Rick Bailey had “participated in the decision to terminate Ms. Singer,” and that he “proceeded] as her grievance hearing officer anyway” on the advice of the County Attorney. (Id.) Reviewing the testimony adduced at the hearing, the Navajo court noted that plaintiffs’ accounting expert “found no pattern of fraud in Ms. Singer[’]s time cards;” that “he attributed Ms. Singer[’]s time card errors to the fact that she was required to be clocking in and out at three different work places and had so many responsibilities,” and that in his experience, “managers are not usually required to use time cards because of their FLSA exemption; ...” (Id. at [7].) The court also noted that the “Caucasian manager of the Monument Valley Clinic, also within the San Juan Health Services District, was not obliged to punch in and out on time cards,” and that other District employees whose “time cards are worse than Singer[’]s” were “never disciplined; charged with fraud; or terminated.” (Id. at [7]-[8].) Like Mr. Riggs, the Navajo court found that the defendants “offered absolutely no credible ... evidence of the San Juan Health Services District affording ... Ms. Singer ... any due process; evidence of any degree of equal protection of the policies and procedures, as well as the law, applicable to her employment;” that the defendants offered “no evidence of any consideration of the Navajo Preference in Employment Act in its actions toward Ms. Singer;” and that, as with Riggs, the defendants did not “offer any evidence that the defendants had not administratively conspired to” use Singer’s case to “mak[e] an example ... of what happens to people who stand up for their rights” and pursue grievances against the Health District, “who make allegations of racial or other discrimination,” or who “take any position in opposition to San Juan Health Services District or the defendants themselves[.]” (Id. at [8].) 3. Findings re: Mr. Dickson The Navajo court preliminarily found that “Mr. Dickson started working for the San Juan Health Services District as a full time temporary fill-in in March of 1998 and in November of 1998 applied for full time employment status;” that ‘Mr. Dickson[’s] time cards and W-2 show that Mr. Dickson worked some 700 hours after his temporary fill-in position had expired;” that the District policies and procedures state “that after an employee has worked for the total of 520 hours they will be made to be regular employees of the San Juan Health Services;” and that “the defendants acknowledge that Mr. Dickson formally requested in writing to Mary Nielson on the 11th day of December, 1998, that he be given regular employment status[.]” (Id. at [8]-[9].) The court further found that “the time cards entered into evidence demonstrate[] the current Montezuma Creek Clinic manager’s nephew is working full time as a regular status employee and working for more hours than Mr. Dickson with less time in seniority;” and that District records “show that there is no other employee of the San Juan Health Services District with Mr. Dickson’s time in service measure[d] by regular work hours that is not a regular permanent employee with benefits of regular status employment.” (Id. at [9].) 4. Preliminary Relief Under the December 28, 1999 Order Based upon the findings set forth in the December 28, 1999 Order, and “[w]ith minor adaptation from the arguments delivered to the Court,” the Navajo court “largely adopted the position of the plaintiffs to the legal reasoning of these proceedings.” (Id. at [11].) “[T]he Navajo court concluded that Riggs, Singer, and Dickson demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their NPEA claims and entered a preliminary injunction in their favor,” MacArthur, 309 F.3d at 1219, and sought to fashion affirmative remedies for the plaintiffs’ employment grievances, treating them as involving more than purely economic harm: The case law of the Navajo Nation provides that an injunction is extraordinary relief that is granted when an injury is unquantifiable and when there is no adequate remedy at law. Gudac v. Marianto, 1 Nav. R. 385, Nav.App. Feb. 28, 1978. The United States Supreme Court has likewise found that while economic loss alone generally does not constitute irreparable injury, “cases may arise in which the circumstances surrounding an employee’s discharge, together with the resultant effect on the employee, may be so far departed from the normal situation that irreparable injury might be found.” Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 92 n. 68, 94 S.Ct. 937, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974). (December 28, 1999 Order at [11].) In the Navajo court’s view, “all these claims raise[d] issues clearly extending well beyond the mere loss of income or loss of a job,” and went “directly into the wellbeing of the plaintiffs and Navajo Nation citizens” and “as argued by the plaintiffs, go to the soul of a person and their inalienable rights” — fundamental interests, the importance of which “exceeds monetary value.” (Id. at [2].) Damages such as deprivation of rights; discrimination; denial of due process; infringements on freedom of speech; denial of dignity; and impunity of a person’s reputation are all deprivations that far exceed mere deprivation of money, or employment of embarrassment. ... No amount of money ... can fully compensate the plaintiffs and Native American population in the Montezuma Creek for these past and ongoing substantial and inestimable damages. (Id. at [18].) Besides the individual claims of Singer, Riggs and Dickson, the Navajo court made reference to evidence already received concerning “patient welfare” and “clinic operations” at the Montezuma Creek Clinic, e.g., the District’s “billing of IHS eligible patients,” which discouraged those patients from seeking further treatment at the clinic, as well as “stoppage of ambulance services;” “interference with pharmaceutical services;” and “stoppage of lab services” at the clinic. (Id. at [13], [15]). “[T]hese plaintiffs produced testimonial evidence and documentary evidence to support their claims of violation of civil and personal rights ... and as well the San Juan Health Services District’s endangerment of the Native American and Navajo public, ” persuading the court that [i]n this case, a preliminary injunction will insure the protection of overwhelming public interest by way of the restoration and preservation of patients’ welfare in the northeastern sector of the Navajo Nation; restoration of the clinic operations of the Montezuma Creek Clinic that are sensitive to Navajo needs; customs; and economic levels; ... thereby improving adherence to the provisions, terms, and conditions of the Navajo Preference in Employment Act;.... (Id. at [12], [13] (emphasis added).) The court thus fashioned injunctive relief in the December 28, 1999 Order to vindicate not only the personal interests of the named plaintiffs, but also the interests of many Navajo patients served by the Montezuma Creek Clinic, as well as the Navajo Nation’s broader governmental interest in safeguarding “the health or welfare of the tribe.” Montana, 450 U.S. at 566, 101 S.Ct. 1245. (See December 28, 1999 Order at [20].) Though it acknowledged “that the Montezuma Creek Clinic will be removed from the control and supervision of the San Juan Health Services District beginning the 1st day of January 2000’’ — four days after the entry of the December 28, 1999 Order — the Navajo court proceeded to grant preliminary injunctive relief against the County and Health District defendants, ordering that the defendants “immediately reinstate Singer and Riggs to them previous positions of employment,” and “immediately tender to Mr. Dickson full time status as an employee of the Montezuma Creek Clinic and that he be paid all commensurate back pay and benefits as may be due him from the occasion of being eligible for such status.” (Id. at [14], [20]). The December 28, 1999 Order further required the defendants to “delete and expunge all the charges and writings pertaining to the December 2nd through December 8th charges of fraud, discipline, and termination, from Mr. Riggs and Ms. Singer’s personnel file”; the defendants were ordered to “immediately pay all due income from whichever source derived within the District, including but not limited to full back pay and compensation as well as back benefits to the plaintiffs, including but not limited to retirement benefits ... with all such compensations to be credited and/or paid immediately,” and further ordered “to issue full payment of attorney’s fees, costs and expenses associated with these proceedings to date to be paid by cashier’s check within five working days of the issuance of the injunction” and “not later than the 31st day of December, 1999,” — three days later — “by and through the Registry of this Court,” (id. at [21]); as to the “time card” issue, the defendants were ordered “to not put Ms. Singer, and other like managers, and Mr. Riggs, and other like Physicians Assistants, on hourly time card keeping requirements for the purposes of salary and compensations or otherwise[.]” (Id.) In addition to mandating immediate relief in favor of Singer, Riggs and Dickson on their employment claims, the December 28,1999 Order imposed a series of express prohibitions affecting the defendants’ operation of the Montezuma Creek Clinic: the court ordered the defendants “to not interfere with clinic operations or move any clinic personnel,” (id. at [21]); the defendants were prohibited from “[eliminating Emergency Medical Technician services and coverage within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation”; “[i]nterfering with the laboratory services” or “pharmaceutical services” to “the Montezuma Creek Clinic,” or “interfering with any form of patient care by, among any other ma